IR 05000334/2011003
| ML112140011 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/02/2011 |
| From: | Roberts D J Division Reactor Projects I |
| To: | Harden P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| BELLAMY RR | |
| References | |
| EA-11-160 IR-11-003 | |
| Download: ML112140011 (42) | |
Text
- with copies to theRegionalAdministrator Region l; the Director, Officp of Enforcement, United States NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector atBeaver Valley. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of the cross-cutting aspectof any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of thisinspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region 1and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Beaver Valley Power Station. The informationyou provide will be considered in accordance with lnspection Manual Chapter 0305.Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report 50-41212011-001, which describedthe details associated with defective diesel generalor fuel injection pump supply lines resultingin the Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being declared inoperable. This issueconstituted a violation of NRC requirements, in that FENOC operated with both EDGsinoperable without immediately taking actions to restore an EDG to operable status inAugust 2, 20IIOn June 30, 2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and2. The enclosed integratedinspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 21, 2011, withmembers of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and iecords, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one (1) NRC-identified finding(Green) and one (1) self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). One findingwas determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very lowsafety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program (CAP), theNRC is tieating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC's P. Hardenaccordance with Technical Specifications (TS). However, the NRC concluded that the cause ofthe inoperability, incorrectly assembled compression fittings on replacement fuel injection pumpsupply lines, was due to an inadequate vendor design change and therefore, did not represent aperfoimance deficiency on the licensee's part. The NRC noted that FENOC took immediateaction to ensure availability of at least one EDG, deolared the EDG inoperable in a timelymanner, and effectively implemented the TS required action statement to immediately initiateaction to restore operability. The NRC's risk evaluation determined the issue to be of very lowsafety significance. Based on these facts, I have been authorized, after consultation with theDirecior,-Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, to exercise enforcementdiscretion in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcementfor the violation.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rulps of Practice," a copy of this letter, and itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be availaple electronically for public inspection in theNRC public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accEssible from the NRC Website athttp
- //www.nrc.qovlreadino-rmiadams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Weappreciate your cooperatton Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questionsregarding this letter.SincerelY,,^M%"Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/201 1003; 050004121201 1003w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ accordance with Technical Specifications (TS). However, the NRC concluded that the cause ofthe inoperability, incorrectly assembled compressioh fittings on replacement fu_el injection pumpsupply lines, wis due to an inadequate vendor design change and therefore, did not represent ap"rfoim"nce deficiency on the licensee's part. The lUnC noted that FENOC took immediateaction to ensure availability of at least one EDG, dellared the EDG inoperable in a timelymanner, and effectively implemented the TS required action statement to immediately initiateaction to restore operability. The NRC's risk evaluafion determined the issue to be of very lowsafety significance. Based on these facts, I have bqen authorized, after consultation with theDireitor,-Office of Enforcement, and the RegionalAdministrator, to exercise enforcementdiscretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enfbrcement Policy and refrain from issuingenforcement for the violation.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be availqble electronically for public inspection in theNRC public Document Room or'from the Publicly AVailable Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://www.nrc.qovireadino-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room)' Weappreciate youi cooperatron piease contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questionsregarding this letter' sincerery,/RA by James W. Clifford Acting For/Darrell J. Roberts, DirectorDivision of Reactor ProjectsP. HardenDocket Nos.: 50-334, 50'412License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/201 1003; 050004121201 1003w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc dencl: Distribution via ListServDistribution dencl:W. Dean, RAD. Lew, DRAD. Roberts, DRPJ. Clifford, DRPR. Bellamy, DRPS. Barber, DRPC. Newport, DRPA. Dugandzic, DRPD. Holody, ORAD. Werkheiser, DRP, SRItE. Bonney, DRP, RlP. Garrett, DRP, Resident OAJ. McHale, Rl OEDORegion I Docket Room (with concurrences)ML112140011DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH6\+++Beav0r Valley\BV lnspection Reports & ExitNotes\BV lnspection Reports 2011\BV Report lR 2q11-003 revl.docxAfter declaring this document "An OfficialAgency Reco-rd' it wl$ b9 rel9a9e,! to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: 'G' = Copyiithout ittachrnenuenclosure "E" = Copy with attadrnrenuendosum 'N' = ltSUNSI Review Gomplete: GSB (Reviewdr's Initials)*See pior concurenceOFFICIAL07121l't1 Docket Nos.License Nos.Report Nos.Licensee:Facility:Location:Dates:Inspectors:Approved by:U. S. NUCLEAR REGULA]'1ORY COMMISSIONREGION I50-334, 50-412DPR-66, NPF-7305000334/201 1 003 and 050004121201 1003FirstEnergy Nuclear Operatin$ Company (FENOC)Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2Shippingport, PA 15077April 1 ,2011through June 30, 2011D. Werkheiser, Senior Residqnt InspectorE. Bonney, Resident InspectdrC. Crisden, Emergency Preparedness SpecialistT. Moslak, Health PhysicistT. Ziev, Reactor EngineerR. Bellamy, Ph.D., ChiefReactor Projects Branch 6Division of Reactor ProjectsEnclosure TABLE Of REPORT DETAILSSummarv of Plant Status:Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent R{wer. On April 7, the unit was down-powered Io 82 percent for planned waterbox cleaninp, then commenced a planned shutdown forieplacement of a power range nuclear instrument (\l-+21 The unit commenced a startup onApril 16, and retuined to full power on April 21. The unit remained at 100 percent power for theremainder of the inspection period.Unit 2 began the inspection period shut down in a rd[ueling outage. On April 8, the unitcommenCed a start-up. On April 10, the unit reachep leVo reactor power and performed arequired shutdown in response to an AFW system l{ak, prior to synchronization. The unitrestarted on April 10, and returned to full power on ,$Rril 14. The unit was down-powered to 94percent on npiit 26for a reheater drain control vaMl repair and returned to full power on April27. The unit remaine.d at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period'1. REACTOR SAFETYCornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigatirig Systems, Barrier Integrity [R]1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)a. Inspection Scope (2 samples: hot weatherSeasonal Susceotibilitvpower system readiness)Station (BVPS) design features andrisk significant mitigating systemsfrom adverse weather effects due to suweather. The inspectors reviewed thecorrective action program database,experience, and the Updated Final Safetyof adverse weather conditions tothe licensee was appropriately identifyingand resolving weather-related equipmentblems.The inspectors evaluated BVPS design featgres and FENOC's imPlementation ofThe inspectors reviewed the Beaver ValleyFENOC's implementation of procedures toAnalysis Report (UFSAR), to determine thewhich the site is susceptible, and to verify tlprocedures to address issues that could impsystems. The inspectors reviewed FENOC':ct offsite alternating current (AC) powerprocedures and programs which discussedb.the operation and availability/reliability of offiite and alternate AC power systems duringadverse weather. The inspectors verified tht communication protocols between thetransmission system operator and FENOC eisted, and the appropriate informationwould be conveyed when potential grid stres and disturbances existed. The inspectorsalso verified that FENOC's procedures contined actions to monitor and maintain theavailability/reliability of offsite and onsite poweather conditions.er systems prior to and during adverseFindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 1 R04 Equipment Alionment (71111.04).1 Partial Svstem Walkdowns (71111.04O)a. Inspection Scope (3 samPles)The inspectors performed three partialalignment inspections duringconditions of increased safety significance,unavailable during maintenance or adverseuding when redundant equipment wasitions. The partial alignmentinspections were also completed after equiwas recently returned to service aftersignificant maintenance. The inspectorspartial walkdowns of the followingsystems, including associated electrical dbution components and control roompanels, to verify the equipment was alignedperform its intended safety functions:. Unit 2, April 25,'A' train componentwater (CCW) during 'B' CCW heatexchanger cleaning;. Unit 2, June 22, temporary airsystem line-up during'B' station airb..2Complete Svstem Walkdown (7 1 I 11 .04S)Inspection Scope (1 samPle)a.The inspectors completed a detailed reviewthe alignment and condition of the Unit 2'A'train low head safety injection (LHSI). The inspectors conducted a walkdownof the system to verify that the critical portisuch as valve positions, switches, andwith procedures, and to identify anybreakers, were correctly aligned in accordadiscrepancies that may have had an effectoperability.The inspectors also reviewed outstandingdeficiencies did not significantly affect thetenance work orders to verify that theI system function. ln addition, theinspectors discussed system health with theengineer and reviewed the conditionreport database to verify that equipmentnt problems were being identified andappropriately resolved. Documents reviduring the inspection are listed in theAttachment.b.FindinqsNo findings were identified.compressor maintenance; and. Unit 1, June 24, 1-2 emergency diesel g$nerator (EDG) fuel oil transfer pump(FOTP) system during 1-1 EDG fuel oil tr]ansfer pump (FOTP) testing.FindinosNo findings were identified.Enclosure 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05).1 Quarterlv Sample Review (71111.05O)a. lnspection Scope (5 samPles)The inspectors reviewed the conditions offire areas listed below, to verifycompliance with criteria delineated in AdminProcedure 1 l2-ADM-1900, "Fire's control of transient combustiblesprotection equipment including firedetection systems, water-based firesystems, gaseous fire suppressionsystems, manual firefighting equipment andty, passive fire protection features,and the adequacy of compensatorys for any fire protection impairments.Documents reviewed are listed in theent:Protection," Rev. 23. This review includedand ignition sources, material condition of. Unit 1, Auxiliary Building General Area ({ire Area PA-1A);. Unit 2, Cooling Tower Pump House (Fire Area CTP-1);o Unit 2, Auxiliary Boiler Area (Fire Area SpB-1);. Unit 2, South Office Shops Building Railviray Bay (Fire Area SOB-2); and. Unit 2, South Office Shops Building (Fire Area SOB-3).b.a..2FindinosNo findings were identified.Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)Inspection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors observed personnelce during a fire drill involving a simulatedfire at the Unit 1 'B' System Station Service(SSST) on April 19, to evaluatethe readiness of station personnel toand fight fires. The inspectors observedthe fire brigade members using protectivebreathing apparatus and entering the fireing, turnout gear, and self-containedin a controlled manner. The inspectorsalso observed the fire fighting equipmentto the fire scene to evaluate whethersufficient equipment was available tocontrol and extinguish the simulated fire.The inspectors evaluated whether theplant fire hose lines were capable ofreaching the fire area and whether hose uwas adequately simulated. Theinspectors observed the fire fightingand communications between fire brigademembers. The inspectors verified that thedrill scenario was followed andobserved the post drill critique to evaluate ifany drill weaknesses were discussed.drill objectives were satisfied and thatFindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)a. Inspection ScoPg (1 samPle)The inspectors reviewed a sample of ithe common intake structure'D' cubicleequipment for Unit 2.This review was conducted to evaluate Frelated systems from internal floodingof the area, reviewed the UFSAR, relateddocuments. The inspectors examined theb. FindinosNo findings were identified.1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07).1 Annual Sample Review (71111.07A)a. Inspection Scgoe (1 samPle)lntroduction: A Green, self-revealing non-ci"Procedures", was identified in that the Unitmaintained in chemicalwet layup, contraryfailed to maintain corrosion inhibitors in theflood protection measures for equipment inining safety-related service waterprotection of the enclosed safety-The inspectors performed a walkdownI flooding evaluations, and other relatednd equipment and conditions to ensureRSS Heat Exchangers HXs were notstation procedures. Specifically, FENOCHXs, resulting in significant HXthe 'B' RSS HX during a service water fullthat they remained consistent with thoseted in the design basis documentation,flooding mitigation documents, and riskassumptions. Documents reviewedduring the inspection are listed in the Aent.The inspectors reviewed the maintenancewith the Unit 2'B'train RSS HXconducted in March and April 2011, inwith 2CMP-1 3RSS-E-21 A-B-C-D-1 M,," Rev. 7. The review included an"Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangerassessment of the testing methodology andconsistency with Electric PowerResearch lnstitute document NP-7552,Exchanger Performance Monitoringtter 89-13, "Service Water SYstemGuidelines," December 1991, and GenericProblems Affecting Safety-Related Equ" The inspectors reviewed maintenanceresults, related condition reports and 'B'against applicable acceptance criteria.Service Water System fullflow test resultsb. Findinqsviolation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1,corrosion, which led to degraded flowflow test.Descriotion: On February 24, during a 'B'discovered degraded flow through the 'BB' RSS HX during the full flow test wastest. The required SW flow rate through30.13.138, "Train 'B' Seryice Water System)gpm, which resulted in a failed surveillance'B' RSS HX was 5731 gPm Per 2OST-service water (SW) fullflow test, Unit 2HX. The as-found SW flow through theFull Flow Test". On March 4th, the'B' RSSand cleaning. The inspection identified aHX was removed from service for iEnclosure Isignificant amount of corrosion products blo(king ftow in the fower end bell of thevertically-mounted heat exchanger. The corfosion products were removed from the endbell andhydrolazing was performed on the $W piping during the 2R15 outage in Apriltorestore system function.The RSS HXs were originally placed in wetin November of 2008. Procedure2OM-30.4.T, "Placing Recirc Spray HXs intocorrosion inhibitors are required to maintainreview of the four RSS HXs determined thatChemical Wet Layup", established thatHXs in wet layup. A maintenance'B'and 'D' RSS HXs in November 2008,the'A'and 'C' RSS HXs were last placed inwet layup in October 2009, per 2OM-30.4.T.EPRI NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger PerformaMonitoring Guidelines," allows use of theperiodic maintenance method to complyheat exchanger testing methodology.Water treatment is one of three periodic mmethods used by FENOC toensure adequate RSS HX performance. ENP-7552 states that "improper watertreatment can result in accelerated, resulting in component reliabilityconcerns." The work management processnot utilized to establish a periodicwet layup chemical profile. Samplingchemical test and addition to maintain theof the RSS HXs was not Performed tothe correct chemical concentration existedto ensure the selected maintenance methodgenerated recurring work orders 200450991inhibitors were last added to thewas effective. FENOC subsequentlyand 200450994 to correct the issue andcladding, reactor coolant system and contareleases caused by accidents or events'ensure allfour RSS HXs are maintained inproper chemical wet layup condition.Analvsis: The failure to maintain the RSSin chemicalwet layup is considered aperformance deficiency. Traditionalt does not apply because the issue didnot have an actual safety consequence orpotential for impacting NRC's regulatoryfunction, and was not the result of any wilviolation of NRC requirements. Theinspectors determined that the finding wassimilar to the examples for minorE, "Examples of Minor lssues". Thedeficiencies contained in IMC A612,finding is more than minor because itthe Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integritythe equipment performance attribute of thecornerstones. The finding is associated wiMitigating Systems cornerstone to ensureavailability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events toundesirable consequences and isalso associated with the SSC and barrieraftribute of the Barrier IntegritYcornerstone to provide reasonablethat physical design barriers (fuelln accordance with IMC 0609.04 (Table 4ament) protect the public from radionuclidePhase 1 - Initial Screening andCharacterization of Findings," the findingdetermined to be of very low safetYsignificance (Green) because the finding dnot result in a loss of operability nor was it adegradation of a radiological barrier, controlpathway.barrier, hydrogen igniter, or an openThe cause of this NCV relates to thetting aspect of Human Performance, WorkControl, in that FENOC personneldid notte work activities consistent withnuclear safety. Specifically, FENOC didchemicalwet layup condition to supportHXs. H.3(b)]coordinate work activities to complete theequipment reliability of the Unit 2 RSSEnclosure 10Enforcemen!: TS 5.4. 1, "Procedures",that procedures be established,implemented, and maintained as recomin Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33.Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 10 requires,part, chemical and radiological controlprocedures to maintain water quality withinbed limits and the limitations onconcentrations of agents that may causeive attack or fouling of heat-transfersurfaces. Contrary to the above, FENOC fato maintain the RSS HXs in chemicalwet layup in accordance with stationres and EPRI NP-7552, which resulted insignificant fouling of the B RSS HX. Becathis deficiency is considered to be of verylow safety significance (Green), and wasinto the corrective action program (CR11-90430), this violation is being treated asn NCV, consistentwith Section2.3.2 of theNRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000411003-1, Failure to MaintainRecirculation Spray Heat Exchangers inhemicalWet LayuP)1R1 1.1a.Licensed Operator Requalification ProoramResident Inspector Quarterlv Review (71111Inspection Scope (1 samPle)71111.11).11O)The inspectors observed one sample of1 licensed operator simulator training anddrill on June 29. The inspectors evaluatedoperator performance regardingcommand and control, implementation ofannunciator response, abnormal, andemergency operating Procedures,compliance, and emergencY Plan itechnical specification review and. The inspectors evaluated thelicensee staff training personnel to verifyidentified, and that conditions adverse tocorrective action program for resolution.deficiencies in operator performance werelity were entered into the licensee'sinspectors reviewed simulator physicalfidelity to assure the simulator appropriatelyled the plant control room. Theinspectors verified that the training evatraining objectives had been achieved.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.adequately addressed that the applicable1R12 Maintenance Rule lmplementation (71111 -1a. Inspection Scope (3 samPles)The inspectors evaluated Maintenance(MR) implementation. The inspectorsevaluated specific attributes, such as MRino. characterization of failed structures,systems, and components (SSCs), MR riskof SSCs, SSC performancecriteria and goals, and appropriateness ofactions. The inspectors verifiedthat the issues were addressed as required10 CFR 50.65 and the licensee's programfor MR implementation. For the selectedthe inspectors evaluated whethercategory (aX1) and (a)(2) performancealso reviewed. Documents reviewedperformance was properly dispositioned formonitoring. MR System Basis Documentsare listed in the Attachment.. On April 2, Unit 2, 'A'train solid statedocumented in CR 11-92245;system 48 volt power supply failure,Enclosure 11b.1R13a.1R15On April 25, Unit 1 and 2, maintenancele program health "EquiPmentPerformance" yellow cornerstone,in CR 11-92375: andOn April 27, Unit 2, emergencY dieselmaintenance rule (aXl ) evaluationdue to goalfailure, documented in CR 13.FindinosNo findings were identified.(71111.13)Inspection Scope (4 samPles)The inspectors reviewed the scheduling andof four activities, and evaluatedtheir effect on overall plant risk. This reviewconducted to ensure compliance withapplicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50inspection are listed in the Attachment.a)(4). Documents reviewed during theo On April 14, Unit 1, planned entry into. On April 15, Unit 2, risk evaluation forwo 200451815;risk for transformer breaker work;addition to'A'and'C'RSS HXs Per. On May 24, Unit 1, planned maintenat. On May 26-27, Unit 2, PRA review forduring 'A' intake structure bay outage; andne-driven auxiliary feedwater pinholesteam leak repairs.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Operabilitv Evaluations (7 1 1 1 1 .15)a. lnspection ScoPe (6 samPles)The inspectors evaluated the technicalof selected immediate operabilitydeterminations (lOD), prompt operabilitynations (POD), or functionalitYassessments (FA), to verifY thatof operability were justified. In addition,the inspectors verified that technical(TS) limiting conditions for operationrequirements were properly addressed'measures worked and were adequately conthe Attachment.measures implemented to ensure theDocuments reviewed are listed inb.(LCO) requirements and UFSAR designIn addition, the inspectors reviewed comOn March 31, Unit 2, pressurizer safetyand acceptability as documented in CRve [2RCS-RV551C]1-92159:gasket evaluationthickness asOn April 4, Unit 1 evaluation of riverdocumented in CR 11-92133;piping below nominalOn May 3, Unit 2, stroke time for'B'adump valve outside accePtancerange as documented in CR 11-94053;On May 9, Unit 1, 'B'quench sPraY[1 QS-P-1 B] comPrehensive testacceptance criteria not meet evaluationdocumented in CR 11'94414;Enclosure On June 8, Unit 1, IOD regarding netemergency diesel generators as. On June 22, Units 1 and 2,licensee 1Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuatorb. FindinosNo findings were identified.1 R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)a. lnspection ScoPe (2 samPles)The inspectors reviewed the followingrisk significance. The permanentscreenings were reviewed against theUFSAR and the TS. The inspectors verifieddesign documentation were consistent withas credited codes and standards, anddescribed in the package were atemporary modifications were implementedProcedure, 1 l2-ADM-2028, "Temporaryverified the post-modification testing wassystem and components oPeratedDocuments reviewed are listed in the Atta. On March 26, Unit 2ECP 09'0771on 2SWS-184; and. On April 4, Unit 2 ECP-11-0179, db. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinq (71111'19)a. lnspection ScoPe (7 samPles)The inspectors reviewed the followingmaintenance tests (PMT) adequatelyequipment was satisfied given the scope ofwas restored. In addition, the inspectorsverify consistency with the design andinspectors witnessed the test or reviewed ttdemonstrated restoration of affected safetyconditions adverse to quality were entered iresolution. Documents reviewed during the. On March 25, Unit 2,WO 2Q0450628 a[2CHS-160];suction for fuel oil transfer forin CR 11-96157; and1 evaluation regarding the MOV/AOVsoftware.nent and temporary modifications based onand associated 10 CFR 50.59design basis documentation, including thethat attributes and parameters within thelicensing and design bases, as welldown the systems to verify that changesimplemented. The inspectors verified theaccordance with Administrative (ADM)tions," Rev. 6. The inspectors alsosfactorily accomplished to ensure thewith their intended safety function.to maintain a packing follower retainerof BV-DC-SWBD 2-1 alarm.to determine whether the Post-that the safety-related function of thework, and that operability of the systemted the applicable acceptance criteria tobases, as well as TS requirements. Thedata to verify results adequatelYnctions. The inspectors also verified thatthe corrective action Program forspection are listed in the Attachment.rebuild of loop fill header relief valveEnclosure On April 3, Unit \WO 200451094On April 6, Unit 2, WO 200452432On April 10, Unit 2, non-destructive exato 2FWE-940 connection Per WO 2011On April 15, Unit 1, WO 200451486testing and performance after detectorOn April 17, Unit 1 adjustment of PRNIando On May 5, Unit 1 'C'charging pumpb. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R20 Refuelino and Outaoe Activities (71111'20).1 Unit 2 Refuelinq Outaoe (2R15)a. Inspection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors observed selected outagesafety functions (e.9. reactor decay heatand containment integrity) were properly maprocedures. The inspectors evaluatedperformance, communications, and instrumprocedures and/or observed selected activioutage. The inspectors verified activitiesand verified required acceptance criteriaconditions adverse to quality identifiedwere identified as required by the licensee'sreviewed are listed in the Attachment. Theo Final containment walkdown and close<. Reactor start-ups (April 8 and April 10)o Balance of plant walkdown during poweThe inspectors also observed selectedrestart readiness of Unit 2, followingrestart readiness review meeting was"Restart Readiness for Plant Outages,' Rev.in part, was to assure that the plant'spersonnel were ready for startup and safe,activities.The inspectors observed the reactor tripresponse to an AFW header leak asSection 4OA3.1). lnspectors also observedooaascension following the repair to the AFWEnclosure13,B'HX retesting after lower-end cleaning;-MOV-1 55-2 testing after maintenance;ination and pressure test after weld repairsRange Nuclear Instrument (PRNI) N42during outage 1POAC4;42trip set points post-detector replacement;replacement and vent valve installation,samples total)to determine whether shutdown, spent fool pool cooling,tained as required bY TS and Plantperformance attributes including operatoraccuracy. The inspectors reviewedassociated with the Unit 2 refuelingperformed in accordance with proceduresmet. The inspectors also verified thatperformance of selected outage activitiescorrective action program. Documentspectors also evaluated the:inspection;heat-up;ascension.review activities associated withof the 2R15 refueling activities. Theas required by NOBP-OM-4O10,4, on March 30. The purpose of the review,condition, programs/processes, andoperation after completion of outageshutdown on April 10 (return to Mode 3) inin NRC Event Notification 46744 (seesubsequent reactor start up and powerlater in the evening on APril 10.
b..2a.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Unit 1 Maintenance Outaoe (1POAC4)Insoection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors reviewed licenseeduring a planned maintenance outagefollowing a Unit 1 shutdown on April 10, tothe failed Power Range Nuclearlnstrument (PRNI-42) detector and toother plant related issues. The inspectorsapproved procedures, conduct of outagereviewed compliance to TS requirementsof key safety functions.risk evaluations, configuration control, andDocuments reviewed during the inspectionmaintenance outage, the inspectorslisted below:. Reactor Shutdown and Shutdown risk e. Startup Readiness Review (April 15) anrr Reactor Startup (April 15) and Criticalityo Plant Startup. Power Ascensionb. FindinosNo findings were identified.1R22 Surveillance Testinq (7 1111.22)a. Inspection Scooe (6 samples: 1 isolationroutine)listed in the Attachment. During thisFENOC's control of the outage activitiesSchedulingApril 16)1 leak rate, 1 in-service testing and 3The inspectors witnessed the performanceor reviewed test data for the eight followingOperation Surveillance Test (OST) andnce Surveillance (MSP) packages. Thereviews verified that the equipment orwere being tested as required by TS, theUFSAR, and procedural requirements. Theinspectors also verified that the licenseeestablished proper test conditions, that nouipment pre-conditioning activitiesoccurred, and that acceptance criteria were. On April 2, Unit 2, 2BW-1'47 '11, SlValve Integrity Test;Charging System Containment Penetration. On April 6, Unit 2, 2OST-30.138, TrainService Water System Full Flow Test;On April 10, Unit 1, l05T-6.24,Water Balance lnventory;On April 11, Unit 2, 2OST-24.9,Generated Reactor Cooling SYstemTrip Test of Turbine Driven AFW;On April 12, Unit 1, lRST-3.4, Incoreysis of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio; andOn May 26, Unit 2,2OST-24.4, SteamQuarterly Test.Auxiliary Feed PumP l2Fal\,lE-P221oaaEnclosure 1EP2a.1 EP3a.b.maintenance and testing procedure,and test records, and the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA)design report to ensure FENOCcompliance with design report commitmentssystem maintenance and testing. Asample of condition reports (CRs)to the ANS was reviewed for causes,trends, and corrective actions. The iinterviewed FENOC corporate staff todiscuss system performance and upgrades.accordance with NRC Inspection ProcedureThe inspection was conducted in1114, Attachment 2. Planning Standard,10 CFR 50.47(bX5) and the relatedas reference criteria.FindinqsNo findings were identified.of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used(71114.03)Inspection Scope (1 samPle)FindinqsNo findings were identified.Gornerstone: Emergency Preparednesslnspection Scooe (1 samPle)An onsite review was conducted to assessBeaver Valley ANS. During the inspection,(71114.02)maintenance and testing practices of theinspectors reviewed the ANStttgvvvlrvrr vvvyv t IThe inspectors conducted a review of Beav{r Valley's ERO augmentation staffingrequirements and the process for notifying aird augmenting the ERO. The review wasperformed to ensure the readiness of key licpnsee staff to respond to an emergencyevent and to ensure FENOC's ability to actir/ate their emergency response facilities in atimely manner. The inspectors reviewed thg Beaver Valley Emergency Plan, duty roster,and iugmentation data. The inspectors als{ reviewed a sampling of ERO responder'straininfrecords to ensure training and qualilications were up to date. The inspectionwas conducted in accordance with NRC Insfiection Procedure71114, Attachment 3.Planning Standard, 10 CFR 50.47(bX2) and]related requirements of 10 CFR 50,Appendix E, were used as reference criterialb. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 1EP4a.1 EPsa.(71114.04)Inspection Scooe (1 samPle)Since the last NRC inspection of thisarea in April2010, FENOC implementedvarious revisions to the Beaver ValleyPlan. FENOC had determined that, inmade to the Plan, and its lowertieraccordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), theseimplementing procedures, had not resulted iany decrease in effectiveness of the Plan,and that the revised Plan continued to meetrequirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) andAppendix E to 10 CFR 50. Although noaction level (EAL)changes werereviewed during this inspection, a sample ofplan changes, including thechanges to lowertier emergency planting procedures, was evaluated for anypotential decreases in effectiveness of theVafley Emergency Plan. However,in an NRC Safety Evaluation RePortthis review by the inspectors was notand does not constitute formal NRCof the changes. Therefore, these changesremain subject to future NRC inspection in50.sa(q) were used as reference criteria.FindinosNo findings were identified.ir entirety. The requirements in 10 CFR(71114.45)Inspection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors reviewed a sampling of selfprocedures and reports toassess FENOC's ability to evaluate theirpreparedness (EP) Performanceand program. The inspectors reviewed apling of CRs from SePtember 2009through May 2011 initiated by FENOC fromself-assessments, and audits. Theinspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.54(t)it reports and nuclear oversight audits.with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,This inspection was conducted inAttachment 5, Planning Standard, 10 CFR.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used ascriteria.b. FindingsNo findings were identified.lEPO Drifl Evaluation (71114,00)a. Inspection ScoPe (1 samPle)The inspectors observed an emergencyRed Team mini-drill and Unit 1licensed-operator simulator evaluationa drillon June 29. Senior licensed-operator performance regarding event cland notifications was specificallyevaluated. The inspectors evaluated the.based scenario that involvedmultiple, safety-related component failuresplant conditions that would havewarranted emergency plan activation,facility activation, and escalation to theevent classification of Site Area EmergencyFENOC planned to credit this evolutiontoward Emergency PreParednessPerformance ( DEP) l nd icators,Enclosure therefore, the inspectors reviewed theble event notifications and classificationscredited, and properly evaluatedto determine whether theY wereconsistent with Nuclear Energy Institute () 99-02, Rev. 6, "Regulatory AssessmentPerformance Indicator Guideline." Theworksheets regarding the performancereviewed licensee evaluatoracceptability, and reviewed other crewand operator evaluations to ensure adverseitions were appropriately entered intothe Corrective Action Program. Otherfollowing:. 112-ADM-1111, Rev.4, "NRC EPPutilized in this inspection include theIndicator Instructions;"I 12-ADM-11 1 1.F01, Rev. 3, "EmergencyClassifications/Notifications/PARS ; "Performance IndicatorsEPP-I-1a/b, Rev. 14, "Recognition and1l2-EPP-l-2, Rev. 35, "Unusual Event;"of Emergency Conditions;". 112-EPP-l-3, Rev.33, "Alert;". 112-EPP-!-4, Rev. 33, "Site Area. 112-EPP-l-5, Rev.34, "GeneralFindinqsNo findings were identified.RADIATION SAFEWoob.2.Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety [PSI2RS05 Radiation Monitorinq lnstrumentation (7 112lnspection Scope (1 samPle)05)
Reactor Building Supplemental LeakMonitor, RM-1VS-110. Auxiliary Building Exhaust Monitor, RM-1. Reactor Building SCLRS Noble Gas MorLiquid Effluent Monitors:. Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor, RM-1LW-. Contaminated Drains Effluent Monitor, Ro Component Cooling Water Monitor, RM-and Release System (SCLRS)111RM-1-VS-1 121LW-116RW-101b.In Unit 2, the walkdown included portions ofGaseous Effluent Monitors:following monitors:. Ventilation Vent Monitor, 2HVS-RQ101. Supplemental Leak Collection and ReltSystem (SCLRS) Monitor, 2HVS-RQl 09Liquid Effluent Monitors:. Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor,Calibration and Testinq ProqramThrough record reviews, the inspectorwere properly calibrated, and that thethat the effluent monitoring instrumentssource checks and functionaltests hadbeen routinely performed. The inspectorpoints are established in accordance withthat the effluent monitor alarm setOffsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).The inspector reviewed contamination saresults (per 10 CFR Part 61) used tocha racterize difficu lt-to-measureto determine if the calibration sourcesin the plant's source term.were representative of the radioisotopes fouProblem ldentification and ResolutionThe inspector reviewed selected Condition(CRs), system health rePorts, andvarious Nuclear Oversight reports to evathe licensee's threshold for identifying,evaluating, and resolving problems for themonitoring instrumentation.lncluded in this review were CRs related toworker and radiation Protectiontechnician errors to determine if anpattern traceable in the maintenance oruse of radiation instruments was evident.FindinqsSee finding in section 4OM.3Enclosure 2RSO6a.(71124.06)Inspection Scope (1 samPle)During the period June 20 - 23, theconducted activities to verify FENOC wasproperly maintaining the gaseous and liquidprocessing systems to ensure thatradiological releases were properlymonitored, and evaluated with respect topublic exposure. lmplementation of thesecontained in the 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50,procedures.Effluent Report Reviewswas reviewed against the criterialicensee's ODCM, and the licensee'sThe inspector reviewed the 2009 and 2010Reports to verify that the effluents programRadiological Effluent Releaseimplemented as required by the ODCM.lncluded in this review were the results ofground water protection program, theinclusion of Carbon-14 dose contributions,current land use census, and verificationthat no significant changes were made toUnit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and liquidthe Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)release system configurations, as specified iand ODCM descriptions.Samplino and AnalvsisWalkdowns and ObservationsThe inspector walked down the major comp{nents of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous andliquid release systems to verify the system cfnfigurations.complied with the FSARdescription, to evaluate equipment material $ondition, and determine the status ofsystem upgrades.The inspector reviewed the most current Uni1 and Unit 2 liquid and gaseous effluentmonitor monthly source checks, quarterly fuctional test results and 18-month calibrationrecords to verify that instrumentation and asociated pumps/isolation valves orfans/isolation dampers, respectively, were oerable.The inspector reviewed the air cleaning systfms surveillance test results for the HighEfficiency particulate Absolute (HEPA) anO {harcoal filtration systems installed in Unit 1and Unit 2. The inspector confirmed that th$ air flow rates were consistent with theFSAR values and the filtration system test r{sults met the acceptance criteria.The inspector reviewed the relevant samplinp/analytical procedures and observed atechnician collect a weekly air sample from tfre Unit 2 Decontamination Buildingventilation system (2RMO-RQ301B) and anlyze the sample on a gammaspectrophotometer. The inspector confirme{ tnat the technician.complied with theprocedural requirements in taking the gas s{mple and the sample was appropriatelyanalyzed.Enclosure FENOC licensee properly calculated theinspector confirmed that no performance20programs to verify that the accuracy of othersamples were operating reliablY.used for counting effluentThe inspector confirmed that proceduresbeen established and alternative, if normal effluent monitors becomesampling equipment is readily available forunavailable.Dose CalculationsThe inspector reviewed monthly, quarterly, agaseous effluents performed during the pastannual dose projections for liquid and2 months to verify that effluent wasprocessed and released in accordance withrequirements and to ensure thatdose from effluent releases. The(criteria contained in Appendix I to10 CFR Part 50) was exceeded for these reThe inspector observed a techniciana liquid discharge permit (No. 5823) forreleasing the steam generator condensatesnk (2SGC-TK23B). The insPectorit 1 and Unit 2 to evaluate the adequacy ofreviewed other liquid discharge permits fordilution flow, radioactive content, set pointustment on liquid waste monitor 2SGC-RQ100, and overall accuracy of thedata.Ground Water Protection ProgramThe inspectors sampled licensee submittalsfor both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify accuracyPerformance Indicators (Pl) listed belowthe data recorded from July 2010 throughJune 201 1. The inspectors reviewed LicenEvent Reports, condition rePorts,portions of various plant operating logs andand Pl data develoPed from monthlYoperating reports. Methods for compilingreporting the Pls were discussed withL To verify the accuracy of the Pl datacognizant engineering and licensing persreported during this period, Pl definitionsguidance contained in Nuclear EnergyInstitute (NEl) 99-02, "Regulatoryused for each data element.lndicator Guideline," Revision 6, wereThe inspector verified that FENOC is continqing to implement the voluntary NEI/IndustryGround Water Protection Initiative. The insppctor reviewed monitoring well sampleresults, trending data, and decommissioning records, maintained per10 CFR S0.7S [g), to evaluate procedural corfnpliance and to identify off normal results.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.4. oTHER ACTIVITIES [OAl4OA1 Performance lndicator Verification (7 1151)a. Inspection Scope (9 samples total)Enclosure
. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor CoolantCornerstone: Mitiqatinq Svstems (2. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety SystemlFailure [MS05];Cornerstone: Barrier lnteqritv (4 samples)Cornerstone: Emeroencv Preparedness (3Activity [B101]Leak Rate [8102]mples)The inspectors reviewed data for EP Pls,o Drilland Exercise Performance;. ERO Drill Participation; and. ANS Reliability.The inspectors reviewed the Pl data and itsdocumentation from the secondquarter of 2010 through the first quarter ofdata.11 to verify the accuracy of the reportedFindinosNo findings were identified.Problem ldentification and Resolution (711- 2 samples total)Inspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure71152,"ldentification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equifailures or specific human performanceissues for follow-up, the inspectorsa daily screening of items entered intoFENOC's corrective action program. Thiswas accomplished bY reviewingsummary lists of each CR, attendingmeetings, and accessing FENOC'scomputerized CR database.FindinosNo findings were identified.Inspection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors reviewed a selected numberCRs related to the implementation ofwork management at the station andon issues related to the completion ofand 11-91287 as a problem identificationsurveillance tests documented CR 11-895b.4c.42.1ab..2and resolution (Pl&R) sample for a detailedrevlew.Enclosure 22The inspectors reviewed FENOC's fullappacause and monitored the correctiveaction review board assessment for CR 1176. The inspectors reviewed causedetermination and assessed FENOC'sof condition, operability determination, andprioritization and timeliness of correctiveto prevent recurrence. Documentsreviewed for this inspection are located inAttachment.Findinqs and ObservationsNo findings were identified.In general, FENOC has identified trends inaddressed the trends within their CAP andmanagement and has aPProPriatelYtaken by the work management groupto communicate and provide guidance toimprovements to and effectiveness of thestation. FENOC continues to focus onmanagement implementation. Theinspectors have recently observed challengin completing work activities due toinsufficient staff resources, particularlytion and controls staff, during outagesat other fleet stations. FENOC plans totheir resource-sharing plans to minimizethis impact. The inspectors will continue tothis area and assess theactions.effectiveness of planned and in-progressInspection Scope (1 samPle)The inspectors reviewed aregarding various radiationselected numberCRs related to issues and deficienciesmonitors thatimportant to safe operation and used in, the inspectors focused on correctiveThe inspectors reviewed cause determand assessed FENOC's extent ofcondition, prioritization, and timeliness ofactions. Documents reviewed forthis inspection are located in theb. Findinqs and ObservationsOne finding was identified. The inspectorsobserved a significant number of out-of-service radiation monitors documented inradiation monitor track logs in the controlroom for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Thesewere accounted for by FENOC in theirand 09-68196), however a number ofemergency response assessments.actions for the Unit 1 and 2 RSS HXRQ100A, B, C, Dl, however other actionsfunction assessment (CR 10-86918 andidentification and resolution (Pl&R) sampleThe inspectors reviewed FENOC's promptmonitor logs, action plans, and completedprompt function assessments (CR 10-8691corrective actions are stilloutstanding andthese out-of-service monitors were notlntroduction: A Green, NRC-identifiedactions to correct long-standing radiationnot accomplished in a timely manner, inLP-2001. Specifically, FENOC failed tor [RM-1RW-100A, B, C, D and 2SWS-other monitors related to FENOC's prompt196) were reviewed as a Problema detailed follow-uP review.assessment, control room radiationactions for the selected monitors'been extended. Also, a number offor safe operation.(FlN) was identified in that plans andritor system instrument deficiencies wherence with FENOC CAP Procedure NOP-and return to service radiation monitorEnclosure 23instruments for Unit 1 and 2 RSS HX [RM-1RQ100A,B,C,D], in a timely manner, requichallenges to assessing radiation detectionThis issue was entered into the licensee's91673 and 1 1-89700.Discussion: A review of FENOC's prompt fuUnit 2 RSS HX radiation monitors have2006, respectively, due to failing to meetrequirements during surveillance testing.sample lines to clog with debris and mud.CRs 06-00509,07-05648, and 09-68196. Fcondition has been observed on Unit 1Alternate methods for detection (alternate(i.e. 1 l2-EPP-lP-2.7, Liquid Release EstimaEngineering changes were developed and iflow issue and return the monitors to servicemultiple groups to coordinate and completeThese issues have been long-standing withextended and delayed due to design, parts,monitors have not yet been returned totheir recovery plans and has madeaffecting the recovery of the RSS HX monAnalvsis: Traditional enforcement does notactual safety consequence or the potentialwas not the result of any willful violation ofdetermined that the finding was not similarcontained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Exathan minor because it affects the Public Radassociated with the attribute of plant eqmonitors) attribute of the Public Radiationprotection of public health and safety frominto the public domain as a result of routineIn accordance with IMC 0609'04 (Table 3a)'Characterization of Findings," the finding"Public Radiation Safety Significancevery low safety significance (Green) becrthe effluent program or cause any publicThe cause of this NCV relates to the crossresolution, Corrective Action Program, incorrective actions to develop and implementdeficiencies. [P.1 (d)]Enforcement: Enforcement action does notdid not involve a violation of a regulatoryrefocused their radiation monitor action planEnclosure100A,8,C,D and 2SWS-maintenance of alternate monitoring andnd assessment during accident situations.action program under CR(s) 11-assessments revealed that Unit 1 andout of service since September 2007 andUFSAR river and service water flowlow flow is due to the susceptibility of theissues were originally documented ininspector review identified this2003.) and methods for estimating releases) were identified and implemented.plemented in an attempt to correct the lowThe recovery of these monitors requireactions.corrective actions that have beenurce, and scheduling issues. TheFENOC has reevaluated and modifiedprogress towards completing the ECPsbecause the issue did not have animpacting NRC's regulatory function, andrequirements. The insPectorsthe examples for minor deficienciesof Minor lssues". The finding is moreion Safety cornerstone. The finding isand instrumentation (process radiationcornerstone to ensure adequatere to radioactive materials releasedlian nuclear reactor oPeration.Phase 1 - Initial Screening andevaluated using IMC 0609 Appendix D,ination Process" and determined to be ofthe finding was not a failure to implementto be exceeded.aspect of Problem, ldentification, andFENOC personnel did not take timelyions for long-standing radiation monitorbecause the performance deficiency. FENOC has revised andnd continues to take action to return the 40A3(7 1 153 - 2 samples total)The inspectors performed one eventinspection activity. Documents reviewedfor this inspection activity are listed in theI lnformation attached to thisreport.Plant Event ReviewInspection Scope (1 samPle)For the plant event below, the inspectorsand/or observed plant parameters,reviewed personnel performance, and evaperformance of mitigating systems.The inspectors communicated the plant eveto regional personnel and compared theevent details with criteria contained in IMC, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis forReactors," for consideration of additionalinspection activities. The inspectorsreviewed FENOC's follow-up actionscorrective actions were im plementedto the events to assure that appropriatewith their safety significance.Documents reviewed during the inspectionlisted in the Attachment.. Unit 2: On April 10, control roominitiated a manual reactor trip whileperforming TS required shutdown duelow water level (25%) on the'A'steamreaching the pre-established trip criteria forwater level. The TS requiredshutdown was in resPonse to anweld leak at 2FWE-940, an auxiliarynot affect steam generator water levels.feedwater header line. This weld leakAfter the manual reactor trip, water levelto lower due to shrink andreached 20.5o/o level, and caused anatic actuation of the steam driveny recovered and stabilized steamauxiliary feedwater pump. Operators q.1to the NRC via Event Notificationresident inspectors. Operators respondedappropriately and mitigating systemsas designed. The licenseedocumented this issue in CR 11-9259711-92603 and is conducting a root causeevaluation. This issue was alsounder NRC OpESS FY2009-02, "NegativeTrend and Recurring Events lnvolvingFindinqsNo findings were identified.Systems.".2Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (sample)generator water levels. This event wasM67744 and was directly observed byb.lllnoDerable"On Marchscheduled25, while Beaver ValleY, Unit 2shut down in Mode 6 (refueling),Train'A' EDG which included replacingmaintenance was performed onEnclosure 25the twelve fuel injection pump supply linesnew fuel injection pump supply linesprocured from the EDG vendor. During postmaintenance testing of the Train 'A' EDG,the supply line to the number four injectorreplaced with its original supply line dueminute). Several additional fuel supplyminor leakage and the required postTrain'A' EDG was completedto a smallfuel leak (approximately 6 dropsline fittings were tightened to eliminate signsmaintenance testing and endurance run ofsatisfactorily. After successful post maitesting, the Train'A'EDG wasdeclared operable by the licensee and the T'B' EDG was subsequentlY declaredinoperable and removed from service forne maintenance.Approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> later the vendor inthe licensee of its recommendation toremove all of the new fuel injection pumplines previously installed on the Train'A' EDG due to concerns over the adequacythe assembly method of the fuel linecompression fittings. Based on this vendormendation, the licensee immediatelydeclared Train'A' EDG inoperable. Sinceapproximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, during which timeEDG trains were inoPerable foraction was immediately taken to restoreone to operability as required by TS 3'8.2.8,licensee was inadvertentlY in acondition prohibited by TS. When the lidetermined that both EDG trains wereinoperable, they entered TS 3.8.2.8, initiactions to restore one EDG to operablestatus, and evaluated the issue forand appropriately issued LER 50-Supply Lines Provided by the DieselDiesel Generator Being lnoperable,"41212011 -001, "Defective Fuel lnjectionEngine Manufacturer Results in andated May 19, 2011. This LER reportedBeaver Valley, Unit 2 had been in acondition that was prohibited by TS 3.8.2.8,trains of EDG are inoperable while in Moderequires immediate action if bothoperations.The issue was considered within theI enforcement process because there wasno performance deficiency identified andion Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612,Appendix B, "lssue Scrbening" directsof this issue in accordance with theEnforcement Policy. The inspectors usedOperations, to evaluate the significance ofEnforcement Policy, Section 6.1 - Reactorviolation. The inspectors concluded thatthe violation is more than minor and bestracterized as Severity Level lV (very lowsafety significance) because it is similar toPolicy Section 6.1, examPle d.1.Additionally, the inspectors assessed theassociated with the issue by using IMCnificance Determination Process." Theit using Checklist 4 of IMC 0609, Appendix0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operationsinspectors screened the issue, and evaG, Attachment 1. The inspectors alsothe licensee's risk evaluation of theevent. Based on these reviews, this issue(Green).screen as very low safety significanceBecause it was not reasonable for theto either have declared the Train 'A' EDGthe inadequate assembly of the fuelned no performance deficiencYexisted. Thus, the NRC has decided towith the Enforcement Policy and refrainise enforcement discretion in accordanceissuing enforcement action for the violation.(EA-1 1-160). Further, because licensees did not contribute to this violation, it willnot be considered in the assessmentclosed.or the NRC's Action Matrix. This LER isinoperable at an earlier time or to have foreinjection pump supply line fittings, the NRCEnclosure 40A5.1OtherThe inspectors reviewed the final report (assessment of Beaver Valley conducted ininspectors also reviewed the final report forconducted February 2011. The inspectorsissues identified were consistent with NRCdetermine if INPO identified any significantfollow-up.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Nuclear Station Fuel Damaqe Event"The inspectors assessed the activities andreadiness to respond to an event similar todamage event. This included (1) anconditions that may result from beyond deson strategies related to the spent fuel pool,April 19th, 2011) for the INPO plantruary 2011 on May 17'n,2011. Thethe maintenance, chemistry, and radiologprotection technical training programslNPO accreditation team evaluation ofthese reports to ensure that anYves of FENOC performance and toissues that required further NRCtaken by the licensee to assess itsFukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fuelof the licensee's capability to mitigatebasis events, with a particular emphasisrequired by NRC Security Order Sectionto in severe accident management.2guidelines, and as required by 10 CFR 50'5capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO)possible for the siteInspection Report 05000334/4 12-2011008 (of this inspection activity.8.5.b issued February 25,2002, as comm); (2) an assessment of the licensee's, as required by 10 CFR 50.63and station design bases; (3) anof the licensee's capability to mitigateinternal and externalflooding events, as reqired by station design bases; and (4) anassessment of the thoroughness of the waand inspections of importantwhich were performed bY theequipment needed to mitigate fire and floodlicensee to identify any potential loss ofof this equipment during seismic eventsI I I 31 0328) documented detailed resultsOn May 18, 2011, the inspectors completeda review of the licensee's severe accidentmanagement guidelines (SAMGS),ted as a voluntary industry initiative in thewere available and updated, (2) whether1990's, to determine (1) whether ther place to controland update its SAMGS,ning of personnel on the use of SAMGS,the licensee had procedures and processes(3) the nature and extent of the licensee'sand (4) licensee personnel's familiarity withThe results of this review were provided toNRC task force chartered bY thea near-term evaluation of the need for.3Executive Director for Operations to condEnclosure 27agency actions following the Fukushima Daiiphifuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Beaver Valley Power Station were provided in an Attachment to amemorandum to the Chief, Reactor tnspectiQn Branch, Division of lnspection andRegional Support, dated May 27,2011 (ML111470361)'Manaqement Meetinqs2010 Annual Assessment DiscussionOn April 28, Ronald Bellamy, NRC Branch Qniet for Beaver Valley, discussed BeaverValley performance for 2010 with Mr. P. Harden, Site Vice President, prior to the publicannual assessment meeting.On May 10, Commissioner Magwood,ied by his staff and Mr. J. Clifford, NRCRegion I Deputy Director of Reactortoured Beaver Valley Power Station andrden, Site Vice President, and other seniordiscussed station performance with Mr. P.members of FENOC.On May 20, an exit meeting was conductedth Mr. R. Brosi, Director of Performancelmprovement, and other members of theobservations of the insPection.Valley staff to discuss the results and.4Emerqencv PreparednessMr. R. Brosi, Director of PerformanceValley staff to discuss the results andOn May 20, an exit meeting was conductedlmprovement, and other members of theobservations of the insPection.On June 3, an exit meeting was conductedto discuss the results of the Tl.Mr. R. Lieb, Director of Site OperationsOn June 23, an exit meeting was conductedother members of the Beaver Valley staff toRadioactive Effluent inspection.Quarterlv Inspection RePort Exitwith Mr. P. Harden, Site Vice President, andthe results and observations of theOn July 21,the inspectors presented thebaseline inspection results to Mr. D.Murray, Director of Performanceand other members of the licensee staff.The inspectors confirmed that proprietaryof the inspection period.rmation was not retained at the conclusion274046.1.2.3.5.6.7ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONEnclosure Licensee personnelM. BankoR. BrosiS. BuffingtonG. CaccianiD. CananW. CressG. CramerD. EckleberryR. FedinJ. GallagherD. GibsonP. HardenM. HelmsR. LiebJ. MatskoJ. MauckC. McFeatersD. MurrayA. OduhoL. RenzJ. SaundersF. SchaffnerB. SepelakH. SzklinskiR. ThompsonB. TuiteOther PersonnelL. RyanSenior Radiationtion TechnicianEmergency PreparednessStaff NuclearStaff NuclearOperationsSite Vice PresidentFleet Oversight SpeciDirector, SitePlant EngineeringCompliance EngineerOperations ManagerDirector PerformanceprovementSystem RadiationEngineerEnvironmental SpeciapervrsorEmergency PreparednessSupervisor, ReguComplianceStaff Nuclear SpeciEmergency PreparednessSenior Chemistry TManager RegulatoryplianceI nspector, Pennsylvaniat of Radiation ProtectionA-1SUPPLEMENTALKEY POINTS OFChemistry SupervisorDirector,Design EngineerDesign Analysis EngRadiation ProtectionSupervisor,EmergencyRadiation ProtectionStaff Nuclear SpeciaORMATIONlmprovementLaboratoryManagerAttachment A-2LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOoen/Closed050004122011003-01 NCV Failure to Maintain Recirculation Spray HeatExchanlers in ChemicalWet Layup. (Section1 R07)05000334, 41212011003-02 FIN Failure [o timely correct Radiation Monitordeficiericies. (Section 40.42.3)LER Defectirle Fuel lnjection Pump Supply LinesProvide[ by the Diesel Engine ManufacturerResults in an Emergency Diesel Generator Beinglnoper{ble. (Section 4OA3.2)Tl Followlp to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear StationFuel D{mage Event. (Section 4OA5.2)Tl Avaihbflity and Readiness lnspection of SevereAcciderft Management Guidelines (SAMGS).(Sectiofl 4OA5.3)Closed050004121201 1001-0005000334, 41212515/1 8305000334, 4121251 51 184Attachment Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProcedures1/2OM-35.4A.A, Voltage Schedule Guidance, Rev.1 I2OM-53C.4A.35.1, Degraded Grid, Rev. 7NOP-WM-2001, Work ManagementRev.11Conditions Reports11-88241 10-81176Section 1R04: Equipment AlisnmentProcedures2OM-15.3.B.1, Valve List-2CCP, Rev. 162OM-11.3.B.1, Valve List-2SlS, Rev. 12DrawinqsvoND 1 0800-RM-041 5-001voND 10080-RM-0411-041Condition Reports11-92336 11-94045Section 1R05: Fire Protection10-81 175Procedures1/2 ADM-1900Pre-Fire Plansl PFP-AXLB-768Calculation'10080-8-085, Rev. 14Condition Reports11-92600 11-95411 11-94375 11-91Section 1R06: Flood ProtectionCalculations8700-DMC-3443, Rev. 2Condition Reoorts11-92449REVIEWEDI Readiness Process,08-4255308-3533407-310911t2 ADM-19022PFP-CTP1Attachment A-4OtherBVPS-2 UFSARBVPS Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment2DBD-30Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProcedures2OM-30.4.T, Placing Recirc Spray Hxs into Chemicfl Wet Layup, Rev.O2OST-30.138, Train B Service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 28Condition Reports11-90096 11-9043011-90899 11-9090111-91513 11-92251Procedures1t2 ADM-2033Condition Reports11-92841 11-91436OtherBV UnitBV Unit11-921891 1-9078711-9264411-9072111-911 1-9064311-9101802-0035011-9257011-9102602-002771111OtherNOTF 600464500 wo2004518151R11:Red Team Mini-Drill Scenario, Rev.0ProceduresNOP-ER-3004, FENOC Maintenance Rule PNOP-ER-21 01, Engineering Program Management,NOBP-LP-4012, NRC Performance Indicators, RevOtherMaintenance Rule Quarterly Program Healthwo200452790NOTF 600673949Condition Reports11-92375 11-92245 11-88460 07-31wo200450994Rev. 1Rev.332011-11 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary fortfie week of April 11,2011,tfie week of May 23,2011,Rev. 1Revs.1,2,and3,Attachment A-5Section 1Rl5: Operabilitv EvaluationsProceduresl OST-1 3.02,'B' Quench Spray pump surveillance tQst2OST-47.3M, Quarter Valve Strokes2OST-30.138, Train 'B'service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev' 28Condition Reports11-89270 11-94426Drawinos2006.51 0-001-025, Rev D,Calculations8700-DMC-3395, Rev.0Other2SVS-PCV1 01 B stroke-time historyBV1 Shift Operations Logs dated May 9,2011Clearance 1W09-1 3-QS-003Section 1Rl8: Plant ModificationsCondition Reports1 1-91800ECP 11-0179-000ECP 09-0771EER 600672192OtherNOTF 600672192ECP 11-0179-000Section 1 R19: Post-Maintenance TestinqProceduresProceduresU2 CMp.1-2-002, PR Neutron Flux Detector ReplaQement and Post Installation Tests, Rev. 31-CMP-1-02-0031 CMP-2N1-OVRPWR.SPIl RST-2.10, Alignment of Power Range lnstrumentation for Startup after Mid-cycle detectorreplacement, Rev.01 t2-Ml-75-Packing-1 M, Valve Packing Instruction, Rpv. 10%-CMP -M-75-039, Repai r Rockwel l-Edwards U n ivalves, Rev. 42OST-30.138, Train B Service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 28BVBP-SITE-0053, Post-Maintenance Test Requirenfents, Rev. 1Work Orders20045:z86 200432097 200451486 200452F32 '200452432 20A403244200451094 200450356 200400196 200451765Attachment Condition Reports11-92952 11-9217011-90096 11-92251Other11-922241 1-90760A-6 I11-917tr7BetaLab report M11110 for weld crack evaluationBV2 Shift operations logs dated April 3, 2011ECP 11-005-003Section {R20: Refuelinq and Outaqe ActivitiesProcedures2MSP-13RS-SUMP, Unit 2 Containment Sump Cloqe-out'Condition Reoorts11-92146 11-92219 [ 1-91659 11-9136511-92177 11-92238 ft t-otssz 11-9111511-92229 11-91910 11-9148311-92442 11-91883 111-9139211-92467 11-91746 [ 1-91390Other1POAC4 Work Project Schedule dated March 30, 2q11BV1 Shift Operations logs dated March 16,20, & 26, 2011BV1 PRNI detector current plots from plant computdr, dated March 16,2Q11operational Decsion Making lnterface for unit 1 PR4'll-42' dated March 26' 201'lWO 200399672, QC inspection of Unit 2 containmeflt sumpSection 1 R22: Surveillance TestinqCondition Reports11-91918 11-92143 11-95443 11-911$0Procedures1l2ADM'1107, Alert Notification System (Sirens) Mfintenance and Testing, Rev. 11OtherElaver Valley Nuclear Facility Design Report, Emerpency Warning Notification System,March 1, 1984Supplement to the Beaver Valley Power Station Emprgency Warning Notification System1 1-9190511-92001- 1't quarter 2011Design ReportVarious Siren and Maintenance Tests, 4th quarterProcedures1 12-ADM-1101, Emergency Response Organization112-ADM-1102, BVPS Emergency Notification T, Review and Trending, Rev. 2Attachment Chanoe EvaluationsBV-2010-064-00 Bv-2010-069-00BV-2010-033-00 BV-2010-029-00BV-2010-044-00 BV-2010-044-00BV-2010-038-001 12-EPP -lP-1 . 7, Emergency Response112 OST-57.1, Emergency Beeper NotificationOtherBeaver Valley Power Station EmergencyERO RosterProceduresNOP+P$O02, Evaluation of Changes to10 CFR 50.54(q), Rev. 2NOP-LP-4003, Evaluation of Changes, Test and(ERO) Teams, Rev. 20, Rev. 15PlanPlans and Supporting DocumentsRev.6BV-2010-030-00BV-2010-067-00BV-2010-039-00BV-201BV-201BV-20112-00EPS: COtherBVRM-EP-5003, Equipment lmportant toResponse, Rev.2Quarterly Report, 1" quarter 2010Quarterly Report, 2nd quarler 201(MS-C-1 O-11-24, Fleet Overiignt RuOit Report, ttovelnOer 12,2010 through Decemb_e_r 15, 2010BV-PA-10-01, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigl'Jt Quarterly Report, 1 quaner zulvBV-pA-10-02, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigfit Quarterly Report, 2* quarter 2010BV-pA-10-03, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigl.{t Quarterly Report, 3'quarter 2010lp-SA-10-217, Integrated Pe*ormance Assessment and trending, 1't six months of 2010lp-SA-1 i-041,Integrated Performance Assessment and trending, 2no six months of 2010lp-SA-1 1-176,Integrated Performance Assessment and trending, 1'tquarter.2011SN-SA-10-160, 2010 Beaver Valley Emergency Redponse Organization Red Team Mini Drill#1MS-C-99-1 1-24,FleetOversightAudit Report, Noveinber 11,2009 through December 16,2009SN-SA-10-284, Beaver Valley Power station Emerg$ncy Response Organization Blue Teamduring Mini-Drill #3, JulY 22,2010SN-SA-10-285, Beaver Valley itower station Emerg$ncy Response Organization Green Teamduring Mini-Drill #4, August 12, 2010Condition Reports10*3020 11-94455 09-64018 10-87068 11-87868 10-8688310-86905 11-94392 10-76036 11-937$6 09-69009 09-68905no-A1n6n 1n-A2226Procedures:112-ODC-1.01, ODCM: Index, Matrix, and History of1 12-ODC-2.01, ODCM: Liquid Effluents1 12-ODC-2.02, ODCM: Gaseous EffluentsChangesAttachment A-8Proc$d112-ODC-3.03, ODCM: Controls for RETS andure & Source Term lnPutsProgram1 -HPP-4.02.008, SA-9/SA-1 0 Noble Gas Monitors1 l 2-HPP -4.02.002, Effluent Mon itors1 -HPP -4.02. 0 1 0, SPI NG-4 Particulate, lodine, andGas Monitor}-HPP -4.02.020, DRMS, Process Monitoring2-HPP -4.02.021, D RMS, Effl uent Mon itoring Su bs1/2-ENV-05.04, Radioactive Waste Discharge112-HPP- 3.06.006, Batch Radioactive Wastetion-LiquidAuthorization-Gas112- ADM-1730, Laboratory Quality Assurance andstrument Quality Control ProgramNOP-OP-3202 , FENOC Radiochemistry QualityProgramNOP-OP-4705, Response to Contaminated SpiMonUnit-1:t tytsp-+S.O1C-1, RM-VS1 12 Reactor Bldg / SLCRS ftadiation Monitor CalibrationlMSp-43.18-1, RM-LW104 Liquid Waste Effluent Rqdiation Monitor Calibration1 MSP-43.21 -1, RM-1 GW-1 08A Gaseous Waste Pa(iculate CalibrationlMSP-43.231, RM-1LW-1 16 Channel Functional Te$t1 MSP-43.61 C-1, RM-VS-1 12 Reactor Bldg/SLCRS [onitor calibration1 OST-43.7, Noble Gas Monitors RM-1VS-109111 0, IGW-109 Functional Test1 OST-43.9D, RM-1 GW-1 08 Channel Functional Te$tlOST-43.9F, RM-1LW-104 High Range Channel Functional TestlOST-43.9E, RM-1LW-104 Low Range Channel Fuitctional Test1 OST-43.9H, RM-1 RW-1 00 Liquid Effluent Monitor Channel Functional Test1 OST-43.91/J, RM-1 VS-1 01 A/B Gaseous Effluent tvfionitor Functional Test1 OST-43.91(1, RM-1VS-1 07 Gaseous Effluent Monitor Functional TestUnit-2:zusp-+e. g6A-1, 2HVS-RQl 1 01, Ventilation Vent R{diation Monitor Test2MSp-43.33-t, 2HVS-RQ1109, BICID Elevated Relefse Gas Monitor Calibration2MSP-43.39-1, 2SGC-RQl 1 00, Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor Calibration2OST -43.2, 2RMF-RQt301 A/B, Fuel Building Exhaulst Monitor Functional Test2OST-43. 3, 2SGC-RQl 1 00, Liquid Waste Effluent tt{onitor Functional Test2OST-43.5, 2MSS-RQ101 NBIC Noble Gas Monitof channelTest20sT-43.9A, 2HVS-RQ101 A/B Ventilation Vent Fuhctional Test2OST-43.8, 2HVS-RQI109C Elevated Release wRqM Functional Test2OST-43.98, 2RMQ-RQ301 A/B Decon Bldg Efflueipt Monitor FunctionalTest2OST-43.9C, 2HVL-RQl112A/B Condensate Polishing Bldg Effluent RM Test2OST-43.9D, 2RMQ-RQ303 A/B Waste Gas Ventilaftion Monitor FunctionalTestAir Cleaninq Svstem Testinq:Unit 1:W-f eW-01-16-06/07, Unit 1 A/B SLCRS HEPA an[ Charcoal Filter Efficiency and Flow TestBV-1BW-01-16-08, Unit 1 Main Filter Charcoal San'iple - A SLCRSBV-2BW-o1-16-11, Unit 1 Main Filter Charcoal Sanr'iple - B SLCRSAttachment A-9Unit 2:BV-2BW-01-16-06/07, Unit 2 A/B SLCRS HEPACharcoal Filter Efficiency and Flow TestBV-2BW-01-16-08, Unit 2 Main Filter CharcoalBV-2BW-01-16-11, Unit 2 Main Filter CharcoalNuclear Oversiqht Reports:Audit MS-C-10-08-02, First Energy Multi-SiteBeaver Valley Fleet Oversight Fourth Quarter 2010Field Observations:8V3201 14154 8V220093821Other Documents:Monthly, Quarterly, and Annual Liquid & Gaseous EUnit 2 from January 2011 through May 20112010 Radioactive Effluent Release ReportSystem 43, Radiation Monitoring Systern Health50.75 (g) Decommissioning RecordsRETS Dose Proiection for June 2011Unit 1 Boron Recovery/Liquid Waste System Iand Environmental AuditFirst Quarter 2011 Reports8V320103932Dose Assessments for Unit 1 and1" Quarter 2011- 50.59 Evaluationsple - A SLCRSple - B SLCRSInter-laboratory Comparison Program Results 201 04th Quarter 2010 RETS Cross Check Program ResuftsCondition Reports:11-96782 11-9536311-95716 11-957741 1-9303711-9294911-szete1 1-e50I111-9412111-92214Rev.520111 1-943651A-858771/2 ADM - 1111, NRC EPP Performance lndicatorOtherPerformance Indicator data - 2nd quarter 2010 to 1'tCondition Reports07-0564807-2661807-31 35008-3814609-5380309-5385409-6021 809-6078209-6085209-6325709-6327310-7135311-719841 0-7969110-8065910-8104610-8130510-816800-820771-892041-905981-908011-909581-909621-909661-912871-924471 1-936081 1-940381 1-9408911-9416511-9416711-9416811-95701Attachment lOST-30.12A & B, Service Water Full-Flow Test IlOST-33.10H, 1B Service Station Transformer anO lRfS Transformer 38 Deluge Valve Testl MSP-1.04, Solid State Protection System Testing, firain 'A'NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action ProgramNOP-WM-4300, Order Execute Process IWork Orders2ooqsazaa 200456670 200385515 200449533 200400261OtherAVpS Maintenance Strategy, Update and Status ; 2Q07,2009, 2010, 201 1BVPS Radiation Monitor lnstrument Action Plan, 20'f lCR1 1-89576, CARB Package for April 12,2011 lA-10Procedures%-ADM-1900, Fire Protection ProgramEPP l-1a, TAB 1.3.4 Containment BypassEvent Notification M5296oDcM, %-oDc-3.03NUREG-1022Surveillance and Periodic Test Program Change for 2MSP-01-04-l & 2MSP-01*05-1 , datedFeb 10,2009Engineering Change Packages 02-0186, 05-0385, q8-650, 09-0131, 09-01 32, and 11-0256.Section 4OA3: Event ResPonseCondition Reports11-95539 11-94109 11-92597 11OtherBV2 AFW PlD, 10080-RM-424.3, Rev. 9BV2 steam generator water level plots from plant icomputer, dated APril 10, 2011BV2 shift operations logs, dated April 9 & 10,2011Event notification #46744 dated April 10,2011Event Review Team Package for April 10,2011trip, dated April 10, 201110,2011Sequence of Events recorder output for BV2 datedAttachment ADMANSBCOBVPSCAPccwCFRCRDEPEALEDGEPEROFAFEMAFENOCFOTPFSARHEPAHXrMcroDIPtsrLCOLERLHSIMRMSPNEINONRCODODCMOSTPIPI&RPODPMTPRNIRSSSAMGSBOSLCRSsscSSSTLIST OF ACAdministrative ProcedureAlert and Notification SYstemBasis for ContinuedBeaver Valley Power Station ICorrective Action ProgramComponent Cooling WaterCode of Federal RegulationsCondition Report(s)Department of EnvironmentalProblem ldentification andPrompt Operability DetermiPost Maintenance TestingPower Range Nuclear IRecirculation Spray SYstemSevere AccidentStation BlackoutSupplemental LeakStructures, Systems, andSystem Station Service TDepartment of Environmental ProtectionEmergency Action LevelEmergency Diesel Generator iEmergency PreparednessEmergency Response OrganilationFunctionality AssessmentsFederal Emergency Manage$ent AgencyFirst Energy Nuclear Operatirig CompanyFuel OilTransfer PumPFinal Safety Analysis RePortHigh-Efficiency Particulate AilHeat ExchangerInspection Manual ChaPtertmmediate Operability DeterniinationInspection Procedure Ilnservice lnspectionLimiting Conditions for OperationsLicensee Event ReportLow Head Safety lnjection iMaintenance RuleMaintenance Surveillance PafkageNuclear Energy InstituteNuclear OversightNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperability DeterminationsOffsite Dose Calculation ManUalOperations Surveillance Test IPerformance IndicatorGuidelinesand Release SystemponentsAttachment SWTSUFSARA-12Service WaterTechnical SpecificationUpdated Final Safety Analysi$ ReportAttachment