ML060250038
| ML060250038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/2005 |
| From: | Duke Energy Corp |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060240605 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML060250038 (28) | |
Text
1Duke PowerAppendix R ReconstitutionOconee (ONS)November 07, 2005 2PurposePresent General Overview of Reconstitution MethodologyShow how Reconstitution Data/Information is used as a direct input into the Fire PRADiscuss How Recent Staff Positions May Impact NFPA-805 Transition 3Split into Three Phases:Phase I -Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) and Logic DiagramsPhase II -Cable and Fire Area Analysis -
identifies all cable/component "hits"Phase III -Performance Based/Risk Informed analysis of multiple spurious actuations in accordance with NFPA-805Appendix R Reconstitution Safe Shutdown Methodology 4Phase I Define Safe Shutdown Functions, Systems and ComponentsSafe Shutdown components listed in a Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) System and Component Dependencies are documented on System and Component Logic DiagramsAppendix R Reconstitution Safe Shutdown Methodology -
continued 5DUKE POWER COMPANYOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAMSHEET 1 OF 1DWG. NO. APPENDIX R -LOGIC -U0 -SLD -001PREPARED BYCHECKED BYAPPROVED BYDATEDATEDATEREV.QA CONDITION 1REVIEWED BYDISCIPLINE~ ! "# $ % "%&"& % "%~'& "$#$% "% "#%( "% " $ %) "!$$!%~'& "$#$ % "% * ~(+#"$#% ,#"!$ %0 "#%~'& "$#$ %! "!% -)")#-%./0-& ~'1.2& " 3%4150$500$.06&7")#%) 100-&7")#% 1.2&$1.0&")#% 4150$500$1.0&")#% ,.20&'1.2&$1.0&&")#%-8~")#-%119(~*~&:%~;*~<! ("# %~#=>=% +" %*~ " %~#=+~ 9.9~*):%(=)!*~~~~8 (+=%)!*~~~~8 (+>% !*~! >%~ 7 !*~! 911./949(~ ~~?~@~*>~-8~*7*?~*~ 94 1A#9,1.$.0$01#A9#1.$.0$01A~,91.$.0$01DUKE POWER COMPANYOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAMSHEET 1 OF 1DWG. NO. APPENDIX R -LOGIC -U0 -SLD -001PREPARED BYCHECKED BYAPPROVED BYDATEDATEDATEREV.QA CONDITION 1REVIEWED BYDISCIPLINEDUKE POWER COMPANYOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1, 2, & 3APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LOGIC DIAGRAMSHEET 1 OF 1DWG. NO. APPENDIX R -LOGIC -U0 -SLD -001PREPARED BYCHECKED BYAPPROVED BYDATEDATEDATEREV.QA CONDITION 1REVIEWED BYDISCIPLINE~ ! "# $ % ! "# $ % "% "%&"& %&"& % "%~'& "$#$%~'& "$#$% "% "#% "#%( ( "% "% " $ % " $ %) "!$$!%) "!$$!%~'& "$#$ % "% * ~(+#"$#% ,#"!$ %0 "#% "#%~'& "$#$ %~'& "$#$ %! "!%! "!% -)")#-%-)")#-%./0-& ~'1.2& " 3%./0-& ~'1.2& " 3%4150$500$.06&7")#%4150$500$.06&7")#%) ) ) 100-&7")#%100-&7")#% 1.2&$1.0&")#% 4150$500$1.0&")#% , 1.2&$1.0&")#% 1.2&$1.0&")#% 4150$500$1.0&")#% 4150$500$1.0&")#% , , ,.20&'1.2&$1.0&&")#%.20&'1.2&$1.0&&")#%-8~")#-%-8~")#-%119(~*~&:%~;*~<! ("# %~#=>=% +" %*~ " %~#=+~ 9.9~*):%(=)!*~~~~8 (+=%)!*~~~~8 (+>% !*~! >%~ 7 !*~! 911./949(~ ~~?~@~*>~-8~*7*?~*~ 94 1A#9,1.$.0$01#A9#1.$.0$01A~,91.$.0$01Example System Logic Diagram 6DUKE POWER COMPANYOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LOGIC DIAGRAMHIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM (HPI)SHEET 1 OF 4DWG. NO. APPENDIX R -LOGIC -U1 -HPI -001PREPARED BYCHECKED BYAPPROVED BYDATEDATEDATEREV.0QA CONDITION 1REVIEWED BYDISCIPLINEDUKE POWER COMPANYOCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT LOGIC DIAGRAMHIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM (HPI)SHEET 1 OF 4DWG. NO. APPENDIX R -LOGIC -U1 -HPI -001PREPARED BYCHECKED BYAPPROVED BYDATEDATEDATEREV.0QA CONDITION 1REVIEWED BYDISCIPLINE E1&00.4)$E1&00.4)E E1&00.4)$E1&00.2)$E1&00.2)E E1&00.2)$1800011800011&00B6)$E1&00B6)$E E18000/18000/18000.18000.1&0112)$E1&0112)$E E E1&00.5)$E E1&00.5)$1&0115)1&0115) ;~)=~1&00/1)($1&00/1)($1&00.C)$E1&00.C)$E E* ~~)=~81'8. &#<#)81'8. &#<#)1 &0001)1 &0001)E1 &00BC)$E1 &00BC)E E1 &00BC)$E1 &006.)$E1 &006.)E E1 &006.)$180002180002E1&041C# )$E1&041C# )E E1&041C# )$E1&0402# )$E1&0402# )E E1&0402# )$E1&0/B6)$E1&0/B6)E E1&0/B6)$<! (!=&# #,D81D#D001"1%E1&04.5)$E1&04.5)E E1&04.5)$E1&04.6)$E1&04.6)E E1&04.6)$1 &000.)1 &000.)#~)=~)=~"( ~%1(7=2>"*?%;~ ~~~<! (9*>~ ==+~ *E*=E~*=~~~+ 919# $A+# $A+#,D81D# D00."1%1&04C.)1&04C.)#,D81DD00."1% ;'+~)=~(~?=*~*~~*~~9.979F 79F #,D81DD001"1%#,D81DD001"1%&1&0402>041C>04.5'04.6~~1.*~9&1&0001>000.>000/>'0004~~./*~9/9/
///1&01.0)($P1&01.0)($P P1&00./)$E1&00./)$E E#,D81DD00/"1% #~)=~1(0015100.B**!>=(~ 9 *~**>~~=>~=**~9*F#=~1(0015100.B?9*~?*~*>=?94922>52>51&0/22)$#,D81DD00."/%#,D81DD00."/%#,D81DD00.".%#,D81DD00.".%E1&040B)$E E1&040B)$E1&0410)$E E1&0410)$C 1James L McGrawLeonard J. LaCrosseJoseph G. Redmond12/20/0112/20/0112/20/01 1James L McGrawLeonard J. LaCrosseJoseph G. Redmond12/20/0112/20/0112/20/01 2Ronald J. CichonWilliam M. McDevittJoseph G. Redmond12/23/0212/23/0212/30/02 2Ronald J. CichonWilliam M. McDevittJoseph G. Redmond12/23/0212/23/0212/30/02#,D81DD00.".%#,D81DD00.".%#,D81DD00."1%#,D81DD00."1%11&0140(((#)1&0140(((#)1&01..(((#)1&01..(((#)"~.9%10Example Component Logic Diagram -HPI System 7Example Safe Shutdown Equipment List Page 8Phase IIIdentify cables for each componentIdentify routing for each cableRouting through each Fire Area documentedFire Area damage assessments performedResults of damage assessments used with Logic Diagrams to determine impact on Safe Shutdown FunctionsLoss of Safe Shutdown Functions addressed through Appendix R Issue Resolution Process for spurious actuations within Design Basis Appendix R Reconstitution Safe Shutdown Methodology -
continued 9Example Circuit -HPI Pump 10Example Safe Shutdown Cable Selection Worksheet Page 11Example Cable Block Diagram 12Example Cable Routing Worksheet Page 13Example Simplified Cable LayoutTurbine BldgMain Control RoomCable RoomEquipment RoomPump RoomElectrical SwitchgearPump DC Control PowerCabinet3/Power CableDC ControlPowerMain ControlBoardControlCables 14Example Fire Area Compliance Assessment Page 15Phase IIIAs Dennis will be explaining in more detail, results of Phase II are combined with an extensive Multiple Spurious Review to address completeness of multiple spurious populationDeterministic Analysis Output (Phase II)PRA Cut Set ReviewExpert Panel ReviewAppendix R Reconstitution Safe Shutdown Methodology -
continued 16SSDA/Fire PRAAll critical data originally entered into the Safe Shutdown Database (ARTRAK) forms the basis for the Fire PRAComponentsCablesCable RoutesFire Areas/ZonesIntent is to make the SSDA and Fire PRA databases match, one-for-one 17NFPA-805 DeterministicMethodology TransitionIn order to determine the need for Change Evaluations, each fire area must be evaluated to determine if it successfully meets one of the deterministic criteria in NFPA-805One train maintained free of fire damage (old III.G.1)Two trains in same area with deterministic solution (Old III.G.2)3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier between trains1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier with suppression and detection20 foot of separation with suppression and detection and no intervening combustiblesAlternate Shutdown (old III.G.3) 18Deterministic Category ImpactsFire Areas/Zones where redundant trains are located in separate fire areas crediting III.G.1 with operator manual actions on the fire affected train may be transitioned as deterministic;prior approval not required (note that the manual action will betreated as performance based with respect to feasibility)Fire Areas/Zones crediting III.G.2 that have manual actions willneed to be transitioned as risk informed/performance based (under the current rules, they require prior NRC approval; underNFPA-805 rules, they will require a Change Evaluation)Fire Areas/Zones crediting III.G.3 that have manual actions may be transitioned as deterministic; prior approval not required (but performance based with respect to feasibility) 19Deterministic Category ImpactsMain Control RoomCable RoomEquipment RoomPump RoomElectrical Switchgear"B"Pump"B"DC Control PowerCabinet"B"3/Power CableDC ControlPowerMain ControlBoardPump RoomPump "A"Electrical Switchgear"A:DC Control PowerCabinet"A:3/Power CableDC ControlPowerControlCables 20Potential Impact of Recent Staff InterpretationsRequirement to protect all associated circuit cables that could negatively impact safe shutdown may be impossible to achieveConsider a simple example: (See next page)A hypothetical plant has a switchgear room arrangement that requires one of the switchgear rooms to credit III.G.2 for safe shutdown (20 foot of separation-etc.)
21Potential Impact of Recent Staff InterpretationsMain Control RoomCable RoomEquipment RoomPump RoomElectrical Switchgear"A"Pump"A"DC Control PowerCabinet"A"3/Power CableDC ControlPowerMain ControlBoardPump RoomPump"B"Electrical Switchgear"B"DC Control PowerCabinet"B"3/Power CableDC ControlPowerControlCables 22Consider a fire in Switchgear Room ACauses a spurious injection into RCS as a direct result of a single hot short that starts HPI Pump AStart of HPI Pump A can have a direct impact on success of safe shutdown due to possible increase in Pressurizerlevel to the point where passing solid water through the PressurizerSafety Valve fails the valve openThis negative impact results in consideration of spurious HPI pump start as "Associated Circuit"Potential Impact of Recent Staff Interpretations 23Potential Impact of Recent Staff Interpretations 24Potential Impact of Recent Staff Interpretations 25Consider a fire in Switchgear Room A -
continuedNew interpretation that no manual actions are allowed prevents the ability to terminate the "fire affected train"Normal controls could be damaged by fireDesign of injection systems normally means there is no redundant isolation valves in series (uses check valves)Combination of Associated Circuit definition and III.G.2 manual action position would require that the circuit be "protected"Potential Impact of Recent Staff Interpretations 26RecommendationsConsider revising policy to allow local operator manual actions to terminate undesirable impacts of spurious actuation of the "fire affected train"This is not unlike the existing allowance for local operator manual actions in areas crediting III.G.1Continuation of the current policy to require protection of associated circuits that are part of the fire affected train is impossible to meetWould require fire wrap/protection in addition to 3-hour barriers separating trains 27How This Affects NFPA-805 TransitionInability to deterministically treat local operator manual actions to terminate injection/impacts on fire affected trains adds unnecessary change evaluations now and in the future (continuing configuration management) 28SummaryAppendix R Reconstitution Data forms the foundation of the Fire PRARecent Staff Interpretations could have a substantial impact on transition scope, cost and schedule