IR 05000315/2023003
| ML23292A030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/2023 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB |
| To: | Lies Q Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR 2023003 | |
| Download: ML23292A030 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2023003 AND 05000316/2023003
Dear Q. Shane Lies:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On October 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
October 19, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000315/2023003 and 05000316/2023003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-003-0049
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023
Inspectors:
T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer
T. Hartman, Senior Project Engineer
T. Hooker, Health Physicist
J. Mancuso, Resident Inspector
J. Park, Reactor Inspector
J. Reed, Health Physicist
P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Without an Operable Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Train Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and an associated non-cited violation of Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.13, Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation (FHAEV) System, was identified when the licensee failed to have one FHAEV train operable and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building.
Failure to Properly Tune the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Positioners Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000316/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to properly set up and calibrate the main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV) positioners after modifying the system.
Specifically, the licensee did not properly tune the Unit 2 MFRV digital positioners after implementing a plant modification, resulting in feedwater oscillations and a reactor trip.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000315,05000316/2021011-03 Establishment of Non-Safety Related Nitrogen Supply as a Credited Motive Power Source to Mitigate a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event 71152A Closed LER 05000316/2022-001-00 LER 2022-001-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator High-High Level 71153 Closed
LER 05000315, 05000316/2023-001-00 LER 2023-001-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Two Trains of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation Inoperable 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 and Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period, with the following exceptions:
Unit 1 reduced power to approximately 95 percent on August 23, 2023, for steam generator power-operated valve testing. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on August 24, 2023.
Unit 2 reduced power to approximately 92 percent on September 22, 2023, for main feedwater pump testing. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power on September 23,
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of high summer heat on July 26, 2023.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 east main feedwater pump electrohydraulic control (EHC) leak on Unit 1 west main feedwater pump on July 12, 2023
- (2) Unit 2 east component cooling water (CCW) during west CCW (2-CMO-413)maintenance on July 17, 2023
- (3) Unit 2 AB and CD emergency diesel generators (EDGs), supplemental diesel generators, and unaffected areas of 345, 765, and 69kV switchyards during significant switchyard work on August 10, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (2) Fire Zone 65A/B: Safety Injection Pump Room South/North, Unit 2 Elevation 590'-0" on July 20, 2023
- (3) Fire Zone 44: General Area South/North Elevation 609' on July 25, 2023
- (4) Fire Zone 15: 1 CD Diesel Generator Room, Unit 1 Elevation 587' on August 7, 2023
- (5) Fire Zone 107: Auxiliary Feedwater Battery Room, Unit 2 Elevation 633'-0" on August 28, 2023
- (6) Fire Zone 40B: 4kV CD Switchgear Room, Unit 1 Elevation 609'-0" on September 6, 2023
- (7) Fire Zone 47B: 4kV CD Switchgear Room Unit 2 Elevation 609'-0" on September 6, 2023
- (8) Fire Zones 70 and 73: Control Room HVAC Equipment, Unit 1 Elevation 650'-0" on September 18, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on September 28, 2023.
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)1-OHP-5030-019-002E; East Essential Service Water System Flush and Flow Data Collection (Attachment 1 - East CCW Heat Exchanger ESW Flow Data Collection) on September 27, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during a Unit 1 rapid downpower due to the west main feed pump EHC leak on July 12, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during a Unit 1/2 offsite electrical power realignment due to Train B Reserve Feed work window on September 6, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated RQ-E-23CPE-S4, 2023 Cook Nuclear CPE Scenario #4 on July 18, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated RQ-S-4803-U1/2 Period 4803 Unit 1 and 2 Train Scenario on August 2, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 main steam a(1) plan on August 1, 2023
- (2) Units 1 and 2 auxiliary building AB-09 a(1) plan on September 25, 2023
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)1AB EDG 8-year maintenance on September 18, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (3) Flooding impacts due to storms July 29 through 30, on July 31, 2023
- (4) Maintenance Risk Cycle 127, Week 08, with Unit 1 west residual heat removal window, Unit 2 AB EDG Surveillance, Unit 1 ESW Surveillance, and hot weather alerts on August 21, 2023
- (5) Action Request (AR) 2023-5953; Unit 1 Main Transformer Gas Concentration and Rate of Change on August 21, 2023
- (6) AR 2023-5950; Unit 1 CD Battery ground on August 22, 2023
- (7) AR 2023-5879; Indications of partial discharge on 12AB Loop Feed Enclosure on September 5, 2023
- (8) Maintenance Risk Cycle 127, Week 10, with Unit 1/2 Train B Reserve Feed out of service for emergent maintenance on September 5, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 2023-4420; Partial Discharge Identified on U1 RCP Penetration on June 13, 2023
- (5) AR 2023-5385; 2-BAT-AB Jar Cracks on July 31, 2023
- (6) AR 2023-5318;12-HV-AFX-HEPA and Charcoal Filter Low D/P and AR 2023-5586; Failure of Both 12/HV-BD-AFX-1 and 12-HV-BD-AFX-2 on August 2, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Rubber blankets in the Unit 2 AB Battery Room on March 17, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 west main feed pump on July 14, 2023, 2023
- (2) Unit 1 essential service water valve on July 18, 2023
- (3) Train B reserve feed following planned work window on September 8, 2023
- (4) Unit 1 north safety injection pump test following planned work window on August 28, 2023 (5)2E motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on August 10, 2023
- (6) Unit 1AB EDG after 8-year preventive maintenance work on September 15, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)1-IHP-4030-113-028; Steam Jet Air Ejectors and Condensers Vent Radiation Monitor SRA-1900 Channel Operational Test and Calibration on August 1, 2023 (2)2-IHP-4030-211-005, 006, 007, 008; Lower Containment Pressure Protection Set 1, 2, 3, 4 Channel Operation Test and Calibration on August 8, 2023 (3)2-OHP-4030-256-017E; East Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test on August 10,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Unit 1 Auxiliary Building ventilation stack filtration system, 1 HV-AES
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) Internal dose assessment for ACAD number 25760 from 2023
- (2) Internal dose assessment for ACAD number 29274 from 2022
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) Declared Pregnant Worker number 3024 from 2022
- (2) Declared Pregnant Worker number 3024 from
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Partial)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
(Partial)
- ARs 2022-5752, 2022-7748, and 2023-5760, 2CD Frequency Not Within Requirements, August 2023 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000316/2022-001-00; Automatic Reactor Trip Due to High-High Steam Generator Level, (ADAMS Accession No. ML23004A205). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000315/2023-001-00; 05000316/2023-001-00; Two Trains of Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation Inoperable, (ADAMS Accession No. ML23271A098). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Without an Operable Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Train Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and an associated non-cited violation of Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.13, Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation (FHAEV)
System, was identified when the licensee failed to have one FHAEV train operable and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building.
Description:
TS 3.7.13 requires one FHAEV train operable and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building. Contrary to this requirement, on July 31, 2023, and August 1, 2023, irradiated fuel was moved in the spent fuel pool, which is in the auxiliary building, without one FHAEV train operable and in operation.
The FHAEV system filters airborne radioactive particulates from the area of the fuel pool following a fuel handling accident. The design-basis evaluation of the postulated fuel handling accident assumes that one train of the FHAEV system is operating with the exhaust flow directed through the charcoal adsorber. It also assumes the fuel handling area supply air system fans automatically shutdown upon receipt of a high radiation signal for the fuel handling area.
The licensee demonstrates FHAEV operability by performing surveillance procedures 12-IHP-4030-128-001, Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System Surveillance (24-month frequency) and 12-OHP-4030-128-028, Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation System Test (92-day frequency). These procedures monitor HEPA/charcoal unit flow rate and differential pressure (dP) as well as the FHAEVs ability to maintain vacuum with respect to atmospheric pressure during its accident mode of operation.
On July 25, 2023, while reviewing operator round data, the licensee recognized the start of a decreasing trend coincident with performance of TS surveillance 12-OHP-4030-128-028 on July 23, 2023. Specifically, an abnormal decrease in HEPA/charcoal dP was identified, with the water column of both HEPA and charcoal less than administrative limits. The issue was documented in the licensee's corrective action program with the equipment determined to be operable and a recommendation for engineering to do an internal inspection of the fan housing/bypass dampers.
During a walkdown on August 1, 2023, the licensee found the fuel handling area exhaust fan 12-HV-AFX-1 rotating backward. On August 2, 2023, further licensee investigation found fuel handling area exhaust fan discharge backdraft dampers 12-HV-BD-AFX-1 and 12-HV-BD-AFX-2 severely degraded. The 12-HV-BD-AFX-1 damper was stuck in place at 45 degrees open, with its top blade broken free from the linkage rod. The 12-HV-BD-AFX-2 damper was found with two of its blades stuck fully open, with the damper blade linkage rod broken off and located approximately 5 feet upstream of the damper. The licensee documented those conditions with the immediate operability determination that both trains of FHAEV were inoperable.
The licensee performed a past operability and determined that neither FHAEV fan train could perform their cleanup/filtration safety function. Consequently, operability was challenged between July 23, 2023, and August 5, 2023. The licensee moved irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool on July 31, 2023, and August 1, 2023. The licensee evaluated the radiological dose consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident in the auxiliary building while the FHAEV was inoperable and concluded the fuel handling accident analysis of record was not adversely affected.
Corrective Actions: The licensee implemented actions intended to correct the FHAEV degraded conditions and performed the required TS surveillance, returning the FHAEV system to an operable status. The licensee completed a causal evaluation in support of Licensee Event Report 05000315/2023-001-00; 05000316/2023-001-00.
Corrective Action References: AR 2023-5318, 12-HV-AFX HEPA and Charcoal Filter D/P Low and AR 2023-5586, Failure of both 12-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to have one FHAEV train operable and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building was contrary to TS 3.7.13 and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, irradiated fuel was moved in the spent fuel pool, located in the auxiliary building, on July 31, 2023, and August 1, 2023, with both FHAEV fan trains inoperable.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in movement of irradiated fuel in the auxiliary building without one operable FHAEV fan train to ensure any releases to the environment from a fuel handling accident were properly filtered.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary building.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee did not understand degraded FHAEV conditions before proceeding with movement of irradiated fuel.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 3.7.13 requires one FHAEV train operable and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building.
Contrary to the above, on July 31, 2023, and August 1, 2023, the licensee failed to have one operable FHAEV train and in operation during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building. Specifically, neither of the FHAEV trains were operable while moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Establishment of Non-Safety Related Nitrogen Supply as a Credited Motive Power Source to Mitigate a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event URI 05000315,05000316/2021011-03 71152A
Description:
During the 2021 NRC Power Operated Valve (POV) Inspection, an Unresolved Item (URI)was opened to determine whether a change made by the licensee required NRC approval before its implementation. The change involved crediting the non-safety-related nitrogen system as a motive power source for the steam generator (SG) power-operated relief valves (PORVs) when the compressed air supply becomes unavailable during a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident, coincident with a loss of offsite power. This change was made in response to a finding identified during the 2012 NRC Component Design Basis Inspection as documented in Inspection Reports 05000315/2012007; 05000316/2012007 (ML13011A401), and 05000315/2013010; 05000316/2013010 (ML13189A243). The details of the URI were documented in Inspection Report 05000315/2021011; 05000316/2021011 (ML21316A061).
The POV inspection indicated that the change should have been considered adverse. The licensee is required to conduct an evaluation to determine whether NRC approval was necessary before implementing changes that introduce adverse effects. In response, the licensee updated 50.59 Screening No. 2017-0156 to Revision 1, and performed 50.59 Evaluation No. 2017-0156, Qualification of Nitrogen Backup to Steam Generator PORVs and Backup Air Bottles for Pressurizer PORVs, in Revision 0. The conclusion of the 50.59 Evaluation was that prior NRC approval was not required.
During the review of this URI, the inspectors reviewed the 50.59 Evaluation along with additional information provided by the licensee and did not identify any performance deficiencies. The inspectors noted that the justifications presented in the 50.59 Evaluation reasonably demonstrated the change did not adversely affect the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) described design function of the SG PORVs to mitigate SGTR events.
The inspectors considered, in part, that the NRC had previously approved the limited use of non-safety-related SSCs for mitigating SGTR events. The use of non-safety-related pneumatic power source for the SG PORVs was already part of the original design, specifically the compressed air system, which the nitrogen system was intended to supplement. Crediting the non-safety-related nitrogen system for this purpose was consistent with the current licensing basis. Also, the inspectors considered that the nitrogen system is a passive design susceptible to slow-progressing degradation mechanisms and the licensee periodically verified its material condition. This allows any potential degradation to be timely detected and addressed via existing processes. Furthermore, they noted that the licensing basis did not include postulating severe natural phenomena, like tornadoes, coinciding with the SGTR event. In addition, the licensing basis did not assume a single failure in the SGTR accident mitigation. Therefore, sharing the nitrogen system between both reactor units would not introduce an adverse effect.
Based on their determination that the change did not adversely affect the UFSAR described design function, the inspectors concluded the licensee was not required to perform a 50.59 evaluation. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee did not consider all the necessary factors to establish that the change did not introduce adverse effects in Revision 0 of 50.59 Screening No. 2017-0156. Consequently, the licensee did not justify their determination that a 50.59 evaluation was not required in Revision 0 of 50.59 Screening No. 2017-0156.
Nevertheless, 50.59 screenings are not required by NRC regulations. Thus, the inspectors did not identify any findings or violations.
This URI is closed under inspection procedure (IP) 71152A because IP 71111.21N.02, under which this URI was originally opened, has been completed Agencywide at the time of the URI closure.
Failure to Properly Tune the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Positioners Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000316/2023003-02 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to properly set up and calibrate the main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV) positioners after modifying the system.
Specifically, the licensee did not properly tune the Unit 2 MFRV digital positioners after implementing a plant modification, resulting in feedwater oscillations and a reactor trip.
Description:
During the 2018 refueling outage of Unit 2, the digital positioners that control the MFRVs were installed and tuned by the vendor. The licensee did a review of the tuning results but failed to notice an undesired dead band in the valve response. Since then, the licensee had challenges maintaining SG water level control, especially during low power operations.
Various mitigating actions were attempted, including controlling the main feedwater pumps (MFPs) using both speed and differential pressure control modes, in both manual and automatic modes.
On November 10, 2022, Unit 2 received an automatic reactor trip signal because of High-High Steam Generator (SG) water level. While the licensee was performing a Unit 2 power ascension from 26 percent, feedwater system oscillations were observed in the steam generators water level indications. In response, operators placed the east MFP in manual differential pressure (dP) control mode and raised pump speed. The licensee believed the SG water level was stabilized around 44 percent power when the east MFP was transferred to speed control mode. Upon attempting to regulate SG water level by adjusting the MFRV controllers, an abrupt and rapid increase in water level occurred. The operators were unable to stop the rise in water level and reached a reactor trip setpoint (i.e., HI-HI Water Level in the SG), which automatically tripped the reactor.
The licensee determined that the feedwater oscillations that occurred during power ascension were due, in part, to the configuration used for operating the MFP and the feedwater system.
The MFW system is designed for 100 percent power with two MFPs in operation. The licensee used the plant-referenced simulator to re-create the event and determined that operating one MFP in manual dP mode at a lower dP than programmed resulted in unrecoverable feedwater oscillations and SG water level disturbances.
Ultimately, the licensee determined the cause of the abnormally high water level was the MFRV digital positioners not being tuned properly and being difficult to control. Engineering Change (EC) 53424, RCI Upgrade, Replace Feedwater Regulating Valve Positioners and Feedwater Isolation Solenoid Valves, was completed under work order (WO) 55465951.
Task 15 of this WO established the instruction to set up and calibrate 2-FRV-220-PU, Steam Generator OME-3-2 Feedwater Regulating Valve FRV-220 Positioner, This WO task referred to sections of procedure 12-IHP-6030-IMP-043, Air Operated Valves (AOV) with Digital Valve Positioner Diagnostics Testing and Calibration, for the set up and calibration.
Revision 6 was in effect when the WO was completed, while Revision 15 was in effect when the issue self-revealed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee revised procedure 12-IHP-6030-IMP-043, Air Operated Valves (AOV) with Digital Positioner Diagnostics Testing and Calibration, Revision 15, to provide additional guidance for tuning the positioners and reviews.
Corrective Action References: AR 2022-9291
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to properly set up and calibrate the positioner for MFRV 2-FRV-220 was contrary to WO 55465951-15 and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to properly tune the main feedwater positioners led to oscillations within the steam generators and ultimately a reactor and plant trip.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors answered no to question B. Transient Initiators in Exhibit 1 - Initiating Events Screening Questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work, and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the post-maintenance testing that should have verified proper operation of the equipment across the ranges of operation failed to identify the condition.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Q. Shane Lies, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Kelly Ferneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 27, 2023, the inspectors presented the inspection follow-up and closure for an Unresolved Item associated with inspection 2021-011 (Design Bases Assurance Inspection) inspection results to M. Scarpello, Director, Regulatory Assurance, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PMI-5055
Winterization/Summerization
009
PMP-2291-OLR-
001
On-Line Risk Management
Procedures
PMP-5055-001-001
Winterization/Summerization
040
AR 2021-8908
Seal Leak
10/30/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2022-1701
Unit 2 CCW Pump Outboard Bearing Oil Discolored and
Hot
03/02/2022
1-OHP-4021-016-
003
Component Cooling Water Operation
1-OHP-4021-032-
008AB
Operating DG1AB Subsystems
036
Procedures
1-OHP-4021-034-
001
Operating DG1CD Systems
043
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 40A: 4KV AB Switchgear Room Unit 1
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 65A: Safety Injection Pump Room South Unit 2
elev. 598'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 65B: Safety Injection Pump Room North Unit 2
elev. 598'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 15: 1CD Diesel Generator Room Unit 1
elev. 587'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Area AA 42: FZ 44S - Auxiliary Building South - Both
Units - elev. 609'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 44N: Auxiliary Building North Both Units,
elev. 609'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Area AA36 (North Portion): FZ 43 - Access Control
Area - Both Units, elev. 609'-0", FZ 44N - Auxiliary Building
North - Both Units - elev. 609'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 107: Aux. Feedwater Battery Room #2 Unit 2
elev. 633'-0"
Fire Plans
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Area AA 1; Fire Zone 1E, Containment Spray Pump
East Unit 2 elev. 573'-0"
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 40B 4kV CD Switchgear Room, Unit 1
elev. 609'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 47B: 4kV CD Switchgear Room, Unit 2
elev. 609'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 70: Control Room HVAC Equipment Unit 1
elev. 650"-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 70: Control Room HVAC Equipment Unit 1
elev. 650"-0"
Fire Pre-Plans -
Volume 1
Fire Zone 73: Control Room HVAC Equipment Unit 1
elev. 650"-0"
Miscellaneous
23-001-D
Fire Pump House MCC
001
1-OHP-4024-103
Annunciator #103 Response: Ventilation
2-FPP-2270-066-
057
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Functional Test
(U-2 Zones 6, 9, 22, 24, 26, and Shared Zone 4) - Data
Sheets 3 (Fire Detection Functional Test for Unit 2 Infrared
Detection Zone 24)
2-FPP-2270-066-
058
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Functional Test
(U-1 Zone 10, 11, 13 (RCT), 14(4kV), 18, 20, 22, and
Shared Zone 5) - Data Sheet 4 (Fire Detection Functional
Test for Unit 1 Infrared Detection Zone 20)
2-FPP-4030-066-
201
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Operational Test
(U-1 Zone 16, U-2 Zone 11 And Shared Zone 20)
2-FPP-4030-066-
205
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Operational Test
(U-1 Zones 6, 8, 9, 12, 13(4kV), 14(RCT), 15(4kV), 17, 19,
21, 23 and 24) - Data Sheet 4 (Fire Detection Operational
Test for Unit 1 Ionization Detection Zone 12 and Infrared
Detection Zone 19)
2-FPP-4030-066-
205
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Operational Test
(U-1 Zones 6, 8, 9, 12, 13[4kV], 14[RCT], 15[4kV], 17, 19,
21, 23 and 24)
Procedures
2-FPP4030-066-
204
Fire Detection Instrumentation Channel Operational Test
(U-2 Zones 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27,
and 28) - Data Sheet 5 (Fire Detection Operability Test for
Unit 2 Ionization Detection Zone 7 and Infrared Detection
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Zone 23)
2-OHP-4025-001-
2
Fire Response Guidelines
1-OHP-5030-019-
2E
East Essential Service Water System Flush and Flow Data
Collection (Attachment 1 East CCW Heat Exchanger ESW
Flow Data Collection)
09/27/2023
Procedures
1-OHP-5030-019-
2E
East Essential Service Water System Flush and Flow Data
Collection (Attachment 1 East CCW Heat Exchanger ESW
Flow Data Collection)
03/08/2022
1-OHP-4021-003-
001
Letdown, Charging and Seal Water Operation
084
2-OHP-4022-018-
006
Irradiated Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Storage
Area - Control Room Actions
RQ-E-23CPE-S4
23 Cook Nuclear Plant CPE Scenario #4
Miscellaneous
RQ-S-4803-U1/2
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Scenario
1-OHP-4021-001-
003
Power Reduction
067
1-OHP-4021-082-
039
De-Energizing Reserve Auxiliary Transformer
1-TR101AB - Attachment 1
1-OHP-4022-001-
006
Rapid Power Reduction Response
21
Procedures
1-OHP-4030-114-
21
Event Initiated Surveillances - Data Sheet 20 Inoperable
Power Supply
AR 2021-9413
MRule Reliability Criteria for Function MS-09 Exceeded
11/17/2021
AR 2022-5051
Maintenance Rule Condition Monitoring Goal Exceeded
06/09/2022
AR 2023-0471
2-OME-90-RI-H2 Broken Bolt
01/17/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-1838
AB Pyrojector Sealing Failure
03/02/2023
Engineering
Evaluations
ER 2100017772
Method for Securing the Pyrojectors on the Auxiliary
Building Roof Closed
05/03/2023
Miscellaneous
EHC Leaks
01/25/2022-
01/25/2023
Procedures
1-OHP-4030-132-
27AB
DG1AB Fast Speed Start
09/16/2023
Corrective Action
AR 2016-12152
10/22/2016
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 2022-2672
ARM-22-04-01 Water Intrusion Events
04/04/2022
AR 2023-5061
EHC Leak from U1 West Main Feed Pump
07/12/2023
AR 2023-5455
Static Transfer Switch
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5458
Unit 2 AHU Abnormal Alarm
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5459
Security UPS Failure
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5460
ISFSI Security Alarms
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5464
Roof Leak in the RPAC Storage Area
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5466
North Microwave Zones Wash Out
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5468
Rain Water Intrusion in Protected Area
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5472
Security Loggable Event
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5473
Standing Water Security Diesel Pipe Chase
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5477
PA Fence Breach Zone 26
07/30/2023
AR 2023-5478
Zone 7 has a Washout
07/30/2023
AR 2023-5483
2-MUP-CPHT-Main MUP Heat Trace Panel Water
Intrusion
07/29/2023
AR 2023-5488
Annunciator 124, Drop 99 Standing
07/30/2023
AR 2023-5489
1-QT-100-CD Oil Level has Risen After Heavy Rain
07/30/2023
AR 2023-5490
1-QT-100-AB Oil Appears to be Milky
07/30/2023
AR 2023-5879
Indication of Partial Discharge on 12AB Loop Feed
08/24/2023
AR 2023-5950
Unit 1 Plant Battery 1CD Ground
08/19/2023
Documents
AR 2023-5953
1-TR-MAIN Rate of Change (ROC) Caution for Several
Gases
08/20/2023
Engineering
Evaluations
ER 2100020192
2AB Loop Feed Enclosure Bus Bar Configuration/Epoxy
Coating Thickness
09/06/2023
Unit 1 Online Risk Cycle 127, Week 10
Unit 2 Online Risk Cycle 127, Week 10
Unit 1 Online Risk, Maintenance Risk Cycle 127, Week 08
Unit 2 Online Risk, Maintenance Risk Cycle 127, Week 08
Unit 1 & 2 Online Risk Cycle, Week 127 Cycle 03
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 & 2 Online Risk Cycle 127, Week 08
Procedures
2-IHP-5030-EMP-
001
Limitorque Valve Operator Preventive Maintenance
047
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AR 2023-4420
Partial Discharge Identified on U1 RCP Penetration
06/13/2023
AR 2023-5318
2-HV-AFX-HEPA and Charcoal Filter D/P Low
07/25/2023
AR 2023-5344
2-LLI-120 Reads Erroneously High
07/26/2023
AR 2023-5586
Failure of Both 12-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
08/02/2023
AR 2023-5586-1
Past Operability Evaluation - Failure of Both
2-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
08/15/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5760
2CD EDG Frequency Drop After Start but Before Sync to
T21D
08/11/2023
Unit 2 Turbine Building Tour Logs - 2AB EDG Fuel Oil
Tank Level (January 2023 through July 2023)
101
Miscellaneous
2-FPP-2270-066-
055
Fire Detection Instrument Channel Functional Test
(U-1 Zones 7, 16, 22, 24, and U-2 Zones 2, 15, 16, 20)
AR 2013-19297
New Cracks in 2-BATT-CD
2/20/2013
AR 2015-15471
1-BATT-CD has New Cracks Identified on Battery Tops
2/01/2015
AR 2016-12152
Xe-133 Identified in Unit 2 CCW Water
10/22/2016
AR 2016-12152-1
Xe-133 Identified in Unit 2 CCW Water
11/22/2016
AR 2020-7975
1-BATT-AB Jar Lid Cracking
10/01/2020
AR 2023-4991
2-WMO-734, ESW from East CCW HX-2WMO-734
07/08/2023
AR 2023-5385
2-BATT-AB Jar Lid Cracks
07/26/2023
Operability
Evaluations
AR 2023-5586-1
Past Operability Evaluation - Failure of Both
2-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
08/15/2023
2-FPP-4030-066-
21
Inspection of Fire Dampers Protecting Safety-Related
Areas
016
2-IHP-4030-082-
005
AB, CD, N-Train Battery Monthly Surveillance and
Maintenance
2-IHP-4030-128-
001
Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System Surveillance
2
2-OHP-4030-128-
28
Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation System Test
005
2-OHL-5030-SOM-
006
Unit 2 Tours - U2 Turbine Tour
101
2-OHP-4030-232-
27AB
AB Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train B)
073
Procedures
DB-12-ESW
Design Basis Document for the Essential Service Water
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
System
Work Orders
55449216-01
Safety-Related Fire Damper Inspection and Testing
04/18/2015
AR 2023-2264
Transient Combustibles Staged Without a Permit
03/16/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-2625
Engineering Direction Not Provided for 2AB Battery
Covers
03/30/2023
2-IHP-5021-EMP-
006
Battery Cell/Bank Replacement
043
2-MHP-5021-SCF-
001
Scaffolding Procedure
2
PMI-5041
Temporary Configuration Change Program
005
Procedures
PMP-5041-TCC-
001
Temporary Configuration Changes
Miscellaneous
Switchgear Inspection and Test Report, 12AB-Term-Cab
09/07/2023
1-IHP-4030-113-
28
Steam Jet Air Ejectors After Condensers Vent Radiation
Monitor SRA-1900 Channel Operational Test and
Calibration
1-OHP-108-051N
North Safety Injection Pump System Test
08/28/2023
1-OHP-4030-108-
051N
North Safety Injection Pump System Test
08/29/2023
1-OHP-4030-119-
2W
West Essential Service Water System Test
07/18/2023
1-OHP-4030-132-
27AB
DG1AB Fast Speed Start
2-IHP-4030-211-
005
Lower Containment Pressure Protection Set 1 Channel
Operational Test and Calibration
009
2-IHP-4030-211-
006
Lower Containment Pressure Protection Set 2 Channel
Operational Test and Calibration
006
2-IHP-4030-211-
007
Lower Containment Pressure Protection Set 3 Channel
Operational Test and Calibration
007
2-IHP-4030-211-
008
Lower Containment Pressure Protection Set 4 Channel
Operational Test and Calibration
006
2-OHP-4030-256-
017E
East Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test
(Attachment 3 & Lineup Sheet 1)
Procedures
2-OHP-4030-256-
East Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test
08/10/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
017E
555301660107
MTE: 1-PS-A-1C; (1-OME-34W) Remove/Replace Breaker
07/18/2023
5553016603
MTE: 1-PS-A-1C; (1-OME-34W) PMT Breaker
07/18/2023
C1004621400104/4/
WLD, 12-OME-215W, Replace Exhaust Elbow, Align
Piping
04/24/2023
Work Orders
C10055329019
2-12AB-Bus-Dict: Perform Megger / DLRO / Hi-Pot as
Needed (MM)
09/07/2023
22-2099
HEPA Verification not Performed at Specified Frequency
03/17/2022
22-3333
Two Positive Whole-Body Counts
04/18/2022
22-3757
DLR and SRD Contaminated during Cavity Dive
04/28/2022
22-5091
Vendor Events That Lead to Increased Airborne
Radioactivity
04/19/2022
23-2429
Air Sample 2023-28 was Cross-Contaminated
03/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
23-4654
Elevated Tritium Levels in Containment
06/21/2023
23-5172
Fit Test Step Missed
07/18/2023
23-5234
Tracking Mechanism for SCBA Bottles
07/20/2023
23-5237
Operations Facial Hair Expectations
07/20/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
23-5238
Bauer Fill Station Failed Grade D Air Test
07/20/2023
230505060-00
Grade D Testing Report for the 7.5 Ton Tank Room Bauer
Fill Station
04/27/2023
Miscellaneous
FPP-2281-RES-201
Monthly Respirator Inspections
06/01/2023
Self-
Assessments
GT 2022-8068
Quick Hit Self-Assessment
06/14/2023
Work Orders
C10006126001
MTP: 2-HV-AES-2, 2-IHP-4030-228-004B
(24 MO Requirements)
11/21/2022
RP-06-03
Internal Dose from Hard to Detect Nuclides (HTD)
RP-15-02
Technical Basis for Response Correction Factor of the
MGP DMC-3000 Electronic Dosimeter
RP-18-02
Comparison of Dosimeter Response
RP-93-05
Evaluation of Tritium Exposure - Internal Dose
Assessment
RP-93-06
Technical Basis for the Internal Monitoring Program
Calculations
RPP-206 for ACAD
Internal Dose Assessment and Calculation
2/22/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
25760
RPP-206 for ACAD
274
Internal Dose Assessment and Calculation
11/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
23-5245
Actions Based on 71124.3 and 71124.4 Inspection
07/20/2023
Engineering
Evaluations
RPP-913
Scaling Factor Determinations
01/04/2023
Miscellaneous
RPP-121 for ACAD
2454
Dose Monitoring for Declared Pregnant Worker
10/26/2021
2-THP-6010-RPP-
101
Preparation and Control of Exposure Records and Reports
2-THP-6010-RPP-
104
Personnel Dosimetry Use in Varying Radiation Fields
2-THP-6010-RPP-
206
Internal Dose Assessment and Calculation
2-THP-6010-RPP-
315
HEPA Equipment Issue, Control, and Maintenance
FPP-2281-RES-209
Operation of the Bauer Fill System
FPP-2281-RES-210
Respirator Fit Testing with the Portacount
Procedures
PMP-6010-RPP-
100
Radiation Exposure Monitoring, Reporting, and Dose
Control
Narrative Operational Logs (July 2022 thru June 2023)
Miscellaneous
PMP-7110-PIP-001
Reactor Oversight Program Performance Indicators and
Monthly Operating Report Data Sheets and MSPI
Derivation Sheets (Heat Removal System (AFW) and
Residual Heat Removal System; July 2022 through
June 2023)
71151
Work Orders
C10055277005
1-OME-84-HPCVW-ACT, Perform Leak Inspection (PMT)
07/14/2023
AR 2022-7748
U2 CD EDG Frequency Not Acceptable
10/02/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-5760
2CD EDG Frequency Drop After Start but Before Synch to
T21D
08/11/2023
Miscellaneous
QDR - Component
2-DGCD-DRU; 2CD Emergency Diesel Generator Digital
08/24/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Detail Report
Reference Unit
Vendor Technical
Document Number
VTD-WOOD-0065
Woodward Governor Co. Digital Reference Unit Manual
with High, Low, & Intermediate Set Points
07/18/2019
Vendor Technical
Document Number:
VTD-WOOD-0001
Woodward Bellows Reverse Type Speed Setting
Mechanism
01/18/1994
2-IHP-6030-032-
003
Bench Testing A Diesel 2301A Analog Governor Electronic
Control with the Woodward Speed Loop Test Set
01/26/2023
Procedures
2-IHP-6030-032-
004
Emergency Diesel Generator Woodward 2301A Analog
Governor Tuning and Adjustment
06/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2022-9291
Unit 2 Rx Trip
11/10/2022
Engineering
Changes
RCI Upgrade, Replace Feedwater Regulating Valve
Positioners and Feedwater Isolation Solenoid Valves
Miscellaneous
AEP-NRC-2023-43
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Licensee Event Report
315/2023-001-00; Two Trains of Fuel Handling Area
Exhaust Ventilation Inoperable
09/28/2023
2-IHP-6030-IMP-
043
Air Operated Valves (AOV) with Digital Valve Positioner
Diagnostics Testing and Calibration
Procedures
2-IHP-6030-IMP-
043
Air Operated Valves (AOV) with Digital Valve Positioner
Diagnostics Testing and Calibration
Work Orders
2-FRV-220-PU, Steam Generator OME-3-2 Feedwater
Regulating Valve FRV-220 Positioner
03/20/2018