ML20052H129
| ML20052H129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1982 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052H130 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-48325, NUDOCS 8205190419 | |
| Download: ML20052H129 (31) | |
Text
7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL Docket No. 50-302 (Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant)
EXEMPTION I.-
The Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) and eleven other co-owners are the holders of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 which authorizes operation of the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant.
This license provides, among other things, that it is subject to all rules, regulations and Orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
The facility comprises one pressurized water reactor at the licensee's site located in Citrus County, Florida.
II.
On November 19, 1980, the Commission published a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 rege-ding fire protection features of nuclear power plants (45 FR 76602). The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981. Section 50.48(c) established the schedules for satisfying the provisions of Appendix R.
Section III of Appendix R contains 15 subsections, lettered A through 0, each of which specifies requirements for a particular aspect of the fire protection features at a nuclear power plant.
Three of these 15 subsections, III.G, III.L and III.0 are the subjects of this Cxempt'en.
Subsection III.G specifies detailed requirements for fire protection of the equipment used for safe shutdown by means of separation and barriers (III.G.2).
If the requirements for separa-tion and barriers could not be met in an area, alternative safe shutdown capability, independent of that area and equipment in that area, is required 520519ONI"
.CR-3 7590-01 1
(III.G.3 and III.L). Subsection III.0 specifies the requirements for an oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps.
Section 50.48(c) required completion of all modifications to meet the provisions of Appendix R within a specified time from the effective date of this fire protection rule, February 17, 1981, except for modifications to provide alternative safe shutdown capability.
These latter modifications (III.G.3) require NRC review and approval. Hence, Section 50.48(c) requires their completion within a certain time after NRC approval. The date for submittal of design descriptions of any modifications to provide alternative safe shutdown capability was specified as March 19, 1981.
By letter dated March 19, 1981, as amended March 17, 1982, and by letter dated June 30, 1981, Florida Power Corporation requested the following exemptions:
(1) Extend from March 19, 1981, to June 30, 1982, the date for submittal of a final Appendix R Fire Study, including Sections III.G and III.L; and (2) Extend the implementation schedule identified in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3) for modifications required for conformance to Section III.0 of Appendix R to as follows:
Any required modifications will be implemented before startup af ter the earliest of the following events commencinq Jul.y 1,1982:
(i) the first refueling outage, or (ii) another planned outage that lasts for at least 60. days; or (iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request and interpret that the licensee requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.48(c) with respect to the require-ments of Sections III.0, III.G and III.L as follows:
(1) Extend from March 19, 1981, to June 30, 1982, the date for submittal of
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plans and schedules to achieve compliance with III.G.2 required by Ii 550.48(c)(5);
(2) Extend from March 19, 1981, to June 30, 1982, the date for filing additional exemptions from Section III.G pursuant to $50.48(c)(6);
(3) Extend from March 19, 1981, to June 30, 1982, the date for submittal of design descriptions of alternative or dedicated shutdown systems I
to comply with Sections III.G.3 and Ill.L. if such are necessary; and (4) Extend froi February 17, 1981, to June 30, 1982, the date from which the installation schedules established in 550.48(c)(2) and (3) are calculated.
When this fire protection rule was approved by the Consnission, it was understood that the time required for each licensee to reexamine those previously-approved configurations at its plant to detennine whether they meet the requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 was not well known and would vary depending upon the degree of conformance.
For each item of nonconformance that was found, a fire hazards analysis had to be performed to deterinine whether the existing configuration provided suf-ficient fire protection.
If it did, a basis had to be formulated for an exemption request.
If it did not, modifications to either meet the require-ments of Appendix R or to provide some other acceptable configuration, that could be justified for an exemption, had to be designed. Where fire pro-tection features alone could not ensure protection of safe shutdown capability, alternative safe shutdown capability had to be designed as required by Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R.
Depending upon the extensiveness and number of the areas involved, the time required for this reexamination, reanalysis and redesign could vary from a few months to a year or more.
The Commission decided, however, to require one, short-term date for all licensees
s CR-3 7590-01 in the interest of ensuring a best-effort, expedited completion of com-pliance with the fire protection rule, recognizing that there would be a number of licensees who could not meet these time restraints but who could then request appmpriate relief through the exenption process. Licensees for 44 of the 72 plants to which Appendix R a'pplies (plants with an operating license issued prior to January 1,1979) have requested such schedular relie f.
The licensees for the remaining 28 plants made submittals to meet the schedular requirements of Y.48(c). All of these subnuttals, however, were deficient in some respects.
In general, much of the information requested in a generic letter (81-12) dated February 20, 1981, to the licensees of all 72 plants, was not provided.
Therefore, additional time is being used to complete those submittals also.
III.
Prior to the issuance of Appendix R Crystal River Unit No. 3 had been reviewed against the criteria of Appendix A to the Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 (BTP 9.5-1).
The BTP 9.5-1 was developed to resolve the lessons learned from the fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
It is broader in scope than Appendix R, fonned the nucleus of the criteria developed further in Appendix R and in its present, revised form constitutes the section of the Standard Review Plan used for the review of applications for construction perniits.ar.d operating licenses of new plants.
The revies was completed by the NRC staff and its fire protection consultants and a Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (FPSER) was issued. A few items remained unresolved.
Further discourse between the licensee and the NRC staff resulted in resolution of the majority of these items. The FPSER supported the issuance of an amendment to the
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CR-3 7590-01 i
I operating license of Crystal River Unit No. 3 which required modifications
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to be made to plant physical features, systems, and administrative controls to meet the criteria of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
All of these modifications, including the modifications associated with the items resolved since issuance of the FPSER, have been completed. Therefore, the Crystal River Unit No. 3 has already been upgraded to a high degree of fire protection. The exten-sive reassessment involved in the request for additional time with regcrd to Section III.G and, if necessary,Section III.L to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 is to quantify, in detail, the differences between what was recently approved and the specific requirements of these Sections.
With regard to Section III.0 to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50, the request for additional time is for the installatiun of any necessary modifications to the existing approved reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil collection system or, if necessary, the installation of a new RCP oil collection system required to meet the specific requirements of Section III.0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
No exemption from the technical requirements is requested.
Based on the above considerations, we find that the licensee has com-pleted a substantial part of the fire protection features at Crystal River Unit No. 3.
The licensee is applying significant effort to complete the reassessment of any remaining modifications and designs which might be necessary for strict conformance with Sections III.G, III.L and 111.0. We find that because of the already-completed upgrading of this facility, there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public involved with I Crystal River Unit No. 3 - Operating License No. DPR-72 Amendment No. 23 Supported by FPSER issued July 27, 1979 SER Supplement dated October 14, 1980 SER Supplement dated January 22, 1981
' CR-3 7590-01 continued operation until the completion of this reassessment on June 30, 1982 and the installation of the revised designs after that date in accordance with the provisions of the Exemption. Therefore, an exemption should be granted to allow such time for completion.
- However, because we have found that most submittals of this reanalysis for con-formance to Section III.G to date from other licensees have not been complete; that is, not all of the information requested by generic letter 81-12 dated February 20, 1981, was provided, we are adding a condition to this Exemption that requires all such information to be submitted by the date granted.
IV.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, an exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the public interest and hereby grants the following exemptions with respect to the requirements of Sections III.G III.L and III.0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50:
(1) The date, March 19, 1981, for submittal of plans and schedules to achieve compliance as required by 550.48(c)(5) is extended to June 30,1982; (2) The date, March 19, 1981, for filing exemption requests pursuant to 850.48(c)(6) which includes a tolling provision is extended to June 30,1982; (3) The date, March 19, 1981, for submittal of design descriptions of alternative or dedicated shutdown systems to comply with Sections III.G.3 and III.! as required by 350.48(c)(5) is extended to June 30, 1982; and (4) The date, February 17, 1981, from which the installation schedules established in 550.48(c)(2) and (3) are calculated, is extended to June 30, 1982; Provided the following conditions are met:
- 1) Requests for exemption pursuant to 650.48(c)(6) must include:
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CR-3 7590-01 a) A concise statement of the extent of the exemption; b) A concise description of the pmposed alternative design features related to assuring post-fire shutdown capability; and c) A sound technical basis that justifies the proposed alternative in terms of protection afforded to post-fire shutdown capability, degree of enhancement in fire safety by full compliance with III.G requirements, or the detriment to plant safety incurred by full compliance with III.G. A simple statement that the feature for which the exemption is requested was previously approved by the NRC staff is not sufficient. A simple assertion that in the licensee's judgment the feature for which the exemption is requested is adequate fire protection is not sufficient.
- 2) The design descriptions of alternative or dedicated shutdown systems to comply with Section III.G.3, as required by 650.48(c)(5) shall include a point-by-point response to each item in Section 8 of Enclosure 1 to generic letter 81-12 dated February 20, 1981, and to each item in to generic letter 81-12 dated February 20, 1981.
If the licensee does not meet the above conditions, the licensee will be found in violation of 10 CFR 50.48(c) even though the submittal may be made within the time limit granted by the Exemption.
If such a violation occurs, imposition of a civil penalty will be considered under Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.
Such a violation will be a continuing one beginning with the date set in the Exemption for submittal and termina-ting when all inadequacies are corrected.
A delay in the determination of inadequi.cy by the NRC staff, caused by the workload associated with reviewing all of the submittals falling due near the same time, will not relieve the licensee of the responsibility for completeness of the submittal, nor will such delay cause any penalty tiat may be imposed to be mitigated.
The NRC st&ff has determined that the granting of this Exemption will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to
CR-3 7590-01 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with this action.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION l
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 4th day of 14y 1982, 1
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CLARIFICATION OF GEllERIC LETTER On February 20, 1981, generic letter 81-12 was forwarded to all reactor licensees with plants licensed prior to January 1,1979. The letter restated the reqdire-ment of Section 50.48 to 10 CFR Part 50 that each licensee would be required to reassess areas of the plant where cables or equipment including associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located to determine whether the require-ments of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 were satisfied. Additionally, and Enclosure 2 of the generic letter requested additional information concerning those areas of the plant requiring alternative shutdown capability. Section 8 of Enclosure 1 requested information for the systems, equipment and procedures of alternative shutdown capability and Enclosure 2 defined associated circuits and requested information concerning associated circuits for those areas requiring alternative shutdown.
In our review of licensee submittals and meetings with licensees, it has become apparent that the request for information should be clarified since a lack of clarity could result in the submission of either insufficient or e,xcessive information. Thus, the staff has rewritten Section 8 of Enclosure 1 and of the February 20, 1981 generic letter. Additionally, further clarification of the definition of associated circuits has been provided to aid in the reassessments to determine compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R.
In developing this= rewrite we have considered the comment of the Nuclear Utility Fire Protection Group.
The attached
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rewrite of the Enclosures contains no new requirements but merely attempts to clarify the request for additional information.
2-Licensees who have not responded to the February 20, 1981 generic letter,
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may choose to respond t'o the enclosed request for information.
Since the enclosed request for information is not new, but merely clarification of our previous letter, responding to it should not delay any submittals in progress that are based upon February 20, 1981 letter. Licensees whose response to the February 20, 1981 letter, has been found incomplete resulting in staff identifications of a major unresolved item (ise., associated circuits),
may choose to respond to pertinent sections of the enclosed request for infor-mation in order to close open items (i.e., open item for. associated circuits,
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use rewrite of Enclosure 2).
If additional clarification is needed, please contact the staff Project flanager for your plant.
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- to Enclosure 2 REWRITE OF SECTION 8 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The following is a rewrite of the staff's request for additional information concerning design modification to meet the requirements of Section III'.G.3 of -
Appendix R.
The following contains no new requests but is merely a rewording of Section 8 of Enclosure 1 of the February 20,~1981 generic letter.
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1.
Identify those areas of the plant that will not meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R and, thus alternati' e shutdown will be provide'ds v
or an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R will be provided. Additionally provide a statement thct all other areas of the plant are or will be in compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
For each of those fire areas of the plant requiring an alternative shutdown system (s) provide a complete set of responses to the following requests for each fire area:
a.
List the system (s) or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability with the loss of offsite power.
b.
For those systems identified in "la" for which alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be provided, list the equipment and components of the normal shutdown system in the fire area and identifp the functions of the circuits of the normal shutdown system in the fire area (power to what equipment, control of what components and instrumentation).
Describe the system (s) or portions thereof used to provide the alternative shutdown capability for the fire area and provide a table that lists the equipment ~
and components of the alternative shutdown system for the fire area.
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.. For each alterna'tive system identify the function of the new circuits being provided.
Identify the location (fire zone) of the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits that bypass the fire area and verify that the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits are separated from the fire area in accordance with Section III.G.2.
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c.
Provide drawings of the alternative shutdown system (s) which highlight any connections to the normal shutdown systems (P& ids for piping ana components,.
elementary wiring diagrams of electrical cabling).
Show the electrical location of all breakers for power cables, and. isolation devices for control and instrumentation circuits for the alternative shutdown systems for that fire area.
d.
Verify that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety systems;
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(e.g., new isolation switches and control switches should meet design criteria and standards in the FSAR for electrical' equipment in the system that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be mounted in should also meet the same criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, the isolation switches should be keylocked or alarmed in the control room if in the " local" or " isolated" position; periodic checks should be made to verify that the switch is in the proper position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source of a failure which 'causes loss of reaunaant safety *-
systems),
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Verify that licensee procedures have been or will be develo' ed uhich describe the p
tasks to-be perfonned to effect the shutdown method.
Provide a summary of these procedures outlining operator actions.
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Verify that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures of e:. as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical speci-fications.
9 Provide a commitment to perform adequate acceptance tests of the alter-
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native shutdown capability.
These tests should verify that:
equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the " local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from' the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer isolation switch is in the " remote" position.
h.
Provide Technical Specifications of the surveillance requirements and l
limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not already covered by existing Technical Specifications.
For example, if new isolation.and control switches are added to a shutdown system, the existing Technical Specification surveillance requirements should le l
be supplemented to verify system / equipment functions from the alternate shutdown station at testing intervals consistent with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and IEEE 338.
Credit may be taken for other existing tests using group overlap test concepts.
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For new equipment comprising the alternative shutdown capability, verify that the systenis available are adequate to perform the necessary shut-down function. The functions required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal ac power or shutdown on Group 1 isola, tion (BWR). The equipment required for the alternative capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis.
j, Verify. that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed
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and material for repaiis is maintained on site.
Provide a summary of these procedures and ailist of the material needed for repairs.
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' Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY The following discusses the. requirements for protecting redundant and/or alternative equipment needed for safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The requirements of Appendix R address hot shutdown equipment which must be
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free of fire damage.
The following teqpirements also apply to cold s,hutdown equip 7ent if the licensee elects to demonstrate that tiie. equipment.is to be f,ree of. fir _e. damage. AppendE R does allow rejairable damage to cold shutdown eaufoment.
Us'ing the requirements of Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix R, the cdpa '
bility'to achieve hot shutdown must exist given a fire in any area of the plant in conjunction with a loss of offsite power for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Section III.G of Appendix R provides four metho'ds for ensuring that the hot shutdown capa-bility is protected from fires. The first three options as defined in Section III.G.2 provides methods for protet. tion from fires of equipment needed for hot shutdown:
1.
Redundant systems including cables, equipment, and associated circuits may be separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier; or, 2.
Redundant systems including cables, equipment and associated circuits may be separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 fe'et with no inter-vening combustibles.
In addition, fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system are required; or, 3.
Redundant systems includ'ing cables, equipment and associated circuits may by enclosed by a one-hour fire rated barrier.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system are required.
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. The last option as defined by Section III.G.3 provides an alternative shutdown capability to the redundant trains damaged by a fire.
4.
Alternative shutdown equipment must be independent of the cables, equip-ment and associated circuits of the redundant systems damaged by the fire.
Associated Circuits of Concern The following discussion provides A) a definition of associated circuits for Appendix R consideration, B) the guidelines for protecting the safe' shutdown capability from the fire-induced failures of associated circuits and C) the in-formation required by the staff to review associated circuits. The definition
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of associated circuits has not changed from the February 20, 1981 generic letter;-
but is merely clarified.
It is important to note that our interest is only with those circuit (cables) whost fire-induced failure could effect shutdown.
The guidelines for protecting the safe shutdown capability from the fire-induced failures of associated circuits are not requirements.
These guidelines should be used only as guidaned when needed. These guidelines do not limit the alter-natives available to the licensee for protecting the shutdown capability.
All proposed methods for protection of the shutdown capability from fire-induced failures will be evaluated by the staff for acceptability,.
A.
Our concern is that circuits within the fire area,will, receive fire damage which can affect shutdown capability and thereby prevent post-fire safe shutdown. Associated Circuits
- of Concern are defined as those cables (safety felated, non-safety related, Class 1E, and non-Class 1E) that:
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as the definition presented in IEEE-384-1977.
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Have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Append'ix R,.and; 2.
Have one of the following:-
a common power source with the shutdown' equipment (redundant or a.
alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concer.n by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices (see diagram 2a), or b.
a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVs, steam generator atmospheric dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.) (see diagram 2b), or a common enclosure (e.g., raceway, panel, junction) with the shutdown c.
cables (redundant and alternative) and, (1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or simi-lar devices, or (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure, (see diagram 2c).
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EXAMPLES OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN s.
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sus The area barriers shown above meet E p p,,,e,f,j,,,e,p the' appropriate sub-paragraphs (a-f).
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The following guidelines are for protecting the shutdown capability from fire-ir.duced failures of circuits (cables) in the fire area.
The guidance -
provided below for interrupting devices applies only to new devices installed to provide electrical isolation of associated circuits of concern, or as part of the alternative or dedicated shutdown system.
The shutdown capability may be protected from tho adverse effect of damage to asscciated circuits of concern by the following methods:
1.
Provide protection between the associated circuits of concern and the shutdown circuits as per Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, or For a common power source case of associated circuit:
2.
a.
Provide load fuse / breaker (interrupting devices) to feeder fuse / breaker coordination to prevent loss of the redundant or alternative shutdown power source. To ensure that the following coordination criteria are met the 'fol]owing should apply:
(1)~ The associated circuit of concern interrupting devices '
(breakers or fuses) time-overcurrent trip characteristic for all circuits faults should cause the interrupting device to interrupt the fault current prior' to initiation of a trip of any upstream interrupting device which will cause a loss of the conaon power source,
,(2) The power source shall supply t'he necessary fault current for sufficient time to ensure the proper coordination without loss of function of the shutdown loads.
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The acceptability of a particular interrupting device is considered demonstrated if the following criteria are met:
(i) The interrupting device design shall be factory tested to verify overcurrent protection as designed in accordance with the applicable UL, ANSI, or NEMA standards.
(ii)
For low and medium voltage switchgear (480 V and above) circuit breaker / protective relay periodic testing shall demonstrate that the overall coordination scheme remains within the limits specified in the design criteria. This testing may be performed as a series of overlapping tests.
(iii) Molded case circuit breakers shall peridically be manually exercised and inspected to insure ease of operation. On a rotating refueling outage basis a sample of these breakers shall be tested to determine that breaker drift is within that allowed by the design criteria. Breakensshould be tested in accordance with an accepted QC testing methodology such as MIL STD 10 5 D.
(iv)
Fuses when used as interrupting devices do not require periodic testing, due to their stability, lack of drift, and high reliability. Administrative controls must insure that replacement fuses with ratings other than those selected for proper coordinating are not accidentally used.
b.
For circuits of equipment and/or components whose spurious operation
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would affect the capability to safely shutdown:
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l (1) provide a means to isolate the equipment and/or components from the fire area prior to the fire (i.e., remove power cabl.es, open circuitbreakers);or (2) provide electrical isolation that prevents spurious operation.
Potential isolation devices include breakers, fuses, ampli-fiers, control switches, current XFRS, fiber optic couplers, relays and transducers; or (3) provide a means to detect spurious operations and then proce-dures to defeat the maloperation of equipment (i.e., closure of the block valve if PORV spuriously operates, opening of the breakers to remove spurious operation of safety infection);
For common enclosure cases of associated circuits:
c.
(1) provide appropriate measures to prevent propagation of the fire; and (2) provide electrical protection (i.e., breakers, fuses or similar. devices)
C.
We recognize that there are different approaches which may be used to reach the same objective of determining the interaction of associated circuits with shutdown systems. One approach is to start with the fire area, identify what is' in the fire area, and' determine the interaction between what is in the fire area and the shutdown systems which are outside the fire area. We nave entitled this approach, "The Fire Area Approach." A second approach which we have named "The Systems Approach" would be to define the shutdown systems around a fire area and then determine
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those circuits that are located in the fire area that are associated with the shutdown system. We have prepared two sets of requests for information, one for each approach.
The licensee may choose to respond to either set of requests depending on the approach cted by the licensee.
FIRE AREA APPROACH 1.
For each fire area where an alternative or dedicated shutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R is provided, the
'following information is required to demonstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method:
a.
Provide a table that lists all the power cables in the fire area
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that connect to the same power supply of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method and the function of each power cable listed (i.e., power for RHR pump).
b.
Provide a table that lists all the cables in the fire area that were considered for possible spurious operation which would adversely affect shutdown and the function of each cable listed.
c.
Provide a table that lists all the cables in the fire area that share a common enclosure with circuits of the alternative or dedicated shutdown systems and the function of each cable listed.
d.
Show that fire-induced failures (hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground)~ of each of the cables listed in a; b, and c will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method.
e.
For each cable listed in a, b and c where new electrical isolation has been provided or modification to existir.g electrical isolation has
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been made, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show how each cable is isolated from the fire area.
SYSTEMS APPROACH 1.
For each area where an alternative or dedica'ted shutdown method, in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R is provided, the following information is required to. demonstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation ~or cause maloperation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method:
a.
Describe the methodology used to assess the potential of associated circuit adversly affecting the alternative or dedicated shutdown.
The description of the methodology should include the methods used to identify the circuits which share a common power supply 4
or. a common enclosure with the alternative or dedicated shutdown system and the circuits whose spurious operation would affect shutdown. Additionally, the description should include the methods used to identify if these circuits are, associated circuits of concern due to their location in the fire area.
b.
Provide a table that lists all associated circuits of concern located in the fire area.
c.
Show that fire-induced failures (hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground) of each of the cables listed in b will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the alternatite or dedicated shutdown method.
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For each cable listed in b where new electrical isolation has been provided, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show how each cable is isolated from the fire area.
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Provide a location at the site or other office,s where ali the tables and drawings generated by this metho' dolo'gy approach
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for the associated circuits review may be audited to verify,the L
information provided above.
HIGH-LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE For either approach chosen the following concern dealing with high-low.
, pressure interface should be addressed.
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The residyal heat removal sy~ stem is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we requi.re compliance with the recommendations of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
Thus, the interface most likely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves. These two motor operated yalves and their associdted cables may be-subject to a single f. ire hazard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire initiated LOCA through the high-low pressure system ir.terface. To assure that this. interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
a.. Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices'(such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
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For each set of redundant valves i~dentified in a., verify the redundant cabling (power and control) have adequate physical separation as required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
For each case where adequate separation is r.ct provided, shott that c.
fire induced failures (hot short, open circuits or short to ground) of the cables will not cause maloperation an. result in a LOCA.
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CRIT'ERIA FOR EVAL'UATING EXEMPTIONS TO SECTION III G OF APPENDIX R OF 10 CFR PART 50 Paragraph 50.48 Fire Protection of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that all nuclear power plants licensed prior to January 1,1979 satisfy the requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
It also requires that alternative fire protection configurations, previously approved by an SER be reexamined for r empliance with the requirements of Section III.G.
Section 111.0 is related to fire protection features for ensuring that systems ano associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown are free of fire damage.
Fire prot 6ction configurations' must eithe.r meet the specific require-ments of Section III.G or an alternative fire protection configuration ^
must be justified by a fire hazard ana]ysis.
The general criteria for accepting an alternative fire protection configur-ations are the following:,
The alternative assures that one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control stations is free of fire damage.
The alternative assures that fire damage to at least one train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown is limited such that it can be repaired within a reasonable time (minor repairs with components stored on-site).
Fire retardant coatings are not used as fire barriers.
Modificatii5ns required to meet Section III.G would not enhance fire protection safety above that provided by either existing or proposed alternatives.
Modifications required to meet Section III.G would be detrimental l
to overall facility safety.
Because of the broad spectrum of potential configurations for which exemptions may be, requested, specific criteria that account for all of the parameters that are important to fire protection and consistent with safety requirements of all plant-unique configurations have not been developed.
However, our evpluations of deviations from these require -
ments in our grevious reviews and in the requests for III.G exemptions received to date have identified some recurring configurations for which specific criteria have been developed,
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i Section III.G.2 accepts three methods of fire protection.
A passive 3-hour fire barrier should be used where possible. Where a fixed barrier cannot be installed, an automatic suppression system in combination with a fire barrier or a separation distance free of combustibles is used if the configurations of systems to be protected and in-situ combustibles are such that there is reasonable assurance that the protected systems will survive.
If this latter condition is not met, alternative shutdown capa--
bility is required and a fixed suppression system installed in the fire area of concern, if it contains a large concentration of cables.
It'is essential to remember that these alternative requirements are not deemed to be equivalent.
However, they provide adequate protection for those configurations in which they are accepted.
When the fire protection features of each fire area are evaluated, the whole system of such features must be kept'in perspective. The defense-in-depth principle of fire protection programs is aimed at achieving an adequate balance between the different features. Strengthening any one can compensate in some measure for weaknesses, known or unknown in others.
The adequacy of fire protection for any particular plant safety system or area is determined by analysis of the effects of postulated fire relative to maintaining the ability to safely shutdown the plant and minimize radio-active releases to the environment in the event of a fire. During thes,e evaluations it is necessary to consider the two-edged nature of fire protection' features recognized in General Design Criterion 3 namely, fire protection should be provided consistent with other safety considerations.
l An evaluation must be made for each fire area for which an exemption I
is requested.
During these evaluations, the staff considers the following parameters:
'A.
Area Description walls, floor, and ceiling construction ceiling height room volume ventilation congestion B.
Safe Shutdown Capability' number of redun, dant systems in area whether or not system or equiment is required for hot shutdown type of equipment / cables involved repair time for cold shutdown equipmnt within this area separation between redundant components and in-situ concentration of combustibles alternative shutdown capability l
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Fire Hazard Analysis type and configuration of combustibles in area i
quantity of combustibles
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ease of ignition and propagation heat release rate potential transient and installed combustibles suppression damage to equipment whether the area is continuously manned traffic through the area i
accessibility of the area D.
Fire Protection Existing or Committed fire detection systems fire extinguishing systems ho,se station / extinguisher radiant heat shields
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A specific description of the fire protection features of the configuration is required to justify the compensating ~ features of the alternative.- Low fire loading is not a sufficient basis for granting an exemption in areas where there are cables.
i If necessary, a team of. experts, including a fire protection engineer, will visit the site to determine the existing circumstances. This v,isual inspection is also considered in the review process.
The majority of the III.G exemption requests received to date are being denied because they lack specificity.
Licensees have not identified the extent of the exemption requested, have not provided a technical basis l
For the request and/or have not provided a specific description of the l
alternative. We expect to receive requests for exemption of the following
, nature:
i 1.
Fix'ed fire barriers less than 3-hour rating.
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Fire barrier without an automatic fire suppression system.
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automatic suppression system.
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For large open areas with few components to be protected and few in-situ combustibles, no automatic' suppression system with separation as in Item 3 aboveF.
5.
No fixed suppression in the contr'ol room.
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No fixed suppression in areas without a large concentration of cables for which alternative shutdown capability has been providq4 Our fire resgarch test program is conducting tests to provide information that will be useful to determine the boundary of acceptable conditions for fire protection configuraticas which do not include a fire rated barrier.
Based on deviations recently approved, specific criteria for certain recurring configurations are as follows:
Firs Barrier Less than Three Hours This barrier is a wall, floor, ceiling or an enclosure which separates one fire area from another.
Exemptions may be granted for a lower rating (e.g., one hour or two hou's) r where the fire loading is no more than 1/2 of the barrier rating. The fire rating of the barrier shall be no less than one hour.
Exemptions may be granted for a fixed barrier with a lower fix rating supplemented by a water curtain.
An Automatic Suppression System With Either One Hour Fire Barrier or 20-Foot Separation This barrier is an enclosure which separates those po. tions of one division r
which are within 20 feet of the redundant division.
The suppressant may be water or gas.
Exemptions may be granted for configurations of redundant systems which
~hav'e compensating features.
For example:
A.
Separation distances less than 20 feet may be deemed acceptable where:
1.
Fire propagation retardants (i.e., cable coati *ngs, covered trays, conduits, or mineral wool blankets) assur4 that fire propagation through in-situ combustibles will not occur or will be delayed suf ficiently to ensure adequate time for detection and ' suppression.
2.
Distance above a floor level exposure fire and below ceiling assures that redundant systems will not be simultaneously subject to an unasceptable temperature or heat flux.
B.
The ommission of an automatic suppression system may be deemed acceptable where:
1.
Distance above a floor level exposure fire and below ceiling assures that redundant systems will not be simultaneously subject to an unacceptable temperature or heat flux.
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The fire area is required to be manned continuously by the provisions in the Technical Specifications.
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