IR 05000219/2011003

IR 05000219-11-003; 04/01/11 - 06/30/11; Oyster Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inpsection Report

ML112060317
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	07/25/2011
From:	Bellamy R R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Pacilio M J Exelon Nuclear
Bellamy R R, Rgn-I/DRP/Br7/610-337-5200
References
IR-11-003
Download: ML112060317 (33)

Text

with copies to theRegionalAdministrator, Region l; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident lnspector atOyster Creek Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of anyfinding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspectionreport, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region l, and theNRC Resident lnspector at Oyster Creek Generating Station. The information you provide willbe considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at (the PublicElectronic Reading Room).

M. PacilioWe appreciate your cooperation.questions regarding this letter.2Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any

Sincerely,Docket No.License No.

Enclosure:

cc w/encl:Vzr""!OA t{-0!4,""^Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief -\-Projects Branch 6Division of Reactor Projects50-219DPR-16f nspection Report 050002 1 91201 1 003

w/Attachment:

Supplemental InformationDistribution via ListServ M. PacilioWe appreciate your cooperation.questions regarding this letter.2Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any

Sincerely,/RA/Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., ChiefProjects Branch 6Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No. 50-219License No. DPR-16Distribution w/encl:W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Roberts, DRP (RlDRSMail Resource)C. Miller, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)P. Wilson, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)J. Clifford, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource)R. Bellamy, DRPS. Barber. DRPC. Newport, DRPN. LaffertyA. DugandzicJ. Kulp, DRP, SRIJ. Ambrosini, DRP, RlJ. DeVries, DRP, OAJ. McHale, Rl, OEDORidsNrrPMOysterCreek ResourceRidsNrrDorl Lpll -2 ResourceROPreports Resource@nrc. govsuNst Review Complete: RRB (Reviewer's Initials) ML1 12060317DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH6\+++OysIer Creek\OC Inspection Reports 2011\OC 2Ql 1 003 lnspectionReport.docxAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.ro receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "9;:==?"jJr1,,ir":ffi:,ffiiffi:N:,1?liJ'1*" = No copy Docket No.:License No.:Report No.:Licensee:Facility:Location:Dates:Inspectors:Approved By:1U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I50-219DPR-160500021 9/201 1 003Exelon NuclearOyster Creek Generating StationForked River, New JerseyApril 1 ,2011- June 30, 2011J. Kulp, Senior Resident InspectorJ. Ambrosini, Resident InspectorE. Keighley, Resident InspectorA. Patel, Resident InspectorS. Barr, Senior Emergency Preparedness InspectorJ. Caruso, Senior Operations EngineerT. Hedigan, Operations EngineerJ. Tomlinson, Operations EngineerC. Cowdrey, Operations EngineerRonald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., ChiefProjects Branch 6Division of Reactor ProjectsEnclosure 2

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500021912011003;0410112011 - 061301201 1; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster CreekGenerating Station; Maintenance Effectiveness.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. One Green non-citedviolation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0609, "SignificanceDetermination Process" (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310,"Components Within the Cross Component Areas." Findings for which the SDP does not applymay be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC'sprogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described inNUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems.

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion X,"lnspection," when Exelon did not conduct a post maintenance inspection of workaccomplished by a contractor on main steam isolation valve (MSIV), V-1-10, whichresulted in heat damage to the valve position indication cabling causing a ground on thecable and the receipt of a half scram. Exelon's corrective actions included replacementof the damaged cable, performance of a work group evaluation and revising the mainsteam insulation work orders to include a caution to not install insulation on top ofcabling.The finding was more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of themitigating systems cornerstone of equipment performance to ensure the availability,reliability, and capability of a Class I cable. Additionally, this finding is similar to IMC0612, Appendix E, Example 4.a, in that an evaluation required by procedures was notperformed and resulted in a failure in the system. The inspectors evaluated the risk ofthis finding using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," attachment 4, "Phase1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." The inspectors determined thatthe finding was of very low safety significance (green) because it did not result in anactual loss of function of the MSIV or the reactor protection system. The inspectorsdetermined that this performance deficiency did not involve a cross cutting aspect as itoccurred 4 years earlier and is not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section1R12)

REPORT DETAILS

Summarv of Plant StatusThe Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating atfull power.On April 30, operators performed a planned shutdown to start the 1M27 maintenance outage,The plant returned to full power on May 7. Details of this maintenance outage are in section1

R20 .On May 9, operators performed a planned downpower to 70o/o to perform a rod patternadjustment. The plant returned to full power later the same day.On May 20, operators performed an unplanned downpower to 88% due to a trip of the 1A2 and1A3 feed heaters. The plant returned to full power later the same day. Details on this event arein section 4OA3.Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.1. REACTORSAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. lnspection Scope (5 samples)The inspectors performed the following inspections: one seasonal extreme weatherreadiness review, one review of power system readiness, one externalflooding review,and reviews of two site specific weather-related conditions.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's activities associated with seasonal readiness for hotweather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report(UFSAR) for Oyster Creek to identify risk significant systems that require protection fromhot weather conditions. The inspectors assessed the readiness of the service water,emergency service water, and emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems to seasonalsusceptibilities. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the EDG structure and theintake to review the material condition of the area. The inspectors reviewed Exelon'scold/hot weather preparation activities to assess their adequacy and to verify they werecompleted in accordance with procedure requirements. The inspectors also reviewedapplicable corrective action program condition reports to assess their reliability andmaterial condition of their systems.The inspectors evaluated Exelon's readiness to address issues that could impact offsiteand alternate AC power systems. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's procedures andprograms which discussed the operation and availability/reliability of offsite and alternateAC power systems during adverse weather. The inspectors verified that communicationprotocols between the transmission system operator and Exelon existed, and theEnclosure b.5appropriate information would be conveyed when potential grid stress and disturbancesoccurred. The inspectors also verified that Exelon's procedures contained actions tomonitor and maintain the availability/reliability of offsite and onsite power systems priorto and during adverse weather conditions.The inspectors evaluated Exelon's readiness to cope with externalflooding. Theinspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine structures and areas of the site that aresusceptible to flooding and performed walk downs of these areas. The inspectors alsoreviewed abnormal or emergency procedures that would be used to cope with ftoodingto ensure that operators were able to implement them in advance of and during theonset of flooding conditions.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's response to a severe thunderstorm warning on April13 and a tornado watch on June 1. The inspectors verified that operators properlymonitored important plant equipment that could have been affected by the weatherconditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of areas that could be potentiallyimpacted by the storm conditions to ensure there was no damage from the severeweather.Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Equipment Aliqnment (7 1 1 1 1.04)1 R04a. Inspection Scope (5 samples)The inspectors performed four partial and one complete equipment alignmentinspections. The partial equipment alignment inspections were completed duringconditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as wouldoccur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverseconditions, or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance. Theinspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable,the associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify theequipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:o 'B' isolation condenser on April 4;r Containment spray system 2 on April 18;r Core spray system 1 on May 24; and. Service water system on June 24.On June 30th, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection onreactor building closed cooling water to determine whether the system was aligned inaccordance with design basis requirements. The inspectors reviewed operatingprocedures, the surveillance test procedure, pipe and instrument drawings, and theapplicable equipment lineup list, to determine if the equipment was aligned to perform itssafety function upon actuation.Enclosure 6Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71 1 11.05)a. Inspection Scope (71111.05Q 4 samples)The inspectors performed a walkdown of four plant areas to assess their vulnerability tofire. During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, firedetection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, and theadequacy of compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed "Oyster Creek FireHazards Analysis Report" and "Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans" for risk insights and designfeatures credited in these areas. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective actionprogram condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identifiedproblems were being evaluated and corrected. Documents reviewed for this inspectionactivity are listed in the Supplemental lnformation attachment to this report. The followingplant areas were inspected:. 'B'480 V switchgear room (OB-FZ-68) on April 12;. Condenser bay (TB-FZ-11E) on May 1;r 4160 V Room (TB-FA-3A and TB-FA-3B) on May 25; andr lntake structure (CW-FA-14) on June 24.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71 1 1 1.06)a. Inspection Scope (2 samples)The inspectors performed one internalflood protection inspection activity and one reviewof cables located in an underground manhole.The inspectors completed one internalflood inspection sample. The inspectorsreviewed selected risk-important plant design features and Exelon procedures intendedto protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. Theinspectors focused on mitigation strategies and equipment in the northwest corner roomof the reactor building which contains the 'A' and 'C' core spray main pumps. Theinspectors reviewed flood analysis and design documents, including the UFSARmaintenance work orders, corrective action issue reports (lRs), and alarm responseprocedures. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood barriers (including wallpenetrations and watertight doors), floor drains, floor sumps and isolation valves, andpotentialflooding sources. The inspectors evaluated these items to assess pipingstructural integrity, material condition, mitigating equipment functionality, design basesconformance, config uration control, and potential internal flood vulnerabilities.Enclosure

7The inspectors performed an internalflood protection inspection associated with bunkersand manholes. The inspectors reviewed corrective action program documentationconcerning conditions in the cable vaults containing station blackout electrical cablesand test results for station blackout cables. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon'sactions to monitor cable degradation and actions to minimize water accumulation andsubmergence of medium voltage cables contained in these areas.Documents associated with these reviews are listed in the Supplemental lnformationattachment to this report.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R1 1 Licensed Operator Requalification Proqram (71111.11)a. Inspection Scope (2 samples)Biennial Review bv Reqional Specialists. Inspection activities were performed usingNUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"Revision 9, Supplement 1, Inspection Procedure Attachment71111.1 1, "LicensedOperator Requalification Program," Appendix A, "Checklist for Evaluating Facility TestingMaterial," and Appendix B, "Suggested Interview Topics."A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspectionreports, licensee event reports, Exelon's corrective action program, and the most recentNRC plant issues matrix (PlM). The inspectors also reviewed specific events fromExelon's corrective action program which indicated possible training deficiencies, toverify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was.also consulted for insights regarding licensed operators' performance. These reviewsdid not detect any operational events that were indicative of possible trainingdeficiencies.The inspectors reviewed three comprehensive written exams, thirteen simulatorscenarios, and twenty-one job performance measures, which comprised the test itemsadministered or planned for administration the weeks of May 23, May 30, and June 6 toensure the quality of these exams met or exceeded the criteria established in theExamination Standards and 10 CFR 55.59. The inspectors observed the administrationof the operating exams to one crew during the onsite inspection week, which beganMay 23.On July 7, the results of the annual operating tests for year 2011 and the written examfor 2011 were reviewed to determine if pass fail rates were consistent with the guidanceof NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"Revision 9, Supplement 1, and NRC lnspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix l,"Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process(SDP)." The review verified the following:Enclosure ao8Crew pass rates were greater than 80%. (Pass rate was 100%)Individual pass rates on the dynamic simulator test were greater than 8070. (Passrate was 100%)lndividual pass rates on the job performance measures of the operating exam weregreater than 80%. (Pass rate was 100%)Individual pass rates on the written exam were greater than 80%. (Pass rate wase8%)o More thanTSo/o of the individuals passed all portions of the exam. (98% of theindividuals passed all portions of the examination)Observations were made of the dynamic simulator exams and job performancemeasures (JPM) administered during the week of May 23. These observations includedfacility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulatorexams and individual performance of six JPMs.The remediation plans for crew and individualfailures for cycle quizzes (i.e., 10 reactoroperators and 3 senior reactor operators), out of the box evaluations (i.e., 7 reactoroperators and 8 senior reactor operators), emergency action level declarations (i.e., 3senior reactor operators) and one 2009 biannual reactor operator written failure werereviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training.Operators, instructors, training management and operations management wereinterviewed for feedback on their training program and the quality of training received.Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plantcontrol room. The inspectors observed simulator performance during the conduct of theexaminations, and reviewed simulator discrepancy reports to verify facility staff werecomplying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46. The inspector reviewed a sample ofsimulator tests including transient, steady state, and scenario-based tests.A sample of records for requalification program feedback, reporting, and eleven medicalexaminations (i.e., 7 reactor operators and 4 senior reactor operators) and 2licensereactivation records (i.e., 1 reactor operator and 1 senior reactor operator) werereviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.Requalification Activities Review bv Resident Staff. The inspectors observed onesimulator training scenario to assess operator performance and training effectiveness onMay 5. The inspectors observed 'Just in time" training scenarios for plant startup fromthe 1M27 maintenance outage. The inspectors assessed whether the simulatoradequately reflected the expected plant response, operator performance met Exelon'sprocedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crewperformance problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in theSupplemental Information attachment to this report.FindinqsNo findings were identified.b.Enclosure 91R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)a. Inspection Scope (3 samples)The inspectors performed three maintenance effectiveness inspection activities. Theinspectors reviewed the following degraded equipment issues in order to assess theeffectiveness of maintenance performed by Exelon:o Main steam isolation valve (MSIV) wiring in the trunnion room (lR 1210400) onMay 1;o Standby gas treatment system 2 (lR 1 226484) on June 8; and. Main control room annunciators (lR 1227720) on June 20.The inspectors also verified that the systems or components were being monitored inaccordance with Exelon's maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectorscompared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to thosebeing tracked by Exelon. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work ordersand procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipmentperformance issues. The inspectors also reviewed applicable work orders, correctiveaction program condition reports, operator narrative logs, and vendor manuals.Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.Findinoslntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B, Criterion X, "lnspection," for the failure to perform a post maintenanceinspection in accordance with MA-AA-1000, Conduct of Maintenance Manual, whichrequires "Exelon personnel to physically, independently verify (lV), final valve restorationbefore returning equipment to Operations" when the work package is performed bycontract personnel. This resulted in a significant condition adverse to quality whenExelon did not identify that the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) valve positionindication cable was run along and insulated against the steam line piping, which causedheat damage and eventual grounding of the cable which, in turn caused the receipt of ahalf scram input to the reactor protection system.Descriotion. On January 14, the 'N', 'P' and 'Q' alarm panels flashed intermittently for afew moments. The operators noted that the balance of plant (BOP) audible alarm wasnot working and that the 'J', 'K' and 'B' panels did not have alarm lights. During awalkdown of the alarm panels, operators identified that smoke was emanating from the'J' A2 power supply card. lnitial troubleshooting identified grounds on the "MSIV Off-Normal" alarm circuit in this panel. Exelon personnelwere able to restore the affectedpanels, however, the "MSIV Off-Normal" alarm remained locked in. On April 29, a halfscram was received. Operators responded to the half-scram and found no other alarmswere received that would have identified the cause of the half-scram. Operators wereable to reset the half scram and submitted the issue into the corrective action programas lR 1209785. On May 1, during performance of troubleshooting in the trunnion room,Exelon maintenance personnel identified that the wire for the limit switch for V-1-10 wascovered by MSIV insulation and was in contact with main steam piping. This resulted inheat damage to the cable's protective "sealtite" coating resulting in the cable having anEnclosure 10intermittent ground, which caused some of the alarm troubles in January and the invalidhalf scram signal in April.During the 1R21 outage in 2006, Exelon disassembled V-1-10 to perform an internalmodification to the valve under work order C2012793. The valve insulation wasremoved to perform the work. During pre-startup walkdown of the trunnion room onNovember 10, 2006, radiation protection technicians noted that the insulation was notinstalled following completion of the work on V-1-10 and documented this discrepancy in1R556218. The insulation was replaced, by contractor insulators, prior to startup whichoccurred on the following day. During this reinstallation, the wire was laid up against themain steam line underneath of the insulation. Exelon did not ensure that a first linesupervisor performed a walk down of the job performed by the contract insulators after itwas finished as required by MA-AA-1000, "Conduct of Maintenance Manual", whichcould have identified that the wiring had been wrapped against the pipe.Analvsis. Exelon's failure to provide proper oversight of contractors in accordance withMA-AA-1000 is a performance deficiency. This finding was determined to be of morethan minor significance because it affected the design control attribute of the MitigatingSystems Cornerstone of equipment performance to ensure the availability, reliability, andcapability of a class I cable. This finding is similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example4.a, in that an evaluation required by procedures was not performed and resulted in afailure in the system. Specifically, the first line supervisor did not perform a walk down ofwork done by contractors, which resulted in the wiring being wrapped in pipinginsulation, heat damage to and grounding of the cable, and receipt of a half scram. Theinspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using IMC 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess," Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings."The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because itdid not result in an actual loss of function of the MSIV or the reactor protection system.The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency did not involve a crosscutting aspect as it occurred 4 years earlier and is not indicative of current licenseeperformance.Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, "lnspection," states, in part, that"Examinations, measurements, or tests of material... shall be performed for each workoperation where necessary to assure quality... lf mandatory inspection hold points,which require witnessing or inspecting by the licensee's designated representative andbeyond which work shall not proceed without the consent of the designatedrepresentative are required, the specific hold points shall be indicated in appropriatedocuments." Contrary to the above, Exelon failed to implement an adequate postmaintenance inspection to provide assurance that maintenance on the safety relatedequipment was performed properly. Specifically, Exelon failed to ensure that theinsulation was installed in a manner that would prevent damage to the cables and allowthe associated instrumentation and alarms to function as designed. Because thelicensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as lR 1210400 and thefinding is of very low safety significance (Green), this violation is being treated as anNCV, consistent with the Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, (NCV05000219/2011003-01: Failure to perform acceptance inspection of contractorwork resufts in damage to safety related instrument cable.)Enclosure 111R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emeroent Work Control (71111.13)a. lnspection Scope (5 samples)The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through directobservation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:Change in risk due to a severe thunderstorm warning on April 13;Change in risk due to a severe thunderstorm warning and tornado watch on June 1;Affect on risk due to heat alert and a grid emergency generation alert on June 8;Core spray system #1 unavailable due to planned surveillance and standby gastreatment system #1 unavailable due to planned maintenance on May 31; andChange in risk due to a severe thunderstorm warning and a tornado warning onJune 23.The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and controlroom logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly andreassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with Exelon's procedures. Exelon'sactions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shiftturnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also usedExelon's on-line risk monitor (Paragon) to gain insights into the risk associated withthese plant configurations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective actionprogram condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments andemergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed inthe Supplemental Information attachment to this report.FindinqsNo findings were identified.aaaob.Enclosure 121 R15 Operabilitv Evaluations (71111

===.15 )a. Inspection Scope (4 samples)The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations for degraded or non-conformingconditions associated with:. "ED" 4160V breaker protective relay on April 18 (lR 1203285);o Containment isolation valve position indicator on May 10 (lR 1214035);. Source range monitor 22 on April 30 (lR 1209980); ando Non-destructive evaluation (NDE) results found to be below minimum wall criteria onemergency service water (ESW) piping on April 29 (lR 1209774).The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to ensurethe conclusions were technically justified. The inspectors also walked down accessibleportions of equipment to corroborate the adequacy of Exelon's operability evaluations.Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.

=

1R19 a.13FindinqsNo findings were identified.Post-Maintenance Testing (7 1 1 1 1

===.19 )Inspection Scope (5 samples)The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of five post-maintenancetests for the following equipment:o 'A' main control room ventilation (HVAC) system operability test following preventivemaintenance on April 6 (R2175959);. Steam inlet valve to 'B' emergency condenser following preventive maintenance onApril6 (R2145671);. Main steam safety valves following installation on May 7 (R2136087);. Fire suppression deluge valve functionaltest on April 30 (C2025410); and. f RM 12 detector replacement on April 30 (C2024631).The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate for thescope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functionalcapability. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

=

14water was present in the south drywell trench and that the north drywell trench was dry.The inspectors verified that Exelon assessed and managed the outage risk. Theinspectors confirmed on a sampling basis that tagged equipment was properly controlledand equipment configured to safely support maintenance and plant operations. Duringcontrol room tours, the inspectors verified that operators maintained reactor vessel leveland temperature within the procedurally required ranges for the operating condition. Theinspectors also verified that the decay heat removal function was maintained throughmonitoring shutdown cooling (SDC) parameters. The inspectors observed OysterCreek's plant onsite review committee (PORC) startup affirmations on May 4.The inspectors performed an inspection and walk down of portions of the drywell prior tocontainment closure on May 5, to verify there was no evidence of leakage or visualdamage to passive systems and to determine that debris was not left which could affectdrywell suppression pool performance during postulated accident conditions. Theinspectors noted that approximately one quart of water was present in the south drywelltrench and that the north drywell trench was dry. The inspectors monitored restartactivities that began on May 5, to ensure that required equipment was available foroperational condition changes, including verifying technical specification requirements,license conditions, and procedural requirements. Portions of the startup activities wereobserved from the control room to assess operator and equipment performance. Theinspectors further verified that unidentified leakage and identified leakage rate valueswere within expected values and within technical specification requirements.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testino (7 1 11 1.22)a. Inspection Scope (3 inservice test (lST) samples and 5 routine surveillance samples)The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of eight surveillancetests:. 'A' isolation condenser valve operability and IST on April 4;r Standby liquid control pump and valve operability and IST on April 12;. Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak detection surveillance on April 11;. Station blackout functional test on November 22;. Reactor high pressure scram test and calibration on April 11;o Reactor building to torus power vacuum breaker test on May 9 ;r Electromatic relief valve (EMRV) pressure sensor test and calibration on May 24;andr Standby gas treatment system #1 surveillance on May 31.The inspectors verified that test data was complete and met procedural requirements todemonstrate the systems and components were capable of performing their intendedfunction. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports thatdocumented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests. Documents reviewedfor this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to thisreport.Enclosure

b.4.40A115FindinqsNo findings were identified.oTHER ACTTVTTTES [OAlPerformance Indicator Verification (7 1 151)a. Inspection Scope (3 samples)The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (Pl) data associated with three Pls. Theinspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 99-02, Revision5, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracyand completeness of the Pl data reported by Exelon. Documents reviewed for thisinspection activity are listed in the Supplemental lnformation attachment to this report.The inspectors reviewed the following Pls:. "Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours" between April 1 ,2010 and March 31,2010.. "Unplanned Scrams with Complications per 7000 Critical Hours" between April 1,2010 and March 31,2010.o "Safety System Functional Failures" between April 1 , 2010 and March 31,2Q10.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4OA2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1 Review of ltems Entered lnto the Corrective Action ProqramThe inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Exelon's correctiveaction program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performanceissues for follow-up. This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each conditionreport, attending daily screening meetings, or accessing Exelon's computerizeddatabase..2 Semi-Annual Review to ldentifv Trendsa. Inspection Scope (1 sample)The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by InspectionProcedure 71152, "Problem ldentification and Resolution," to identify trends that mightindicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectorsincluded repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Exelonin places other than the normal corrective action system, such as trend reports,performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports,maintenance rule assessments, and Oyster Creek management reports. The inspectorsalso reviewed Exelon's corrective action program database to assess condition reportsEnclosure b.16written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance issues, etc,),as well as individual issues identified during the NRC's daily condition report review.The results of the trend review by the inspectors were compared with the results ofnormal baseline inspections. The review considered a six-month period of January 1through June 30, 2011.Assessment and ObservationsNo findings were identified.The inspectors noted continued recurring instances of water in the emergency dieselgenerator (EDG) cable trenches. On four separate occasions (March 17, May 31, June6, and June 27), the inspectors noted standing water in the cable trenches. This issuewas first identified during the 2010 NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (NCV05000219/2010008-02, EDG Low Voltage Control Cable Submergence). The correctiveactions developed in response to the NCV included cleaning out the EDG cable trenchdrains, which had not been completed at the end of this assessment period. Exeloncontinues to monitor the trenches each night through operator rounds and pumps outany standing water upon discovery.Annual Sample ReviewInspection Scope (1 Annualsample)The inspectors reviewed Exelon's evaluation and corrective actions associated with thefollowing issues. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in theSupplemental Information attachment to this report.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's evaluation and corrective actions associated with lR1 1931 10, "Full reactor scram due to the main condenser low vacuum trip" and lR556890, "Power increase from 1R21 delayed to condenser vacuum". The inspectorsreviewed relevant corrective action program condition reports to ensure that the fullextent of the issue was identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, andcorrective actions were specified, prioritized and effective. The inspectors discussed thisissue with operations, engineering and licensing personnel.Findinos and ObservationsIntroductio!. An_unresolved item (URl) was identified to review the results of Exelon'sinvestigation to identify the source of water that builds up in the 48 inch offgas headerfollowing a plant shutdown, an evaluation of the effect of that water on the inability todraw a vacuum in the turbine condenser on the subsequent startup, and to evaluate theeffectiveness of the corrective actions taken following a similar event in 2006 todetermine if a performance deficiency existed. The inspectors will review the results ofExelon's evaluation after it is completed, which had not occurred by the end of thisinspection period.Description During the startup from the 1M26 outage in December 2010, Oyster Creekexperienced a full reactor scram due to a main condenser low vacuum trip. Exelonperformed a root cause evaluation, which was centered on operator performance issues,and documented the results in lR 1 155520. NRC inspectors reviewed the root causea.b.Enclosure 17report (RCR) in March 2011 and identified that the root cause evaluation did not addressthe issue of the difficulty of drawing a vacuum in the main condenser using themechanical vacuum pump and three sets of air ejectors. Exelon generated lR 1 1931 10to document the inspectors'observation. During resident inspector follow-up of theissue, the inspectors identified that a similar event had taken place during the startupfollowing the

1R21 outage in November 2006 and evaluated in an equipment apparentcause evaluation (EACE) documented in lR 556890. The inspectors identified that thesource of the excess water found in the 48 inch hold up line was not identified in eitherthe 2006 EACE or the 2010 RCR. Additionally, the inspectors questioned effectivenessof the corrective actions identified in the 2006 EACE due to the recurrence of the issuein 2010 which resulted in a reactor scram. The licensee documented the inspectors'concerns in lR 1227974, which is currently being evaluated. (URl 0500021912011003-02: Difficulty in drawing a main condenser vacuum during plant startup due towater in 48 inch holdup line)4OA3 Event Followup

(1 sample)The inspectors performed one event follow-up inspection activity. Documents reviewedfor this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to thisreport..1 Trip of the 1A3 hioh pressure feedwater heatera. lnspection ScopeOn May 20, operations personnel in the control room responded to a trip of the 1A3 highpressure and the 1A2 intermediate pressure feedwater heaters.The inspectors responded to the control room after hearing the site-wide announcementof the trip. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the control room and discussed theissue with Exelon personnel in order to understand the extent of the issues with thefeedwater system. The inspectors verified that the operators implemented guidancecontained in ABN-17, "Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions". The inspectors alsoreviewed operator logs, plant process computer (PPC) data, and system drawings tounderstand the plant's response. Exelon's troubleshooting identified a failed linkage onthe 1A3 feedwater heater normal drain valve as the cause of the trip. The inspectorsmonitored the troubleshooting and repair efforts concerning the 1A3 feedwater heaternormal drain valve and the subsequent return to full power.FindinqsNo findings were identified.4OA5 Other.1 (Closed) NRC Temporarv lnstruction 2515/183, "Follow-up to the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Station Fuel Damaqe Event"The inspectors assessed the activities and actions taken by the licensee to assess itsreadiness to respond to an event similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fueldamage event. This included (1) an assessment of the licenseels capability to mitigateEnclosure

.218 conditions that may result from beyond design basis events, with a particular emphasison strategies related to the spent fuel pool, as required by NRC Security Order Section8.5.b issued February 25, 2002, as committed to in severe accident managementguidelines, and as required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh); (2) an assessment of the licensee'scapability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50,63and station design bases; (3) an assessment of the licensee's capability to mitigateinternal and externalflooding events, as required by station design bases; and (4) anassessment of the thoroughness of the walkdowns and inspections of importantequipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events, which were performed by thelicensee to identify any potential loss of function of this equipment during seismic eventspossible for the site.lnspection Report 05000219/201 1008 (ML1 1 1330025) documented detailed results ofthis inspection activity.Following issuance of the report, the inspectors conducted detailed follow-up on selectedissues.(Closed) NRC Temporarv Instruction 2515/184. "Availabilitv and Readiness lnspection ofSevere Accident Manaoement Guidelines (SAMGS)"On May 19, the inspectors completed a review of the licensee's severe accidentmanagement guidelines (SAMGS), implemented as a voluntary industry initiative in the1990's, to determine (1) whether the SAMGs were available and updated, (2) whetherthe licensee had procedures and processes in place to control and update its SAMGS,(3) the nature and extent of the licensee's training of personnel on the use of SAMGS,and (4) licensee personnel's familiarity with SAMG implementation.The results of this review were provided to the NRC task force chartered by theExecutive Director for Operations to conduct a near-term evaluation of the need foragency actions following the Fukushima Daiichi fuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Oyster Creek Generating Station were provided in an Attachment to amemorandum to the Chief, Reactor Inspection Branch, Division of lnspection andRegional Support, dated May 27,2011 (ML111470361),(Closed) URI 05000219/2011008-01. Testinq Documentation for Black Start TimeDemonstration of SBO Alternate AC Source,Inspection ScopeDuring the performance of the Tl-183 inspection, the inspectors identified that Exeloncould not locate a record of the completion of a test that demonstrated the amount oftime required for startup and alignment of the alternate AC power source, which is arequirement of 10CFR50.63, loss of all alternating current power. The inspectorsidentified that the biannual station blackout start time test of the alternate AC source didnot use the most conservative method of starting the alternate AC source and that therewas very little margin between the demonstrated start time and the required starting timespecified in Oyster Creek's station blackout coping analysis. The licensee entered thisissue into the corrective action program as lR 1205775..3a.Enclosure

19Exelon performed a test that demonstrated their ability to start the alternate AC sourceusing the most conservative method of starting the source within the time requirementsof the'station blackout coping analysis. Exelon reviewed their alternate AC sourcestarting procedures with Maxxim Power (owner of the alternate AC source) and identifiedseveral steps that could be done at the same time instead of being done sequentially.The review and optimization of the starting procedure has resulted in a shorter time torestore power to the plant following a station blackout. Exelon will update the biannualblack start time test to reflect the optimized starting procedure. Exelon has documentedtheir actions in lR 1205775.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's actions to date including the completed correctiveactions and did not identify any deficiencies. This closes URI 0500021912011008-01.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4OAO Meetinos. Includinq ExitResident lnspector Exit Meetinq. On July 21, the inspectors presented their overallfindings to members of Exelon's management led by Mr. M. Massaro, Site VicePresident, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. Theinspectors confirmed that proprietary information reviewed during the inspection periodwas returned to Exelon.EP Exit Meetinq. On July 7, the inspectors discussed the inspection results bytelephone with Mr. V. Cwietniewicz, Exelon Mid-Atlantic Corporate EmergencyPreparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectorsconfirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.Annual Assessment Meetino. On May 26, a site visit was conducted by Mr. R. Bellamy,Branch Six Branch Chief for the NRC region 1 office. During Mr. Bellamy's visit, he metwith Mr. M. Massaro, Site Vice President to discuss Oyster Creek's performance in2010.4C.A7 Licensee-ldentified ViolationsNone.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Massaro, Site Vice-President

R. Peak, Plant Manager

D. Dicello, Director, Work Management

M. McKenna, Director, Operations

G. Malone, Acting Director, Engineering

C. Symonds, Director, Training

J. Dostal, Director, Maintenance

J. Barstow, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

T. Keenan, Manager, Security

M. Ford, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry

A. Farenga, Manager, Radiological Protection

R. Skelsky, Senior Manager, Systems Engineering

H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering

G. Flesher, Shift Operations Superintendent

J. McDaniel, Manager, Nuclear Oversight

M. Seeloff, Manager, Corrective Action Program

J. Chrisley, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

J. Kerr, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

V. Cwietniewicz, Exelon Mid Atlantic Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager

T. Dunn, Acting Operations Training Manager

M. Rossi, Program Lead, Training

R. Brown, Simulator Supervisor, Training

G. Young, Instructor, Training

J. Gessner, Exam Developer, Training

M. Mattis, Site NurseOthers:State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened/Closed05000219/201 1003-01Opened0500021 9/201 1 003-02NCVURIFailure to perform acceptance inspection ofcontractor work results in damage to safety relatedinstrument cable (Section 1R12)Difficulty in drawing a main condenser vacuumduring plant startup due to water in 48 inch holdupline (Section 4OA2)Attachment

Closed

05000219t2011008-0105000291/2515t18305000291/2515t184A-2Testing Documentation for Black Start TimeDemonstration of SBO Alternate AC Source(Section 4OA5)Follow-up to Fukushima Daiichi NuclearStation Fuel Damage Event (Section 4OA5.1)Availability of Readiness Inspection of SevereAccident Management Guidelines (Section 4OA5.2)Attachment

A-3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report, the inspectors reviewed thefollowing documents and records.Sectioq 1R01: Adverse Wgllther ProtectionProceduresOP-OC-108-109-1001, "Preparation for Severe Weather T&RM for Oyster Creek"OP-M-1 08-1 1 1 -1001, "Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines"WC-M-1 07, "Seasonal Readiness"OP-OC-108-1001, "Preparation for Severe Weather T&RM for Oyster Creek"OP-OC-108-109-1002, "Cold Weather Freeze Inspection"OP-OC-1 08-1 09-'t 003, "Winter Readiness"ABN-31, "High Winds"ABN-32, "Abnormal Intake Level"Drawinqs19701, "Site plan - Topographic Survey Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station", Sheets 7, 8,9 and 11"06'121-203, "As-Built Survey Diesel Generator Building Security"4020-1, "Emergency Diesel Generator Vault"Condition Reports (lR)1116152

1183456 1203582Work Orders (AR)A2275942 A2261179Other DocumentgOC 09-00548-0A1, "Security Force on ForceUFSAR 2.4.2, "Floods"

==Section 1R04: Equipment Aliqnment1216545

1115321 1224385Changes for==

EDG Bldg Protection"Procedures310, "Containment Spray System Operation"309.2, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System"642.4.002, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Valve Operability and In-Service Test"322, "Service Water System"DrawinqsGE1 48F7 40, "Containment Spray System"GE885D781, "Core Spray System"BR 2006, "Flow Diagram Closed Cooling Water System"BR 2005, "Reactor and Turbine Building Service Water System"Condition Reports (lR)871 650721574Attachment

A-4

Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresABN-29, "Plant Fires"101.2, "Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program"CC-AA-?I 1, "Fire Protection Program"333, "Plant Fire Protection System"Condition Reports (lR)1146158Other DocumentsOB-FZ-68, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plan Layout: "Reactor Building-480 Switchgear Room FloorEl.23',-6"TB-FZ-11E, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plan Layout: "Turbine Building- Condenser Bay"TB-FA-3A, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plan Layout: "4160 V Room"TB-FA-3B, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plan Layout: "4160 V Room"CW-FA-14, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plan: "lntake Structure"Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProcedurgsEMG-3200.1 1, "Secondary Containment Control"ER 616-041, "Local Control Panel

ER 616-041 Torus Room Doors lndication and Alarm"RAP-RB1C(1-7), "1-7 Sump Reactor Bldg Flr Drain Sump High Level"DrawinosGU 3D-153-07-001, "General Arrangement Floor and Equipment Drains - Reactor Building"GU 3E-153-02-001, "GeneralArrangement Reactor Building Plan Floor Elevation (-) 19'-6""Condition Reoorts (lR)0810465

1133347

1134943

1136370

1137368 11380661138809 1 13897't 1 13961 1

1140289

1181834 1 1826601184050

1184058

1200090

1201122

1201543 12016341201643

1181875

1179636 1179669Work Orders (AR)R2095953Other DocumentsWhite Paper No. 28063-005, "Design and Licensing Basis for Flooding at OCGS"lnternal Flood Evaluation Summary and Notebook - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station2009-04, Cable System Assessment Provided for OC Nuclear Generating System, 11291092009-09, Cable System Assessment Provided for OC Nuclear Generating System, 3/5/09201A-74, Cable System Assessment Provided for OC Nuclear Generating System, 81141112010-122, Cable System Assessment Provided for OC Nuclear Generating System, 11120111

Section 1Rl1: Licensed Operator RequalifiEtion ProqramProcedulesTQ-M-1 50, Operator Training ProgramsTQ-AA-2O1, Examination Security and AdministrationOP-M-1A5-102

NRC Active License MaintenanceAttachment Condition Reports1221557 1220428Job Performance Measures (JPMs)261.03264.08262.07226.012010-242010-22A-5200.14200.05200.1 02010-212010-04345.06345.01A345.032010-252010-07308.03262.15209.05201 0-1 0201 0-1 3279.06229.01279.02212.06201.01223.05202.12264.06Scenarios2010-01 2010-082fi0-24 2U0-152010-23.Written Examinatiorls11-4 "E"

RO 11-4 "E'SROSimulator Condition Reports1191275 1204062Transient Tests11-4'A"

RO 11-4"A"

SRO 11-4 "8"

RO 11-4 "8" SRO,1204036TT569, 14.8.1, Manual Reactor Trip:Performed:

1114105,

213106,

119107, 6/30/08,

8129109, 1013110TTS73, 14.8.5, Single Recirculation Pump TripPerformed: 11118/04, 10/10/05, 8129/06,7/31107,

10127108, 1111109.7121110TTS70, Simultaneous Trip of All Feedwater PumpsSWR 1 1756 and 11894 initiated for test discrepancies. 10/3/10Annual/Normal Evolution TestqSSP01, Steady State Test, lQ9o/oSWR 12210 and

MMI 7661 initiated for test discrepancies 1215110Other DocumentsEOP User's Guide (2000-BAS-3200.02)Section 1 Rl2: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresER-AA-310, "lmplementation of Maintenance Rule"ER-AA-310-1005, "Maintenance Rule - Disposition Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)"LS

AA-125-1003, "Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual"HU-AA-1 02, "Technical Human Performance Practices"HU-AA-101 , "Human Performance Tools and Verification Practices"WC-AA-1 04, "lntegrated Risk Management"MA-AA-71 6-008, "Foreign Material Exclusion Program"MA-AA-71 6-026, "Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program"Attachment

24.4.001, "Main Steam Valve Position Indication and IST Test"2400-SMM-3411.27, "Modified MSIV Overhaul"2400-SME-341 1.06, "MSIV Limit Switch Adjustment"602.4.002,.MSIV Closure and IST Test"ER-AA-321, "Administrative Requirements for lnservice Testing"1 1 6, "Surveillance Testing Program"LS-AA-120, "lssue ldentification and Screening Process"NO-AA-300-1001 , "Nuclear Oversight Independent lnspection Plan"NO-AA-300, "lnspection Planning and Execution of Quality Inspection Activities"MA-M-71 6-01 0, "Maintenance Planning"MA-AA-1000, "Conduct of Maintenance Manual"ES-029, "Piping and Equipment Insulation Design"Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)"SP-9000-41-005, "lnstallation Specification for Cables & Raceways at Oyster Creek NuclearGenerating Station"2400-GME-3780.52, "lnstallation, Testing and Termination of Wire and Cable"330, "Standby Gas Treatment System"651.4.003, "Standby Gas Treatment System 10-Hour Run- System 2"Condition Reports 0R)121040412Q97851210496n277241 1630609793824227954111633761227663A205107512253051 1 37580121040055621 IWork Orders (AR)c2024970 C2025943c2012793A2054075 A2054069DrawinosGU 3E-61 1-17-011, "Electrical Elementary Diagram Control Panel 5F 6F Annunciator J 5-6F J"GE 237E566, "Reactor Protection System Electrical Elementary Diagram"Other DocumentsNEI 93-01, "lndustry Guideline for monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at NuclearPower Plants"1209785, "Equipment prompt investigation for receipt of a half scram on RPS System 2"

Section 1Rl3: Maintenan$ Risk Assesgnents an{ .EmerqentJvork ControlProceduresER-AA-600-1042, "On-line Risk Management"ER-AA-600-1021, "Risk Management Application Methodologies"ER-AA-600-101 4, "Risk Management Configuration Control"ER

M-600-1011, "Risk Management Program"WC-OC-101-1001, "On-line Risk Management and Assessment"ABN-31, "High Winds"Condition Beport (lR)1232146 525922Other DocumentsNational Weather Service Tornado Warning, June 22,2011UFSAR 3.3, "Wind and Tornado Loadings"Attachment

A-7Section 1 Rl 5: Operabilitv EvaluationsProceduresOP-AA-1 08-1 1 5, "Operability Determination"ABN 36, "Loss of offsite Power"RAP-T8e, "Tie Breaker ED Closed"635.2.001, "4160 Switchgear Buses (A, B, C, D) and Circulating Water Pump Protective RelaySurveillance"337,"4160 Volt Electrical System"ER-AA-335-004, "Ultrasonic Measurement of Material Thickness and lnterfering Conditions"654.2.001, "Reactor Building Ventilation Supply Valve Position Indication Check"620.4.004, "Source Range Monitor Test and Calibration"DrawingsGU 3E-61 1-17-011, "Electrical Elementary Diagram Control Panel 5F 6F Annunciator J 5-6F J"GE 237E566 Sh. 6, "Reactor Protection System Electrical Elementary Diagram Channel 2"GE 237E566 Sh. 7, "Reactor Protection System Electrical Elementary Diagram Channel 2"Condition Reports (lR)1214035120328512119291210400121872012097851200968c20253881 21 0096121249912097741209980Work Orders (AR)c2024515 R2173236c2025389 A2275695 M2275695Other DocumentsNRC Inspection Manual - Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations &Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming ConditionsAdverse to Quality or Safety"FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.1, "Onsite Power Systems,4.16kV Distribution System"VM-OC-0013, "Namco Limit Switch and Connectors"NDE Data Report 2011-002-015, "ESW Piping Under the Intake"NDE Data Report 2011-002-016, "ESW Piping Under the Intake"NDE Data Report 2011-002-017, 'ESW Piping Under the Intake"828.0.0016, "Nuclear Plant Operator Initial Course/Program, Electrical Distribution"Technical Specifications 1 .0-1, "Definitions"Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Criteriafor Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear PowerPlants"Technical Specifications 3.1.1, "Protective Instrumentation Requirements"Operations Plant Manual Module 29B, "Source Range Monitor System"

Section 1Rl8: Plant ModificationsProceduresOP-AA-108-111, "Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan:

TE-47 Step ChangeResulted in rise in Indication Reactor Power"2000-BAS-3200.-2, "EOP User's Guide"680.4.009, "Remote Shutdown Panel Functional Test for Control Power Transfer"680,4.006, "Remote Shutdown Panel Functional Test Train B"202.1, "Power Operation"Attachment

Condition Report

(lR)1216739 1219447Work Order (AR)c201 9658Other1215193A-81190467OC 10-00175-000, "ECR for Calculation on Combustion Turbine Tank Oil Level"OC-2010-3-0048, 50.59 Review "Forked River Combustion Turbine Fuel Oil System Evaluationfor SBO"UFSAR 8.3.4, "Station Blackout"C-1302-743-E310-006, "Forked River Fuel Oil Transfer System Performance Evaluation"RG 1.155, "Station Blackout"NUMARC 87-00, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing StationBlackout at Light Water Reactors"NRG Letter: "Safety Evaluation - Station Blackout Analysis Oyster Creek Nuclear GeneratingStation", dated 81221199110CFR50.63, "Loss of all Alternating Current Power"Generic Letter 89-16, "lnstallation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent"UFSAR 6.2.7, "Hardened Vent System"GPU Nuclear letter, "Hardened Vent", dated 8/31/1990C-1302-822-5360-036, "lsolation Valves Opening tor 1o/o Decay Heat Venting"MDD-OC-822A, "Modification Design Description for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating StationHardened Vent System"C-1 302-822-5320-037, " H a rdened Ve nt lso I atio n Va lves (V-23- 1 3/ 1 6 )VM-OC-2386, "Fisher Valves, Regulators & Valve Actuators Composite Manual"GE Nuclear Energy Group letter

OG-94-479-58, "Mark 1 Containment Hardened Vent", dated6123t1994SE-402968-001, Technical Functions Safety Evaluation, "Hardened Vent Modification"lR

1190467, "EvenVlssues Report:TE-47 Final FW Temperature Element"OC-11-00196-001, "ECR for TCCP to Use the Other

TE-47 Element to Feed the PPC"AD-AA-101-F-01, "Document Site Approval Form forTE-47 Modification during PowerOperations (202.1)"LS-AA-1 04-1 001,'50.59 Review for

TE-47 Modification"LS-AA-104-1003, "50.59 Screening Form for

TE-47 Modification"AD-AA-1 0 1 -F-1 0, "Temporary Procedure change-Site Approval Form-for

TE-47"UFSAR 7.2, "Reactor Trip System"OP-AA-106-101-1006, "lssue resolution Documentation Form:

TE-47 Step Change"Technical Specifications 2.1, "Safety Limit- Fuel Cladding Integrity"Technical Evaluation

1219447-02, "Hardened Vent System Valves Viton Liner Evaluation"Section 1 Rl 9: Post-Maintenance TestinsProceduresMA-AA-71 6-01 2, "Post Maintenance Testing"OP-MA-1 09-1 01, "Clearance and Tagging"654.4.003, "Control Room HVAC System Operability Test"609.1.005, "lsolation Condenser lsolation Valve Inspection"2400-SMM-3900.04, "System Pressure Test Procedure (ASME Xl)"2400-SM M -341 1. 04, "Removal/l nstallation of Reactor Safety Valves"645.6.010, "Fire Suppression Deluge Valve Functional Test"Attachment

A-9ER-AA-335-018, "Detailed, General,

VT-1,

VT-2,

VT-1C,

VT-3, and W-3 Visual Examination ofASME Class MC and CC Containment Surfaces and Components"ER-AA-330-001, "Section Xl Pressure Testing"2400-SMl-3623.1, "SRM/IRM Detector Insert & Retract Mechanism Maintenance"Condition Report (lR)1198623

1213232 1210068DrawinqGE1 48F262, "Emergency Condenser"Work Order (AR)R2175959 R2145671 R2136087c2024631Other2011-002-020, "ASME IWE (Class MC) Containment Visual Examination NDE Report"207223-PT-001, "Liquid Penetrant Inspection Report for Weld Joint Preparation on X-63Penetration"2011-002-013, "NDE Data Report for New Penetration ECR 1Q-Q0727"207223-PT-002, "Liquid Penetrant Inspection Report for Weld Joint Preparation on X-63Penetration"207223-PT-003, "Liquid Penetrant Inspection Report for Final Weld on X-63 Penetration"C20251 42-1 9, "Rad iograph ic report", dated 5l3l 1 1"Pneumatic pressure test report for Spare Drywell Penetration for

ECR 10-00727," dated 513111

==Section 1R20: Refuelinq and Outase ActivitiesProcedures201, "Plant Startup"203, "Plant Shutdown"305, "Shutdown Cooling System Operation"OP-AA-1 08-1 08, "Unit Restart Review"Condition Report (lR)1211455

1209939

1209977

1209989

1210003 12100131210014

1210029

1210041

1210068

1210116 12103591209980Section 1 R22: Surveillance TestinsProceduresSA-AA-1 29, "Electrical Safety"MA-AA-1 000, "Conduct of Maintenance"609.4.001, "lsolation Condenser Valve Operability and In Service Test"678.4.005, "Station Blackout Functional Test"676.3.002, "DWEDT Sump Flow Integrator-Channel Calibration"676.3.003, "DW Sump Flow Integrator-Channel Calibration"681.4.004, Technical Specification Log Sheet, performed 4111111312.8, "Operation of the Containment Airborne Particulate and Gaseous Radiation MonitoringSystem"31 2.9, "Primary Containment Control"351.1, "The Chemical Waste/Floor Drain System Operating Procedure"1

2099331 21 00031212922c202541A

C2025142 A2227478Attachment==

A-10351.1 Attachment 351.1-1 1, "Testing 1-7 and 1-6 Sump lsolation Valves"617.4.002, "CRD Exercise and Flow Test/lST Cooling Water Header Check Valve"OP-AA-1 02-1 03, "Operator Work-Around Program"RAP-C1f, "DW Press Hi-Hi

RV 46 NB"RAP-C1g, "CAPGRMS Radiation High"RAP-C3h, "DW Sump Hi Leak/Pwr Fail"RAP-C4h, "DW Sump VLV Closed"RAP-C8h, "DW Temp Hi"RAP-RB1C(1-8), "1-8 Sump Drywell Floor Drain Sump High Level"RAP-RB1C(2-7), "Reactor Drywell High Leak Rate"RAP-RB1C(3-8), "641N6418 Drywell Flr Drain Sump Pumps Running"RAP-RB1C(4-9), "DW Sump 1-8

WC-FY-1O3BAIVC-FQ-103 Pwr Lost"612.4.001, "Standby Liquid Control Pump and Valve Operability and ln-Service Test"304, "Standby Liquid Control System Operation"619.3.017, "Reactor High Pressure Scram Test and Calibration"604.3.001, "Reactor Building to Torus Power Vacuum Breaker Test"1 16, "Surveillance Testing Program"602.3.004, "Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration"330, "Standby Gas Treatment System"651.4.002, "Standby Gas Treatment System 1O-Hour Run System 1"Condition Reports (lR)1143867

1143791

1177273

1144454

1144457 11444581144459

1145963

1147123

1155658

1156390 11560101190343 1220188Work Orders (AR)R2178435 A2272522 R2132087 A2265207A2272820 R2165005 R2180656 R2086400A2203405 R2178666R21 63538Other DocumentsNRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Maintenance- Preconditioning ofStructures, Systems, and Components Before Determining Operability"OC-201 1-5-001 1, 50.59 Screening "351.1 The Chemical Waste/Floor Drain System OperatingProcedure, Rev. 0"Section 4OAl : Performance lndicator VerificationProceduresNEl 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline"Condition Reports (lR)1064529

1161987

1155922 1053577Other DocumentsOyster Creek Performance Indicator Summary dated 411912011Section 4OM: ldentification and Resolution of ProblemsProcedures325, Air Extraction and Off Gas System201, Plant StartupAttachment

A-11DrawinqsBR 2008, "Air Extraction & Off-Gas System Flow Diagram"BR 2009,'H&V Main Stack Flow Diagram"Condition Reports (lR)556890495114579204

1140316

985777

1062796 11973371155520

1193110 1227974Work Orders (AR)R2121215 .R2182478 R2098257 R0800766Other DocumentsComponent History Work Order Closure Remarks for Y-7-29, dated 3131111Component History Work Order Closure Remarks for V-12-317, dated 3131111

Section 4OA3: Event FollowupProceduresABN-17, "Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions"DrawinosBR 2003, "Condensate/Feed System Flow Diagram"BR 2007, "Heater Drain, Vent and Pressure Relief System Flow Diagram"Condition Reports (lR)1 21 8368Other DocumentsNUREG-1 022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10

CFR 50.72 and 50.73"Section 4OA5: OtherCondition Reports (lR)1205775Attachment