05000311/LER-1982-048, Forwards LER 82-048/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-048/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054L652
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/23/1982
From:	Frahm R, Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054L653	List: 05000311/LER-1982-048, Forwards LER 82-048/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000311/LER-1982-048-03, /03L-0:on 820606,red Tag Discovered Missing from post-LOCA Sampling Sys Containment Isolation Valve.Tagging Request Form Also Missing.Tag Inadvertently Knocked Off & Tagging Request Form Lost.Form Reissued & Tag Replaced
References
NUDOCS 8207080330
Download: ML20054L652 (3)

LER-1982-048, Forwards LER 82-048/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3111982048R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSIEG l

Public Seruce Electnc anci Gas Company P O. Box E Hancocks Brick;e, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 23, 1992 Mr.

R.

C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-048/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.c, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-048/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l( % jf',be~

H.

J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations kf RF:ks CC:

Distribution 8207080330 820623 DR ADOCK 05000311

'k

' g b, PDR The Energy Peopic

Report Number:

82-048/03L t

Report Date:

06-23-82 Occurrence Date:

06-06-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Post LOCA Sampling System - Improper Tagout.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-143.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br />, on June 6, 1982, during routine operation, it was discovered that a red tag was not in place on one of the Post LOCA Sampling System containment isolation valves in the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area.

Further investigation revealed that the Tagging Request form required by Administrative Procedure AP-15 Safety Tagging Program, was missing; and that the valve should have, in fact, been tagged in the closed position.

The valve was immediately verified to be closed, a new Tagging Request for the Post LOCA System valves was prepared, and the missing red tag was replaced.

Other valves on the tagout were subsequently checked, and were found in the closed position with their respective red tags in place.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The missing red tag was apparently knocked off the valve by unknown person (s) moving about in the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area.

Avoiding contact with the valves and tags is difficult due to the confined nature of the space.

The Tagging Request form for the tagout appears to have been inadvertantly lost during the implementation of the Tagging Request Inquiry System (TRIS).

I

LER 82-048/03L ANhLYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Post LOCA Sampling System was under construction at the time of the occurrence, and the lines containing the valves had not yet been connected to the rest of the system.

Consequently, the valves were tagged closed to provide two-valve isolation in the lines and maintain the integrity of the containment boundary.

This boundary prot-ects the public and environment in the event of the release of radioactive liquid or gas from the Reactor Coolant System.

The inadequacies involved in the administration of Administrative Procedure AP-15, consequently threatened to reduce the redundancy provided in an engineered safety feature system; and the occurrence is therefore, reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.c.

Because the valve was found closed, and containment integrity was maintained, the health and safety of the public were in no way endangered.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, the inadequacies in the tagout were immediately corrected, and the follow-up check of the tagout was satisfactory.

Discussion of the incident was incorporated into safety tagging training in accordance with AP-15 Section 3.1.1.d, to remind station personnel not to disturb red tags in place on tagged components.

The isolated nature of the circumstances surrounding the missing tag makes recurrence unlikely.

The implementation of TRIS had been completed at the time of the incident.

An audit of TRIS after the occurrence showed no other missing Tagging Requests.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm

/r h bad Gene'ral'Mana'ger -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-63