05000311/LER-1982-068, Forwards LER 82-068/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-068/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20063A576
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063A579 List:
References
NUDOCS 8208240395
Download: ML20063A576 (3)


LER-1982-068, Forwards LER 82-068/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982068R00 - NRC Website

text

O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 12, 1982 Mr.

R.

C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-068/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications,_Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-068/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, f( %f'e v~

H.

J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations

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Distribution 8208240395 820812 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

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Report Number:

82-068/03L Report Date:

08-12-82 Occurrence Date:

07-22-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report is initiated by Incident Report 82-148.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Rx Power 83% - Unit Load 890 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, July 22, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator received indication of malfunction of the ContainmGnt-Plant Vent Monitoring System (Channels 2RllA and 2R12A).

The monitor was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.lb Actions 24 and 25 were entered.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation into the cause of the Channel 2RllA alarm revealed that the spool tension was out of adjustment.

Apparently, when the filter paper roll was replaced, the retaining screw was adjusted too tightly, causing the plate to bind on the take-up roll.

Investigation into the cause of the Channel 2R12A alarm revealed the cause to be loose retaining screws on a circuit module, preventing proper contact of the electrical connections.

The retaining screws may have been inadvertently left loose by personnel performing previous maintenance.

It has been determined that although these occurrences are coincident in discovery, they are unrelated.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor provides indicaticn of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage.

It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits specified by the Technical Specifications; a high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves.

LER 82-068/03L

  • ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring System.

Backup for the containment purge and pressure functions is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent Monitor 2Rl6, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path.

Failure of the Containment-Plant Vent Monitor, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Due to backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in no risk to the health or safety of the general public.

t Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Action 24 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Action 25 requires:

With the containment purge and pressure vacuum relief isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Tne containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were being maintained closed in accordance with operating instructions, in compliance with the limiting condition for operation.

Channel 2RllA filter paper roll tension was adjusted and tested satisfactorily.

Channel 2R12A circuit module retaining screws were tightened and the channel tested satisfactorily.

The 4

Containment Plant Vent Monitor was declared operable and Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.lb Actions 24 and 25 were terminated.

The personnel responsible for performing maintenance on the containment plant vent monitoring system have been counseled on the safety implications of this occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R.

Heller

/ b "C

Genefal Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-75