ML20049A274
| ML20049A274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/11/1980 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Harold Denton, Minogue R, Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257E308 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-92, REF-SSINS-3800 NUDOCS 8009120238 | |
| Download: ML20049A274 (3) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W ASHINGTO N, D. C. 20555 K
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JUL 11 ISSO 8
MEM',RANDUM FOR:
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development c
Victor Stello, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert J. Budnitz, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM:
William J. Dircks Acting Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
SAFETY RATIONALE FOR ACTION PLAN The Connission has provided in its approval of the TMI Action Plan (MUREG-0660) and the new operating license requirements (NUREG-0694),
a statement of actions that are to be accoglished as a result of the accident at TMI.
However, there is no substantive discussion in the' Action Plan, other than the limited discussion in the introduction to each chapter, of the basis for each requirement in terms of safety significance or the necessity and sufficiency of the requirements.
Clearly, we need a more comprehensive safety rationale for the Action It could eventually be used in licensing Plan and the OL requirements.
hearings for any summary disposition motions the staff will file and as a general future reference as to the intent and purpose of the require-ments.
I am asking each of you to manage the preparation of such a statement of rationale for all areas of the plan for which you have lead responsibility.
Each item in the Action Plan should have a rationale that discusses why the requirement or other action is needed, why the particular approach was selected and other approaches were not, and why the requirement is l
sufficient both in scope and timing.
In developing these statements of rationale, you should make use, as appropriate, of the general concept that the Action Plan as a whole presents a sequency of actions that will result in gradually increasing improvement in safety and that longer term more desirable actions generally replace or supplement shorter term Although many actions which were of an interim character in some cases.
of the actions are not necessarily requirements for, licensees, such as the nuclear data link or the NRC simulator or possible future improvements in requirements, the safety bases for deferring the possible safety improvement still needs to be presented.
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Tchle 1 of f:U?.EG-0CCO identifies a Lecd Office for ecch iten in the
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I.ction Plan. The lead office is respcnsibic for drafting a s.fety F
rctionale for all of its itens. These safety bases are to be uritten and -
su'a:..itted to Roger i:attson within tuo uteks. A foraat and style guide is attcched. These Lcscs uill be revicued and collated by a short term
" reincarnation" of the Action Plan Stecring Group and, if necessary, l
returnad to the authors to be rettritten. Ecch office should also assign one of ti.cir original representatives on the Steering Group to aid in (l
co. piling the complete set of bases. Picase provide the nt as to l
Dr. Ik.ttson.
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i Hilliam J. Dircks, Acting E::ccutive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Action Plan Sasis For.nat 1
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ENCLOSURE ACTION PLAN SAFETY BASES FORMAT t,
item No.
i Ti tle:
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Description of Action g
(This should be paraphrased from the Action Plan).
Bases for Action The following items should be discussed:
1.
Why is it necessary to take any action to achieve improvement.
What is the safety significance or the source of the concern (usually some aspect of the THI accident).
The statement of objectives for each portion of the plan should be used in this section, but will generally require some embellishment for effective communication on this theme.
2.
The intent or purpose of the action or requirement.
3 How the action or requirement accomplishes the intent. Why it is sufficient in both scope and timing.
4.
The alternative means to achieve the intent and why the action l
indicated by the plan is preferabis.
5 Other actions that relate or interact with this action to effect an overall improvement.
c 9
NRR ASSIGNMENTS FOR TM1 ACTION PLAN SAFETY RATIONALE RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY LIST AND TITLE DIVISION /P0 BRANCH INDIVIDUAL NT0L'S l'.A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor DHFS LQB L. Crocker I.A.1.2 Shift Superviso. Admin. Duties DHFS LQB D. Vassallo 1.A.1.3 Shift Manning DHFS LQB D. Va'ssallo q,j I.A.2.1,
immediate Upgrade of R0 & SR0 Qualifications DHFS OLB P. Collins 1.A. 2.2 Training & Qualifications of Other Personnel DHFS OLB J. Buzy 1.A.2 3 NRR Audit Training DHFS OLB R. Campbell 1.A.2 5 Plant Drills DHFS OLB R. Campbell l.A.2.7 Accreditation of Training Institutions DHFS OLB R. Campbell I.A.3.1 Revise Scope and Criteria for Exam DHFS OLB P. Collins 1.A.3.2 NRC Operator Licensing Reform DHFS OLB P. Collins 1.A.3.4 Licensing of Additional Operations Personnel DHFS OLB J. Holman e
i 1.A.3.5 Establish Statement of Understanding with INPO AND DOE DST 1.A.4.1 Initial Simulator improvement DHFS OLB J. Holman 1.B.1.1 Organization & Management Long-Term Improvements DHFS LQB D. Vassallo I.C.1 Short Term Accident Analysis DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann l.C.2 Shift and Relief Turnover DHFS LQB D. Vassallo O
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ENCLOSURE 2
NRR ASSIGNMENTS FOR TMI ACTION PLAN SAFETY RATIONALE (cont'd)
RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE l
PRIORITY LIST AND TITLE DIVISION /PO BRANCH INDIVIDUAL 1.C.3 Shif t Supervisor Responsibilities DHFS LQB D. Vassallo 1.C.4 Control Room Access DHFS LQB D. Vassallo I.C.5 Feedback of Operating Experience DHFS LQB D. Vassallo 1
1.C.6 Verification of Operating Activities DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann -
~ 1.C.7 NSSS Vendor Review DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann 1.C.8
' Pilot Program - NT0L DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann I.C.9 Long-Term Program Plan for Operating Procedures DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann 1.D.1 Control Room Design Review DHFS HFEB D. Tondi 1.D.2 Safety Parameter Console DHFS HFEB L. Beltracchi 1.D.3 System Status Monitoring DHFS HFEB S. Weiss I.G.1 Low-Power Testing Training DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann l.G.2 Scope of Test Program for Training During Low-Power Testing DHFS PTRB D. Ziemann V
ll.A.1 Siting Policy Rulemaking ENG SAB J. Norris ll.A.2 Site Evaluation ENG SAB
~J. Norris 11.5.1 Primary System Vents DSI RSB G. Mazetis 11.B.2 Plant Shielding DSI RAB D. Collins
.II.B.3 Post-Accident Sampling DSI ETSB/CPB P. Stoddart (Lead)/
R. Meyer
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c NRR ASSIGilMENTS FOR TMI ACTI0ll PLAll SAFETY RAT 10!lALE (cont'd)
RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY tIST AND TITLE DIVISION /PO BRANCH INDIVIDUAL II.B.4 Degraded Core Training DHFS OLB P. Collins II.B.6 Risk Reduction for Degraded / Melted Cores at High Population Sites DSI RSB T. Speis/R. Meyer ll.B.7 Containment Inerting DSI CSB C. Tinkler ll.C.3 Systems Interaction in Reliability Engineering DSI SIB J. Stolz II.C.4 Reliability Engineering DST RRAB S. Israel ll.D.1 Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements ENG EQB J. Zudans II.D.3 Relief and Safety Valve Position Indication DSI ICSB J. Rosenthal ll.E.1.1 Aux Feedwater System Evaluation DSI ASB/ICSB W. LeFave/D. Thatcher II.E.1.2 Aux Feedwater System Auto Initiation and Flow DSI ASB/ICSB W. LeFave/R. Wilson Indication CSB P. Hearn II.E.1.3 Update SRP and. Develop RG DSI II.E.2.1 Reliance on ECCS DSI RSB N. Lauben II.E.2.3 Uncertainties in ECCS Performance Predictions DSI
.RSB/CPB N. Lauben(Lead)/
D. Powers /H. Balukjian II.E.3.1 Natural Circulation DSI RSB ll.E.3.3 Studies of Feed and Bleed Decay Heat Removal DST SPEB R. Baer DSI RSD T. Spels ll.E.3.2 Systems Reliability in De c y Heat Removal ll.E.4.1 Dedicated. Penetrations DSI RSD/CSB R. Fitzpatrick/M. Fields DSI CSB M. Fields ll.E.4.'2 Isolation Dependabitity k
y URR ASSIGNMENTS FOR TMI ACTION PLAN SAFETY RATIONALE (cont'd)
RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE RESP 0HSIBLE PRIORITY LIST AND TITLE DIVISION /PO BRANCH INDIVIDUAL II.E.4.3 Integrity Check of Containment Design DSI II.E.4.4 Purging of Containment DSI CSB Y. Huang II.E.5 Design Sensitivity of B&W Reactors DSI RSB/ICSB B. Sheron/J. Rosenthal
II.E.6 In Situ Testing of Valves ENG II.F.1
' Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation DSI ICSB/ETSB/
- 5. Morris (Lead)/P. Stoddart/
RAB P. Collins II.F.2 Inadequate Core Cooling DSI.
CPB/
L. Phillips (Lead)/
RSB B. Sheror II.F.4 Cont.rol and Protection Action DSI ICSB/RSB II.G.1 Electric Power for PORV DSI PSB R. Fitzpatrick II.H.1 THI-2 Safety Examination TMI Program D. Brinkman Office II.H.3 Evaluation & Feedback of TMI-2 Cleanup Information TMI Program D. Brinkman Office 1._/
II.J.3.1 Management Organization and Staffing for Design and Construction DHFS LQB D. Vassallo II.K.1 IE Bulletins DSI RSB II.K.2 Commission Ord'ers on B&W P,lants DSI RSB II.K.3 B&O Task Force (NT0L Items in Appendix C-3)
DSI ICSB and R. Wilson others 4
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NRR ASSIGN!!ENTS FOR TMI ACTION PLAN SAFETY RATIONALE (cont'd)
RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE PRIORITY LIST AND TITLE DIVISION /P0 BRANCH INDIVIDUAL III.A.1.1 Upgrade Emergency Preparedness EPPO EPLB F. Pagano I'I I. A.1.2 Upgrade Support Facilities EPPO EPDB S. Ramos l
Ill.A.1.3 Thyroid Blocking Agent EPPO EPDB S. Ramos g III.A.2.2 Eniergency Preparedness Guidance and Criteria EPPO DPLB F. Pag'ano 111.D.1 1 Source Outside Containment DSI ETSB W. Gamill 111.D.1.2 Radioactive Gas Management DSI ETSB R. Bangert III.D.1.3 Vent System and Radiciodine Adsorber Criteria DSI.
ETSB R. Bangert III.D.1.4 Radwaste System Design DSI ETSB R. Bangert j
Ill.D.2.1 Effluent Monitoring.
DSI ETSB P. Stoddart III.D.2.1 Path Dose Analysis DSI RAB F. Congel III.D.2.3 Liquid Pathway Radiological Control DE HGEB W. Bivins 111.D.2.5 Dose Calculation Manual DSI RA3 F. Congel v
III.D.3.1 Radiation Protection Plans DSI RA,B D. Collins Ill.D.3.3 Inplant Monitoring DSI RAB D. Collins-111.D.3.4 Control Room 'e
- tabili ty DSI AEB H. Schierling IV.B.1 Revise Practi;.s for Issuance of Instructions and DST Information to Licensee IV.E.?
Plan for Early Resolution of Safety Issues DST SPEB R. Baer IV.E.3
, Plan for Resolving Issues at CP Stage DST SPEB R. Baer' s
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IlRR ASSIGNMENTS FOR TMI ACTION PLAN SAFETY RATIONALE (cont'd)
RESPONSIBLE RESP 0llSIBLE RESPONSIBLE g PRIORITY LIST AND TITLE DIVISION /PO BRANCH INDIVIDUAL IV.E.5 Assess Currently Operating Reactors DST SPEB R. Baer-IV.F.1 Financial Disincentives to Safety ENG UFB J. Peterson r
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