ML18033B396

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Safety Evaluation of Employee Concerns Special Program Subcategory Rept 80200, Insp
ML18033B396
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1990
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML18033B375 List:
References
NUDOCS 9006210283
Download: ML18033B396 (6)


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0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C, 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM SUBCATEGORY REPORT NUMBER 80200, "INSPECTION" TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT I.

STATEMENT OF CONCERNS Within Subcategory Report 80200, there were a total of 123 concerns broken by comon nature into 44 issues.

Each issue was evaluated by the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Quality Assurance Concerns Evaluation Group (QACEG) for safety significance, site applicability, veracity, and necessity and/or status of corrective action.

Eleven of the 44 issues, comprising a total of 22

concerns, were found to require analysis at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN).

Six of the concerns originated at.BFN, while the remaining 16 originated at other sites and were evaluated at BFN.

Thirteen of the 22 BFN applicable concerns were determined to be safety related.

The safety related concerns were distributed among nine issues, which are suomarized in the following paragraphs, grouped by their respective topically related elements.

Issue 3.1.2 Inadequate receipt inspection of Critical Systems, Structures and Components (CSSC) items.

Material listed as "Quality," "CSSC," or otherwise required to be within the scope of the Quality Assurance Program (QAP), may have been inadequately inspected upon receipt and may have been installed without inspection and documentation as required by the QAP.

Element 3.2 - Procedures/Inspection Criteria.

Issue 3.2.2 TVA does not have adequate control over the quality of instrument fittings because of inadequate procedures.

The compression fitting installation program is inadequate due to lack of adequate procedures and training of personnel in installation and inspection.

Issue 3.2.3 Certain TVA Quality Assurance Procedures are lacking acceptance criteria,"in that specific procedures do not provide qualitative and quantitative values sufficient to perform adequate inspections.

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Issue 3.2.4 Procedures used for guality Inspections have conflicting, unclear, and incom-plete acceptance criteria, resu1ting in inadequate inspection results.

Issue 3.2.5 Notices of Indications (NOI's) and Maintenance Requests (MR's) do not have a

- proper tracking system, resulting in the NOI/MR originator not knowing the status of the NOI/MR at any given time.

Issue 3.2.6 Excessive and uncontrolled procedure and drawing revisions have caused con-fusion for the craft.

Element 3.3 - Incomplete/Inadequate Inspections.

Issue 3.3.1 Fundamental problems exist with establishing, implementing and enforcing program requirements for cable pulling, resulting in an inadequate cable pul 1 ing program.

Issue 3.3.5 Inspectors cannot calculate torque value conversions when using extensions.

Issue 3.3.7 Engineering approving the acceptance of equipment by waiving required quality control inspections.

II.

SUMMARY

OF ISSUES The gACEG was unable to validate issues 3.1.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.5, 3.2.6 and 3.3.7

=at BFN.. Further details concerning the remaining four safety related issues applicable to BFN are provided below.

Issue 3.2.2 TVA does not have adequate control over the quality of instrument. fittings because of inadequate procedures.

The compression fitting insta11ation program is inadequate due to lack of adequate procedures and training of personnel in installation and inspection.

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Originally, the staff did not concur with TVA's evaluation of the pulling programs at BFN because, even though the procedures and supporting documentation may have appeared satisfactory, the implementation was not adequate.

This inadequacy was demonstrated by the current repulling of environmentally qualified cables in the drywell of BFN Unit 2 because their initial installations were unsatisfactory.

However, subsequent cozz'ective actions taken by TVA provided adequate resolution.

Issue 3.

.5 Inspectors cannot calculate torque value conversions when using extensions.

This issue was found to be a problem at BFN in that, when questioned, none of five Quality Control Inspectors could properly calculate torque.

The QACEG attributed the problem primarily to inadequate training of inspectors.

Corrective action-has included retraining inspectors on torque calculations.

However, there appears to have been no material impact of this concern at BFN
because, in accordance with the BFN General Torquing Guide, the onsite engineering group provides all the required torque values and associated conversion factors withi'n work packages.

III. EVAIUATION The staff concurs with TVA's disposition of the nine safety related issues applicable to BFN in the area of quality assurance and quality control inspections.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS The technical programs staff finds that TVA's dispositions of the safety related employee concerns contained in Subcategory Report 80200, as they apply to the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, are adequate to support the restart of BFN Units 1, 2 and 3.

V.

REFERENCES NUREG-1232, Volume 2, Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority:

Sequoyah Nuclear Performance

Plan, May 1988 Principal Contributors:

P. Castleman, G. Hubbard and E. Marinos

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