IR 05000220/2017008
| ML17293A057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/2017 |
| From: | DeFrancisco A E Division Reactor Projects I |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2017008 | |
| Download: ML17293A057 (12) | |
Text
October 19, 2017
Mr. Bryan Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/191 INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2017008 AND 05000410/2017008
Dear Mr. Hanson:
The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 25, 2017, with Mr. Jim Tsardakas, Director Site Training, and other members of your staff. An exit was conducted with Mr. Dennis M. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Manager, via telephone on September 13, 2017, to discuss the final results of the inspection. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating licenses. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with plant personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of NRC requirements were identified. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,/RA/ Anne E. DeFrancisco, Acting Chief Technical Support and Assessment Branch Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410 License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000220/2017008 and 05000410/2017008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000220/2017008 and 05000410/2017008; 08/21/2017 - 08/25/2017; NMPNS, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans. The inspection covered a one week inspection by a senior reactor analyst, an operations engineer, and a resident inspector. No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
3
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Other Activities
TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/ Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans The objective of TI 2515/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," is to verify: (1) that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML15163A097, ML16188A265 and ML16188A271) and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17009A141); (2) that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools (SFPs); and (3) that licensees have implemented emergency preparedness enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and NRC safety assessments, including dose assessment capability, enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient, and that communications can be maintained during beyond-design-basis external events.
The team verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events," (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735) and EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A044) were in place and were being implemented by Exelon. The team also verified that Exelon had implemented staffing and communications plans provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned," dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
The team discussed the plans and strategies with Exelon personnel, reviewed documentation, completed a tabletop exercise involving a beyond design basis event leading to an extended loss of offsite power and, where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in Exelon's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections. Documents reviewed for each section of this report are listed in the Attachment. 1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined Exelon's established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design-basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the Exelon staff coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walk downs with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios.
The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Exelon staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel.
Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that Exelon satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittal(s) and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17009A141) and determined that Exelon was in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049.
The team verified that Exelon satisfactorily:
- Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events;
- Integrated their FSGs into their existing emergency operating procedures and off-normal procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs are clear when using existing plant procedures;
- Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards;
- Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability;
- Trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events, and;
- Developed procedures to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment will be available from off-site locations.
The team verified that inspector observations identified during the inspection were entered into Exelon's corrective action program, where appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the team determined that Exelon satisfactorily installed and established appropriate operating and maintenance controls for the SFP instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation. The team determined that Exelon was in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The team verified that Exelon satisfactorily:
- Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling, and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation;
- Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the accessible location, and environmental conditions as described in the plant specific submittals;
- Trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and,
- Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation. The team verified that issues identified during the inspection were entered into Exelon's corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information
a. Inspection Scope
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation, and plant walk downs, the team verified that Exelon had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support an extended loss of all AC power (ELAP) scenario as described in Exelon's staffing assessment and the NRC safety evaluation. The team also verified that Exelon had implemented dose assessment (including releases from SFPs) capability using site-specific dose assessment software, as described in Exelon's dose assessment submittal. Assessment The team reviewed information provided in Exelon's dose assessment submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ML12053A340), and verified that Exelon satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3, response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an ELAP and impedes access to the site.
The team verified the following:
- Exelon satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario;
- Emergency preparedness communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario, and;
- Exelon implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from SFPs) using Nine Mile Point's site-specific dose assessment software and approach. The team verified that issues identified during the inspection were entered into Exelon's corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On August 25, 2017, the team debriefed the inspection results to Mr. Jim Tsardakas, Director Site Training, and other members of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station staff. An exit was conducted with Mr. Dennis M. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Manager via telephone on September 13, 2017, to discuss the final results of the inspection. The team verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- R. Kreider, Plant Manager
- D. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- J. Thompson, Director Site Operations
- M. Busch, Director Site Maintenance
- M. Khan, Director Site Engineering
- R. Pritchard, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Tsardakas, Director Site Training
- M. Checola, Senior Engineering Analyst
- R. Corieri, Senior Design Engineer
- B. Balzer, Unit 1 Operations Shift Supervisor
- J. Revelle, Operations Support Manager
- D. Morley, Senior Design Engineer
- K. Yurkon, Site Emergency Planning Manager
- W. Revelle, Senior Site Emergency Planning Specialist
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened and Closed
None
Discussed
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
- CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening, Revision 30
- Instrument Program Document, Revision 2
- CC-NM-118-1002, Congested Area Plan Nine Mile Point Power Station, Revision 001
- EP-AA-110-204, NMP Dose Assessment, Revision 001
- EP-AA-112-100-F-52, Shift Dose Assessor Checklist, Revision B
- EP-AA-112-400-F-62, Dose Assessor Checklist, Revision C
- EP-AA-124-F-03, Site and Site-Specific EOF Communications 9.3 and EMNET Satellite
- Communications Systems Semi-annual Testing and Inventory, Revision B
- EPA-15-10, NMP EP Aid, Revision 4 N1-DRP-FLEX-ELEC, Emergency Damage Repair - BDB/FLEX Generator Deployment
- Strategy, Revision 210 N1-DRP-FLEX-MECH, Emergency Damage Repair - BDB/FLEX Pump Deployment
- Strategy, Revision 500 N1-EOP-2, RPV Control, Revision 1600 N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control - Flowchart, Revision 01500 N1-IPM-054-003, Fuel Pool Sludge Tank and Surge Tank Level Instrumentation, Revision 00700 N1-SOP-33A.2, Station Blackout/ELAP, Revision 01400 N2-DRP-FLEX-ELEC, Emergency Damage Repair - BDB/FLEX Generator Deployment
- Strategy, Revision 00200 N2-DRP-FLEX-MECH, Emergency Damage Repair - BDB/FLEX Pump Deployment Strategy, Revision 00300 N2-EOP-SC, Secondary Containment Control - Flowchart, Revision 01200
- N2-IPM-SFC-001, Calibration of SFP Instrument Channel Loops 2SFC-LI413A, 2SFC-LI413B, and 2SFC-TI415, Revision 00000 N2-SOP-01, Station Blackout/Extended Loss of AC Power, Revision 01400 N2-SOP-02, Station Blackout/Extended Loss of AC Power Support Procedure, Revision 01100 N2-SOP-03, Loss of AC Power, Revision 01700 N2-SOP-38, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Revision 01100
- OP-NM-102-106, Operator Response Time Program at NMP, Revision 007
- SA-AA-127, Power Industrial Truck and Motor Vehicle Operation, Revision 13 S-DRP-OPS-005, Use of FLEX Phase 3 SAFER Equipment, Revision 00000 S-DRP-OPS-004, Refueling Diesel Driven Portable Equipment, Revision 00101 S-DRP-COMM, BDBEE Communication Procedure, Revision 00000 S-DRP-HC, DRP Hard Card Procedure, Revision 400 S-DRP-OPS-004, Refueling Diesel Driven Portable Equipment, Revision 101 S-PM-FLEX, FLEX Equipment Inventories and Checklists, Revision 500 S-PM-001, FLEX 3419MX Water Pump Test, Revision 100 S-PM-005, FLEX 3419MX Water Pump Performance Test, Revision 0
- TQ-AA-150, Operator Training Programs, Revision 14
- TQ-AA-174, Industrial Safety Training Program, Revision 4
Calculations
- Revision 0
- Revision 0
- Completed Surveillances S-PM-002, FLEX Diesel Air Compressor Test, performed 5/25/16 S-PM-001, FLEX 3419MX Water Pump Test, performed 5/24/16 S-PM-005, FLEX 3419MX Water Pump Performance Test, performed 9/28/16 S-PM-FLEX, FLEX Equipment Inventories and Checklists, performed 6/23/17
- Issue Reports (*NRC Identified)
- 04045026*
- 04045085*
- 04045224*
- 04045360*
- 04045375*
- 04045384*
- 04045391*
- 04045397*
- 04045495*
- 04045702*
- 04025063
- 04020655
- 04020333
- 02720765
- 02720310
- 02685864
- 02677933
- 02673281
- 02665255
- 02653462
Drawings
- C18017C-001,
- ECP-13-001034, Revision 55 C18016C-001,
- ECP-13-001034, Revision 42
- Modifications
- ECP-13-000652-015-7-01, Design Consideration Summary Unit 2 Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Level Monitoring System, Revision 1
- ECP-13-000651-015-7-01, Design Consideration Summary Unit 1 Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Level Monitoring System, Revision 1
- ECP-14-000768, Design Consideration Summary ComLabs Unit 2, Revision 2
- ECP-14-000767, Design Consideration Summary ComLabs Unit 1, Revision 2
Miscellaneous
- Generic Basic FLEX Training (via NANTel) Revision 1 Generic Advanced FLEX Training (via NANTel) Revision 1 Vendor Technical Manual, Power Prime Pumps Operating Manual, N1P24755PUMP001 (N11792), Revision 0
Work Orders
- C93170992
- C93415260
- C93193736
- C93193761
- C92872111
- C92797434
- C92754958
- C92761893 C92721738
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- FSG [[]]