ML20064K969
| ML20064K969 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Robinson |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1981 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064E577 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-389 NUDOCS 8112020852 | |
| Download: ML20064K969 (3) | |
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DISTRIBUTION AEB R/F NOV 171931 CENTRAL FILE MWohl Docket No.: 50-261 WPasedag RWHouston PTriplett MEf40RANDUf4 FOR: Steve h rgi, Chief Operctine T'::: terr Pr:nch #1 Divisica ci Licen:ir.r FROM:
R. Wayne Houston, Chief Accident Evaluation Branch
. Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
H. D. ROBI!;SOf: STEA': ELECTRIC PLA'!T UNIT f 0. 2 - SPENT FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY,EXPAtlSION (TAC. #42415)
Plant Name:
H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Uliit No. 2 Docket No.:
50-261 Responsible Branch: ORB-1 Project Manager:
W. Ross Review Status: AEB-Complete The Accident Evaluation Branch has ccnpleted its review and evaluation of the December 1, 1980 letter from Carolina Power and Light Company which contains information on the proposed expansion of the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool (SFP) at H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2. is AEB's input for the Safety Evaluation for this spent fuel pool storage modification action. Enclosure 2 is our input for the Environmental Impact Appraisal.
This review was performed by H. Wohl, AEB/DSI.
Original signed by:
R. Wayne Houston, Chief Accident Evaluation Branch Division of Systems Integration
Enclosures:
As stated
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ENCLOSURE 1 For the Robinson Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Related to the Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Modification.
2.1 Fuel Handlina The NRC staff has underway a generic review of load handling operations in the vicinity of spent fuel pools to determine the likelihood of a heavy load impacting fuel in the pool and, if necessary, the radiological consequences of such an event. Because Robinson-2 will be required (by Technical Specification) to prohibit loads greater than the nominal weight of a fel assembly and har.dling tool to be transported over spent fuel in the SFP, we have concluded that the likelihood of a load handling accident is sufficiently small that the proposed modification is acceptable, and no additional restrictions on load handling operations in the vicinity of the SFP are necessary while our generic review is underway.
The potential consequences of fuel handling accidents (i.e., rupture of fuel pins in one fuel assembly and subsequent release of the radioactive inventory within the gap) in the spent fuel pool area presented.in the.-SE dated.
a May 18, 1970 are not changed by the use of high density racks, since the amount of fuel damage in this accident remains unchanged.
ENCLOSURE 2 For the Robinson Unit 2 Enhironcental Impact Appraisal Related to the Spent Fuel Pool Modification 5.0 Environmental Imoact of Postulated Accidents Althoughthenewhigh-densityrackswillacco=odatealargerinhentory ofspentfuel,wehahedeterminedthattheinstallationanduseofthe racks will not change the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident in the SFP area from those values reported in the Robinson-2 FES dated April, 1975
, since the amount of fuel damage in the accident remains unchanged.
Additionally, the NRC staff has unerway a generic rehiew of load handling operations in the vicinity of spent fuel pools to determine the likelihood of a heavy load impacting fuel in the pool and, if necessary, the radiological consequencesofsuchanehent. Because Robinson-2 will be required (by Technical Specification) to prohibit loads greater than the nominal weight of a fuel assembly and handling tool to be transported over spent fuel intheSFP,wehaheconcludedthatthelikelihoodofaloadhandling accident is sufficiently small that the proposed modification is acceptable, and no additional restrictions on load handling operations in the hicinity of the SFP are necessary while our rehiew is underway.
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