Text

STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Amendment 26 (Redacted)
	ML21230A019
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	03/30/2021
From:	Connolly J; South Texas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
	Galvin D, NRR/DORL/LPL4
References
	NOC-AE-21003792
	Download: ML21230A019 (681)
	v • d • e

NOC-AE-21003792 Attachment 1 STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report Amendment 26 Summary of Changes

STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report Amendment 26 Summary of Changes Chapter 1, Introduction and Methodology

1. Revise the definition of Fire Protection Engineer to meet Regulatory Guide 1.189 Rev 3. and consistent with the UFSAR. [Section 1.0](CN-3271)

Chapter 2, Safe-Shutdown Assessment

Chapter 3, Fire Hazards Analysis

1. Correct location of Room 008 to be under Fire Zone 306/Fire Area 35 not 307/35.

[Section 3.1] (CN-3273)

2. Include note that Hatch E between FA4 and FA34 is removed. [Section 3.2]

(CN-3288)

3. Correct multiple rooms errors for various Fire Areas and Fire Zones. [Section 3.1]

(CN-3297)

4. Abandon PASS in Unit 1. [Section 3.3] (CN-3293)

5. Replace non-collapsible hoses with double jacketed collapsible hoses and replace pressure reducing valves with manual isolation valves [Section 3.10] (CN-3302)

Chapter 4, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R and APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A

1. Add minimum to the fire pump rating description. [Section 4.1] (CN-3269)

2. Include note that Hatch E between FA4 and FA34 is removed. [Section 4.2]

(CN-3288)

3. Allow nationally recognized labs as acceptable to Appendix A. [Section 4.2]

(CN-3290)

4. Remove UL or FM approved requirement for non-collapsible hoses. [Section 4.2]

(CN-3295)

5. Replace non-collapsible hoses with double jacketed collapsible hoses and replace pressure reducing valves with manual isolation valves [Section 4.2] (CN-3302) replaces CN-3295 Figures

NOC-AE-21003792 Attachment 2 STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Section/Figure Amendment Figure Amendment Table of Contents 26 Fig. 2-13 (Unit 2) 20 Section 1 26 Fig. 2-13A (Unit 1) 9 Section 2 25 Fig. 2-13A (Unit 2) 9 Section 3.1 26 Fig. 2-14 (Unit 1) 11 Section 3.2 26 Fig. 2-14 (Unit 2) 11 Section 3.3 26 Fig. 2-15 (Unit 1) 10 Section 3.4 16 Fig. 2-15 (Unit 2) 11 Section 3.5 16 Fig. 2-16 (Unit 1) 9 Section 3.6 16 Fig. 2-16 (Unit 2) 9 Section 3.7 16 Fig. 2-17 (Unit 1&2) 11 Section 3.8 16 Fig. 2-18 (Unit 1) 9 Section 3.9 16 Fig. 2-18 (Unit 2) 9 Section 3.10 26 Fig. 2-19 (Unit 1) 9 Section 4.0 16 Fig. 2-19 (Unit 2) 9 Section 4.1 26 Fig. 2-20 (Unit 1) 9 Section 4.2 26 Fig. 2-20 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-21 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 1-1 9 Fig. 2-21 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 1-2 9 Fig. 3-1 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 1-3 9 Fig. 3-1 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-1 9 Fig. 3-2 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-2 9 Fig. 3-2 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-3 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 3-3 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-3 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-3 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-4 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-4 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-4 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-4 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-5 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-5 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-5 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-5 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-6 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-6 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 2-6 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-6 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-7 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-7 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-7 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-7 (Unit 2) 10 Fig. 2-8 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 3-8 (Unit 1) 20 Fig. 2-8 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-8 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-9 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-9 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-9 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-9 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-10 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-10 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-10 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-10 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-11 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-11 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 2-11 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-11 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-12 (Unit 1) 20 Fig. 3-12 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 2-12 (Unit 2) 20 Fig. 3-12 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 2-13 (Unit 1) 20 Fig. 3-13 (Unit 1) 10 1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Section/Figure Amendment Figure Amendment Fig. 3-13 (Unit 2) 10 Fig. 3-35 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-14 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-36 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-14 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-36 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-15 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-37 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-15 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-37 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-16 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-38 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-16 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-38 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-17 (Unit 1) 20 Fig. 3-39 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-17 (Unit 2) 20 Fig. 3-39 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-18 (Unit 1) 20 Fig. 3-40 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-18 (Unit 2) 20 Fig. 3-40 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-19 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-41 (Deleted) 8 Fig. 3-19 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-42 (Deleted) 8 Fig. 3-20 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-43 (Deleted) 8 Fig. 3-20 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-44 (Deleted) 8 Fig. 3-21 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-45 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-21 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-45 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-22 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 3-46 (Deleted)

Fig. 3-22 (Unit 2) 10 Fig. 3-47 9 Fig. 3-23 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-48 9 Fig. 3-23 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-49 24 Fig. 3-24 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-50 9 Fig. 3-24 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 4.1-1 8 Fig. 3-25 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 4-1 9 Fig. 3-25 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 4-2 9 Fig. 3-26 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-26 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-27 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-27 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-28 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-28 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-29 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-29 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-30 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-30 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-31 (Unit 1) 11 Fig. 3-31 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-32 (Unit 1) 10 Fig. 3-32 (Unit 2) 11 Fig. 3-33 (Unit 1) 9 Fig. 3-33 (Unit 2) 9 Fig. 3-34 (Unit 1&2) 13 Fig. 3-35 (Unit 1) 9 2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY Section Title Page

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 1.2 REPORT ORGANIZATION 1-1 1.3 DESIGN

SUMMARY

1-2 1.3.1 Level of Safety 1-2 1.3.2 Fixed Suppression 1-2 1.3.3 Additional Nuclear Safety Features 1-3 1.3.4 Appendix R Compliance 1-4 1.3.5 Appendix A Compliance 1-4 1.4 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 1-4 1.5 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS GUIDELINES 1-5 1.6 METHODOLOGY 1-6 1A RESUMES 1A-i 1B COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 1B-i 1C DEFINITIONS 1C-i i Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 2 SAFE-SHUTDOWN ASSESSMENT Section Title Page

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2-1 2.2 SAFE-SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 2-1 2.3 SAFE-SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS GUIDELINES 2-2 2.3.1 General Guidelines 2-2 2.3.2 Specific Guidelines for the Appendix R,Section III.G Evaluation 2-3 2.4 SAFE-SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2-4 2.4.1 Hot Standby and Cooldown Systems 2-4 2.4.1.1 Initial Reactivity Control 2-4 2.4.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Inventory and Reactivity Control 2-4 2.4.1.3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control 2-5 2.4.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Temperature Control 2-6 2.4.2 Cold Shutdown Systems 2-6 2.4.2.1 Long Term Reactivity Control 2-6 2.4.2.2 Long Term Decay Heat Removal 2-7 2.4.3 Support Systems 2-7 2.4.3.1 Component Cooling Water System 2-7 2.4.3.2 Essential Cooling Water System 2-7 2.4.3.3 Onsite Power Systems 2-7 2.4.3.4 Safety-related Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems 2-8 2.4.3.5 Qualified Display Processing System 2-8 2.4.4 Alternate Shutdown Capability 2-8 ii Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 3 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1-1 3.1.1 Methodology 3.1-1 3.1.2 Fire Area and Zone Tables 3.1-1 3.1.3 Spurious Actuation, Common Power Source and Common Enclosure 3.1-2 3.1.3.1 Spurious Actuation 3.1-2 3.1.3.2 Common Power Source 3.1-2 3.1.3.3 Common Closure Associated Circuits 3.1-3 3.1.4 Redundant Shutdown Pathway 3.1-3 3.2 MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING (MEAB) 3.2-1 Fire Areas 1 through 22 3.2-3 Fire Areas 24 through 34 3.2-134 Fire Areas 64 through 77 3.2-187 Fire Area 79 3.2-221 3.3 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING 3.3-1 Fire Area 35 3.3-2 3.4 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING 3.4-1 Fire Areas 36 through 47 3.4-2 3.5 ISOLATION VALVE CUBICLE 3.5-1 Fire Areas 48 through 52 3.5-2 3.6 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE 3.6-1 Fire Areas 53 through 58 3.6-2 iii Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Section Title Page 3.7 FIRE PUMP HOUSE 3.7-1 Fire Areas 59 through 61 3.7-2 3.8 REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING 3.8-1 Fire Area 63 3.8-2 3.9 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK 3.9-1 Fire Area 78 3.9-2 3.10 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN CONFIGURATIONS 3.10-1 3.10.1 Fixed Suppression for the Control Room 3.10-1 3.10.2 Automatic Suppression for the Containment 3.10-1 3.10.3 Yard Deviations 3.10-2 3.10.4 NFPA Deviations 3.10-2 CHAPTER 4 COMPARISON TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A 4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R 4.1-1 4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 4.2-1 iv Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER 1 Table Title Page 1B-1 Cable Tray Weight and BTU Content 1B-2 1B-2 BTU Content of Selected Class B Combustibles (Liquids) 1B-3 1B-3 BTU Content of Selected Class A Combustibles 1B-4 1B-4 BTU Content of Selected Class B Combustibles (Gases) 1B-5 1B-5 Estimated Fire Severity for Offices and Light Commercial 1B-6 Occupancies CHAPTER 2 2-2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List 2-10 2-3 Safe Shutdown Summary 2-48 2-4 High/Low Pressure Interface Equipment List 2-52 2-5 Spurious Operation of Equipment List 2-53 CHAPTER 3 3.1-1 Fire Zone Locations 3.1-4 3.1-2 Detection Zone Locations 3.1-19 CHAPTER 4 4.2-1 Interior Boundary Walls Without Rated Penetration Seals 4.2-84 4.2-2 Justification for not Providing Detection Systems for all Safety 4.2-87 Related Areas v Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER 4 (Continued) 4.2-3 Special Function/Fire Resistant Door Data 4.2-90 4.2-4 Justification for Acceptability of Special 4.2-93 Function/Fire Resistant Doors 4.2-5 Evaluation of Horizontal Installation of 4.2-97 Fire Rated Doors in a Fire Area Boundary vi Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 1 Figure Reference Number Title Number 1-1 Examples of Concentrated Cable Trays - Horizontal Configuration 1-2 Examples of Concentrated Cable Trays - Vertical Configuration 1-3 Logic for Determining the Type of Fire Suppression System, Manual or Fixed, for all Cable Trays Outside Cable Spreading Rooms/ Power Cable Vault CHAPTER 2 2-1 Diagrammatic Safe Shutdown Path (Train A) 2-2 Fire Areas - Legend Safe-Shutdown Separation Group Graphics 2-3 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24500 #1 REV. 6

(-) 11'-3" 7C-14-9-M-24500 #2 REV. 6 2-4 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24501 #1 REV. 5

(-) 2'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24501 #2 REV. 5 2-5 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24502 #1 REV. 6 19'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24502 #2 REV. 6 2-6 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24503 #1 REV. 7 37'-3" 7C-14-9-M-24503 #2 REV. 7 vii Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 2 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 2-7 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24504 #1 REV. 5 52'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24504 #2 REV. 5 2-8 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24505 #1 REV. 6 68'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24505 #2 REV. 6 2-9 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24513 #1 REV. 10 Plan At El. 10'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24513 #2 REV. 9 2-10 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24514 #1 REV. 10 Plan At El. 21'-0", 23'-0", 29'-0", & 30'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24514 #2 REV. 10 2-11 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24515 #1 REV. 19 Plan At El. 35'-0", 41'-0", & 51'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24515 #2 REV. 14 2-12 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24516 #1 REV. 11 Plan At El. 60'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24516 #2 REV. 11 2-13 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24517 #1 REV. 9 Plan At El. 72'-0", 74'-0", & 76'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24517 #2 REV. 8 2-13A Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24518 #1 REV. 8 Roof Plan 7M-14-9-M-24518 #2 REV. 8 viii Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 2 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 2-14 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24519 #1 REV. 6 Partial Plan At El. 19', 41', 48' 7M-14-9-M-24519 #2 REV. 6 2-15 Fire Areas - Diesel Generator Building Plans At El. 7D-14-9-M-24531 #1 REV. 6 25'-0", 55'-0" 7D-14-9-M-24531 #2 REV. 2 2-16 Fire Areas - Diesel Generator Building Plan & Section 7D-14-9-M-24532 #1 REV. 5 7D-14-9-M-24532 #2 REV. 2 2-17 Fire Areas - Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure 7P-14-9-M-24533 #1 REV. 6 7P-14-9-M-24533 #2 REV. 6 2-18 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 10'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24534 #1 REV. 4

& 21'-2" 7M-14-9-M-24534 #2 REV. 4 2-19 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 34'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24535 #1 REV. 4

& 44'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24535 #2 REV. 4 2-20 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 51'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24536 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24536 #2 REV. 4 2-21 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 58'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24537 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24537 #2 REV. 4 ix Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-1 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24500 #1 REV. 6

(-) 11'-3" 7C-14-9-M-24500 #2 REV. 6 3-2 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24501 #1 REV. 5

(-) 2'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24501 #2 REV. 5 3-3 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24502 #1 REV. 6 19'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24502 #2 REV. 6 3-4 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24503 #1 REV. 7 37'-3" 7C-14-9-M-24503 #2 REV. 7 3-5 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24504 #1 REV. 5 52'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24504 #2 REV. 5 3-6 Fire Areas - Reactor Containment Building Plan At El. 7C-14-9-M-24505 #1 REV. 6 68'-0" 7C-14-9-M-24505 #2 REV. 6 3-7 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Plan At El. (-) 29'- 7F-14-9-M-24506 #1 REV. 6 0" & (+) 4'-0" 7F-14-9-M-24506 #2 REV. 7 3-8 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Plan At El. 21'-11" 7F-14-9-M-24507 #1 REV. 10

& 30'-0" 7F-14-9-M-24507 #2 REV. 9 x Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-9 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Plan At El. 42'-6" 7F-14-9-M-24508 #1 REV. 7 7F-14-9-M-24508 #2 REV. 6 3-10 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Plan At El. 68'-0" 7F-14-9-M-24509 #2 REV. 7 3-11 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Section "A-A" 7F-14-9-M-24510 #1 REV. 5 7F-14-9-M-24510 #2 REV. 5 3-12 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Section "B-B" 7F-14-9-M-24511 #1 REV. 6 7F-14-9-M-24511 #2 REV. 6 3-13 Fire Areas - Fuel Handling Building Section "C-C" & 7F-14-9-M-24512 #1 REV. 6 "D-D" 7F-14-9-M-24512 #2 REV. 5 3-14 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24513 #1 REV. 10 Plan At El. 10'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24513 #2 REV. 9 3-15 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24514 #1 REV. 10 Plan At El. 21'-0", 23'-0", 29'-0", & 30'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24514 #2 REV. 10 3-16 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24515 #1 REV. 19 Plan At El. 35'-0", 41'-0", & 51'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24515 #2 REV. 14 3-17 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24516 #1 REV. 11 Plan At El. 60'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24516 #2 REV. 11 xi Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-18 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24517 #1 REV. 9 Plan At El. 72'-0", 74'-0", & 76'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24517 #2 REV. 8 3-19 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24518 #1 REV. 8 Roof Plan 7M-14-9-M-24518 #2 REV. 8 3-20 Fire Areas - Mechanical & Electrical Auxiliary Building 7M-14-9-M-24519 #1 REV. 6 Partial Plan At El. 19'-0", 41'-0", & 48'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24519 #2 REV. 6 3-21 Fire Areas - Electrical Auxiliary Building Section "A-A" 7M-14-9-M-24520 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24520 #2 REV. 4 3-22 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "A- 7M-14-9-M-24521 #1 REV. 6 A" 7M-14-9-M-24521 #2 REV. 6 3-23 Fire Areas - Electrical Auxiliary Building Section "B-B" 7M-14-9-M-24522 #1 REV. 5 7M-14-9-M-24522 #2 REV. 5 3-24 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "B- 7M-14-9-M-24523 #1 REV. 7 B" 7M-14-9-M-24523 #2 REV. 6 3-25 Fire Areas - Electrical Auxiliary Building Section "C-C" 7M-14-9-M-24524 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24524 #2 REV. 4 3-26 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "C- 7M-14-9-M-24525 #1 REV. 5 C" 7M-14-9-M-24525 #2 REV. 5 xii Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-27 Fire Areas - Electrical Auxiliary Building Section "D-D" 7M-14-9-M-24526 #1 REV. 5

& "J-J" 7M-14-9-M-24526 #2 REV. 5 3-28 Fire Areas - Electrical Auxiliary Building Section "E-E" 7M-14-9-M-24527 #1 REV. 6 7M-14-9-M-24527 #2 REV. 6 3-29 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "F- 7M-14-9-M-24528 #1 REV. 7 F" 7M-14-9-M-24528 #2 REV. 7 3-30 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "G- 7M-14-9-M-24529 #1 REV. 7 G" 7M-14-9-M-24529 #2 REV. 8 3-31 Fire Areas - Mechanical Auxiliary Building Section "H- 7M-14-9-M-24530 #1 REV. 5 H" 7M-14-9-M-24530 #2 REV. 5 3-32 Fire Areas - Diesel Generator Building Plan At El. 25'- 7D-14-9-M-24531 #1 REV. 6 0", 55'-0" 7D-14-9-M-24531 #2 REV. 2 3-33 Fire Areas - Diesel Generator Building Plan & Section 7D-14-9-M-24532 #1 REV. 5 7D-14-9-M-24532 #2 REV. 2 3-34 Fire Areas - Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure 7P-14-9-M-24533 #1 REV. 6 7P-14-9-M-24533 #2 REV. 6 xiii Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-35 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 10'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24534 #1 REV. 4

& 21'-2" 7M-14-9-M-24534 #2 REV. 4 3-36 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 34'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24535 #1 REV. 4

& 44'-0" 7M-14-9-M-24535 #2 REV. 4 3-37 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 51'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24536 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24536 #2 REV. 4 3-38 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Plan At El. 58'-6" 7M-14-9-M-24537 #1 REV. 4 7M-14-9-M-24537 #2 REV. 4 3-39 Fire Areas - Isolation Valves Cubicle Sections "A-A" & 7M-14-9-M-24538 #1 REV. 4 "B-B" 7M-14-9-M-24538 #2 REV. 4 3-40 Fire Areas - Turbine Generator Building Plan At El. 7G-14-9-M-24539 #1 REV. 5 29'-0" 7G-14-9-M-24539 #2 REV. 5 3-41 to 3-44 Deleted 3-45 Fire Areas - Turbine Generator Building Section "C-C" 7G-14-9-M-24544 #1 REV. 4 7G-14-9-M-24544 #2 REV. 4 3-46 Deleted xiv Amendment 26

STP FHAR LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 3 (Continued)

Figure Reference Number Title Number 3-47 Fire Areas - Pumphouse Floor Plan 7P-14-0-M-24546 REV. 2 3-48 Fire Areas - Pumphouse Section "A-A" 7P-14-0-M-24547 REV. 2 3-49 Fire Areas - General Plant Arrangement Plot Plan 3-50 Fire Areas - Legend & Symbols 7A-62-9-M-24548 REV. 3 CHAPTER 4 4.1-1 Plant Main Fire Loop Layout 4-1 Penetration Seal Details 4-2 In-Rack Sprinkler Arrangement, Class I, II, III, & IV Multiple-Row Racks, Height of Storage Over 25 Feet xv Amendment 26

STP FHAR

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR) is to present a comprehensive description of the fire protection features and demonstrate the safe shutdown capabilities for the South Texas Project (STP)

Units 1 and 2 under any given single postulated fire condition. The evaluation includes a detailed comparison of STP fire protection features to the guidelines contained in Appendix A of the Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 (Revised February 2, 1977) "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants docketed prior to July 1, 1976" (referred to as Appendix A, henceforth), and 10CFR50 Appendix R "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979", November 19, 1980. Units 1 and 2 are replicate plants with identical fire protection systems within the power block.

This report is applicable to both units. A comparison of the STP Fire Protection Program to Appendix R and Appendix A is provided in Chapter 4.0 of this report. Appendix 1C contains the definitions of the terms used in the FHAR.

The Fire Hazards Analysis is performed under the direction of qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers (see Appendix 1A for historical resumes) to:

1. Consider potential in-situ and transient fire hazards;

2. Determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor and limit radioactive releases to the environment to values less than 10CFR100 guidelines; and

3. Specify measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, fire containment, and alternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems, and components that are required for safe shutdown.

The unique design for STP includes three trains, or pathways, of equipment capable of bringing the plant to safe shutdown conditions. Although only one pathway is required, many fire areas at STP will have two pathways available. Other exceptional nuclear safety features included in this design include additional separation, plant layout which complements fire protection design, extensive shutdown capability outside the control room and power, controls, and instrumentation design with unique isolation capabilities. Details of additional nuclear safety features are discussed in the Section 1.3.3.

1.2 REPORT ORGANIZATION The Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR) is organized into four chapters, as summarized below:

Chapter 1.0 - INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY This chapter consists of an overview of the STP Fire Protection Program and the definitions, fire protection guidelines, and methodology used in performing the Fire Hazards Analysis.

Chapter 2.0 - SAFE-SHUTDOWN ASSESSMENT 1-1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR This chapter deals with the safe-shutdown assessment of STP which includes a description of the implementation of this philosophy and a list of the safe-shutdown systems and components.

Chapter 3.0 - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS This chapter contains the actual fire hazards analysis (FHA) of STP which includes a description by building of the plant design, combustible inventory, and fire protection and detection features.

The impact of these factors on the safe-shutdown equipment in the area and the overall effect on the plant's safe-shutdown capability is also summarized. Justifications for the alternative design configurations from providing fixed fire suppression in the Control Room and automatic suppression in the containment are contained in Section 3.10.

Chapter 4.0 - COMPARISON TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND APPENDIX A TO APCSB 9.5-1 This chapter provides a comparison of the STP Fire Protection Program to 10CFR50 Appendix R and to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A.

1.3 DESIGN

SUMMARY

1.3.1 Level of Safety The STP design consists of three trains of safe shutdown pathways which are separated to the extent practical by fire barriers. While only one pathway is required, many fire areas may have two pathways available. This enhances the operators flexibility in achieving safe shutdown, and is superior to the typical two train design.

1.3.2 Fixed Suppression The STP fire protection program provides for manual and automatic fire suppression capabilities to prevent the spread of fire between fire zones or fire areas. The FHA evaluated those areas within STP where safe shutdown systems are located and where combustible materials such as concentrations of cables in trays exist outside of the cable spreading rooms/power cable vaults.

As a result of the FHA, fixed fire suppression systems are provided for substantial fire hazards such as diesel fuel, charcoal filters, oil filled transformers and laundry/change areas. Automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection, at the ceiling level, is provided throughout the cable spreading rooms and power cable vaults.

The STP fire protection program provides for manual suppression to prevent the spread of fire between fire zones or fire areas in plant areas with moderate or limited fire hazards. It also provides for automatic suppression for certain concentrations of cable in trays outside of the cable spreading rooms/power cable vault. An evaluation has been performed to determine which cable tray configurations are classified as "concentrated" or "not concentrated". This evaluation consisted of walking down the entire plant reviewing cable tray configuration against the criteria shown in Figures 1- 1 and 1-2. An evaluation was 1-2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR then performed determining if manual suppression was adequate using the methodology shown on Figure 1-3, and discussed below.

The evaluation of the adequacy of manual suppression for the concentrations of cable trays first looked at whether or not early warning fire detection was provided for the area, and then if manual hose stations were available, whether they could easily reach all parts of the area with an effective hose stream. The evaluation for concentrated cables then looked at both the amounts, as well as the specific configurations, of the combustibles in each of the areas under review.

Numerous areas were identified as containing "concentrated" cable tray configurations. It was determined that a fire in any of these areas could be adequately controlled by manual fire suppression. However, some areas of concentrated cables contain cable tray configurations which make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened). Therefore, automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided for these areas.

This evaluation demonstrated that no area of the plant contains a concentration of combustibles that could develop a fire growth scenario such that the fire could not be controlled within a given fire area by manual suppression efforts.

Fixed sprinkler systems have been added to or extended in twenty four (24) additional zones in which suppression would not have been required using the above criteria. Of these twenty four (24) systems sixteen (16) were added in zones containing concentrated cabling which were of concern to the NRC based on the guidance of Appendix A of BTP 9.5.1 of the APCSB. For details, see Section 4.2, item D.3.c.

1.3.3 Additional Nuclear Safety Features The most significant points of the STP fire protection design and fire hazards analysis/safe-shutdown design philosophy are as follows:

Redundancy - Because of the STP three train design, the plant can be brought to safe shutdown by at least one redundant (or diverse) pathway following loss of any single fire area.

Plant Layout - The Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) vertically separates safe-shutdown trains from each other by fire barriers. This includes the cable spreading rooms, switchgear rooms, battery rooms, etc., for each train in the EAB.

Additional Redundancy from Accident Mitigation Design - A superior design using three trains of safety-related equipment needed only for accident mitigation (but not safe shutdown) is provided. Power-operated equipment is single function in duty, for example, three High Head Safety Injection and three Low Head Safety Injection pumps are provided for the safety injection function as opposed to other plant designs which require a combination of Residual Heat Removal and Charging equipment to accomplish both accident mitigation and safe shutdown.

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STP FHAR

Additional Shutdown Capability outside the Control Room - In the event of a disabling fire in the Control Room or Relay Room, the plant can be brought to safe shutdown via the use of auxiliary shutdown stations where control of all three safe-shutdown trains is provided.

A discussion of the auxiliary shutdown panel is provided in FSAR Section 7.4.1.9.1.

Transfer Switches - Transfer switches are provided to transfer equipment control from the control room to the auxiliary shutdown panel and local control stations. These transfer switches are predominantly located in the three redundant switchgear rooms. This design minimizes the difficulties often encountered with the spurious actuation, associated circuits and high/low pressure boundary interfaces. A discussion of the transfer switch panels is provided in FSAR Section 7.4.1.9.2.

Instrumentation Isolation - Instrumentation cabling for each train is protected, where required, from the component to the QDPS cabinet (each QDPS cabinet is in a separate fire area) where the signals are electrically buffered to provide isolation from electrical fault.

The signals then go independently to the control room and the remote auxiliary shutdown panel in separate fire areas. Therefore only one channel of instrumentation could be affected by any one fire in the EAB. This also means that a loss of either the control room or the remote auxiliary shutdown panel would still leave three channels of instrumentation available to support the three trains of equipment.

Additional Separation - STP provides three cable spreading rooms, one for each train. In addition to this, each cable spreading room is a separate fire area from the rest of the plant, including the remainder of that train.

Heavy Concrete Zone Boundaries - Fire loading analysis is done by fire zones (subsets of fire areas) which are separated from each other by heavy concrete walls. In analyzing the consequences of a fire, relative to plant safe-shutdown capability, the entire fire area is conservatively assumed to be affected. This includes the battery rooms and switchgear rooms which are separated by fire zones with heavy concrete walls but are not separated as fire areas from the same safe-shutdown train. However, each safe-shutdown train, including the switchgear and battery rooms, is separated to the extent practicable from each redundant safe-shutdown train by 3-hour fire rated or equivalent Fire Barriers. At least one safe-shutdown train will be available for a fire in any fire area.

1.3.4 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements A comparison of the STP units with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R is discussed in Section 4.1. Alternative design configurations from that of 10CFR50, Appendix R are discussed in Section 3.10.

STP meets the requirements specified in 10CFR50 Appendix R with minimal alternative design configurations, e.g., manual control room fire suppression and manual initiation of the Train "B" cabling special hazard spray system used to meet Appendix R,Section III G.2 in containment. Refer to Sections 3.10 and 4.1.

1.3.5 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A requirements 1-4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR A comparison of the STP design to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position, APCSB 9.5-2 requirements is discussed in Section 4.2.

1.4 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM The overall Fire Protection Program for STP provides an adequately balanced, defense-in-depth approach which considers prevention, detection, containment and suppression of fires along with maintaining the plant's ability to maintain and perform safe-shutdown functions and limit radioactive releases to the environment to values less than 10CFR100 limits.

The effects of postulated fires on the plant's ability to perform safe-shutdown functions and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment were examined in the Fire Hazards Analysis.

The Fire Protection Program was developed using the results of the Fire Hazards Analysis. The Fire Protection Program encompasses the components, procedures and personnel utilized in carrying out detection, annunciation, control, confinement, suppression and extinguishment. The Fire Protection Program outlines administrative procedures, fire brigade organization, inspection, maintenance, training, quality assurance and testing. Each element of the program is designed considering the Fire Hazards Analysis to assure an adequately balanced, defense-in-depth fire protection program.

Section 9.5-1 of the FSAR provides a description of the Fire Protection Program.

1.5 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS GUIDELINES The following guidelines form the bases for the STP Fire Hazards Analysis:

1. The overall Fire Protection Program is based upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the plant and the effect of the fire relative to maintaining ability to perform post fire safe-shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.

2. Only one fire originating from a single source is assumed to occur at a time.

3. It is conservatively assumed that the fire totally consumes all combustibles in the fire area under consideration. It is also assumed all power-operated functions are lost unless specifically protected from the fire by a 3-hour fire rated or equivalent barrier.

4. The fire loading analysis includes the potential distribution of transient combustible sources in areas where they are likely to be present. Miscellaneous items that are essential to normal operation (e.g., polybags, rags, containers for potentially contaminated garments) are included in the evaluation where appropriate. Temporary storage and use of high pressure cylinders of flammable gases, except cylinders connected to a fixed pipe distribution system, is considered as transient combustible materials. Administrative control procedures address the storage and use of these cylinders. Bulk gas storage, as used in this analysis, is considered to be a single storage tank of combustible gas in excess of 400 cubic feet. There is no bulk storage of combustible gases within safety-related plant structures.

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STP FHAR The potential heating values of the combustible materials found at STP are provided in Appendix 1-B of this report.

5. Electrical cables inside steel conduits are not considered to be sources of fire and do not contribute to the combustible load of an area. However, such cables, when exposed to fire, are considered to be damaged.

Note: Electrical cables in non-combustible enclosures, such as cabinets, equipment/instrument enclosures, junction boxes, etc., are not considered to be sources of fire and do not contribute to the combustible load of an area, as these enclosures are considered equivalent to steel conduits.

6. Pipes containing flammable liquids or gases are not considered to contribute to the combustibles inventory.

7. Fires are not assumed to occur simultaneously with other plant accidents, natural phenomenon, or potential man-made site related events.

8. Simultaneous fires are not postulated in more than one unit.

9. The analysis takes into account the effect of the fire on the capability to assure that systems used for cold shutdown can be maintained free of fire damage or repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months if normal hot shutdown systems are used, or to achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months if alternate or dedicated shutdown systems are used either with or without offsite power.

1.6 METHODOLOGY The methodology used in performing the Fire Hazards Analysis is outlined below:

1. Identify three redundant (or diverse) safe shutdown pathways (which exceeds the minimum systems or portions of systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown) with consideration given to a maximum postulated fire occurring when offsite power is (a) available, and (b) not available. Two pathways are assumed to be damaged by the fire and the remaining pathway is preserved to provide the redundant safe shutdown pathway. This single safe shutdown pathway meets the Appendix R requirement that a single safe shutdown pathway be preserved following a fire.

2. Establish the fire areas and fire zones.

3. Locate, by fire zone, redundant safe-shutdown equipment and cables. See Chapter 2.0 for a list of safe shutdown equipment and location.

4. Define the combustible loading for each fire area on the basis of fire zones by review of drawings and specifications.

5. For each fire area, determine the fire loading on the basis of fire zones.

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STP FHAR

6. Locate, by fire zone, material containing radioactivity which could result in potential release.

7. Evaluate as follows:

For each fire area, evaluate the capabilities of the plant fire protection features to:

(1) Contain the Maximum Postulated Fire (MPF) or Maximum Credible Fire (MCF) within the fire area; (2) Maintain redundant (or diverse) safe shutdown pathways should an MPF occur; and (3) Prevent the unacceptable release of radioactivity to the environment.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Chapter 3.0.

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STP FHAR APPENDIX 1A RESUMES HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION 1A-i Amendment 26

STP FHAR WAYNE VARNELL Reviewed STP FHAR thru Amendment 2 POSITION Engineering Group Leader, Fire Protection EDUCATION B.S., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University

SUMMARY

Present: Engineering Group Leader 1 Year: Senior Mechanical Engineer 2 Years: Area Engineering Supervisor 2 Years: Systems Engineer 3 Years: Mechanical Engineer 1 Year: Mechanical Maintenance Engineer EXPERIENCE Mr. Varnell has 5 years of design experience in fire protection engineering on nuclear power projects. Mr. Varnell joined Bechtel in April 1982 as an Engineering Group Leader in the Mechanical group. He is responsible for the South Texas Project fire protection and detection system design, and the overall coordination of the fire protection design program. Other responsibilities as Engineering Group Leader include technical direction for system design of a majority of the safe-shutdown systems.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION As Senior Mechanical Engineer, with Brown & Root, Mr. Varnell was responsible for providing technical input and direction for reevaluation of the South Texas Project fire hazard analysis for compliance with Appendix R requirements. He was also responsible for providing technical input and coordination of the analysis of the effects on essential plant equipment of postulated high-energy line breaks and postulated missiles.

While at Texas Utilities Services, Mr. Varnell was an area Engineering Supervisor at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station in Glen Rose, Texas, responsible for upgrade of fire protection and detection systems to meet Appendix R requirements and for revisions to the fire hazard analysis. He was also responsible for performing field "as-built" verification of pipe whip and jet impingement effects on electrical, mechanical, I&C, and HVAC equipment. Also while working for Texas Utilities, Mr. Varnell worked as a Systems Engineer on field assignment at Comanche Peak, responsible for review and approval of plant system flow diagrams. In addition, he provided technical coordination and contract administration for both the Nuclear Steam Supply System (Westinghouse) and the Turbine-Generator (Allis-Chalmers) vendors. As a Mechanical Engineer in the Engineering and Construction offices of Texas Utilities, Mr. Varnell was responsible for the review and approval of Comanche Peak system flow diagrams, composite piping drawings, plumbing drawings, and mechanical design specification.

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STP FHAR JAMES N. CONWAY Reviewed STP FHAR thru Amendment 5 POSITION Corporate Manager of Fire Protection Services, Impell Corp.

EDUCATION B.S., University of Massachusetts Sodium Technology, Atomics International Reliability and Productivity Improvement of Electric Power Plants, University of California, Los Angeles EXPERIENCE As Corporate Manager of Fire Protection Services at Impell Corporation, Mr. Conway has overall corporate responsibility for the program management and technical quality of fire protection-related projects. Recent fire protection programs which Mr. Conway has managed have included fire hazard analyses, Appendix R evaluations, fire protection component qualifications, fire protection audits, NFPA code compliance evaluations, fire protection commitment analysis and fire protection program definition and implementation. Additionally, Mr. Conway managed the development of Impell's two proprietary computer codes, which are Fire Protection Data System (FPDS) and Fire Rated Assemblies Tracking System (FRATS).

HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION Mr. Conway is a registered Fire Protection Engineer and presently Chairman of the American Nuclear Society committee on fire hazard analysis for nuclear power plants. Additionally, he is the Chairman of an American Nuclear Society subcommittee on Fire Hazards Analysis.

Mr. Conway has extensive experience in the management, licensing, and design services for both utility clients and architect-engineers. As a Project Manager, he was recently responsible for the overall direction of various plant modification activities for a large steam-electric power plant including regulatory compliance, engineering and design criteria, and design reviews.

Mr. Conway's experience includes the engineering, design, and construction phases of large power plant projects. He held responsible positions on projects including fossil and nuclear power plants and on developmental projects such as the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project. His responsibilities included project management, technical direction, cost, and schedule control for a wide range of power plant programs.

1A -2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR EXPERIENCE Mr. Conway was responsible for sodium fire protection (Continued) the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project for over five years. In this position he developed sodium fire mitigation techniques from concept to the final design. These techniques included sodium catch pans, sodium leak detection, sodium drain systems, inerted compartments, compartment overpressure control, sodium aerosol venting, and the interface with heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems operation.

Additionally he was responsible for sodium fire, leak, and pipe break analysis and is intimately familiar with analysis tools such as SOFIRE, SPRAY-3A, and various atmospheric transport models.

Mr. Conway has been responsible for the engineering and design of mechanical, nuclear, and auxiliary systems for several different nuclear power plant complexes.

Mr. Conway has had substantial experience in the design, engineering, and construction of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning and fire protection systems on nuclear power plants.

As a part of his responsibilities, he prepared and reviewed SAR sections and participated in various regulatory meetings and presented formal testimony. Earlier he developed system design descriptions, operational procedures, failure modes and effects analyses, and reliability analyses for turbine plant systems.

PROFESSIONAL Professional Engineer, State of Pennsylvania DATA Mechanical Engineer, Tennessee Professional Engineer Fire Protection Engineering, State of California Certified Lead Quality Assurance Auditor (N45.2.23)

HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION PROFESSIONAL American Society of Mechanical Engineers AFFILIATIONS American Nuclear Society Society of Fire Protection Engineers - member grade COMMITTEES/ American Nuclear Society, Chairman ANS 59.6 committee, ADVISORY GROUPS "Fire Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants" American Nuclear Society, Vice-Chairman ANS 59.4/ANSI 18.10 committee, "Generic Requirements for Light Water Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection" Automated Procedures for Engineering Consultants, Past Chairman, Piping Program Committee Advisory Council on Engineering Education at San Francisco State University PUBLICATIONS "Fire Suppression & Detection for Electrical Cable AND Tray Fires", 12th Annual WATTEC Conference, February PRESENTATIONS 1985 "Evaluation of Control Room Radiation Exposure", 14th Air Cleaning Conference, August, 1976 1A -3 Amendment 26

STP FHAR DANIEL J. LOVE EDUCATION BSEE - Illinois Institute of Technology MSEE - Illinois Institute of Technology Certificate - University of California Business Mgmt.

KBA - California State University Long Beach

SUMMARY

Bechtel Electrical Engineering with a three year assignment as Chief Electrical Engineer in Madrid, Spain, and assignment as Staff Engineering Specialist in Electrical Protection and Fire Protection.

EXPERIENCE Presently, Mr. Love has staff responsibility for review of project Fire Protection Programs including that of the South Texas Project. This includes activities such as fire hazards analysis, fire detection and protection systems, NFPA Code compliance evaluation, and Appendix R separation reviews. He is also responsible for Electrical Standards for Generating Station Design including fire stops, separation criteria, combustible material calculations, power cable derating, etc.

Previously Mr. Love was the Chief Electrical and Control Systems Engineer in Madrid, Spain, providing support and direction to those Bechtel engineers on four nuclear power plants. Review and direction areas included protection of electrical systems, separation for safety-HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION related systems, hazards analysis, and cable tray fire detection and retardation methods. He was also the Bechtel representative to IAEA Nuclear Power Division.

Prior to Spain, Mr. Love was an Engineering Specialist responsible for development of nuclear/fossil station systems design and protection, including the selection/ setting of all protective devices. He developed two design guides for circuit protection and overcurrent coordination, and was the Chief Electrical Engineer designee for various nuclear/

fossil projects, and responsible for the administration of engineers.

PROFESSIONAL Registered Professional Engineer - Illinois DATA Professional Engineer (Electrical) - California, Arizona, Louisiana; Professional Engineer (Fire Protection) - California Member, National Society of Professional Engineers Fellow, Institute for the Advancement of Engineers Sr. Member - Instrument Society of America Fellow - IEEE Power Engineering Society Fellow - IEEE Computer Society Fellow - IEEE Industry Applications Society Member - National Fire Protection Association 1A -4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TECHNICAL SOCIETY Member Working Group revising IEEE Standard 242(Buff ACTIVITIES Book) Protection of Industrial end Commercial Power Systems.

Member Working Group developing IEEE P1015 Application Guide for Low Voltage Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Power Circuit Breakers.

Reviewer and Contributor to International Atomic Energy Agency Guidebooks on Design of Nuclear Power Plants and on Problems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants on Electric Power Grids of Limited Capacity.

Member IEEE Industry Applications Society, Power Systems Protection Committee Secretary.

Mr. Love has authored over fourteen published papers in addition to many lectures on protection.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION 1A -5 Amendment 26

STP FHAR CARL M. TURNER POSITION Staff Engineer EDUCATION B.S., Nuclear Engineering, Mississippi State University Sodium Technology, Atomics International Nuclear Reactor Safety, Carnegie-Mellon University EXPERIENCE Mr. Turner has six (6) years of experience in fire protection on nuclear power plant projects. Mr. Turner has fourteen (14) years experience working on eight (8) nuclear power plant projects involving twelve (12) power plants. His responsibilities include engineering review of major design efforts by outside A/E firm (Bechtel) in preparation of Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Protection System design, hydraulic calculations, plant inspection/as-built conditions, review of system acceptance tests, review of project scope changes, coordination of NFPA code verification analysis. His responsibilities in six (6) years at Houston Lighting & Power have also included safety grade cold shutdown design modification, TMI upgrades, Essential Cooling Water System (Ultimate Heat Sink), Refueling, Liquid, Solid, and Gaseous Radwaste Processing Systems, Design Assurance Reviews, etc.

Mr. Turner designed and directed design on the liquid waste processing HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION system on Pilgrim 2 Power Station for two (2) years working for Bechtel Power Corporation. He also worked as a licensing engineer on Pebble Springs Nuclear Station while at Bechtel.

Prior to this, Mr. Turner was a lead engineer on the Clinch River Project working for Westinghouse Electric Corporation. His responsibilities during three (3) years at Westinghouse included overall engineering, cost, and scheduling of a portion of the work done by a subcontractor, Atomics International. This work included the Plant Maintenance Equipment and the safety evaluation for the in-containment cleaning of large sodium wetted components.

While in college, Mr. Turner worked four (4) semesters with Southern Company Services doing technical studies on Farley, Hatch, Vogtle, and Central Alabama Nuclear Power Plant Projects. He analyzed the Farley Nuclear Plant Cooling Pond for the loss-of-coolant accident. He also reviewed the design of Vogtle containment, and transients on the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

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STP FHAR CARL M. TURNER Page 2 PROFESSIONAL Registered Fire Protection Engineer, State of California DATA Registered Mechanical Engineer, State of California Registered Professional Engineer, State of Texas Member of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers Member of the American Nuclear Society TECHNICAL PAPERS "Long- and Short-term Radwaste System Changes at the South Texas Project" by C. M. Turner and G. Kniazcwycz which was presented at Waste Management 184 in Tucson, Arizona.

"Use of Freeze Seals for Barriers Against Liquid Sodium in Stainless Steel Piping" for a Westinghouse Advanced Reactors Division (WARD) Technical Position Paper Rev. 0 in 1975.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION HISTORICAL INFORMATION 1A -7 Amendment 26

STP FHAR APPENDIX 1B COMBUSTIBLE LOADING 1B - i Amendment 26

STP FHAR The fire load in Btu/ft2 is calculated based on the floor area and the total combustible inventory, including transient combustibles, for each fire area or zone. This floor area is assumed equal to the total area (ft2) bounded by the fire area or zone, except in the case of multi-level locations, where the sum of the floor areas does not adequately represent the actual (conservative) geometry. Values for the Btu content of the individual materials which make up this inventory are derived as follows:

1. Cable - Typically, the major contribution to fire loading is cable located in tray. The combustible inventory is evaluated by performing a material takeoff (from electrical cable tray drawings) and summarizing the total footage by tray size and class/voltage level for each area. The actual Btu loading is found using the Btu/ft multipliers developed in Table 1B-1.

NOTE: Above method was employed in the original generation of combustible loading.

Subsequently a computer dump from EE-580 was used to identify quantity of cables and combustible load from those cables for each zone in both units 1 & 2. Where the Unit 1 or 2 loading was greater than the original loading, the higher value was used in the combustible loading.

2. Oil - A survey of vendor data on equipment throughout the plant provides the inventory of oil for fuel, lubricating, etc. Unless specific data is available the heat of combustion values in Table 1B-2 are used.

3. Class A - Reasonable quantities of paper and/or wood are assumed in appropriate areas such as corridors, offices, labs, work areas, etc. The combustible values for these items are shown in Table 1B-3.

4. Charcoal - Various amounts of charcoal are located in filters and similar equipment.

Quantities are determined from vendor data and the combustible values in Table 1B-3 are applied.

5. PVC and Miscellaneous - See Section 3.1-6. Combustible values are taken from NFPA Handbook 15th Edition Section 4/Chapter 11, Table 4-12B, where specific data is not available. Additional data is located in Table 1B-4.

The resulting fire load for each area can be used to determine the equivalent fire severity based on the information in Table 1-5. It is this fire severity which describes the relationship between the assumed fire in the area and the rating of fire barriers surrounding the area.

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STP FHAR TABLE 1B-1 CABLE TRAY WEIGHT AND BTU CONTENT(a)

Tray Size TRAY CLASS/VOLTAGE LEVEL 15 kV Power 5 kV Power 480 V Power 600 V Content Instrumentation Depth Width Weight Content Weight Content Weight Content Weight Content Weight Content inches inches lb/ft Btu/ft lb/ft Btu/ft lb/ft Btu/ft lb/ft Btu/ft lb/ft Btu/ft 6 7.5 75,045 7.1 69,566 8.1 98,656 9.1 92,923 8.6 75,371 1B - 2 8 10.1 100,060 9.7 92,754 10.7 131,542 12.2 123,897 11.4 100,050 6 12 15.1 150,091 14.8 139,131 16.3 197,313 18.4 185,845 17.2 150,742 18 23.5 225,136 21.9 208,697 24.8 295,969 27.7 278,768 25.9 226,113 24 31.0 300,181 29.6 278,262 33.0 394,625 36.8 371,690 34.5 301,484 6 10.1 101,412 9.9 94,042 10.7 126,844 12.2 124,465 11.4 100,050 8 13.4 135,217 13.2 125,389 14.6 169,125 16.4 165,939 15.4 133,400 8 12 21.0 202,825 19.7 188,085 21.8 253,688 24.5 248,930 23.1 200,100 18 31.0 304,827 29.6 282,127 33.0 380,531 36.8 373,395 34.5 300,150 24 45.3 405,650 42.7 376,169 47.9 507,375 53.2 497,860 50.0 400,200 6 15.1 152,119 14.8 140,419 16.3 190,196 18.4 186,271 17.2 159,742 8 21.0 202,825 19.7 187,226 21.8 254,542 24.5 248,362 23.1 200,989 12 12 31.0 304,237 29.6 280,839 33.0 381,813 36.8 372,543 34.5 301,484 18 46.9 456,356 44.4 421,258 49.6 572,719 55.4 558,814 51.7 452,226 24 62.9 608,475 59.7 561,667 66.3 763,625 73.9 745,085 69.3 602,968 Amendment 26 (a) Tray Btu content calculated from "worst case" cable vendor data, assuming tray is filled to the 40% (100% visual) design limit.

STP FHAR TABLE 1B-2 BTU CONTENT OF SELECTED CLASS B COMBUSTIBLES (LIQUIDS)

Material Density Density Btu Content (a) Btu Content (a)

(lb/ft3) (lb/gal) (Btu/lb) (Btu/gal)

Alcohol 49.5 6.6 12,800 84,480 Gasoline 42.5 5.7 21,000 119,000 Kerosene 50.2 6.7 20,000 134,000 1B - 3 Oil, Crude 53.1 7.1 20,000 142,000 Oil, lub. Minerals 57.0 7.6 20,000 152,000 Oil, Fuel No. 1 51.6 6.9 20,000 138,000 Oil, Fuel No. 2 54.6 7.3 20,000 145,000 Oil, Fuel No. 3 61.3 8.2 20,000 164,000 Oil, Fuel No. 4 62.8 8.4 20,000 168,000 Oil, Fuel No. 5 64.3 8.6 20,000 172,000 Amendment 26 (a) Values are approximate. Use unless a specific value is known.

STP FHAR TABLE 1B-3 BTU CONTENT OF SELECTED CLASS A COMBUSTIBLES Material Density Btu Content(a) Btu Content (lb/ft3) (Btu/lb) (Btu/ft3)

Cotton 93 7,200 669,600 Leather 59 8,000 472,000 Paper 58 8,000 464,000 Rubber Goods 94 10,000 940,000 Wool 82 9,000 738,000 Wood, All 54 8,000 432,000 Charcoal - 14,900 -

(a) Values are approximate. Use unless specific values are known.

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STP FHAR TABLE 1B-4 BTU CONTENT OF SELECTED CLASS B COMBUSTIBLES (GASES)

Material Density Btu Content(a) Btu Content (lb/ft3) (Btu/lb) (Btu/ft3)

Hydrogen 0.0052 62,000 319 Methane 0.0416 24,000 1,086 Acetylene 0.0675 22,000 1,451 Ethane 0.0779 22,000 1,743 Propane 0.1142 22,000 2,480 Butane 0.1506 22,000 3,216 Benzene 0.2025 22,000 3,686 Toluene 0.2388 22,000 4,410 (a) Use 24,000 Btu/lb for other Class B combustible gases unless a specific value is known.

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STP FHAR TABLE 1B-5 ESTIMATED FIRE SEVERITY FOR OFFICES AND LIGHT COMMERCIAL OCCUPANCIES (a)

Combustible Content Total, Including Finish, Floor, and Heat Potential Tile Assumed(b)

(lb/ft2) (Btu/ft2) 5 40,000 10 80,000 15 120,000 20 160,000 30 240,000 40 320,000 (a) Fire Protection Handbook, 15 Edition, NFPA, Section 5, Chapter 9, Table 5-9B.

(b) Heat of combustion of contents taken at 8,000 Btu/lb.

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STP FHAR APPENDIX 1C DEFINITIONS 1C-i Amendment 26

STP FHAR Various words or phrases used in the report are defined as follows:

1. Active Component - equipment that is capable of powered physical movement and electrical, electronic or pneumatic equipment that controls and powers active mechanical components.

Pumps, power-operated valves, MCCs, and process instruments are examples of active components.

2. Approved - tested and accepted for a specific purpose or application by a nationally recognized testing laboratory.

3. Automatic - self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence such as a change in current, voltage, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.

4. Cold Shutdown - the reactor is subcritical (effective multiplication factor less than .99), the decay heat is removed by the residual heat removal system, 0% rated thermal power and the average reactor coolant temperature is less than or equal to 200oF.

5. Combustible Load - the maximum permitted fire load or maximum amount of combustible materials (measured in BTU/square foot) that has been evaluated for inclusion in a particular fire zone (listed in the Fire Load Table).

6. Combustible Material - material that does not meet the definition of a noncombustible material.

7. Control Room Envelope - the area served by the Control Room Envelope HVAC System. This is a safety-related system with common ducts, separate from the EAB, Main Area HVAC System.

8. Emergency Lighting - sealed beam units with 8-hour battery power supplies.

9. Exposure Fire - a fire in a given area that involves either in situ or transient combustibles and is external to any structures, systems, or components located in or adjacent to that same area. The effects of such a fire (e.g., smoke heat, or ignition) can adversely affect those structures, systems or components important to safety. Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may constitute an exposure fire for the redundant train located in the same area, and a fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both redundant trains located in the same area.

10. Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other fire areas by fire barriers or a boundary (e.g., wall, floor, or ceiling that may have non-rated penetrations) which provides an equivalent level of fire protection for the hazards present on either side.

11. Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, and their essential structural support members, penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fire dampers) that have a 3-hour fire resistance rating (see fire rating definition) or have been qualitatively evaluated to provide an 1C - 1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR equivalent rating and that are used to prevent the spread of fire or that provide an equivalent level of fire protection.

12. Fire Barrier Penetration Seal - a feature of construction in electrical or mechanical penetrations in a fire barrier to prevent spreading of fire to an adjacent fire area.

13. Fire Brigade - the team of plant personnel assigned to fire fighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting of fires.

14. Fire Detector - a device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm and/or other action. Some typical fire detectors are as follows:

(a) Heat Detector - a device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature and/or rate of temperature rise. Rate compensated, continuous line-type, and thermistor-type thermal detectors can be used.

(b) Ionization Smoke Detector - a device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustion.

15. Fire Protection Program - the integrated effort involving components, procedures, and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection.

16. Fire Rating - (the fire resistance rating) the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the duration of resistance to a standard fire exposure as designed in accordance with the Uniform Building Code - 1973 or in accordance with ASTM E-119 Standard Time-Temperature Fire Test, 1971.

17. Fire Suppression - control and extinguishing of fires (fire fighting). Manual fire suppression is the use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually actuated fixed systems by plant personnel.

Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated fixed systems such as water or Halon systems.

18. Fire Zones - a subdivision of a fire area which is analyzed separately as a zone within a fire area due to its unique combustible loading, building, or construction characteristics. Zone boundaries provide spatial separation or physical barriers to mitigate fire propagation and aid fire control and extinguishment.

19. Fixed Water Spray (Deluge) System - a network of piping similar to a sprinkler system except that it utilizes open-head spray nozzles.

20. Foam-Water Sprinkler System - a special sprinkler system which is pipe-connected to a source of air foam concentrates and to a water supply and is equipped with discharge devices for extinguishing agent discharge and for distribution over the area to be protected. Air foam is an aggregation of air-filled bubbles of lower specific gravity than the flammable fluids or water.

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STP FHAR

21. Halon 1301 System - a special piped distribution system which delivers a colorless, odorless, electrically non-conductive gas that is an effective medium for extinguishing fires. Halon 1301 is a trade name for bromotrifluoromethane.

22. Heavy Concrete - a substantial concrete structure (wall, ceiling, or floor) 12 inches thick or greater, which, although not specifically assigned a fire resistance rating, can be considered to provide a significant measure of fire protection in the fire hazards analysis in Section 3.0.

23. High-Low Pressure Interface - exists when a low-pressure system interfaces with the reactor coolant system. A high-low pressure interface must be evaluated if it consists of two redundant and independent electrically controlled devices (such as motor-operated valves) and the devices or their associated cables may be subject to a single fire hazard.

24. Hot Shutdown - the reactor is subcritical (effective multiplication factor is less than .99) and the average reactor coolant temperature is greater than 200oF but less than 350oF.

25. Hot Standby - the reactor is subcritical (effective multiplication factor is less than .99), the decay heat is removed by the steam generators, 0% rated power, and the average reactor coolant temperature is greater than or equal to 350oF.

26. Maximum Credible Fire (MCF) - an actual fire which involves varying amounts of incomplete combustion, thereby yielding a lower than maximum theoretical total heat release to the area. It considers limited combustion due to the quantities of fuel or oxygen available. Credit is taken for fire barriers, fire stops, or separation which exists within the fire area or zone.

27. Maximum Postulated Fire (MPF) - a fire which assumes the total simultaneous combustion of the combustible inventory in the fire area or zone at maximum burn rates. This MPF is used to conservatively establish a maximum upper limit fire and to compare the potential fire severity of different fire areas or zones. The MPF is used in the evaluation of the effects of a fire in this fire hazards analysis.

28. Noncombustible Material (a) A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat.

(b) Material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in (a), with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame-spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using the ASTM E-84 Test, Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials.

29. Passive Component - equipment that is not active and that is not subject to spurious failure due to a fire. Piping, tanks, check valves, and manual valves are examples of passive components.

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STP FHAR

30. Post-Fire - the time period following the identification of a fire.

31. Pre-Fire - the time period preceding the identification of a fire (e.g., normal operation).

32. Qualified Display Processing System (QDPS) - the QDPS is a system which provides data acquisition, display, and control and addresses the separation requirements associated with a control room/relay room/cable spreading room fire. It provides isolation via signal buffers for instrumentation circuits and in conjunction with transfer switches allows control of safe shutdown systems to be transferred from the control room to the auxiliary shutdown control stations.

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33. Qualified Fire Protection Engineer - A fire protection engineer (or a consultant) shall be a graduate of an engineering curriculum of accepted standing and satisfies the eligibility requirements as a Member grade (or Professional Member grade) in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE), or is a graduate of an engineering curriculum of accepted standing and is a licensed professional fire protection engineer in the State of Texas.

34. Raceway - any channel that is designed and used expressly for supporting or enclosing wires or cable. Raceways consist primarily of, but are not restricted to, cable trays and conduits.

35. Safe Shutdown - hot standby with the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

36. Safe Shutdown Functions - hardware/operational capabilities organized into those logical groups required to accomplish safe shutdown. Safe shutdown functions include features from one or more plant systems.

37. Safe-Shutdown Pathway - systems and components which are capable of satisfying the essential functions necessary to bring the plant to hot standby and ultimately to achieve cold shutdown.

Generally, a safe-shutdown pathway consists of one of the three trains of safe-shutdown systems.

Alternate or diverse means may be used to perform the safe-shutdown function in lieu of strictly redundant pathways.

38. Safe Shutdown Systems and Components - systems and components designated to be used under fire conditions to achieve hot standby with the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

Safe shutdown systems and components may include both safety-related and nonsafety-related systems and components as required.

39. Safety-related Systems and Components - systems and components required to shutdown the reactor, mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents, or maintain the reactor in a safe-shutdown condition.

40. Seismic Category II/I - systems and equipment which are seismically supported to prevent unacceptable interactions with safety-related systems and equipment in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 Rev. 3, 1978. Pressure boundary integrity is not necessarily maintained.

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STP FHAR

41. Special Function Doors - special-function doors installed or modified for overriding nuclear safety or security reasons (e.g., missile, fumetight, airtight, or watertight doors) which are located in fire barriers.

42. Sprinkler System - a network of piping connected to a reliable water supply that will distribute the water to the area protected and will discharge the water through sprinkler heads in sufficient quantity either to extinguish the fire entirely or to prevent its spread. The system, usually activated by heat, includes a controlling valve and a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The following categories of sprinkler systems are used:

Wet-pipe System

Preaction System

Foam Water System

Deluge System

43. Standpipe and Hose Systems - fixed piping systems with hose outlets, hoses, and nozzles connected to a reliable water supply to provide effective fire hose streams to specific areas inside the building.

44. Thermal Barrier - a noncombustible radiant energy shield which is installed to protect specific equipment or raceways from the effects of a fire.

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STP FHAR 2.0 SAFE -SHUTDOWN ASSESSMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The safe-shutdown assessment of the South Texas Project (STP) Units 1 and 2 during and following a fire is an analysis to verify compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L. An evaluation has been performed to identify the location of the equipment that must function in order to achieve safe shutdown, and the raceways, which serve this equipment.

Circuits were analyzed for spurious operation, common power sources, and common enclosures. The fire protection requirements for the subject safe-shutdown equipment and raceways have been assessed and are delineated in Chapter 3 of this report. Unless otherwise noted, all Unit 1 information, such as equipment number and description, is applicable for Unit 2 with the appropriate changes made to the unit designators.

The STP safe-shutdown capability consists of three redundant safe-shutdown trains (A, B, and C) powered from independent Class 1E power. Where the system design contains less than three redundant trains, alternate or diverse pathways have been identified to ensure that the necessary functions to achieve safe shutdown are available during and after any postulated fire. Operation in a single train mode provides an acceptable safe-shutdown means, however, it may not represent the system operating modes described in the FSAR. The plant operating procedures will include post fire operating procedures, which identify the actions necessary to put a single train into operation. A summary of the safe-shutdown functions, systems, and the redundancy available to accomplish these functions is provided in Table 2-3.

The STP fire protection design objective is to have at least one functionally redundant safe- shutdown pathway available following a fire occurring at any location. An evaluation to demonstrate the ability to provide one redundant safe-shutdown pathway following a fire was performed for each fire area in FHAR Chapter 3. Evaluations of the areas in Chapter 3 resulted in a list of operator actions required to provide one functionally redundant safe-shutdown pathway following a fire.

In summary, STP meets the design object of providing one functional safe-shutdown pathway following a fire in accordance with the Appendix R minimum safe-shutdown requirements.

2.2 SAFE-SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS Safe-shutdown is defined as hot standby with the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Hot standby and cold shutdown are defined in FHAR Appendix 1C and in Table 1.2 of the Technical Specifications.

The following functions must be accomplished to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition Achieve and maintain shutdown margin for both hot and cold shutdown conditions 2-1 Amendment 25

STP FHAR Provide reactor coolant system makeup and letdown capability to maintain reactor coolant inventory Maintain reactor coolant pressure and temperature control Provide decay heat removal capability The following systems or portions thereof are required to provide the functional requirements listed above for both hot standby and cold shutdown:

Reactor coolant system Auxiliary feedwater system Main steam system (between steam generators and MSIVs)

Feedwater system (between steam generator and FIVs)

Steam generator blowdown system (Between steam generators and containment isolation valves)

Residual heat removal system Chemical and volume control system Various instrumentation and control systems The following support systems are also required to function:

Component cooling water system Essential cooling water system Onsite power systems Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems including essential chilled water 2.3 SAFE-SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS GUIDELINES 2.3.1 General Guidelines The guidelines concerning the nature of the fire and plant conditions prior to and during the fire are as follows:

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STP FHAR All plant operating modes, except refueling, were evaluated. However, post-fire safe shutdown from 100% power is the most limiting case and was used in determining required operator actions.

Plant accidents unrelated to the fire are not postulated concurrently with the fire and subsequent plant shutdown.

The fire is assumed concurrent with or without a loss of offsite power. Required operator actions are based on the most limiting case.

When a loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with a fire that results in control room evacuation, the loss of offsite power is assumed to occur coincident with the manual reactor trip.

When offsite power is available, all equipment NOT affected by the fire remains in its pre-fire condition. If the fire involves the BOP diesel or the instrument air compressor powered from the BOP diesel, and offsite power is lost, then all equipment served by that air compressor goes to its loss of air condition.

The BOP and TSC diesels and their respective electrical distribution systems are available if not damaged by the fire.

Credit may be taken for non-safety related components where the fire has not damaged their ability to function.

Simultaneous fires are not assumed to occur in separate fire areas.

Single failures are not considered concurrent with a fire.

Only systems and components which can affect safe shutdown are subject to evaluation.

Prior to the fire event, all three ESF electrical trains are available except in modes 5 and 6.

Credit is taken for manual operator action.

When a reactor trip is a required operator action, the reactor is assumed to be tripped from the control room.

2.3.2 Specific Guidelines for the Appendix R,Section III.G Evaluation All the guidelines of Section 2.3.1 are valid in this analysis in addition to the following:

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STP FHAR The worst case combination of a single spurious actuation and fire damage to circuits of other components in the fire area is evaluated.

A spurious actuation may be caused by a single hot short, open circuit, short to ground, or wire to wire short.

With the exception of high-low pressure interface components, fire-induced failures in three-phase power cables can only result in a loss of power to, or the inability to supply power to, the component.

Spurious actuations of components due to damage to cables in the area of the fire are assumed to occur at any time following the onset of the fire.

To assess the extent of the damage, each fire area is evaluated for safe shutdown systems affected by the fire.

The time interval between the onset of the fire event and that time when the operator can reasonably be expected to be able to counter the adverse effects of the spurious action is 30 minutes, unless lesser response time can be justified.

The simultaneous spurious actuation of all valves in each high-low pressure interface line was evaluated if the circuits for the valves were in the same fire area.

Simultaneous failure of interface valves in all lines is not considered credible.

The analysis is limited to fire areas in buildings containing safe shutdown circuits.

For spurious actuation, common power source and common enclosure see Section 3.1.3.

2.4 SAFE-SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The following sections describe how the safe shutdown functional requirements identified in Section 2.2 are accomplished. As described in Section 2.1, the fire protection design objective is to have at least one redundant safe shutdown pathway, capable of achieving and maintaining the plant in a cold-shutdown condition following a fire occurring at any location. This section provides a description of these pathways. Refer to Tables 2-2, 2-4, and 2-5 for a list of the safe shutdown equipment used in the fire area evaluations contained in chapter 3. Typical circuit routing for the hot and cold shutdown equipment is shown on Figures 2-2 through 2-21. Detailed circuits listings for each fire area are given in document no. 5E019EL002, "Safe Shutdown Circuit Listing". Section 2.4.4 provides a description of the alternate shutdown capability provided to respond to a control room fire.

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STP FHAR 2.4.1 Hot Standby and Cooldown Systems 2.4.1.1 Initial Reactivity Control Initial reactivity control occurs by tripping the reactor control rods to insert sufficient negative reactivity to make the reactor core subcritical. Subsequently, monitoring the reactor neutron flux in combination with RCS boration assures that the reactor remains subcritical as required by the Technical Specifications.

The control rod drives are fail-safe since they are inserted by gravity into the reactor core when the reactor trip system is deenergized. The monitoring of source-range neutron flux is performed by the two post-accident monitoring system (PAMS) extended range neutron detectors (Trains A and C power), which are indicated in the control room and at the auxiliary shutdown panel or by the source range excore detectors (Trains A and D), which are indicated in the control room.

2.4.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Inventory and Reactivity Control Control of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory is accomplished by assuring the integrity of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals, controlling RCS letdown, providing borated RCS makeup, and monitoring pressurizer level. The methods of accomplishing these functions are discussed below.

Reactor coolant pump seal integrity is assured by maintaining flow of component cooling water (CCW) to provide cooling for the RCP thermal barriers or seal injection charging. Refer to Section 2.4.3.1 for a description of the component cooling water system. RCS normal letdown isolation is accomplished by closing redundant reactor coolant pressure boundary isolation valves. RCS letdown can be accomplished by normal letdown, excess letdown, or seal letdown to the CVCS or through the reactor vessel head vent line to the pressurizer relief tank. The reactor vessel head vent line contains Trains A and B isolation and throttle valves in parallel so that either train of power allows operation of this pathway. The normal or excess letdown lines can be aligned to divert reactor coolant to the recycle holdup tanks in the mechanical auxiliary building to provide additional RCS letdown pathways.

Borated makeup can be provided to the RCS from the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) centrifugal charging pumps (Trains A and C power) through the normal or alternate charging lines and/or the RCP seals. RCS makeup can also be provided through the RCP seals by the positive displacement charging pump (powered from the non-Class 1E technical support center diesel generator) which is located in a different fire area than the centrifugal charging pumps. The positive displacement charging pump provides the third RCS makeup pathway. All charging pumps can take suction from the boric acid tanks (via the boric acid transfer pumps, if available, or the gravity drain system) or the refueling water storage tank. Adequate NPSH is available for proper operation of the charging pumps when taking suction from the boric acid tank via the gravity drain system.

Pressurizer water level is monitored by four channels of level instrumentation (Trains A, B, C, and D) which indicate pressurizer water level at the control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel.

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STP FHAR 2.4.1.3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control RCS pressure control is accomplished by using the pressurizer PORVs or pressurizer (auxiliary) spray to depressurize the RCS or actuation of heaters to maintain pressure above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint.

There are two pressurizer PORVs (Train A and B) which, when combined with the pressurizer spray, provide the required redundancy. RCS wide range pressure indications (Trains B, C, and D) are available to monitor the rate of RCS depressurization from the control room or the auxiliary shutdown panel.

The steam bubble is maintained in the pressurizer by use of one bank of the pressurizer backup heaters (Trains A and C) or by RCS cooldown.

Accumulator injection is blocked during RCS depressurization by manually isolating the accumulators. If power is unavailable to any one of the accumulator discharge isolation valves, depressurization of the accumulator tanks can be accomplished by opening either of the accumulator nitrogen supply header vent valves in conjunction with the affected accumulator vent valve.

Safety injection pump operation can be manually controlled at the switchgear area for each train.

2.4.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Temperature Control RCS temperature control is accomplished by using natural circulation or, if offsite power is available, forced RCS circulation to remove decay heat from the reactor core and transfer it to the steam generators for removal. During hot standby when the main feedwater system is unavailable due to loss of offsite power (LOOP), this heat removal is accomplished by operation of the auxiliary feedwater system.

The auxiliary feedwater system consists of three motor driven pumps (Trains A, B, and C) and one turbine driven pump (Train D). Each pump supplies water to a dedicated steam generator which has a PORV powered from the same train as the pump. Valves in the turbine driven train are powered from the Train D Class 1E battery, which is charged by the Train A diesel generator. The turbine driven pump receives its steam supply from the steam generator D main steam line. Steam generator water level and pressure are monitored at the control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel to aid in auxiliary feedwater system operation. Operation of the auxiliary feedwater system can be accomplished from the control room or the auxiliary shutdown panel.

Steaming from four steam generators may be required to avoid stagnation during natural circulation cooldown. Steam Generator inventories in all four steam generators can be maintained by cross-CN-3257 connecting the available auxiliary feedwater trains. The valves in the cross-connect header can be operated from the control room if offsite power is available or locally if not. This allows RCS cooldown to proceed without stagnation. In the event only one steam generator PORV is available, additional steam venting is achieved through the deaerator.

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STP FHAR The auxiliary feedwater pumps take suction from the auxiliary feedwater storage tank, which has sufficient volume to satisfy Appendix R requirements. Several sources of makeup water for the auxiliary feedwater storage tank can be made available (such as the demineralized water storage tank and condensate hotwells or other alternate sources) if required. The design configuration and automatic controls on this system allow it to meet the Appendix R requirement of one redundant success path after a fire. If necessary, manual actions can be taken to replenish the auxiliary feedwater supply to assure that two redundant success paths can be made available after a fire.

RCS temperature indication of the rate of RCS cooldown can be accomplished by monitoring either hot or cold leg temperature. RCS hot leg temperature instrumentation (Train D) is provided in each of the four hot legs while cold leg temperature indication (Train B) is provided in each of the four cold legs. A third means of monitoring RCS temperature is by using the core exit thermocouples (Trains A and C) to indicate the coolant temperature at various points as it exits the reactor core. The availability of any one of the above three means of temperature indication provides an acceptable means of monitoring the rate of RCS cooldown. These temperature indications are provided in the control room and at the auxiliary shutdown panel.

2.4.2 Cold Shutdown Systems 2.4.2.1 Long Term Reactivity Control Long term reactivity control involves continued neutron flux monitoring in combination with RCS boration from the boric acid tank through the positive displacement or centrifugal charging pumps to assure the reactor is subcritical in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Alternately, borated water can be added from the refueling water storage tank to the RCS by the chemical and volume control system.

2.4.2.2 Long Term Decay Heat Removal Long term heat removal is accomplished by the residual heat removal system. The system has three redundant trains (A, B, and C) which are each capable of removing sufficient reactor decay heat to maintain the plant in a cold shutdown condition. If power is not available to the in-containment RCS isolation valves, they may be opened manually. Refer to FSAR Section 5.4.7 for additional description of the RHR system.

2.4.3 Support Systems 2.4.3.1 Component Cooling Water System The component cooling water system is a closed system, which provides cooling for many systems and components required for safe shutdown. The system consists of three train oriented loops (Trains A, B, and C) of which any single loop can provide sufficient cooling for systems and components required to achieve hot shutdown. These components are served either from the train-oriented loop or from a common header. Nonessential branch lines in the common portion can be isolated. Heat from the CCW system is rejected to the essential cooling water system. Refer to FSAR section 9.2.2 for additional description of the CCW system.

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STP FHAR 2.4.3.2 Essential Cooling Water System The essential cooling water system has three redundant trains (A, B, and C). Each train provides cooling water from the essential cooling pond to a CCW heat exchanger and other train oriented components. One ECW train is sufficient for safe shutdown. Refer to FSAR section 9.2.1 for additional description of the ECW system.

2.4.3.3 Onsite Power Systems Three Class 1E standby diesel generators (Trains A, B, and C) are each capable of powering the safety related system ac power loads associated with its respective train of safe shutdown equipment.

Class 1E batteries are provided for each of the four dc trains (A, B, C, and D). The Train A and D batteries are both charged from the Train A diesel generator. The Train B and C batteries are charged by their respective train diesel generators.

Credit is taken for the balance of plant (BOP) diesel generator and the BOP generator-powered instrument air compressor in the safe shutdown analysis. However, all components using instrument air fail safe upon loss of air or power. In addition, the BOP diesel generator and the instrument air compressor are neither safety-related nor are they contained in safety-related structures. Therefore, a safe shutdown analysis is not required for those portions of the turbine generator building which contain the BOP diesel generator and the instrument air compressor.

The TSC diesel generator and its associated power distribution system provide power to the positive displacement charging pump.

Refer to FSAR section 8.3 for additional information on onsite power systems.

2.4.3.4 Safety-related Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems The safety-related HVAC systems which provide environmental control within safety-related buildings and equipment areas, with the exception of the containment and electrical auxiliary buildings, are designed so that the safe-shutdown equipment is specifically cooled by HVAC equipment of the same train. The containment, electrical auxiliary building (except for the electrical penetration rooms which are cooled by train oriented room fans), and the main control room complex are cooled by using all three trains of HVAC equipment to cool the common area. The operation of any one train of HVAC equipment is capable of supporting the continued operation of the required safe shutdown systems until offsite power is restored. Refer to FSAR sections 6.4 and 9.4 for additional information on safety-related HVAC systems.

The primary means of smoke removal is use of portable blowers and flexible ductwork.

2.4.3.5 Qualified Display Processing System A qualified display processing system (QDPS) is used to provide data acquisition, display, and control functions in the main control room and at the auxiliary shutdown panel following a control 2-8 Amendment 25

STP FHAR room fire. Refer to Figure 2-1 for a diagrammatic example of QDPS circuits. Remote processing unit cabinets are powered by the associated train (Train A, B, C, or D). These cabinets are located in separate fire areas. The Train A and C QDPS database processing unit cabinets are each capable of displaying all four channels of safe shutdown indications in the main control room and at the auxiliary shutdown panel and are located in separate fire areas. The QDPS performs the following functions (Refer to FSAR Section 7.5.6 for additional information concerning QDPS):

1. Signal processing for display of safe shutdown parameters in the main control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel. The QDPS output signals are electrically isolated such that failure by hot short, short to ground, or open circuit at the control room or auxiliary shutdown panel does not affect the signal at the other location.

2. Signal processing for modulating control of selected safe shutdown equipment from the control room and from the auxiliary shutdown panel. The output circuits from QDPS are electrically isolated from fires originating in the control room or auxiliary shutdown panel.

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STP FHAR 2.4.4 Alternate Shutdown Capability Alternate shutdown capability is provided to respond to a large fire occurring within the main control room. Following operationsa performed from the control room, the transfer of control from the control room to the auxiliary shutdown panel and local control stations is accomplished from outside the control room using transfer switches which are predominately located in the three redundant switchgear rooms. The remaining transfer switches are on the auxiliary shutdown panel in the train related diesel generator rooms and at the Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure ventilation fan MCCs. When transferred, these circuits are independent of the control room. Safe shutdown from outside the control room is discussed in FSAR Section 7.4.1.9.

If a loss of offsite power occurs, all three Class 1E standby diesel generators receive an automatic start signal. No single control circuit failure due to a control room fire can disable all standby diesel generators. The sequencer circuits for the standby diesel generators are on separate paths outside the control room. The sequencers are located within their own fire area separated from the control room fire area. When control of a standby diesel generator is transferred to the local control station, the diesel will remain operating. Only one standby diesel generator is required to achieve safe shutdown. [1]

a Credit is given to the following operations in the control room to meet the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.L. Operators taking action to:

Trip the reactor

Initiate main steam isolation

Close the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) block valves

Secure all reactor coolant pumps

Close feedwater isolation valves

Secure the startup feedwater pumps

Isolate the reactor coolant system letdown

Secure the centrifugal charging pumps In addition, credit is taken for an automatic turbine trip in response to the reactor trip.

1 STP Safe Shutdown Compliance Analysis, Calculation 5A11MC6023 2-10 Amendment 25

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 01Z032 202 BS 3Z121ZRR019 (Deleted) 5 01Z032 202 BS B1BSZRR018 B/B NSSS Proc. Cab 03, Prot. Set III (Bat 1B Level) Instrumentation 6 01Z032 202 BS N1BSZRR009 N/A NSSS Proc. Cab 05, Cont. Grp. 1 (RHR HX 1A Inlet Temp.) Instrumentation 6 01Z032 202 BS N1BSZRR011 N/B NSSS Proc. Cab 07, Cont. Grp. 3 (RHR HX 1B Inlet Temp.) Instrumentation 6 01Z032 202 BS N1BSZRR012 N/C NSSS Proc. Cab 08, Cont. Grp. 4 (RHR HX 1C Inlet Temp.) Instrumentation 6 01Z032 202 NI A1NIZCP011R A/A Source Range NI Channel 31 Detector Panel Instrumentation 4 01Z032 202 NI D1NIZCP011R D/D Source Range NI Channel 32 Detector Panel Instrumentation 4 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP005 -/* Main Control Panel - Reactor Control Instrumentation 3 2-11 STP FHAR 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP006 -/* Main Control Panel - Steam Generator Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP001 -/* Main Control Panel - ESF Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP002 -/* Main Control Panel - ESF Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP003 -/* Main Control Panel - ESF Elect. Distribution Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP004 -/* Main Control Panel - CVCS Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP008 -/* Main Control Panel - Feedwater & Condensate Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 7Z341ZCP010 -/* Main Control Panel - Elec. Power Distribution Instrumentation 3 01Z034 202 MB 5Z341ZCP022 -/* Main Control Panel - HVAC Instrumentation 3 01Z034 203 MB A1MBZCP5B14 A/A Main Control Board - Reactor Control Instrumentation 6 01Z034 203 MB B1MBZCP5T24 A/A Main Control Board - Reactor Control Instrumentation 6 Amendment 25 02Z001 009 DJ D1DJBC047C D/D E1D11-1 Battery Charger Channel II Electrical Distribution 3 02Z001 009 DJ D1DJBC047D D/D E1D11-2 Battery Charger Channel II Electrical Distribution 3 02Z001 009 DJ D1DJPL037B D/D 125 VDC Class I Distr. Swed, E1D11 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z001 009 VA D1VADP1202 D/D 120V Dist. Panel Channel II Electrical Distribution 6 02Z001 009 VA D1VAIV1202 D/D 120V ESF Inverter Channel II Electrical Distribution 6 02Z001 009 DJ D1DJPL040A D/D 125VDC Distr. Pnl. PL040A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z002 006 DJ D1DJBT045B D/D 125 VDC Vital Battery E1D11 Electrical Distribution 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 02Z003 007 DJ A1DJBC047A A/A E1A11-01 Battery Charger Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 DJ A1DJBC047B A/A E1A11-02 Battery Charger Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 DJ A1DJPL037A A/A 125 VDC Class I Dist. Swed E1A11 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 VA AV1VDP0001 A/A 120V Dist. Panel Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 VA A1VADP1201 A/A 120V Dist. Panel Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 VA A1VAIV0001 A/A 120V ESF Inverter Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 VA A1VAIV1201 A/A 120V ESF Inverter Channel I Electrical Distribution 6 02Z003 007 DJ A1DJPL039A A/A 125VDC Distr. Pnl. PL039A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PK A1PKSG0E1A A/A 4160VAC Vital Bus E1A & Breakers Electrical Distribution 6 2-12 STP FHAR 02Z004 010 PL A1PLSG0E1A A/A Load Center E1A, Sec. 1, XMFR & Breakers Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PM A1DMMCE1A1 A/A MCC E1A1 480 VAC Vital MCC E1A1 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PM A1PMMCE1A2 A/A MCC E1A2 480 VAC Vital MCC E1A2 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PM A1PMMCE1A4 A/A MCC E1A4 480 VAC Vital MCC E1A4 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNERR118A A/A Train A Aux. Relay Pnl. RR118A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNERR119A A/A Train A Aux. Relay Pnl. RR119A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNERR129A A/A Train A Aux. Relay Pnl. RR129A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNERR130A A/A Train A Aux. Relay Pnl. RR130A Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNERR135 A/A Train A Isol. Pnl. RR135 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z004 010 PN N1PNERR135 A/A Train N Isol. Pnl. RR135 Electrical Distribution 6 Amendment 25 02Z004 010 VF 3E341EDTA170 (Deleted) - 6 02Z004 010 VF 3E341EDTA270 (Deleted) - 3 02Z004 010 PN A1PNZLP653 A/A Train A Transfer Switch Panel Alt Shutdown 6 02Z004 010 PN A1PNZLP700 A/A Train A Transfer Switch Panel Alt Shutdown 6 02Z004 010 PN 4Z551ZLP659 (Deleted) - 6 02Z004 010 PN 4Z551ZLP662 (Deleted) - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 02Z004 010 SI Power Lockout A A/A Power Lockout for MOV-0039A RCS Pressure Control 3 02Z005 013 HE 3V111VAH007 A/A Control Room Envelope AHU HVAC Support 3 02Z005 013 HE 3V111VDA249 (Deleted) - - 6 02Z005 013 HE 3V111VDA258 (Deleted) - - 5 02Z005 013 HE 3V111VFN017 A/A Control Room AHU Supply Fan HVAC Support 3 02Z005 013 HE 3V111VFN025 A/A Control Room Return Air Fan HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VFF095 A/A Fire Damper HVAC Support 7 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VFL130 A/A Flow Interruptor Damper HVAC Support 7 2-13 02Z005 013 CH A1CHTV9476A A/A Control Room AHU Chilled Wtr. Valve HVAC Support 3 02Z005 013 CH A1CHTV9476B A/A Control Room AHU Chilled Wtr. Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 02Z005 013 HE A1HEFY9677 (Deleted) - - 5 STP FHAR 02Z005 013 CH A1CHTY9476B A/A Control Room AHU Sol. Valve for CH Valve TV-9476A & HVAC Support 3 B

02Z005 013 HE A1HEFV9698 A/A Control Room Return Air Damper Valve HVAC Support 6 02Z005 010 PL A1PLSGDE1A/2 A/A Load Center E1A Sec. 2 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z005 013 HE A1HEFY9698 A/A Control Room Return Air Damper DA249 Sol. Valve HVAC Support 3 02Z005 013 HE A1HEFV9695 A/A Return Fan Recirculation Damper Valve HVAC Support 4 02Z005 013 HE A1HE-FY-9695 A/A Return Fan Recirculation Damper Solenoid Valve HVAC Support 4 02Z005 013 HE A1HEFV9670 A/A Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 Amendment 25 02Z005 013 HE B1HEFV9671 B/A Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 02Z005 013 HE A1HEFY9670 A/A Solenoid For FV9670 HVAC Support 7 02Z005 013 HE B1HEFY9671 B/A Solenoid For FV9671 HVAC Support 7 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VAH001 A/A EAB AHU Train A HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VFN001 A/A EAB Return Fan HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VFN010 A/A Battery Room Exhst. Air Fan HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B HE 3V111VFN014 A/A EAB Supply Fan HVAC Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 02Z005 104B CH A1CH-TV-9477A A/A EAB AHU Chilled Water Valve HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B CH A1CH-TV-9477B A/A EAB AHU Chilled Water Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 02Z005 104B CH A1CH-TY-9477B A/A EAB AHU Chilled Water Sol. Valve for CH Valve TV- HVAC Support 3 9477A&B 02Z006 001 NI A1NILDSRN31 A/A Source Range NI Channel 31 Pre Amp Instrumentation 4 02Z006 001 NI D1NILDSRN32 D/A Source Range NI Channel 32 Pre Amp Instrumentation 4 02Z006 001 PF N1PFMC01A5 N/* 480 VAC Non Vital MCC 1A5 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z006 001 HE 3V111VFN032 A/A Elect. Penet. Area HVAC Emerg. Fan HVAC Support 3 2-14 02Z006 001 HE 3V111VAH004 A/A Pen. Space HVAC Emerg. AHU HVAC Support 7 02Z013 012 DA N1DABT125D N/* 125VDC Battery - Dist. Swbd. 1B (EAB) Electrical Distribution 6 02Z013 012 DA N1DAPL125B N/* 125V Non Class 1E DC Dist. Swbd. 1B (EAB) Electrical Distribution 6 STP FHAR 02Z016 011 DA N1DABC125C N/* Battery Charger #1 - Dist. Swbd. 1B (EAB) Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 012A DA N1DABC125D N/* Battery Charger # 2 - Dist. Swbd. 1B (EAB) Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCDP001 N/* 120VAC Uninterrupted Dist. Panel - EAB Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCDP002 N/* 120VAC Uninterrupted Dist. Panel - EAB Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCIV001 N/* BOP Inverter 1 - DP001 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCIV002 N/* BOP Inverter 2 - DP002 Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCXS001 N/* DP001 Auto Power XFR SW Electrical Distribution 6 02Z016 011 VC N1VCXS002 N/* DP002 Auto Power XFR SW Electrical Distribution 6 Amendment 25 02Z016 011A HE 3V111VFI010 A/A Flow Interruptor Damper HVAC Support 7 02Z016 011 DA N1DAPL125D N/* 125V DC Panel PL125D Electrical Distribution 6 02Z084 008 PN D1PNRR124D D/D Group D Channel II Aux. Rly. Pnl. RR124D Electrical Distribution 6 02Z084 008 PN 3E251ERR125D (Deleted) - - 6 02Z084 009 PN 3E251ERR141 (Deleted) - - 6 02Z084 009 PN 4Z551ZLP688 (Deleted) - - 6 02Z084 006 DJ A1DJBT045A A/A ESF Channel I Battery E1A11 Electrical Distribution 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 02Z128 067 CC 3R201NPA101A A/A CCW Pump 1A CCW Support 3 02Z128 067 HM 3V101VAH001 A/A CCW Pump 1A Supplementary Cooler HVAC Support 3 02Z128 067 HM 3V101VAH019 A/A Essential Chiller Area AHU-Train A HVAC Support 6 02Z128 067 CH 3V111VCH004 A/A EAB Essential Chiller #4 HVAC Support 6 02Z128 067 CH 3V111ZLP620 A/A HVAC Chiller Panel #1 HVAC Support 7 02Z128 067 CH 3V111ZLP623 A/A HVAC Chiller Panel #1 HVAC Support 7 2-15 STP FHAR 02Z128 067 CH 3V111VPA004 A/A Essential Chilled Water Pump Train A HVAC Support 3 03Z031 201 HE 3V111VFN031 B/B Elect. Penet. Area HVAC Emerg. Fan HVAC Support 3 03Z031 201 HE 3V111VAH005 B/B Pen. Space HVAC Emerg. AHU HVAC Support 7 03Z031 201 PF N1PFEMC01B5 N/* 480 VAC Non Vital MCC 1B5 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z031 201 PN N1PNERR113 N/* Auxiliary Relay Rack 113 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z031 201 PN N1PNERR115 N/* Auxiliary Relay Rack 115 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z038 HE A1HEFV9673 A/A Control Room Exhaust Isolation Damper HVAC Support Amendment 25 03Z038 HE A1HEFV9674 B/B Control Room Exhaust Isolation Damper HVAC Support 03Z038 HE A1HEFY9673 A/A Solenoid for FV9673 HVAC Support 03Z038 HE A1HEFY9674 B/B Solenoid for FV9674 HVAC Support 03Z038 HE A1HESC9673 A/A Limit Switch for FV9673 HVAC Support 03Z038 HE A1HESC9674 B/B Limit Switch for FV9674 HVAC Support 03Z039 206 HE 3V111VAH008 B/B Control Room Envelope AHU 11B & Supply Fan HVAC Support 7 03Z039 206 HE B1HEFY9697 B/B Control Room Return Air Control Damper (FV-9697) HVAC Support 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 03Z039 206 HE 3V111VDA259 (Deleted) - - 5 03Z039 206 HE 3V111VFN018 B/B Control Room AHU Supply Fan HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 HE 3V111VFN026 B/B Control Room Return Fan HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 CH B1CH-TV-9486A B/B Control Room AHU Chilled Water Valve HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 CH B1CH-TV-9486B B/B Control Room AHU Chilled Water Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 CH B1CH-TY-9486B B/B Control Room AHU Sol Valve for TV-9486A & B HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 HE B1HE-FY-9676 (Deleted) - - 5 03Z039 206 HE B1HE-FY-9697 B/B Control Room Return Air Damper FV9697 Sol Valve HVAC Support 6 2-16 03Z039 206B HE 3V111VAH002 B/B EAB AHU Train B HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206B HE 3V111VFN002 B/B EAB Return Fan HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206B HE 3V111VFN011 B/B Battery Room Exhst. Air Fan HVAC Support 3 STP FHAR 03Z039 206B HE 3V111VFN015 B/B EAB Supply Fan HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 HE B1HE-FV-9694 B/B Control Room Return Air Control Damper (FV9694) HVAC Support 6 03Z039 206 HE B1HE-FY-9694 B/B Control Room Return Air Damper FV9694 Solenoid Valve HVAC Support 6 03Z039 206B CH B1CH-TV-9487A B/B EAB AHU Chilled Water Valve HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206B CH B1CH-TV-9487B B/B EAB AHU Chilled Water Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206B CH B1CH-TY-9487B B/B EAB AHU Chilled Water Sol. Valve for TV-9487A & B HVAC Support 3 03Z039 206 HE A1HEFV9667 A/B Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 Amendment 25 03Z039 206 HE B1HEFV9668 B/B Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 03Z039 206 HE A1HEFY9667 A/B Solenoid For FV9667 HVAC Support 7 03Z039 206 HE B1HEFY9668 B/B Solenoid For FV9668 HVAC Support 7 03Z042 212 PK B1PKSG0E1B B/B Swgr. Bus E1B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PL B1PLSG0E1B/1 B/B Load Center E1B Bus E1B1 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PL B1PLSG0E1B/2 B/B Load Center E1B Bus E1B2 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PM B1PMMCE1B1 B/B MCC E1B1 Electrical Distribution 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 03Z042 212 PM B1PMMCE1B2 B/B MCC E1B2 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PM B1PMMCE1B4 B/B MCC E1B4 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNERR120B B/B Train B Aux. Relay Pnl. RR120B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNERR121B B/B Train B Aux. Relay Pnl. RR121B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNERR131B B/B Train B Aux. Relay Pnl. RR131B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNERR132B B/B Train B Aux. Relay Pnl. RR132B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNERR137 B/B Train B Isol. Relay Pnl. RR137 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z042 212 PN 3E251ERR137 (Deleted) - - 6 2-17 03Z042 212 VF 3E341EDTB170 (Deleted) - - 6 03Z042 212 VF 3E341EDTB270 (Deleted) - - 6 03Z042 212 PN B1PNZLP654 B/B Train B Transfer Switch Panel Alt Shutdown 6 STP FHAR 03Z042 212 PN B1PNZLP701 B/B Train B Transfer Switch Panel Alt Shutdown 6 03Z042 212 PN 4Z551ZLP660 (Deleted) - - 6 03Z042 212 PN 4Z551ZLP663 (Deleted) - - 6 03Z042 212 SI Power Lockout B B/B Power Lockout for MOV-0039B RCS Pressure Control 3 03Z043 213 DJ B1DJBC047E B/B E1B11-1 Battery Charger Channel III Electrical Distribution 6 03Z043 213 DJ B1DJBC047F B/B E1B11-2 Battery Charger Channel III Electrical Distribution 6 03Z043 213 DJ B1DJPL037C B/B ESF Channel III Dist. Pnl. PL037C Electrical Distribution 6 Amendment 25 03Z043 213 VA B1VADP1203 B/B 120V Dist. Panel Channel III Electrical Distribution 6 03Z043 213 VA B1VAIV1203 B/B 120V ESF Inverter Channel III Electrical Distribution 6 03Z043 213 DJ B1DJPL039B B/B 125VDC Distr. Pnl. PL039B Electrical Distribution 6 03Z043 214 DJ B1DJBT045C B/B ESF Channel III Battery E1B11 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z115 217 DA N1DAPL125C N/* 125VDC Panel PL125C Electrical Distribution 6 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0197 C/C CCW to RCFC 11C & 12C Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0199 C/C Chilled Wtr. to RCFC 11C & 12C Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0209 C/C Chilled Wtr. From RCFC 11C & 12C Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0210 C/C CCW from RCFC 11C & 12C Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 03Z116 216 RC D1RC-PT-0405 D/* RCS Extended Range Pressure Loop B Monitoring 3 03Z116 216 CC A1CC-MOV-0012 A/A RHR Pump 1A, RHR HX 1A Supply ISO CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC A1CC-MOV-0050 A/A RHR Return ISO Valve CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC A1CC-MOV-0291 A/A CCW Supply to RCP ISO CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC B1CC-MOV-0122 B/B RHR Pump 1B, RHR HX 1B Supply ISO CCW Support 6 03Z116 216 CC B1CC-MOV-0130 B/B RHR Return ISO Valve CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC B1CC-MOV-0318 B/B CCW to RCP ISO CCW Support 5 2-18 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0182 C/C RHR Pump 1C, RHR HX 1C Supply ISO CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0190 C/C RHR Return ISO Valve CCW Support 5 03Z116 216 CC C1CC-MOV-0404 C/C CCW Return ISO Outside RC CCW Support 5 STP FHAR 03Z116 216 CC D1CC-FV-4493 D/* CCW Return ISO Outside RC CCW Support 6 03Z116 216 CC D1CC-FY-4493 D/* Solenoid for D1CC-FV-4493 CCW Support 6 03Z117 218K CC 7R201TCC0833 (Deleted) - - 5 03Z119 226 CV B1CV-MOV-0113A B/* Volume Control Tank 1A Isolation Valve RCS Boration 3 03Z119 226 CV C1CV-MOV-0112B C/* Volume Control Tank 1A Isolation Valve RCS Boration 3 03Z119 233 CV 2R171NTS101A */* Volume Control Tank RCS Boration 3 03Z119 233 CV N1CV-LCV-0112A (Deleted) - - 7 Amendment 25 03Z119 233 CV N1CV-LY-3167A N/* Letdown Divert Valve Solenoid RCS Letdown 4 03Z119 233 CV N1CV-LY-3167B N/* Letdown Divert Valve Solenoid RCS Letdown 4 03Z119 226 CV N1CVFCV0110B N/* BA Blend to Chg. Pump Suct. FCV RCS Boration 7 03Z119 226 CV N1CVFCV0111B N/* BA M/U Flow to VCT 1A STVLV RCS Boration 8 03Z119 335 CV 2R171TCV0221 */* Isolation Valve for Boric Acid from Boric Acid Transfer RCS Boration 8 Pumps 03Z119 335 CV 3R171TCV0219 */* Isolation Valve for Boric Acid Transfer Pump to VCT RCS Boration 8

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 03Z130 218 CC 7R201TCC0834 (Deleted) - - 6 03Z130 218A CC 7R201TCC0273 */* CCW to BTRS Isolation Valve CCW Support 7 03Z130 218A CC 7R210TCC0300 (Deleted) - - 5 03Z130 218 CV N1CVFCV0110A N/* BA M/U to VCT FCV RCS Boration 7 03Z130 218A PN N1PNERR108 N/* Auxiliary Relay Rack 108 Electrical Distribution 6 03Z130 218A CV N1CVFCV0394 */* CCW Out. From Boron Thermal Regen. Chiller 1A RCS Boration 7 03Z130 218A CV N1CVFIC0394 N/* Controller for N1CVFCV0394 RCS Boration 7 03Z147 206B HE 3V111VFI207 B/B Flow Interruptor Damper HVAC Support 8 2-19 03Z147 206B HE 3V111VFF312 B/B Fire Damper HVAC Support 7 03Z147 206B HE 3V111VFF314 B/B Fire Damper HVAC Support 7 04Z046 301 HE 3V111VFN030 C/C Elect. Penet. Area HVAC Emerg. Fan HVAC Support 3 STP FHAR 04Z046 301 HE 3V111VAH006 C/C Pen. Space HVAC Emerg. AHU HVAC Support 7 04Z046 301 PF N1PFMC01C5 N/* 480 VAC Non Vital MCC 1C5 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z046 301 PN N1PNERR114 N/* Auxiliary Relay Rack 114 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VAH009 C/C Control Room Envelope AHU 11C & Supply Fan HVAC Support 7 04Z049 307 HE C1HE-FV-9696 C/C Control Room Return Air Control Damper (FV-9696) HVAC Support 6 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VDA260 (Deleted) - - 5 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VFN019 C/C Control Room AHU Supply Fan HVAC Support 3 Amendment 25 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VFN027 C/C Control Room Return Fan HVAC Support 3 04Z049 307 CH C1CH-TV-9496A C/C Control Room AHU Chilled Water Valve HVAC Support 3 04Z049 307 CH C1CH-TV-9496B C/C Control Room AHU Chilled Water Water Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 04Z049 307 CH C1CH-TY-9496B C/C Control Room AHU Sol Valve for TV-9496A & B HVAC Support 3 04Z049 307 HE C1HE-FY-9675 (Deleted) - - 5 04Z049 307 HE C1HE-FY-9696 C/C Control Room Return Air Damper FV-9696 Sol. Valve HVAC Support 6 04Z049 410 HE 3V111VAH003 C/C EAB AHU Train C HVAC Support 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 04Z049 410 HE 3V111VFN003 C/C EAB Return Fan HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 HE 3V111VFN012 C/C Battery Room Exhst. Air Fan HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 HE 3V111VFN016 C/C EAB Supply Fan HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 CH C1CH-TV-9497A C/C EAB AHU Chilled Water Valve HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 CH C1CH-TV-9497B C/C EAB AHU Chilled Water Bypass Valve HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 CH C1CH-TY-9497B C/C EAB AHU Chilled Water Sol. Valve for TV-9497A & B HVAC Support 3 04Z049 410 HE C1HE-FV-9693 C/C Control Room Return Air Control Damper (FV-9693) HVAC Support 6 2-20 04Z049 410 HE C1HE-FY-9693 C/C Control Room Return Air Damper FV-9693 Solenoid Valve HVAC Support 6 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VFI259 C/C Flow Interruptor Damper HVAC Support 8 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VFF272 C/C Fire Damper HVAC Support 7 STP FHAR 04Z049 307 HE 3V111VFI409 C/C Flow Interruptor Damper HVAC Support 8 04Z049 307 HE C1HEFV9664 C/C Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 8 04Z049 307 HE C1HEFY9664 C/C Solenoid Valve for FV9664 HVAC Support 8 04Z049 307 HE A1HEFV9665 A/C Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 8 04Z049 307 HE A1HEFY9665 A/C Solenoid Valve for FV9665 HVAC Support 8 04Z050 308D DA N1DAPL125H N/* 125 VDC Distribution Panel 125H Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PK C1PKSG0E1C C/C Swgr Bus E1C Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PL C1PLSG0E1C/1 C/C Load Center E1C Bus E1C1 Electrical Distribution 6 Amendment 25 04Z052 318 PM C1PMMCE1C1 C/C MCC E1C1 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PM C1PMMCE1C2 C/C MCC E1C2 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PM C1PMMCE1C4 C/C MCC E1C4 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PL C1PLSG0E1C/2 C/C Load Center E1C Bus E1C2 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PN C1PNERR122C C/C Train C Aux. Relay Pnl. RR122C Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PN C1PNERR123C C/C Train C Aux. Relay Pnl. RR123C Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PN C1PNERR133C C/C Train C Aux. Relay Pnl. RR133C Electrical Distribution 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 04Z052 318 PN C1PNERR134C C/C Train C Aux. Relay Pnl. RR134C Electrical Distribution 6 04Z052 318 PN 3E251ERR139 (Deleted) - - 6 04Z052 318 PN 3E251ERR140 (Deleted) - - 6 04Z052 318 VF 3E341EDTC270 (Deleted) - - 6 04Z049 307 HE C1HEFV9664 C/C Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 04Z049 307 HE C1HEFY9664 C/C Solenoid Valve for FV9664 HVAC Support 7 04Z049 307 HE A1HEFY9665 A/C Outside Air Supply Isolation Damper HVAC Support 7 04Z049 307 HE A1HEFY9665 A/C Solenoid Valve for FV9665 HVAC Support 7 04Z052 318 PN C1PNZLP655 C/C Train C Transfer Switch Panel Alt. Shutdown 6 04Z052 318 PN C1PNZLP702 C/C Train C Transfer Switch Panel Alt. Shutdown 6 2-21 04Z052 318 PN C1PNZLP709 C/C Train C Transfer Switch Panel Alt. Shutdown 6 STP FHAR 04Z052 318 PN 4Z551ZLP661 (Deleted) - - 6 04Z052 318 PN 4Z551ZLP664 (Deleted) - - 6 04Z052 318 SI Power Lockout C C/C Power Lockout for MOV-0039C RCS Pressure Control 3 04Z053 319 DJ C1DJBC047G C/C E1C11-1 Battery Charger Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 DJ C1DJBC047H C/C E1C11-2 Battery Charger Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 DJ C1DJPL037D C/C ESF Channel IV Dist. Pnl. Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 VA C1VADP002 C/C 120V Dist. Panel Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 VA C1VADP1204 C/C 120V Dist. Panel Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 VA C1VAIV002 C/C 120V ESF Inverter Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 Amendment 25 04Z053 319 VA C1VAIV1204 C/C 120V ESF Inverter Channel IV Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 319 DJ C1DJPL039C C/C 125VDC Distr. Pnl. PL039C Electrical Distribution 6 04Z053 321 DJ C1DJBT045D C/C ESF Channel IV Battery E1C11 Electrical Distribution 6 04Z056 301 SP A1SPRXTRPSG2 */A Reactor Trip Switchgear Breaker Alt. Shutdown 3 04Z056 301 SP B1SPRXTRPSG1 */B Reactor Trip Switchgear Breaker Alt. Shutdown 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 07Z071 015 PN D1PNZLP680 D/D QDPS APC D - Processor/Sensor I/F Instrumentation 6 07Z071 015 PN D1PN1ZLP680/A A/A QDPS DPU APC D DPU A I/F Instrumentation 6 07Z071 015 PN D1PNZLP680/C C/C QDPS DPU APC D DPU C I/F Instrumentation 6 07Z071 015 PN 5Z341ZLP100 -/* Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Alt. Shutdown 3 08Z072 015B PN C1PNZLP803 C/C ESF Load Sequencer Pnl. Electrical Distribution 6 08Z072 015B PN C1PNZLP679 C/C QDPS APC-Processor/Sensor/Controller I/F Instrumentation 6 08Z072 015B PN C1PNZLP679/A A/A QDPS APC C - DPU A I/F Portion Instrumentation 6 08Z072 015B PN C1PNZLP679/C C/C QDPS APC C - DPU C I/F Instrumentation 6 08Z072 015B PN A1PNZLP682 A/C QDPS DPU Train C Instrumentation 6 2-22 08Z072 015B NI C1NIZLP684 C/C Neutron Flux Signal Processor Monitoring 6 STP FHAR 08Z072 015B NI C1NIZLP686 C/C Neutron Flux Amplifier Monitoring 6 09Z073 015C PN B1PNZLP802 B/B ESF Load Sequencer Pnl. Electrical Distribution 6 09Z073 015C PN B1PNZLP678 B/B QDPS APC B - Processor/Sensor/I/F Instrumentation 6 09Z073 015C PN B1PNZLP678/A A/A QDPS APC B - DPU A I/F Portion Instrumentation 6 09Z073 015C PN B1PNZLP678/C C/C QDPS APC B - DPU C I/F Portion Instrumentation 6 20Z129 106A CC A1CC-FV-4540 (Deleted) - - 6 20Z129 106A CC A1CC-MOV-0235 A/* CCW to LTDN HX, Br. Evap. & BTRS CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC B1CC-FV-4541 (Deleted) - - 6 20Z129 106A CC B1CC-MOV-0032 (Deleted) - - 5 Amendment 25 20Z129 106A CC C1CC-MOV-0447 (Deleted) - - 5 20Z129 106A CC AICC-FV-4656 A/* CCW Supply to Charging Pumps Cross Connect Vlv. CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC AICC-FV-4657 A/* CCW from Charging Pumps Cross Connect Vlv. CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC AICC-MOV-0052 A/* Train A CCW Return from Common Header Isolation Valve CCW Support 20Z129 106A CC AICC-MOV-0316 A/* CCW Train A Valves to Common Header CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC AICC-MOV-0768 A/* CCW Train A Isolation Valve to Charging Pumps CCW Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 20Z129 106A CC AICC-MOV-0772 A/* CCW Train A Isolation Valve from Charging Pumps CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-FY-4656B B/* CCW Supply to Charging Pumps Vent Solenoid Valve CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-FY-4657B B/* CCW to Charging Pumps Cross Connect Solenoid Valve CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-MOV-0132 B/* Train B CCW Return from Common Header Isolation Valve CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-MOV-0314 B/* CCW Train B Valve to Common Header CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-MOV-0770 B/* CCW Train B Isolation Valve to Charging Pumps CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC BICC-MOV-0774 B/* CCW Train B Isolation Valve from Charging Pumps CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC CICC-FY-4656C C/* CCW Supply to Charging Pumps Vent Solenoid Valve CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC CICC-FY-4657C C/* CCW to Charging Pumps Cross Connect Solenoid Valve CCW Support 3 2-23 20Z129 106A CC CICC-MOV-0192 C/* Train C CCW Return from Common Header Isolation Valve CCW Support 3 STP FHAR 20Z129 106A CC CICC-MOV-0312 C/* CCW Train C Valve to Common Header CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC CICC-MOV-0771 C/* CCW Train C Isolation Valve to Charging Pumps CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC CICC-MOV-0775 C/* CCW Train C Isolation Valve from Charging Pumps CCW Support 3 20Z129 106A CC A1CC-FY-4656A A/* CCW Supply to Charging Pumps Solenoid Operator CCW Support 4 20Z129 106A CC A1CC-FY-4657A A/* CCW Return from Charging Pump Solenoid Operator CCW Support 4 20Z129 106A CC A1CC-TE-4510 A/A CCW HX 1A Outlet Temperature Monitoring 3 20Z129 106A CC B1CC-TE-4515 B/B CCW HX 1B Outlet Temperature Monitoring 3 20Z129 106A CC C1CC-TE-4520 C/C CCW HX 1C Outlet Temperature Monitoring 3 22Z133 064 CC A1CC-MOV-0057 A/A CCW to RCFC 11A & 12A Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 CC A1CC-MOV-0059 A/A Chilled Wtr. to RCFC 11A & 12A Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 Amendment 25 22Z133 064 CC A1CC-MOV-0069 A/A CCW From RCFC 11A & 12A Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 CC A1CC-MOV-0070 A/A Chilled Wtr. from RCFC 11A & 12A Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 CC B1CC-MOV-0136 B/B CCW to RCFC 11B & 12B Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 CC B1CC-MOV-0137 B/B Chilled Wtr. to RCFC 11B & 12B Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 CC B1CC-MOV-0148 B/B CCW from RCFC 11B & 12B Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 22Z133 064 CC B1CC-MOV-0149 B/B Chilled Wtr. from RCFC 11B & 12B Isol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 22Z133 064 RC B1RC-PT-0406 B/* RCS Wide Range Pressure Loop C Monitoring 3 22Z133 064 RC C1RC-PT-0407 C/* RCS Wide Range Pressure Loop A Monitoring 3 22Z133 64 IA B1IAFV8565 B/* IA Containment Isolation Various 7 23Z104 063 SI 2N121NTF101A */* Refueling Water Storage Tank RCS Boration 6 23Z114 107 CC 9R201TCC0033 */* CCW to BRS Evap. Vlv. CCW Support 3 23Z114 107 CC 9R201TCC0264 */* CCW to BRS Evap. Vlv. CCW Support 3 23Z114 107 CC C1CC-MOV-0236 C/* CCW Hdr Isol. Valve to Ltdn HX, BRS Evap. & BTRS CCW Support 3 23Z131 237 CV 2R171NFR101A */* RC Filter 1A RCS Letdown 3 2-24 23Z131 237 CV A1CV-MOV-0025 A/A CVCS Charging ISO RCB RCS Charging 5 STP FHAR 23Z131 237 CV N1CV-FV-3127 N/* Letdown Return to VCT Isol. Valve RCS Letdown 3 23Z131 237 CV N1CV-TCV-0143 */* Filter Bypass RCS Letdown 5 23Z131 237 CV N1CV-FY-3127 N/* Solenoid for FV-3127 RCS Letdown 3 23Z131 237 CV N1CV-TY-3163 N/* Solenoid for TCV-0143 RCS Letdown 5 23Z135 108C CV B1CV-MOV-0024 B/* RCS Letdown ISO Outside RCB RCS Letdown 6 23Z135 108C CV B1CV-MOV-0079 B/* RCB Letdown ISO Outside RCB RCS Letdown 6 23Z135 108D CV B1CV-MOV-0033A B/A Seal Water to RCP 1A ISO Valve RCS Charging 7 23Z135 108D CV B1CV-MOV-0033B B/B Seal Water to RCP 1B ISO Valve RCS Charging 6 23Z135 108D CV B1CV-MOV-0033C C/C Seal Water to RCP 1C ISO Valve RCS Charging 6 23Z135 108D CV B1CV-MOV-0033D D/D Seal Water to RCP 1D ISO Valve RCS Charging 7 Amendment 25 23Z135 108C PS B1PS-FV-4456 (Deleted) - - 5 23Z135 108C PS B1PS-FY-4456 (Deleted) - - 5 24Z102 067D PN N1PNERR107 N/* Auxiliary Relay Rack 107 Electrical Distribution 6 24Z102 067D CV N1CV-TCV-0381B */* Flow Control to Letdown HX RCS Letdown 6 24Z102 067D CV N1CV-TY-3351A N/* Solenoid For TCV-0381B RCS Letdown 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 24Z137 111B CC 7R201TCC0277 */* CCW to LWPS Evap. Vlv. CCW Support 3 25Z124 041 CV 2R171NPA101B A/* Charging Pump 1B RCS Boration 3 25Z124 041 HM 3V101VAH005 A/A Centr. Charg. Pump 1B Cubicle Cooler HVAC Support 3 25Z124 044 CV 2R171XCV0226 N/* BAT. 1A/BAT. 1B Gravity Drain Isolation RCS Boration 3 25Z124 044 HM 3V101VAH007 (Deleted) - - 6 25Z124 044 CV C1CV-MOV-0112C C/* RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Vlv. RCS Boration 3 26Z123 033 HM 3V101VAH011 (Deleted) - - 6 26Z123 033 CV A1CV-MOV-0218 A/* RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Vlv. RCS Boration 7 26Z123 033 CV B1CV-MOV-0113B B/* RWST Charging Pump Isolation Vlv. RCS Boration 3 26Z123 039 CV 2R171NPA101A C/* Charging Pump 1A RCS Boration 3 2-25 STP FHAR 26Z123 039 HM 3V101VAH004 C/C Centrfg. Charg. Pump 1A Cubicle Cooler HVAC Support 3 27Z018 018 CV 3V101VAH009 C/

Supply Fan Coil Unit (BA Transfer Pump Room) HVAC Support 7 27Z108 018 CV 2R171XCV0335A */* BAT. 1A Gravity Drain to BA XFR. Pump 1B Isol. Valve RCS Boration 7 27Z108 018 CV 2R171XCV0335B */* BAT. 1B Gravity Drain to BA XFR. Pump 1A Isol. Vlv. RCS Boration 7 27Z108 018 CV 3R171NPA103A C/* Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1A RCS Boration 7 27Z108 018A CV 3R171NPA103B A/* Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1B RCS Boration 7 27Z108 018A CV 3V101VAH008 A/* Supply Fan Coil Unit (BA Transfer Pump Room) HVAC Support 7 27Z127 026 CV 4R171NHX104A */* Seal Water HX 1A RCS Letdown 8 Amendment 25 27Z127 050 CV 5R171NHX102A */* Letdown Heat Exchanger 1A RCS Letdown 3 27Z127 079 CV A1CV-HV-0206 (Deleted) - - 7 27Z127 048 CV 2R171TCV0104 */* Bypass Valve for PCV0135 RCS Letdown 7

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 27Z127 048 CV 2R171XCV0102 */* Isol. Valve for PCV0135 RCS Letdown 7 27Z127 048 CV 2R171XCV0103 */* Isol. Valve for PCV0135 RCS Letdown 7 27Z127 226 CV 2R171TCV0193 */* CVCS Flow Valve to RHT RCS Letdown 7 27Z127 079 CV 2R171TCV0225 */* PDP Recirc. Manual Valve RCS Charging 8 27Z127 079 CV 2R171TCV0255 */* Loop Charging Bypass Valve RCS Charging 8 27Z127 079A CV A1CV-FCV-0205 A/* Charging Flow Control Vlv. RCS Boration 3 27Z127 079A CV A1CV-FY-0205 A/* Charging Flow Control (FCV-205) Sol. Vlv. RCS Boration 3 27Z127 079A CV A1CV-MOV-8377B A/* Chg. Pmp. 1B Isol. Vlv. RCS Boration 3 27Z127 079B CV C1CV-MOV-8348 (Deleted) - - 7 2-26 27Z127 079B CV C1CV-MOV-8377A C/* Chg. Pmp. 1A Isol. Vlv. RCS Boration 3 STP FHAR 27Z127 050 CV 2R171-XCV-0170 */* Excess and Seal Letdown Return to VCT Isolation Valve RCS Letdown 4 27Z127 050 CV 2R171-XCV-0171 */* Excess and Seal Letdown Return to Charging Pump Suction RCS Letdown 4 27Z127 050 CV 2R171-XCV-0693 */* Excess and Seal Letdown Return to VCT Isolation Valve RCS Letdown 6 27Z127 046 CV N1CVPCV0135 */* Outlet of Letdown HX RCS Letdown 5 27Z127 046 CV N1CVPY3164 N/* I to P for PCV0135 RCS Letdown 5 27Z127 037 CV 2R171NPD101A N/* PDCP Suction Stabilizer RCS Boration 7 27Z127 046 CC N1CC-TV-4494 */* CCW Outlet from Letdown HX 1A CCW Support 5 27Z127 046 CC N1CC-TY-4494 */* Cntrlr. for TV4494 CCW Support 5 27Z127 079C CV C1CVHCV0218 C/* Seal Injection ISO Vlv RCS Charging 5 27Z127 079C CV C1CVHY3171A C/* Solenoid for C1CVHCV0218 RCS Charging 5 Amendment 25 27Z127 079A CV 2R171XCV0254A */* Loop Charging Isolation Valve RCS Charging 8 27Z139 067F CC 3R201NPA101C C/C CCW Pump 1C CCW Support 3 27Z139 067F HM 3V101VAH003 C/C CCW Pump 1C Supplementary Cooler HVAC Support 3 27Z139 067F HM 3V101VAH021 C/C Essential Chiller Area AHU HVAC Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 27Z139 067F CH 3V111VCH006 C/C Essential Chiller Train C HVAC Support 3 27Z139 067F CH 3V111VPA006 C/C Essential Chilled Water Pump Train C HVAC Support 3 27Z139 067F CH 3V111ZLP622 C/C HVAC Chiller Panel #3 HVAC Support 7 27Z139 067F CH 3V111ZLP625 C/C HVAC Chiller Panel #3 HVAC Support 7 27Z141 076 CV A1CVLT0102 A/* BAT 1A Level Transmitter RCS Boration 5 27Z141 076 CV C1CVLT0106 C/* BAT 1B Level Transmitter RCS Boration 5 27Z141 076 CV 2R171XCV0333 */* BAT. 1A & 1B Gravity Drain Iso. Valve RCS Boration 3 27Z141 076 CV 3R171NTF101A */* Boric Acid Tank 1A RCS Boration 3 27Z141 076 CV 3R171NTF101B */* Boric Acid Tank 1B RCS Boration 3 2-27 27Z141 076 CV B1CV-LT-0105 B/* Boric Acid Tank 1B Level Monitoring 3 STP FHAR 27Z141 076 CV C1CV-LT-0103 C/* Boric Acid Tank 1A Level Monitoring 3 27Z141 076 CV N1CVLI0108 */* Boric Acid Tank 1A Level Monitoring 7 27Z141 076 CV N1CVLI0109 */* Boric Acid Tank 1B Level Monitoring 7 27Z142 106 CC 3R201NHX101A */A CCW HX 1A CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CC 3R201N01B */B CCW HX 1B CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CC 3R201NHX101C */C CCW HX 1C CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CH 3V111VTS004 */A Essential Chilled Water Expansion Tank HVAC Support 3 27Z142 106 CH 3V111VTS005 */B Essential Chilled Water Expansion Tank HVAC Support 3 27Z142 106 CH 3V111VTS006 */C Essential Chilled Water Expansion Tank HVAC Support 3 27Z142 106 CC A1CC-MOV-0642 A/A CCW HX 1A Bypass Valve CCW Support 3 Amendment 25 27Z142 106 CC A1CC-MOV-0643 A/A CCW HX 1A Disch. Valve CCW Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 27Z142 106 CC B1CC-MOV-0644 B/B CCW HX 1B Bypass Vlv. CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CC B1CC-MOV-0645 B/B CCW HX 1B Disch. Vlv. CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CC C1CC-MOV-0646 C/C CCW HX 1C Bypass Valve CCW Support 3 27Z142 106 CC C1CC-MOV-0647 C/C CCW HX 1C Disch. Valve CCW Support 3 29Z140 067E CC 3R201NPA101B B/B CCW Pump 1B CCW Support 3 29Z140 067E HM 3V101VAH002 B/B CCW Pump 1B Supplementary Cooler HVAC Support 3 29Z140 067E HM 3V101VAH020 B/B Essential Chiller Area AHU HVAC Support 3 29Z140 067E CH 3V111VCH005 B/B Essential Chiller Train B HVAC Support 3 2-28 29Z140 067E CH 3V111VPA005 B/B Essential Chilled Water Pump Train B HVAC Support 3 STP FHAR 29Z140 067E CH 3V111ZLP621 B/B HVAC Chiller Panel #2 HVAC Support 7 29Z140 067E CH 3V111ZLP624 B/B HVAC Chiller Panel #2 HVAC Support 7 31Z047 302 PN 3E121ETCB01 (Deleted) - - 6 31Z047 302 PN 3E121ETCB02 (Deleted) - - 6 31Z047 302 PN 3E121ETCB03 (Deleted) - - 6 31Z047 302 PN 3E121ETCB04 (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 31Z047 302 PN 3E121ETCB05 (Deleted) - - 6 32Z122 324B CC 3R201NTS101A */* CCW Surge Tank CCW Support 3 35Z310 305 HF 9V121VAH001 (Deleted) - - 6 35Z310 305 AP 9Z541ZLP665 (Deleted) - - 6 35Z310 305 AP 9Z541ZLP666 (Deleted) - - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 35Z310 305 AP 9Z541ZLP738 (Deleted) - - 6 35Z310 305 AP 9Z541ZLR101 (Deleted) - - 6 35Z310 305 AP 9Z541ZTA001 (Deleted) - - 6 36Z500 003 DJ C1DJPL139C C/C 125 VDC Distr. Pnl. PL139C Electrical Distribution 6 36Z500 003 DG 3Q151MDG0334 C/C ESF Diesel Generator No. 13 Electrical Distribution 3 36Z500 003 DG 3Q151MSA0334 C/C DG Aux. Skid Assy. 13 DG Support 7 36Z500 003 DG 3Q151MTS0534 */C DG Starting Air Rec. No. 15 DG Support 3 36Z500 003 DG 3Q151MTS0634 */C DG Starting Air Rec. No. 16 DG Support 3 36Z500 003 DG 3Z351ZLP105 C/C DG No. 13 Pnl. DG Support 8 2-29 36Z500 003 DG 3Z351ZLP106 C/C DG No. 13 Pnl. DG Support 8 STP FHAR 36Z512 103 DG 3Q151MFR0334 */C Diesel Generator Inlet Air Filter DG Support 3 36Z512 106 DG 3Q151MTS2334 */C Diesel Generator Inlet Silencer DG Support 5 36Z512 106 DG 3Q151MTS3334 */C Diesel Generator Exhaust Silencer DG Support 3 37Z501 002 DJ B1DJPL139B B/B 125 VDC Distr. Pnl. PL139B Electrical Distribution 6 37Z501 002 DG 3Q151MDG0234 B/B ESF Diesel Generator No. 12 Electrical Distribution 3 37Z501 002 DG 3Q151MSA0234 B/B DG Aux. Skid Assy. 12 DG Support 3 37Z501 002 DG 3Q151MTS0334 */B DG Starting Air Rec. No. 13 DG Support 3 37Z501 002 DG 3Q151MTS0434 */B DG Starting Air Rec. No. 14 DG Support 3 37Z501 002 DG 3Z351ZLP103 B/B DG No. 12 Pnl. DG Support 8 37Z501 002 DG 3Z351ZLP104 B/B DG No. 12 Pnl. DG Support 8 Amendment 25 37Z513 102 DG 3Q151MFR0234 */B Diesel Generator Inlet Air Filter DG Support 3 37Z513 002 DG 3Q151MTS2234 */B Diesel Generator Inlet Silencer DG Support 5 37Z513 105 DG 3Q151MTS3234 */B Diesel Generator Exhaust Silencer DG Support 3 38Z502 001 DJ A1DJPL139A A/A 125 VDC Distr. Pnl. PL139A Electrical Distribution 6 38Z502 001 DG 3Q151MDG0134 A/A ESF Diesel Generator No. 11 Electrical Distribution 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 38Z502 001 DG 3Q151MSA0134 A/A DG Aux. Skid Assy. 11 DG Support 7 38Z502 001 DG 3Q151MTS0134 */A DG Starting Air Rec. No. 11 DG Support 3 38Z502 001 DG 3Q151MTS0234 */A DG Starting Air Rec. No. 12 DG Support 3 38Z502 001 DG 3Z351ZLP101 A/A DG No. 11 Pnl. DG Support 8 38Z502 001 DG 3Z351ZLP102 A/A DG No. 11 Pnl. DG Support 8 38Z514 101 DG 3Q151MFR0134 */A Diesel Generator Intake Air Filter DG Support 3 38Z514 001 DG 3Q151MTS2134 */A Diesel Generator Inlet Silencer DG Support 5 38Z514 104 DG 3Q151MTS3134 */A Diesel Generator Exhaust Silencer DG Support 3 39Z503 109 DG 3Q151MTF0337 */C DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank No. 13 DG Support 6 2-30 40Z504 108 DG 3Q151MTF0237 */B DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank No. 12 DG Support 6 STP FHAR 41Z505 107 DG 3Q151MTF0137 */A DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank No. 11 DG Support 6 45Z509 209 HG 3V131VFN003 C/C DG 13 Emerg. Vent Fan 11C HVAC Support 6 45Z509 209 HG C1HG-TV-9745 C/C DG Rm. 13 Recirc. Damper DA-238 HVAC Support 3 45Z509 209 HG C1HG-TY-9745 C/C DG Rm. 13 Recirc. Damper Sol. Vlv. HVAC Support 3 46Z510 208 HG 3V131VFN002 B/B DG 13 Emerg. Vent Fan 11B HVAC Support 3 46Z510 208 HG B1HG-TV-9744 B/B DG Rm. 12 Recirc. Damper DA-237 HVAC Support 3 46Z510 208 HG B1HG-TY-9744 B/B DG Rm. 12 Recirc. Damper Sol. Vlv. HVAC Support 3 47Z511 207 HG 3V131VFN001 A/A DG 11 Emerg. Vent Fan 11A HVAC Support 6 47Z511 207 HG A1HG-TV-9743 A/A DG Rm. 11 Recirc. Damper DA-236 HVAC Support 3 Amendment 25 47Z511 207 HG A1HG-TY-9743 A/A DG Rm. 11 Recirc. Damper Sol. Vlv. HVAC Support 3 48Z403 005 AF 3S141MPA03 C/C AFW Pump 13 (Motor Driven) SG Invent. Cntr./RCS 6 Temp.

48Z403 101 SB A1SB-FY-4151A A/C SG 1C Blwdwn. Isolation Valve Sol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 48Z403 101 AF C1AF-FV-7515 C/* AFW to SG 1C Crossover Valv. SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 48Z403 101 AF C1AF-FV-7523 C/C AFW to SG 1C Flow Reg. Valve SG Invent. Cntr./RCS 3 Temp.

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 48Z403 101 AF C1AF-FY-7515 C/* AFW Crossover Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 48Z403 101 AF C1AF-MOV-0085 C/C AFW Pump 13 Isol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 48Z403 101 SB C1SB-FV-4151 C/C SG 1C Bldwn. Isol. Vlv. SG Inventory Control 3 48Z403 101 SB C1SB-FY-4151 C/C SG 1C Blowdown Isol. Vlv. Sol Valve SG Inventory Control 3 48Z403 101 SB N1SB-FV-4155 */C Blowdown ISO Valve for SG 1C SG Inventory Control 6 48Z403 101 SB N1SB-FY-4155 N/C Controller For N1SB-FV-4155 SG Inventory Control 6 48Z406 501 HC 3V141VFN003 C/C AFW Pump 13 Vent Fan HVAC Support 3 48Z406 501 MS C1MS-PT-7431 C/C MS Line Pressure SG 1C Monitoring 3 48Z406 501 MS C1MS-PV-7431 C/C SG 1C PORV SG Pressure Control 3 2-31 48Z406 501 MS C1MS-PY-7431 C/C SG 1C PORV E/H Signal Converter SG Pressure Control 3 STP FHAR 48Z406 501 MS A1MS-FV-7432 (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS N1MS-PSV-7430 (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS N1MS-PSV-7430A (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS N1MS-PSV-7430B (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS N1MS-PSV-7430C (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS N1MS-PSV-7430D (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS A1MS-FY-7432 (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS B1MS-FY-7432A (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS A1MS-FSV-7434 (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS A1MS-FY-7434 (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 48Z406 501 MS B1MS-FY-7434A (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS A1MS-FY-7434C (Deleted) - - 6 48Z406 501 MS B1MS-FY-7434D (Deleted) - - 6 49Z402 006 AF 3S141MPA02 B/B AFW Pump 12 (Motor Driven) SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 49Z402 102 AF B1AF-FV-7516 */B AFW to SG 1B Crossover Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 6 49Z402 102 AF B1AF-FV-7524 B/B AFW to SG 1B Flow Reg. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 49Z402 102 AF B1AF-FY-7516 B/* AFW Crossover Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 49Z402 102 AF B1AF-MOV-0065 B/B AFW Pump 12 Isol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 49Z402 102 SB B1SB-FV-4152 B/B SG 1B Bldwn. RCB Isol. Vlv. SG Inventory Control 3 49Z402 102 SB B1SB-FY-4152 B/B SG 1B Blowdown Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 49Z402 102 SB C1SB-FY-4152A C/B SG 1B Blowdown Isol. Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 49Z402 102 SB N1SB-FV-4156 */B SG 1B Blowdown Isol. Valve SG Inventory Control 6 49Z402 102 SB N1SB-FY-4156 N/B Controller For N1SB-FV-4156 SG Inventory Control 6 2-32 49Z407 502 HC 3V141VFN002 B/B AFW Pump 12 Vent Fan HVAC Support 3 STP FHAR 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-PT-7421 B/B MS Line Pressure SG 1B Monitoring 3 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-PV-7421 B/B SG 1B PORV SG Inventory Control 3 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-PY-7421 B/B SG 1B PORV E/H Signal Converter SG Inventory Control 3 49Z407 502 MS A1MS-FV-7422 (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS N1MS-PSV-7420 (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS N1MS-PSV-7420A (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS N1MS-PSV-7420B (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS N1MS-PSV-7420C (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS N1MS-PSV-7420D (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS A1MS-FY-7422 (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-FY-7422A (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS A1MS-FSV-7424 (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS A1MS-FY-7424 (Deleted) - - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-FY-7424A (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS A1MS-FY-7424C (Deleted) - - 6 49Z407 502 MS B1MS-FY-7424D (Deleted) - - 6 50Z401 007 AF 3S141MPA01 A/A AFW Pump 11 SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 50Z401 103 AF A1AF-FV-7517 A/* AFW to SG 1A Crossover Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 50Z401 103 AF A1AF-FV-7525 A/A AFW to SG 1A Flow Reg. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 50Z401 103 AF A1AF-FY-7517 A/* AFW Crossover Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 50Z401 103 AF A1AF-MOV-0048 A/A AFW Pump 11 Isol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 50Z401 103 SB A1SB-FV-4153 A/A SG 1A Bldwn. Isol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 2-33 50Z401 103 SB A1SB-FY-4153 A/A SG 1A Blowdown Isol Valve Sol Valve SG Inventory Control 3 STP FHAR 50Z401 103 SB B1SB-FY-4153A B/A SG 1A Blowdn Isol Valve Sol Valve SG Inventory Control 3 50Z401 103 SB N1SB-FV-4157 */A Blowdown Iso. Valve For SG 1A SG Inventory Control 6 50Z401 103 SB N1SB-FY-4157 N/A Controller For N1SB-FV-4157 SG Inventory Control 6 50Z408 503 HC 3V141VFN001 A/A AFW Pump 11 Vent Fan HVAC Support 3 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-PT-7411 A/A MS Line Pressure SG 1A Monitoring 3 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-PV-7411 A/A SG 1A PORV SG Pressure Control 3 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-PY-7411 A/A SG 1A PORV E/H Signal Converter SG Pressure Control 3 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-FV-7412 (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS N1MS-PSV-7410 (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS N1MS-PSV-7410A (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 50Z408 503 MS N1MS-PSV-7410B (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS N1MS-PSV-7410C (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS N1MS-PSV-7410D (Deleted) - - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

(NOTE 3)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-FY-7412 (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS B1MS-FY-7412A (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-FSV-7414 (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-FY-7414 (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS B1MS-FY-7414A (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS A1MS-FY-7414C (Deleted) - - 6 50Z408 503 MS B1MS-FY-7414D (Deleted) - - 6 51Z400 008 AF 3S141MPA04 D/D AFW Pump 14 SG Invent Cntr/RCS Temp 6 2-34 51Z400 008 AF 3S141MTU01 */D AFW Pump 14 Turbine Driver SG Invent Cntr/RCS Temp 3 STP FHAR 51Z400 008 AF D1AF-MOV-0514 D/D AFW Pump 14 Turb. Trip & Throttle Valve SG Invent Cntr/RCS Temp 3 51Z400 104 SB N1SB-FV-4154 */D Blowdown Iso. Valve For SG 1D SG Inventory Control 6 51Z400 104 SB N1SB-FY-4154 N/D Controller For N1SB-FV-4154 SG Inventory Control 6 51Z400 104 SB A1SB-FV-4150 A/D SG 1D Bldwn Isol Valve SG Inventory Control 3 51Z400 104 SB A1SB-FY-4150 A/D SG 1D Blowdown Valve Sol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 51Z400 104 SB B1SB-FY-4150A B/D SG 1D Blowdown Valve Sol. Valve SG Inventory Control 3 51Z400 104 AF D1AF-FV-7518 D/* AFW to SG1D Crossover Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 51Z400 104 AF D1AF-FV-7526 D/D AFW to SG 1D Reg Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 51Z400 104 AF D1AF-FY-7518 D/* AFW Crossover Vlv. Sol. Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 Amendment 25 51Z400 104 AF D1AF-MOV-0019 D/D SG1D AFW Isol Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 Temp.

51Z409 404 AF D1AF-MOV-0143 D/D AFW Pump 14 Turb Steam Inlet Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 51Z409 404 AF D1AF-FV-0143 D/D AFW Pump 14 Steam Inlet Bypass Valve SG Invent. Cntr /RCS Temp. 3 51Z409 504 HC 3V141VFN004 A/D AFW Pump 14 Vent Fan HVAC Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

(NOTE 3)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 51Z409 504 MS D1MS-PT-7441 D/D MS Line Pressure SG 1D Monitoring 3 51Z409 504 MS D1MS-PV-7441 D/D SG 1D PORV SG Pressure Control 3 51Z409 504 MS D1MS-PY-7441 D/D SG 1D PORV E/H Signal Converter SG Pressure Control 3 51Z409 504 MS A1MS-FV-7442 (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS N1MS-PSV-7440 (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS N1MS-PSV-7440A (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS N1MS-PSV-7440B (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS N1MS-PSV-7440C (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS N1MS-PSV-7440D (Deleted) - - 6 2-35 51Z409 504 MS A1MS-FY-7442 (Deleted) - - 6 STP FHAR 51Z409 504 MS B1MS-FY-7442A (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS A1MS-FSV-7444 (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS A1MS-FY-7444 (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS B1MS-FY-7444A (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS A1MS-FY-7444C (Deleted) - - 6 51Z409 504 MS B1MS-FY-7444D (Deleted) - - 6 53Z600 104 PM A1PMMCEA3 A/A MCC E1A3 Electrical Distribution 6 53Z600 104 VF 3E341EDTA370 (Deleted) - - 6 53Z600 104 EW 3R281NPA101A A/A ECW Pump 1A ECW Support 3 Amendment 25 53Z600 104 EW 3R281NSP101A A/A ECW Self Cleaning Strainer 1A ECW Support 3 53Z600 104 HZ 3V151VFN001 A/A ECW Pump Building Fan No. 1 HVAC Support 3 53Z600 104 HZ 3V151VFN002 A/A ECW Pump Building Fan No. 2 HVAC Support 3 53Z600 104 EW A1EW-MOV-0121 A/A ECW Pump 1A Discharge Valve ECW Support 3 53Z600 109 HZ A1HZ-FV-9894 (Deleted) - - 6 53Z600 109 HZ A1HZ-FV-9894A (Deleted) - - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

(NOTE 3)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 53Z600 109 HZ A1HZ-FY-9894 (Deleted) - - 6 53Z600 109 HZ A1HZ-FY-9894A (Deleted) - - 6 54Z601 105 PM B1PMMCEB3 B/B MCC E1B3 Electrical Distribution 6 54Z601 105 VF 3E341EDTB370 (Deleted) - - 6 54Z601 105 EW 3R281NPA101B B/B ECW Pump 1B ECW Support 3 54Z601 105 EW 3R281NSP101B B/B ECW Self Cleaning Strainer 1B ECW Support 3 54Z601 105 HZ 3V151VFN003 B/B ECW Pump Building Fan No. 11B HVAC Support 6 54Z601 105 HZ 3V151VFN004 B/B ECW Pump Building Fan No. 12B HVAC Support 6 54Z601 105 EW B1EW-MOV-0137 B/B ECW Pump 1B Discharge Valve ECW Support 3 2-36 54Z601 108 HZ B1HZ-FV-9895 (Deleted) - - 6 STP FHAR 54Z601 108 HZ B1HZ-FV-9895A (Deleted) - - 6 54Z601 108 HZ B1HZ-FY-9895 (Deleted) - - 6 54Z601 108 HZ B1HZ-FY-9895A (Deleted) - - 6 55Z602 106 PM C1PMMCEC3 C/C MCC E1C3 Electrical Distribution 6 55Z602 106 VF 3E341EDTC370 (Deleted) - - 6 55Z602 106 EW 3R281NPA101C C/C ECW Pump 1C ECW Support 3 55Z602 106 EW 3R281NPS101C C/C ECW Self Cleaning Strainer 1C ECW Support 3 55Z602 106 HZ 3V151VFN005 C/C ECW Pump Building Fan No. 11C HVAC Support 6 55Z602 106 HZ 3V151VFN006 C/C ECW Pump Building Fan No. 12C HVAC Support 6 Amendment 25 55Z602 106 EW C1EW-MOV-0151 C/C ECW Pump 1C Discharge Valve ECW Support 3 55Z602 107 HZ C1HZ-FV-9896 (Deleted) - - 6 55Z602 107 HZ C1HZ-FV-9896A (Deleted) - - 6 55Z602 107 HZ C1HZ-FY-9896 (Deleted) - - 6 55Z602 107 HZ C1HZ-FY-9896A (Deleted) - - 6 63Z202 001 RC 1R101NRV101A */* Reactor Vessel RCS 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z202 001 HC 8V141VFN017 A/* CRDM Vent Fan 11A HVAC Support 3 63Z202 001 HC 8V141VFN018 B/* CRDM Vent Fan 11B HVAC Support 3 63Z202 001 HC 8V141VFN019 C/* CRDM Vent Fan 11C HVAC Support 3 63Z202 001 NI A1NI-NE-0045 (Deleted) - - 6 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0026 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0027 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0028 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0029 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0030 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 2-37 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0031 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 STP FHAR 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0032 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0033 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0034 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0035 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0036 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0037 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0038 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0039 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0040 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0041 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 Amendment 25 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0042 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0043 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0044 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0045 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0046 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0047 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0048 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 163Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0049 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 II C1II-TE-0050 C/* Core Exit Temp Monitoring 3 63Z202 001 NI C1NI-NE-0046 Ex-core neutron detector Monitoring 8 63Z202 001 NI A1NINE0045 Ex-core neutron detector Monitoring 8 63Z202 001 NI A1NI-NE-0031 Source range detector Monitoring 8 63Z202 001 NI D1NI-NE-0032 Source range detector Monitoring 8 63Z202 301 RC A1RC-HV-3657A A/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent. Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 2-38 63Z202 301 RC A1RC-HV-3658A A/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent. Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 STP FHAR 63Z202 301 RC B1RC-HV-3657B B/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent. Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 63Z202 301 RC B1RC-HV-3658B B/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent. Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 63Z202 501 HC 3V141VFN027 A/* Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan (11A) HVAC Support 6 63Z202 501 HC 3V141VFN028 B/* Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan (11B) HVAC Support 6 63Z202 501 HC 3V141FVN029 A/* Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan (12A) HVAC Support 6 63Z202 501 HC 3V141VFN030 C/* Containment Cubicle Exhaust Fan (12B) HVAC Support 6 63Z202 501 FW A1FW-LT-0571 A/A SG 1A Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 3 63Z202 501 FW B1FW-LT-0528 B/B SG 1B Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 3 63Z202 501 FW C1FW-LT-0537 C/C SG 1C Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 3 Amendment 25 63Z202 501 FW D1FW-LT-0549 D/D SG 1D Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 3 63Z202 501 FW A1FWLT0572 A/B Steam Generator 1B Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 7 63Z202 501 FW A1FWLT0574 A/D Steam Generator 1D Narrow Range Water Level Monitoring 7 63Z205 307 CV 5R171NHX103A */* Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 1A RCS Letdown 6 1

Item abandoned in place

63Z206 402 CC A1CC-FV-4531 */A CCW Flow Valve from RHR HX 1A CCW Support 6 63Z206 402 CC A1CC-FY-4531 A/A CCW Flow Vlv. Sol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 2-39 STP FHAR Amendment 25

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z206 402 CC B1CC-FV-4548 B/B CCW Flow Valve from RHR HX 1B CCW Support 3 63Z206 402 CC B1CC-FY-4548 B/B CCW Flow Vlv. Sol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 63Z206 402 CC C1CC-FV-4565 C/C CCW Flow Valve From RHR HX 1C CCW Support 3 63Z206 402 CC C1CC-FY-4565 C/C CCW Flow Vlv. Sol. Vlv. CCW Support 3 63Z206 402 CC A1CC-MOV-0189 A/* RHR Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z206 402 CC B1CC-MOV-0049 B/* RHR Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z207 308 FW C1FW-LT-0504 C/D Steam Gen 1D Water Level (Wide Range) Monitoring 3 63Z207 308 RC C1RC-LT-0468 C/* Pressurizer Water Level Monitoring 3 63Z207 308 RC D1RC-LT-0466 D/* Pressurizer Water Level Monitoring 3 2-40 63Z207 308 CC A1CC-MOV-0063 A/* RCFC 12A Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 STP FHAR 63Z207 308 CC C1CC-MOV-0203 C/* RCFC 12A Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z207 308 CC N1CCMOV0339 N/A Reactor Coolant Pump 1A CCW Outlet MOV CCW Support 7 63Z207 308 CC N1CCMOV0356 N/D Reactor Coolant Pump 1D CCW Outlet MOV CCW Support 7 63Z208 308 RC B1RC-LT-0467 B/* Pressurizer Water Level Monitoring 3 63Z208 308 FW D1FW-LT-0501 D/A Steam Gen 1A Water Level (Wide Range) Monitoring 3 63Z209 308 FW B1FWLT0528 B/B S/G 1B NR Level Monitoring 7 63Z209 308 FW D1FWLT0529 D/B S/G 1B NR Level Monitoring 7 63Z209 308 FW C1FWLT0529 C/B S/G 1B NR Level Monitoring 7 63Z209 308 FW A1FWLT0502 A/B Steam Gen 1B Water Level (Wide Range) Monitoring 3 63Z209 308 CC B1CCMOV0393 B/* CCW Supply To Excess Letdown Heat Ex. CCW Support 6 Amendment 25 63Z209 308 CC A1CCMOV0208 A/C RCFC 11C, 12C Ret. Iso. Vlv. CCW Support 6 63Z210 308 CC A1CCMOV0297 A/* Excess Letdown and LWPS Heat Ex. CCW Support 6 63Z210 308 FW B1FW-LT-0503 B/C Steam Gen 1C Water Level (Wide Range) Monitoring 3 63Z210 308 CC A1CCMOV0542 A/* CCW Return Iso. Inside RC CCW Support 6 63Z210 308 CC C1CC-MOV-0392 (Deleted) - - 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z210 308 CC B1CCMOV0403 B/* CCW Return Iso. Inside RC CCW Support 6 63Z210 308 CC N1CCMOV0374 N/B Reactor Coolant Pump 1B CCW Outlet MOV CCW Support 7 63Z210 308 CC N1CCMOV0390 N/C Reactor Coolant Pump 1C CCW Outlet MOV CCW Support 7 63Z211 210 RC A1RC-LT-0465 A/* Pressurizer Water Level Monitoring/Control 6 63Z211 210C CC B1CCMOV0068 B/B RCFC 11A, 12A Rtn. Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z211 112 CC C1CCMOV0200 C/B RCFC 12C Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z211 112 RC A1RCLT0465 A/* PZR Level RCS Pressure Control 6 63Z211 210C CC C1CCMOV0147 C/B RCFC 11B, 12B Rtn. Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z211 210C CC C1CCMOV0207 C/A RCFC 11C Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 2-41 63Z212 210 SI B1SIPV3930 B/* Accumulator 1C Vent Isol Valve RCS Pressure Control 6 STP FHAR 63Z212 210 RH A1RHFY3860A A/A Solenoid Valve for HCV-864 Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z213 210 CC A1CCMOV0064 A/A RCFC 11A Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z213 210 SI C1SIPV3929 C/B Accumulator 1B Vent Valve RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z213 210 RH B1RH-FY-3861A B/B Solenoid Valve for HCV-865 Residual Heat Removal 6 63Z213 210 RC D1RCPT0403 D/B RCS Loop 2 Wide Range Pressure RCS Pressure Control 7 63Z214 210 SI A1SIHCV0900 A/* Accumulator Header Vent Vlv RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z214 210 CC A1CCMOV0060 A/B RCFC 12A Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z214 210 SI A1SIPV3928 A/C Accumulator 1A Vent Valve RCS Pressure Control 6 63Z214 210 CC A1CCMOV0067 A/A RCFC 11A Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z214 210 RC B1RCPT0404 B/C RCS Loop 3 Wide Range Pressure RCS Pressure Control 7 Amendment 25 63Z214 210 SI B1SIHV0899 B/* Accumulator Header Vent Vlv RCS Pressure 6 Control 63Z214 210 CC C1CCMOV0204 C/A RCFC 11C Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z215 112 HC 2V141VFN002 A/* RCFC Supply Fan 12A HVAC Support 3 63Z215 112 HC 2V141VFN006 C/* RCFC Supply Fan 12C HVAC Support 3 63Z215 112 HC 2V141VHX002 */* RCFC Cooling Coil 12A HVAC Support 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z215 112 HC 2V141VHX006 */* RCFC Cooling Coil 12C HVAC Support 3 63Z216 010 SI A1SIMOV0039A A/A Accumulator 1A Discharge Isol Vlv RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z216 112 HC 2V141VFN004 B/* RCFC Supply Fan 12B HVAC Support 3 63Z216 112 CC B1CCMOV0142 B /B RCFC 12B Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z216 112 HC 2V141VHX004 */* RCFC Cooling Coil 12B HVAC Support 3 63Z217 010 SI B1SIMOV0039B B/B Accumulator 1B Discharge Isol Vlv RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z217 112 HC 2V141VFN001 A/* RCFC Supply Fan 11A HVAC Support 3 63Z217 112 HC 2V141VFN003 B/* RCFC Supply Fan 11B HVAC Support 3 63Z217 010B CC B1CCMOV0139 B/B RCFC 12B Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z217 112 HC 2V141VHX001 */* RCFC Cooling Coils 11A HVAC Support 3 2-42 63Z217 110C CC B1CCMOV0143 B/B RCFC 11B Supply Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 STP FHAR 63Z217 112 HC 2V141VHX003 */* RCFC Cooling Coils 11B HVAC Support 3 63Z218 112 HC 2V141VFN005 C/* RCFC Supply Fan 11C HVAC Support 3 63Z218 010B CC B1CCMOV0146 B/B RCFC 11B Return Iso. Valve CCW Support 6 63Z218 112 HC 2V141VHX005 */* RCFC Cooling Coils 11C HVAC Support 3 63Z218 112 SI C1SIMOV0039C C/C Accumulator 1C Discharge Isol Vlv RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z219 001 HC 8V141VFN023 N/* Reactor Cavity Vent Fan 11A HVAC Support 6 63Z219 001 HC 8V141VFN024 N/* Reactor Cavity vent Fan 11B HVAC Support 6 63Z219 001 HC 9V141VFN036 N/* Reactor Supports Exh. Fan HVAC Support 7 63Z219 001 HC 9V141VFN037 N/* Reactor Supports Exh. Fan 11A HVAC Support 7 Amendment 25 63Z220 201 MS 1R121NSG101D */D Steam Generator 1D RCS Heat Removal 3 63Z220 201 RC 1R131NPP101D */D Reactor Coolant Pump 1D Seal RCS Inventory Control/ 3 Boration 63Z220 201 CV A1CV-MOV-0082 A/* Excess Letdown Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 63Z220 201 CV B1CV-MOV-0083 B/* Excess Letdown Isol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 3 63Z220 201 CV N1CVFV3157 */D RCP 1D #1 Seal Leakoff RCP Seal Integrity 7

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z220 201 RC B1RC-TE-0444 B/D T (Cold) Wide Range Loop 4 Monitoring 3 63Z220 201 RC D1RC-TE-0443 D/D T (Hot) Wide Range Loop 4 Monitoring 3 63Z220 201 CV N1CVFY3157 N/D Solenoid for FV3157 RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z221 201 CV N1CVFV3154 */A RCP 1A #1 Seal Leakoff RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z221 201 CV N1CVFY3154 N/A Solenoid for FV3154 RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z221 201 MS 1R121NSG101A */A Steam Generator 1A RCS Heat Removal 3 63Z221 201 RC 1R131NPP101A */A Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Seals RCS Inventory Control/ 3 Boration 63Z221 201 RH A1RH-MOV-0060A (Deleted) - - 7 2-43 63Z221 201 RC B1RC-TE-0414 B/A T (Cold) Wide Range Loop 1 Monitoring 3 STP FHAR 63Z221 201 RC D1RC-TE-0413 D/A T (Hot) Wide Range Loop 1 Monitoring 3 63Z221 201 SI A1S1MOV0019A A/A RHR Ht. Ex. Bypass to RCS via SI Residual Heat Removal 7 63Z222 201 CV N1CVFV3155 */B RCP 1B #1 Seal Leakoff RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z222 201 CV N1CVFY3155 N/B Solenoid for FV3155 RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z222 201 MS 1R121NSG101B */B Steam Generator 1B RCS Heat Removal 3 63Z222 201 RC 1R131NPP101B */B Reactor Coolant Pump 1B Seals RCS Inventory Control/ 3 Boration 63Z222 201 RC B1RC-TE-0424 B/B T (Cold) Wide Range Loop 2 Monitoring 3 63Z222 201 RH B1RH-MOV-0060B (Deleted) - - 7 63Z222 201 RC D1RC-TE-0423 D/B T (Hot) Wide Range Loop 2 Monitoring 3 Amendment 25 63Z222 201 RC A1RC-HCV-0601 A/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve RCS Letdown 6 63Z222 201 RC B1RC-HCV-0602 B/* Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve RCS Letdown 4 63Z222 201 SI B1S1MOV0019B B/B RHR Ht. Ex. Bypass to RCS via SI Residual Heat Removal 7 63Z223 201 CV N1CVFV3156 */C RCP 1C #1 Seal Leakoff RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z223 201 MS 1R121NSG101C */C Steam Generator 1C RCS Heat Removal 3 63Z223 201 RC 1R131NPP101C */C Reactor Coolant Pump 1C Seals RCS Inventory Control/ 3 Boration

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z223 201 RC B1RC-TE-0434 B/C T (Cold) Wide Range Loop 3 Monitoring 3 63Z223 201 RH C1RH-MOV-0060C (Deleted) - - 7 63Z223 201 CV A1CV-LCV-0465 A/* Letdown Stop Valve RCS Letdown 3 63Z223 201 CV C1CV-LCV-0468 C/* Letdown Stop Valve RCS Letdown 3 63Z223 201 RC D1RC-TE-0433 D/C T (Hot) Wide Range Loop 3 Monitoring 3 63Z223 201 CV N1CVFY3156 N/C Solenoid for FV3156 RCP Seal Integrity 7 63Z223 201 SI C1S1MOV0019C C/C RHR Ht. Ex. Bypass to RCS via SI Residual Heat Removal 7 63Z224 403 RC 7R111EHT101A A/* Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1A RCS Pressure Control 6 2-44 63Z224 403 RC 7R111EHT101B C/* Pressurizer Heater Backup Group 1B RCS Pressure Control 6 63Z224 403 RC 1R111NPZ101A */* Pressurizer RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z224 403 RC A1RC-MOV-0001A A/A Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve RCS Pressure Control 3 STP FHAR 63Z224 403 RC B1RC-MOV-0001B B/B Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z224 403 RC A1RC-PCV-0655A (Deleted) - - 7 63Z224 403 RC B1RC-PCV-0656A (Deleted) - - 7 63Z224 403 CV N1CV-LV-3119 */* Aux Spray Isolation Vlv RCS Pressure Control 7 63Z224 403 CV N1CV-LY-3119 N/* Solenoid for LV-3119 RCS Pressure Control 3 63Z225 211 PS C1PS-FV-4454 (Deleted) - - 6 63Z225 211 PS C1PS-FV-4454A (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 63Z225 211 PS C1PS-FV-4455 (Deleted) - - 6 63Z225 211 PS C1PS-FV-4455A (Deleted) - - 6 63Z226 108 RH A1RH-TE-0857 A/A RHR HX 1A Discharge Temp. Monitoring 3 63Z226 108 RH B1RH-MOV-0061A (Deleted) - - 7 63Z226 109 RH 2R161NPA101A A/A RHR Pump 1A Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z226 207 RH A1RH-MOV-0066A A/A RHR-CVCS Isol Valve RCS Letdown 3 63Z226 304 RH 2R161NHX101A */A RHR HX 1A Residual Heat Removal 3

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z226 304 RH A1RH-HCV-0864 A/A RHR HX IA Flow Control Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z226 304 SI A1SI-FCV-0851 A/A RHR HX 1A Bypass Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z226 304 SI A1SI-FY-3857A A/A Solenoid Valve for FCV-851 Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z226 304 RH N1RH-TE-0874 N/A RHR HX 1A Inlet Temp Monitoring 3 63Z226 304 SI A1SI-MOV-0031A A/A RHR Train A Outlet Isol. Residual Heat Removal 6 63Z227 105 RH N1RH-TE-0875 N/B RHR HX 1B Inlet Temp Monitoring 3 63Z227 110 RH 2R161NPA101B B/B RHR Pump 1B Residual Heat Removal 3 2-45 63Z227 111 RH B1RH-TE-0858 B/B RHR HX 1B Discharge Temp. Monitoring 3 63Z227 111 RH C1RH-MOV-0061B (Deleted) - - 7 63Z227 204 RH B1RH-MOV-0066B B/B RHR-CVCS Isol Valve RCS Letdown 3 STP FHAR 63Z227 306 RH 2R161NHX101B */B RHR HX 1B Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z227 306 RH B1RH-HCV-0865 B/B RHR HX 1B Flow Control Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z227 306 SI B1SI-FCV-0852 B/B RHR HX 1B Bypass Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z227 306 SI B1SI-FY-3858A B/B Solenoid Valve for FCV-852 Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z227 306 SI B1SI-MOV-0031B B/B RHR Train B Outlet Isol. Residual Heat Removal 6 63Z228 104 RH 2R161NPA101C C/C RHR Pump 1C Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 105 RH C1RH-TE-0859 C/C RHR HX 1C Discharge Temp. Monitoring 3 63Z228 105 RH N1RH-TE-0876 N/C RHR Train C HX Inlet Temp. Monitoring 3 Amendment 25 63Z228 202 RH A1RH-MOV-0061C (Deleted) - - 7 63Z228 303 RH 2R161NHX101C */C RHR HX 1C Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 303 RH C1RH-HCV-0866 C/C RHR HX 1C Flow Control Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 303 SI C1SI-FCV-0853 C/C RHR HX 1C Bypass Valve Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 303 RH C1RH-FY-3862A C/C Solenoid Valve for HCV-862 Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 303 SI C1SI-FY-3859A C/C Solenoid Valve for FCV-853 Residual Heat Removal 3 63Z228 303 SI C1SI-MOV-0031C C/C RHR Train C Outlet Isol. Residual Heat Removal 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 63Z229 307 CV B1CV-FV-3123 B/* Excess Letdown HX Discharge Diversion Valve RCS Letdown 6 63Z229 307 CV B1CV-FY-3123 B/* Excs Letdown HX Discharge Diversion Sol. Vlv. RCS Letdown 6 63Z229 307 CV N1CV-HCV-0227 N/* Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Valve RCS Letdown 6 63Z229 307 CV 2R171NHX101A */* Regenerative Heat Exchanger 1A RCS Letdown 3 63Z229 307 CV A1CV-MOV-0003 A/* RCS Normal Charging Isolation RCS Boration 3 63Z229 307 CV C1CV-MOV-0006 C/* Alt Chg Isolation Valve RCS Boration 3 63Z229 307 CV C1CV-MOV-0014 C/* Letdown Orifice Isol Valve RCS Letdown 3 63Z229 307 CV C1CV-FV-0013 C/* Letdown Orifice Isol Valve RCS Letdown 8 2-46 63Z229 307 CV A1CV-FV-0012 A/* Letdown Orifice Isol Valve RCS Letdown 8 63Z229 307 CV C2CVFV0011 C/* CVCS LTD ORIF HDR ISO Valve (Unit 2 only) RCS Letdown 8 64Z026 102 PN 3E121ETCA01 (Deleted) - - 6 STP FHAR 64Z026 102 PN 3E121ETCA02 (Deleted) - - 6 64Z026 102 PN 3E121ETCA03 (Deleted) - - 6 64Z026 102 PN 3E121ETCA04 (Deleted) - - 6 64Z026 102 PN 3E121ETCA05 (Deleted) - - 6 65Z057 401 PN 3E121ETCC01 (Deleted) - - 6 65Z057 401 PN 3E121ETCC02 (Deleted) - - 6 65Z057 401 PN 3E121ETCC03 (Deleted) - - 6 Amendment 25 65Z057 401 PN 3E121ETCC04 (Deleted) - - 6 75Z112 015D DA N1DAPL125G N/* 125 VDC Panel PL125G Electrical Distribution 6 76Z017 015D PN A1PNZLP801 A/A ESF Load Sequencer Pnl. Electrical Distribution 6 76Z017 015D PN A1PNZLP0677 A/A QDPS APC- Process/Sensor/I/F Instrumentation 6 76Z017 015D PN A1PNZLP677/A A/A QDPS APC- DPU A I/F Portion Instrumentation 6 76Z017 015D PN A1PNZLP681 A/* QDPS DPU Train A Instrumentation 6 76Z017 015D NI A1NIZLP683 A/A Neutron Flux Signal Processor Monitoring 6

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number 76Z017 015D NI A1NIZLP685 A/A Neutron Flux Amplifier Monitoring 6 76Z017 015D PN A1PNZLP677/C C/C QDPS APC-DPU C I/F Portion Instrumentation 6 76Z017 015D PN C1PNZLP681 C/A QDPS DPU Train A Instrumentation 6 TGB 103 DB 8E171EMC01G5 N/* BOP Diesel Generator Bus 1G5 Electrical Distribution 7 TGZ703 104 DB 9Q141EDG001 N/* BOP Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Distribution 7 TGZ703 104 DB 9Q141ZLP138 N/* BOP Diesel Generator Control Panel Electrical Distribution 7 2-47 TGB 105 DB 9Q141EDG003 N/* BOP Diesel Generator Battery Charger Electrical Distribution 7 TGB 106 DA 7E231EBT125E N/* 125 VDC Battery Swbd. 1A (TGB) Electrical Distribution 7 TGG 105 DA 7E231EPL125A N/* 125 VDC Distribution 1E Swbd 1A Electrical Distribution 7 STP FHAR TGB 105 DA 8E231EBC125A N/* Battery Charger #1 - Swbd 1A (TGB) Electrical Distribution 7 TGB 105 DA 8E231EBC125B N/* Battery Charger #2 - Swbd 1A (TGB) Electrical Distribution 7 TGB 105 DA 9E521EPL125E N/* 125 VDC Distribution Pnl. 125E Electrical Distribution 7 TGB N/A FW 7S131XFW0621 */* Deaerator Vent Valve RCS Temperature Control 7 TGB N/A AS N1ASPV7401 N/* Auxiliary Steam Pressure Control Valve RCS Temperature Control 7 TGB 102A IA 8Q111MC0014 N/* Air Cooled Diesel Powered Instrument Air Compressor Process Support 16 Amendment 25

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number TGB 201B AS N1ASMOV0186 N/* Auxiliary Steam Header Isolation Valve RCS Temperature Control 7 TGB 201B AS N1ASMOV0304 N/* Auxiliary Steam Header Isolation Valve RCS Temperature Control 7 TGB N/A FN 7S131XFW0621 */* Deaerator Vent Valve RCS Temperature Control 8 TGB N/A AS N1ASPV7401 N/* Auxiliary Steam Pressure Control Valve RCS Temperature Control 8 TGB 201B AS N1ASMOV0186 N/* Auxiliary Steam Header Isolation Valve RCS Temperature Control 8 TGB 201B AS N1ASMOV0304 N/* Auxiliary Steam Header Isolation Valve RCS Temperature Control 8 Yard N/A AF 3S191MTF03 */* Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank SG Inventory Control 7 2-48 Yard N/A AF A1CT-LT-7716 A/* AFW Storage Tank Level Monitoring 3 STP FHAR Yard N/A AF B1CT-LT-7748 B/* AFW Storage Tank Level Monitoring 3 Yard N/A AF C1CT-LT-7718 C/* AFW Storage Tank Level Monitoring 3 Yard N/A FO 8Q170MPA0120 N/* Aux. Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DG Support 7 Amendment 25

TABLE 2-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (Note 2)

Elec/Proc. Current Room Train Amendment Fire Area Number System Equipment Tag Number (Note 1) Equipment Description Function Number Notes:

1. Electrical Train Process Train A: Train A A: Train A 1 B: Train B B: Train B 1 C: Train C C: Train C 1 2-49 D: Train D D: Train D 1 N: Non-Class 1E *: Common or No Train Orientation 1

No Electrical Power 1 STP FHAR

-: Common to All Trains 1

2. The Equipment List contains minimum safe shutdown and redundant safe shutdown equipment which are active 2 equipment during safe shutdown or major passive equipment associated with safe shutdown flowpath. The 4 Equipment List does not include strictly spurious operation of equipment (SOE) and high-low pressure 4 interface (HLP) components. A listing of strictly high-low pressure components is contained in 4 Table 2-4. A listing of strictly spurious operation of equipment (SOE) components is contained in Table 2-5.

Amendment 25

3. For equipment located in Fire Areas 53, 54, and 55, the corresponding information for Fire Area and Room Number for Unit 2 8 is as follows:

Unit 1 Unit 2 Fire Area Room Number Fire Area Room Number 53Z600 104 58Z605 101 53Z600 109 58Z605 112 54Z601 105 57Z604 102 54Z601 108 57Z604 111 55Z602 106 56Z603 103 55Z602 107 56Z603 110

TABLE 2-3 SAFE SHUTDOWN

SUMMARY

FUNCTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY RCS Reactivity Control Post Accident Neutron Flux Monitoring Trains A & C Instrumentation Source Range Neutron Monitor Trains A & D RCS Reactor Scram Breakers Trains A & B Grab Sample from Excess Letdown One Flowpath 2-50 Pressurizer Water Level Control Level Instrumentation Trains A, B, C, and D RCS Pressure Control Pressurizer PORV Trains A & B RCS Pressure Instrumentation Trains B, C, and D STP FHAR Pressurizer Heaters Trains A and C Pressurizer Spray Train N RCS Decay Heat Removal Auxiliary Feedwater System 3 Motor Driven Pumps (Trains A, B & C) and one turbine driven pump (Train D). Each pump is normally dedicated to one Steam Generator but Amendment 25 can be cross-connected to feed any steam generator.

Residual Heat Removal System Trains A, B, & C

TABLE 2-3 SAFE SHUTDOWN

SUMMARY

FUNCTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY RCS Letdown Reactor Vessel Head Vent To Pressurizer Relief Trains A & B Tank CVCS Normal Letdown to Recycle Holdup Tank One Flowpath CVCS Excess Letdown to Recycle Holdup Tank One Flowpath CVCS Seal Letdown One Flowpath 2-51 RCS Boration & Makeup CVCS Charging - Normal, Alternate & 2 Centrifugal Pumps Seal Injection Paths (Trains A & C)

STP FHAR SIS Charging - Train A HHSI Path 1 HHSI Pump (Train A)

SG Water Level Control Wide Range Level Instrumentation SG-A: Train D SG-B: Train A SG-C: Train B SG-D: Train C Narrow Range Level Instrumentation SG-A: Train A SG-B: Train B SG-C: Train C SG-D: Train D Amendment 25

TABLE 2-3 (Continued)

SAFE SHUTDOWN

SUMMARY

FUNCTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY SG Pressure Control Steam Generator PORV SG-A: Train A SG-B: Train B SG-C: Train C SG-D: Train D (480V ac Power from Train A)

Main Steam Line Pressure Instrumentation Same as train for PORV Support Systems Essential Cooling Water System 3 Trains (A, B & C) 2-52 Component Cooling Water System 3 Train Oriented Loops (A, B & C) Which Can Each Provide Cooling To Components in a STP FHAR Common Loop as well as in that train loop.

Class 1E Onsite AC Power 3 Diesel Generators (Trains A, B & C) 4 120 Vac channels (Trains A, B, C, & D)

Class 1E Onsite DC Power 4 Batteries (Trains A, B, C & D) Train A DG Powers the Train A & D Battery Chargers Essential Chilled Water System 3 Trains (A, B & C)

Amendment 25

TABLE 2-3 (Continued)

SAFE SHUTDOWN

SUMMARY

FUNCTION SYSTEM REDUNDANCY Support Systems (cont.) Containment HVAC 2 Headers Each Containing 3 Fan Coolers (A, B & C) 2 Headers Each Containing 2 Cubicle Exhaust Fans EAB HVAC 3 Trains (A, B & C)

Control Room HVAC 3 Trains (A, B & C) 2-53 MAB HVAC Local Safety-Related Room Coolers STP FHAR DG Bldg HVAC 3 Trains (A, B & C)

IVC HVAC 3 Trains (A, B & C)

ECW Intake Structure HVAC 3 Trains (A, B & C)

Amendment 25

TABLE 2-4 HIGH/LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec/Proc.

Train Fire Area Equipment Tag No. System (Note 2) Equipment Description Remarks 63/Z221 A1RHMOV0060A RH A/A RHR Pump 1A Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

63/Z222 B1RHMOV0060B RH B/B RHR Pump 1B Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

63/Z223 C1RHMOV0060C RH C/C RHR Pump 1C Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

63/Z224 A1RCMOV0001A RC A/* Pressurizer PORV Isol. Mitigation by de-energizing PORV PCV-0655A to assure PORV closure and isolation of the flow path.

63/Z224 B1RCMOV0001B RC B/* Pressurizer PORV Isol. Mitigation by de-energizing PORV PCV-0656A to assure PORV closure and isolation of the flow path.

2-54 63/Z224 N1RCPSV3450 RC */* Pressurizer Safety Valve Mechanical device actuated by high pressurizer pressure. Pressurizer STP FHAR pressure is kept within limits by operation of the pressurizer spray or pressurizer PORV which are analyzed as hot shutdown paths.

63/Z224 N1RCPSV3451 RC */* Pressurizer Safety Valve Same as above 63/Z224 N1RCPSV3452 RC */* Pressurizer Safety Valve Same as above 63/Z215 7R091NTS101A RC */* Pressurizer Relief Tank 63/Z224 A1RCPCV0655A RC A/* Pressurizer PORV Required to keep Pzr. Pressure within limits 63/Z224 B1RCPCV0656A RC B/* Pressurizer PORV Required to keep Pzr. Pressure within limits 63/Z226 B1RHMOV0061A RH B/A RHR Pump 1A Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

63/Z227 C1RHMOV0061B RH C/B RHR Pump 1B Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

63/Z228 A1RHMOV0061C RH A/C RHR Pump 1C Suction Isol Vlv. Required to isolate RHR System from high pressure of the RCS System.

Amendment 25 Notes:

1. This table lists components which are strictly high/low pressure interface (HLP). It does not include those hot and cold shutdown components which could also be considered to be HLP

2. Electrical Train Process Train A: Train A *: Common or No Train Orientation B: Train B N: Non-Class 1E

No Electrical Power

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 01Z032 BS A1BSZRR013 A NSSS PCC 01A 5 01Z032 BS A1BSZRR014 A NSSS Proc Cab 01, Prot Set 5 01Z032 BS B1BSZRR017 B NSSS PCC 03A 5 01Z032 BS C1BSZRR019 C NSSS PCC 04 (Bat 1A Level) 5 01Z032 BS D1BSZRR015 D NSSS PCC 02A 5 01Z032 BS D1BSZRR016 D NSSS PCC 02 5 01Z032 SP A1SPZRR001I A SSPS Logic Cabinet 'R'/A Input Section 5 01Z032 SP A1SPZRR002 A SSPS Actuation Cabinet A 5 2-55 01Z032 SP A1SPZRR008I A SSPS Logic Cabinet 'S'/A Input Section 5 01Z032 SP B1SPZRR001I B SSPS Logic Cabinet 'R'/B Input Section 5 01Z032 SP B1SPZRR004 B SSPS Actuation Cabinet B 5 STP FHAR 01Z032 SP B1SPZRR008I B SSPS Logic Cabinet 'S'/B Input Section 5 01Z032 SP C1SPZRR001I C SSPS Logic Cabinet 'R'/C Input Section 5 01Z032 SP C1SPZRR006 C SSPS Actuation Cabinet C 5 01Z032 SP C1SPZRR008I C SSPS Logic Cabinet 'S'/C Input Section 5 01Z032 SP D1SPZRR001I D SSPS Logic Cabinet 'R'/D Input Section 5 01Z032 SP D1SPZRR008I D SSPS Logic Cabinet 'S'/D Input Section 5 01Z034 HE A1HEFV9699 A Supply to Computer Relay Room 5 01Z034 HE A1HEFV9700 A Return From Relay Room 5 01Z034 HE A1HEFY9699 A Solenoid For FV9699 5 01Z034 HE A1HEFY9700 A Solenoid For FV9700 5 Amendment 25 01Z034 HE B1HEFY9699A B Solenoid For FV9699 5 01Z034 HE B1HEFY9700A B Solenoid For FV9700 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9649 A EAB Train A Inlet Damper 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9650 A EAB Train A Exhaust Damper 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9651 A EAB Train A Recirc Damper 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9656 A Supply Fan 11A Outlet (Heating) Damper 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9657 A Supply Fan 11A Outlet (Cooling) Damper 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFV9672 A A Train Smoke Purge Damper 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9649 A Solenoid For FV9649 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9650 A Solenoid For FV9650 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9651 A Solenoid For FV9651 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9656 A Solenoid For FV9656 5 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9657 A Solenoid For FV9657 5 2-56 02Z005 HE A1HEFY9672 A Solenoid For FV9672 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9646 B EAB Train B Inlet Damper 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9647 B EAB Train B Exhaust Damper 5 STP FHAR 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9648 B EAB Train B Recirc Damper 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9654 B Supply Fan 11B Outlet (Heating) Damper 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9655 B Supply Fan 11B Outlet (Cooling) Damper 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFV9669 B B Train Smoke Purge Damper 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9646 B Solenoid For FV9646 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9647 B Solenoid For FV9647 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9648 B Solenoid For FV9648 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9654 B Solenoid For FV9654 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9655 B Solenoid For FV9655 5 03Z039 HE B1HEFY9669 B Solenoid For FV9669 5 Amendment 25 03Z116 HC A1HCPT0937 A Containment Bldg Press (ESF) 5 03Z116 HC C1HCPT0934 C Containment Bldg Press (ESF) 5 03Z116 HC D1HCPT0936 D Containment Bldg Press (ESF) 5 03Z119 CV N1CVLCV0112A N Letdown Divert to BRS Holding Tank 7 03Z130 CV N1CVFCV0394 (Deleted) - 7

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 03Z130 CV N1CVFIC0394 (Deleted) - 7 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9643 C EAB Train C Inlet Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9644 C EAB Train C Exhaust Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9645 C EAB Train C Recirc Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9652 C Supply Fan 11C Outlet (Heating) Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9653 C Supply Fan 11C Outlet (Cooling) Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFV9666 C C Train Smoke Purge Damper 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9643 C Solenoid For FV9643 5 2-57 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9644 C Solenoid For FV9644 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9645 C Solenoid For FV9645 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9652 C Solenoid For FV9652 5 STP FHAR 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9653 C Solenoid For FV9653 5 04Z049 HE C1HEFY9666 C Solenoid For FV9666 5 20Z129 CC B1CCMOV0032 B CCW Supply Header Isol. 5 20Z129 CC C1CCMOV0447 C CCW Supply Header Isol. 5 22Z133 HC B1HCPT0935 B Containment Bldg Press (ESF) 5 22Z133 SI A1SIFV3936 A Refuel Wtr Tank 1A to Spnt Fuel Pool Iso. Vlv 5 22Z133 SI A1SIFY3936 A Solenoid Operator For A1SIFV3936 5 22Z133 SI B1SIFV3937 B Refuel Wtr Tank 1A to Spnt Fuel Pool Iso. Vlv 5 22Z133 SI B1SIFY3937 B Solenoid Operator for B1SIFV3937 5 23Z103 HM 3V101VAH012 C RMWP 1A Supp. Cooler (11A) 7 Amendment 25 23Z103 HM 3V101VAH013 B RNWO 1B Supp. Cooler (11B) 7 23Z103 RM 3R271NTF101A - Reactor Makeup Water Supply (RMWS) Tank 7 23Z103 RM 3R271NPA101A C Reactor Makeup Water Pump (RMWP) 1A 7 23Z103 RM 3R271NPA101B B Reactor Makeup Water Pump (RMWP) 1B 7 23Z103 RM N1RMFV7664 N RMWS Supply Valve to PSS 7

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 23Z103 RM B1RMFV7663 B RMWP Discharge Valve 7 23Z131 FC 9R211TFC0019 N/A SFP Supply Valve to Demineralizers 7 23Z131 FC 7R211TFC0021B N/A SFP Supply Valve to Demin. 1B 8 23Z131 FC 9R211TFC0020 N/A SFP Supply Valve to Demin. 1A 7 23Z135 PS B1PSFV4466 B SI Accumulator Sample Iso. (ORB) 5 23Z135 PS B1PSFY4466 B SI Accumulator Sample Iso. (ORB) Control 8 23Z135 PS C1PSFV4451B B Pressurizer Liquid Sample (ORB) 5 23Z135 PS C1PSFV4452 C Pressurizer Vapor Sample (ORB) 5 2-58 23Z135 PS C1PSFV4461 C RHR Sample Iso. (ORB) 5 23Z135 PS C1PSFY4451B B Pressurizer Liquid Sample (ORB) Cntl 5 23Z135 PS C1PSFY4452 C Pressurizer Vapor Sample (ORB) Cntl 5 STP FHAR 23Z135 PS C1PSFY4461 C RHR Sample Iso. (ORB) Cntl 5 26Z123 CV A1CVMOV0218 (Deleted) 7 27Z127 CV N1CVFCV0201 N Charging Pump 1A Min Flow Recirc Valve 5 27Z127 CV N1CVFCV0202 N Charging Pump 1B Min Flow Recirc Valve 5 27Z127 CV N1CVFY3172 N Solenoid for FCV0202 5 27Z127 CV N1CVFY3173 N Solenoid for FCV0201 5 27Z127 CV A1CVHV0206 A Charging Pump 1B 7 27Z127 CV C1CVMOV8348 C Normal Charging 7 27Z138 BR N1BRFCV0307 N CCW Outlet From Boron Recycle Evap. Pkg. 1A 5 35Z305 CS C1CSMOV0001C C Containment Spray Iso. 5 Amendment 25 35Z305 SI C1SIMOV0001C C Safety Injection RWST Isolation Valve 5 35Z305 SI C1SIMOV0016C C Emergency Sump Iso. 5 35Z305 SI 2N121NPA102C C Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1C 7 35Z305 HF 3V121VAH006 C LHSI Pump Supply Cooler 7 35Z305 SI N1SIPI0916 N/A LHSI Pump 1C Pressure Indicator 8

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 35Z305 SI C1SIMOV0014C C LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z305 SI C1SIMOV0013C C LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z306 CS B1CSMOV0001B B Containment Spray Iso. 5 35Z306 SI B1SIMOV0001B B SI RWST Isolation Valve 5 35Z306 SI B1SIMOV0016B B Emergency Sump Iso. 5 35Z306 SI 2N121NPA102B B Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1B 7 35Z306 HF 3V121VAH005 B LHSI Pump Supply Cooler 7 35Z306 SI N1SIPI0915 N/A LHSI Pump 1B Pressure Indicator 8 2-59 35Z306 SI B1SIMOV0013B B LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z306 SI B1SIMOV0014B B LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z307 CS A1CSMOV0001A A Containment Spray Iso. 5 STP FHAR 35Z307 SI A1SIMOV0001A A Refueling Water Tank 1A Isolation Valve 5 35Z307 SI A1SIMOV0016A A Emergency Sump Iso. 5 35Z307 SI 2N121NPA102A A Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1A 7 35Z307 HF 3V121VAH004 A LHSI Pump Supply Cooler 7 35Z307 SI N1SIPI0914 N/A LHSI Pump 1A Pressure Indicator 8 35Z307 SI A1SIMOV0013A A LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z307 SI A1SIMOV0014A A LHSI Pump Recirc. Valve 7 35Z319 HF 3V121VAH010 B SFPCC Pump A Cooler 7 35Z319 FC 3R211NPA101A B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump A 5 35Z319 FC 3R211TFC0015A N/A SFP Pump Discharge Valve 7 Amendment 25 35Z319 FC 3R211XFC0012C N/A SFP Main Header Valve 7 35Z320 HF 3V121VAH011 C SFPCC Pump B Cooler 7 35Z320 FC 3R211NPA101B C Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump B 5 35Z320 FC 3R211TFC0015B N/A SFP Pump Discharge Valve 7 35Z320 FC 3R211TFC0048 N/A RMWS Supply Valve to SFP 7

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 35Z320 FC 3R211XFC0012D N/A SFP Main Header Valve 7 45Z509 HG C1HGTV9745 C DG Rm. 13 Recirc. Damper DA-238 7 45Z509 HG C1HGTY9745 C DG Rm. 13 Recirc. Damper Sol. Valve 7 46Z510 HG B1HGTV9744 B DG Rm. 12 Recirc. Damper DA-237 7 46Z510 HG B1HGTY9744 B DG Rm. 12 Recirc. Damper Sol. Valve 7 47Z511 HG A1HGTV9743 A DG Rm. 11 Recirc. Damper DA-236 7 47Z511 HG A1HGTY9743 A DG Rm. 11 Recirc. Damper Sol. Valve 7 48Z406 FW A1FWFV7143 A Steam Generator 1C Main Feed Containment Iso. 5 2-60 48Z406 FW A1FWFV7191 C Steam Generator 1C Main/Aux Feed Iso. 7 48Z406 FW A1FWFY7143 A Steam Generator 1C FV7143 Cntl 5 48Z406 FW A1FWFY7191A A Steam Generator 1C Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 STP FHAR 48Z406 FW B1FWFY7143A B Steam Generator 1C FV7143 Cntl 5 48Z406 FW B1FWFY7191B B Steam Generator 1C Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 48Z406 MS A1MSFSV7434 A Steam Header 1C Isolation Vlv 5 48Z406 MS A1MSFV7432 A Steam Header 1C MSIV Bypass Vlv 5 48Z406 MS A1MSFY7432 A Steam Header 1C MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 48Z406 MS A1MSFY7434 A Steam Header 1C Isol Vlv Cntl 5 48Z406 MS A1MSFY7434C A Steam Header 1C Isol Vlv Cntl 5 48Z406 MS A1MSPT0534 A Steam Gen 1B Press (ESF) 5 48Z406 MS N1MSFY7434B N Steam Header 1C Isol Vlv Cntl 8 48Z406 MS B1MSFY7432A B Steam Header 1C MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 Amendment 25 48Z406 MS B1MSFY7434A B Steam Header 1C Isol Vlv Cntl 5 48Z406 MS B1MSFY7434D B Steam Header 1C Isol Vlv Cntl 5 48Z406 MS B1MSPT0536 B Steam Gen 1C Press (ESF) 5 48Z406 MS D1MSPT0535 D Steam Gen 1C Press (ESF) 5 48Z406 MS N1MSPSV7430A, B, C, D N Steam Header 1C Safety Relief Vlv 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 49Z407 FW A1FWFV7142 A Steam Generator 1B Main Feed Containment Iso. 5 49Z407 FW A1FWFV7190 A Steam Generator 1B Main/Aux Feed Iso. 5 49Z407 FW A1FWFY7142 A Steam Generator 1B FV7142 Cntl 5 49Z407 FW A1FWFY7190A A Steam Generator 1B Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 49Z407 FW B1FWFY7142A B Steam Generator 1B FV7142 Cntl 5 49Z407 FW B1FWFY7190B B Steam Generator 1B Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 49Z407 MS A1MSFSV7424 A Steam Header 1B Isolation Vlv 5 49Z407 MS A1MSFV7422 A Steam Header 1B MSIV Bypass Vlv 5 2-61 49Z407 MS A1MSFY7422 A Steam Header 1B MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 49Z407 MS A1MSFY7424 A Steam Header 1B Isol Vlv Cntl 5 49Z407 MS A1MSFY7424C A Steam Header 1B Isol Vlv Cntl 5 STP FHAR 49Z407 MS A1MSPT0524 A Steam Gen 1B Press (ESF) 5 49Z407 MS B1MSFY7422A B Steam Header 1B MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 49Z407 MS B1MSFY7424A B Steam Header 1B Isol Vlv Cntl 5 49Z407 MS B1MSFY7424D B Steam Header 1B Isol Vlv Cntl 5 49Z407 MS B1MSPT0526 B Steam Gen 1B Press (ESF) 5 49Z407 MS D1MSPT0525 D Steam Gen 1B Press (ESF) 5 49Z407 MS N1MSPSV7420A, B, C, D N Steam Header 1B Safety Relief Vlv 5 49Z407 MS N1MSFY7424B N Steam Generator 1B Isol Vlv Cntl 8 50Z408 FW A1FWFV7141 A Steam Generator 1A Main Feed Containment Iso. 5 50Z408 FW A1FWFV7189 A Steam Generator 1A Main/Aux Feed Iso. 5 Amendment 25 50Z408 FW A1FWFY7141 A Steam Generator 1A FV7141 Cntl 5 50Z408 FW A1FWFY7189A A Steam Generator 1A Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 50Z408 FW B1FWFY7141A B Steam Generator 1A FV7141 Cntl 5 50Z408 MS N1MSFY7414B N Steam Generator 1A Isol Vlv Cntl 8 50Z408 FW B1FWFY7189B B Steam Generator 1A Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 50Z408 MS A1MSFSV7414 A Steam Header 1A Isolation Vlv 5 50Z408 MS A1MSFV7412 A Steam Header 1A MSIV Bypass Vlv 5 50Z408 MS A1MSFY7412 A Steam Header 1A MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 50Z408 MS A1MSFY7414 A Steam Header 1A Isol Vlv Cntl 5 50Z408 MS A1MSFY7414C A Steam Header 1A Isol Vlv Cntl 5 50Z408 MS A1MSPT0514 A Steam Gen 1A Press (ESF) 5 50Z408 MS B1MSFY7412A B Steam Header 1A MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 50Z408 MS B1MSFY7414A B Steam Header 1A Isol Vlv Cntl 5 2-62 50Z408 MS B1MSFY7414D B Steam Header 1A Isol Vlv Cntl 5 50Z408 MS B1MSPT0516 B Steam Gen 1A Press (ESF) 5 50Z408 MS D1MSPT0515 D Steam Gen 1A Press (ESF) 5 STP FHAR 50Z408 MS N1MSPSV7410A, B, C, D N Steam Header 1A Safety Relief Vlv 5 51Z409 FW A1FWFV7144 A Steam Generator 1D Main Feed Containment Iso. 5 51Z409 FW A1FWFV7192 A Steam Generator 1D Main/Aux Feed Iso. 5 51Z409 FW A1FWFY7144 A Steam Generator 1D FV7144 Cntl 5 51Z409 FW A1FWFY7192A A Steam Generator 1D Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 51Z409 FW B1FWFY7144A B Steam Generator 1D FV7144 Cntl 5 51Z409 FW B1FWFY7192B B Steam Generator 1D Aux/Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 51Z409 MS A1MSFSV7444 A Steam Header 1D Isolation Vlv 5 51Z409 MS A1MSFV7442 A Steam Header 1D MSIV Bypass Vlv 5 51Z409 MS A1MSFY7442 A Steam Header 1D MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 Amendment 25 51Z409 MS A1MSFY7444 A Steam Header 1D Isol Vlv Cntl 5 51Z409 MS A1MSFY7444C A Steam Header 1D Isol Vlv Cntl 5 51Z409 MS A1MSPT0544 A Steam Gen 1C Press (ESF) 5 51Z409 MS B1MSFY7442A B Steam Header 1D MSIV Bypass Vlv Cntl 5 51Z409 MS B1MSFY7444A B Steam Header 1D Isol Vlv Cntl 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 51Z409 MS B1MSFY7444D B Steam Header 1D Isol Vlv Cntl 5 51Z409 MS B1MSPT0546 B Steam Gen 1D Press (ESF) 5 51Z409 MS N1MSFY7444B N Steam Header 1D Isol Vlv Cntl 8 51Z409 MS D1MSPT0545 D Steam Gen 1D Press (ESF) 5 51Z409 MS N1MSPSV7440A, B, C, D N Steam Header 1D Safety Relief Vlv 5 53Z600 HZ A1HZFV9894 A Inlet Train A 5 53Z600 HZ A1HZFV9894A A Outlet Train A 5 53Z600 HZ A1HZFY9894 A Solenoid For FV9894 5 2-63 53Z600 HZ A1HZFY9894A A Solenoid For FV9894A 5 54Z601 HZ B1HZFV9895 B Inlet Train B 5 54Z601 HZ B1HZFV9895A B Outlet Train B 5 STP FHAR 54Z601 HZ B1HZFY9895 B Solenoid For FV9895 5 54Z601 HZ B1HZFY9895A B Solenoid For FV9895A 5 55Z602 HZ C1HZFV9896 C Inlet Train C 5 55Z602 HZ C1HZFV9896A C Outlet Train C 5 55Z602 HZ C1HZFY9896 C Solenoid For FV9896 5 55Z602 HZ C1HZFY9896A C Solenoid For FV9896A 5 63Z202 RC A1RCPT0455 A Pressurizer Press Xmitter (PORV, Spray, Htr Cnt) 5 63Z202 RC B1RCPT0457 B Pressurizer Press Xmitter (PORV, Spray, Htr Cnt) 5 63Z202 RC C1RCPT0458 C Pressurizer Press Xmitter (PORV, Spray, Htr Cnt) 5 63Z202 RC D1RCPT0456 D Pressurizer Press Xmitter (PORV, Spray, Htr Cnt) 5 Amendment 25 63Z207 CC N1CCMOV0339 (Deleted) 7 63Z207 CC N1CCMOV0356 (Deleted) 7 63Z210 CC C1CCMOV0392 C CCW Supply to LWPS Heat Ex. 5 63Z210 CC N1CCMOV0374 (Deleted) 7

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 63Z210 CC N1CCMOV0390 (Deleted) 7 63Z220 CV N1CVFV3157 (Deleted) 7 63Z220 CV N1CVFY3157 (Deleted) 7 63Z220 RC 1R131NPP101D D Reactor Coolant Pump 1D 5 63Z220 RC A1RCTE0454 A Loop 4 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z220 RC C1RCTE0474 C Loop 4 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z220 RC D1RCTE0464 D Loop 4 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 2-64 63Z221 CV N1CVFV3154 (Deleted) 7 63Z221 CV N1CVFY3154 (Deleted) 7 63Z221 RC 1R131NPP101A A Reactor Coolant Pump 1A 5 STP FHAR 63Z221 RC A1RCTE0451 A Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z221 RC B1RCTE0471 B Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z221 RC D1RCTE0461 D Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z222 CV N1CVFV3155 (Deleted) 7 63Z222 CV N1CVFY3155 (Deleted) 7 63Z222 RC 1R131NPP101B B Reactor Coolant Pump 1B 5 63Z222 RC A1RCTE0452 A Loop 2 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z222 RC B1RCTE0472 B Loop 2 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z222 RC D1RCTE0462 D Loop 2 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z223 CV N1CVFV3156 (Deleted) 7 Amendment 25 63Z223 CV N1CVFY3156 (Deleted) 7 63Z223 RC 1R131NPP101C C Reactor Coolant Pump 1C 5 63Z223 RC A1RCTE0453 A Loop 3 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z223 RC B1RCTE0473 B Loop 3 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z223 RC D1RCTE0463 D Loop 3 Cold Leg Temp (ESF) 5 63Z224 RC N1RCPCV0655B N Pressurizer Spray Iso. 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number 63Z224 RC N1RCPCV0655C N Pressurizer Spray Iso. 5 63Z224 RC N1RCPY3656B N RCS Spray Valve PCV 655B I/P Converter 5 63Z224 RC N1RCPY3656C N RCS Spray Valve PCV 655C I/P Converter 5 63Z225 PS B1PSFV4450 B Pressurizer Vapor Sample (IRB) 5 63Z225 PS B1PSFV4450A B Pressurizer Vapor Sample (IRB) 5 63Z225 PS B1PSFV4451 B Pressurizer Liquid Sample (IRB) 5 63Z225 PS B1PSFV4451A B Pressurizer Liquid Sample (IRB) 5 63Z225 PS B1PSFV4823 B RHR Sample Iso. (IRB) 5 2-65 63Z225 PS C1PSFV4824 C SI Accumulator Sample Iso. (IRB) 5 63Z226 RH N1RHMOV0067A A Pump 1A & HX 1A Recirc Vlv 5 63Z227 RH N1RHMOV0067B B Pump 1B & HX 1B Recirc Vlv 5 STP FHAR 63Z228 RH N1RHMOV0067C C Pump 1C & HX 1C Recirc Vlv 5 63Z229 CV N1CVHV0469 N Excess Ltdn to Norm Ltdn Pressurization Valve 8 TGB FW A1FWFY3551A A Steam Generator 1A Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY3552A A Steam Generator 1B Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY3553A A Steam Generator 1C Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY3554A A Steam Generator 1D Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY7151A A Steam Generator 1A FV7151 Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY7152A A Steam Generator 1B FV7152 Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY7153A A Steam Generator 1C FV7153 Cntl 5 TGB FW A1FWFY7154A A Steam Generator 1D FV7154 Cntl 5 Amendment 25 TGB FW B1FWFY3551B B Steam Generator 1A Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY3552B B Steam Generator 1B Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY3553B B Steam Generator 1C Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY3554B B Steam Generator 1D Main Feed Iso. Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY7151B B Steam Generator 1A FV7151 Cntl 5

TABLE 2-5 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT LIST (NOTE 1)

Elec Current Fire Area System Equipment Tag Number Train Equipment Description Amendment Number TGB FW B1FWFY7152B B Steam Generator 1B FV7152 Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY7153B B Steam Generator 1C FV7153 Cntl 5 TGB FW B1FWFY7154B B Steam Generator 1D FV7154 Cntl 5 TGB FW N1FWFCV0551 N Steam Generator 1A Main Feed Valve Reg 5 TGB FW N1FWFCV0552 N Steam Generator 1B Main Feed Valve Reg 5 TGB FW N1FWFCV0553 N Steam Generator 1C Main Feed Valve Reg 5 TGB FW N1FWFCV0554 N Steam Generator 1D Main Feed Valve Reg 5 TGB FW N1FWFV7151 N Steam Generator 1A Main Feed Reg Bypass 5 2-66 TGB FW N1FWFV7152 N Steam Generator 1B Main Feed Reg Bypass 5 TGB FW N1FWFV7153 N Steam Generator 1C Main Feed Reg Bypass 5 TGB FW N1FWFV7154 N Steam Generator 1D Main Feed Reg Bypass 5 STP FHAR NOTES:

1. This table lists components which are strictly spurious operation of equipment (SOE).

It does not include those hot and cold shutdown components which could also be considered to be SOE.

2. For equipment located in Fire Areas 53, 54, and 55, the corresponding information for Fire Areas for Unit 2 is as follows:

Amendment 25 Unit 1 Fire Area Unit 2 Fire Area 53Z600 58Z605 54Z601 57Z604 55Z602 56Z603

STP FHAR CHAPTER DRAWINGS The current information on suppression and detection for the fire protection systems is contained in Chapter Drawings in Section 3.11. Typical circuit routing for the hot and cold shutdown equipment is shown on Figures 2-2 through 2-21. Detailed circuits listings for each fire area are given on document no.

5E019EL002 "Safe Shutdown Circuit Listing".

2-67 Amendment 25

STP FHAR 3.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This section contains the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and the details that form the basis for it. The FHA, in the form of a narrative and table, is the data base supporting the conclusion that applicable requirements of Appendix R have been met. This data is presented on a building basis, with each fire area within the building being discussed. Where appropriate, the fire areas are further divided into fire zones and a table provided for each zone. Fire zone locations and descriptions are summarized in Table 3.1-1.

Fire area drawings, depicting the items noted in the discussion as well as the physical plant layout, are included at the end of Chapter 3.0.

It should be noted that although the analysis is written in terms of Unit 1, both Units 1 and 2 are essentially identical and therefore the analysis is applicable to both. The Unit 2 design differences will be evaluated.

3.1.1 Methodology The methodology used in performing this FHA for STP is discussed in Section 1.6 of this report.

3.1.2 Fire Area and Zone Tables The description of fire areas and fire zones is done in terms of the items defined below:

Equipment - Equipment required for safe shutdown is listed in Table 2-2, the Safe Shutdown Equipment List, which includes the area in which the equipment is located.

Circuits - A reference as to where a listing of the safe-shutdown circuits in the fire area or zone is to be found.

Combustibles - In-situ and potential transient combustibles are considered for the fire loading in the fire area or zone. For transient combustibles, this is an estimate which is not to be used for Fire Protection Program limitations. The combustible loading of a fire zone is considered negligible when it is calculated to be less than 5 minutes in duration.

NOTE: The combustible load values shown are based on: a) actual cable loading as tabulated in Plant Data Management System (PDMS), b) permanent plant fire loading of the area, c) a specified amount of transient fire 3.1-1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR load as allowed by administration limits; and are bounded by the construction of the fire barrier. This value is used in the combustible calculation as maximum permitted load (MPL).

Detection. Type of fire detection system(s) in the fire area or zone.

A summary of detection-zone locations and descriptions is presented in Table 3.1-2.

Suppression Type of fire suppression system(s) applicable to the fire area or zone.

Radioactive/ Existence of any radioactive or toxic Toxic Material material in the fire area or zone. When no quantities of toxic material is given, the toxic material is PVC in negligible quantities.

Communications Identifies whether or not emergency communication is located in the room.

Emergency Identifies whether or not emergency Lightning lighting (in the form of 8-hour battery packs) is located in the room.

Redundant Safe - Identifies the conclusions derived from Shutdown Assessment the Appendix R,Section III.G evaluation.

3.1.3 Spurious Actuation, Common Power Source and Common Enclosure 3.1.3.1 Spurious Actuation The consequences of spurious operation of equipment have been mitigated by protection of cables or by manual compensating operator action. These operator actions include verification of the equipment status, de-energizing electrical equipment and manually repositioning valves. Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

3.1.3.2 Common Power Source During the Appendix R,Section III.G evaluation, potential associated circuits (using common power supplies) that may affect safe shutdown were identified. Where the breakers or fuses of these circuits do not coordinate these circuits are listed in document 5E019EL002 "Safe Shutdown Circuit Listing" as associated circuits of concern (category ASC). Where coordination is required in a specific fire area, the coordination in that fire area has been analyzed. Where coordination does not exist in the specific fire area, the appropriate cables are protected.

3.1-2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR The STP evaluation of multiple high impedance cable failures concluded that in no case could simultaneous multiple high impedance faults cause loss of power to any circuit not directly affected by the fire.

3.1.3.3 Common Enclosure Associated Circuits All power circuits in common enclosures are electrically protected with circuit breakers or fuses, which will prevent secondary electrical fires from occurring.

All exposed cables (1E and non 1E) are 1EEE 383-1974 qualified as fire resistant. This minimizes the propagation of exposure fires away from the primary source.

All non-1E circuits are separated from 1E circuits under the guidelines of Reg. Guide 1.75 (1EEE 384-74). A computer program exists to check routings to assure non-1E circuits are not routed with 1E circuits. As discussed in FSAR Section 8.3, all circuits are color identified to provide a means of distinguishing safety related cables and preventing the intermixing of cables.

Cable penetrations through fire areas are fire rated with sealed penetrations to prevent propagation of the flame beyond a fire area.

Therefore, STP does not have any circuits associated by common enclosure, which would prevent safe shutdown under fire conditions anywhere in the plant.

3.1.4 Redundant Shutdown Pathway The STP safe-shutdown capability consists of three redundant safe-shutdown trains (A, B, and C) powered from independent Class 1E power supplies. Where the system design contains less than three redundant trains, alternate or diverse pathways have been identified to assure that the necessary functions to achieve safe shutdown are available during and after any postulated fire.

The STP fire protection design objective is to provide at least one functionally redundant safe-shutdown pathway to allow the plant to be safely shutdown following a fire occurring at any given location. The redundant pathway may share components when these components have been evaluated to be available following a fire in a given area. During the Appendix R,Section III.G evaluation, the cable protection requirements and operator action requirements needed to assure the availability of one of the redundant paths is identified. Specifics of the protection requirements and operator actions provided are contained in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

3.1-3 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description CN-3297 3.1-4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description 3.1-5 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description CN-3297 CN-3297 3.1-6 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description CN-3297 CN-3297 3.1-7 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description 3.1-8 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description CN-3297 CN-3297 3.1-9 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description 3.1-10 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description CN-3297 CN-3297 3.1-11 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description CN-3297 3.1-12 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire_Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description 3.1-13 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description CN-3273 3.1-14 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description CN-3273 3.1-15 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description 3.1-16 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev Room Numbers Description CN-3297 3.1-17 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-1 (Cont'd)

FIRE ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Fire Bldg. Coord/ Fire Zone Zone Area Bldg. Elev. Room Numbers Description 3.1-18 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-2 DETECTION ZONE LOCATIONS Detection zones described below are for reference only. These detection zones are designations for either equipment or specific portions of fire zones (such as subfloor areas) throughout the plant which have a detection system separate from the fire zone area detectors.

Fire Detection Zone Bldg Coord/

Zone Location Bldg Elevation Detection Zone Description 3.1-19 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 3.1-2 (Cont'd)

DETECTION ZONE LOCATIONS Fire Detection Zone Bldg Coord/

Zone Location Bldg Elevation Detection Zone Description 3.1-20 Amendment 26

STP FHAR 3.2 MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING (MEAB)

The Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB) is a steel reinforced Seismic Category I concrete structure which is divided into two distinct portions, the electrical portion north of column line 24 and the mechanical portion south of column line 24.

The electrical portion of the MEAB, sometimes referred to as the EAB, houses the control room, cable vaults, cable spreading rooms and penetration areas, switchgear rooms, computer rooms, the auxiliary shutdown panel and other electrical equipment and distribution facilities.

The Trains A, B and C electrical equipment and cable areas are generally located on separate elevations except for the Train B cable spreading room which is located in a separate fire area on the same elevation as Train C equipment and cables.

The MEAB is divided into 49 fire areas, 1 to 22, 24 to 34, and 64 to 79 (refer to figures 3-14 through 3-31), which separate redundant safe-shutdown equipment and cables. Each fire area contains one or more fire zone(s). Zones have been defined because of existing barriers that naturally inhibit fire spread rather than by some arbitrary means. Zone boundaries are heavy concrete walls but are not provided with rated penetration seals or HVAC dampers. The majority of the zone boundaries contain 3- hour rated fire doors. Fire areas are bounded by 3-hour rated fire barriers or floors, walls or ceilings that may contain non-rated penetrations which provide an equivalent level of fire protection for the hazards present on either side. Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with dampers rated in accordance with the barrier and are installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Stairwells are bounded by 2-hour-rated fire barriers with Class B doors and dampers; they may contain minimal combustibles.

Ionization detectors are generally provided in each zone to ensure early warning and to locate fires to facilitate manual fire fighting. Alarm annunciation is provided locally and in the control room.

Fire suppression systems provided to protect equipment and cables in the MEAB are as follows:

Hand-held fire extinguishers at strategic locations

Standpipe system with hose stations strategically located

Fixed water spray (deluge) systems for charcoal filter protection with those in the MAB provided solely for property protection.

3.2-1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems, at the ceiling, for each cable spreading room and power cable vault.

Automatic Halon gas suppression systems for the computer room, relay room and TSC computer room. The systems for the plant computer and relay rooms are actuated by cross-zoned ionization detectors. Ventilation system dampers in these rooms are closed by this signal to ensure that adequate concentrations for fire extinguishment are maintained.

Note: Since these computers are not safety related and are not required to achieve cold shutdown, the Halon system description is only provided for information and will not be included in the Technical specifications or required for NRC audits.

Fixed dry pipe manually actuated sprinkler systems in the switchgear rooms are provided for various areas where they are deemed necessary to support manual fire fighting as described in the fire area write-ups.

3-hour barriers for conduit and/or tray are provided where required to protect redundant circuits. Alternate protection may be provided in accordance with Appendix R.

MEAB protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area in the following fire area write-ups.

3.2-2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 1 Reference Figure: 3-16 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 1 is composed of the following fire zones:

Z032 Relay Cabinet Area of Control Room Z034 Control Room Z083 Watch Supervisor's Office The boundary between Fire Zones Z032 and Z034 is a heavy concrete wall.

Although the fire zone boundary penetrations are not provided with rated penetration seals or HVAC dampers, the fire zone boundaries are significant obstructions which will limit zone-to-zone fire propagations. This will facilitate containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual fire fighting capabilities.

The walls, floors, and ceilings of Fire Area 1 are all 3-hour rated fire barriers with the exception of those portions of Fire Zones Z032 and Z034 that bound on Fire Area 19, which is a stairwell that has a 2-hour fire rating with Class B labeled doors and 1-1/2 hour rated fire dampers. The structural steel supporting the fire barrier is fireproofed to the same rating as that required of the barrier.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 1-1 through 1-3.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization smoke detectors are provided in each fire zone in Fire Area 1.

3.2-3 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire detection is provided throughout the Control Room, both above and below the suspended ceiling and in the safe-shutdown control cabinets to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. These detectors alarm at the local fire panel and inside the room itself. Detector spacing is such that the number of detectors employed is several times that required by NFPA 72E-1978.

Fire protection is effected through portable water and CO2 extinguishers and hose streams from standpipes strategically located at the control room exits and adjacent to Fire Zone Z036. The majority of cables can be effectively reached by these hose streams from the floor level. A seismic catwalk above the ceiling ensures access for manual suppression in the event of a fire in the cabling in the area above the ceiling. The HVAC system return ducts contain smoke detectors which, upon activation, close dampers and divert airflow into a purge and cleanup mode. The system also has manual override capability. It should be noted that the space above the suspended ceiling is not used as an HVAC plenum and contains limited combustibles.

In situ combustibles loading is IEEE 383 cable and ordinary class A combustibles.

There are only 38 cable trays (of which approximately 20% are covered) above the suspended ceiling. The configuration of the cable trays themselves is not considered to be concentrated as defined in figures 1- 1 and 1-2. In addition these trays are 40 percent filled.

The cable runs consist mainly of vertical cable trays and the sizes of these cable trays are 6" x 6",

6" x 12", 6" x 18", and 6" x 24". The cable trays have been grouped into 5 clusters which consist of 6 or less equivalent 24" cable trays. These clusters are arranged in a "U-shaped" pattern above the control room console. Inside each cluster the equivalent 24" trays are typically separated by approximately 4' from the next 24" equivalent tray. Each vertical "cluster" is at least 10' in diameter and is separated from the other vertical clusters by a horizontal distance of 4' or greater.

Two of the clusters (III & IV) have horizontal "branch" trays (2) at the top of the room within 2' of cluster II. This arrangement, given the separation within the clusters provides ready access for manual fire fighting efforts and is therefore not considered to be a significant hazard. A sketch of this configuration showing the individual clusters (groups) can be found in HL&P letter to the staff, ST-HL-AE-1565, dated December 23, 1985. All cable trays that enter this area terminate in this area. The cabling in these cable trays is designed to meet the requirements of IEEE-383 and consists of control and instrumentation circuits. There are no other combustible materials above the suspended ceiling except power cables for lighting which are encased in steel conduit.

The Control Room is continuously manned.

Automatic fire suppression has not been provided in the control room as the use of manual suppression by trained personnel provides a high reliability against accidental introduction of fire protection agents into this safety-related area. Considering the high density early warning 3.2-4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR detection provided, the wide spacing of the trays, the type of cables and size of trays, the full accessibility of manual hose streams, and the continuous manning of the control room below, the use of automatic systems in this room is neither justified nor necessary.

Summary of Cable Trays in Each Group of Vertical Trays Above the Control Room Suspended Ceiling Group I (4) 6" Tray (1) 12" Tray Equivalent to (3) 24" Cable Tray (1) 24" Tray Group II (4) 6" Tray (8) 12" Tray Equivalent to (6) 24" Cable Tray (1) 24" Tray Group III (2) 6" Tray (7) 12" Tray Equivalent to (6) 24" Cable Tray (1) 18" Tray Group IV (2) 6" Tray (2) 12" Tray Equivalent to (6) 24" Cable Tray (1) 18" Tray Group V (3) 6" Tray (2) 12" Tray Equivalent to (5) 24" Cable Tray (1) 24" Tray Adequate emergency lighting is provided in all fire areas needed to operate equipment required.

Automatic Halon Suppression is provided in the relay portion of the Control Room (Fire Zone Z032). Alternate shutdown capability is provided by the auxiliary shutdown stations, including the auxiliary shutdown panel, which are located in separate fire areas from the Control Room.

3.2-5 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Transfer switches are also located in separate fire areas. This precluded the need to provide separation for Trains A, B, C and D in the Control Room and Relay Cabinet Area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment In the event of a Control Room or Relay Room fire, cold shutdown can be achieved and maintained from the auxiliary shutdown panel, transfer switch panels or other local control stations and MCCs.

However, before control room evacuation, operator action should be taken from the control room to trip the reactor, secure the reactor coolant pumps, the startup feedwater pump, and CVCS charging pumps, and close the pressurizer PORV block valves, the reactor coolant system letdown isolation valves, MSIV, and FWIV valves. With the exception of tripping the reactor and securing the startup feedwater pump, the above actions are backed up outside the control room with alternate circuits by transferring control to local control stations.

The Startup Feed Pump is not backed up outside of the Control Room because closing of the FWIV ensures that a spurious running Startup Feed Pump will not have any significant impact to achieve and maintain the safe shutdown post Control Room evacuation.

E. Conclusions The loss of all circuits and equipment in Fire Area 1 is acceptable as safe shutdown functions can be controlled from the auxiliary shutdown stations which are in separate fire areas. Circuits necessary to shutdown from the auxiliary shutdown locations would remain free of fire damage.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:F.2 Deviation Cables located above a suspended ceiling.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.2

2. Appendix A:F.2 and Appendix R:III.G.3 Deviation No fixed suppression in the control room complex.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.2, FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G, and FHAR pages 3.2-5 and 3.10-1.

3. Appendix A:F.2 3.2-6 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Deviation Control room is not separated from the relay room and watch supervisor's office by 3-hour barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.2 and Fire Area 1, Section 3.2.

4. Appendix A:D.1.J Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

5. Appendix A:D.1.d Deviation The control room Z034 contains a frame utilized to display current control room staffing which is constructed of untreated wood.

Justification The frame does not significantly add to the combustible loading of the zone.

6. Appendix A: III.G.3 Deviation In addition to reactor trip, additional operations are performed in the control room prior to transferring control to the auxiliary shutdown panel and other points of control for meeting the alternate shutdown capability. These operations are discussed in Section 2.4.4.

Justification License Amendment No. 203 for Unit 1 and License Amendment No. 191 for Unit 2 3.2-7 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 1-1 FIRE AREA NO. 1 FIRE ZONE Z032 RELAY CABINET AREA OF CONTROL ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 4,110 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Total Flooding Halon System Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Hand-Held Pressurized Water Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-4 Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-6 Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-8 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 1-2 FIRE AREA NO. 1 FIRE ZONE Z034 MAIN CONTROL ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 4,011 ft2)

Detection: Ionization (detectors are located above and below suspended ceiling and in control cabinets)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-10, HC-4, and HC-8 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Hand-Held Pressurized Water Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-9 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 1-3 FIRE AREA NO. 1 FIRE ZONE Z083 WATCH SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 235 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-10 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Hand-held Pressurized Water Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-10 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 2 Reference Figures: 3-14, 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 2 is a multi-elevation area in the MEAB composed of the following fire zones:

Z001 Channel II Distribution Room Z002 Channel II Battery Room Z003 Channel I Distribution Room Z004 Train A ESF Switchgear Room Z005 Train A HVAC Equipment Room & CR Cleanup Unit Z006 Train A Elec. Penetration Area Z010 Train A Power Cable Vault Z013 Equipment Room, Train A Z016 Z027 Train A Elec. Chase Z028 Z029 Emergency Switchgear Area Z030 Nonradioactive Pipe Chase Z037 Halon Storage Room Z084 Channel I Battery Room Z111 Train A Electrical Chase Z128 Train A CCW Pump & Chiller Room Z200 Tendon Gallery 3.2-12 Amendment 26

STP FHAR The fire area boundaries of Fire Area 2 are 3-hour rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Knockout panels contained in fire walls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal either in the room or adjacent hallways. Equipment in switchgear rooms is mounted on raised pads.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 2-1 through 2-19.

C. Protection Requirements 3.2-13 Amendment 26

STP FHAR A fixed manually actuated, dry pipe closed head sprinkler system is provided for the concentrated cabling of the Train "A" Switchgear Room (Fire Zone 004). The hydraulic design of this system provides an average water density of 0.17 gpm/sq. ft. per the guidelines of NFPA 231C (1975) for industrial storage racks.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Affected Component Cooling Water Valves

Affected RHR Valves

ESF Components SOE

Affected RCPs

Affected Pressurizer Spray Valves

Affected SIS Valves, AHUs and Pumps

Affected Safeguards Control HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV and PORV Block Valve Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The Consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by protection of cables and/or by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications 3.2-14 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section d.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.5 Deviation Switchgear room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.5.

3. Appendix A:F.7 Deviation Battery room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.7.

4. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-15 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

5. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

6. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

7. Appendix R Section III.G.2.a Deviation Separation of EAB Fire Area 17 Zone 081 from Fire Area 2 Zone 016 by a 2-hour rated barrier without suppression. Fire area 7 Zone 081 contains ductwork which is required to remain intact following a fire to provide cooling to the QDPS rooms.

Justification This deviation is considered to be acceptable for the following reasons:

Zone 081 is bounded by 3-hour rated barriers except for the 2-hour floor bounding Zone 016.

Zone 081 contains no combustibles and is a limited access area such that there is a low probability of transient combustibles being introduced into the zone.

The combustible loading in Zone 016 is significantly less than the 2- hour rating of the barrier between Zone 016 and Zone 081.

Zone 016 contains an ionization detector mounted in the ceiling (which is the barrier with Zone 081).

Zone 016 contains manual suppression capabilities.

3.2-16 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Provision of a 3-hour barrier between Fire Area 17 Zone 081 and Fire Area 2 Zone 016 will not significantly enhance the level of safety provided.

Note: The two hour barrier between Fire Area 17 Zone 081 and Fire Area 2 Zone 016 consists of metal Q-decking with 2.5 inches of Mandoval P-20 fireproofing applied to the Fire Area 2 Zone 016 side. This configuration has been tested in accordance with British Standards Institute Fire Test Code BS 476: Part 8:1972 and shown to be a 2-hour rated barrier. The above referenced code utilizes the Standard Time-Temperature Curve and is the British equivalent of ASTM E-119.

3.2-17 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-1 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z001 CHANNEL II DISTRIBUTION ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 584 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-1 and HC-3 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-18 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-2 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z002 CHANNEL II BATTERY ROOM SEE TABLE 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 442 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-1 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-19 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-3 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z003 CHANNEL I DISTRIBUTION ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 533 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-1 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-20 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-4 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z004 ESF SWITCHGEAR ROOM, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3397 ft2)

DETECTION: Ionization Suppression: Manual Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-7 and HC-3 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Manually actuated, dry pipe, close head, special hazard Sprinkler System for cable trays Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-21 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-5 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z005 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1276 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for Area Thermal for Charcoal Filter Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Deluge System for Charcoal Filter HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN A Rad/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit

- Fire zone Z005 includes the Control Room Cleanup Unit (Charcoal Filter).

This Cleanup Unit has been assigned the fire detection zone Z086.

3.2-22 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-6 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z006 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5190 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel inside Zone: HR-5 Hand-held carbon dioxide Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-23 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-7 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z010 POWER CABLE VAULT, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 7455 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinklers, at Ceiling Level Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-1 and HR-9 Hand-held Dry Chemical Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-24 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-8 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z013 EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 485 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-9 Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-25 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-9 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z016 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2868 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-9 and HR-5 Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-1, HC-3, HC-7, and HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-26 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-10 THIS TABLE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

3.2-27 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-11 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z027 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 162 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel outside Zone: HR-10 Hand-held carbon dioxide Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-28 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-12 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z028 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 188 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-27 Hand-held Dry Chemical Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-29 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-13 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z029 EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits*

A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 6700 BTUs (negligible)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-27 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-30 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-14 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z030 NONRADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-31 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-15 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z037 HALON STORAGE ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 BTU/FT2 (Area: 264 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-1 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-32 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-16 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z084 CHANNEL I BATTERY ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 515 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-1 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-33 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-17 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z111 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN A Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 147 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet outside Zone: HC-19 Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-34 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-18 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z128 CCW PUMP & CHILLER, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1860 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-15 Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-35 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 2-19 FIRE AREA NO. 2 FIRE ZONE Z200 TENDON GALLERY SEE TABLE 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 Detection: None Suppression: None Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-36 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 3 Figure

References:

3-14, 15, 16, 25 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 3 is a multi-elevation area in the MEAB composed of the following fire zones:

Z031 Electrical Penetration Area, Train B Z036 Z038 Kitchen Z039 HVAC Equipment Room, Train B Z042 Train B ESF Switchgear Room Z043 Channel III Battery and Dist. Rooms Z045 Plant Computer Room, Sub-floor Area and Associated Battery Room Z115 Radwaste Control and Counting Rooms Z116 Nonradioactive Piping Penetration Area Z117 Solid Radwaste and Unloading Area Z119 Volume Control Tank and Valve Rooms Z130 Service Areas and BRS Recycle Holdup Tanks Z143 Electrical Chase, Train B Z147 Locker Rooms and Clothing Issue Fire Zones contained in Fire Area 3 are bounded by heavy concrete walls, ceilings, and floors except a 50-foot portion of the Zone 130/147 interface. Doors in zone boundaries are 3-hour rated except for those in Fire Zone Z147 which are not. Although zone boundary penetrations are not provided with 3-hour rated seals and HVAC dampers, the zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will inhibit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a zone using manual fire fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

3.2-37 Amendment 26

STP FHAR The fire area boundaries of Fire Area 3 are 3-hour rated fire barriers or the equivalent, except a portion of the Fire Area 3 Zone 147/Fire Area 30 Zone 144 interface which is described below.

Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are the same thickness as the wall. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal either in the room or adjacent hallways. Equipment in switchgear rooms is mounted on raised pads.

A portion of the wall between Fire Area 3 Zone 147 and Fire Area 30 Zone 144 contains a soffit (ceiling) which is not rated and a door which is not installed in a 3-hour rated configuration. The soffit is constructed of gypsum-wallboard which has been qualified to 3-hour rating in the vertical configuration but not in the horizontal application. The door is constructed as a 3-hour rated door. However, the installation of a 3-hour rated door in gypsum-wallboard is only qualified as a 1 1/2-hour rated door. Based on the combustible loading on either side of the wall and the level of detection and suppression, a Generic Letter 86-10 evaluation has been performed which justifies the adequacy of the fire area boundary to withstand the hazards associated with the area and provide the required protection for circuits in the area from a fire in the other area.

There is a plant protection supply locker in the airlock in Room 207.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 3-1 through 3-14.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in each zone - except Zone Z119 and Z117 - to provide early warning of a fire for manual firefighting. Zone Z117 is provided with optical flame detectors.

Also, a portion of zone Z147 is provided with line-type heat detectors above suspended ceiling.

Zone Z119 contains negligible combustibles, or ignition sources and will be inaccessible normally to plant personnel due to the VCT radiation levels. Therefore, fire detection instrumentation is not required for this zone.

Automatic Halon suppression is provided in the Plant Computer Room (Fire Zone Z045 and Detection Zone Z009) for property protection purposes only.

3.2-38 Amendment 26

STP FHAR A deluge suppression is provided for the carbon filters in Fire Zones Z039 and Z130 with those in Zone 130 (MAB) provided solely for property protection.

An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is provided for the laundry room in Fire Zone Z130 and the truck bay in Fire Zone Z117 for property protection purposes only. Therefore, this sprinkler system is not covered by plant technical specifications.

A fixed manually actuated, dry pipe closed head sprinkler system is provided for the Train "B" ESF Switchgear Room (Fire Zone 042). The hydraulic design of this system provides an average water density of 0.17 gpm/sq. ft. per the guidelines of NFPA 231C (1975) for industrial storage racks.

Fire Zone Z147 has a suspended ceiling. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system meeting the requirements of NFPA-13 1976 is provided to extinguish fires below the suspended ceiling and to prevent exposure fires from igniting the cables in the trays above. Due to cable tray sections that are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream because of the suspended ceiling, an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in portions of the area above the suspended ceiling to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be accomplished.

Fire Zone Z036 has a suspended ceiling. Ionization detection is provided below this ceiling.

Zone 036 also contains an all metal open lattice type false ceiling in the corridors just outside of the control room. The ceiling is installed approximately eight feet above the floor. Pipe, duct and cable trays are installed above the ceiling, with no combustibles installed below the ceiling.

Smoke detectors are provided above the ceiling, and can detect a fire from above or below the ceiling. Because the ceiling is an open lattice design, it is possible to look up through the ceiling to locate a fire if one were to occur, and to extinguish the fire with the use of local fire hose streams. In addition, the lattice panels are light weight and can be easily removed, if necessary.

The area above the open lattice ceiling is not considered to be a concealed space.

Because cable tray sections are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream, automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in portions of Fire Zone Z130 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved. Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed at ceiling level in Fire Zones Z116 and Z143. These systems are hydraulically designed to provide an average density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over any 3000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Affected CCW Valves

Affected CVCS Valves

Affected Essential Chiller Control Panel 3.2-39 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

Affected Essential Chilled Water Pump, Chillers and Coolers

Reactor Trip Breaker Circuitry for Scram Breaker RTR and BYR

Affected Safety Injection Valves

Affected ESF Components

Affected Essential Cooling Water Valves

Affected RHR Valves

Affected Boric Acid Transfer Pump and Associated Room Cooler HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV and PORV Block Valve SOE

Affected CCW Valves

Affected RCPs

Affected Safeguards Control

Affected SIS Pumps and Valves

Affected HVAC AHU

Affected RHR Valve Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 title "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action and adequate spatial separation with automatic suppression. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-40 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:F.5 Deviation Switchgear room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.5.

3. Appendix A:F.7 Deviation Battery room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.7.

4. Appendix A:D.1.f.

Deviation Cables located above a suspended ceiling in Zone 036 and 147.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.f.

5. Appendix A:D.1.a.(2)

Deviation Justification This deviation is considered acceptable for the following reasons:

Detection is provided for Fire Area 3, including above and below the suspended ceiling in Zone 147, for early warning.

Wet pipe suppression systems are provided above and below the suspended ceiling in Zone 147 which will tend to inhibit the propagation of fire into or out of Zone 147.

3.2-41 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Providing full area suppression for Fire Area 3 would not significantly increase the level of safety provided in Zone 147.

6. Appendix A:F.14 Deviation Radwaste building is not separated from other areas of the plant by 3-hour rated barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.14.

7. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

8. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

9. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

10. Appendix A:D.1.d Deviation The following combustible structure is located in Fire Area 3:

3.2-42 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Zone 038 Contains a counter top made of untreated wood composite.

Justification The structure does not add significantly to the combustible loading of Area 3.

G. Redundant Path Clarification

1. Zone 115 and 130 are locations where redundant circuits have less than 20 horizontal feet separation, intervening combustibles are present and no suppression system except for a small portion of Zone 130.

Discussion This clarification is considered acceptable for the following reasons.

No Train A safe shutdown circuits are in zones 115 or 130. The train A circuits are in Zones 116 and 147 which have full zone suppression systems. The train A circuits are approximately 20 horizontal feet from the zone boundaries of 115 and 130.

Detection is provided in each zone.

Cables are IEEE 383 qualified.

Hose reels are strategically placed to aid in manual fire suppression.

2. Provision of a redundant safe shutdown RHR and RCFC path in zone 116.

Discussion Supply and return containment isolation valves for all three trains of CCW to the RHR heat exchangers are in Zone 116 of this fire area. These valves are all normally open.

A spurious actuation of the Train A CCW containment isolation valve in this zone could impact the availability of the Train A RHR system. However, these valves may be manually positioned for reasons stated below. The RHR and RCFC systems will not be necessary for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . A local manual operation in the fire area may be required to provide a safe shutdown path. This action for RHR and RCFC valve is possible because:

The systems are not necessary for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months which provides sufficient time for fire suppression and smoke removal to make the zone accessible for the operator action.

The valves are located at least 1 1/2 horizontal feet from any significant combustible loading, cable trays.

3.2-43 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

A sprinkler is located about 1 1/2 horizontal feet and about 3 1/2 vertical feet from valve A1CCMOV0050. This sprinkler would provide local cooling to the valve to prevent mechanical damage to the valve.

Hot gases from any significant fire in this zone will collect at the ceiling and cause actuation of the wet pipe sprinkler system which provides full zone suppression capabilities.

3. Provision of redundant safe shutdown paths for letdown.

Discussion Volume control tank isolation valves as well as CCW train A and C valves for excess letdown heat exchanger and train B circuits are located in the fire area. The CCW valves are located in Zone 116. The VCT valves are located in Z119 which is a separate room and a good distance away from train B circuits (Z042, Z036, Z031). There is suppression and detection in Z031, Z042, Z147, Z045, Z116, Z130).

A. If fire is in vicinity of VCT valves then train B circuits for head vents are unaffected. Train A and B head vents may then serve as primary and secondary paths. Normal letdown should be isolated by closing FV0013 and 12. Excess letdown will be isolated by CVMOV0082.

B. If fire is in vicinity of train B circuits (Z031, Z042, Z036) then spurious operation will occur to train B valves and CCW train A and C valves will remain open.

CCW valves are located in Z116 which has detection and full zone suppression.

Combustible loading for the whole zone is equivalent to under 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire. The spurious operated train B valve, which will not be in FA will need to be manually operated.

3.2-44 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-1 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z031 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5194 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-6 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler at ceiling level Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-45 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-2 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z036 Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None. None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2951 ft2)

Detection: Ionization (detectors are located below suspended ceilings)

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-4, HC-8, HC-10, and HC-13 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-46 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-3 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z038 KITCHEN Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None. None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 120,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 104 ft2)

Detection: Ionization (detectors are located below suspended ceiling)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-10 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-47 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-4 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z039 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 967 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for area Thermal for charcoal filters Suppression: Deluge System for Charcoal Filters Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-10 and HC-13 Hand-Held C Communications:

Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-48 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-5 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z042 ESF SWITCHGEAR ROOM, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3471 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets outside Zone: HC-8, HC-4 and HC-13 Hose Reel outside Zone: HR-40 Hand-held carbon dioxide Manually actuated dry pipe, closed head, special hazard sprinkler system.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-49 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-6 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z043 CHANNEL III BATTERY & DISTRIBUTION ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 841 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-40 and HR-39 Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-2 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-50 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-7 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z045*

PLANT COMPUTER ROOM, SUB-FLOOR AREA & ASSOCIATED BATTERY ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1911 ft2)

Detection: Ionization detectors are located above and below suspended ceiling and below the raised access floor Suppression: Automatic Halon System, (Solely for property protection)

Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-4 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y Includes Detection Zone Z009 in sub-floor area of computer room 3.2-51 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-8 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z115 RADWASTE CONTROL & COUNTING ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1466 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone:

Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HR-21 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-52 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-9 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z116 NONRADIOACTIVE PIPING PENETRATION AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 4241 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels inside Zone: HR-21 and HR-23 Hand-Held dry chemical Automatic sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communication: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-53 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-10 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z117 SOLID RADWASTE & UNLOADING AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 240,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5269 ft2)

Detection: Optical Flame Detectors Suppression: Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system Truck Loading area (solely for property protection)

Hose Cabinet outside Zone: HC-29 Hose Reel outside Zone: HR-31 Hose Cabinet inside Zone: HC-26 Hand-held dry chemical extinguisher Large-Wheeled dry chemical extinguisher Radioactive/Toxic Materials: Y/Y Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y (1)

Charcoal is in this area only when being processed for offsite disposal.

3.2-54 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-11 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z119 VOLUME CONTROL TANK & VALVE ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2(Area: 626 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-32 Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-18 Hand-held Dry Chemical Rad/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-55 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-12 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z130 SERVICE AREAS & BRS RECYCLE HOLDUP TANKS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 10,389 ft2)

SERVICE AREAS & BRS RECYCLE HOLDUP TANKS Detection: Ionization: areas other than Charcoal Filter Thermal: Charcoal Filter Suppression: Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system: Laundry Room (solely for property protection)

Deluge System: Charcoal Filter for Sample Room and Radio. Chem. Lab (Solely for property protection)

Hose Reel outside Zone: HR-23 Hose Reels inside Zone: HR-17, HR-31, and HR-32 Hose Cabinets inside Zone: HC-29 and HC-18 Hand-held dry chemical extinguisher Rad/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: Y (Located in hallways only)

Emergency Lighting: Y (Located in hallways only) 3.2-56 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-13 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z143 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None. None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 388 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet outside Zone: HC-23 Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-57 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 3-14 FIRE AREA NO. 3 FIRE ZONE Z147 LOCKER ROOMS & CLOTHING ISSUE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles Below Suspended Ceiling See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load Below Susp. Ceiling: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 8,642 ft2)

Combustibles Above Suspended Ceiling See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load Above Susp. Ceiling: 120,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 8,066 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Above and Below Suspended Ceiling Line-type Above Susp. Ceiling Suppression: Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Below Suspended Ceiling Wet Pipe Sprinkler Coverage Above Suspended Ceiling Hose Cabinets and Reels Outside Zone: HC-18, HR-17 and HR-32 Hose Cabinets and Reels Inside Zone: HC-20, and HC-23 Hand-held Dry Chemicals Rad/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: Y (located in hallways only)

Emergency Lighting: Y (located in hallways only) 3.2-58 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 4 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 4 is a multi-elevation area in the MEAB composed of the following fire zones:

Z046 Train C Elec. Penetration Area Z049 Train C HVAC Equip. Room Z050 Corridor, Offices, CAS Battery Room and Elec. Equipment Z052 Train C ESF Switchgear Room Z053 Channel IV Battery and Dist. Room Z054 Motor Generator Room Z055 Misc. Elec. Equipment Room Z056 Control Rod Drive Room Z065 Office Z066 Elec. Equipment Room The zones contained in Fire Area 4 are bounded by heavy concrete walls, ceilings and floors.

Doors in fire zone boundaries are 3-hour rated. (Note that door 312 between Fire Zone 52 and 54 has been removed) Although fire zone boundary penetrations are not provided with 3-hour rated seals and HVAC dampers, the fire zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will inhibit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

All fire area boundaries are 3-hour fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations CN-3288 contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier (Note Hatch E between Fire Area 4 and Fire Area 34 has been removed). Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable 3.2-59 Amendment 26

STP FHAR exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal either in the room or adjacent hallways. Equipment in switchgear rooms is mounted on raised pads.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 4-1 through 4-10.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in each zone to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. A deluge system is provided for the charcoal filter in the Train C HVAC equipment room (Fire Zone Z049). An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed at ceiling level in Fire Zone Z046. The hydraulic design of this system provides an average density of 0.3 gpm/sq.

ft. over any 3000 sq. ft. of floor area.

A fixed manually actuated, dry pipe closed head sprinkler system is provided for the Train C ESF Switchgear Room (Fire Zone Z052). The hydraulic design of this system provides an average water density of 0.17 gpm/sq. ft. per the guidelines of NFPA 231C (1975) for industrial storage racks.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Reactor Trip Breakers SOE

Affected RC Pumps

Affected CCW Valves

Affected SIS Valves Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation 3.2-60 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2 Appendix A:F.5 Deviation Switchgear room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.5.

3. Appendix A:F.7 Deviation Battery room not separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.7.

4. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

5. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-61 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-1 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z046 ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5303 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet outside Zone: HC-6 Hose Reel inside Zone: HR-7 Hand-Held carbon dioxide Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-62 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-2 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z049 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1058 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for Area Thermal for Charcoal Filters Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Deluge System for Charcoal Filter HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN C Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-63 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-3 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z050 CORRIDOR, OFFICES, CAS BATTERY ROOM AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3424 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-11 and HR-7 Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-5, HC-6 and HC-9 Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler at ceiling level cover area(s) of concentrated cabling only)

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-64 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-4 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z052 ESF SWITCHGEAR ROOM, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3524 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-5 and HC-9 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Manually operated, dry pipe, closed head, special hazard Sprinkler System for cable trays Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-65 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-5 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z053 CHANNEL IV BATTERY AND DISTRIBUTION ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1030 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-5 and HC-6 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-66 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-6 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z054 MOTOR GENERATOR ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 639 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-5 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-67 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-7 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z055 MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 870 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-5 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-68 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-8 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z056 CONTROL ROD DRIVE ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1103 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-6 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-69 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-9 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z065 CENTRAL ALARM STATION* AND SUB-FLOOR AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 476 ft2)

Detection: Ionization (detectors are located below the suspended ceiling)

Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-11 and HC-9 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y The Central Alarm Station applies to Unit 1 only. The corresponding floor space in Unit 2 is a conference room.

3.2-70 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 4-10 FIRE AREA NO. 4 FIRE ZONE Z066*

ELEC. EQUIPMENT ROOM Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 75 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

Zone Z066 is for Unit 1 only, since Unit 2 does not have a Room 308D. The corresponding floor space in Unit 2 is included as part of Zone Z050.

3.2-71 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 5 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 5-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in the elevator shaft. No in-situ combustibles are located in the stairwell. No further protection is required for Fire Area 5.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment This Area contains no Safe Shutdown equipment or cables.

E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation The HVAC exhaust penetration at the roof elevation is not provided with a rated fire barrier.

Justification

The roof elevation that the exhaust is located at is a small area that is 10 feet higher than the remainder of the roof. As such it is even lower trafficked than the remainder of the roof.

The roof is of noncombustible construction and is therefore a low combustible area.

3.2-72 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-73 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 5-1 FIRE AREA NO. 5 FIRE ZONE Z014 STAIRWELL NO. 1 AND ELEVATOR NO. 4 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 251 ft2)

Detection: Ionization (Elevator equipment room only)

Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-9, HR-10, HR-11 and HR-38 Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-12, HC-27, HC-10 and HC-13 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide and Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cable in this fire zone is installed in conduit.

3.2-74 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 6 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 6 is composed of the following fire zones in the electrical portion of the MEAB:

Z019 Equipment Removal Area Z061 Train B HVAC Equipment Room Z062 Train A HVAC Equipment Room Z063 Train C HVAC Equipment Room Z085 HVAC Equipment Z097 Outside Air Intake The walls, ceilings and floors of all Fire Area 6 zones are heavy concrete with 3-hour rated doors. Although fire zone boundary penetrations are not provided with 3-hour rated seals or HVAC dampers, the fire zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will inhibit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual firefighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire Fire Area.

All Fire Area boundaries except stairwells are 3-hour rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

There is a plant protection supply locker in the airlock in Room 502.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 6-1 through 6-5.

3.2-75 Amendment 26

STP FHAR C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in each zone (except Z097) to provide early warning of a fire for manual firefighting. Deluge systems are provided for the charcoal filter systems in Fire Zones Z061, Z062 and Z063. No further protection is required in Fire Area 6 as the HVAC equipment in these rooms is not required for safe-shutdown.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusions Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-76 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-1 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z019 EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area 234 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-7, HC-13, HC-9, HC-15 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-77 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-2 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z061 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 190 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for area Thermal for Charcoal Filter Suppression: Deluge System (Carbon Filter)

Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-31 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-78 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-3 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z062 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 227 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for area Thermal for Charcoal Filter Suppression: Deluge System (Carbon Filter)

Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-31 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-79 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-4 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z063 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 227 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for area Thermal for Charcoal Filter Suppression: Deluge System (Carbon Filter)

Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-31 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-80 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-5 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z085 HVAC EQUIPMENT Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1968 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-38 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-81 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 6-6 FIRE AREA NO. 6 FIRE ZONE Z097 HVAC EQUIPMENT Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1995 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-82 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 7 Reference Figures: 3-14 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 7 is composed of Fire Zone Z071 which is the Auxiliary Shutdown area. The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hour rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. The fire dampers installed in the HVAC supply duct (FF-036) and the return air duct (FF-367 and FF-368) in the ventilation system serving the QDPS area are not installed per the manufacturer's instructions. See zone figure 7-1. The HVAC duct system for these fire dampers is common to all three trains of QDPS areas and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (Fire Areas 7, 8, 9, and 76). Since the barrier surrounding the HVAC duct is not concrete, the installation of the fire damper cannot be made per the manufacturer's instruction. A Generic Letter 86-10 engineering evaluation of the duct/damper installation was performed by a fire protection engineer. The installed configuration was judged to provide a level of fire protection commensurate with the hazard of the area. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal in the adjacent hallway.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 7-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual firefighting. The equipment and cables in the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel room are required for safe shutdown only in the event that the control room has to be evacuated.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

HSD

Steam Generator C PORV

Affected RH and SI Valves 3.2-83 Amendment 26

STP FHAR HSD (Cont'd)

Affected Essential Power Distribution.

Affected AFW Valves and Pumps

Affected CCW, ECW and RHR Pumps

Affected CCW Valves

Affected QDPS Circuits

Centrifugal Charging Pump A

Affected Pressurizer Heaters

Affected ECW Valves

Affected circuits for HVAC Fans and Panels and CH Pumps and Chillers.

SOE

Steam Generators A, B, and D PORVs

Affected Diesel Generator Load Sequencer

Affected QDPS Panels Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Protection Equipment Requirements". In addition, where required component circuitry will be isolated at transfer panels.

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in Area 7 will be mitigated by protection of cables or by manual compensating operator action. Safe-shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation The fire dampers which are installed in the HVAC supply duct (FF-036) and the return air duct (FF-367 and FF-368) in the ventilation system serving the QDPS area are not installed per the manufacturer's instructions. See zone figure 7-1.

3.2-84 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification

The HVAC duct system in which these fire dampers are installed are common to all three trains of QDPS area and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (Fire Areas 7, 8, 9 and 76). Since the barrier surrounding the HVAC duct is not concrete, the installation of the fire damper cannot be made per the manufacturer's instruction.

The fire load in the area is relatively small. Damper closure is by thermal link.

Automatic area detection is provided which alarms locally and alarms and annunciates in the control room.

Manual fire suppression is provided by hose cabinets and portable extinguisher located in the corridor just outside the entrance to the room.

2. Appendix R Section III.G.2.c Deviation Lack of suppression in an area with circuit of one redundant train enclosed within a 1-hour fire wrap.

Justification

Fire Area 07 is limited and transient combustible and ignition sources are controlled by administrative procedures.

Calculated fire severity is approximately 45 minutes.

Area fire detection system provides reasonable assurance that a fire will be detected in its incipient stage.

STP Fire Brigade operational experience has demonstrated that full fire fighting capability can be achieved in approximately 25 minutes.

SER (ST-AE-NOC-000273) from NRC dated 10/15/1998 3.2-85 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 7-1 FIRE AREA NO. 7 FIRE ZONE Z071 AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 950 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-12 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-86 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 8 Reference Figures: 3-14 Safe-shutdown Equipment of Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 8-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE Steam Generator C PORV Specifics of mitigation are listed in Report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-88 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 8-1 FIRE AREA NO. 8 FIRE ZONE Z072 QDPS ROOM, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 214 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-7 and HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-89 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 9 Reference Figures: 3-14 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 9-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-90 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 9-1 FIRE AREA NO. 9 FIRE ZONE Z073 QDPS ROOM, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/FT2 (Area: 171 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-7 and HC-12 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-91 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 10 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 10-1.

C. Protection Requirements Since there are no in-situ or transient combustibles and the area is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour fire barriers or equivalent, no protection is required in this area.

D. Conclusion Loss of the makeup riser due to a fire is not considered a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

3.2-92 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-93 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 10-1 FIRE AREA NO. 10 FIRE ZONE Z074 MAKEUP AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-94 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 11 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 11-1.

C. Protection Requirements Due to the lack of combustibles and isolation from the rest of the building by 3-hour fire barriers or equivalent, no protection is required.

D. Conclusion A fire in the Outside Air Supply Riser is not considered a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-95 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-96 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 11-1 FIRE AREA NO. 11 FIRE ZONE Z075 OUTSIDE AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-97 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 12 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 12-1.

C. Protection Requirements This Fire Area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers or equivalent. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the EAB Smoke and Exhaust Riser due to a fire is not a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

In the event the riser is lost it would not prevent achieving and maintaining the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-98 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R.III.F.

Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-99 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 12-1 FIRE AREA NO. 12 FIRE ZONE Z076 SMOKE AND EXHAUST RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-100 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 13 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

The control room supply air riser extension to the control room (fire zone Z034) is also bounded by 3-hour rated fire barriers. Ventilation ducts are provided with 3-hour rated dampers at the duct fire barrier penetrations to the control room. Dampers are installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 13-1.

C. Protection Requirements This Fire Area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the Supply Air Riser due to a fire is not a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-101 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-102 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 13-1 FIRE AREA NO. 13 FIRE ZONE Z077 CONTROL ROOM SUPPLY AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-103 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 14 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 14-1.

C. Protection Requirements This fire area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers or equivalent. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the Exhaust Air Riser due to a fire is not a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A ad/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-104 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 14-1 FIRE AREA NO. 14 FIRE ZONE Z078 EAB EXHAUST AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-105 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 15 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

The control room return air riser extension to the control room (Fire Zone Z034) is also bounded by 3-hour rated fire barriers. Ventilation duct is provided with a 3-hour rated damper at the duct fire barrier penetration to the control room and at duct branches from other areas. Dampers are installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 15-1.

C. Protection Requirements This fire area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the Control Room Return Air Riser due to a fire in the duct is not a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-106 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-107 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 15-1 FIRE AREA NO. 15 FIRE ZONE Z079 CONTROL ROOM RETURN AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-108 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 16 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 16-1.

C. Protection Requirements This fire area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the EAB Main Return Riser due to a fire in the duct is not a credible event due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-109 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 16-1 FIRE AREA NO. 16 FIRE ZONE Z080 EAB MAIN RETURN AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-110 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 17 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 17-1.

C. Protection Requirements This fire area does not contain any combustibles and is isolated from the rest of the building by 3-hour rated fire barriers. No further protection is required.

D. Conclusion Loss of the EAB Main Supply Air Riser due to a fire in the duct is not credible due to the lack of combustibles and inaccessibility.

E. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

3.2-111 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

4. Appendix R Section III.G.2.a Deviation Separation of EAB Fire Area 17 Zone 081 from Fire Area 2 Zone 016 by a 2-hour rated barrier without suppression. Fire Area 17 Zone 081 contains ductwork which is required to remain intact following a fire to provide cooling to the QDPS rooms.

Justification This deviation is considered to be acceptable for the following reasons:

Zone 081 is bounded by 3-hour rated barriers except for the 2-hour floor bounding Zone 016.

Zone 081 contains no combustibles and is a limited access area such that there is a low probability of transient combustibles being introduced into the zone.

The combustible loading of 25 minutes in Zone 016 is significantly less than the 2-hour rating of the barrier between Zone 016 and Zone 081.

Zone 016 contains an ionization detector mounted in the ceiling (which is the barrier with Zone 081).

3.2-112 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

Zone 016 contains manual suppression capabilities.

Provision of a 3-hour barrier between Fire Area 17 Zone 081 and Fire Area 2 Zone 016 will not significantly enhance the level of safety provided.

Note: The two hour barrier between Fire Area 17 Zone 081 and Fire Area 2 Zone 016 consists of metal Q-decking with 2.5 inches of Mandoval P-20 fire proofing applied to the Fire Area 2 Zone 016 side. This configuration has been tested in accordance with British Standards Institute Fire Test Code BS 476: Part 8: 1972 and shown to be a 2-hour rated barrier. The above referenced code utilizes the Standard Time-Temperature Curve and is the British equivalent of ASTM E-119.

3.2-113 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 17-1 FIRE AREA NO. 17 FIRE ZONE Z081 EAB MAIN SUPPLY AIR RISER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-114 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 18 Reference Figures: 3-15 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 18-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-115 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 18-1 FIRE AREA NO. 18 FIRE ZONE Z020 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN A Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 75 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-12, HC-13, and HC-9 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-116 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 19 Reference Figures: 3-16 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 19-1.

C. Protection Requirements No in-situ combustibles are located in the stairwell and it is isolated from the rest of the building by 2-hour rated barriers with 1-1/2 hour-rated doors and dampers. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements.

None.

E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-117 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 19-1 FIRE AREA NO. 19 FIRE ZONE Z033 MEAB STAIRWELL NO. 3 Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load:

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-3, HC-12 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-118 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 20 Reference Figure: 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 20-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in Fire Zone Z129 for coverage of concentrated cabling.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD Affected CCW Valves and HVAC Components SOE Affected CCW Valves Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 tiled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action and adequate spatial separation with automatic suppression. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-119 Amendment 26

STP FHAR F. Redundant Path Clarification Provision of CCW/HVAC/ECW to ensure a charging path remains available.

Discussion Zone 129 contains the CCW supply and return cross-connect headers and ECW and HVAC redundant circuits. All three trains of CCW are tied together by these cross-connect headers.

The valves associated with the cross-connect headers are all normally open. The ECW and HVAC circuits are located in the Train A and C cable trays.

Train B CCW pump power circuits are not in this fire area. Train A and C CCW pump circuits in this fire area are separated by approximately 45 horizontal feet with no intervening combustibles, with the exception of motor operators for the cross-connect header valves. With the exception of the vertical cable trays at the north end and the southwest portion of the fire area, all cables in this area are housed in steel conduit. Therefore, no intervening combustibles (except for the limited amount associated with the valve motor operators) exist between valves of redundant trains. A fire originating at any one valve has no transport path to impact operation of a redundant valve and it has insufficient combustible loading to cause mechanical damage or a spurious operation to another valve due to radiant energy. Therefore, the only combustibles of concern are the Train A and N vertical cable trays at the north end and the Train C vertical tray in the southwest portion of the fire area. With the exception of the solenoid valves for FV4656 and FV4657, the following separations of cross-connect valves are provided by Train:

A to C 28 horizontal feet A to B 4 horizontal feet B to C 15 horizontal feet This separation ensures that at least 1 of ECW/HVAC/CCW train (A or C) will be available for satisfying Appendix R requirements in this fire area.

A detection system is provided and full area suppression is available from a wet pipe sprinkler system.

To establish CCW flow for the credited charging pump, it will be necessary (assuming closure of FV4656 and FV4657) to take operator action to locally manually open valves FV4656 and FV4657.

The combustible loading in this region is low enough to allow suppression of the fire, and sufficient ventilation exists to allow the manual action within two hours to re-establish charging.

Valves FV4656 and FV4657 are at least 10 horizontal feet from the Train C cable trays and at floor level making it not credible for radiant energy to mechanically damage the valve before the sprinkler system is actuated by hot gases.

3.2-120 Amendment 26

STP FHAR In summary, CCW/ECW/HVAC will be available to support the credited charging pump for the following reasons:

Due to the mentioned separation, radiant energy is not sufficient to cause failure of circuits within the valve bodies.

Circuits are protected by steel conduit from hot gases and the sprinkler system will provide added cooling.

The design of the room will tend to prevent hot gases from concentrating in one location at the ceiling.

3.2-121 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 20-1 FIRE AREA NO. 20 FIRE ZONE Z129 NONRADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List NONRADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2336 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels and Cabinets outside Zone: HR-16, HC-19, & HC-17 Hand-held dry chemical Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-122 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 21 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Doors are 1-1/2-hour rated barriers, and duct penetrations are provided with 1-1/2-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions except as noted in Section F. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 21-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in the elevator machine room. No in- situ combustibles are located in the stairwell and negligible quantities are located in the elevator machine room. Fire Area 21 is separated from the rest of the building by 2-hour rated fire barriers with 1-1/2-hour rated doors and dampers. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment There are no safe shutdown circuits or components located in this area.

E. Conclusion A fire in Fire Area 21 would not affect the capability to achieve and maintain the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation The HVAC exhaust penetration at the roof elevation is not provided with a rated fire barrier.

3.2-123 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification

The roof elevation that the exhaust is located at is a small area that is 10 feet higher than the remainder of the roof. As such it is even lower trafficked than the remainder of the roof.

The roof is of noncombustible construction and is therefore a low combustible area.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

3. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.l, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-124 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 21-1 FIRE AREA NO. 21 FIRE ZONE Z100 MEAB STAIRWELL NO. 2 AND ELEVATOR NO. 5 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 BTU/ft2 Detection: Ionization (Provided in elevator machine room only)

Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-15, HR-16, HR-17, HR-18 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y (in stairwell) 3.2-125 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 22 Reference Figure: 3-14 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Z125 RCP Oil Drain Tank Room Z132 480V MCC Room Z133 Pipe Penetration Room All Fire Area 22 boundaries are 3-hour rated firewalls, ceilings, and floors or the equivalent.

Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 22-1 through 22-3.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in each zone for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting. The RCP Oil Drain Tank in zone Z125 is nitrogen inerted and normally empty. During a shutdown for maintenance the tank will receive 880 gallons of oil. Oil will be drummed and removed as part of the maintenance schedule prior to returning to power operation.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impact on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

3.2-126 Amendment 26

STP FHAR HSD

Affected RHR Valve SOE

Affected CV Valve

Affected SI Valve Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in Area 22 will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action.

Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-127 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 22-1 FIRE AREA NO. 22 FIRE ZONE Z125 RCP OIL DRAIN TANK ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 6700 BTUs (negligible)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-19 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-128 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 22-2 FIRE AREA NO. 22 FIRE ZONE Z132 MCC ROOM, 480 VOLT See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1113 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-15 and HR-19 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-129 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 22-3 FIRE AREA NO. 22 FIRE ZONE Z133 PIPE PENETRATION ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5553 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinkler System at ceiling level Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-19 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-130 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 23 Fire Area 23 DELETED. Fire Area 23 combined with Fire Area 32 3.2-131 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 24 Reference Figures: 3-14 and 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 24 is composed of the following fire zones:

Z102 Corridor and Nonradioactive Pipe Chase Z136 Gaseous Radioactive Collection and Processing Area Z137 Liquid Waste Processing Area The fire zones contained in Fire Area 24 are bounded by heavy concrete walls, ceilings, and floors. Although the zone boundary penetrations are not provided with 3-hour rated doors, HVAC dampers, or penetration seals, fire zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will limit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual fire fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

The Fire Area 24 boundaries are 3-hour fire barriers, except stairwells which are 2-hour barriers.

Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are the same thickness as the wall. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 24-1 through 24-3 3.2-132 Amendment 26

STP FHAR C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in each zone to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Smoke detection is also provided in portions of Fire Zone Z137. Radioactive materials are contained in closed metal tanks or containers. Charcoal in Fire Zone Z136 is contained in sealed stainless steel tanks. Combustible gas monitoring is provided in Fire Zone Z136.

Hydrogen in Fire Zone Z136 is contained in sealed stainless steel tanks.

Due to cable tray sections that are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream, ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in portions of Fire Zone Z102 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved.

The fire area is bounded by column lines E, F, 24.6, and 26 as shown on Figure 3-14. These systems are hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over the area covered.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements.

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

3.2-133 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 24-1 FIRE AREA NO. 24 FIRE ZONE Z102 CORRIDOR AND NONRADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 4814 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Wet pipe sprinkler system (partial coverage 1 area)

Hose Cabinets and Reels Inside Zone: HC-30, HR-15, HR-30 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y (Room/Corridor 067B only)

Area wide automatic fire suppression has not been provided for the following reasons:

1. A single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements will be available following a fire in this zone.

2. Manual operator action can be taken to mitigate the consequences of SOE.

3. Detection system and manual fire suppression equipment are provided in this zone.

4. The concentrated cable area in this zone is provided with wet pipe sprinkler system.

5. Other areas are easily accessible for manual fire fighting.

6. The fire detection will provide alarm and indication locally and in the control room for implementing immediate Fire Brigade response.

7. IEEE 383 cables and R.G. 1.75 separation criteria were utilized in cable layout design.

3.2-134 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 24-2 FIRE AREA NO. 24 FIRE ZONE Z136 GASEOUS RADIOACTIVE COLLECTION AND PROCESSING AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3646.5 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets and Reels Outside Zone: HC-30, HR-15, and HR-30 Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-25 Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-135 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 24-3 FIRE AREA NO. 24 FIRE ZONE Z137 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 4953 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Smoke Suppression: Hose Cabinets and Reels Outside Zone: HC-28, HC-30, HC-31, and HR-30 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/Y (radioactive materials are contained in closed metal containers)

Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-136 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 25 Reference Figures: 3-14, 3-20, 3-24, and 3-30 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 25 is bounded by 3-hour rated walls, ceiling, and floor. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are of the same thickness as the wall. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible duct work. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 25-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and circuits in Fire Area 25 would not prevent achieving and maintaining the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

3.2-137 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Test data is not available to certify that the blocks forming the 3-hour barrier (removable wall section) between Fire Area 25 Zone 124 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 are 3-hour rated.

Justification

1. The removable wall consists of solid concrete blocks, stacked to full wall depth and anchored by steel framing on both sides. The individual block strength is the same as that of the permanent 3-hour wall. The blocks are cut to fit and vertically and horizontally staggered such that propagation of fire or hot gases thru the stack is highly improbable.

2. The combustible loading of Fire Area 25 Zone 124 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 is low.

3. Fire Area 25 Zone 124 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 both contain fire detectors which alarm in the control room providing early warning in the event of a fire.

3.2-138 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 25-1 FIRE AREA NO. 25 FIRE ZONE Z124 CVCS CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1B AND VALVE ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 456 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-15 and HR-30 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-139 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 26 Reference Figures: 3-14, 3-20, and 3-30 Safe-shutdown Equipment and Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 26 is bounded by 3-hour rated walls, ceiling, and floor. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are of the same thickness as the wall. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 26-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

3.2-140 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Test data is not available to certify that the blocks forming the 3-hour barrier (removable wall section) between Fire Area 26 Zone 123 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 are 3-hour rated.

Justification

1. The removable wall consists of solid concrete blocks, stacked to full wall depth and anchored by steel framing on both sides. The individual block strength is the same as that of the permanent 3-hour wall. The blocks are cut to fit and vertically and horizontally staggered such that propagation of fire or hot gases thru the stack is highly improbable.

2. The combustible loading of Fire Area 26 Zone 123 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 is low.

3. Fire Area 26 Zone 123 and Fire Area 27 Zone 139 both contain fire detectors which alarm in the control room providing early warning in the event of a fire.

3.2-141 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 26-1 FIRE AREA NO. 26 FIRE ZONE Z123 CVCS CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1A AND VALVE ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 486 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-142 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 27 Reference Figures: 3-14 and 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 27 is composed of the following fire zones:

Z108 Z109 Train C Electrical Chase Z127 CVCS Equipment Rooms Z138 Corridor and Pipe and HVAC Chase Z139 Train C CCW Pump and Chiller Z141 Boric Acid Tank Rooms Z142 CCW Heat Exchangers Zone boundaries are heavy concrete with 3-hour rated fire doors except Fire Zone Z127, which does not have 3-hour fire doors, and Fire Zone Z141 which has a watertight special function door. Although fire zone boundaries are not provided with rated penetration seals and HVAC dampers, the fire zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will inhibit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual fire fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

Fire Area 27 boundaries are 3-hour fire barriers except stairwells which are 2-hour barriers.

Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are the same thickness as the wall.

3.2-143 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

There is a plant protection supply locker in the airlock in Room 067C.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 27-1 through 27-7.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in each zone for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting. The Train A, B, and C CCW heat exchangers do not require additional protection due to the passive nature of the heat exchangers and the low fire severity in the Fire Zone Z142.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.l.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

3.2-144 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:F.ll Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.ll.

3.2-145 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-1 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z108 BORIC ACID TANK AND PUMP ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,041 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y (Room 018 only)

Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-146 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-2 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z109 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 200 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-17 and HC-19 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-147 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-3 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z127 CVCS EQUIPMENT ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3,698 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-16 and HC-28 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N CVCS EQUIPMENT ROOMS Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

NOTE 1: Powered by TSC Diesel 3.2-148 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-4 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z138 CORRIDOR AND PIPE AND HVAC CHASE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,650 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-16 and HC-28 Hand-held Dry Chemical Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler at Ceiling Level (over area(s) of concentrated cabling only).

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-149 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-5 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z139 CCW PUMP AND CHILLER, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,930 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels and Cabinets Outside Zone: HR-15 and HC-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler at Ceiling Level over Concentrated Cabling Only.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y Automatic fire suppression has not been provided for the following reasons:

1. A single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements will be available following a fire in this zone.

2. Detection system and manual fire suppression equipment are provided in this zone.

3. All areas of this zone are easily accessible for manual fire fighting.

4. The fire detection will provide alarm and indication locally and in the control room for implementing immediate Fire Brigade response.

5. IEEE 383 cables and R.G. 1.75 separation criteria were utilized in cable layout design.

3.2-150 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-6 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z141 BORIC ACID TANK ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-151 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 27-7 FIRE AREA NO. 27 FIRE ZONE Z142 CCW HEAT EXCHANGERS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5,082 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-17 and HC-19 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-152 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 28 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-16 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Doors are 1-1/2-hour rated barriers and ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 1-1/2-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 28-1.

C. Protection Requirements No in-situ combustibles are located in Fire Area 28. Fire Area 28 is separated from the rest of the building by 2-hour rated fire barriers with 1-1/2-hour rated doors and dampers. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment There are no safe-shutdown circuits or components located in this area.

E. Conclusion A fire in Fire Area 28 would not affect the capability to achieve and maintain the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.2-153 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 28-1 FIRE AREA NO. 28 FIRE ZONE Z105 MEAB STAIRWELL NO. 4 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-28, HC-31, and HC-29 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-154 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 29 Reference Figure: 3-14 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description The walls, ceiling, and floor of Fire Area 29 are 3-hour fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Knockout panels contained in fire barriers are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are the same thickness as the wall.

Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 29-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to ensure early warning for manual firefighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:F.ll Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.ll.

3.2-155 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 29-1 FIRE AREA NO. 29 FIRE ZONE Z140 CCW PUMP AND CHILLER, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1496 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets and Reels Outside Zone: HC-16 and HR-15 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-156 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 30 Reference Figure: 3-16 Safe-Shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description The walls, ceiling and floor are 3-hour fire barriers, except the stairwell/elevator boundary which is a 2-hour fire barrier with doors and dampers 1-1/2-hour rated and a portion of the Fire Area 30 Zone 144/Fire Area 3 Zone 147 interface which is discussed below. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with dampers rated the same as the barrier installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

A portion of the wall between Fire Area 3 Zone 147 and Fire Area 30 Zone 144 contains a soffet (ceiling) which is not rated and a door which is not installed in a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated configuration. The soffet is constructed of gypsum - wallboard which has been qualified to 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rating in the vertical configuration but not in the horizontal application. The door is constructed as a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated door however the installation of a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated door in gypsum - wallboard is only qualified as a 1 1/2 hour rated door. Based on the combustible loading on either side of the wall and the level of detection and suppression, a Generic Letter 86-10 evaluation has been performed which justifies the adequacy of the Fire Area boundary to withstand the hazards associated with the area and provide the required protection for circuits in the area from a fire in the other area.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 30-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed at ceiling level in Fire Zone Z144. The hydraulic design of this system provides an average density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over any 3000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-157 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 30-1 FIRE AREA NO. 30 FIRE ZONE Z144 MEAB STAIRWELL NO. 2 AND ELEVATOR FOYER See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List.

Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 120,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 476 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels and Cabinets outside Zone: HR-17 Hand-held dry chemical Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-158 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 31 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 31 is separated from other interior fire areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers with the exception of Fire Area 19 which is separated by a 1-1/2-hour rated boundary. The north exterior wall of the MEAB forms a portion of the area boundary. This wall is provided with 3-hour rated penetration seals from column A/20 to column E/20 which is within 50' of the ESF auxiliary transformers. Currently, no penetrations exist in the balance of this exterior wall and no significant combustibles are present with 50' exterior to this portion of the wall.

Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 31-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided to provide early warning for manual fire fighting. A ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed throughout Fire Zone Z047 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved.

The sprinkler system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over any 3,000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

3.2-159 Amendment 26

STP FHAR SSD

Affected Safety Injection Valves

Affected ESF Components

Affected CVCS Valves SOE

Affected CCW Valves HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in Area 31 will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action.

Safe shutdown of the plant can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2 Appendix A:F.3.b Deviation Three foot by eight foot aisle separationis not provided between all tray stacks in the cable spreading room.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.3.b.

3.2-160 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 31-1 FIRE AREA NO. 31 FIRE ZONE Z047 CABLE SPREADING/POWER CABLE AREA AND CABLING AREA, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5,945 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinkler at Ceiling Level Hose Reel Outside Area: HR-7 (For Room 301 B Only)

Hose Reels Inside Area: HR-3 and HR-11 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-161 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area 32:

Reference Figure: 3-14 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 32 is a multi-elevation area in the MEAB composed of the following fire zones:

Z103 Reactor Makeup Water and LASR Storage Tank and Pump Rooms Z104 Refueling Water Storage Tank Room Z113 RCP Oil Feed Tank Room Z114 Radioactive and Nonradioactive Pipe Chases Z121 Decontamination Area Z122 HVAC Intake and Hot Machine Shop Z126 480 V Non-ESF Switchgear Z131 Filter and Demineralizer Area Z134 Nonradioactive Pipe Chase Z135 Radioactive Pipe Penetration Area Z145 Personnel Access to Containment Z146 HVAC Outside Exhaust Equipment 3.2-162 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Zones Z103, Z104, Z113, Z126, Z131, and Z134 have 3-hour rated fire doors. Fire Zone Z121 has an airtight special function door. The remaining Fire Zones Z122, Z145, and Z146 do not have fire-rated doors. The door between Fire Zones Z114 and Z135 is also a non-rated door.

The fire zones contained in Fire Area 32 are bounded by heavy concrete walls, ceilings, and floors. Although some zone boundary penetrations are not provided with 3-hour rated seals and HVAC dampers, zone boundaries provide significant obstructions which will limit zone-to-zone fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires within a fire zone using manual fire fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire area.

Fire Area 32 is bounded by 3-hour rated fire barriers or equivalent except the stairwell (Area 21) boundary which is a 2-hour fire barrier with 1-1/2-hour rated doors and dampers. Doors and penetrations contained in firewalls are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in firewalls are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Knockout panels contained in firewalls are constructed of solid concrete blocks with offset joints and are the same thickness as the wall.

Smoke and heat removal will be accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

Drains are provided for firewater removal.

There is a plant protection supply locker in the airlock in Room 326 B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 32-1 through 32-12.

C. Protection Requirements Due to cable tray sections that are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream, ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in portions of Fire Zone Z122 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved.

The area is bounded by column lines H, J, 27, and 28 as shown on figure 3-17. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in a portion of Fire Zones Z145 and Z134 for coverage of concentrated cabling. These systems are hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over the area covered.

3.2-163 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Ionization detection is provided in each zone to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting except Fire Zone Z131 where the equipment is located in shielded compartments and there is a low fire load. Radioactive materials are contained in closed metal tanks or containers.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

HSD

Affected CVCS Valve

Affected CCW Valves

Affected RHR Valve SOE

Affected CCW Valves

Affected SI Valves

Affected ESF Components Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by protection of cables and/or by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown of the plant can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-164 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceiling are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

4. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

5. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB9.5-1. Section F.11.

3.2-165 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

6. Appendix R, III.G.2 Deviation Operator manual actions are taken to de-energize and manually open charging pump suction valve CV-MOV-0112C (Train C) to align the charging pumps suction to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and to de-energize and manually close the Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valve CV-MOV-0112B (Train B) to the charging pumps suction in lieu of meeting circuit protection separation requirements to ensure that adequate boron concentration is available for reactivity control and to ensure that adequate inventory control is maintained for safe shutdown.

Justification License Amendment No.186 for Unit 1 and License Amendment No. 173 for Unit 2.

3.2-166 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-1 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z103 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER AND LASR STORAGE TANK AND PUMP ROOMS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 "Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles:*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2640 ft²)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-36 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-167 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-2 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z104 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 "Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft² (Area: 3614 ft²)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-36 and HR-23 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-168 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-3 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z113 RCP OIL FEED TANK ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 6700 BTUs (negligible)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-24 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-169 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-4 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z114 RADIOACTIVE AND NONRADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASES See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 "Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles:*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 17,676 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-22 Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-31 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-170 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-5 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z121 DECONTAMINATION AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1150 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-18 and HR-24 Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N Automatic fire suppression has not been provided for the following reasons:

1. A single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements will be available following a fire in this zone.

2. A fire in this zone will not cause spurious operation of safe-shutdown components.

3. Detection system and manual fire suppression equipment are provided in this zone.

4. The fire detection will provide alarm and indication locally and in the control room for implementing immediate Fire Brigade response.

5. All areas of this zone are easily accessible for manual fire fighting.

6. IEEE 383 cables and R.G. 1.75 separation criteria were utilized in cable layout design.

3.2-171 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-6 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z122 HVAC INTAKE AND HOT MACHINE SHOP See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 14,927 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels inside Zone: HR-13, HR-18, HR-14, and HR-33 Hose Reel outside Zone: HR-24 Hand-held dry chemical and Hand-held carbon dioxide outside Zone Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system over concentrated cabling.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-172 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-7 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z126 480 V NON-ESF SWITCHGEAR See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,376 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-13 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-173 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-8 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z131 FILTER AND DEMINERALIZER AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles:*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 8,355 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-32 and HR-33 Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-34 and HR-35 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

(Unit 2 Only) 3.2-174 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-9 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z134 NON RADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2622 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-20 Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-16 Hand-held Dry Chemical Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system over concentrated cabling.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-175 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-10 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z135 RADIOACTIVE PIPE PENETRATION AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles:*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of Combustibles.

Combustible Load: 6700 BTUs (negligible)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-20, HR-22 Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-16 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-176 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-11 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z145 PERSONNEL ACCESS TO CONTAINMENT See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3624 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinkler System at ceiling level over concentrated cabling (i.e. partial coverage)

Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-25 Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-24 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide and Dry Chemical extinguishers Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-177 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 32-12 FIRE AREA NO. 32 FIRE ZONE Z146 HVAC OUTSIDE EXHAUST EQUIPMENT See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 7053 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-25, HR-26, HR-27, HR-28, and HR-29 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-178 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 33 Reference Figures: 3-16 through 3-20 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 33 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 33-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Due to cable tray sections that are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream, ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in portions of Fire Zone Z018 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved. The fire area is bounded by column lines 22.4, 24, E, and H, as shown on figure 3-20. This system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over the area covered.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generator B PORV

Affected SI Valve HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve Specifications of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Action and Equipment Protection Requirements".

3.2-179 Amendment 26

STP FHAR E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-180 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 33-1 FIRE AREA NO. 33 FIRE ZONE Z018 CABLING AREA TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None N N N Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2921 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Wet Pipe Sprinkler System (Partial Coverage)

Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-4 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Hose Reels in Zone: HR39 and HR40 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-181 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 34 Reference Figures: 3-16 and 3-20 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 34 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are CN-3288 constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier (Note Hatch E between Fire Area 34 and Fire Area 4 has been removed). Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 34-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Due to cable tray sections that are not readily accessible to an effective hose stream, ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are installed in portions of Fire Zone Z060 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved. The area is bounded by column lines 22.4, 24, E.4, and H, as shown on figure 3-18. This system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over the area covered.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE Steam Generator C PORV Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusions The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-182 Amendment 26

STP FHAR F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-183 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 34-1 FIRE AREA NO. 34 FIRE ZONE Z060 CABLING AREA, TRAIN C Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2921 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Wet Pipe Sprinkler System (Partial Coverage)

Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-8 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-184 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 64 Reference Figure: 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 64 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 64-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting.

A ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler system will be installed throughout Fire Zone Z026 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved.

The sprinkler system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over any 3,000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Steam Generator B or C MSIV

Affected Residual Heat Removal System Valves HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV and PORV Block Valve 3.2-185 Amendment 26

STP FHAR SOE

Affected Safety Injection System Valves and Pumps

Affected Reactor Coolant Pumps

Affected RCS Spray Valves

Affected Safeguards Control

Affected ESF Components

Affected HVAC Components

Steam Generators A and D PORVs Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.3.b Deviation Three foot by eight foot aisle separation is not provided between all tray stacks in the cable spreading room.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.3.b.

3.2-186 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 64-1 FIRE AREA NO. 64 FIRE ZONE Z026 CABLE SPREADING ROOM, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 7204 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinklers at Ceiling Level Hose Reels HR-2 and HR-10, Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-187 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 65 Reference Figure: 3-18 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 65 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 65-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting.

A ceiling mounted area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed throughout Fire Zone Z057 to aid in cooling and controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved.

The sprinkler system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over any 3,000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements.

SOE

Affected CVCS Valves

Affected RCS Valves

Affected ESF Components

Affected SIS Valve

Steam Generator C PORV 3.2-188 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.3.b Deviation Three foot by eight foot aisle separation is not provided between all tray stacks in the cable spreading room.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.3.b.

3.2-189 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 65-1 FIRE AREA NO. 65 FIRE ZONE Z057 CABLE SPREAD/POWER CABLE AREA, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 5484 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Automatic Sprinklers at Ceiling Level Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-4 and HR-12 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-190 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 66 Reference Figure: 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 66 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 66-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed at ceiling level in Fire Zone Z025. The system is hydraulically designed to provide an average density of 0.3 gpm/sq.

ft. over any 3000 sq. ft. of floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generators A and D PORVs

Affected Safeguard Control HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORV Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019FP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion 3.2-191 Amendment 26

STP FHAR The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-192 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 66-1 FIRE AREA NO. 66 FIRE ZONE Z025 CABLING AREA, TRAIN A Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2836 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel inside Zone HR-37 Hand-Held carbon dioxide Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-193 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 67 Reference Figure: 3-18, 27 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 67 is bounded by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or the equivalent. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier.

Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal either in the room or adjacent hallways.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 67-1 and 67-2.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in each zone to ensure early warning and locate fires for manual fire fighting. Automatic Halon suppression is provided in the TSC computer room (Fire Zone Z082) and the computer room sub-floor area (Detection Zone Z015). Each of these Zones is covered solely for property protection.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

HSD

Steam Generator C PORV Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-194 Amendment 26

STP FHAR F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-195 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 67-1 FIRE AREA NO. 67 FIRE ZONE Z058 TSC OPERATIONS, RECORDS STORAGE, AND MISCELLANEOUS AREAS See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3698 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-11 and HC-15 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Automatic Wet Pipe System at Ceiling Level Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-196 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 67-2 FIRE AREA NO. 67 FIRE ZONE Z082*

TSC COMPUTER ROOM, SUB-FLOOR AREA, AND STORAGE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

8.00 x 104Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1111 ft2)

Detection: Ionization detectors are located below suspended ceiling and below the raised access floor Suppression: Automatic Halon Suppression System provided solely for property protection Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-11 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N Includes Detection Zone Z015 in sub-floor area.

3.2-197 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 68 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 68-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path available per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Affected RC Pumps Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-198 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 68-1 FIRE AREA NO. 68 FIRE ZONE Z011 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 240,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 84 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-1, HR-3, and HR-4 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-199 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 69 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 69-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generators C and D PORVs Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-200 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 69-1 FIRE AREA NO. 69 FIRE ZONE Z008 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN C Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 240,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 82 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-5 and HR-6 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System at Ceiling Level Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-201 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 70 Reference Figures: 3-15 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 70-1 and 70-2.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generator C PORV Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-202 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 70-1 FIRE AREA NO. 70 FIRE ZONE Z023 ELECTRICAL CHASE, BOP Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 885,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 76 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-12, HC-13, and HC-9 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-203 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 70-2 FIRE AREA NO. 70 FIRE ZONE Z068 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN C Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 350,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 76 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-12, HC-10, and HC-9 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-204 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 71 Reference Figures: 3-14 and 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 71-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Steam Generators A and/or C and/or D MSIVs SOE

Affected Steam Generator B PORV Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-205 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 71-1 FIRE AREA NO. 71 FIRE ZONE Z007 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 53 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-5 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System at Ceiling Level Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-206 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 72 Reference Figures: 3-14 and 3-15 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 72-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-207 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 72-1 FIRE AREA NO. 72 FIRE ZONE Z024 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 52 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-3 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-208 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 73 Reference Figures: 3-15 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 73-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generator B PORV Specifics of the mitigation are listed in report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-209 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 73-1 FIRE AREA NO. 73 FIRE ZONE Z070 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 350,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 75 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-9 and HC-13 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-210 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 74 Reference Figures: 3-14 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 74-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-211 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 74-1 FIRE AREA NO. 74 FIRE ZONE Z012 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN C Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 240,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 90 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-1, HR-3, HR-4, and HR-12 Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-212 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 75 Reference Figures: 3-15 through 3-17 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire barrier penetrations are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 75-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early detection to facilitate manual fire fighting. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in a portion of Fire Zone Z112 for coverage of concentrated cabling.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Affected SIS Valve Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.2-213 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 75-1 FIRE AREA NO. 75 FIRE ZONE Z112 ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 240,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 775 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels outside Zone: HC-18, HR-21, and HR-16 Hand-held dry chemical extinguisher Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-214 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 76 Reference Figures: 3-14 and 3-21 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 76-1.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided for early warning of a fire to facilitate manual fire fighting. Fire Area 76 contains only Train A equipment and cables. Loss of the Train A safe-shutdown equipment and cables in Fire Area 76 would not affect the operation of Train B and C safe-shutdown equipment. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path:

SOE

Steam Generator A PORV

Affected RCS Valves

Affected SIS Pumps Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and cables in Fire Area 76 would not prevent achieving and maintaining the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

3.2-215 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 76-1 FIRE AREA NO. 76 FIRE ZONE Z017 QDPS, ROOM TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 (Area: 214 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-12 and HC-7 Hand-held Carbon Dioxide Rad/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.2-216 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 77 Reference Figure: 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Z093 HVAC and Electrical Room Z096 MEAB Roof Column Lines C-H and 20-24 Fire Area 77 is separated from the remainder of the MEAB by heavy concrete walls. Although the fire area boundary penetrations are not provided with rated seals or HVAC dampers, these boundaries provide significant obstructions which will inhibit fire propagation. This facilitates containing and suppressing a fire using manual fire fighting capabilities and significantly reduces the possibility of a fire spreading into the MEAB itself.

Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 77-1 and 77-2.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in the HVAC and electrical room to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Ionization detectors are not provided in fire zone Z096 because that fire zone is outside of the MEAB proper. There are no redundant safe shutdown components in this fire area; therefore, no further protection is required in this fire area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment A single safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements will be available following a fire in this area.

E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and cables in Fire Area 77 would not prevent achieving and maintaining the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

3.2-217 Amendment 26

STP FHAR F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-218 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 77-1 FIRE AREA NO. 77 FIRE ZONE Z093 HVAC AND ELECTRICAL ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area 4,200 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-31 Hand-held Dry Chemical Deluge System (charcoal filter) (solely for property protection)

Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.2-219 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 77-2 FIRE AREA NO. 77 FIRE ZONE Z096 MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area 14,884 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-31 Hand-held Dry Chemical Rad/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N 3.2-220 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area: 79 Reference Figure: 3-19 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire Area 79 is adjacent to Fire Areas 6 and 32 and the shared fire area boundaries are 3~hour rated fire barriers or equivalent construction. The other Fire Area 79 wall and ceiling boundaries, framed steel with plates or grating, are not fire rated. Two access gates into the fire area, of similar material1 are not fire rated. These steel fire area walls are open to the outside. The in-situ exterior fixed combustibles are insignificant.

Smoke and beat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. A drain is provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 79-1.

C. Protection Requirements There are no redundant safe shutdown components in this fire area. Therefore, no protection is required in this fire area.

A ceiling mounted, area coverage automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed throughout Fire Zone Zl62 to aid in controlling the fire until manual suppression can be achieved. This reduces the possibility of a fire spreading into other fire areas of the MEAB. The sprinkler system is hydraulically designed to provide a density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over the floor area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment A fire in the FLEX Diesel Generators Area will have no impact on plant systems required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.

E. Conclusion The plant can be safely shutdown following a fire in this fire area.

3.2-221 Amendment 26

STP FHAR F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non*rated.

Justification See FHAR4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.2-222 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 79-l FIRE AREA NO. 79 FIRE ZONE Zl62 FLEX DIESEL GENERATORS AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,291 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Wet Pipe Sprinkler System (for property protection)

Hand-held Dry Chemical Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-41 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.2-223 Amendment 26

STP FHAR 3.3 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING The Fuel Handling Building (FHB) is a steel reinforced Seismic Category I concrete structure which CN-3293 borders the south side of the Reactor Containment Building. The FHB houses the spent fuel pool and related equipment, fuel transfer canal, fuel storage areas, post-accident sampling system (Note that the Unit 1 PASS has been abandoned in place), and the three redundant trains of pumps and valving for the high and low head safety injection system and containment spray system.

The FHB is a single fire area which is separated from other fire areas by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or equivalent (refer to drawings 3-7 to 3-13). Door and penetrations contained in fire barriers are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

The FHB fire area is divided into 13 fire zones. Fire zones have been defined because of existing barriers that naturally inhibit fire spread rather than by some arbitrary means. The stairwell internal to the FHB is enclosed, except at the top, by 2-hour-rated barriers with Class B rated doors and dampers or equivalent.

Each zone, except Zones Z321 and Z322, is provided with ionization or smoke detectors to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. No combustible materials are located in Fire Zones Z321 and Z322. In addition, these fire zones do not contain any safety-related equipment. Therefore, fire detection instrumentation is not required for these zones.

Fire suppression systems provided in the FHB are as follows:

Hand-held fire extinguishers at strategic locations.

Standpipe system which manual hose stations strategically located.

Six fixed water spray (deluge) systems for charcoal filter protection.

FHB protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described in the following fire area write-up.

3.3-1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area : 35 Reference Figures: 3-7 through 3-13 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 35 is the Fuel Handling Building and is composed of the following fire zones:

Z301 Elevator No. 6 Z303 HVAC Equipment Z305 Train C SI/CSS Cubicle Z306 Train B SI/CSS Cubicle and Train B Electrical Chase Z307 Train A SI/CSS Cubicle and Train A Electrical Chase Z310 Fuel Transfer and Loading Area Z311 Spent Fuel Pool Auxiliary Area Z317 New Fuel Inspection Area Z318 New Fuel Storage Hatch Z319 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger and Pump 1A Z320 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger and Pump 1B Z321 Containment Purge Supply Z322 FHB Stairway Fire Area 35 borders the south side of the RCB and the west side of the mechanical portion of the MEAB.

3.3-2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Fire Area 35 is bounded by 3-hour fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for firewater removal in the zone, adjacent hallway or open area.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See Fire zone tables 35-1 through 35-13.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detection is provided in each zone to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting, except Zones Z321 and Z322 which do not contain combustibles and therefore do not need detection and Zone Z310 where smoke detection is provided. Radioactive materials are contained in pools, closed metal tanks, or containers. In the event of a fire that incapacitates 2 trains of spent fuel cooling the spent fuel pool will eventually boil. Makeup can be provided by the reactor makeup pumps which are located in another fire area and are 3.3-3 Amendment 26

STP FHAR provided with Class-1E power. This would require the manual operation of valve FC0048 which is located in the pump room of Fire Zone Z320. The valve is considered operable since there are negligible combustibles in the pump room and operation of the valve is not required for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . In addition, makeup water can be supplied to the spent fuel pool using local hose stations.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

HSD

Affected SIS Valves Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unrated penetration seals and/or dampers in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.3-4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

3. Appendix A:D.1.J Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

4. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

5. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.3-5 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-1 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z301 FHB ELEVATOR NO. 6 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 124 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-9 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.3-6 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-2 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z303 HVAC EQUIPMENT See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 6,300 ft2)

Detection: Ionization for Area Thermal for Charcoal Filter Suppression: Deluge System (Charcoal Filter)

Hose Cabinets and Reels Inside Zone: HC-1, HC-2, HC-3, HC-5, HR-1, HR-2, and HR-4 Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-6 and HC-8 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-7 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-3 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z305 SI/CSS CUBICLE, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,344.5 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-1 and HC-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-8 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-4 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z306 SI/CSS CUBICLE AND ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1194 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-2 and HC-1 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-9 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-5 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z307 SI/CSS CUBICLE AND ELECTRICAL CHASE, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1802 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-2 and HC-1 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-10 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-6 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z310 FUEL TRANSFER AND LOADING AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2* (Area: 14,265 ft2)

Detection: Optical Detectors Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-4, HC-7, HC-8, and HC-9 Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-3 and HR-5 Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-4 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y Note 1: Powered by TSC diesel

During Refueling 3.3-11 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-7 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z311 SPENT FUEL POOL AUXILIARY AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 3,000 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-12 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-8 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z317 NEW FUEL INSPECTION AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,322 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-13 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-9 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z318 NEW FUEL STORAGE HATCH Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet: HC-9 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.3-14 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-10 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z319 SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER AND PUMP 1A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 370 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.3-15 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-11 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z320 SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER AND PUMP 1B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 318 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.3-16 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-12 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z321 CONTAINMENT PURGE SUPPLY Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 6700 BTUs (negligible)

Detection: None Suppression: None Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.3-17 Amendment 26

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 35-13 FIRE AREA NO. 35 FIRE ZONE Z322 FHB STAIRWAY Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: (Area: 185.5 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-2, HR-4, and HR-5 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.3-18 Amendment 26

STP FHAR 3.4 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING The Diesel Generator Building (DGB) is a steel reinforced Seismic Category 1 concrete structure located just north of the MEAB.

The DGB houses the three redundant trains of ESF diesel generators, Seismic Category 1 fuel oil tanks and associated support equipment. The DGB is divided into 12 fire areas (4 per train), refer to figures 3-32 and 33. The three redundant trains of equipment are completely separated within the building by vertical reinforced concrete walls.

Each fire area contains one or more fire zones. Zones have been defined because of existing barriers that naturally inhibit fire spread rather than by some arbitrary means. Zone boundaries are heavy concrete but are not provided with rated penetration seals.

Fire area boundaries are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Stairwells are bounded by 2-hour-rated barriers with Class B doors and dampers and do not contain combustibles.

Ionization and/or spot-type thermal detectors are provided in each zone to ensure early warning and to locate fires for manual fire fighting.

Fire suppression systems provided in the DGB are as follows:

Hand-held fire extinguishers at strategic locations

Standpipe system with manual hose stations strategically located

Preaction sprinkler systems, one protecting each diesel generator. These systems are actuated by cross-zoned thermal spot-type detectors.

Foam-water sprinkler systems, one protecting each diesel fuel oil tank. These systems are actuated by cross-zoned thermal spot-type detectors.

DGB protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area in the following fire area write-ups.

3.4-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-3 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 36-1 FIRE AREA NO. 36 FIRE ZONE Z500 DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 13 TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,800 ft2)

Detection: Spot-Type Thermal Suppression: Preaction Sprinklers Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-5, HR-6 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-4 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 36-2 FIRE AREA NO. 36 FIRE ZONE Z512 DIESEL AIR INTAKE/EXHAUST, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 882 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-5 Hand-Held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-5 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-7 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 37-1 FIRE AREA NO. 37 FIRE ZONE Z501 DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 12, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,800 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Preaction Sprinklers Hose Reels Outside Zone: HR-3 and HR-4 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-8 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 37-2 FIRE AREA NO. 37 FIRE ZONE Z513 DIESEL AIR INTAKE/EXHAUST, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 882 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-3 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-9 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-11 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 38-1 FIRE AREA NO. 38 FIRE ZONE Z502 DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 11, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,800 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Preaction Sprinklers Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-1 and HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: Y Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-12 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 38-2 FIRE AREA NO. 38 FIRE ZONE Z514 DIESEL AIR INTAKE/EXHAUST, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 882 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-1 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-13 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unrated doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.10 Deviation Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons is located inside a building containing safety related equipment.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.10.

3.4-15 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 39-1 FIRE AREA NO. 39 FIRE ZONE Z503 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK NO. 13, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 10,500,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 990 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Foam-water System Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-6 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.4-16 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.10 Deviation Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons is located inside a building containing safety related equipment.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.10.

3.4-18 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 40-1 FIRE AREA NO. 40 FIRE ZONE Z504 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK NO. 12, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 10,500,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 990 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Foam-water System Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-4 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.4-19 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.10 Deviation Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons is located inside a building containing safety related equipment.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.10.

3.4-21 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 41-1 FIRE AREA NO. 41 FIRE ZONE Z505 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK NO. 11, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 10,500,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 990 ft2)

Detection: Spot-type Thermal Suppression: Foam-water System Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.4-22 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F 3.4-24 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 42-1 FIRE AREA NO. 42 FIRE ZONE Z506 DIESEL GENERATOR STAIRWELL, TRAIN C Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 190 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-25 Amendment 16

STP FHAR F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.4-27 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 43-1 FIRE AREA NO. 43 FIRE ZONE Z507 DIESEL GENERATOR STAIRWELL, TRAIN B Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 190 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-4 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-28 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:E.1.a and Appendix R:III.F Deviation Full area fire detection system is not installed.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.4-30 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 44-1 FIRE AREA NO. 44 FIRE ZONE Z508 DIESEL GENERATOR STAIRWELL, TRAIN A Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 190 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-31 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-33 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 45-1 FIRE AREA NO. 45 FIRE ZONE Z509 HVAC FAN/ENTRY, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.4-34 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-36 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 46-1 FIRE AREA NO. 46 FIRE ZONE Z510 HVAC FAN/ENTRY, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-4 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.4-37 Amendment 16

STP FHAR E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.4-39 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 47-1 FIRE AREA NO. 47 FIRE ZONE Z511 HVAC FAN/ENTRY, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.4-40 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.5 ISOLATION VALVE CUBICLE The Isolation Valve Cubicle (IVC) is a steel reinforced Seismic Category I concrete structure which houses 4 trains of auxiliary feedwater pumps and valving and the main steam and feedwater piping and safety-related valves. The four trains are completely separated within the building by vertical walls.

The IVC is divided into 5 fire areas which separate redundant safe-shutdown equipment and cables (refer to drawings 3-35 through 39). Fire areas contain one or more fire zone(s). Zones have been defined because of existing barriers that naturally inhibit fire spread rather than by some arbitrary means. Zone boundaries are heavy concrete but are not provided with rated penetration seals.

Fire area boundaries are 3-hour rated fire barriers except the stairwell which is bounded by 2-hour rated fire barriers with 1-1/2-hour rated doors and dampers. Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. The ventilation duct penetrations are provided with rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Ionization and/or smoke detectors are provided in each zone except Zone Z404 to ensure early warning and locate fires for manual fire fighting. There are no combustible materials or safety-related components located in Fire Zone 404; therefore, fire detection instrumentation is not required for Fire Zone 404.

Fire suppression systems provided in the IVC are as follows:

Hand-held fire extinguishers at strategic locations

Standpipe system with manual hose stations strategically located.

IVC protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area in the following fire area write-ups.

3.5-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Ionization detectors are provided in the auxiliary feedwater pump room and smoke detectors in the main steam/main feedwater piping penetration area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Hose reels are hand-held dry chemical extinguishers are available at the entrance to Fire Zone Z403 and in Fire Zone Z406 for manual firefighting capability. The hydraulic fluid used in the hydraulic valve operators is a high flash point fluid. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generators C and D PORVs

Affected ESF Components

Affected MS Valves

Affected Safety Injection System Pumps Specifics of mitigation are listed in report no. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.5-3 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 48-1 FIRE AREA NO. 48 FIRE ZONE Z403 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 439 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-4 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 48-2 FIRE AREA NO. 48 FIRE ZONE Z406 MAIN STEAM & FEEDWATER PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 673 ft2)

Detection: Smoke Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-6 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-5 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Ionization detectors are provided in the auxiliary feedwater pump room and smoke detectors in the main steam/main feedwater piping penetration area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Hose reels and hand-held dry chemical extinguishers are available at the entrance to Fire Zone Z402 and in Fire Zone Z407 for manual firefighting capability. The hydraulic fluid used in the hydraulic valve operators is a high flash point fluid. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SOE

Steam Generator A MSIV

Steam Generator B PORV

Affected ESF Components Specifics of mitigation are listed in Report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusions The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems 3.5-7 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.5-8 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 49-1 FIRE AREA NO. 49 FIRE ZONE Z402 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 416 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-9 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 49-2 FIRE AREA NO. 49 FIRE ZONE Z407 MAIN STEAM & FEEDWATER PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 650 ft2)

Detection: Smoke Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-5 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-10 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Ionization detectors are provided in the auxiliary feedwater pump room and smoke detectors in the main steam/main feedwater piping penetration area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Hose reels and hand-held dry chemical extinguishers are available at the entrance to Fire Zone Z401 and in Fire Zone Z408 for manual firefighting capability. The hydraulic fluid used in the hydraulic valve operators is a high flash point fluid. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Steam Generator 1B & 1C MSIV

Affected AFW Storage Tank Level Transmitters (Unit 1 only)

SOE

Affected ESF Components

Affected Steam Generator A and D Valves and PORVs Specifics of mitigation are listed in Report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusions The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.11 3.5-12 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.5-13 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 50-1 FIRE AREA NO. 50 FIRE ZONE Z401 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 416 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-1 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-14 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 50-2 FIRE AREA NO. 50 FIRE ZONE Z408 MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 650 ft2)

Detection: Smoke Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-4 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.5-15 Amendment 16

STP FHAR B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 51-1 through 51-3.

C. Protection Requirements Ionization detectors are provided in the auxiliary feedwater pump and steam generator recirculating pump rooms and smoke detectors in the main steam/main feedwater piping penetration area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Hose reels and hand-held dry chemical extinguishers are available at the entrance to Fire Zone Z400 and in Fire Zones Z405 and Z409 for manual firefighting capability. The hydraulic fluid used in the hydraulic valve operators is high flash point fluid. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Affected Auxiliary Feedwater Level Instrumentation SOE

Affected ESF Components

Affected Steam Generator D Valves Specifics of the mitigation are listed in Report No. 5A019MFP001 titled "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements".

E. Conclusion The consequences of a fire in this area will be mitigated by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Unlabeled doors in Fire Area boundaries.

Justification 3.5-17 Amendment 16

STP FHAR See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.5-18 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 51-1 FIRE AREA NO. 51 FIRE ZONE Z400 TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, TRAIN D See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 439 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-1 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.5-19 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 51-2 FIRE AREA NO. 51 FIRE ZONE Z405 STEAM GENERATOR RECIRCULATING PUMP ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List CIRCUITS A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1170 ft2)

Detection: Ionization Suppression: Hose Reels Inside Zone: HR-1, HR-2 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.5-20 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 51-3 FIRE AREA NO. 51 FIRE ZONE Z409 MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION AREA, TRAIN D See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 673 ft2)

Detection: Smoke Suppression: Hose Reel Inside Zone: HR-3 Hand-held Dry Chemical Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.5-21 Amendment 16

STP FHAR See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section E.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.F.

3.5-23 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 52-1 FIRE AREA NO. 52 FIRE ZONE Z404 STAIRWELL FOR IVC Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-2 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communication: N 3.5-24 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.6 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE The Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure (ECWIS) is a steel reinforced Seismic Category I concrete structure common to Units 1 and 2. The ECWIS houses the three redundant ECW pumps (per unit) and associated support equipment. The ECWIS is divided into 6 fire areas which separate the redundant pumps by vertical walls (Refer to Drawing 3-34).

Fire area boundaries are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Thermal, spot-type detectors that alarm at the local building panel and in the control room are provided to ensure early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting.

Fire suppression systems in the ECWIS are as follows:

Hand-held fire extinguishers at strategic locations

Fire hydrant connected to main fire loop in close proximity to the building ECWIS protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area in the following fire area write-ups.

3.6-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 53 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 53 is composed of Fire Zone Z600, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 1A area in the ECW intake structure. This area is contiguous to the Unit 2 ECW intake structure and Fire Area 54.

The boundaries between Fire Area 53 and the Unit 2 ECW intake structure and Fire Area 54 are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. The doors contained within the fire walls are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the walls. The east and west walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are airtight missile doors of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 53-1.

C. Protection Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Yard fire hydrants are located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure to provide manual firefighting capability.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe-shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification 3.6-2 Amendment 16

STP FHAR See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation The sluice trough between fire areas does not have a 3-hour rated seal.

Justification

The sluice trough is separated from safe-shutdown equipment by a heavy concrete wall.

The sluice trough is sloped to drain liquids out of the building.

The trough would contain and channel any fire.

The area on either side of the trough and on either side of the fire wall the trough passes through is low in combustibles and an exposure fire in the trough would not pose a significant exposure fire to the safe-shutdown equipment.

3. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.6-3 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 53-1 FIRE AREA NO. 53 FIRE ZONE Z600 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN A (Unit 1)

See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.6-4 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 54 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 54 is composed of Fire Zone Z601, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 1B area in the ECW intake structure. This area is contiguous to Fire Area 53 and Fire Area 55.

The boundaries between Fire Area 54 and Fire Areas 53 and 55 are 3-hour rated fire barriers. The doors contained within the fire walls are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the walls. The east and west walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are watertight missile doors of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 54-1.

C. Protection Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Yard fire hydrants are located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure to provide manual firefighting capability.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification 3.6-5 Amendment 16

STP FHAR See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation The sluice trough between fire areas does not have a 3-hour rated seal.

Justification

The sluice trough is separated from safe-shutdown equipment by a heavy concrete wall.

The sluice trough is sloped to drain liquids out of the building.

The trough would contain and channel any fire.

The area on either side of the trough and on either side of the fire wall the trough passes through is low in combustibles and an exposure fire in the trough would not pose a significant exposure fire to the safe-shutdown equipment.

3. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.6-6 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 54-1 FIRE AREA NO. 54 FIRE ZONE Z601 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN B (Unit 1)

See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.6-7 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 55 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes A. Area Description Fire Area 55 is composed of Fire Zone Z602, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 1C area in the ECW intake structure. This area is contiguous to the south wall of the ECW intake structure and Fire Area 54.

The boundary between Fire Area 55 and Fire Area 54 is a 3-hour-rated fire barrier. The door contained within the fire wall is constructed such that its rating is compatible with that of the wall. The east, west, and south walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are watertight missile doors of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 55-1.

C. Protective Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. Yard fire hydrants are located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure to provide manual firefighting capability.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion A fire in Area 55 will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A: D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

3.6-8 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

2. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation The sluice trough between fire areas does not have a 3-hour rated seal.

Justification

The sluice trough is separated from safe-shutdown equipment by a heavy concrete wall.

The sluice trough is sloped to drain liquids out of the building.

The trough would contain and channel any fire.

The area on either side of the trough and on either side of the fire wall the trough passes through is low in combustibles and an exposure fire in the trough would not pose a significant exposure fire to the safe-shutdown equipment.

3. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.11.

3.6-9 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 55-1 FIRE AREA NO. 55 FIRE ZONE Z602 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN C (Unit 1)

See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.6-10 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 56 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes (Unit 2 only)

A. Area Description Fire Area 56 is composed of Fire Zone Z603, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 2C area in the ECW intake structure. This area is contiguous to the Unit 1 ECW intake structure and Fire Area 57.

The boundaries between Fire Area 56 and the Unit 1 ECW intake structure and Fire Area 57 are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. The doors contained within the fire walls are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the walls. The east and west walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are watertight missile doors of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See Fire Zone Table 56-1.

C. Protective Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. A portable hand-held carbon dioxide extinguisher and yard fire hydrants located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure provide manual firefighting capability.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusions A fire in Area 56 will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining cold shutdown.

3.6-11 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 56-1 FIRE AREA NO. 56 FIRE ZONE Z603 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN C (Unit 2)

SEE TABLE 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.6-12 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 57 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes (Unit 2 only)

A. Area Description Fire Area 57 is composed of Fire Zone Z604, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 2B area in the ECW intake structure. This area is contiguous to Fire Area 56 and Fire Area 58.

The boundaries between Fire Area 57 and Fire Areas 56 and 58 are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. The doors contained within the fire walls are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the walls. The east and west walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are watertight missile doors of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See Fire Zone Table 57-1.

C. Protective Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. A portable hand-held carbon dioxide extinguisher and yard fire hydrants located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure provide manual firefighting capability.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide single shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion The consequences of fire in this area will be mitigated by protection of cables and/or by manual compensating operator action. Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.6-13 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 57-1 FIRE AREA NO. 57 FIRE ZONE Z604 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN B (Unit 2)

SEE TABLE 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communication: N Emergency Lighting: Y 3.6-14 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 58 Reference Figure: 3-34 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: Yes (Unit 2 only)

A. Area Description Fire Area 58 is composed of Fire Zone Z605, which is the essential cooling water (ECW) pump 2A room. This area is contiguous to the north wall of the ECW intake structure and Fire Area 57.

The boundary between Fire Area 58 and Fire Area 57 is a 3-hour-rated fire barrier. The doors contained within the firewall are constructed such that its rating is compatible with that of the wall. The east, north, and west walls of the ECW intake structure are heavy concrete walls. The doors in the external walls of the ECW intake structure are watertight missile doors made of heavy steel construction. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See Fire Zone Table 58-1.

C. Protective Requirements Thermal, spot-type detectors are provided in the fire area to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. A portable hand-held carbon dioxide extinguisher and yard fire hydrants located in close proximity to the ECW intake structure provide manual firefighting capability. No further protection is required.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

None E. Conclusion Safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in this area.

3.6-15 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 58-1 FIRE AREA NO. 58 FIRE ZONE Z605 ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER (ECW) PUMP ROOM, TRAIN A (Unit 2)

SEE TABLE 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 20,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 834 ft2)

Detection: Thermal, spot-type Suppression: Hand-Held Carbon Dioxide Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N 3.6-16 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.7 FIRE PUMP HOUSE The Fire Pump House (FPH) is a metal building which contains three steel reinforced concrete pump rooms. The pump rooms house the three redundant 100 percent capacity fire pumps. The FPH is divided into three fire areas which separate the three redundant fire pumps (see Figure 3-47). Fire area boundaries are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Doors and penetrations contained in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations in fire barriers are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

Fire suppression systems provided to protect equipment in the FPH are as follows:

Automatic wet pipe sprinklers in the pump rooms and the surrounding metal building.

Manual fire alarms which alarm locally and in the control room.

Fire hydrant connected to the main fire loop adjacent to the building.

FPH protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area in the following fire area write-ups.

3.7-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 59 Reference Figure: 3-47 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire Area 59 consists of Fire Zone Z801, which is the fire pump no. 1 room located in the fire pump house. Fire Area 59 is separated from the balance of the fire pump house (Fire Areas 60 and 61) by 3-hour-rated walls, ceiling, and floor. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, except for the gravity roof ventilator, which does not contain a 3-hour-rated damper. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 59-1.

C. Protection Requirements Fire Area 59 is completely enclosed by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or equivalent. Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers are provided along with manual fire alarms which alarm locally and in the control room. The fire pump no. 1 room is separated from redundant pumps 2 and 3 and all safe-shutdown equipment and cables by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or equivalent. The pump house surrounding the pump room is also provided with automatic wet-pipe sprinklers.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment There are no safe shutdown circuits or components located in this area.

E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and circuits in Fire Area 59 would not affect the capability to achieve and maintain the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

3.7-2 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 59-1 FIRE AREA NO. 59 FIRE ZONE Z801 FIRE PUMP NO. 1 ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 275,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 298 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.7-3 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 60 Reference Figure: 3-47 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire Area 60 consists of Fire Zone Z802, which is the fire pump no. 2 room located in the fire pump house. Fire Area 60 is separated from the balance of the fire pump house (Fire Areas 59 and 61) by 3-hour-rated walls, ceiling, and floor. Doors and penetrations in fire barriers are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barrier. Ventilation duct penetrations are provided with 3-hour-rated dampers installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, except for the gravity roof ventilator, which does not contain a 3-hour-rated damper. Smoke and heat removal area accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork. Drains are provided for fire water removal.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone table 60-1.

C. Protection Requirements Fire Area 60 is completely enclosed by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or equivalent. Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers are provided along with manual fire alarms which alarm locally and in the control room. The fire pump no. 2 is separated from redundant pumps 1 and 3 and all safe-shutdown equipment and cables by 3-hour-rated fire barriers or equivalent. The pump house surrounding the pump room is also provided with automatic wet-pipe sprinklers.

D. Redundant Safety Shutdown Assessment There are no safe shutdown circuits or components located in this area.

E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and circuits in Fire Area 60 would not affect the capability to achieve and maintain the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

3.7-4 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 60-1 FIRE AREA NO. 60 FIRE ZONE Z802 FIRE PUMP NO. 2 ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 275,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 298 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.7-5 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Fire Area: 61 Reference Figure: 3-47 Safe-shutdown Equipment or Cables: No A. Area Description Fire Area 61 consists of Fire Zones Z803 and Z804, which are the fire pump no. 3 room and the rest of the fire pump house surrounding the pump rooms, respectively. Smoke and heat removal are accomplished with portable exhaust fans and flexible ductwork.

B. Equipment Summary and Protective Features See fire zone tables 61-1 and 61-2.

C. Protection Requirements Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers are provided in both fire zones along with a manual fire alarm which alarms locally and in the control room. Fire pump no. 3 is separated from fire pumps 1 and 2 by 3-hour-rated fire barriers. Fire propagation to or from Fire Area 61 external to the fire pump house is precluded by the limited quantities of combustibles in the surrounding yard area.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment There are no safe shutdown circuits or components located in this area.

E. Conclusion The loss of all equipment and circuits in Fire Area 61 would not affect the capability to achieve and maintain the plant in a cold-shutdown condition.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix A:D.1.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.1.j.

3.7-6 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 61-1 FIRE AREA NO. 61 FIRE ZONE Z803 FIRE PUMP NO. 3 ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 275,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 298 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.7-7 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 61-2 FIRE AREA NO. 61 FIRE ZONE Z804 FIRE PUMP CORRIDOR AND JOCKEY PUMP See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits None Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 967 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Yard Fire Hydrant Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.7-8 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.8 REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING The reactor Containment Building (RCB) is a steel reinformed Seismic Category I concrete structure which houses the nuclear steam supply system, residual heat removal pumps and heat exchangers, part of the chemical and volume control system and various support equipment and cable.

The RCB is made up of a single fire area (Fire Area 63). Fire barrier penetrations and doors are constructed such that their ratings are compatible with that of the barriers.

Fire Area 63 contains 29 fire zones (Refer to Drawings 3-1 to 3-6). Administratively located as an aid to performing the fire hazards analysis, concrete walls have been used as a zone boundary where possible.

Line-type thermal detectors are provided for cable trays and spot-type thermal detectors are provided around the reactor coolant pumps. These detectors alarm both at the mechanical auxiliary building local panel and in the control room.

Fire suppression systems provided in the RCB are as follows:

Dry standpipe system with manual hose stations strategically located.

Fixed water spray (deluge) systems for charcoal filter protection.

Manually operated special hazard spray system is provided for the Train "B" cables in fire zones Z207, Z208, Z209, and Z210.

RCB protection requirements and regulatory compliance are described for each fire area zone in the following fire zone write-ups.

3.8-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR inventory from all reactor coolant pumps. No other major sources of combustibles for an exposure fire exist in the containment building.

The three trains of safe-shutdown electrical cable enter the containment at separate elevations.

The cabling is qualified to IEEE 383 and is in general routed around the containment at the elevation at which it penetrated from the EAB, with risers up and down through grating floors to service equipment on other elevations (see Figures 2-3 through 2-8).

The extensive use of grating floors and the large containment free volume prevents the concentration of heat from a fire. The large free volume, coupled with low in-situ combustibles and limited and controlled access to limit transient combustibles, makes the probability of an exposure fire very low.

A manually operated special hazard spray system is installed above and below Train "B" cable trays in fire zones Z207, Z208, Z209, and Z210. This system is installed to prevent the vertical spread of a fire in containment form the "A" to the "B" or the "B" to the "C" train.

This spray system is designed to provide a spray density of 0.3 gpm/square foot over any 3,000 square feet of floor area. Therefore, this system provides more than adequate separation of redundant safe shutdown components, and is considered to be equivalent to a radiant energy shield.

D. Redundant Safe Shutdown Assessment Mitigation of fire impacts on the following components will provide a safe shutdown path per Appendix R requirements:

SSD

Affected Residual Heat Removal Valves

Affected Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation and Valves

Affected Component Cooling Water System Valves

Affected Containment Building HVAC Components

Affected Safety Injection System Valves

Affected Nuclear Instrumentation System Components

Affected Feedwater System Instrumentation

Affected CVCS System Valves HLP

Affected Pressurizer PORVs and PORV Block Valves 3.8-5 Amendment 16

STP FHAR SOE

Affected ESF Components

Safety Injection Pumps

Affected Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Htrs, Pumps 1A & 1D and Valves

Affected CVCS Valves Specifics of the mitigation provided are listed in Report No. 5A019MFP001 titled, "Post Fire Operator Actions and Equipment Protection Requirements."

E. Conclusions Protection is provided for the safe-shutdown equipment and cables from fire hazards as described above. The combination of protection and separation, coupled with the low combustible concentrations, limited and controlled access, and the large containment free volume, provides protection from exposure fires and ensures the integrity of at least one pathway required for safe shutdown.

F. Deviations from BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R with Respective Justifications

1. Appendix R:III.G.2.d Deviation In general, safe-shutdown cables are not separated by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles.

Justification

Detection is provided by line-type thermal detectors to provide early warning for manual fire fighting.

The containment is a limited and controlled access, thereby minimizing the introduction of transient combustibles.

A reactor coolant pump oil collection system is provided, and deluge suppression is provided or charcoal filters to eliminate major combustion loading. Other combustion loading in the area is light.

The large containment free volume allows for dissipation of the hot off-gas temperatures and reduces the effect of the stratified hot gases on safe-shutdown equipment.

Cable in the containment is IEEE-383 qualified.

3.8-6 Amendment 16

STP FHAR

The use of grating floors combined with the configuration of cables and components are such that the effects of potential exposure fires are considered to be negligible.

A special hazards spray system is installed around the Train B cable trays to provide vertical separation between Trains A and C.

2. Appendix A:D.l.j and Appendix R:III.G.2.a Deviation The containment building electrical penetrations are not 3-hour-rated barriers.

Justification The penetrations are of heavy steel construction and are designed to prevent fire propagation.

3. Appendix A:D.l.j and Appendix R:III.G.2.a Deviation The personnel airlocks and equipment hatch are not 3-hour-rated barriers.

Justification The air locks and equipment hatch are of heavy steel construction, thus limiting fire propagation.

4. Appendix A:F.1.a and Appendix R:III.G.2.e Deviation Fire detection and suppression is not provided throughout the fire area.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.1.a and FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.d-f.

5. Appendix A:D.l.j.

Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

3.8-7 Amendment 16

STP FHAR

6. Appendix A:F.11 Deviation Pump houses and rooms housing safety related pumps are not protected by automatic sprinkler systems Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A APCSB 9.5-1, Section F.ll.

7. Appendix R:III.G.2.e Deviation The Train B cable tray special hazards spray system is manually actuated.

Justification See FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.e. and FHAR Section 3.10, Alternate Design Configuration.

8. Appendix R:III.J Deviation Portable lighting will be used in lieu of emergency lighting in the RCB.

Justification See FHAR 4.1, Comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.J.

3.8-8 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-1 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z201 ELEVATOR NO. 3 See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 77 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-3, HC-13, and HC-17 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-9 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-2 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z202 CENTRAL REACTOR AREA (UPPER)

See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 13,629 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-23, HC-24, HC-25, and HC-26 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-10 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-3 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z203 SW PERIPHERAL AREA Equipment Safe Shutdown Safety Related Train None None None None Circuits None.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,031 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-22 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-11 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-4 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z204 NW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1814 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Thermistor (Carbon Filter)

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-19 Deluge System (Charcoal Filter) (solely for property protection)

Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-12 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-5 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z205 NE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2061 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-20 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-13 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-6 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z206 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1613 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Thermistor (Carbon Filter)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-21 Deluge System (Charcoal Filter) (solely for property protection)

Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-14 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-7 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z207 SW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1802 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Special Hazard Spray System Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-18 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-15 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-8 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z208 NW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1814 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Special Hazard Spray System Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-15 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-16 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-9 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z209 NE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1869 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Special Hazard Spray System Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-16 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-17 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-10 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z210 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1761 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Special Hazard Spray System Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-17 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-18 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-11 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z211 SW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1877 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-14 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-19 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-12 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z212 NW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2110 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-10 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-20 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-13 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z213 NE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2110 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-11 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-21 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-14 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z214 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,049 ft2)

Detection: Line-Type Thermal (Cable Tray)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-13 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-22 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-15 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z215 SW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,995 ft2)

Detection: None.

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-4 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-23 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-16 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z216 NW PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 1,973 ft2)

Detection: None.

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-1 and HC-5 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-24 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-17 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z217 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,056 ft2)

Detection: None.

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-5 Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-2 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-25 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-18 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z218 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 160,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 2,047 ft2)

Detection: None.

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Inside Zone: HC-3 and HC-7 Radioactive/Toxic Material: Y/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-26 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-19 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z219 CENTRAL REACTOR AREA (LOWER)

See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 7,181 ft2)

Detection: None.

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-1 and HC-4 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-27 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-20 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z220 STEAM GENERATOR 1D See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 918 ft2)

Detection: Stop-Type Thermal (RC Pumps)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-9 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-28 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-21 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z221 STEAM GENERATOR 1A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 918 ft2)

Detection: Stop-Type Thermal (RC Pumps)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-9 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-29 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-22 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z222 STEAM GENERATOR 1B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 918 ft2)

Detection: Stop-Type Thermal (RC Pumps)

Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-11 and HC-12 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-30 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-23 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z223 STEAM GENERATOR 1C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 80,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 918 ft2)

Detection: Stop-Type Thermal (RC Pumps)

Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-12 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-31 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-24 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z224 PRESSURIZER ENCLOSURE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for listing of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/Ft2 (Area: 279 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-23 and HC-26 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N 3.8-32 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-25 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z225 SE PERIPHERAL AREA See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-13 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.8-33 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-26 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z226 RHR CUBICLE, TRAIN A See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 187 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Inside Zone: HC-15 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.8-34 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-27 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z227 RHR CUBICLE, TRAIN B See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 187 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinets Outside Zone: HC-15 and HC-16 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/Y Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.8-35 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-28 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z228 RHR CUBICLE, TRAIN C See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 40,000 Btu/ft2 (Area: 265 ft2)

Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-17 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.8-36 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 63-29 FIRE AREA NO. 63 FIRE ZONE Z229 REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER ENCLOSURE See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles*

See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 0 Detection: None Suppression: Hose Cabinet Outside Zone: HC-16 Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: N Emergency Lighting: N

All electrical cables in this fire zone are installed in conduit.

3.8-37 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.9 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER STORAGE TANK The Auxiliary Feedwater Storage tank is a steel lined seismic Category I concrete structure which provides safety-related storage for the water used as makeup to the steam generators in the event that main feedwater is not available. Although not in a specific designated fire area, the contents of the tank and the 3 level transmitters mounted on the side of the tank are required for safe shutdown.

This tank is located outdoors on the west side of the IVC in an area formed by the Turbine building, IVC and Reactor Containment Building. See Figure 3-36. The tank is at least 20 feet form the nearest structure and approximately 40 feet form the turbine generator lube oil area. The concrete walls of this tank are 36 inches thick. The Yard Fire Protection System hydrants and hoses may be used to cool the tanks and extinguish an exposure fire. Portable extinguishers are also provided in the TGB. Therefore, no addition fire protection is required for the tank.

3.9-1 Amendment 16

STP FHAR Deviation No automatic suppression system on the BOP diesel generator.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, comparison to Appendix A of ApCSB 9.5-1, Section F.9.

2. Appendix A: D.l.j Deviation Exterior walls and/or ceilings are non-rated.

Justification See FHAR 4.2, Comparison to Appendix A of APCSB 9.5-1, Section D.l.j.

3.9-3 Amendment 16

STP FHAR FIRE ZONE TABLE 78-1 FIRE AREA NO. 78 FIRE ZONE Z703 BOP DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM See Table 2-2 for Safe Shutdown Equipment List Circuits A listing of safe shutdown cables routed through this zone is contained in Calculation no.

5A011MC6023 Appendix R Evaluation.

Combustibles See Calculation MC-5800 for list of combustibles.

Combustible Load: 192,000 Btu/Ft2 (Area: 576 ft2)

Detection: Thermal spot-type Suppression: Hose Reel Outside Zone: HR-P-17 Hand Held Dry Chemical Hand Held Carbon Dioxide Radioactive/Toxic Material: N/N Communications: (LATER) 3.9-4 Amendment 16

STP FHAR 3.10 ALTERNATIVE DESIGN CONFIGURATIONS 3.10.1 Fixed Suppression For The Control Room Appendix R,Section III.G.2, requires the provision of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems for the Control Room (Fire Area 1, Zone Z034), which contain redundant safe shutdown systems without adequate separation.

In the event of a Postulated Control Room (Fire Zone Z034) or Relay Room (Fire Zone Z032) fire, cold shutdown can be achieved and maintained from the auxiliary shutdown stations as described in Chapter 2 of this FHAR.

The loss of all circuits and equipment in Fire Area 1 is acceptable as safe-shutdown functions can be controlled from the auxiliary shutdown stations which are in separate fire areas. Circuits necessary to shutdown from the auxiliary shutdown panel would remain free of fire damage.

Fire detectors are provided in each fire zone including above and below the suspended ceiling in the control room and in each control cabinet group to provide early warning of a fire for manual fire fighting. A fixed fire suppression system is not provided in the Control Room. Automatic Halon suppression is provided in the relay portion of the Control Room (Fire Zone Z032). The results of the FHA for these rooms support this position as shown in the fire area analysis for Fire Area 1 in Section 3.2 of this report.

Therefore, a level of fire protection equivalent to the requirements of Appendix R,Section III, G.2, is afforded by the existing plant configuration. Providing a fixed fire suppression system in the Control Room would not enhance the fire protection features at STP.

3.10.2 Automatic Suppression For the Containment Appendix R,Section III.G.2, requires the provision of fire detection and automatic fire suppression inside noninerted containments which contain redundant safe shutdown systems without adequate separation.

A manually actuated special hazard spray system is provided inside the containment to prevent the vertical spread of fire from the "A" to the "B" or from the "B" to the "C" cable trays.

A manual- rather than automatic-system was used because of overriding concerns of nuclear safety.

The containment isolation valve (which is normally closed) is installed outside the containment, upstream of the deluge valve.

The design requirements of this system is found in the response to III.G.2.(D-F) in Section 4.1 of this report.

This special hazard spray system provides a level of protection equivalent to a radiant energy shield for the following reasons:

3.10-1 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

The spray coverage of the system will provide an adequate level of protection for the train "B" cable tray as discussed in Section 4.1 of this report

In addition, area coverage below the train "B" cable tray protects the train "B" cable tray from the effects of a fire in the train "A" cable tray below it

The combined effects of the train "B" coverage and the area coverage provides added protection for the train "A" cable tray Additional details of the special hazards spray system is contained in Item III.G.2.f in Section 4.1 of this document.

Line-type thermal detectors are provided for cable trays, and spot-type thermal detectors are provided for the reactor coolant pumps.

Therefore, a level of fire protection equivalent to the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2 is afforded by the existing plant configuration.

3.10.3 Yard Deviations

1. Appendix A:D.5.a and Appendix R:III.J Deviation Eight-hour battery powered lights are not provided in all areas of the yard.

Justification

Fixed 8-hour self-contained battery powered lighting is provided for outdoor ramps between buildings.

Security lighting is provided in the yard between the main power block and the essential cooling water structure. The security lighting is powered from the lighting diesel and cables are routed in dedicated underground duct.

Battery powered portable hand lights will be available in the main control room for operator use during emergency situations including a fire event safe shutdown.

2. Appendix R:III.C Deviation Individual hydrant isolation valves are not provided.

Justification See FHAR 4.1 comparison to 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.C.

3.10-2 Amendment 26

STP FHAR 3.10.4 NFPA Deviations

1. Deviation from NFPA 14-1976/1978/1983, with Justification NFPA 14, Para. 4-4 4-4 Hose Valves 4-4.2 Where the pressure at any standpipe outlet exceeds 100 pounds per square inch (6.9 bars), an approved device shall be installed at the outlet to reduce the pressure with required flow at the outlet to 100 pounds per square inch (6.9 bars). For Class I and Class III systems the approved device shall not be capable of being CN-3302 adjusted to provide pressures higher than 100 psi (6.9 bars) if available, unless specified by the fire department. If a pressure greater than 150 psi (10.3 bars) is available, an appropriate warning sign shall be provided.

Deviation Hose stations are equipped with manual isolation valves.

Justification Fog nozzles, Elkhart Model No. L-205-EB, are rated for 95 gallons per minute at 100 psi. To meet this pressure and flow requirements of nozzles hose station pressure reducing valves have been replace with manual isolation valves. The fire brigade are the only personnel expected to use hose stations and are trained at the higher pressure.

2. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 3-9.3.4.4 3-9.3.4.4 When feed and cross mains are hung with single rods longer than 6 inches, sway bracing shall be provided.

Deviation No sway bracing is provided for feed and cross mains in the fire protection systems.

Justification A seismic test of typical sprinkler system designs was performed, the results of which showed that sway bracing is not required. However, sway bracing is being provided where an unacceptable interaction with another commodity will occur.

(Applicable for all areas) 3.10-3 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

3. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976 with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 3-13.2.3 by reference from NFPA 231-C, Para. 5-2.1 3-13.2.3 Valves controlling sprinkler systems, except underground gate valves with roadway boxes, shall be supervised open by one of the following methods:

(a) Central station, proprietary or remote station alarm service, (b) Local alarm service which will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended point, (c) Locking valves open, (d) Sealing of valves and approved weekly recorded inspection when valves are located within fenced enclosures under the control of the owner.

Deviation Isolation valves for switchgear rooms are not "supervised open".

Justification Switchgear room sprinkler systems are manually-actuated, dry pipe preaction systems.

Isolation valves are "supervised closed" to prevent inadvertent discharge of water into switchgear rooms.

(Applicable for all areas)

4. Deviation from NFPA 231-C-1975, with Justification NFPA 231-C, Para. 6-6 6-6 In-Rack Sprinkler Discharge Pressure.

6-6.1 Sprinklers in racks shall discharge at not less than 15 psi for all classes of commodity.

Deviation For Switchgear Room Preaction Systems, the minimum discharge pressure of sprinklers in racks may be less than the minimum 15 psig recommended by NFPA.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In the switchgear rooms where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), dry-pipe, manually actuated preaction sprinkler systems are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3.10-4 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

3. Systems are hydraulically designed to ensure adequate water pressure to all sprinklers.

4. The quantity of sprinklers provided are at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

5. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is adequate.

6. Minimum discharge pressure of sprinklers exceeds 9 psig.

7. Sprinklers are closed head, upright sprinklers designed to operate satisfactorily at a minimum of 7 psig.

8. NFPA 231-C was used for guidance in the design of the sprinkler systems for the switchgear rooms, even though the sprinkler system coverage requirements are not the same as for "true" rack storage. Therefore, NFPA 231-C was used as a "Best Approach" NFPA code and total conformance with the code is not justified. Based on the above justifications, it is concluded that the existing sprinkler installations are acceptable, meet the design objectives for the plant, and that total compliance with NFPA 231-C would not significantly add to the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

5. Deviation from NFPA 231-C-1975, with Justification NFPA 231-C, Para. 5-5.1 5-5 In-Rack Sprinkler System Control Valves.

5-5.1 When sprinklers are installed in racks, separate indicating gate valves and drains shall be provided for ceiling sprinklers and sprinklers in racks, except such drains and valves are not required for small in-rack installations of less than 20 sprinklers.

Deviation For Switchgear Room Preaction Systems, separate indicating gate valves are not provided for in-rack sprinklers and ceiling sprinklers.

3.10-5 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In the switchgear rooms where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), dry-pipe, manually actuated preaction sprinkler systems are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. Systems are hydraulically designed to ensure adequate water pressure to all sprinklers.

4. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

5. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is adequate.

6. Minimizing the number of system manual isolation valves reduces the probability of inadvertent actuation.

7. The systems in the switchgear rooms are not subject to mechanical damage.

8. NFPA 231-C was used for guidance in the design of the sprinkler systems for the switchgear rooms, even though the sprinkler system coverage requirements are not the same as for "true" rack storage. Therefore, NFPA 231-C was used as a "Best Approach" NFPA code and total conformance with the code is not justified. Based on the above justifications, it is concluded that the existing sprinkler installations are acceptable, meet the design objectives for the plant, and that total compliance with NFPA 231-C would not significantly add to the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

6. Deviation from NFPA 231-C-1975, with Justification NFPA 231-C, Para. 5.3.2 5-3.2 Sprinkler spacing may exceed 100 square feet, but shall not exceed 130 square feet, in systems hydraulically designed in accordance with the design curves shown in Figs. 6-11.1a through g and 6-14.1a through d for densities below 0.25 gpm 3.10-6 Amendment 26

STP FHAR per square foot. Densities shall not be less than those shown on the design curves as amended for conditions in accordance with Chapter 6.

NFPA 231-C, Para. 6.5.1 6-5.1 Maximum horizontal spacing of sprinklers in double row racks with nonencapsulating storage up to and including 25 feet in height shall be in accordance with the following table:

Commodity Class Aisle Widths I & II III IV 8 ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 8 ft.

4 ft. 12 ft. 8 ft. 8 ft.

For encapsulated storage, maximum horizontal spacing is 8 feet.

Deviation For switchgear room preaction systems, some sprinklers have been relocated to avoid obstructions or to optimize spray coverage of cable trays. In these cases, the individual sprinkler spacing may exceed the 12 ft. spacing and the 130 sq. ft./sprinkler coverage recommended by NFPA.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In the switchgear rooms where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), dry-pipe, manually actuated preaction sprinkler systems are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

4. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is adequate.

5. Each sprinkler system protecting the switchgear rooms is designed to provide a water density that meets or exceeds the requirements of NFPA 231-C-1975.

3.10-7 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

6. NFPA 231-C was used for guidance in the design of the sprinkler systems for the switchgear rooms, even though the sprinkler system coverage requirements are not the same as for "true" rack storage. Therefore, NFPA 231-C was used as a "Best Approach" NFPA code and total conformance with the code is not justified. Based on the above justifications, it is concluded that the existing sprinkler installations are acceptable, meet the design objectives for the plant, and that total compliance with NFPA 231-C would not significantly add to the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

7. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 4-2.1.3 4-2.1.3 For extra hazard occupancy, the distance between the branch lines and between sprinklers on the branch lines shall not exceed 12 feet.

Deviation Some sprinklers have been relocated to avoid obstructions or to optimize spray coverage of cable trays. In these cases, the individual sprinkler spacing may exceed the 12 ft. spacing recommended by NFPA.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantify of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

4. The primary design objective for the sprinkler systems is to provide coverage to the cable trays, which are not always located in a symmetrical manner or on consistent center line dimensions. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is adequate. Full compliance with NFPA-13 would not significantly increase the safety of the plant.

3.10-8 Amendment 26

STP FHAR (Applicable for):

8. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 4-2.1.4 4-2.1.4 Distance from Walls. The distance from the walls to the end sprinklers on the branch lines shall not exceed one-half of the allowable distance between sprinklers on the branch lines. The distance from the walls to the end branch line shall not exceed one-half the allowable distance between the branch lines. For exception relating to small rooms, refer to Paragraph 4-4.20.

Deviation Some sprinklers have been relocated to avoid obstructions or to optimize spray coverage of cable trays. In these cases, the individual sprinkler spacing may exceed the 6 ft. maximum distance from walls.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

3.10-9 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

4. The primary design objective for the sprinkler systems is to provide coverage to the cable trays, which are not always located in a symmetrical manner or on consistent center line dimensions. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is optimized. Full compliance with NFPA-13 would not significantly increase the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

10. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 4-3.4.1 4-3.4.1 Deflectors of sprinklers in bays formed by members, such as beams framed into girders, resulting in panels up to 300 square feet shall be located one inch to 18 inches below combustible or noncombustible roof or floor decks.

3.10-11 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Deviation Some sprinklers have been relocated to avoid obstructions or to optimize spray coverage of cable trays. In these cases, the individual sprinkler spacing may exceed the 18-inch maximum distance from the ceiling recommended by NFPA.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

4. The primary design objective for the sprinkler systems is to provide coverage to the cable trays, which are not always located in a symmetrical manner or on consistent center line dimensions. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is optimized. Full compliance with NFPA-13 would not significantly increase the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

11. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 4-2.4.6 4-2.4.6 Beams. Deflectors of sprinklers in bays shall 3.10-12 Amendment 26

STP FHAR be at sufficient distances from the beams, as shown in Table 4-2.4.6 and Figure 4-2.4.6 to avoid obstruction to the sprinkler discharge pattern. Otherwise the spacing of sprinklers on opposite sides of the beams shall be measured from the beam and the distance shall not exceed 1/2 of the allowable distance between sprinklers.

3.10-13 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Table 4-2.4.6 Position of Deflector when Located above Bottom of Beam Maximum Allowable Distance Distance from Sprinkler Deflector above to Side of Beam Bottom of Beam Less than 1 ft. 0 in.

1 ft. to less than 2 ft . 1 in.

2 ft. to less than 2 ft. 6 in. 2 in.

2 ft. 6 in. to less than 3 ft. 3 in.

3 ft. to less than 3 ft. 6 in. 4 in.

3 ft. 6 in. to less than 4 ft. 6 in.

4 ft. to less than 4 ft. 6 in. 7 in.

4 ft. 6 in. to less than 5 ft. 9 in.

5 ft. to less than 5 ft. 6 in. 11 in.

5 ft. 6 in. to less than 6 ft. 14 in.

Deviation Deflectors of sprinklers may be partially obstructed by beams, conduits, cable trays, or other items.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where concentrated cable trays make manual fire suppression more difficult (i.e., response time is lengthened), automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to help cool and contain the fire.

3. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

4. The primary design objective for the sprinkler systems is to provide coverage to the cable trays, which are not always located in a symmetrical manner or on consistent center line dimensions. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is adequate. Full compliance with NFPA-13 would not significantly increase the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

3.10-14 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

12. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 3-10.1.3 3-10.1.3 On dry pipe systems sprinkler pipe on branch lines shall be pitched at least 1/2-inch in 10 feet and the pipe of cross and feed mains shall be given a pitch of not less than 1/4-inch in 10 feet. A pitch of 3/4-inch to 1-inch shall be provided for short branch lines and 1/2-inch in 10 feet for cross and feet mains in refrigerated areas and in buildings of light construction where the floor may settle under heavy loads.

Deviation Dry pipe sprinkler systems are not pitched for drainage.

Justification

1. Quantity and location of drains are in accordance with NFPA recommendations and are sufficient to drain systems without the need for pitching.

2. Dry pipe systems are installed in temperature controlled buildings not subject to freezing.

3. Physical constraints (congested areas) preclude pitching of piping.

3.10-15 Amendment 26

STP FHAR (Applicable for all areas)

13. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 2-7.1 2-7.1 When Required. A connection through which a fire department can pump water into the sprinkler system makes a desirable auxiliary supply. For this purpose, a fire department connection shall be provided in all cases except when permission of the authority having jurisdiction is obtained for their omission.

Deviation Fire Department connections are not provided for each sprinkler system.

Justification

1. The fire protection water pumping system is designed to be self-sufficient.

2. Fire Department connections are provided for the mechanical/electrical auxiliary building, administration building, machine shop, east gate guard house, warehouse, and lighting diesel generator building for fire department pumping to these systems, if necessary.

(Applicable for all areas)

14. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 3-10.2 3-10.2 System or Main Drain Connections and Drain Valves.

(See Fig. 3-10.2) 3-10.2.1 Provisions shall be made to properly drain all parts of the system.

3-10.2.2 On all risers 4 inches or larger, 2-inch drain pipes and valves shall be provided.

3-10.2.3 On risers 2-1/2 inches to 3-1/2 inches inclusive, drain pipes and valves not smaller than 1-1/4 inch shall be provided.

3-10.2.4 On smaller risers, drain pipe and valves not smaller than 3/4 inch shall be provided.

3.10-16 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Deviation Drain valves have been replaced by plugs in sprinkler systems where leakage could damage equipment or be a danger to personnel.

Justification Plugs provide adequate means of draining systems.

(Applicable for all areas)

15. Deviation from NFPA 13-1976, with Justification NFPA 13, Para. 4-4.13 4-4.13 Ducts. Sprinklers shall be installed beneath ducts over four feet wide unless sprinklers can be spaced in accordance with Table 4-2.4.6.

Deviation Dropped sprinklers may not be installed below obstructions which are more than 4 ft.

wide, particularly below HVAC ducts.

Justification

1. Hose reels and cabinets are provided for manual extinguishment and can reach all points in the area.

2. In areas where obstructions such as HVAC ducts make manual fire suppression more difficult, automatic wet pipe sprinklers at the ceiling level are provided to provide suppression for combustibles above the obstruction.

3. Dropped sprinklers are not required since areas below obstructions are accessible by manual hose stream.

4. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler.

5. The primary design objective for the sprinkler systems is to provide coverage to the cable trays, which are not always located in a symmetrical manner or on consistent center line dimensions. Sprinkler heads have been individually inspected during fire protection walkdowns to ensure that tray coverage and sprinkler spacing is optimized. Full compliance with NFPA-13 would not significantly increase the safety of the plant.

(Applicable for):

3.10-17 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

16. Deleted.

17. Deviation from NFPA 72D-1975, with Justification NFPA 72D, Para. 3113 3113. Manual fire alarm boxes shall be distributed throughout the protected area so that they are unobstructed, readily accessible, and located in the normal path of exit from the area, and as follows:

a. One box shall be provided on the first floor and on each succeeding alternate floor except that one box shall be provided for each floor where the maximum fire area is 10,000 square feet or more.

b. Additional boxes shall be provided on each floor to obtain a maximum horizontal travel distance of 200 feet to the nearest box.

Deviation 3.10-18 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Justification

1. The door has an automatic closure and will be closed during normal plant operations.

2. Zone 147 cont on detectors.ains ionization 3 .Zone 147 contains an automatic suppression system.

4. STP has 4 communications systems - the PBX system, the plant voice paging system, the maintenance communications system (sound powered) and the radio system which could be utilized to report a fire in this zone. See FHAR Section 4.2, Item D.5 for additional details.

18. Deviation from NFPA 72D-1975, with Justification NFPA 72D, Para. 1321 1321. Except as provided in paragraphs 1112 and 1113, each signaling line circuit and the devices connected to it shall be capable of operating for their intended signaling services during a single break or a single ground fault condition of any signaling line circuit conductor.

Deviation STPEGS takes exception for the connection wiring between each local addressable module associated with either a "spot" thermal detector or manually activated station.

This is a deviation from the above paragraph because a single break or single ground fault of any signaling line circuit conductor for this connection shall result in only a "TROUBLE" condition and will not indicate an "ALARM" condition.

Justification This is not considered to be a significant deviation because of the following:

1. Each local addressable module is located inside a common enclosure with either the "spot" thermal detector or manually activated station.

2. The physical connection between each local addressable module and its respective device, shall be less than 12" in length.

3. Each local addressable module shall send a "TROUBLE" condition to the Control Room during a postulated single break or single ground fault condition of any signaling line circuit conductor.

4. "Spot" thermal detectors or manually activated stations are identified with an address which specifically identifies, to the Control Room, the devices indicating a "TROUBLE" condition.

3.10-19 Amendment 26

STP FHAR

19. Deviation from NFPA Testing Requirements with Justification Deviation STPEGS does not intend to perform periodic system/component testing in accordance with the various NFPA standards.

Justification For those systems required to protect safe shutdown capability, STPEGS has developed a testing program based on NUREG 0452, Revision 5 (Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications). See ST-HL-AE-2007 and FSAR Section 9.5.1.6.1 for details and clarification.

3.10-20 Amendment 26

STP FHAR 4.0 COMPARISON TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX R AND APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A This chapter of the Fire Hazards Analysis is a comparison of the STP design with 10CFR50 Appendix R and with the Guidelines of APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. Section 4.1 presents the comparison for 10CFR50 Appendix R and Section 4.2 presents the comparison of Appendix A to PCSB 9.5-1.

4-i Amendment 16

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II. General Requirements II. General Requirements II.A. Fire Protection Program II.A. Fire Protection Program A fire protection program shall be established at each Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) has nuclear power plant. The program shall establish the fire responsibility for design, engineering, procurement, protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, fabrication, construction, and operation associated with STP.

and components important to safety at each plant and the The design and construction of the Fire Protection Systems procedures, equipment, and personnel required to have been delegated to Bechtel. A review of the Bechtel implement the program at the plant site. design of the Fire Protection System is performed by the HL&P Nuclear Engineering and Construction Department.

The fire protection program shall be under the direction of With regard to fire prevention, training, and fire-fighting an individual who has been delegated authority 4.1-1 STP FHAR activities, the HL&P Nuclear Plant Operations Department commensurate with the responsibilities of the position and has the responsibility for establishing the Operating Fire who has available staff personnel knowledgeable in both fire Protection Program. The HL&P organization has upper protection and nuclear safety. management personnel responsible for the interdisciplinary coordination required to establish the STP Fire Protection The fire protection program shall extend the concept of Program. FSAR Section 9.5.1.6 describes the STP Fire defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to Protection Program and summarizes the delegation of safety, with the following objectives: responsibilities for formulation, implementation and assessment of the effectiveness of this program. STP Nuclear to prevent fires from starting; Operating Company became responsible for operating and Amendment 26 maintaining STP in 1997.

to detect rapidly, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; The overall Fire Protection Program for STP is based upon an to provided protection for structures, systems, and adequately balanced, defense-in-depth approach which components important to safety so that a fire that is considers preventing, detecting, and suppressing fires along not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression with maintaining plant ability to perform safe shutdown activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of plant. functions and limiting radioactive releases to the environment to values less than 10CFR100 limits. Fire hazards throughout the plant are evaluated in developing the Fire Protection Program.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II. A. Fire Protection Program (Cont'd) II.A. Fire Protection Program (Cont'd)

The Fire Protection Program encompasses the components, procedures, and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection and includes such things as fire prevention, detection, annunciation, control, confinement, suppression and extinguishment, administrative procedures, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing.

4.1-2 STP FHAR Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II.B. Fire Hazards Analysis II.B. Fire Hazards Analysis A fire hazards analysis shall be performed by qualified fire The Fire Hazards Analysis is performed under the direction of protection and reactor systems engineers to (1) consider qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to:

potential in situ and transient fire hazards; (2) determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant in the ability 1. Consider potential in-situ and transient fire hazards; to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment; 2. Determine the consequences of fire in any location in the and (3) specify measures for fire prevention, fire detection, plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor and fire suppression, and fire containment and alternative limit radioactive releases to the environment to values less shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing than 10CFR100 guidelines; and structures, systems, and components important to safety in

3. Specify measures for fire prevention, detection, 4.1-3 STP FHAR accordance with NRC guidelines and regulations.

suppression, and containment, and alternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems, and components that are required for safe shutdown.

The resumes of personnel responsible for the preparation and review of the Fire Hazards Analysis and fire protection system design are contained in Section 1, Appendix 1A of the Fire Hazards Analysis Report.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II.C. Fire Prevention Features II.C. Fire Prevention Features Fire protection features shall meet the following general The fire hazard analysis has considered in-situ and transient requirements for all fire areas that contain or present a fire fire hazards (Reference Section 1.1 of the FHAR). Plant hazard to structures, systems, or components important to procedures have been developed to control the transient fire safety. hazards (see also III.K of this section). Throughout the plant, fire detection systems, portable extinguishers, and standpipe

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified and suitable and hose stations are provided as required to provide fire protection provided. protection suitable for the safe shutdown equipment. Also, fire barriers and automatic fire suppression are provided as

2. Transient fire hazards associated with normal required for the fire loading (up to a maximum of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) operation, maintenance, repair, or modification established from the fire hazard analysis. A trained plant fire activities shall be identified and eliminated where 4.1-4 STP FHAR brigade will be equipped and available at all times.

possible. Those transient fire hazards that cannot be eliminated shall be controlled and suitable protection provided.

3. Fire detection systems, portable extinguishers, and standpipe and hose stations shall be installed.

4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or components necessary for Amendment 26 safe shutdown.

5. A site fire brigade shall be established, trained, and equipped and shall be on site at all times.

6. Fire detection and suppression systems shall be designed, installed, maintained, and tested by personnel properly qualified by experience and training in fire protection systems.

Fire detection and suppression systems will be designed, installed, maintained, and tested by personnel properly qualified by experience or training in fire protection systems.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II.C. (Cont'd) II.C. (Cont'd)

7. Surveillance procedures shall be established to The plant procedure for breaching of fire barriers provides ensure that fire barriers are in place and that fire for the implementation of the Fire Protection Program suppression systems and components are operable. Administrative controls.

Inspection or test procedures will be established to ensure that fire barriers are in place and that fire suppression systems and components, as required, are operable.

Inspection, test, and maintenance procedures are developed and implemented for fire suppression and detection systems, as they are declared operable.

4.1-5 STP FHAR Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II.D. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability II.D. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability In areas where the fire protection features cannot ensure Alternative safe shutdown capability is provided via the safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area, transfer switches located predominantly in the three alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability shall be redundant switchgear rooms and the auxiliary shutdown provided. stations. The transfer of control from the control room to the auxiliary shutdown stations provides circuits, which are independent of the control room.

A qualified display processing system (QDPS) is used to provide data acquisition, display, and a limited number of control functions. Display of necessary parameters for Trains A, B, C, and D is available at the auxiliary shutdown panel 4.1-6 STP FHAR following a control room fire.

Following a control room fire and transfer of the control functions to the auxiliary shutdown panel, the QDPS control functions may be performed from the auxiliary shutdown panel.

(See Also III. L of this Section)

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS III. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS III.A. Water supplies for fire suppression systems. Two separate III.A. Two separate dedicated water supplies consisting of two tanks water supplies shall be provided to furnish necessary water of with 300,000 gallons (useable) each for fire protection volume and pressure to the fire main loop. water are installed. The tanks are interconnected so that the fire pumps can take suction from either or both tanks. A Each supply shall consist of a storage tank, pump, piping, and failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other appropriate isolation and control valves. Two separate supply.

redundant suctions in one or more intake structures from a large body of water (river, lake, etc.) will satisfy the requirement for two separated water storage tanks. These supplies shall be separated so that a failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other supply.

4.1-7 Each supply of the fire water distribution system shall be STP FHAR capable of providing for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months the maximum expected water demands as determined by the fire hazards analysis for safety-related areas or other areas that present a fire exposure hazard to safety-related areas.

The fire water supply is calculated on the basis of the largest When storage tanks are used for combined expected flow rate for a period of two hours for safety-service-water/fire-water uses the minimum volume for fire related areas or other areas that present a fire exposure uses shall be ensured by means of dedicated tanks or by hazard to safety-related areas. The largest expected flow Amendment 26 some physical means such as a vertical standpipe for other rate has been calculated as follows: largest design demand of water service. Administrative controls, including locks for any water suppression system plus 500 GPM for manual tank outlet valves, are unacceptable as the only means to hose streams for a minimum duration of two hours equals ensure minimum water volume. 296,000 gallons minimum water supply required. The fire water supply is capable of delivering this design demand over the longest route of the water supply system. The fire water supply system includes an underground yard fire main loop of cement-lined ductile iron pipe. The water supply (Fresh Water System) is capable of refilling either tank in less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.A. (Cont'd) III.A. (Cont'd)

CN-3269 Other water systems used as one of the two fire water Three 100-percent capacity diesel-driven automatic fire supplies shall be permanently connected to the fire main pumps, each rated at 2,500 gpm at a minimum of 125 psig, system and shall be capable of automatic alignment to the are provided. Each pump is independent of the others and is fire main system. Pumps, controls, and power supplies in complete with a diesel engine driver, a fuel oil storage tank, a these systems shall satisfy the requirements for the main fire fire pump controller, and two sets of starter batteries. A pumps. The use of other water systems for fire protection failure of one pump or associated auxiliary equipment will not shall not be incompatible with their functions required for prevent the other two pumps from starting and providing 100 safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system shall not percent of the required water capacity. The fire pump degrade the fire main system. installation complies with NFPA 20-1974/1976 Editions.

III.B. Sectional isolation valves. Sectional isolation valves such as III.B. Indicating sectional control valves have been provided to 4.1-8 STP FHAR post indicator valves or key operated valves shall be installed isolate portions of the fire main loop for maintenance or in the fire main loop to permit isolation of portions of the fire repair without shutting off the entire water supply to primary main loop for maintenance or repair without interrupting the and secondary fire suppression system serving areas that entire water supply. contain or expose safety-related equipment. See Figure 4.1-1.

III.C. Hydrant isolation valves. Valves shall be installed to permit III.C. Sectional isolation valves are provided at an appropriate point isolation of outside hydrants from the fire main for in the underground main fire loop which allow isolation of maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply outside hydrant groups without interrupting water supply to to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in any area any primary or backup fire suppression systems in areas that containing or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related or contain or present a fire exposure to safety-related Amendment 26 safe shutdown equipment. equipment. See Figure 4.1-1.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.D. Manual fire suppression. Standpipe and hose systems shall III.D. STP is provided with adequate standpipe systems that will be installed so that at least one effective hose stream will be permit parts of the power block containing safe shutdown able to reach any location that contains or presents an components to be easily reached by at least one effective exposure fire hazard to structures, systems, or components hose stream. However, in those areas where cable tray important to safety. configurations, ducting, or equipment form physical barriers to make fire suppression efforts somewhat more difficult, Access to permit effective functioning of the fire brigade automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided.

shall be provided to all areas that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to structures, systems, or components All standpipe systems installed at STP conform to NFPA 14, important to safety. 1976/1978/1983 Editions for sizing, spacing, and pipe support requirements. More restrictive seismic Category II/I supports Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside PWR are provided where required. The locations of the hose containments and BWR containments that are not inerted.

4.1-9 STP FHAR stations are selected to provide optimum accessibility and Standpipe and hose stations inside containment may be fire-fighting capability.

connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant- The containment is provided with a single water supply line specific features prevent extending the fire main supply for the hose stations and fixed suppression systems extended inside containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose from the fire main loop. The containment standpipe is stations shall be placed outside the dry well with adequate normally dry.

lengths of hose to reach any location inside the dry well with an effective hose stream.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.E. Hydrostatic hoses tests. Fire hose shall be hydrostatically III.E. Fire hoses will be tested periodically at 150 psi or 50 psi above tested at a pressure of 150 psi or 50 psi above maximum fire the maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is main operating pressure, whichever is greater. Hose stored greater, in accordance with plant procedures for maintenance in outside hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior of fire protection equipment.

standpipe hose shall be tested every three years.

Hose stored in outside hose houses shall be tested annually.

III.F. Automatic fire detection. Automatic fire detection systems Interior standpipe hose shall be tested every three years.

shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety- III.F. Detection systems are provided for areas that contain or related systems or components. These fire detection present a fire exposure to safe shutdown systems and all but systems shall be capable of operating with or without offsite a few safety-related equipment areas, which present no fire power. hazard due to radiation, levels or specific plant configurations (e.g., no combustibles present).

4.1-10 Battery backup (24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months duration) is provided as the STP FHAR emergency power supply for the detection system.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability. III.G. Fire protection of safe shutdown capability.

1. Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, 1. Systems and components essential for safe shutdown are systems, and components important to safe shutdown. separated or protected from fire hazards to assure that These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so redundant safe-shutdown pathways necessary to that: achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are available following a fire.

a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and 2. The design of associated circuits is in accordance with IEEE 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 as described in

b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold Section 8.3 of the STP FSAR.

4.1-11 STP FHAR shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within The effects of postulated fires on the plant's ability to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . perform safe shutdown functions and to minimize radioactive releases to the environment have been

2. Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, examined in the fire hazards analysis. More specifically, where cables or equipment, including associated non- the effects of loss of equipment and cabling located in safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause each affected fire area have been determined. Also, the maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts effects of fire-induced spurious actuation on equipment to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to and non-safety associated circuits have been analyzed.

achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are Amendment 26 located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G.2 (Cont'd) III.G.2 (Cont'd)

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non- (a-c) Cable and active equipment and associated non-safety safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having circuits of redundant trains are separated by fire a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or barriers having a 3-hour rating where practical.

supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the Where these 3-hour rated fire barriers have not been barrier; provided, STP has provided alternate protection as allowed by Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b or c. Electrical

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non- and mechanical penetrations of the reactor safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal containment and the personnel airlock are not fire distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening rated assemblies, but are of substantial steel combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors construction for overriding nuclear safety concerns and 4.1-12 STP FHAR and an automatic fire suppression system shall be will meet or exceed the fire resistive rating of the fire installed in the fire areas; or barrier.

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non- Fire rated barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier have a 3-hour rating or have an equivalency to the having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an barriers as determined by a qualified fire protection automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in engineer based upon an engineering judgment.

the fire area; Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G.2. (Contend) III.G.2. (Cont'd)

Inside nominated containments one of the fire protection means specified above or one of the following fire protections means shall be provided.

d. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a (d-f) A manually actuated special hazard system is horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no provided inside containment where cables and intervening combustibles or fire hazards; equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains are not separated by a distance of

e. Installation of fire detectors and an automatic fire more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles suppression system in the fire area; or 4.1-13 STP FHAR or fire hazards.

f. Separation of cables and equipment and associated A manual-rather than automatic-system was used non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a because of overriding concerns of nuclear safety.

noncombustible radiant energy shield.

The normally closed containment isolation valve installed upstream of the deluge valve must be opened by operator action in the control room to introduce water into the system.

This special hazard spray system is as a minimum; designed, installed, and acceptance tested in Amendment 26 accordance with the requirements of NFPA 15, 1977 Edition. Any nonconformance will be evaluated by a qualified fire protection engineer.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G.2. (Cont'd) III.G.2. (Cont'd)

The design requirements of this system are:

The system is designed to provide the following protection:

- Adequate wetting of the cable tray, and

- To provide area coverage beneath the Train "B" cable tray between elevations 37' and 30' 4.1-14 STP FHAR Pipe size, support, and installation details are per NFPA 15, 1977 Edition, except where the more restrictive seismic Category II/I supports were rovided in lieu of NFPA supports.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G.2. (Cont'd) III.G.2. (Cont'd)

Coverage - For cases where obstructions impair the effectiveness of the spray system, sprinkler heads will be relocated or additional heads installed to provide adequate coverage. The quantity of sprinklers provided will be at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft./sprinkler of floor area. However, in no case will protection exceed 200 sq. ft. All areas will have some coverage with densities as specified below.

4.1-15 STP FHAR Design Density - This system will be designed to provide an average density of 0.3 gpm/sq. ft. over 3,000 sq. ft. of floor area.

Spacing and Location - Sprinkler heads will be spaced and oriented to achieve adequate wetting of the "B" Train cable trays as well as providing area coverage of the area below the Train "B" cable tray Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G.2. (Cont'd) III.G.2. (Cont'd)

This special hazard spray system provides a level of protection equivalent to a radiant energy shield for the following reasons:

The spray coverage of the system will provide an adequate level of protection for the Train "B" cable tray In addition, area coverage below the Train B cable tray protects the Train B cable tray from the effects of fire in the Train A cable tray 4.1-16 STP FHAR The combined effects of the Train B coverage and the area coverage provides added protection for the Train A cable tray.

Additional details of the design and operation were submitted to the staff in letter ST-HL-AE-2033 dated April 8, 1987.

Line-type thermal detectors are provided for cable trays, and spot-type thermal detectors are provided around the reactor Amendment 26 coolant pumps. These detectors alarm both at the Mechanical Auxiliary Building local panel and in the control room.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.G. (Cont'd) III.G. (Cont'd)

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its 3. Alternate shutdown capability for all three trains is associated circuits,2 independent of cables, systems or provided outside the control room fire area to respond components in the area, room or zone under to a large control room fire. Following operations consideration, shall be provided: performed in the control room described in Section 2.4.4, the transfer of control to the auxiliary shutdown

a. Where the protection of systems whose function is panel and other points of control is accomplished from required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the outside the control room fire area. These circuits when requirement of paragraph G.2 of this section; or transferred are independent of the control room fire area.

b. Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be 4.1-17 STP FHAR subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire A fixed fire suppression system has not been provided suppression systems. throughout the control room. A detailed justification for this deviation is presented in Section 3.10. The control In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system room is continuously occupied and is provided with shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under portable fire extinguishers inside the control room and consideration. fire hose stations near the entrances. Fire detection is provided in the control room and the relay portion of the control room is provided with an automatic Halon suppression system.

Amendment 26 2

Alternate shutdown capability is provided by rerouting, relocating or modificating of existing systems; dedicated shutdown capability is provided by installing new structures and systems for the function of post-fire shutdown.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.H. Fire Brigade III.H. Fire Brigade A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire fighting shall be Sections 9.5.1.6, 13.2.3, and 13.5 of the FSAR and the Fire established to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability Protection Program establish the policies for the for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or administrative controls for fire protection to minimize fire components important to safety. The fire brigade shall be at hazards. Plant procedures will be developed to least five members on each shift. The brigade leader and at implement these policies, and will be available for NRC least two brigade members shall have sufficient training in or review at the site.

knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown A site fire brigade of at least five members per shift has capability. The qualification of fire brigade members shall been formed. The fire brigade leader will not be the shift include an annual physical examination to determine their supervisor. At fuel load, the fire brigade leader and at least two fire brigade members will have sufficient 4.1-18 STP FHAR ability to perform strenuous fire fighting activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a member of the fire brigade. The knowledge of safety-related systems to understand the brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel. Such capability. The fire brigade members will undergo an competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by annual physical examination.

possession of an operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems. The fire brigade has been provided the necessary equipment for fire fighting including at least ten NIOSH The minimum equipment provided for the brigade shall consist approved self-contained breathing apparatus, each with a of personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, minimum service life of one-half hour. It will be the gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, responsibility of the health physics department to provide Amendment 26 portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable emergency breathing capabilities for damage control and extinguishers. Self-contained breathing apparatus using full- control room personnel.

face positive-pressure masks approved by

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.H. (Cont'd) III.H (Cont'd)

NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health-approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and At least a 1-hour supply of breathing air in extra bottles will control room personnel. At least 10 masks shall be available be located on the STP plant site for each unit of self-for fire brigade personnel. Control room personnel may be contained breathing apparatus.

furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated operating life In addition, STP will maintain an adequate air supply for the shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained five man fire brigade for six hours. This may be via approved units. air compressors operable following a loss of offsite power, spare cylinders, or cascaded storage cylinders.

At least a 1-hour supply of breathing air in extra bottles shall 4.1-19 STP FHAR be located on the plant site for each unit of self-contained breathing apparatus. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air shall be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted air supply bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air shall be used and the compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of offsite power. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I. Fire brigade training. The fire brigade training program shall III.I. Fire Brigade Training ensure that the capability to fight potential fire is established and maintained. The program shall consist of an initial (See also the response to III.H above) classroom instruction program followed by periodic classroom instruction, fire fighting practice, and fire drills: The fire brigade training program is being developed and will be maintained at the site. The program will include:

1. Instruction Instruction covering the topics indicated to ensure that the

a. The initial classroom instruction shall include: capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained.

(1) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific identification of each See also Sections 9.5.16.2 and 13.2.3 of the FSAR for further individual's responsibilities. information.

4.1-20 (2) Identification of the type and location of STP FHAR fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.

(3) The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.

(4) Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and Amendment 26 familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I.1 (Cont'd)

(5) The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or modifications (welding), and record file 4.1-21 STP FHAR fires.

(6) The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation, and emergency breathing equipment.

(7) The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.

(8) The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders Amendment 26 only).

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I.1 (Cont'd) III.I.1 (Cont'd)

(9) Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.

(10) Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.

NOTE: Items (9) and (10) may be deleted from the training of no more than two of the non-operations personnel who may be assigned to the fire brigade.

4.1-22 STP FHAR

b. The instruction shall be provided by qualified individuals who are b. Instruction of the fire brigade will be provided by qualified knowledgeable, experienced, and suitably trained in fighting the individuals suitably trained in fighting the types of fires that types of fires that could occur in the plant and in using the types of could occur in the plant, using the types of equipment equipment available in the nuclear power plant. available in the plant.

c. Instruction shall be provided to all fire brigade members and fire c. Instruction will be provided for the brigade members and brigade leaders. leaders.

d. Regular planned meetings shall be held at least every 3 months for d. Planned meetings shall be conducted quarterly for all fire Amendment 26 all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessary. program and other subjects as necessary.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION II.I.1 (Cont'd) III.I.1 (Cont'd)

e. Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to e. Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instruction program for all repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a two-year period. These brigade members over a two year period.

sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.

2. Practice

2. Practice Practice sessions will be held at least once per year Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire for each shift brigade on the proper methods of brigade on the proper method of fighting the various fighting possible plant fires, and the proper method types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power 4.1-23 STP FHAR of fighting under strenuous conditions.

plant. These sessions shall provide brigade members with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting.

These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I. (Cont'd) III.I. (Cont'd)

3. Drills 3. Drills

a. Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so a. Fire drills will be performed so that each fire brigade that the fire brigade can practice as a team. can practice as a team.

b. Drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to b. Fire drills will be performed quarterly in the plant for exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade. Each fire each shift's fire brigade. Each fire brigade member brigade member should participate in each drill, but will participate in at least two drills per year. At least must participate in at least two drills per year. one of these drills each shift will be unannounced.

A sufficient number of these drills, but not less than At least one drill per year will be on a back shift for 4.1-24 STP FHAR one for each shift fire brigade per year, shall be each shift fire brigade.

unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment. Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill shall ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it is begun. Unannounced drill shall not be scheduled closer than four weeks.

Amendment 26 At least one drill per year shall be performed on a "back shift" for each shift fire brigade.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I.3 (Cont'd) III.I.3 (Cont'd)

c. The drills shall be preplanned to establish the c. Fire drills will be preplanned and critiqued for training objectives of the drill and shall be critiqued effectiveness. Deficiencies will be remedied to determine how well the training objectives have through extra training and/or a repeat drill.

been met. Unannounced drills shall be planned and critiqued by members of the management staff Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be followed by responsible for plant safety and fire protection. a repeat drill within 30 days.

Performance deficiencies of a fire brigade or of

d. Qualified individuals independent of STP will critique individual fire brigade members shall be remedied by an unannounced fire drill at least once every 3 years.

scheduling additional training for the brigade or A copy of their written report will be available for members. Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be NRC review at the site.

4.1-25 STP FHAR followed by a repeat drill within 30 days.

d. At 3-year intervals, a randomly selected unannounced drill shall be critiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensee's staff. A copy of the written report from such individuals shall be available for NRC review.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I.3 (Cont'd) III.I.3 (Cont'd)

e. Drills shall as a minimum include the following. e. As a minimum, fire drills will include:

(1) Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness, time (1) Assessment of alarm effectiveness, assembly required to notify and assemble fire brigade, time, use of equipment, and strategy.

and selection, placement and use of equipment, and fire fighting strategies.

(2) Assessment of each member's knowledge of (2) Assessment of each brigade member's his/her role in the fire fighting effort.

knowledge of his or her role in the fire fighting strategy for the area assumed to contain the fire. Assessment of the brigade 4.1-26 STP FHAR member's conformance with established plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire fighting equipment, including self-contained emergency breathing apparatus, communication equipment, and ventilation equipment to the extent practicable.

(3) The simulated use of fire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation and type of fire selected for the drill. The area and Amendment 26 type of fire chosen for the drill should differ from those used in the previous drill so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires (3) Simulated use of fire fighting equipment in required to cope with the situation and fire selected for the drill. The area and type of drill chosen will differ from the previous drill.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I.3.e (Cont'd) III.I.3.e (Cont'd) various plant areas. The situation selected should simulate the size and arrangement of a fire that could reasonably occur in the area selected, allowing for fire development due to the time required to respond, to obtain equipment, and organize for the fire, assuming loss of automatic suppression capability.

(4) Assessment of brigade leader's direction of the fire fighting effort as to thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness.

4.1-27 STP FHAR (4) The brigade leader's thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness will be addressed by the critiquing body.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.I. (Cont'd) III.I. (Cont'd)

4. Records 4. Records Individual records of training provided to each fire Individual records of training will be maintained for brigade member, including drill critiques, shall be each fire brigade member, including drill critiques.

maintained for at least 3 years to ensure that each Records will be maintained for at least 3 years.

member receives training in all parts of the training program. These records of training shall be available for NRC review. Retraining or broadened training for fire fighting within buildings shall be scheduled for all those brigade members whose performance records show deficiencies.

4.1-28 III.J. Emergency lighting. Emergency lighting units with at least an STP FHAR 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. III.J. Fixed self-contained emergency lighting, consisting of sealed-beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery supply, will be provided in areas needed for operation of hot standby/hot shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. In containment and areas needed for Amendment 26 operation of cold shutdown equipment, portable lights will be provided. A portable, self-contained, 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months emergency light is mounted on the 60 MAB for containment ingress and egress. These emergency lighting units will provide the lighting needed to permit the required operator actions. A walkdown will be performed to verify the ability of the operator to access/egress to/from these areas and perform the required operations. The emergency lighting areas and additional information are provided in FSAR Section 9.5.3.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K. Administrative controls. Administrative control shall be III.K. Administrative Controls established to minimize fire hazards in areas containing structures, systems, and components important to safety. Sections 9.5.1.6.1 and 13.5 of the FSAR and the Fire These controls shall establish procedures to: Protection Program establish the policies for the administrative controls for fire protection to minimize fire hazards. Plant procedures will be developed to implement these policies, and will be available for NRC review at the site.

1. Govern the handling and limitation of the use of 1. The use and handling of flammable gases, liquids, and ordinary combustible materials, combustible and other combustibles in safety-related areas are flammable gases and liquids, high efficiency controlled by administrative fire protection 4.1-29 STP FHAR particulate air and charcoal filters, dry ion exchanger procedures for control of transient fire loads and use resins, or other combustible supplies in safety- of flammable liquids and gases.

related areas.

2. Prohibit the storage of combustibles in safety-related 2. Procedures to control transient fire loads and the use areas or establish designated storage areas with of flammable liquids and gases will provide guidance appropriate fire protection. to control and limit the bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety-related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods except in designated storage Amendment 26 areas with appropriate fire protection.

3. Govern the handling of and limit transient fire loads 3. Procedures to control transient fire loads and the use such as combustible and flammable liquids, wood of flammable liquids and gases will provide guidance and plastic products, or other combustible materials to control and limit transient fire loads during all in buildings containing safety-related systems or phases of plant operation, including outages for equipment during all phases of operating, and refueling or modifying the plant.

especially during maintenance, modification, or refueling operations.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K. (Cont'd) III.K. (Cont'd)

4. Designate the onsite staff member responsible for the in 4. The Fire Marshal is responsible for the plant plant fire protection review of proposed work activities to fire protection review of proposed work identify potential transient fire hazards and specify activities.

required additional fire protection in the work activity procedure.

5. Govern the use of ignition sources by use of a flame permit 5. Procedures for welding, cutting, and brazing system to control welding, flame cutting, brazing, or control will be developed to control the use of soldering operations. A separate permit shall be issued ignition sources, including an appropriate for each area where work is to be done. If work continues permit program.

over more than one shift, the permit shall be valid for not 4.1-30 STP FHAR more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the plant is operating or for the duration of a particular job during plant shutdown.

6. Control the removal from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediately following completion of the 6. Procedures for control of transient fire loads activity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes will require that waste combustibles be first. removed as soon as practical.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K. (Cont'd) III.K. (Cont'd)

7. Maintain the periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure 7. The Fire Marshal is responsible for continued compliance with these administrative controls. administration of the Fire Protection Program, including administrative controls, to ensure continued compliance.

8. Control the use of specific combustibles in safety-related 8. The administration fire protection procedures areas. All wood used in safety-related areas during govern the use of specific combustibles in maintenance, modification, or refueling operations (such safety-related areas. Wood used inside, or as lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be treated with a adjacent to, the power block shall be treated flame retardant. Equipment or supplies (such as new fuel) with a fire retardant. These procedures shipped in untreated combustible packing containers may require that transient combustibles and 4.1-31 STP FHAR be unpacked in safety-related areas if required for valid combustible wastes will be stored in approved operating reasons. However, all combustible materials containers, or removed from safety-related shall be removed from the area immediately following the areas as soon as practical following unpacking.

unpacking. Such transient combustible material, unless Exceptions to administrative controls may be stored in approved containers, shall not be left reviewed and approved by the Fire Marshal.

unattended during lunch breaks, shift changes, or other This review ensures that appropriate similar periods. Loose combustible packing material such additional precautions are taken.

as wood or paper excelsior, or polyethylene sheeting shall be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing metal covers.

Amendment 26

9. General Employee Training describes the

9. Control actions to be taken by an individual discovering a actions to be taken by anyone discovering a fire, for example, notification of control room; attempt to fire.

extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire suppression systems.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K. (Cont'd) III.K. (Cont'd)

10. Control actions to be taken by the control room operator 10. Plant procedures for Fire Emergencies to determine the need for fire brigade assistance upon Onsite, which are being developed, will report of a fire or receipt of alarm on control room describe the actions to be taken by the annunciator panel, for example, announcing location of fire control room personnel when a fire is over PA system, sounding fire alarms, and notifying the indicated.

shift supervisor and the fire brigade leader of the type, size, and location of the fire.

11. Control actions to be taken by the fire brigade after notification by the control room operator of a fire, for 11. The fire brigade training program, example, assembling in a designated location, receiving ensures that fire brigade members know their 4.1-32 STP FHAR directions from the fire brigade leader, and discharging responsibilities and actions during a fire specific fire fighting responsibilities including selection and emergency. General employee training transportation of fire fighting equipment to fire location, provides general instructions for all personnel selection of protective equipment, operating instructions during a fire emergency. The Fire Preplans for use of fire suppression systems, and use of preplanned provide information for the fire brigade, strategies for fighting fires in specific areas. control room personnel and support personnel for fighting fires in specific areas.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K. (Cont'd) III.K. (Cont'd)

12. Define the strategies for fighting fires in all safety- 12. An overview of the information specified in a.

related areas and areas presenting a hazard to through j. of Section III.K.12 is presented in the safety-related equipment. These strategies shall fire brigade training program and will be designate: included in detail in the Fire Preplans. Preplans are guidance documents used for quick reference

a. Fire hazards in each area covered by the specific and fire brigade training. Since the Fire prefire plans. Preplans will be used by the fire brigade for training and practice, the fire brigade training

b. Fire extinguishments best suited for controlling program will ensure that the fire brigade leader is the fires associated with the fire hazards in that knowledgeable of the format and general content.

area and the nearest location of these This will enable the fire brigade leader to 4.1-33 STP FHAR extinguishments. determine the best method of attack based on the Fire Preplans, his/her training and experience,

c. Most favorable direction from which to attack a and the conditions at the fire scene.

fire in each area in view of the ventilation direction, access hallways, stairs, and doors that are most likely to be free of fire, and the best station or elevation for fighting the fire. All access and egress routes that involve locked doors should be specifically identified in the procedure with the appropriate precautions and Amendment 26 methods for access specified.

d. Plant systems that should be managed to reduce the damage potential during a local fire and the location of local and remote controls for such management (e.g., any hydraulic or electrical systems in the zone covered by the specific fire fighting

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K.12.d. (Cont'd) procedure that could increase the hazards in the area because of overpressurization or electrical hazards).

e. Vital heat-sensitive system components that need to be kept cool while fighting a local fire. Particularly hazardous combustibles that need cooling should be designated.

f. Organization of fire fighting brigades and the assignment of special duties according to job title so that all fire fighting functions are covered by any complete shift personnel complement. These duties include command control of 4.1-34 STP FHAR the brigade, transporting fire suppression and support equipment to the fire scenes, applying the extinguishment to the fire, communication with the control room, and coordination with outside fire departments.

g. Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.

h. Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when the ventilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing operations.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.K.12. (Cont'd)

i. Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.

j. Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.

4.1-35 STP FHAR Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.L. Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability III.L. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability

1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability 1. Alternative shutdown capability is provided where provided for a specific fire area shall be able to (a) redundant safe shutdown trains do not meet achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions separation criteria. With this capability, the plant in the reactor; (b) maintain reactor coolant can achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity inventory; (c) achieve and maintain hot standby conditions in the reactor; maintain reactor coolant conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown 3 for a BWR); inventory; achieve and maintain hot standby; achieve (d) achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and hours; and (e) maintain cold shutdown conditions maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. With thereafter. During the postfire shutdown, the this capability, the reactor coolant system process reactor coolant system process variables shall be variables can be maintained within those limits 4.1-36 STP FHAR maintained within those predicted for a loss of predicted for a loss of normal ac power and the normal a.c. power, and the fission product boundary fission product boundary can be maintained during integrity shall not be affected; i.e., there shall be no the post-fire shutdown.

fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary. An area by area analysis of the consequences of a fire in a given fire area is provided in Chapter 3.0.

2. The performance goal for the shutdown functions are:

2. The performance goals for the shutdown a. Reactivity control is provided by the control rods functions shall be:

Amendment 26 and boration to achieve and maintain cold

a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of shutdown reactivity conditions.

achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.L.2. (Cont'd) III.L.2 (Cont'd)

b. The reactor coolant makeup function shall be b. The CVCS system provides for primary coolant capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level makeup from the refueling water storage tank or above the top of the core for BWRs and be within boric acid tanks through the charging pumps. Level the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs. monitoring is provided with pressurizer level instrumentation.

c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal. c. Heat removal is provided through the steam generators or residual heat removal system.

d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above d. Indications of process variables required to 4.1-37 STP FHAR functions. achieve and maintain safe shutdown are provided in the main control room and at the auxiliary shutdown

e. The supporting functions shall be capable of panel.

providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc.,

necessary to permit the operation of the equipment e. The supporting functions are capable of providing used for safe shutdown functions. the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.L. (Cont'd) III.L (Cont'd)

3. The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may 3. One train of alternate shutdown control is provided be unique for each such area, or it may be one for shutdown with or without offsite power for 72 unique combination of systems for all such areas. In hours. Procedures will be developed as required to either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall implement this capability.

be independent of the specific fire area(s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability.

4. If the capability to achieve and maintain cold 4.1-38 STP FHAR shutdown will not be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain the hot standby or 4. If the capability to achieve and maintain cold hot shutdown condition shall be capable of shutdown is not available because of fire damage, maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can the equipment and systems comprising the means to be achieved. If such equipment and systems will not achieve and maintain the hot standby conditions are be capable of being powered by both onsite and capable of maintaining such conditions until cold offsite electric power systems because of fire shutdown can be achieved. The number of operating damage, an independent onsite power system shall shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, be provided. The number of operating shift required to operate such equipment and systems will Amendment 26 personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, be onsite at all times.

required to operate such equipment and systems shall be onsite at all times.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.L. (Cont'd) III.L (Cont'd)

5. Equipment and systems comprising the means to 5. Repair procedures for systems necessary to achieve achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall and maintain cold shutdown using the "Appendix R not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such Required" single safe shutdown pathway will be equipment and systems shall be limited so that the generated as required.

systems can be made operable and cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Materials for such repairs shall be readily available on site and procedures shall be available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after 4.1-39 STP FHAR the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided. Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months may be powered by offsite power only.

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire shutdown capability need not be designed to meet

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or shutdown capability are not designed to meet other design basis accident criteria, except where Seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, required for other reasons, e.g., because of interface Amendment 26 or other design basis accident criteria, except with or impact on existing safety systems, or because where required for other reasons, e.g., because of of adverse valve actions due to fire damage. interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.L. (Cont'd) III.L (Cont'd)

7. The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each 7. The effects of fire on non-safety circuits associated fire area shall be known to be isolated from with safe shutdown circuits have been evaluated.

associated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that (See also III.G.2 of this Section.)

hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment. The separation and barriers between trays and conduits containing associated circuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or safe shutdown cables from the redundant division, or 4.1-40 STP FHAR the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, shall be such that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.4 Amendment 26 4

An acceptable method of complying with this alternative would be to meet Regulatory Guide 1.75 position 4 related to associated circuits and IEEE Std 384-1974 (Section 4.5) where trays from redundant safety divisions are so protected that postulated fires affect trays from only one safety division.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.M. Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification. Penetration III.M. Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification.

seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials and Penetration seal designs utilize only noncombustible shall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used materials and are qualified by tests that are comparable to rate fire barriers. The acceptance criteria for the test shall to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance include: criteria for the test include:

1. The cable fire barrier penetration seal has withstood 1. The cable fire barrier penetration seal has the fire endurance test without passage of flame or withstood the fire endurance test without ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period passage of flame or ignition of cables on the of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to required of the barrier. the fire resistance rating required of the barrier.

2. The temperature levels recorded for the 4.1-41 STP FHAR

2. The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate side are analyzed and demonstrate that the that the maximum temperature is sufficiently maximum temperature is sufficiently below the below the cable insulation ignition temperature; cable insulation ignition temperature; and and

3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and 3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact does not allow projection of water beyond the and does not allow projection of water beyond unexposed surface during the hose stream test. the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.

Amendment 26

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.N. Fire doors. Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing III.N. STP uses a combination of the specified measures to ensure mechanisms and shall be inspected semiannually to verify that that the fire doors protect the openings as required.

automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable.

One of the following measures shall be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location;

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position; 4.1-42

3. Fire doors shall be provided with automatic hold-open and STP FHAR release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

Amendment 26 The fire brigade leader shall have ready access to keys for any The fire brigade team captain has ready access to keys for any locked fire doors. locked fire doors.

Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression Areas containing safe shutdown systems which are protected systems shall have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or by an automatic total flooding gas suppression system have shall satisfy option 1 above. electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or these fire doors are kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location.

4.1 COMPARISON OF STP UNITS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS STP POSITION III.O. Oil collection system for reactor coolant pump. The reactor coolant III.O. The reactor coolant pumps are provided with thermal pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the spot-type detectors and a seismic Category I oil containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system, sized for the total oil inventory and collection system shall be so designed, engineered, and installed designed to collect lube oil from potential leakage that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis sites. The collection pans on the reactor coolant accident conditions and that there is reasonable assurance that the pumps are the standard design as provided by system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. Westinghouse for this application.

Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from Separate drain tanks with flame arrestors are all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the provided for each reactor coolant pump. The oil reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Leakage shall be collected collection system drain lines are sized to 4.1-43 STP FHAR and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps. The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection A. Overall Requirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Program A.1. Personnel A.1. Personnel Responsibility for the overall fire protection program STPs compliance is described in the FHAR comparison should be assigned to a designated person in the upper to Appendix R, Sections II.A. and B.

level of management. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulation and assurance of program implementation is delegated. Such delegation of 4.2-1 authority should be to staff personnel prepared by training and experience in fire protection and nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection programs for nuclear power plants. The qualification requirements for the fire protection engineer FHAR or consultant who will assist in the design and selection of equipment, inspect and test the completed physical aspects of the system, develop the fire protection program, and assist in the fire fighting training for the operating plant should be stated. Subsequently, the FSAR should discuss the training and the updating provisions such as fire drills provided for maintaining the competence of the station fire-fighting and operating crew, including personnel responsible for maintaining and inspecting the fire Amendment 26 protection equipment.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.1. Personnel (Cont'd) A.1. Personnel (Cont'd)

The fire protection staff should be responsible for:

a. coordination of building layout and systems design with fire area requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated design basis fires,

b. design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems,

c. fire prevention activities, and STP FHAR 4.2-2

d. training and manual fire-fighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.

(NOTE: NFPA 6 - Recommendations for Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention, contains useful guidance for organization and operation of the entire fire loss prevention program.)

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.2. Design Bases A.2. Design Bases The overall fire protection program should be based STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison upon evaluation of potential fire hazards throughout the to Appendix R, Sections II.A and III.G.2.

plant and the effect of postulated design basis fires relative to maintaining ability to perform safety shutdown function and minimize radioactive releases to the environment.

STP FHAR 4.2-3 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.3. Backup A.3. Backup Total reliance should not be placed on a single Total reliance is not placed on a single automatic fire automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate backup suppression system. STP provides manual backup fire suppression capability should be provided. suppression (standpipes with hose reels and cabinets, and portable fire extinguishers) to automatic suppression systems.

A.4. Single Failure Criterion A.4. Single Failure Criterion A single failure in the fire suppression system should A single failure in a fire suppression system will not not impair both the primary and backup fire impair both the primary and backup suppression suppression capability. For example, redundant fire capabilities.

water pumps with independent power supplies and STP FHAR controls should be provided. Postulated fires or fire STP's water supplies for fire suppression systems are protection system failures need not be considered described in the FHAR comparison to Appendix R, 4.2-4 concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe Sections III. A, B, C and D.

natural phenomena.

Postulated fires or fire protection system failures are not considered to occur concurrently with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.4. Single Failure Criterion (Cont'd) A.4. Single Failure Criterion (Cont'd)

The effects of lightning strikes should be included in The effects of lightning strikes are included in the the overall plant fire protection program. overall plant Fire Protection Program.

Lightning protection is provided and is designed in accordance with NFPA 78, 1980 Edition.

A.5. Fire Suppression Systems A.5. Fire Suppression Systems Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety related systems or system will not incapacitate safety-related systems or components. Fire suppression systems that are components.

pressurized during normal plant operation should meet the guidelines specified in APCSB Branch Technical Results of a moderate energy crack or inadvertent STP FHAR Position 3-1, "Protection Against Postulated Piping system operation are included in the systems interaction Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment." effort to assure compliance with SRP Section 3.6.

4.2-5 Further details are provided in STP FSAR Section 3.6.

The STP Fire Preplans will address the location of redundant safe shutdown systems or components within fire zones. The fire brigade training program will address the use of manual hose streams in these areas.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.6. Fuel Storage Areas A.6. Fuel Storage Areas The fire protection program (plans, personnel and New Fuel Area equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire zones which could affect the fuel The fire protection program (plans, personnel and storage zone should be fully operational before fuel is equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for received at the site. adjacent fire zones which could affect the fuel storage zone will be fully operational before fuel is received.

A.7. Fuel Loading A.7. Fuel Loading The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit will will be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that that reactor unit. reactor unit.

STP FHAR 4.2-6 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION A.8. Multiple-Reactor Sites A.8. Multiple-Reactor Sites On multiple-reactor sites where there are operating At STP, Unit 1 is scheduled for fuel loading in June, reactors and construction of remaining units is being 1987, and Unit 2 in December, 1988. During the time completed, the fire protection program should provide period when Unit 1 is operational and construction is continuing evaluation and include additional fire continuing on Unit 2, the fire protection program will barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire controls necessary to protect the operating units from barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the controls necessary to protect Unit 1 from potential operating plant should have the lead responsibility for construction fire hazards at Unit 2. The Plant Manager site fire protection. at Unit 1 will have the lead responsibility for fire protection during this time period. See FSAR Section 9.5.1.6 for more information.

A.9. Simultaneous Fires A.9. Simultaneous Fires STP FHAR Simultaneous fires in more than one reactor need not be The STP units are arranged using a "slide-along" 4.2-7 postulated where separation requirements are met. A concept that results in Unit 2 being essentially identical fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be to Unit 1. The centerline of Unit 1 is separated from the postulated except for facilities shared between units. centerline of Unit 2 by 600 feet. The only shared safety-related area between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the Essential Cooling Pond and the Essential Cooling Water Pump House structure. Three hour rated fire barriers separate Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment within the Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure. Simultaneous fires are not postulated.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B. Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade B. Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade B.1. Administrative procedures consistent with the need for Section 9.5.1.6 of the FSAR and the Fire Protection maintaining the performance of the fire protection Program establish the policies for the administrative system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be controls for fire protection to minimize fire hazards.

provided. Plant procedures will be developed to implement the policies, and will be available for NRC review at the Guidance is contained in the following publications: site.

NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services B.1. The referenced NFPA standards were reviewed in preparing the administrative fire protection procedures NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department for STP; but, except for NFPA 27, they are not currently endorsed by NFPA. They did not contribute substantial NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention information in excess of NRC guidance and are not STP FHAR referenced by plant procedure. See FSAR Sections NFPA 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies 9.5.1.6, 13.2.3, 13.5 and the FHAR comparison to 4.2-8 Appendix R sections III.H and III.I for more NFPA 8 - Management Responsibility for Effects of information.

Fire on Operations.

For those systems required to protect safe shutdown NFPA 27 - Private Fire Brigades capability, STPEGS has developed a testing program based on NUREG 0452, DRAFT Revision 5 (Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications). See ST-HL-AE-2007 and FSAR Section 9.5.1.6.1 for details and clarification. This program is utilized in lieu of performing periodic system/component testing in accordance with the various NFPA standards.

B.2. Effective administrative measures should be B.2. HL&P will use Regulatory Guide 1.39 for guidance in implemented to prohibit bulk storage of combustible preparing or revising STP administrative fire protection Amendment 26 materials inside or adjacent to safety-related buildings procedures. STP's compliance is further described in the or systems during operation or maintenance periods. FHAR comparison to Appendix R,Section III.K. (K.2.,

Regulatory Guide 1.39, "Housekeeping Requirements K.6. and K.7.) STP Nuclear Operating Company for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," provides became responsible in 1997 for maintaining and revising guidance on housekeeping, including the disposal of STP administrative fire protection procedures.

combustible materials.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.3. Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated B.3. STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison operations such as modifications (e.g., breaking fire to Appendix R,Section III.K.

stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and refueling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of management and appropriate special actions and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers implemented to assure adequate fire protection and reactor safety. In particular:

(a) Work involving ignition sources such as (a) STP's compliance is described in the FHAR welding and flame cutting should be done comparison to and is based on Appendix R, under closely controlled conditions. Section III.K (K.4. and K.5.)

Procedures governing such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in fire protection. Persons STP FHAR performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and equipped to prevent and 4.2-9 combat fires. If this is not possible, a person qualified in fire protection should directly monitor the work and functions as a fire watch.

(b) Leak testing, and similar procedures such as air (b) Plant procedures will be developed and will flow determination, should use one of the prohibit the use of open flames or combustion commercially available aerosol techniques. generated smoke for leak testing or similar Open flames or combustion generated smoke procedures.

should not be permitted.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.3. (Cont'd) B.3. (Cont'd)

(c) Use of combustible material, e.g., HEPA and (c) STP's compliance is described in the FHAR charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins or other comparison to Appendix R,Section III.K (K.1.,

combustible supplies, in safety related areas K.4. and K.8.).

should be controlled. Use of wood inside buildings containing safety related systems or equipment should be permitted only when suitable noncombustible substitutes are not available. If wood must be used, only fire retardant treated wood (scaffolding, lay down blocks) should be permitted. Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their STP FHAR possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the 4.2-10 adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.4. Nuclear power plants are frequently located in remote B.4. As an integral part of the defense-in-depth approach to areas, at some distance from public fire departments. fire safety, the plant will be self-sufficient with respect Also, first response fire departments are often to fire-fighting activities and will rely on public fire volunteer. Public fire department response should be department response only for supplemental or backup considered in the overall fire protection program. capability.

However, the plant should be designed to be self sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely Mutual aid agreements have been established with on the public response only for supplemental or backup surrounding public fire departments.

capability.

STP FHAR 4.2-11 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.5. The need for good organization, training and equipping B.5. HL&P uses NUREG 0654 for guidance in developing a of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires comprehensive emergency plan for the operation of the effective measures be implemented to assure proper plant. The fire protection program is an integral part of discharge of these functions. The guidance in the emergency plan, and is developed using NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Planning for guidance. The organization and training of the STP fire Nuclear Power Plants," should be followed as brigade will be an integral part of the operating staff applicable. responsibilities. A summary description of the qualifications, training, and functions of the plant staff is provided in FSAR Sections 9.5.1.6 and 13.2.3, and FHAR comparison to Appendix R, Sections III.H and III.I. STP Nuclear Operating Company became responsible in 1997 for maintaining and revising STP administrative fire protection procedures.

STP FHAR (a) Successful fire fighting requires testing and (a) Plant procedures will provide for testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment, maintenance of the fire protection equipment emergency lighting and communication, as well as and systems, emergency lighting and 4.2-12 practice as brigades for the people who must utilize the communication, and provide instructions for equipment. A test plan that lists the individuals and maintaining temporary fire protection when a their responsibilities in connection with routing tests fire protection system is impaired or during and inspections of the fire protection and protection periods of plant maintenance.

systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connections to water systems.

(b) Basic training is a necessary element in (b) STP's compliance is described in FHAR effective fire-fighting operation. In order for a comparison to Appendix R,Section III.I.

Amendment 26 fire brigade to operate effectively, it must operate as a team.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.5. (Cont'd) B.5. (Cont'd)

All members must know what their individual duties are. They must be familiar with the layout of the plant and equipment location and operation in order to permit effective fire-fighting operations during times when a particular area is filled with smoke or is insufficiently lighted. Such training can only be accomplished by conducting drills several times a year (at least quarterly) so that all members of the fire brigade have had the opportunity to train as a team, testing itself in the major areas of the plant. The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be preplanned and post-critiqued to establish the training objective of the drills and determine how well STP FHAR these objectives have been met. These drills should periodically (at least annually) include local fire 4.2-13 department participation where possible. Such drills also permit supervising personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of communications within the fire brigade and with the on-scene fire team leader, the reactor operator in the control room, and the offsite command post.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.5. (Cont'd) B.5. (Cont'd) c) To have proper coverage during all phases of operation, members of each shift crew should (c) HL&P will utilize these recommendations to be trained in fire protection. Training of the develop a comprehensive fire safety program for plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the operation of the plant. The organization and the local fire department so that responsibilities training will be an integral part of the operating and duties are delineated in advance. This staff responsibilities. A summary description of coordination should be part of the training the qualifications, training, and functions of the course and implemented into the training of the plant staff is provided in FSAR Sections 9.5.1.6, local fire department staff. Local fire 13.2.3 and 13.5 and the Technical departments should be educated in the Specifications. STP Nuclear Operating operational precautions when fighting fires on Company became responsible in 1997 for nuclear power plant sites. Local fire maintaining and revising STP administrative fire departments should be made aware of the need protection procedures.

STP FHAR for radioactive protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power 4.2-14 plant site.

(d) NFPA 27, "Private Fire Brigade", should be (d) HL&P reviewed the referenced NFPA Standards followed in organization, training, and fire for guidance in preparing or revising drills. This standard also is applicable for the administrative fire protection procedures for inspection and maintenance of fire-fighting STP. These standards did not contribute equipment. Among the standards referenced in substantial information in excess of NRC this document, the following should be utilized: guidance and are not referenced in program.

NFPA 194, "Standard for Screw Threads and See FSAR Sections 13.2 and 13.5 for more Gaskets for Fire Hose Couplings," NFPA 1961, information regarding fire brigade training. STP "Standard for Fire Nuclear Operating Company became responsible in 1997 for maintaining and revising STP administrative fire protection procedures.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION B.5 (Cont'd)

Hose," NFPA 197, "Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks," NFPA 601, "Recommended Manual of Instructions and Duties for the Plant Watchman on Guard."

NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed on page 27-11 of Volume 8, 1971-72 are also applicable for good training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression, which are recognized and/or sponsored by the fire protection industry, should be utilized.

STP FHAR 4.2-15 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION C. Quality Assurance Program C. Quality Assurance Program Quality assurance (QA) programs of applicants and The Quality Assurance (QA) program for fire protection contractors should be developed and implemented to will assure that the requirements for design, assure that the requirements for design, procurement, procurement, installation, and testing and administrative installation, and testing and administrative controls for controls for the fire protection program for safety-related the fire protection program for safety-related areas as areas are satisfied.

defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the QA organization. The QA program criteria that apply to the fire protection program should include the following:

1. Design Control and Procurement Document Control STP FHAR Measures should be established to assure that 4.2-16 all design-related guidelines of the Branch Technical Position are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations there from are controlled.

2. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION C. Quality Assurance Program (Cont'd)

3. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and .

Services Measure should be established to assure that purchased material, equipment and services conform to the procurement documents.

4. Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by, or for, the organization performing the activity to verify STP FHAR conformance with documented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing 4.2-17 the activities.

5. Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to assure that testing is performed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be properly evaluated and acted on.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION C. Quality Assurance Program (Cont'd)

6. Inspection, Test and Operating Status Measures should be established to provide for identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.

7. Nonconforming Items Measures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use of installation.

STP FHAR

8. Corrective Action 4.2-18 Measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and nonconformances, are promptly identified, reported and corrected.

9. Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION C. Quality Assurance Program (Cont'd)

10. Audits Audits should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection program including design and procurement documents; instructions; procedures and drawings; and inspection and test activities.

STP FHAR 4.2-19 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection D. General Guidelines for Plant Protection D.1. Building Design D.1. Building Design (1) Isolate safety-related systems from D.1.a. Redundant safety-related systems and components are unacceptable fire hazards, and generally compartmentalized by heavy concrete walls.

Also, all cabling associated with safety-related (2) Separate redundant safety-related systems from components has been routed in accordance with the each other so that both are not subject to requirements of Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev. 2, as noted in damage from a single fire hazard. Section 8.3 of the STP FSAR. These components were physically and electrically separated in order to ensure their availability in the event of an accident. This also or results in minimizing the potential for a single fire affecting more than one train of safety-related Redundant safety-related systems that are equipment.

STP FHAR subject to damage from a single fire hazard should be protected by a combination of fire Separate fire areas exist for the separate divisions of safe 4.2-20 retardant coatings and fire detection and shutdown systems, except within containment. For suppression systems. further discussion refer to the FHAR Sections 1.0 and 2.0, and the comparison to Appendix R, III.G. This or clarification for safe shutdown systems as opposed to safety-related systems is consistent with 10CFR50, A separate system to perform the safety Appendix R requirements.

function should be provided.

In all fire areas, adequate fire detection and protection of the safe shutdown systems and components is provided to allow the fire brigade to manually extinguish the fire and bring the plant to cold shutdown. The protection provided for each of these areas is described in Section 3.0 of the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.b. In order to accomplish 1(a) above, safety-related D.1.b. A detailed fire hazard analysis has been performed for systems and fire hazards should be identified STP. Layout drawings showing plant equipment were throughout the plant. Therefore, a detailed fire hazard used to analyze potential fire hazards to safe shutdown analysis should be made. The fire hazard analysis equipment. Materials used in the construction of the should be reviewed and updated as necessary. plant were evaluated as part of the fire hazard analysis Additional fire hazard analysis should be done after for fuel contribution, flame spread, and smoke plant modification. development. The fire hazard analysis will be updated as necessary. Additional fire hazard analyses will be performed after plant modification. (See Section 3.0 of the FHAR.)

D.1.c. For multiple-reactor sites, cable spreading rooms D.1.c. See F.3 of this section.

should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers (walls and floors) having a STP FHAR minimum fire resistance of three hours. Cabling for redundant safety division should be separated by walls 4.2-21 having three-hour fire barriers. Alternate guidance for constructed plants is shown in Section F.3, "Cable Spreading Room."

D.1.d. Interior wall and structural components, thermal D.1.d. Interior walls and structural components, thermal insulation materials and radiation shielding materials insulation, radiation shielding, and soundproofing and soundproofing should be non-combustible. Interior materials are non-combustible, as defined below:

finishes should be non-combustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Noncombustible Material Factory Mutual or Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. for flame spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less a. A material in the form in which it is used and under the in its use configuration (ASTM E-84 Test), "Surface conditions anticipated will not ignite, burn, support Burning Characteristics of Building Materials"). combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat; or Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.d. (Cont'd) D.1.d (Cont'd)

b. A material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in (a) above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame-spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using the ASTM E-84 Test, "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials", or equivalent.

c. An interior finish (such as an oil-based or water-based paint) applied in thin films to the following non-combustible materials: plaster, acoustic plaster, gypsum plaster-board (gypsum wall board), brick, stone, concrete blocks, and concrete slabs, steel and STP FHAR aluminum panels, structural steel, support steel, and the containment liner.

4.2-22 Some limited quantities of interior finishes do not meet the definition of non-combustible as given above. These are very small contributors to combustible loading in the given room.

D.1.e. Metal deck roof construction should be non-combustible D.1.e. The metal deck roofs at STP are of non-combustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters' construction in accordance with details in Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc.) or listed as Class I by Factor Mutual Laboratory Building Materials Directory.

System Approval Guide.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.f. Suspended ceilings and their supports should be of D.1.f. In structures containing safety-related equipment, where noncombustible construction. Concealed spaces should suspended ceilings are provided; i.e., the control room and be devoid of combustibles. office spaces, the suspended ceilings and their supports are of noncombustible construction. Some spaces above suspended ceilings may contain limited amounts of cables for the lighting and communication. These cables are installed in enclosed raceways in accordance with the National Electric Code.

Alternate compliance with this guidance exists in Fire Area 1, Fire Zone Z034, and Fire Area 3, Fire Zone Z147 and Zone Z036. See Section 3.2 of the FHAR for further details.

D.1.g. High Voltage - high amperage transformers installed D.1.g. Dry type transformers are installed inside fire areas inside buildings containing safety-related systems containing safety-related systems.

STP FHAR should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with non-combustible liquid.

4.2-23 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.h. Buildings containing safety-related systems should be D.1.h. The only oil-filled transformers in the vicinity of safety-protected from exposure or spill fires involving oil filled related buildings are two 4.16 kV transformers located 80 transformers by: feet north of the Diesel-Generator Building, and three auxiliary Engineered Safety Features (ESF) transformers (1) Locating such transformers at least 50 feet distant, located 30 feet east of the Diesel Generator Building and or 30 feet north of the Electrical Auxiliary Building. Each of the above oil filled transformers is located in a separate (2) Ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of diked pit sized to contain 100% capacity of the oil-filled transformers are without openings and transformer oil plus water flow from the fixed fire have a fire resistance rating of at least three hours. suppression system for a 10 minute duration.

A fixed deluge/water spray system is installed for protection of each transformer. The systems are automatically actuated by electrically-operated thermal detectors and manually by electric fire-alarm stations at STP FHAR each unit or a mechanical trip at each deluge valve.

Portions of the two walls facing and within 50' of the ESF 4.2-24 transformers are 3-hour-rated Fire Barriers or as noted in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report.

D.1.i. Floor drains, sized to remove expected fire fighting water D.1.i. Floor drains are provided to remove expected fire fighting flow should be provided in those areas where fixed water water flow from fixed fire suppression systems or hand fire suppression systems are installed. Drains should also hose lines without flooding safety-related equipment. No be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be drains are provided in areas protected by gas suppression used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable systems. Firewater drainage in these areas is provided in damage to equipment in the area. Equipment should be adjacent hallways. The methodology and criteria installed on pedestals, or curbs should be provided as associated with the plant flooding analysis is found in required to contain water and direct it to floor drains. (See Sections 3.4, 3.6, and 9.3 of the STP FSAR.

NFPA 92M, "Water proofing and Draining of Floors.")

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.i. (Cont'd) D.1.i. (Cont'd)

Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should Floor drains in areas having combustible liquid are have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire designed to prevent back flow to safety-related areas throughout the drain system. Water drainage from through interconnecting drain systems. Drainage from areas which may contain radioactivity should be areas that may contain radioactivity are sampled and sampled and analyzed before discharge to the analyzed prior to discharging to the environment.

environment.

If accumulation of water from the operation of new fire suppression systems does not create unacceptable consequences drains need not be installed.

D.1.j. Floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas D.1.j. Floors, walls, and ceilings (including penetrations) should have minimum fire rating of three hours. which separate fire areas have either a fire resistance STP FHAR Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months or meet the following criteria:

and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire 4.2-25 resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier Rated penetration seals and HVAC dampers are not itself. Door openings should be protected with provided when the fire area boundaries communicate equivalent rated doors, frames and hardware that have with an area of low in-situ combustible loading. It is been tested and approved by a nationally recognized unlikely that a fire would propagate through the non laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and rated assemblies to other fire areas as there are no direct locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the combustible pathways. No penetration openings exceed control room. Penetrations for ventilation system 4' x 4' in size. No penetration openings are located such should be protected by a standard "fire door damper" as to provide a direct path for flame spread beyond the where required. (Refer to NFPA 80, "Fire Doors and boundary walls. In specific cases when 4' x 4' horizontal Windows.") openings exist, combustibles are located only on one side and are approximately 5 feet from the penetration opening. Detection is provided as a minimum on at least one side.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.j. (Cont'd) D.1.j. (Cont'd) of the boundary for early warning of a fire. Hose streams and portable extinguishers are available for manual fire fighting. These non-rated penetrations are listed in Table 4.2-1. Door openings are protected by approved fire doors, frames, and hardware or special function doors, which have been evaluated to provide an equivalent level of fire protection. This evaluation has been reviewed and approved by a qualified Fire Protection Engineer. Refer to Section 4.1, Comparison to Appendix R,Section III.N for fire door surveillance methods. The penetrations for ventilation systems are protected by standard "fire door dampers," as indicated in the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.

Fire doors have been installed in conformance with the STP FHAR 4.2-26 criteria of NFPA 80 and tested and approved by a CN-3290 nationally recognized lab with the following exceptions:

1) Door to frame gaps shall not exceed 1/4".

(NFPA 80 allowable is 1/8")

2) Bottom of door to floor gap shall not exceed 1".

(NFPA 80 allowable is 3/4")

The above exceptions have been fire tested and shown to be acceptable barriers. Fire Test CSN ST-XX-HS-510.

A detailed analysis of the special function doors (i.e.,

tornado resistant, watertight, and missile proof) with Amendment 26 respect to fire resistant doors was submitted to the staff in letter ST-HL-AE-1511 dated October 31, 1985 on pages 76 through 108 and in letter ST-HL-AE-1626, dated March 19, 1986 (pgs48-60A). See Tables 4.2-3 and 4.2-4 for details.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.1.j. (Cont'd) D.1.j. (Cont'd)

Details of additional special function doors (i.e.,

horizontal hatch doors) were presented to the NRC at the Appendix R Audit. See Tables 4.2-3, 4.2-4 and 4.2-5 for details.

Security modifications to STP fire doors have been CN-3290 accomplished such that the Fire-Rating of the doors is not affected.

Enclosed stairwells and elevator shafts are constructed of 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months rated fire barrier with Class B fire doors and dampers. In order for fire to propagate through a stairwell, it must pass through two (2) 2-hour rated fire barriers. Thus the stairwell itself is equivalent to a 3-STP FHAR hour fire barrier. In addition, the combustible loading in the stairwell is insignificant and cannot support a fire of 4.2-27 sufficient intensity to compromise a 2-hour rated fire barrier.

Exterior walls are non-rated with the exception of portions where significant exposures are located within 50 feet of the wall. Non-rated walls with significant exposures located within 50 feet of the wall may be acceptable on a case-by-case basis when acceptability is supported by an evaluation in accordance with GL 86-

10. Surveillance inspections and testing is not required for non-rated portions of exterior walls.

Detailed analyses of additional special function doors (i.e., Halon Pressure Resistant Door Assemblies) for Fire Amendment 26 Area 1, (Control Room/Relay Cabinet Room Fire Area Boundary) are provided in Tables 4.2-3 and 4.2-4.

Although not UL labeled, these doors are constructed and installed similar to labeled 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire rated doors.

(Unit 2 only).

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.2. Control of Combustibles D.2. Control of Combustibles D.2.a. Safety-related systems should be isolated or separated D.2.a. Safety-related systems are normally separated from from combustible materials. When this is not possible combustible materials. Where this is not possible, because of the nature of the safety system or the special precautions are taken to ensure that a postulated combustible material, special protection should be fire will not affect more than one of the three trains of provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety safe shutdown equipment.

system function. Such protection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression, and construction capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present. Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:

(1) Emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks STP FHAR (2) Turbine generator oil and hydraulic control 4.2-28 fluid systems (3) Reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.

D.2.b. Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic) D.2.b. Bulk gas storage is defined as 2 tanks in excess of 900 should not be permitted inside structures housing cubic feet, and is not permitted within safety-related safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas structures. An area is designated for the location of bulk such as hydrogen should be located outdoors or in gas containers, north of the Unit 2 Turbine Building (See separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion Figure 3-49).

will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.2.b. (Cont'd) D.2.b. (Cont'd)

(Refer to NFPA 50A, "Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.") An excess flow stop check valve is provided at the Care should be taken to locate high pressure gas storage discharge valve of the truck which provides the containers with the long axis parallel to building walls. hydrogen to the hydrogen system piping. This valve This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in restricts the flow of hydrogen in the event of a pipe leak the event of a container failure. Use of compressed or break. This valve is located outside safety-related gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside structures.

buildings should be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, "Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.") Only two appreciable quantities of high-pressure gas cylinders are located within any safety-related building.

One set is the cylinders used to store the Halon 1301 for the fire protection of the computer room and relay room.

These cylinders are installed in a small room in the Electrical Auxiliary Building. The walls, floor, and STP FHAR ceiling of this room are made of reinforced concrete.

The other set of high-pressure cylinders is used to store 4.2-29 the breathing air.

Small quantities of flammable gas stored in high pressure cylinders are used in the rad-chem lab and the counting rooms at Mechanical Auxiliary Building El.

41'. Only those cylinders in service will be located there; spare cylinders will be stored remote from Seismic Category I buildings.

The use of other compressed gases within safety-related buildings, particularly those gases used for welding or cutting, will be administratively controlled. See also the FHAR comparison to Appendix R,Section III.K.5.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.2.c. The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In D.2.c. The use of plastic materials is minimized and PVC is not particular, halogenated plastics such as polyvinyl used in plant cabling. Small amounts, however, are chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when utilized in some vendor-supplied equipment.

substitute non-combustible materials are not available. Procurement is being monitored for control of PVC in All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant new purchase orders.

materials, will burn with an intensity and BTU production in a range similar to that of ordinary See also response to Item D.3.f below and FHAR hydrocarbons. When burning, they produce heavy comparison to Appendix R, III.K.

smoke that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, especially charcoal and HEPA. The halogenated plastics also release free chloride and hydrogen chloride when burning which are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.

STP FHAR D.2.d. Storage of flammable liquids should, as a minimum, D.2.d. Storage of flammable liquids complies with the comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, requirements of NFPA 30, 1973 Edition, "Flammable 4.2-30 "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code." and Combustible Liquids Code" with the exception of the Fuel Oil Storage Transfer System which complies with the requirements of the 1981 Edition of NFPA 30.

Alternative configurations from this are identified in Fire Areas 39, 40, and 41. See FHAR Chapter 3.0 for further details.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable D.3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations Penetrations D.3.a. Only non-combustible materials should be used for D.3.a. Cable tray and conduit for plant cabling is of metal cable tray construction. construction, with flexible metallic tubing only being used for short runs between junction boxes and equipment.

D.3.b. See Section F.3 for fire protection guidelines for cable D.3.b. See F.3.

spreading rooms.

D.3.c. Automatic water sprinkler systems should be provided D.3.c. The FHA evaluated those areas within STP where safe for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. Cables shutdown systems are located and concentrations of should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge cable trays exist outside of the cable spreading STP FHAR water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations rooms/power cable vault. This analysis has included all and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as in-situ and reasonable transient combustible loading, the 4.2-31 backup. Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such physical configuration of the plant, the location of safe cable trays, that does not itself require water fire shutdown systems, cable routing (based on existing protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage from design criteria and specifications), and the potential sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from adverse effects of a hot gas layer resulting from an sprinkler system operation or malfunction. exposure fire. The capabilities of the fire area/zone boundaries, automatic fire detection/suppression systems, manual fire equipment (fire hose and extinguishers) provided, the response time of the fire brigade, and the ability of the fire brigade to have reasonable access to cable tray fires are also included.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.c. (Cont'd) D.3.c. (Cont'd)

In addition to the sprinklers added for the above reason, fixed sprinkler systems were added to or extended in twenty-four (24) additional zones. Of these twenty-four systems, sixteen (16) were added in zones which were of concern to the NRC as agreed to in the March 13, 1986 meeting between the NRC and HL&P. (See pages 15 through 40 of ST-HL-AE-1626 dated March 19, 1986.) Fixed, manually actuated, dry pipe, closed head, "racked storage type" sprinkler systems were added for cabling in the three (3) switchgear rooms which are in Fire Areas and Zones: FA2Z004, FA3Z042, FA4Z052. Fixed automatic overhead wet pipe sprinkler systems were added in the remaining 13 zones of NRC concern as follows: FA2Z006, FA66Z025, FA2Z027, FA4Z046, FA23Z134, FA2Z111, STP FHAR FA3Z143, FA30Z144, FA75Z112, FA3Z116, FA32Z145, FA32Z122 and FA20Z129. The remaining eight (8) sprinkler 4.2-32 systems were added or extended in eight zones as follows:

FA3Z031, FA4Z050, FA24Z102, FA27Z138, FA27Z139, FA67Z058, FA69Z008, and FA71Z007. These eight systems are also fixed automatic overhead wet pipe sprinkler systems.

(See Section 3.2 for further information).

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.c. (Cont'd) D.3.c. (Cont'd)

Automatic fire detection systems are provided in these areas, which provide for the detection and the local annunciation of a fire, as well as remote annunciation in the continuously manned control room.

Also included in this analysis is the consideration of the provision of special hazard automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems to provide protection at the ceiling for those cable trays where reasonable access is not available for manual fire fighting activities by the fire brigade.

Where reasonable access is available to permit access for fire fighting activities, automatic fire detection is considered adequate to detect the fire and sound the STP FHAR alarm.

4.2-33 See also Section 1.3.2 of the FHAR and the response to E.3.c below for further information.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.c. (Cont'd) D.3.c. (Cont'd)

Cables are designed to allow wetting with deluge water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers are provided strategically around the plant. Concentrations of safety-related cable outside of containment are provided with area fire detection. Inside containment, concentrations of safety-related cables are equipped with thermal line type detectors. Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of automatic water suppression systems are protected from the effects of system malfunction, if required. See response to Item A.5 above and FSAR Section 3.6 for further information.

STP FHAR D.3.d. Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers D.3.d. Openings through designated fire barriers for pipe, 4.2-34 (vertical and horizontal) should be sealed to give conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas are protection at least equivalent to that fire barrier. The sealed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable that of the barrier itself or have been evaluated by a trays should, as a minimum, meet the requirements of qualified Fire Protection Engineer to ensure ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and acceptability of the boundary.

Materials," including the hose stream test.

1. Conduit Greater than 4" Openings inside conduit which are greater than 4" in diameter are sealed at the fire barrier with a rated stop as shown on Detail 1, Figure 4-1, - Penetration Seal Detail.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.d. (Cont'd) D.3.d. (Cont'd)

2. Conduit 4" or less Openings inside conduit which are 4" or less in diameter are sealed at the fire barrier with a rated fire stop if the conduit terminates within 5 feet of the fire barrier or if access (e.g.,

condulet) is available within 5 feet of the barrier as shown in Detail 2, figure 4 Penetration Seal Detail.

If the conduit extends greater than 5 feet on both sides of the fire barrier it will be sealed with noncombustible smoke/gas seals as shown on STP FHAR Details 3a and 3b, Figure 4 Penetration Seal Detail.

4.2-35 If the conduit extends beyond 5 feet on one side of a fire barrier and less than 5 feet on the other side of that barrier it will be sealed as shown on Details 4a and 4b, Figure 4 Penetration Seal Detail.

3. Conduit Passing Through an Area If a conduit enters a fire zone via a rated fire barrier and then exits that same fire zone through a second rated fire barrier without terminating in that fire zone, the conduit will be sealed using the criteria listed above.

Amendment 26 Fire barrier penetration seals are qualified as stated in Appendix R,Section III.M.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.e. Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by D.3.e. Firebreaks have not been utilized in STP other than the fire hazards analysis. Flame or flame retardant those provided by fire barriers based upon this FHA.

coatings may be used as a firebreak for grouped electrical cables to limit spread of fire in cable ventings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of such coating materials must be considered during design.)

D.3.f. Electrical cable constructions should be as a minimum D.3.f. Cable specified for installation in open raceways, cable pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test. (This does trays, etc., including power, control, instrumentation, not imply that cables passing this test will not require etc., meets the IEEE 383-1974 flame test as assured by additional fire protection.) compliance with purchase specifications. Specific exceptions to this criterion are:

For cable installation in operating plants and plants under construction that do not meet the IEEE No. 383 (1) Cable installed wholly within an enclosed flame test requirements, all cables must be covered raceway, or provided with metal sheathing, such STP FHAR with an approved flame retardant coating and properly as communication cables, lighting cables, etc.

derated.

4.2-36 (2) Building wire, etc., specifically approved by the National Electric Code for such application.

(3) Plenum rated innerduct was installed in Non-Class 1E trays in the power block and this is comparable to the flame spread requirements of IEEE 383-1974. Ref: PCF 172292 The justification for not providing flame retardant coatings is that the quantity of this cable contained within any fire area is small, and the physical arrangement of this cable does not substantially contribute to the spread of fire within the area.

Amendment 26 D.3.g. To the extent practical, cable construction that does not D.3.g. STP complies.

give off corrosive gases while burning should be used.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.3.h. Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches, or culverts D.3.h. Project design provisions restrict such passages to cable should be used only for cables. Miscellaneous storage use only. Administrative controls prohibit use of such should not be permitted nor should piping for passages for storage.

flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in these areas.

D.3.i. The design of cable tunnels, culverts and spreading D.3.i. Primary means of smoke and heat removal will be rooms should provide for automatic or manual smoke portable fans and flexible temporary ducts. See also venting as required to facilitate manual fire fighting Response to Item D.4. below.

capability.

D.3.j. Cables in the control room should be kept to the D.3.j. Power, instrumentation and control cabling which enters minimum necessary for operation of the control room. the Control Room terminates there. The Control Room All cables entering the control room should terminate does not have trenches or culverts.

STP FHAR there. Cables should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room.

4.2-37 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.4 Ventilation D.4 Ventilation D.4.a. The products of combustion that need to be removed D.4.a. Primary means of smoke and heat removal will be with from a specific fire area should be evaluated to portable fans and flexible duct. Normal HVAC will aid determine how they will be controlled. Smoke and in a "smoke purge" mode (EAB only) up to the point of corrosive gases should generally be automatically fire damper closure. The smoke purge mode is manual-discharged directly outside to a safe location. Smoke electrically initiated at the Control Room. This Fire and gases containing radioactive materials should be Hazards Analysis Report identifies by zone if monitored in the fire area to determine if release to the radioactive material could be released due to fire.

environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. Smoke and corrosive gases resulting from potential fire hazards within radioactive areas of the plant will be monitored for radiation levels either by the existing area radiation monitors, or by the radiation monitor located in the main plant exhaust duct, or when these methods are STP FHAR unavailable radioactive releases to the environment will be monitored by health physics. Supplementary local 4.2-38 monitoring in the areas affected by the fire will be performed by health physics personnel as required by the location, nature, and extent of the fire. The radiation monitoring system automatically alarms in the control room in the event of radioactivity levels above setpoints.

Controls are available in the control room to start or stop the ventilation units for these areas.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.4.b. Any ventilation system designed to exhaust smoke or D.4.b. Not applicable to STP.

corrosive gases should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel.

D.4.c. The power supply and controls for mechanical D.4.c. Wherever practical, normal ventilation systems have ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area power supply and controls outside the area served by the served by the system. system.

D.4.d. Fire suppression systems should be installed to protect D.4.d. Charcoal filters in the plant are protected by fixed water charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide deluge systems in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.52, 1.52, "Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for manually activated by requiring both local operator STP FHAR Atmospheric Cleanup Air Filtration." action and operation of a switch located in the Control Room upon receipt of fire alarm.

4.2-39 D.4.e. The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety D.4.e. The fresh air intakes to buildings containing safety related equipment or systems should be located remote related equipment are located remote from exhaust air from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other outlets.

fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.4.f. Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke D.4.f. Enclosed stairwells other than those in EAB are infiltration during a fire. Staircases should serve as positively pressurized, minimizing smoke infiltration.

escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. Fire This is not possible in the EAB in order to maintain a exit routes should be clearly marked. Stairwells, separate, controlled environment in the Control Room elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry Envelope. Stairwells are provided with 2-hour-rated towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and barriers with Class B fire doors.

automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building.

Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies.

D.4.g. Smoke and heat vents may be useful in specific areas D.4.g. See Response to D.4.a above.

such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switchgear rooms. When natural-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of 1 STP FHAR square foot of venting area per 200 square feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection 4.2-40 ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 square feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.4.h. Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face D.4.h. STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National to Appendix R,Section III.H.

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control and control room personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one half hour for the self-contained units.

At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete STP FHAR replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of 4.2-41 breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

D.4.i. Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are D.4.i. Automatic control of dampers is provided in those rooms used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers which contain automatic Halon systems, in order to should close upon initiation of gas flow to maintain ensure proper concentrations.

necessary gas concentration. (See NFPA 12 "Carbon Dioxide Systems", and 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems.")

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION D.5. Lighting and Communication D.5. Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements:

D.5.a. Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed D.5.a. STP complies with emergency lighting requirements as beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery described in the FHAR comparison to Appendix R, power supplies. Section III.J.

D.5.b. Suitable sealed beam battery powered portable hand D.5.b. Suitable battery powered portable hand lights will be lights should be provided for emergency use. provided for emergency use.

STP FHAR D.5.c. Fixed emergency communication should use voice D.5.c. Fixed emergency communications independent of powered headsets at pre-selected stations. normal plant communication systems will be installed at appropriate stations.

4.2-42 Fire brigade personnel and operations personnel required to achieve safe shutdown will be provided with an emergency radio communications system which does not interfere with the communications capability of the plant security force. There are 4 emergency communications systems - the PBX system, the plant voice paging system, the maintenance communications system (sound powered), and the radio system.

D.5.d. Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio D.5.d Telephone maintenance jack stations with d.c. and sound communication units should be protected from powered jacks or UHF/VHF radio are available at exposure fire damage. operating/command locations needed for safe-shutdown.

Where the required radio and maintenance jack circuits Amendment 26 are run through the same fire zone, one means of communications will be protected from exposure fire damage.

Additionally, the hand held transceivers are designed for limited direct point-to-point coverage.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E. Fire Detection and Suppression E. Fire Detection and Suppression E.1. Fire Detection E.1. Fire Detection E.1.a. Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply E.1.a. Detection systems are provided for areas of safety with NFPA 72D, "Standard for the Installation, related buildings that contain or present a fire exposure Maintenance and Use Proprietary Protective Signaling to safe shutdown systems. In some areas of the plant, Systems." detectors were not installed due to the presence of high radiation levels, low combustible loadings, etc. These areas can be organized into nine groups. The groups and basis for deciding that plant safety is not enhanced by their addition are listed in table 4.2-2. The fire detectors are located in accordance with NFPA 72-E, 1978. These detection systems comply with the requirements as defined in NFPA 72 D, 1975, except for: 1) The STP FHAR connection wiring between each local addressable module associated with either a "spot" thermal detector 4.2-43 or manually activated station. This is not considered to be a significant deviation since each local addressable module is located inside a common enclosure with either the "spot" thermal detector or manually activated station, utilizing connections less than 12" in length. For further details describing this deviation, see FHAR section 3.10.4.

E.1.b. Fire detection systems should give audible and visual E.1.b Fire alarm bells and systems trouble alarm horns provide alarm and annunciation in the control room. Local audible alarms at the local control panels that provide the audible alarms should also sound at the location of the fire protection system control for each fire hazard. These fire. local control panels are normally located in the vicinity of the fire hazards that they protect. Fire protection alarms are annunciated in the control room, with an Amendment 26 audible tone and visually displayed on a display screen located within the control room.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.1.c. Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique. They E. Fire Detection and Suppression (Cont'd) should not be capable of being confused with any other plant system alarms. E.1. Fire Detection (Cont'd)

E.1.c. Fire alarms are distinctive and unique from other alarms.

E.1.d. Fire detection and actuation systems should be E.1.d. Battery backup (24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months duration) is provided as the connected to the plant emergency power supply. emergency power supply for the detection system and for electrically operated automatic valves in suppression systems.

E.2. Fire Protection Water Supply Systems E.2. Fire Protection Water Supply Systems E.2.a. An underground yard fir main loop should be installed E.2.a. STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison to furnish anticipated fire water requirements. NFPA to Appendix R, Sections III.A., B., and C.

STP FHAR 24 - Standard for Outside Protection - gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other 4.2-44 design codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWWA). Lined steel or cast iron pipe should be used to reduce internal tuberculation. Such tuberculation deposits in an unlined pipe over a period of years can significantly reduce water flow through the combination of increased friction and reduced pipe diameter. Means for treating and flushing the systems should be provided. Approved visually indicating sectional control valves, such as Post Indicator Valves, should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system.

Amendment 26 The fire main system piping should be separate from service or sanitary water system piping.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.2.b. A common yard fire main loop may serve multi unit E.2.b. STP two-unit fire loop satisfies these criteria. (See nuclear power plant sites, if cross connected between Figure 4.1-1) units. Sectional control valves should permit maintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit. For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. The water supply should be sized for the largest single expected flow.

For multiple reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.

E.2.c. If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow E.2.c STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison requirements, a sufficient number of pumps should be to Appendix R,Section III.A provided so that 100 percent capacity will be available with one pump inactive (e.g., three 50 percent pumps or STP FHAR two 100 percent pumps). The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely 4.2-45 separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant. Each pump should have its own driver with independent power supplies and control. At least one pump (if not powered from the emergency diesels) should be driven by nonelectrical means, preferably diesel engine. Pumps and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a minimum three hour fire wall. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, or failure to start should be provided in the control room.

Details of the fire pump installation should as a minimum conform to NFPA 20, "Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps."

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.2.d. Two separate reliable water supplies should be E.2.d. STP's compliance is described in the FHAR comparison provided. If tanks are used, two 100 percent (minimum to Appendix R,Section III.A.

of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a leak in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain. The main plant fire water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in a minimum of eight hours.

Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by means of a vertical standpipe for other water services.

STP FHAR E.2.e. The fire water supply (total capacity and flow rate) E.2.e. The fire water supply is calculated on the basis of the 4.2-46 should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected largest expected flow rate of a period of two hours. This flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than flow rate is based on 500 gpm for manual hose streams 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based plus the largest hydraulic design demand for the design (conservatively) on 1,000 gpm for manual hose streams area of application or any sprinkler or deluge system plus the greater of: protecting safety-related areas or other areas that present a fire exposure hazard to safety-related areas. The fire (1) all sprinkler heads opened and flowing in the water supply is capable of delivering this design demand largest designed fire area; or over the longest route of the water supply system. (See Response to Appendix R,Section III.A.)

(2) the largest open head deluge system(s) operating.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.2.f. Lakes or fresh water ponds of sufficient size may E.2.f. This section is not applicable to STP.

qualify as sole source of water for fire protection, but require at least two intakes to the pump supply. When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:

(1) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity; and (2) Failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.

E.2.g. Outside manual hose installation should be sufficient to E.2.g STP complies. Fire hydrants are strategically located at STP FHAR reach any location with an efficient hose stream. To approximately 250-foot intervals throughout the plant to accomplish this, hydrants should be installed provide a good fire-fighting capability. (See Figure 4.1-4.2-47 approximately every 250 feet on the yard main system. 1.) Hose houses which, as a minimum, are equipped as The lateral to each hydrant from the yard main should required by NFPA 24, 1973 Edition are provided. All be controlled by a visually indicating or key-operated threads on hydrant hose valves and hose equipment are (curb) valve. A hose house, equipped with hose and National Hose Thread. This hose thread is also used by combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment the local departments.

recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection,"

should be provided as needed but at least every 1,000 See also FHAR comparison to Appendix R, III.C.

feet.

Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose coupling and standpipe risers.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3. Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems E.3. Water Sprinklers and Hose Standpipe Systems E.3.a Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose E.3.a. STP complies. Each automatic sprinkler system and hose station standpipe should have an independent station standpipe system in safety-related buildings is connection to the plant underground water main. either connected independently to the plant underground Headers fed from each end are permitted inside water main or connected to a header within the building.

buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and standpipe If such a header is used, two widely separated systems. When provided, such headers are considered connections are provided between the header and the an extension of the yard main system. The header underground main. Adequate isolating valves are arrangement should be such that no single failure can provided in the main, the header, and in each system to impair both the primary and backup fire protection ensure that no single failure could impair both the systems. primary and backup fire protection systems. Isolating valves installed underground are of the post indicator Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be type or curb box type; isolating valves installed above equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate ground are of the OS&Y type. Automatic sprinkler STP FHAR valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow systems are equipped with water flow alarms. The effect alarm. Safety-related equipment that does not itself of sprinkler water discharge is evaluated as part of the 4.2-48 require sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to systems interaction evaluation. See FSAR Section 3.6, unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water responses to Sections A.5 and D.3.e above and the FHAR discharge, should be protected by water shields or comparison to Appendix R,Section III.B for further baffles. information.

E.3.b. All valves in the fire water systems should be E.3.b The valves in the fire protection system whose improper electrically supervised. The electrical supervision positioning could affect the performance of the system signal should indicate in the control room and other are either supervised or have their position verified by appropriate command locations in the plant (See NFPA procedure in accordance with the requirements of the 26, "Supervision of Valves.") Fire Protection Program. The valves in the fire protection system which ensure the availability of water from the fire water storage tanks to the Unit 1/Unit 2 fire loops and from the loops to the headers inside the site Amendment 26 structures are

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3.b. (Cont'd) E.3.b. (Cont'd)

When electrical supervision of fire protection valves is supervised, i.e., they provide alarms at local panels and not practicable, an adequate management supervision on a control room CRT when not in their normal program should be provided. Such a program should alignment. Some examples of supervised valves include include locking valves open with strict key control; tank isolation valves, fire pump suction and discharge tamper proof seals; and periodic, visual check of all valves, building header isolation valves, and sprinkler or valves. deluge supply valves. Non-supervised valves consist of valves with local indication, i.e., post indicating, and those without any direct means of position indication.

The latter group of valves consists of valves such as check valves and relief valves which are controlled by the condition of the fire protection system and vent and drain valves or instrument root valves whose positions are controlled by the fire protection system operating STP FHAR procedure. The position of valves with local indication, such as the main fire loop sector isolation valves, and 4.2-49 supervised valves is verified by procedure in accordance with the Fire Protection Program. The nonindicating valves which are not locked in place have been evaluated and their repositioning will not affect the proper operation of the fire protection system. Valves which are electrically supervised are shown on the fire protection P&ID's in Section 9.5 of the FSAR.

E.3.c. Automatic sprinkler systems should as a minimum E.3.c. Automatic sprinkler systems and fixed water spray conform to requirements of appropriate standards such systems are as a minimum, designed, installed, and as NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler acceptance tested in accordance with the requirements of Systems", and NFPA 15, "Standard for Water Spray NFPA No. 13, 1976 Fixed Systems."

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3.c. (Cont'd) E.3.c. (Cont'd)

Edition of NFPA No. 15, 1977 edition as applicable, or have been evaluated in conjunction with other suppression capabilities by a qualified Fire Protection Engineer to ensure equivalent protection. Periodic testing of sprinkler systems will be performed in accordance with the Fire Protection Program described in FSAR section 9.5.1.6. In addition, an evaluation of the NFPA supports confirmed that they satisfy the seismic requirements in Category I buildings, per Modified Seismic II/I criteria; which considers only the downward vertical loads due to the vertical peak seismic acceleration. Special hazards such as diesel fuel oil storage tanks, diesel and charcoal filters are protected by STP FHAR the sprinkler systems in accordance with the NFPA 13 or 15 requirements.

4.2-50 Special hazards such as concentrations of cable in trays (outside and within cable spreading rooms) are protected by sprinkler systems designed and installed with guidance from appropriate industrial fire protection practices and the engineering judgement for a qualified Fire Protection Engineer. Design requirements are:

Pipe size, support, and installation details other than those discussed below are per NFPA 13, 1976.

Coverage - These systems are provided at the ceiling level to aid in cooling and controlling a Amendment 26 fire until manual suppression

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3.c. (Cont'd) E.3.c. (Cont'd) is achieved. Separation exists between most cable trays such that the obstruction of sprinklers is minimized. For those cases where substantial obstruction does occur, sprinkler heads have been relocated to provide the most effective coverage. The quantity of sprinklers provided is at least equal to NFPA recommended quantities based on 100 sq. ft/sprinkler.

Spacing and Location - Sprinkler heads are mounted at the ceiling, spaced and orientated to achieve adequate wetting of tray stacks from the ceiling level as well as providing coverage of the floor level. Sprinklers may exceed NFPA STP FHAR guidelines regarding area of protection per sprinkler, but maximum area per sprinkler does 4.2-51 not exceed 200 sq. ft. Densities are as specified below.

Design Density - These systems are designed to provide an average density of 0.30 gpm per sq.

ft. over any 3,000 sq. ft. of floor area.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3.d. Interior manual hose installation should be able to E.3.d. The standpipe systems are described in the FHAR reach any location with at least one effective hose comparison to Appendix R,Section III.D.

stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximum of 75 feet of 1- Hose lengths are 75 feet where feasible, but hose lengths 1/2- inch woven jacket-lined fire hose and suitable of 100 feet are utilized as required and as a permitted by nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including NFPA 14, 1976/1978/1983 Editions. 1-1/2 in. woven containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not jacket-lined fire hoses and suitable nozzles installed on more than 100-foot intervals. Individual standpipes semiautomatic racks in hose cabinets are used where should be of at least 4-inch diameter for multiple hose feasible. 1-1/2 in. double jacket-lined fire hoses and CN-3302 connections and 2-inch diameter for single hose suitable nozzles installed on hose reels are flaked on the connections. These systems should follow the hose reel to facilitate rapid deployment. Individual requirements of NFPA 14, "Standpipe and Hose standpipes are minimum 4 in. in diameter for multiple Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support fire hose connections and 2-1/2 in. in diameter for single requirements. fire hose connection.

STP FHAR Hose stations should be located outside entrances to Each standpipe is provided with a shut-off valve. Each normally unoccupied areas and inside normally fire hose reel or cabinet is provided with a manual 4.2-52 occupied areas. Standpipes serving hose stations in isolation valve or a dual function shut-pressure reducing areas housing safety related equipment should have device, as required.

shut off valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area.

E.3.e. The proper type of hose nozzles to be supplied to each E.3.e. The hose nozzle selected is that most suitable for use on area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The the fire hazards within the area in which the hose nozzle usual combination spray/straight-stream nozzle may is normally installed. The nozzles installed are of the cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, approved electrically safe type with variable spray the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) patterns by no straight stream capability where this could and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be cause damage.

provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.3.f. Certain fires such as those involving flammable liquids E.3.f. A foam extinguishing system is provided for protection respond well to foam suppression. Consideration of the Auxiliary Fuel Oil Storage Tank and foam water should be given to use of any of the available foams for sprinklers to protect the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil such specialized protection application. These include Storage Tanks.

the more common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF).

E.4. Halon Suppression Systems E.4. Halon Suppression Systems The use of Halon fire extinguishing agents should as a This Halon system description is provided for general minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A information only since the computers protected are not and 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent safety related. The relay room (part of the control room Systems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211." Only UL or fire area) is not required for safe shutdown.

STP FHAR FM approved agents should be used.

Halon 1301 systems designed in accordance with NFPA 4.2-53 In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, 12A, 1977 Edition, are provided in the central Control preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, Room Computer Room and subfloor space, associated including check weighing of the Halon cylinders, battery and charger rooms, relay room, and Technical should be done at least quarterly. Support Center Computer Room and subfloor space.

Consideration in system design is given to toxicity, Particular consideration should also be given to: concentration, soak time, ventilation control, and detector location.

(a) Minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) Toxicity of Halon (c) Toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.5. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems E.5. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems (a-f) should as a minimum comply with the requirements of STP does not have carbon dioxide suppression systems.

NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems."

Particular consideration should also be given to:

(a) minimum required C02 concentration and soak time; (b) toxicity of C02; (c) possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; STP FHAR (d) offsetting requirements for venting during C02 4.2-54 injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (e) design requirements from overpressurization; and (f) possibility and probability of C02 systems being out-of-service because of personnel safety consideration. C02 systems are disarmed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found with C02 systems shut off.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION E.6. Portable Extinguishers E.6. Portable Extinguishers Fire extinguishers should be provided in accordance Portable extinguishers in accordance with NFPA 10, with Guidelines of NFPA 10 and 10A, "Portable Fire 1975 Edition, are provided at locations throughout the Extinguishers Installation, Maintenance and Use." Dry plant including areas that contain or could present a fire chemical extinguishers should be installed with due expose hazard to safety consideration given to cleanup problems after use and related equipment.

possible adverse effects on equipment installed in the area. The type, size and number of extinguishers are selected to be the most suitable for use on the fire hazards within the area in which the extinguisher is installed. Portable extinguishers for the containment are provided and located outside the containment access AREA for ready accessibility. A dry standpipe system with strategically STP FHAR located hose stations is installed for fire fighting purposes. See also FHAR comparison to Appendix R, 4.2-55 Section III.D.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas F. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas F.1. Primary and Secondary Containment F.1. Primary and Secondary Containment F.1.a. Normal Operation F.1.a. Normal Operation Fire protection requirements for the primary and A manual pre-action standpipe system is provided in the secondary containment areas should be provided on the Reactor Containment Building for protection of cable basis of specific identified hazards. For example: trays and reactor coolant pumps. The system is supplied from the Mechanical Auxiliary Building internal fire Lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the protection header. Motor-operated isolation valves primary coolant pumps controlling the water supply are provided with controls in the control room.

Cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations STP FHAR Thermal line type detectors suitable to detect burning Charcoal filters cable insulation are provided in cable trays.

4.2-56 Thermostatic, spot-type heat detectors with rate Fixed fire suppression capability should be provided for compensation are provided over each reactor coolant hazards that could jeopardize safe plant shutdown. pump. Thermistor type thermal detectors are provided Automatic sprinklers are preferred. An acceptable in each of the charcoal filter units. The detection system alternate is automatic gas (Halon or C02) for hazards will alarm at the local panel and annunciate in the identified as requiring fixed suppression protection control room.

An enclosure may be required to confine the agent if a A Primary Containment general area fire detection gas system is used. Such enclosures should not system is not provided. Such a system would be adversely affect safe shutdown, or other operating impracticable for a large volume area such as the equipment in containment. Containment since smoke detector response times would be very long due to the reduction in smoke concentration that would occur.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.1.a Normal Operation (Cont'd)

Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise integrity of the containment or the other safety-related systems. Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in conjunction with total containment requirements such as control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release and ventilation.

Fire detection systems should alarm and annunciate in the control room. The type of detection used and the location of the detectors should be most suitable to the particular type of fire that could be expected from the identified hazard. A primary containment general area STP FHAR fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above described hazard detection. To 4.2-57 accomplish this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters.

Automatic fire suppression capability need not be provided in the primary containment atmospheres that are inerted during normal operation. However, special fire protection requirements during refueling and maintenance operations should be satisfied as provided below Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.1.b. Refueling and Maintenance F.1.b. Refueling and Maintenance Refueling and maintenance operation in containment Administrative controls will be implemented to ensure may introduce additional hazards such as contamination adequate fire protection against transient combustibles control materials, decontamination supplies, wood and hazardous operations during refueling/maintenance planking, temporary wiring, welding and flame cutting outages. Implementation and definition of controls and (with portable compressed fuel gas supply). Possible procedures were instituted for the fuel storage area fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed before fuel arrived on site and the NRC will be given the detection and suppression systems. required details prior to fuel load.

STP's compliance is further described in the FHAR Management procedures and controls necessary to comparison to Appendix R, Sections III.D (Standpipe assure fire protection are discussed in Section 3a. and Hose Systems) & III.K (Administrative Controls) and Appendix A, Sections D.4.k (Self-Contained In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be Breathing Apparatus), E.3 (Water Sprinklers and Hose STP FHAR permanently installed in containment. Standpipes with Standpipe Systems), and E.6 (Portable Fire hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be Extinguishers).

4.2-58 installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations.

Adequate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fire fighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.2. Control Room F.2. Control Room The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. The control room and associated relay room are separated f It must be protected against disabling fire damage and all other areas inside the electrical auxiliary building by should be separated from other areas of the plant by 3-hour-rated fire barriers, except for stairwells (see D.4.f) a floors, walls and roofs having minimum fire resistance special function doors (see D.1.J.).

ratings of three hours.

Portable C02 and H20 extinguishers are provided inside Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to the control room and relay room, hose stations are located damage from two distinct fire hazards: on standpipes adjacent to doorways to both areas.

(a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console: A fixed Halon 1301 suppression system covers the relay and cabinet area of the control room. This room will be isolated from the control room and other areas inside the (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles in the electrical auxiliary building by fire dampers which close STP FHAR general room area. on Halon system activation.

4.2-59 Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both hazards. Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the control room. An additional hose piping shut off valve and pressure reducing device should be installed outside the control room.

Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.2. Control Room (Cont'd) F.2. Control Room (Cont'd)

Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and Nozzles used on hose stations outside the control room equipment in the control room should be provided for are compatible with the equipment in the control room.

the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement.

Fire detection is provided throughout the control room Fire detection in the control room cabinets, and both above and below the suspended ceiling and in the consoles should be provided by smoke and heat control cabinets.

detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annunciation should be provided in the control room. Fire alarms in Ionization detectors cover the control room and relay other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and room. This detection system provides local and remote annunciated in the control room. annunciation and alarm, and activates the Halon system STP FHAR in the relay room.

4.2-60 Breathing apparatus for control room operators will be Breathing apparatus for control room operators should provided. The control room floor, ceiling, supporting be readily available. Control room floors, ceilings, structural steel, walls, penetrations and doors are supporting structures, and walls, including penetrations designed to a 3-hour rating, with the exception of and doors, should be designed to a minimum fire rating stairwell three which borders on the control room.

of three hours. All penetration seals should be air tight. Automatic HVAC damper closure and penetration seals are provided in walls, floors, and ceilings bordering the relay portion of the control room to attain and maintain Halon concentrations.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.2. Control Room (Cont'd) F.2. Control Room (Cont'd)

The control room ventilation intake should be provided The HVAC system return ducts from the control room with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm contain smoke detectors which actuate an alarm in the locally and isolate the control room ventilation system control room. Upon receiving this alarm the operator to protect operators by preventing smoke from entering can remove-manually close the return dampers from the the control room. Manually operated venting of the control room and divert the smoke to the outdoors. This control room should be available so that operators have allows the HVAC System to be put into the smoke purge the option of venting for visibility. mode.

Cables should not be located in concealed floor and The STP control room has a partial suspended ceiling ceiling spaces. All cables that enter the control room with cabling above it. Cabling which enter the control should terminate in the control room. That is, no room terminates there. The in situ combustible loading cabling should be simply routed through the control in the area above the suspended ceiling consists entirely STP FHAR room from one area to another. of IEEE 383 cables. The cables are routed in trays or conduit which rise vertically out to the cabinets located 4.2-61 directly below the ceiling. The trays either continue to rise vertically through the area or rotate and exit through the side walls. In no case are trays stacked above each other. Ionization detectors are provided in the space above the ceiling to ensure hose stream accessibility for manual suppression. Fire hose stations are located in adjacent fire zone and provide coverage with at least one effective hose stream. Portable water and C02 fire extinguishers are strategically located throughout the control room for immediate fire fighting. Since the control room is continually manned, the presence of the operators provides additional Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.2. Control Room (Cont'd) F.2. Control Room (Cont'd) sources of early detection and suppression. For a more detailed discussion refer to the Fire Analysis for Fire Area 1.

If such concealed spaces are used, however, they should A fixed automatic total flooding Halon protection is not have fixed automatic total flooding Halon protection. provided for cables in this area.

STP FHAR 4.2-62 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.3. Cable Spreading Room F.3. Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading The FHA evaluated the three sets of cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as rooms and power cable vaults and considered all in-situ closed head sprinklers, open head deluge, or open and reasonable transient combustible loading, as well as directional spray nozzles. Deluge and open spray the physical configuration of each fire area.

systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should be provisions to The capability of the fire area boundaries to contain the preclude inadvertent operation. Location of sprinkler postulated fire and maintain the minimum number of heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing safe shutdown paths necessary to achieve and maintain and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. cold shutdown free of fire damage was analyzed.

Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Automatic fire detection systems are provided in these areas, which provide for local annunciation of a fire, as Open head deluge and open directional spray systems well as remote annunciation in the continuously manned STP FHAR should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive control room.

the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability.

4.2-63 Special hazard automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type provided at the ceiling level throughout the 3 cable capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge spreading rooms and the power cable vault. These system, such as a Aqueous Film Forming Foam sprinkler systems will aid in the cooling and control of a (AFFF). fire until manual suppression is achieved.

An automatic water suppression system with manual hoses and portable extinguisher backup is acceptable, provided:

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.3. Cable Spreading Room (Cont'd) F.3. Cable Spreading Room (Cont'd)

It must be noted that STP has a unique design, in that there are three separate trains or pathways to achieve and maintain shutdown. A loss of any one of the three safe shutdown pathways still leaves the STP operators two pathways to achieve and maintain shutdown. Also, the cable spreading room/power cable vault for each train is physically separated from the other trains by a fire barrier with a 3-hour fire resistive rating.

Each cable spreading room and power cable vault is segregated by safe-shutdown train (A, B or C) and is STP FHAR separated from the redundant rooms by 3-hour rated fire barriers. Each cable spreading room is separated from 4.2-64 the adjacent fire areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers.

Smoke and hot gas removal will be accomplished primarily by temporary flexible ducts and portable fans.

(See D.4.g.).

(a) At least two remote and separate entrances are (a) Two remote and separate entrances are provided to provided to the room for access by fire bridge the cable spreading rooms and power cable vault.

personnel; and (b) All parts of the room are accessible for manual fire (b) Aisle separation provided between tray stacks suppression and can be reached by at least one should be at least three feet wide and eight feet effective hose stream. However, cable tray high configurations in parts of the room form physical barriers which make manual fire suppression efforts somewhat more difficult. Therefore, in Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.3. Cable Spreading Room (Cont'd) F.3. Cable Spreading Room (Cont'd) those specific areas, as well as throughout the entire cable spreading room, automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided at the ceiling level to control a fire; the 3-hour fire barriers enclosing each cable spreading room will contain a fire.

F.3. Cable Spreading Room F.3. Cable Spreading Room Alternately, gas systems (Halon and C02) may be used Gas suppression systems are not utilized in the cable for primary fire suppression if they are backed up by an spreading rooms.

installed water spray system and hose stations and portable extinguishers immediately outside the room and if the access requirements stated above are met.

STP FHAR Electric cable construction should as a minimum, pass Electrical cable construction is addressed in D.3.f. of this 4.2-65 the flame test in IEEE Std. 383, "IEEE Standard for section.

Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

Drains to remove fire fighting water should be provided Drains are addressed in D.1.i. of this section.

with adequate seals when gas extinguishing systems are also installed.

Redundant safety related cable division should be See response to this item above.

separated by walls with a 3-hour fire rating.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.3. Cable Spreading Room F.3. Cable Spreading Room For multiple-reactor unit sites, cable spreading rooms The STP cable spreading rooms and power cable vaults should not be shared between reactors. Each cable are not shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2. Each cable spreading room of each unit should have divisional spreading room is separated from other plant areas by cable separation as stated above and be separated from barriers (walls, ceilings, and floors) having a 3-hour fire the other and the rest of the plant by a wall with a resistance rating.

minimum fire rating of three hours. (See NFPA 251, "Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials", or ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials", for fire test resistance rating.)

The ventilation system to the cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any gas extinguishing system in the area. In addition, STP FHAR smoke venting of the cable spreading room may be desirable. Such smoke venting systems should be 4.2-66 controlled automatically by the fire detection or suppression system as appropriate. Capability for remote manual control should also be provided.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.4. Plant Computer Room F.4. Plant Computer Room Safety related computers should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having The plant computer is nonsafety related, a minimum 3-hour fire resistant rating. separated from other areas of the electrical Automatic fire detection should be provided to auxiliary building by structural walls, ceiling, alarm and annunciate in the control room and and floors of steel-reinforced concrete alarm locally. Manual hose stations and construction.

portable water and Halon fire extinguishers should be provided Automatic Halon suppression is provided.

Automatic fire detection is provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally for each of the QDPS computer room.

STP FHAR A manual hose station and portable water and Halon extinguishers are provided near the QDPS 4.2-67 computer rooms.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.5. Switchgear Rooms F.5. Switchgear Rooms Redundant safe shutdown paths will be free The ESF switchgear rooms each contain one from fire damage to achieve and maintain train of safety-related equipment and are shutdown. separated from each other by floors and ceilings which are 3-hour-rated fire barriers. This A fire area or zone boundary will contain a provides two redundant safe shutdown trains to postulated fire and allow time for the control or achieve and maintain shutdown in the event of a extinguishment of this fire before it can fire in a switchgear room which disables one reasonably be expected to propagate out of the train of safety-related equipment.

zone or area.

A special hazard, manually actuated, dry pipe, Switchgear rooms should be separated from the closed head sprinkler system is provided for remainder of the plant by minimum 3-hour each room. The design is similar to that of rated fire barriers to the extent practicable. NFPA 231C-1975 (Industrial Fire Protection of STP FHAR Automatic fire detection should alarm and Rack Storage) because the location of the annunciate in the control room and alarm sprinkler heads provides staggered coverage of 4.2-68 locally. Fire hose stations and portable the cable trays (See Fig. 4-2).

extinguishers should be readily available.

Heavy concrete walls with unsealed cable Acceptable protection for cables that pass penetrations and HVAC penetrations without through the switchgear room is automatic water fire dampers separate these fire zones from other or gas agent suppression. Such automatic fire zones within the same fire area. All suppression must consider preventing unprotected wall openings are horizontal, do not unacceptable damage to electrical equipment exceed 4' x 2' in size for HVAC duct and 6' x 5' and possible necessary containment of agent in size for electrical tray, and are readily following discharge. accessible to an effective hose stream.

Combustibles located near these openings are limited to IEEE-383 cabling in trays which are also accessible to effective manual hose streams.

This facilitates containing and suppressing fires Amendment 26 within each switchgear room using manual firefighting capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.5. Switchgear Rooms (Cont'd F.5. Switchgear Rooms (Cont'd Ionization detectors are provided which alarm at the local panel and in the control room. Manual hose stations are portable fire extinguishers are available outside the room. The equipment is on 4-inch pads and drains are located in the corridors directly outside the room.

F.6. Remote Safety Related Panels F.6. Remote Safety Related Panels The general area housing remote safety related Remote safe-shutdown panels consist of the panels should be provided with automatic fire auxiliary shutdown panel, the transfer panels in detectors that alarm locally and alarm and the respective train related switchgear rooms, the annunciate in the control room. Combustible standby diesel generator control panels, and the STP FHAR materials should be controlled and limited to essential chiller control panels. Each of these those required for operation. Portable areas is provided with automatic fire detectors 4.2-69 extinguishers and manual hose stations should that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in be provided. the control room.

Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided near each area.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.7. Station Battery Rooms F.7. Station Battery Rooms Battery rooms should be protected against fire The battery rooms each containing one train of explosions. Battery rooms should be separated from safety-related equipment are separated from each other each other and other areas of the plant by barriers by floors and ceilings which are 3-hour-rated fire having a minimum fire rating of 3-hour inclusive of all barriers. This provides two redundant safe shutdown penetrations and openings. (See NFPA 69, "Standard trains to achieve and maintain shutdown in the event of a on Explosion Prevention Systems.") Ventilation fire in a battery room which disables one train of systems in the battery rooms should be capable of safety-related equipment.

maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration. Standpipe and hose Heavy concrete walls with unsealed cable penetrations and portable extinguishers should be provided. and HVAC penetrations without fire dampers separate these fire zones from other fire zones within the same fire Alternatives: area. All unprotected wall openings are horizontal, do not exceed 3' x 2' in size for HVAC duct 6' x 3' in size for STP FHAR (a) Provide a total fire rated barrier enclosure of electrical conduit, and are readily accessible to an the battery room complex that exceeds the fire effective hose stream. All penetrations are provided with 4.2-70 load contained in the room. air-tight seals which prohibit hydrogen migration out of the rooms. These seals mounted in heavy concrete walls, (b) Reduce the fire load to be within the fire barrier provide a degree of fire resistance. Combustibles located capability of 1-1/2 hours. near these openings are limited to IEEE-383 cabling in trays which are not considered concentrated (see Section OR 1.3.2) and are also accessible to effective manual hose streams. This facilitates containing and suppressing fires (c) Provide a remote manual actuated sprinkler within each battery room using manual firefighting system in each room and provide the 1-1/2- capabilities and significantly reduces the probability of a hour fire barrier separation. fire spreading throughout the entire fire area.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.7. Station Battery Rooms (Contd) F.7. Station Battery Rooms (Contd)

DDC switchgear, battery chargers, and inverters are not located in safety-related battery rooms. Fire detection systems which alarm and annunciate in the control room and locally are provided. Ventilation systems will limit the H2 concentration well below 2% by volume. Loss of ventilation will alarm in the control room. Standpipes and portable extinguishers are provided outside the room.

A detection-activated fixed Halon suppression system which may also be manually activated covers the plant computer battery room.

STP FHAR 4.2-71 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use F.8. Turbine Lubrication and Control Oil Storage and Use Areas Areas A blank fire wall having a minimum resistance rating Turbine lubrication and control oil is stored and handled of three hours should separate all areas containing in separate areas and buildings remote from safety related systems and equipment from the turbine safety-related systems and equipment. The turbine oil system. generator building and the IVC, which are adjacent to each other, are separated by a 3-hour rated barrier.

F.9. Diesel Generator Areas F.9. Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other STP has three class-1E diesel generators installed in the and other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a diesel-generator building of each unit. Each diesel minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. generator is located in an individual room and is separated from any adjacent diesel by a reinforced STP FHAR Automatic fire suppression such as AFFF foam or concrete wall, 24 inches thick, which has more than a sprinklers should be installed to combat any diesel 3-hour-fire rating. There are no openings or penetrations 4.2-72 generator or lubricating oil fires. Automatic fire through these separating walls.

detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.9. Diesel Generator Areas (Cont'd) F.9. Diesel Generator Areas (Cont'd)

Each diesel generator room is provided with a complete automatic preaction sprinkler system that is initiated by a fire detection system within each room. This detection system will provide a local alarm and will alarm and annunciate in the control room. Adequate drainage for fire-fighting water is provided. Smoke ventilation is provided by portable fans and flexible ducts. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are readily available outside the fire area. All parts of these rooms are accessible for manual fire suppression and can be reached by at least one effective hose stream.

(a) Day tanks with total capacity up to 1,100 gallons There are no diesel fuel oil day tanks.

STP FHAR are permitted in the diesel generator area under the following conditions: Two other diesels are used to achieve safe shutdown.

4.2-73 The first is the TSC diesel which is primarily used to The day tank is located in a separate enclosure, power the positive displacement charging pump and is with a minimum fire resistance rating of three located in the yard, greater than 50 feet from any hours, including doors or penetrations. These safety-related structure. This diesel and its associated 70 enclosures should be capable of containing the gallon day tank are housed in an open structure.

entire contents of the day tanks. The enclosure Protection is provided by portable fire extinguishers and should be ventilated to avoid accumulation of oil yard hydrants. No further protection is required because fumes. the loss of this diesel has no effect on safe shutdown.

(b) The enclosure should be protected by automatic fire suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.9. Diesel Generator Areas (Cont'd) F.9. Diesel Generator Areas (Cont'd)

The second is the BOP diesel which is primarily used to power the instrument air compressor and is located in the north-east corner of the turbine building. It is housed, with its associated 515 gallon day tank, inside a room which has a 2-hour rated fire barrier on the sides facing the turbine building. Drainage is provided by thermal spot type detectors. No further protection is required because the loss of this diesel has no effect on safe shutdown.

In addition, there are two 480V FLEX diesel generators for beyond-design-basis external event {BDBEE) scenarios on the roof of the MEAB. The diesel STP FHAR generators are self-contained in metal enclosures, with the exception of a single double-walled, 660-gallon fuel 4.2-74 tank. The diesel generators are redundant and only one unit is designed to operate during a BDBEE. An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in the area containing the FLEX diesel generators. Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke are provided. No further protection is required because the loss of the FLEX diesel generators has no impact on the ability to safely shut down the plant.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas F.10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 STP has three 70,000 gallon diesel fuel oil storage tanks, gallons should not be located inside the buildings one for each of the three standby diesel generators. Each containing safety related equipment. They should be tank is located directly above the diesel generator which located at least 50 feet from any building containing it supplies. Each tank is located in an individual room safety related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, and is separated from any adjacent tank by a reinforced they should be housed in a separate building with concrete wall. Each diesel fuel oil storage tank is construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of provided with a foam-water sprinkler system, three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the automatically actuated by a fire detection system within 3-hour fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, the room.

"Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code", for additional guidance. In addition to these fire protection and detection systems, a ventilation fan, powered from an ESF bus, is provided.

When located in a separate building, the tank should be This fan operates continuously with thermally actuated STP FHAR protected by an automatic fire suppression system such damper closure under fire conditions.

as AFFF or sprinklers.

4.2-75 See also the response to Item D.2.d above.

In operating plants where tanks are located directly above or below the diesels generators and cannot reasonably be moved, separating floors and main structural members should, as a minimum, have a fire resistance rating of three hours. Floors should be liquid-tight to prevent leaking of possible oil spills from one level to another. Drains should be provided to remove possible oil spills and fire-fighting water to a safe location.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.10. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas (Contd)

One of the following acceptable methods of fire protection should also be provided:

(a) Automatic open head deluge or open head spray nozzle system(s);

(b) Automatic closed head sprinklers; or (c) Automatic AFFF that is delivered by a sprinkler system or spray system.

STP FHAR 4.2-76 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.11. Safety Related Pumps F.11. Safety Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing safety-related pumps Safety-related pumps are not provided with automatic should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection sprinkler protection since this FHA demonstrates that a unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a postulated fire in these areas will not endanger other fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment safety related equipment required for safe shutdown.

required for safe plant shutdown. Early warning fire detection should be installed with alarm and These areas are provided with automatic fire detectors annunciation locally and in the control room. Local that alarm locally as well as provide remote annunciation hose stations and portable extinguishers should also be in the control room.

provided.

Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided near each area. At least one effective hose stream will reach all parts of the pump house/pump rooms.

STP FHAR 4.2-77 Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.12. New Fuel Area F.12. New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers should be located within Hand-held portable extinguishers are located in the new this area. Also, local hose stations should be located fuel inspection area and hose stations are located just outside but within hose reach of this area. Automatic outside of this area. Automatic fire detection is provided fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the which alarms in the control room and locally. Adequate control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should firewater drainage is provided. Fuel is stored such that be limited to a minimum in the new fuel area. The criticality is precluded for any water density that might storage area should be provided with a drainage system occur during fire water application.

to preclude accumulation of water.

The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.

STP FHAR F.13. Spent Fuel Pool Area F.13. Spent Fuel Pool Area 4.2-78 Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be The spent fuel pool is located within the fuel-handling provided by local hose stations and portable building. The operating deck is provided with automatic extinguishers. Automatic fire detection should be fire detection systems which will alarm locally and alarm provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and annunciate in the control room. Portable and to alarm locally. extinguishers are provided throughout the building, and hose stations are provided. Combustible materials are kept to a minimum, and adequate drainage is provided throughout the building Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.14. Radwaste Building F.14. Radwaste Building The radwaste building should be separated from other The radwaste handling area is incorporated into the areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least 3-hour mechanical auxiliary building, and is separated from ratings. Automatic sprinklers should be used in all other areas by concrete walls, floors, and ceilings.

areas where combustible materials are located.

Automatic fire detection should be provided to Although the penetrations and HVAC ducts are not annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm sealed with 3-hour rated seals and dampers, fire locally. During a fire, the ventilation systems in these propagation from the radwaste handling area to other areas should be capable of being isolated. Water should areas will be inhibited because of the following reasons.

drain to liquid radwaste buildings sumps.

The radwaste handling area is enclosed by 3-hour Acceptable alternative fire protection is automatic fire equivalent concrete walls and roof with doors procured detection to alarm and annunciate in the control room, as 3-hour rated fire doors. The penetrations are for in addition to manual hose stations and portable piping, ducts and conduits. There are no electrical tray STP FHAR extinguishers consisting of hand-held and penetrations. No penetration openings exceed 3' x 1-1/2' large-wheeled units. (duct) in size and are located so as not to provide a direct 4.2-79 path for flame spread beyond the radwaste handling area.

In a specific case where a 3' x 1-1/2' duct penetration exists combustibles are located only on one side and are approximately 10 ft. from the penetration opening.

Therefore, these walls provide a degree of fire resistance.

These walls are listed in Table 4.2-1.

The solid radwaste system uses cement as a solidification agent, which presents a low fire load.

Except for dry waste, most combustibles in this area are not radioactive. In the event Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.14. Radwaste Building (Contd) F.14. Radwaste Building (Contd) of a fire, the offsite releases would be within the limits established by 10CFR100. Also, HVAC exhaust from this general area is monitored for radiation.

In addition, automatic fire detection which alarms in the control room is provided. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers (hand-held and large-wheeled) are provided.

Special hazard sprinkler systems are provided for the truck bay and dry waste compactor for purpose of property STP FHAR protection. No safe shutdown systems are located in the radwaste handling area. Therefore the discussion of these 4.2-80 systems is provided for information only.

F.15. Decontamination Areas F.15. Decontamination Areas The decontamination areas should be protected by The decontamination area at STP, located in the automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. mechanical auxiliary building, is not used for the storage Automatic fire detection should be provided to of flammable liquids. The decontamination fluids which annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm are stored and used in appreciable quantities (50 gallons) locally. The ventilation system should be capable of are of the water-based type and will not present a fire being isolated. Local hose stations and hand portable hazard. Portable fire extinguishers are provided within the extinguishers should be provided as backup to the area, and hose stations are provided adjacent to the area.

sprinkler system.

Automatic fire detection is provided in the decontamination area to annunciate and alarm in the Amendment 26 control room and alarm locally.

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION F.15. Decontamination Areas (Contd) F.15. Decontamination Areas (Contd)

The cask decontamination area in the fuel handling building contains minimal combustibles. Automatic fire detection is provided by the building detection system in the area which alarms locally and alarms and annunciates in the control room. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided.

F.16. Safety Related Water Tanks F.16. Safety Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe-shutdown Indoor safety-related water tanks are separated from any should be protected from the effects of fire. Local hose significant combustibles by steel reinforced concrete STP FHAR stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. walls, floors, and ceilings. Local hose stations and Portable extinguishers should be located in nearby hose portable extinguishers are provided. The only 4.2-81 houses. Combustible materials should not be stored safety-related outdoor water tanks are the auxiliary next to outdoor tanks. A minimum of 50 feet of feedwater storage tanks. These are located approximately separation should be provided between outdoor tanks 40 feet from the turbine generator lube oil area, and are and combustible materials where feasible. discussed in Section 3.9. These tanks are encased in 30-inch-thick reinforced concrete. The yard hydrants and hoses may be used to cool the tanks and extinguish an exposure fire. Portable extinguishers are also provided nearby in the turbine generator building.

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION G. Special Protection Guidelines G. Special Protection Guidelines G.1. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene - Oxygen Fuel Gas G.1. Welding and Cutting, Acetylene - Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems Systems This equipment is used in various areas throughout the The storage area for gas bottles is remote from any plant. Storage locations should be chosen to permit fire safety-related buildings.

protection by automatic sprinkler systems. Local hose stations and portable equipment should be provided as STP compliance is described in the FHAR comparison to backup. The requirements of NFPA 51 and 51B are Appendix R,Section III.K.5.

applicable to these hazards. A permit system should be required to utilize this equipment.

G.2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins G.2. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange Resins STP FHAR Dry ion exchange resins should not be stored near Dry ion exchange resins are stored in a separate site essential safety-related systems. Dry unused resins warehouse, remote from any safety-related buildings, 4.2-82 should be protected by automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems, or equipment.

installations. Detection by smoke and heat detectors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Local hose stations and portable extinguishers should provide backup for these areas.

Storage areas of dry resin should have curbs and drains.

(Refer to NFPA 92M, "Waterproofing and Draining of Floors.")

Amendment 26

4.2 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 APPENDIX A OF APCSB 9.5-1 STP POSITION G.3. Hazardous Chemicals G.3. Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should be stored and protected in Provisions are included in the plant design for the storage accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49, of all hazardous chemicals in accordance with the "Hazardous Chemicals Data." Chemicals storage areas requirements of NFPA 49, 1975 Edition, and any other should be well ventilated and protected against flooding applicable standards. Chemical storage areas are well conditions since some chemicals may react with water ventilated and protected against flooding conditions.

to produce ignition.

G.4. Materials Containing Radioactivity G.4. Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such as Temporary storage of radioactive materials is provided in spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA the radwaste handling area of the mechanical auxiliary filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or building. Ion exchange resins are collected and stored wet containers that are located in areas free from ignition in tanks until ready for solidification or packaging in high STP FHAR sources or combustibles. These materials should be integrity containers.

protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as 4.2-83 well. Consideration should be given to requirements A separate radioactive waste materials staging building is for removal of isotopic decay from entrained provided for interim storage of packaged radioactivity radioactive materials. until it can be properly disposed of, which is remote from any safety-related buildings, systems, or equipment.

Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-1 (Reference Section D.1.j and F.14)

Interior Boundary Walls Without Rated Penetration Seals El Fire Area / Zone Col Line Description 10' 32/Z103 - 24/Z137 J - 30 to 32 Reactor Makeup Storage Tank to

& J to H30.5 LWPS Waste Monitor Tank 10' 27/Z138 - 3/Z130 B - 30 to 31.8 Hallway to Recycle Holdup Tank

& A To B-30 10' 17/Z081 - 2/Z005 A - 22 Main Return Air Riser to HVAC Equipment Room 29' 32/Z114 - 24/Z137 E to C - 31 to 32 Radioactive Pipe Chase to LWPS Spent Resin Tank and Waste Evap Room 29' 32/Z114 - 3/Z130 A to B - 30 to 31.8 Radioactive Pipe Chase to Recycle Holdup Tank 29' 32/Z114 - 27/Z138 B to D - 27 to 30 Radioactive Pipe Chase to Pipe and HVAC Chase 29' 3/Z130 - 27/Z138 A to B - 30 Boron Recycle Evap to Recycle Holdup Tank 29' 24/Z137 - 3/Z117 C to E - 32 LWPS Spent Resin Tank and Waste Evap to Valve Room and Dry Waste Compactor 41' 32/Z131 - 3/Z130 E to H - 28 to 3 Demineralizer Cubicles to Room 128 Boron Thermal Regen 41' 32/Z131 - 3/Z117 E-29 to 32 Demineralizer Cubicles to Low &

High Rad Storage 60' 32/Z131 - 3/Z117 E - 30 to 32 Demineralizer Cubicles to Radwaste Handling 86' 4/Z049 - 6/Z085 A to B 22 HVAC Equip. Room to HVAC Outside Intake 29' 27/Z127 - 23/Z114 E 30 Valve Operating Area to Radioactive Pipe Chase 29' 24/Z102 - 23/Z114 E 31 Valve Room to Radioactive Pipe Chase 4.2-84 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-1 (Contd)

El Fire Area / Zone Col Line Description 29' 24/Z137 - 23/Z114 E - 31 to 31.5 Valve Operating Room to Radioactive Pipe Chase 41' 24/Z137 to 3/Z117 E - 31.5 to 32 Valve Room to Low Activity Storage Area 43' 32/Z114 to 3/Z117 E - 30 to 31.5 Radioactive Pipe Chase to Solid Radwaste Handling 29' 24/Z136 to 23/Z114 H - 31 to 32 Processing Area to Radioactive Pipe Chase 29' 24/Z137 to 23/Z114 H - 28 to 31 Laundry Hot Shower Tank to Radioactive Pipe Chase 10' 63/ to 2/Z006 M to J - 21 to 24 Reactor Containment to Elect.

Penetration Area 10' 63/ to 22/Z133 M to J - 24 to 27 Reactor Containment to Pipe Penetration Area 29' 63/ to 23/Z135 M to J - 24 to 27 Reactor Containment to Pipe Penetration 41' 63/ to 3/Z031 M to J - 21 to 24 Reactor Containment to Elect.

Penetration Area 41' 63/ to 3/Z116 M to J - 24 to 27 Reactor Containment to Pipe Penetration Area 60' 63/ to 4/Z046 M to J - 21 to 24 Reactor Containment to Elect Penetration Area 60'-74' 63/ to 32/Z145 M to J - 24 to 27 Reactor Containment to Personnel Access Area 29'-68' 63/ to 35/ N to T.5-26 Reactor containment to Fuel Handling Building 86' 11/Z075 to 6/Z097 A.5-20 HVAC Duct to Outside Air Intake Structure 86' 10/Z074 to 6/Z097 A.5-20 HVAC Duct to Outside Air Intake Structure 86' 12/Z076 to Outside A.5-20 HVAC Duct to Outside Air Intake Structure (Tornado Damper Installed) 4.2-85 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-1 (Contd)

El Fire Area / Zone Col Line Description 86' 32/Z122 to 6/Z097 A.5-22 HVAC Duct to HVAC Room 60' 32/Z145 to 35/ M.8-26.5 to 28 Personnel Access Area 41' 32/Z103 to 35/ M.8-28 to 32 Refueling Water Storage Tank 41' 3/Z116 to 35/ M.8 26.8 to 28 Piping Penetration Area 10 & 21' 32/Z103 to 35/ M.8 - 30.5 to 32 Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank 10 & 21' 32/Z104 to 35/ M.8 - 30 to 30.5 Refueling Water Storage Tank 35' 15/Z079 to 3/Z038 B-21 Control Room Return Air Riser 35' 13/Z077 to 3/Z036 B-20.5 Control Room Supply Air Riser 21' 17/Z081 to 2/Z016 A to B-20.0 to 20.2 Floor Separating EAB Main Supply Air Riser Room and Corridor Below 4.2-86 Amendment 26

TABLE 4.2-2 (Reference Section E.1.a)

Justification For Not Providing Detection Systems For All Safety-Related Areas Group Plant Area(s) Ignition Fire Accessibility Shutdown Sources Duration (1) Trains Fire Protection Features 1 Reactor Motors Varied Limited due to A,B,C,D

Dry Standpipe System (FA63) Containment by zone ALARA

Deluge Spray Systems for charcoal (All Elevations) 0-90 min. considerations filters

Line type thermal detectors in cable tray

Spot-type thermal detectors around the reactor coolant pumps

Special hazard spray for the Train "B" STP FHAR cable tray 4.2-87 2 Fuel Handling Motors 5 min. Limited due to None

Wet Standpipes in zone (FA35/ Building-Cask ALARA

Portable Fire Extinguishers FZ310) Decon Area, considerations Tank Area 3 Mechanical None 0 Yes None

Hose cabinet outside of zone (FA32/ Auxiliary Building-

Portable Fire Extinguishers FZ134 Nonradio active pipe chase 4 Mechanical Motor 5 min. Limited due to A,B,C

Hose cabinet outside zone FA3/ Auxiliary Building- ALARA

Portable Fire Extinguishers FZ119) Volume Control considerations Tank and Valve Rooms Amendment 26

TABLE 4.2-2 (Contd)

Group Plant Area(s) Ignition Fire Accessibility Shutdown Sources Duration (1) Trains Fire Protection Features 5 Mechanical None 0 None

Risers are enclosed by 3-hour rated Electrical barriers or walls which have been Auxiliary found to be equivalent to a 3-hour Building barrier by a qualified Fire Protection Engineer.

(FA10/ Makeup Air Riser A,B,C FZ074 (FA11/ Outside Air Riser A,B,C FZ075) 4.2-88 (FA12/ Smoke and Exhaust A,B,C FZ076) Riser (FA13/ Control Room A,B,C FZ077) Supply Riser (FA14/FZ078) EAB Exhaust A,B,C Riser STP FHAR (FA15/FZ079) Control Room Air A,B,C Riser (FA16/FZ080) EAB Main Return A,B,C Riser Amendment 26 (FA17/FZ081) EAB Main Supply A,B,C Riser

TABLE 4.2-2 (Contd)

Group Plant Area(s) Ignition Fire Accessibility Shutdown Sources Duration (1) Trains Fire Protection Features 6 Post Accident Motors 5 min. Yes None

Smoke detection outside of room (FA35/ System Sampling

Hose cabinet outside of zone FZ310) Room 7 Tendon Galleries Motors 5 min. Yes None

Limited ignition sources (FA2/FZ200) 8 Personnel Airlocks None 5 min Yes None

Outside Yard Hydrant (FA32/FZ145

Hose Cabinets

& Yard Area)

Portable Fire Extinguishers 4.2-89 9 Stairwells None Negligible Yes None

Hose Cabinets outside of zone STP FHAR (FA5/FZ014) (Varied)

Portable Fire Extinguishers (FA21/FZ100)

(FA28/FZ105)

(FA30/FZ144)

(FA35/FZ322)

(FA42/FZ056)

(FA43/FZ057)

(FA44/FZ058)

(FA52/FZ404)

Notes:

1. Fire duration based on in-situ combustibles only Amendment 26

TABLE 4.2-3 Special Function/Fire Resistant Door Data South Texas Project - Unit 1 (Reference Section D.1.j)

(Page 1 of 3)

Drawing Ref Fire COMB. SSD Elev/Col/

Door No. Area/Zone Load (BTU/SF) Detection Suppression Equipment Door Type FHAR Fig. No.

MAB-338 35 310 3,000 Smoke None None Tornado /M.8-27&28/

32 145 10,000 Ionization None Yes Resistant/ 3-10 & 3-17 Fire Resistant DGB-104 39 503 10,300,000 Heat Foam-Water Yes* Watertight/

45 509 Negligible Ionization None Yes Fire Resistant F.5 & H-16.9 3-32 STP FHAR 4.2-90 DGB-105 40 504 10,300,000 Heat Foam-Water Yes* Watertight/

46 510 Negligible Ionization None Yes Fire Resistant D.9 & F.5-16 3-32 DGB-106 41 505 10,300,000 Heat Foam-Water Yes* Watertight/

47 511 Negligible Ionization None Yes Fire Resistant C.8 & D.9-16 3-32 DGB-201 45 509 None Ionization None Yes Missile Proof DGB Roof None None None No Fire Resistant F.5 & H-19.4 3-33 DGB-202 46 510 None Ionization None Yes Missile Proof DGB Roof None None None No Fire Resistant D.9 & F.5-19.4 Amendment 26 3-33

These doors separate equipment of the same train, i.e., the same diesel generator.

TABLE 4.2-3 (Contd)

(Page 2 of 3)

Drawing Ref Fire COMB. SSD Elev/Col/

Door No. Area/Zone Load (BTU/SF) Detection Suppression Equipment Door Type FHAR Fig. No.

DGB-203 47 511 None Ionization None Yes Missile Proof DGB Roof None None None No Fire Resistant C.8 & D.9-19.4 3-33 IVC-002 48 403 45,000 Ionization None Yes Watertight/ /

51 405 Negligible Ionization None No Fire Resistant N.5 & P.4-20 3-35 IVC-003 49 402 80,000 Ionization None Yes Watertight/ /

51 405 Negligible Ionization None No Fire Resistant P.4 & R-20 3-35 STP FHAR 4.2-91 IVC-004 50 401 134,000 Ionization None Yes Watertight/ /

51 405 Negligible Ionization None No Fire Resistant R & R9-20 3-35 EAB 3 045 26,754 Ionization Yes No Horizontal/

Hatch A 66 025 170,902 Ionization Yes No UL Labeled F & 22.8 3-15 & 3-16 EAB 3 115 159,002 Ionization None Yes Horizontal/ /

Hatch B 66 025 170,902 Ionization Yes No UL Labeled G & 23.5 3-15 & 3-16 EAB 4 056 96,780 Ionization None Yes Horizontal/ /

Hatch C 33 018 209,540 Ionization Yes No UL Labeled H & 23.3 3-17 & 3-20 Amendment 26

These Doors separate equipment of the same train, i.e., the same diesel generator.

TABLE 4.2-3 (Contd)

(Page 3 of 3)

Drawing Ref Fire COMB. SSD Elev/Col/

Door No. Area/Zone Load (BTU/SF) Detection Suppression Equipment Door Type FHAR Fig. No.

EAB 4 054 59,527 Ionization None No Horizontal/ /

Hatch D 33 018 209,540 Ionization Yes No UL Labeled E.3 & 23.7 3-17 & 3-20 EAB 4 056 96,780 Ionization None Yes Hatch E Door /

Hatch E 34 060 183,186 Ionization Yes No Removed H & 23.3 3-17 & 3-18 EAB-206 1 034 60,890 Ionization No Yes Bullet Proof/ /

3 036 71,108 Ionization No No Fire Resistant B.5 & 21 STP FHAR 4.2-92 3-16 EAB-208 1 034 60,890 Ionization No Yes Bullet Proof/ /

3 036 71,108 Ionization No No Fire Resistant D.5 & 21 3-16 EAB-210 1 034 60,890 Ionization No Yes Bullet Proof/ /

3 036 71,108 Ionization No No Fire Resistant B.8 & 21 3-16 EAB-204 1 032 353,000 Ionization Yes Yes Halon Pressure/

(Unit 2 3 045 26,800 Ionization Yes No Fire Resistant G & 22.3 Only) 3-16 Amendment 26 EAB-207 1 032 353,000 Ionization Yes Yes Halon Pressure/

(Unit 2 3 036 71,100 Ionization No No Fire Resistant E.3 & 22 Only) 3-16

These doors separate equipment of the same train, i.e., the same diesel generator.

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-4 JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF SPECIAL FUNCTION / FIRE RESISTANT DOORS (Reference Section D.1.j)

Door Type: Watertight-Fire Resistant Door Manufacturer: The Mosler Safe Co.

Comparison to labeled Included in Attachment C to letter ST-HL-AE-1511, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: dated 12-23-85 Door No. Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability DGB-104 128 hours0.00148 days 0.0356 hours 2.116402e-4 weeks 4.8704e-5 months - 45 minutes 1. Automatic foam-water DGB-105 suppression on fire side of DGB-106 door

2. Door separated diesel fuel oil supply from the same train of diesel components

3. Not required to meet Appendix R Section III.G IVC-002 34 minutes 1. Low fire severity

2. No SSD Components on other side IVC-003 60 minutes 1. Low fire severity

2. No SSD components on other side IVC-004 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months - 41 minutes 1. No SDD components on other side

2. Negligible combustibles on other side

3. Nearest SSD components protected by door IVC-003 which means that there are two water tight doors and a considerable distance separating the respective pumps 4.2-93 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-4 (Contd)

Door Type: Missile Proof-Fire Resistant (Description given in Attachment E to Letter ST-HL-AE-1626 Dated 3-19-86)

Door Manufacturer: The Mosler Safe Co.

Comparison to labeled Not required due to the steel door construction as 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: described in Attachment E to Letter ST-HL-AE-1626 dated 3-19-86, and the lack of combustibility on either side of the door.

Door No. Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability DGB-201 None 1. No anticipated fire severity DGB-202 either side DGB-203

2. Administrative procedures will effectively minimize transient combustibles Door Type: Tornado Resistant-Fire Resistant Door Manufacturer: The Presray Corporation Comparison to labeled Included in Attachment D to Letter ST-HL-AE-1626 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: dated 3-19-86.

Door No. Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability MAB-338 Less than 8 minutes 1. Low fire severity

2. No SSD component on either side of door 4.2-94 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-4 (Contd)

Door Type: Horizontal Hatch Door Manufacturer: Fenestra Corporation Comparison to labeled Door is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months vertical fire door which is 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: installed in the horizontal position.

Door No. Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability EAB Hatch A 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - 8 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in area of worst severity

2. See Table 4.2-5.

EAB Hatch B 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - 8 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in area of worst severity

2. See Table 4.2-5.

EAB Hatch C 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - 37 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in area of worst severity

2. See Table 4.2-5.

EAB Hatch D 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - 37 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in area of worst severity

2. See Table 4.2-5.

EAB Hatch E 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months - 17 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in CN-3288 (Removed) area of worst severity

2. See Table 4.2-5.

4.2-95 Amendment 26

STP FHAR Door Type: Bullet Proof/Fire Resistant Door Manufacturer: Krieger Steel Products Co.

Comparison to labeled Heavier construction than tested Krieger 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: Class 1, 2 and 3, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months labeled bullet proof doors.

Reference Letter ST-HL-AE-2029 dated April 8, 1987, Item 12.

Door No Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability EAB-206 53 minutes 1. Heavier construction than similar UL 3-hour rated doors EAB-208 53 minutes 1. Heavier construction than similar UL 3-hour rated doors EAB-210 53 minutes 1. Heavier construction than similar UL 3-hour rated doors.

Door Type: Halon Pressure / Fire Resistant Door Manufacturer: Protective Door Industries Comparison to labeled Heavier construction than similar UL 3-hour rated 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months fire door: doors. Reference Vendor document no. 14926-BF48896-00009-AXX.

Door No. Worst Fire Severity Basis for Acceptability EAB-204 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months - 25 minutes 1. Automatic suppression in area EAB-207 of worst severity (Unit 2 only)

2. No SSD components on other side

3. Heavier construction than similar UL 3-hour rated doors 4.2-96 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-5 (Ref. Table 4.2-4)

Evaluation of Horizontal Installation of Fire Rated Doors In a Fire Area Boundary Hatch Door A Statement of Condition:

A fire rated door is installed in a horizontal configuration in the floor which serves as a fire area boundary between Fire Area 3 Zone 045 and Fire Area 66 Zone 025. This installed configuration is not in accordance with configuration represented by the manufactures fire test due to the horizontal orientation of the door.

Physical Condition:

The door is installed in the floor of an electrical equipment room (Fire Area 3). The door opens up into the electrical equipment room and has dimensions of approximately 29" x 35".

The fire area below the door (Fire Area 66) contains a cable vault. The cable vault contains a large number of cable trays but no trays are in the direct vicinity of the door. The electrical equipment room contains a number of electrical panels, but no cable trays.

Fire Protection Features:

The zone below the door has an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system and detection. Sprinkler heads are located 4 and 6 feet away from the door. A smoke detector is located in the vicinity of the door in the cable vault. The electrical equipment room contains a halon suppression system. Detection is present in the electrical equipment room with a detector above the door.

Evaluation:

Due to the limited combustibles in the electrical equipment room, a fire in the electrical equipment room would not impact the equipment operability in the cable vault.

A fire in the cable vault would be alarmed at its incipient stage by the detection system. The automatic wet pipe sprinkler system would effectively control the fire and would suppress fire in the vicinity of the door.

The door in a listed 3-hour rated door that is installed in a configuration differing from the tested orientation. The small size of the door would lead to its increased strength. Due to the opening of the door in the upward direction, the strength afforded by the jamb of the door would increase its strength in the downward direction and hence it is concluded that the door could successfully pass a fire test when oriented as in the plant installed condition.

4.2-97 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-5 (Contd)

(Ref. Table 4.2-4)

Hatch Door A (Cont'd)

Considering the installed condition, the hazards present, the fire protection features and the physical door size and installation, it is concluded that the horizontal door will serve as an adequate component of the fire area boundary.

Hatch Door B Statement of Condition:

A fire rated door is installed in a horizontal configuration in the floor which serves as a fire area boundary between Fire Area 3 Zone 115 and Fire Area 66 Zone 025. This installed configuration is not in accordance with configuration represented by the manufacturers fire test due to the horizontal orientation of the door.

Physical Condition:

The door is installed in the floor of a 125V distribution room (Fire Area 3). The door opens up into the 125V distribution room and has dimensions of approximately 29" x 35". The fire zone below the door (Fire Area 66) contains a cable vault. The cable vault contains a large number of cable trays. The 125V distribution room contains a number of electrical panels.

One cable tray is located above the door and contains 3 cables.

Fire Protection Features:

The zone below the door has an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system and detection. Detection is present in the 125V distribution room.

Evaluation:

Due to the limited combustibles in the 125V distribution room, a fire in the 125V distribution room would not impact the equipment operability in the cable vault.

A fire in the cable vault would be alarmed at its incipient stage by the detection system. The automatic wet pipe sprinkler system would effectively control the fire.

The door is a listed 3-hour rated door that is installed in a configuration differing from the tested orientation. The small size of the door would lead to its increased strength. Due to the opening of the door in the upward direction, the strength afforded by the jamb of the door would increase its strength in the downward direction and hence, it is concluded that the door could successfully pass a fire test when oriented as in the plant installed condition.

4.2-98 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-5 (Contd)

(Ref. Table 4.2-4)

Hatch Door A (Cont'd)

Considering the installed condition, the hazards present, the fire protection features and the physical door size and installation, it is concluded that the horizontal door will serve as an adequate component of the fire area boundary.

Hatch Door B Statement of Condition:

A fire rated door is installed in a horizontal configuration in the floor which serves as a fire area boundary between Fire Area 4 Zone 056 and Fire Area 33 Zone 018. This installed configuration is not in accordance with configuration represented by the manufacturers fire test due to the horizontal orientation of the door.

Physical Condition:

The door is installed in the floor of the Control Rod Drive Room (Fire Area 4). The door opens up into the Control Rod Drive Room and has dimensions of approximately 29" x 35".

The fire area below the door (Fire Area 33) contains the cable vault room. The cable vault room contains a large number of cable trays.

In the direct vicinity above the door, there is one cable tray, covered top and bottom. The Control Rod Drive Room contains a number of electrical panels and some cable trays as well as cables in conduits.

In the direct vicinity of the door on the under side, there is one cable tray. Additional trays are in the vicinity.

Fire Protection Features:

The area below the door has an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system and detection. A sprinkler head is located next to the door (approximately 12" to the side). A second sprinkler head is located on the opposite side of the door approximately 5 feet to the side. A hose station is located at the base of the ladder leading from the door to the floor of the cable vault room. A fire hose cabinet is located outside of the Control Rod Drive Room near the entrance.

Detection is present in the Control Rod Drive Room.

Evaluation:

Due to the limited combustibles in the Control Rod Drive Room in the vicinity of the door, a fire in the Control Rod Drive Room would not impact the equipment operability in the cable vault room below.

4.2-99 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-5 (Contd)

(Ref. Table 4.2-4)

Hatch Door C (Cont'd)

A fire in the cable vault would be alarmed at its incipient stage by the detection system. The automatic wet pipe sprinkler system would effectively control the fire and the sprinklers located near the door would suppress fire directly beneath the door.

The door is a listed 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rated door that is installed in a configuration differing from the tested orientation. The small size of the door would lead to its increased strength. Due to the opening of the door in the upward direction, the strength afforded by the jamb of the door would increase its strength in the downward direction and hence it is concluded that the door could successfully pass a fire test when oriented as in the plant installed condition.

Considering the installed condition, the hazards present, the fire protection features and the physical door size and installation, it is concluded that the horizontal door will serve as an adequate component of the fire area boundary.

Hatch Door D Statement of Condition:

A fire rated door is installed in a horizontal configuration in the floor which serves as a fire area boundary between Fire Area 4 Zone 054 and Fire Area 33 Zone 018. This installed configuration is not in accordance with configuration represented by the manufacturers fire test due to the horizontal orientation of the door.

Physical Condition:

The door is installed in the floor of the motor generator room (Fire Area 4). The door opens up in the motor generator room and has dimensions of approximately 29" x 35". The fire area below the door (Fire Area 33) contains a cable vault. The cable vault contains a large number of cable trays.

In the vicinity of the door in the motor generator room, there is one cable tray about 8 feet above the door. The switchgear room contains a number of electrical panels, motor generators, and some cable trays as well as cables in conduits.

Fire Protection Features:

The area below the door has an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system and detection. A sprinkler head is located 1-2 feet to the side of the door. A smoke detector is located approximately 8 feet from the door in the cable vault. Detection is present in the motor generator room with a detector approximately 8 feet horizontally from the door.

4.2-100 Amendment 26

STP FHAR TABLE 4.2-5 (Contd)

(Ref. Table 4.2-4)

Hatch Door D (Cont'd)

Evaluation:

Due to the limited combustibles in the motor generator room in the vicinity of the door, a fire in the motor generator room would not impact the equipment operability in the cable vault.

A fire in the cable vault would be alarmed at its incipient stage by the detection system. The automatic wet pipe sprinkler system would effectively control the fire and would suppress fire in the vicinity of the door.

The door is a listed 3-hour rated door that is installed in a configuration differing from the tested orientation. The small size of the door would lead to its increased strength. Due to the opening of the door in the upward direction, the strength afforded by the jamb of the door would increase its strength in the downward direction and hence it is concluded that the door could successfully pass a fire test when oriented as in the plant installed condition.

Considering the installed condition, the hazards present, the fire protection features and the physical door size and installation, it is concluded that the horizontal door will serve as an adequate component of the fire area boundary.

Hatch Door E - Removed (Ref: DCP 08-5529-7 and GL 86-10 evaluation).

4.2-101 Amendment 26

Figures 2-3 to 3-49 Withheld in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390

NOC-AE-21003792, STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Amendment 26 (Redacted)

Contents

Text

1.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

References:

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NOC-AE-21003792, STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Amendment 26 (Redacted)

Text

1.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

References:

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