IR 05000334/2012007

IR 05000334-12-007 and 05000412-12-007, 07/23/2012 - 08/10/2012, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, Beaver Valley Power Station; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection

ML12265A028
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/20/2012
From:	Christopher Miller Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	Harden P A FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
EA-12-195 IR-12-007
Download: ML12265A028 (34)

Text

t--W September 20, 2012EA-12-195Mr. PaulA. HardenSite Vice PresidentFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyBeaver Valley Power StationP. O. Box4, Route 168Shippingport, PA 15077 -0004

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTIONI NSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2012007 and 05000 41212012007, EXERCI SEOF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Harden:

On August 10,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fireprotection inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station. The enclosed inspection reportdocuments the inspection results, which were discussed on August 10,2012, with yourself andother members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of yourlicense. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing largefires and explosions.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.The licensee identified a finding involving a violation of a Beaver Valley Power Station fireprotection license condition. The NRC screened this finding and determined that it warrantedenforcement discretion per Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretionfor Certain Fire Protection lssues (10 CFR 50.48)."In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rulesof Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be availableelectronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS).ln accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulafions (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will beavailable electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records component of NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/)/\ /H/ZLu--Christopher G. Miller, DirectorDivision of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-334, 50-412License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

I nspection Report N os. 05000 334 l 20 I 2007 and 050004 1 2l2O 1 2007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformationcc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ P. HardenManagement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA by Peter R. Wilson for/Christopher G. Miller, DirectorDivision of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-334, 50-412License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

I nspection Report Nos. 05000 3341 20 1 2007 and 05000 41 21 20 1 2007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformationcc w/encl: Distribution via ListServDOCUMENT NAME: GTDRS\Engineering Branch 3\FuhrmeisteABvPs 12'07 Rev 1.docxADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: MLV suNstReviewg Non-sensitivetr SensitiveVDPublicly AvailableNon-Publicly AvailableOFFICERI/DRSRI/DRSRI/ORARI/DRPRI/DRSNAMERFuhrmeister/JFR forCCahillMMcLaughlinGHunegs/SB forJRoggeDATE9t10t1291101129t10t1291191129t10t12 Distribution w/encl: (via E-mail)W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource)J. Clifford, DRP (Ri DRPMail Resource)C. Miller, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)P. Wilson, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)G. Hunegs, DRPS. Barber, DRPA. Dugandzic, DRPD. Spindler, DRP, SRIE. Bonney, DRP, RlP. Garrett, DRP, Resident AAS. Kennedy, Rl OEDORidsNrrPMBeaverValley ResourceRidsNrrDorlLpll -2 ResourceROPreports ResourceM. McLaughlin, ORAD. Bearde. DRSR. Fuhrmeister, DRSJ. Rogge, DRS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.: 50-334; 50-412License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73Report Nos.: 05000334/2012007 and 0500041212012007Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating CompanyFacility:Beaver Valley Power StationLocation: Technology Blvd., Shippingport, PADates: July 23 - August 10,2012lnspectors: R. Fuhrmeister, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)C. Cahill, Senior Reactor AnalystK. Young, Senior Reactor InspectorL. Scholl, Senior Reactor InspectorD. Orr, Senior Reactor lnspectorApproved by: John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetyEnclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500033412012007 and 0500041212012007; 0712312012 - 0811012012; First Energy NuclearOperating Company; Beaver Valley Power Station; Triennial Fire Protection BaselineInspection.The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors.The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating SystemsNRC ldentified and Self-Revealing Findings:No findings were identified.

Other Findings

Violations of very low safety significance or severity level lV that were identified by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) have been reviewed by the NRC.Corrective actions taken or planned by FENOC have been entered into FENOC'scorrective action program. These violations are listed in Section 4OA3 and 4OA7 of thisreport.Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

BackqroundThis report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordancewith NRC Inspection Procedure (lP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection." The objective of theinspection was to assess whether First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) hasimplemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilitieshave been established and are being properly maintained at the Beaver Valley Power Station(BVPS). The following fire areas (FAs) and/or fire zones (FZs) were selected for detailed reviewbased on risk insights from the BVPS Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).. FA 1-QP-1r FA 1-ES-2. FA 2-SB-4o FA 2-CV-2lnspection of these areaslzones fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect aminimum of three samples.The inspection team evaluated FENOC's fire protection program (FPP) against applicablerequirements which included the plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition2.C(5) for Unit 1 and 2.F for Unit 2 , NRC Safety Evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, 10 CFR 50,Appendix R, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) Chemical Engineering Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1.The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety AnalysisReport (UFSAR), Section 9.10 (Unit 1) and 9.5.1 (Unit 2), the fire hazards analysis (FHA), andthe post-fire safe shutdown analyses.The team also evaluated eight FENOC mitigating strategies for addressing large fires andexplosions as required by Operating License Condition 2.C(11) for Unit 1, Operating LicenseCondition 2.C(13) for Unit 2, and 10 CFR 50.54 (hhx2). Inspection of these strategies fulfills theinspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of one sample.Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.,1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier lntegrity1R05 Fire Protection (lP 711 1 1.05T)Protection of Sgfe Shutdown CapabilitiesInspection ScopeThe team reviewed the FHA, safe shutdown analyses, supporting drawings anddocumentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. Theteam ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (U1), BTP 9.5-1 (U2), and FENOC's design and licensingEnclosure.01a.

b.a.b..02.032bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supportingpower, control and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of theadequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactorheat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Passive Fire Protectionlnspection ScopeThe team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to evaluatewhether the material conditions of the fire area boundaries were adequate for the firehazards in the area. The team compared the fire area boundaries, including walls,ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, electrical raceway andconduit fire barriers, and redundant equipment fire barriers to design and licensing basisrequirements, industry standards, and the BVPS fire protection program (FPP), asapproved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-conformances.The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations, installation and repair work orders,and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether the fillmaterial was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied designrequirements for the intended fire rating. The team also reviewed similar records forselected fire protection wraps to verify whether the material and configuration wasappropriate for the required fire rating and conformed to the engineering design.The team also reviewed recent FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers, to verify whether inspectionswere adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potentialperformance degradations were identified. In addition, the team reviewed recent testresults for the carbon dioxide (COz) fire damper functionality tests for the Unit 2 eastcable vault room to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, theacceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradations wereidentified.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Active Fire ProtectionInspection ScopeThe team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in theselected fire areas to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained, andoperated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Associationa.Enclosure 3(NFPA) codes of record, and the BVPS FPP,assessed whether the suppression systems'extinguish fires associated with the hazardsin the selected areas.The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verifywhether the design and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements weresatisfied, and to assess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazardsinvolved. The team reviewed the fire water system hydraulic analyses to assess theadequacy of a single fire water pump to supply the largest single hydraulic load on thefire water system plus concurrent fire hose usage. The team evaluated the fire pumpperformance tests to assess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pumpminimum discharge pressure at the required flow rate, to verify whether the criteria wasadequate to ensure that the design basis and hydraulic analysis requirements weresatisfied. The team also evaluated the underground fire loop flow tests to verify whetherthe tests adequately demonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meetdesign basis requirements. In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flowtest results to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptancecriteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, vendor requirements,engineering evaluations, and routine functional testing for the CO2 suppression systemfor the Unit 2 east cable vault room. The team walked down accessible portions of theCO2 system, including storage tanks and supply systems, to independently assess thematerial condition, operational lineup, and availability of the systems. The team alsoreviewed and walked down the associated fire fighting strategies and CO2 systemoperating procedures.The team walked down accessible portions of the fire detection and fire hosesuppression systems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supplysystem, including both diesel and motor driven fire pumps, interviewed system andprogram engineers, and reviewed selected condition reports to independently assess thematerial condition of the systems and components. In addition, the team reviewedrecent test results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected fireareas to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteriawere met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, anddrill critique records. The team also reviewed FENOC's fire fighting strategies (i.e., pre-fire plans) for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information wasprovided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdownequipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impactpost-fire safe shutdown capability. The team independently inspected the fire brigadeequipment, including personnel protective gear (e.9., turnout gear) and smoke removalequipment, to determine operational readiness for fire fighting. In addition, the teamreviewed FENOC's fire brigade equipment inventory and inspection procedure andrecent inspection and inventory results to verify whether adequate equipment wasavailable, and whether any potential material deficiencies were identified.as approved by the NRC. The team alsocapabilities were adequate to control and/orEnclosure 4b..04FindinqsNo findings wereProtection From Damaqe From Fire Suppression ActivitiesInspection ScopeThe team walked down the selected fire areas and adjacent areas, and reviewedselected documents to determine whether redundant safe shutdown trains could bepotentially damaged from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertentoperation of fire suppression systems. During the walkdowns, the team evaluated theadequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.Specifically, to determine whether a potential existed to damage redundant safeshutdown trains, the team evaluated whether:o A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not release smoke, heat, or hotgases that could cause unintended activation of suppression systems in adjacentfire areas which could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains;. A fire suppression system rupture, inadvertent actuation, or actuation due to afire, in one of the selected fire areas, could not directly damage all redundanttrains (e.g., sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); andr Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppressionsystems.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capabilitv - Normal and Alternativelnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping andinstrumentation drawings (P&lDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supportingdocuments for the selected fire areas to verify that the licensee had properly identifiedthe systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdownconditions. The team assessed the adequacy of the selected systems and componentsfor reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring,and support system functions. This review included verification that alternative post-fireshutdown could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.Plant walkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration wasconsistent with that described in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. Theteam verified that the systems and components credited for use during shutdown wouldremain free from fire damage.b..05Enclosure 5The team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operatorsincluded alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel requiredfor safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures aretrained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigademembers.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown andperformed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure theimplementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verifiedthat the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within thetime required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included thefollowing:. 1OM-568.4,1, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Service Building,Rev. 13o 1OM-568.4.H, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in Safeguards, Rev. 20o 1OM-56C.4.A, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room - Intentand Methodology, Rev.9o 1OM-56C.4.8, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Shift Manager Procedure, Rev. 44. 1OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -NCO Procedure, Rev. 35o 1OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Rev. 32r 1OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Shift Technical Advisor's Procedure, Rev. 21. 1OM-56C.4.G, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #2 Procedure, Rev. 3o 1OM-56C.4.H, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #3 Procedure, Rev. 0o 2OM-568.4.8, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Cable VaultBuilding, Rev.22;o 2OM-56B.4.1, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Service Building,Rev. 12;2OM-56C.4.B, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, UnitSupervisor Procedure, Rev. 30;2OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NCOProcedure, Rev. 18;2OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NuclearOperator #1 Procedure, Rev. 22;2OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NuclearOperator #2 Procedure, Rev. 21;2OM-56C.4.F-1, ASP Activation, Rev. 12;Enclosure b.a..066. 2OM-56C.4.F-15, Manual Operation of Hydraulically Operated Valves, Rev. 4;and,. 2OM-56C,4.F-19, Operation of Reactor Head Vent Valves, Rev. 0.The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed andapproved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plantprocedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each firearea. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfercapability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests are adequate toensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.No findings were identified.Circuit AnalvsisInspection ScopeThe team reviewed FENOC's post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areasto ensure the analysis identified both required and associated electrical circuits andcables for the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safeshutdown. The team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for thepower and control cables associated with selected components. Specifically, the teamevaluated the selected circuits and cables to determine whether they were(a) adequately protected from potential fire damage, or (b) analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not preventsafe shutdown, or (c) analyzed to show that any adverse effect of potential damagecould be mitigated with approved operator manual actions, in order to verify fire-inducedfaults would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities. The team's evaluationsconsidered credible fire scenarios, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, cablerouting, and common power supply or electrical bus configurations.ln addition, the team reviewed cable raceway drawings and cable routing databases fora sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to determine whetherthose cables were routed as described in the safe shutdown analysis. The team alsoreviewed equipment important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, toassess whether FENOC's safe shutdown methodologies were appropriate, conformed todesign and licensing basis requirements, and appropriately considered the guidance inNRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.Circuit analysis was performed for the following components:Enclosure b.o LT-RC-460, Pressurizer Level {(at Backup Indicating Panel (BlP)};. MOV-CH1158, Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) lsolation to Chargingo MOV-CH115D, RWST lsolation to Charging Pump;o MOV-CH289, Charging Pump Header Containment lsolation Valve; and. SOV-RC1028, Reactor Vessel Vent Valve (at BIP).. 2CHS*P21A, Charging Pump A, (High Head Safety Injection);. 2FWE*P23A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump A;o 2FWS*L1487F,218 Steam Generator Wide Range Level {(at AlternateShutdown Panel (ASP));. 2RHS*P21A, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A; ando 2E10, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-1 ACB Output Circuit Breaker.The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker over-current protection coordinationstudies to determine whether equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown activitiescould be adversely affected due to a lack of coordination that could result in a commonpower supply or common electrical bus concern. The team also evaluated whethercoordination studies appropriately considered multiple faults due to fire. In addition, theteam reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records, for componentsrequired for safe shutdown, to determine whether the breakers were properlymaintained.The team assessed the transfer of control from the control room to the alternativeshutdown locations to determine whether it would be affected by fire-induced circuitfaults (e.9., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternativeshutdown control circuits).FindinosNo findings were identified.Communicationslnspection ScopeThe team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, andassociated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would beavailable to plant operators following a fire. During this review, the team considered theeffects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability, and coverage patterns.The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify theavailability of portable radios for the fire brigade and for plant operators. The team also.07Enclosure

.098 verified that communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not beaffected by a fire.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Emersencv Liqhtinqlnspection ScopeThe team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lightsthroughout the selected fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access andegress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentationmonitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery powersupplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenanceprocedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests, and battery replacementpractices were also reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintainedconsistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and in a manner that would ensurereliable operation.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Cold Shutdown RepairsInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, andmaterials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which mightbe damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the timeframes specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repairequipment, components, tools, and materials (e.9., pre-cut cables with preparedattachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.FindinosNo findings were identified.Compensatorv MeasuresInspection ScopeThe team verified whether compensatory measures were in place for outof-seryice,degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems,or features (e.9., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive firebarriers, pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions orb..10a.Enclosure

b..119capabilities). The team evaluated whether the short term compensatory measuresadequately compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate correctiveaction could be taken and whether FENOC was effective in returning the equipment toservice in a reasonable period of time.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Fire Protection Proqram ChanqesInspection ScopeThe team reviewed recent changes to the approved fire protection program to verify thatthe changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.FindinosNo findings were identified.Control of Transient Combustibles and lonition SourcesInspection ScopeThe team reviewed FENOC's procedures and programs for the control of ignitionsources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires andin controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hotwork and transient combustible control permits were reviewed to assess the adequacy ofFENOC's fire protection program administrative controls. The team performed plantwalkdowns to independently verify whether transient combustibles and ignition sourceswere being properly controlled in accordance with the administrative controls.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Laroe Fires and Explosions Mitioation Strateoieslnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions byreviewing eight licensee mitigating strategies to verify they continue to meet10 CFR 50.54 (hhx2) by determining that:. Procedures are being maintained and adequate;r Equipment is properly staged and is being maintained and tested; and,r Station personnel are knowledgeable and can implement the procedures..12.13Enclosure 10b.FindinqsNo findings were identified.oTHER ACTTVTTTES [OA]ldentification and Resolution of ProblemsCorrective Actions for Fire Protection DeficienciesInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee was identifying fire protection and post-fire safeshutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective actionprogram. The team also reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that the licenseehad taken or planned appropriate corrective actions.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-334/2011-01: Fire Barrier Penetration SealsNot Conforming To a Tested ConfigurationIntroduction. The licensee identified a finding of low to moderate safety significanceinvolving a violation of a Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 (Beaver Valley 1) fireprotection license condition, in that FENOC identified that the coatings on some flexibleconduits installed through fire barrier penetration seals in Unit 1 did not conform totested and approved configurations. The finding has been screened by the NRC anddetermined to warrant enforcement discretion per Section 9.1 of the NRC EnforcementPolicy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection lssues (10 CFR 50.48)."Description. As a result of transitioning to NFPA 805, FENOC identified that samplestaken of the coatings of flexible steel conduits from certain Unit 1 fire barrier penetrationsdid not exhibit expected flame resistant characteristics and were not in conformance withpreviously-tested and approved configurations. Specifically, while the original tests ofthe penetration seal material (silicon foam) used rigid steel conduit as penetrating items,the licensee identified that some seals contained aluminum conduit or liquid{ight flexibleconduit which were coated with poly vinyl chloride (PVC). Further, the licensee identifiedthat the PVC material and thickness varied by manufacturer, and identified up to 16different types of coating material on conduit within approximately 924 of the 2843 tirebarrier penetrations. Since these penetrations differed from the previously-tested andapproved configuration, Beaver Valley postulated that the potential could exist for a firein one fire area to eventually spread to another fire area by burning or melting the seal.4.4c.A2.01a..01Enclosure 11The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR-2011-Q4769,CR-201 1-96801 , and CR-2011-97411. FENOC implemented fire watch tours in allaffected areas, and established combustible free zones around each affectedpenetration. FENOC continues to pursue resolution of this issue through review of testswith aluminum conduits for another facility, analysis, comparison with UL listed designs,and may perform additionalfire tests. The NRC concluded that FENOC's interimcompensatory measures were commensurate with the risk significance.Analvsis. FENOC failed to analyze the acceptability of using aluminum conduit or PVC-coated liquid{ight flexible steel conduit in lieu of rigid steel conduit as the penetratingitems through numerous fire barrier penetrations. The licensee evaluated this issuethrough use of its fire probabilistic safety assessment (PRA), and determined that thechange in core damage frequency attributed to the issue was 8X10' per reactor year(White). NRC staff reviewed this evaluation and concluded that the risk numbers wereartificially inflated by the rules for fire PRA. Namely, the NRC staff considered thatNUREG/CR-6850 imposes a 317 kW transient combustible material fire in allcompartments, with an ignition frequency of 3.9X10-3 per year for the control and primaryauxiliary buildings, and 4.9X10-3 for general plant areas. The inspection team did notobserve this level of transient combustible material in any area of the plant. Therefore,the NRC concluded that FENOC's risk estimate is conservative and that this issue wouldbe of no greater than low to moderate safety significance.NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection issues(10 CFR 50.48)," provides, in part, for the exercise of enforcement discretion for certainnoncompliances with fire protection license conditions that are identified as a result of alicensee's transition to NFPA 805. The NRC staff concluded that this issue qualifies fordiscretion since: 1) FENOC identified the violation as a result of the voluntary initiativeto adopt NFPA 905; 2) FENOC took immediate compensatory measures and actions tocorrect the violation as described above; 3) the issue was not likely to have beenpreviously identified by routine licensee activities; 4) the violation was not willful; and,5) the violation is not associated with a finding of high safety significance.Cross-cutting aspects are not applicable to findings involving enforcement discretion.Enforcement. Beaver Valley Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.5 requires that FENOC shallimplement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection programas described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the facility, andthat FENOC may make changes to the approved fire protection program without priorapproval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the abilityto achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Beaver Valley Unit 1UFSAR Section 9.10, "Fire Protection System," states, in part, that fire protectionfeatures to satisfy the provisions of Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP)APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior toJuly 1 , 1976," are reflected in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for BeaverValley Unit 1 issued by the NRC, and documented as Amendment No. 18 to theTechnical Specifications, dated June 6, 1979. The Fire Protection Safety EvaluationReport for Beaver Valley Unit 1, Section 4.9.3 states that The licensee has conducted aEnclosure 12survey of penetrations in safety-related areas and will upgrade them where necessary tothe fire rating of the wall. Ceiling or floor they pass through.Contrary to the above, on November 2,2011, while preparing for its transition toNFPA 805, Beaver Valley identified that electrical conduit installed through certain Unit 1fire barrier penetrations were covered with an outer coating that had not a part of thetests conducted to determine the acceptability of the electrical penetration seal material.Consequently, the ability of the affected seals to provide protection at least equivalent tothe fire barriers could not be verified.Beaver Valley is in transition to NFPA 805 and, therefore, the licensee-identified violationwas evaluated in accordance with the criteria established in Section 9.1 of the NRCEnforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection issues(10 CFR 50.48)." Because allthe criteria were met, the NRC is exercising enforcementdiscretion for this issue. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no additionalfindings were identified.4OAO Meetinos. includinq ExitExit Meetinq SummaryThe team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. Paul Harden, Site VicePresident, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on August 10,2012.No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.4C.A7 Licensee ldentified Violations.01 Requirement for Seismic Water Supplv for Firefiohtino Not MetLicense Condition 2.F tor Unit 2 requires FENOC to implement and maintain the fireprotection program as approved in the Safety Evaluation Reports. UFSAR Section9.5.1, Revision 14, states, in part, "The BVPS-2fire suppression system is capable ofdelivering water to manual hose stations located within reach of areas containing safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown following a safe shutdown earthquake."Supplement 5 to NUREG-1057, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation ofBeaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2," Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program,"documented the review of Amendment 14 of the FSAR.Contrary to the above, in the year 2000, BVPS abandoned the booster pump whichprovided the seismic water supply to the standpipe system feeding the areas containingsafety-related equipment. This condition was identified by the FENOC NFPA 805Project Team in 2006. At that time, a procedure was developed to align a 6-inch bypassline around the abandoned booster pump to provide water from the River Water Systemto the standpipe system in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). FENOC did not performan evaluation at that time to determine the capability of the line to provide adequatewater pressure and flow to ensure effective hose streams for firefighting purposes.Enclosure 13In response to questions from the team, FENOC performed an informal, undocumentedcalculation which determined that the 6-inch bypass line would not provide sufficient flowand pressure to enable effective hose streams at normal river water system operatingconditions. FENOC revised an operations standing order to direct operators to isolateunnecessary river water flow paths after an earthquake to raise river water systempressure to improve flow and pressure provided to the PAB standpipe system.This issue only pertains following a safe shutdown earthquake. The safety-relatedequipment is designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake. Non safety-relatedequipment in proximity to safety-related equipment is also designed so that anearthquake will not cause it to fail in such a way that it will adversely impact safety-related equipment. FENOC's seismic-fire interaction study indicates that while theremay be some seismically induced fires following a safe shutdown earthquake, none willbe in areas containing safety-related equipment. With this "seismic 2 over 1 design,"there will be no safety-related equipment damaged by a seismic induced fire, so deltaCDF will be zero (Green). Since this issue is of very low safety significance and hasbeen entered into FENOC's corrective action program as CR-2012-12265, it is beingtreated as a Green, licensee identified NCV consistent with the NRC EnforcementPolicy.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

P. Harden, Site Vice President

D. Benyak, Manager of Regulatory Compliance

R. Bologna, Director of Engineering

R. Kurkienicz, Manager of Fleet Oversight

J. Belfiore, Design Engineer (Fire Protection)

T. Collopy, Design Engineer (Electrical)

K. Farzan, Compliance Engineer (Licensing)

J. Flaherty, Design Engineer (Electrical)

H. Kahl, Design Engineer (Fire ProtectioniSafe Shutdown)

B. Sepelak, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor

M. Tobin, Electrical Contractor

R. Price, Operator Training

J. Bosilevac, Telecommunications Supervisor

M. Unfried, Design Engineer

C. Eberle, Operations Procedure Writer

D. Gmys, Fire Protection System Engineer

J. Miller, Site Fire Marshall

NRC Personnel

J. Rogge, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor Safety

C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety

D. Spindler, Senior Resident lnspector, Beaver Valley Power Station

E. Bonney, Resident lnspector, Beaver Valley Power Station

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

OpenedNONEOpened and ClosedNONEClosedLER 50-334t11-01Attachment

A-2DiscussedNONE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Fire Protection Licensinq DocumentsUFSAR, BVPS, Unit 1, Section 9.10, Fire Protection SystemUFSAR, BVPS, Unit 2, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Rev. 20UFSAR, BVPS, Unit 2, Section 9.5A, Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Rev. 20BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 36Exemption dated

3114183, BVPS, Unit 1, Request for Exemption from some Requirements ofAppendix R to CFR Part 50SER dated

616179, BVPS, Unit 1, SER Related to Amendment No. 18 to Facility OperatingLicense No.

DPR-66SER dated

115183, BVPS, Unit 1, SER for Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, ltems lll.G and lll.LSERdated 10/1985, BVPS, Unit2,

NUREG-1057SER dated 11l1986, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement 3SER dated 5/1987, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement 5SER dated

811987, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement 6Updated Fire Protection Appendix R Review - Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1, Rev. 3010080-8-085, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 148700-8-084, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 12Desiqn Basis Documents2DBD-33B, Fire Protection System Design Basis Document, Rev. 10Desion ChanqesDesign Change Package No. 684, Communications - Alternate Shutdown, Rev. 0Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Desiqn ChanoesECP 02-0532, CO2 Operator Action Point Level Limits, Rev. 0ECP 06-01 47, Evaluation of Caulking in West Cable Mezzanine, Rev. 0ECP 09-0356-000, 2FDP-AOV203 Replacement in CO2 System, Rev. 1ECP 12-0180-000, Temporary Cooling for Unit 2 Battery Rooms, Rev. 2Notification 2Q0465469, Battery 2-2 Replacement, dated 7111112Notification

600740609, Battery 2-1 Replacement, dated 716112Calculations/Enoineerino Evaluation Reports10080-8-436,

BV-2 Sprinkler Supply Requirement for TB, Rev. 010080-8-438,

BV-2 Turb. Bldg Sprinkler System Conformance to

NFPA-850, Rev. 010080-8-438,

BV-2 Turb. Bldg Sprinkler System Conformance to

NFPA-850, Addendum 1Attachment

A-310080-DEC-0182, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag 330 Deviations, Rev. 110080-DEC-0188, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag 330 Configurations, Rev.010080-DEC-0190, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag 330 J-Box Configurations, Rev. 110080-DEC-0191, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Non-rated Assemblies, Rev. 0211-8-41A,BV-z Aux Bldg Hose Rack Pipe Sizing, Addendum 1211-B-41A,BV-z Aux Bldg Hose Rack Pipe Sizing, Rev.021 1-N-265 , BV-z Flooding Analysis Outside Containment, Rev. 6211-N-44,

BV-2 Sprinkler & Water Spray Hydraulic Calculation, dated 117176211-N-44A,

BV-2 Fire Water Available Pressure, Rev. A2601.337-844-078, Promatec Seismic Gap Seal Procedure, Rev. F2601.337-844-082, Promatec Electrical Fire Seals Procedure, Rev. B2701.620.000-021, NFPA 805 Fire PRA Task 5.13 Seismic-Fire Interactions, Rev. A8700-10.1-819A,

BV-2 Hydraulic Calculations for Fire Water Piping, dated 121181878700-DMC-3079, Fire Pump Minimum Operating Curve, Rev. 1B-183, BV-z COz Excess Pressure and Required Vent Area, Rev. 0Beta Lab Test Report M11462, Fire Water Pipe-1FP11 Degradation Analysis, dated 218112CTP-1037, 3-6548 RTV Foam Differential Pressure Test, dated 12114182EM No. 63302, CO2 System Concentration Testing, dated 2122188BVPS, Unit 1, SSDA - Appendix R Review, Rev. 30BVPS, Unit 2, SSDA - Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 36Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation No.12-081, Compensatory Measure Evaluation ofFire Areas

PT-1 and

MS-1 for MSOs, Rev. 02701.620-000-005, BV2 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Rept., Rev. B8700-01 .062-0002, NFPA 805-MSO Expert Panel Review Report, Rev. B8700-E-308, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1N1, Rev. 08700-E-309, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency bus 1N, Rev. 08700-E-310, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1P, Rev. 08700-E-311, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1P1, Rev. 08700-E-342, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt EmergencyBus 1AE, Rev.08700-E-343, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt EmergencyBus 1DF, Rev.08700-E-523, U1 Protective Settings Calculations for 125VDC Systems; Batteries 1-1,1-2,1-3,andl-4, Rev.18700-E-524, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 120VAC UPS Systems,Rev. 18700-E-525, Ul Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for Emergency DieselGenerators No. 1 and No. 2, Rev. 010080-E-307 , U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 480 Volt EmergencyBus 2N, Rev. 010080-E-308, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 480 Volt EmergencyBus 2P, Rev. 010080-E-309, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt EmergencyBus 2AE, Rev. 110080-E-31 0, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt EmergencyBus 2DF, Rev. 110080-E-524,U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 125VDC SystemsBatteries 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, Rev. 1Attachment

A-410080-E-525,U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for Emergency DieselGenerator No. 2-1 and No. 2-2, Rev.010080-E526,U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 120VAC UPS Systems,Rev.08700-US(P)-276, Beaver Valley Unit 1 Appendix R Loss of AC Power Analysis, Rev. 08700-DMC-1352, Emergency Diesel Generator Operating Time with Loss of River Water,Rev.08700-DMC-1644, Pressurizer Level Response Following a Fire, Rev.08700-DMC-3232, Minimum Time Required to Overfill a Steam Generator Using Only AuxiliaryFeedwater Following a Plant Trip, Rev. 08700-DMC-3233, Time Available for Preventing Re-Criticality Due to an Uncontrolled RCSCooldown, Rev.08700-DMC-3509, HHSI Pump OilTemperature Following Loss of RW, Rev. 08700-DMC-1559,

BVPS-1 Charging Pump Cubicle Heatup Following a DBA and Loss of AllVentilation, PRA Analysis, Rev.08700-DMC-2975,

BV-1 ESGR Area Heat-Up Following Recovery of Loss of All AC, Rev. 08700-DMC-3476,

BVPS-1 Service Building Area Heatup Rates Following a Loss of All HVACDue to a Fire in

CR-2, Rev. 08700-DMC-3507, Emergency Diesel Generator Room 1-2Heat Up with Appendix R ScenarioLoss of Ventilation, Rev. 110080-DMC-0820, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Loss of Offsite Power + Stuck OpenPressurizer PORV Analysis, Rev. 0, Addendum 110080-DMC-0825, Pressurizer Level Response Following a Fire, Rev. 1, Addendum 1'10080-DMC-0826, Minimum Time Required to Overfill a Steam Generator Using Only AuxiliaryFeedwater Following a Plant Trip, Rev. 010080-DMC-0827, Time Available for Preventing Violation of Shutdown Margin Due to anUncontrolled RCS Cooldown, Rev. 010080-DMC-0841, Minimum Time Available to lsolate Hydrogen Supply to the VCT for FireProtection Safe Shutdown, Rev. 0, Addendum 110080-N-830, Beaver Valley Unit 2 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Loss of AC Power Analysis, Rev.

010772, Unit 2 UFSAR Appendix 9.5A and FPSSR Update for PORV, Rev. 08700-DMC-1450, Attachment 2, Fire Tests of 3X3 Ft. Specimens Made With Standard High-Density Cellular Concrete, Rev. 0Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation 09-074Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation 12-047Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation 12-070Procedures1/2OM-53C.4A.75.3, Acts of Nature - Earthquake, Rev. 15lOST-33.2B, Fire Hose Stations Flow Verification & Hydrostatic Test, Rev. 82OST-33.35, Fire Rated Assemblies Visual Inspection, Rev. 2ADM-0407, Installation & Inspection of Penetration Seals, Rev. 6ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Rev.26ADM-1901, Pre-Fire Plan Administrative Control, Rev. 3ADM-1902, Fire Brigade, Rev. 10ADM-1904, Control of lgnition Sources & Hot Watches, Rev. 3ADM-1905, Fire ProtectioniFire Barrier lmpairments, Rev. 2Attachment

A-5ADM-1906, Control of Transient Combustible Materials, Rev. 7NOP-ER-2077, Underground Piping and Tanks Integrity Program, Rev. 2S-1 1P, Inspection of Fire Wrap, Rev. 0ES-E-003, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit No. 2, Rev. 4ES-E-004, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit No. 1, Rev. 7Operations Procedures10M-56C.4.8., BVPS Unit 1, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, ShiftManager Procedure, Rev. 4410M-56C.4.E., BVPS Unit 1, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, ShiftTechnical Advisor's Procedure, Rev. 211OM-53A.1.E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, lssue 1C Rev. 1 11OM-56C.4.F-1, BIP Activation, Rev. 221OM-56C.4.F-2, Transferring AFW Pump Suction to River Water Supply, Rev. 141OM-56C.4.F-7, Pneumatic Jumpering of Condenser Steam Dump Valves, lssue 2 Rev. 1 11OM-56C.4.F-8, Supplying Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank From the Other DieselGenerator Storage Tank, lssue 2 Rev. 111OM-56C.4.F-12, Establishing Portable Emergency Ventilation, Rev. 91OM-56C.4.F-14, Water-To-Water Heat Exchanger, Rev. 02OM-56B.4.B, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Cable Vault Building, Rev. 222OM-568.4.1, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Service Building, Rev. 122OM-56C.4.8, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Unit Supervisor Procedure,Rev.302OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NCO Procedure, Rev. 182OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #1Procedure, Rev.222OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #2Procedure, Rev. 212OM-56C.4.F-1, ASP Activation, Rev. 122OM-56C.4.F-15, Manual Operation of Hydraulically Operated Valves, Rev. 42OM-56C.4.F-19, Operation of Reactor Head Vent Valves, Rev. 02OM-56C.4.G, Transferring Equipment Control - From the Alternate Shutdown Panel- To theControl Room, Rev.72OST-45.9, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 1, 2, and 3, Rev. 15Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation Strateqies Documents1/2OM-53C.4A.100.4, Spent Fuel Pool, Rev. 51/2OM-53C.4,A.100.6, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, Rev. 6BV-L-07-009, Response Providing Information Regarding lmplementation Details for Phase 2and 3 Mitigation Strategies, January 26,20Q7t-07-150, Commitment Change in Response Providing Information Regarding lmplementationDetails for the Phase 2 and 3 Mitigation Strategies, November 21, 2007Ll-11-177,30-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies", June 9,2011Ll-1 1-179, 60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies", July 11 , 2011Ll-11-360, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding 60-Day Response to NRCBulletin 201I-01, "Mitigating Strategies," December 29, 2Q1IAttachment

A-6Com pleted Tests/Su rveillanceslOST-33.04, Fire Water Hydrant Test, performed 4111112lOST-33.07, Motor Driven Fire Pump Test, performed 3/31/12 & 4126112lOST-33.08, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Test, performed

417112 &5151122OST-33.04, Fire Water Hydrant Test, performed 41171122OST-33.12, Fire Water Loop Flow Test, performed 1/17111 &91221112OST-33.13A, Annual Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed 9/30/112OST-33.13P, CO2 FunctionalTest Zone 2A (east cable vault), performed 61161122OST-33.16D, Aux Bldg Early Warning Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed 91211112OST-33.16E, Service Bldg Early Warning Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed 41241122OST-33.31, Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, performed 51111122OST-33.31, Fire Brigade Equipment Test, performed 5123112QC-3A.2 Release No. 06529, Penetration 2SWC342P02, performed 7 131 187QC-3A.2 Release No. 10098, Penetration

CV-1H (seismic gap), performed 3/30/87QC-3A.2 Release No. 10187, Penetration

SS-A-1H, performed2l9lSTQCI-5787, Penetration Seal 2WX401N20 Repair Inspection, performed 9128111QCI-5836, Penetration Seal 2FBKUT08 Repair Inspection, performed 1Ol5111QCI-5850, Penetration Seal 2WBKUT08 Repair Inspection, performed 1017111SOV-2.33A.01, Main Plant CO2 System Test, performed 1 1117187lOST-45.9, BIP Instrumentation and Source Range Indication Test, Rev. 13,completed 1111110lOST-45.9, BIP Instrumentation and Source Range Indication Test, Rev. 14, completed 416112lOST-45.10, BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4, completed 10128110lOST-45.10, BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4, completed 5141121/2OST-56C.1, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R PAX Phone Verification, Rev, 8,completed 817111lOST-45.10, Operating Surveillance Test - BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4,completed 514112l

OST-1 .10A, Operating Surveillance Test - Cold Shutdown Valve Exercise Test (Part A) RCSVents, Rev.0, completed 5161121/205T-568,1, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R Equipment Verification, Rev. 9completed

10113110 and 31111121/205T-568,2, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R Equipment lnventory Verification,Rev. 6, completed 9120111l

PMP-38VB-EL-1E, Appendix R and Non-Appendix R Emergency Lighting Maintenance,Testing, Inspection, and Repair, Rev. 29, completed 1110112112-Ml-C-010, Maintenance of Communications Battery, lssue 4 Rev. 5, completed 61221122OST-45.9, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 1,2,and 3, completed01l03l11,01110111, and 071281122PMP-38-EMERGLGT-4E, Appendix R and Non-Appendix R Emergency Lighting OperabilityTest, Inspection and Repair, completed

12109110,12110/10, and 121141101/2-OST-33.12, Fire Protection System Loop Flow Test, Rev. 1 1, completed 111212011Qualitv Assurance Audits and Self-AssessmentsBV-C-10-06-04/05, Fleet Oversight Audit Repoft,

6124110 - 7115110Attachment

A-7Svstem Health ReportsBV-O Fire Protection Program SHR, 4th Quarter 2011BV-2 Fire Protection System SHR, 1st Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 1, System-36A-Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, 4th Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 1, System-368-Unit 1 4 KV Station Service System, 4th Quarter 201 1BVPS Unit 1, System-37-Unit 1 480 Volt Station Service System, 4th Quarter.2011BVPS Unit 1, System-38-Unit 1 120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 4tn Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 1, System-39-Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution System, 4'n Quarter 201 1BVPS Unit 1, System-36A-Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, 1" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 1, System-368-Unit 1 4 KV Station Service System, 1" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 1, System-37-Unit 1 480 Volt Station Service System, 1" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 1, System-38-Unit 1 120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, l" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 1, System-39-Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution Systeffi, 1" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit2, System-36A-Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, 4th Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 2, System-368-Unit 1 4KV Station Service System, 4th Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 2, System-37-Unit 1 480 Volt Station Service System, 4tn Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 2, System-38-Unit 1 120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 4th Quarter 2011BVPS Unit 2, System-39-Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution System, 4'n Quarter 2011BVPS Unit2, System-36A-Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, 1" Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 2, System-36B-Unit 1 4 KV Station Service System, 1"'Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 2, System-37-Unit 1 480 Volt Station Service System, 1'I Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 2, System-38-Unit 1 120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 1u'Quarter 2012BVPS Unit 2, System-39-Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution System, l" Quarter 2012Drawinqs and Wirinq Diaqrams10080-RA-9F, Shake Space Fire Stops, Rev. 510080-RB-168, Vent & Air Conditioning - Reactor Contiguous Areas, Rev. 1110080-RB-3A,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 1210080-RB-38,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 1010080-RB-3C, BV-z Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 610080-RB-3D,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 710080-RB-3E,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 510080-RE-37L, Cable Tunnel Conduit & Sleeves, Rev. 151 0080-RM-301A,

BY-2 Hazard Boundaries Lower Elevations, Rev. 610080-RM-3018,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 735 ft., Rev. 1510080-RM-301C,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 752ft., Rev. 1410080-RM-301D,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 760 ft., Rev. 1510080-RM-301E,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 735 ft., Rev. 122010210185045, Fire Damper Specification, Rev. J2866.624-000-001, Ruskin Back Draft Damper, Rev. D8700-RB-2S,

BV-0 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 68700-RB-2V,

BV-0 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 48700-RE-1A, Sht. 1, U1, Main One Line Diagram, Rev.258700-RE-18, Sht. 2, U1, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 258700-RE-1 D, U1 , 4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 188700-RE-1E, U1,4160V One Line Diagram, Rev.23Attachment

A-88700-RE-1F, U1,4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 198700-RE-1K, U1, 480V One Line Diagram, Rev. 288700-RE-1S, U1, 480V One Line Diagram, Rev. 378700-RE-1U, U1, 120V AC Vital Bus - l, Rev. 388700-RE-1V, U1 ,125V DC, Rev. 308700-RE-1Z,U1, Vital Bus and DC One Line Diagram, Rev.288700-RE-1AE, Sht. 5, U1, 125 VDC One Line Diagram, Rev. 188700-RE-3GK, U1, Wiring Diagram, BIP Transfer Switch Panel No. 1, Rev. 28700-RE-21DN, U1, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Coolant Vent System, Rev. 68700-RE-22B,J, U1, Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer Level Protection CH. ll Level ControlSystem Loop Diagram,

LT-RC-460, Rev.98700-RE-21FR, Sht.4, Elementary Diagram, Charging and Volume Control, Rev. 138700-RE-27A, Arrgt.-Control & Computer Rooms, Rev. 408700-RE-34AC, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Control & Switchgear Area, Rev. 528700-RE-34AH, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 148700-RE-34AN, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Cable Vault Area, Rev. 178700-RE-34H, U1, Cable Tray Plan, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 168700-RE-37J,U1, Conduit Sleeve Details, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 108700-RE-378C, Sleeve Designation, Control & Computer Room, Rev. 368700-RE-42K, U1, Conduit Plan, Cable Vault, Rev. 328700-RE-48D, Sht. 4,U1, Conduit Plan, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 2410080-E-5D8, l)2, Elementary Diagram, 4160V Emergency Diesel Generator 2-1 ACB, Rev. 2010080-E-5DF, Sht. 1,1)2, Elementary Diagram,4160V Residual Heat Removal Pump(2RHS.P21A), Rev.2310080-E-1 2C,l)2, Elementary Diagram, Motor Operated Ground Disconnect Switch, Rev. 610080-RE-1A, Sht. 1,U2, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 1710080-RE-1F, Sht. 3,U2,4160V One Line Diagram, Rev.2010080-RE-1J, Sht. 3, U2, 480V US One Line Diagram, Rev. 1810080-RE-1 U, Sht. 10, U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 2810080-RE-1V, Sht. 11,U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 3410080-RE-1W, Sht. 12,U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev.2810080-RE-1X, Sht. 13, U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 2610080-RE-1Y, Sht. 14,U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev.2510080-RE-1AH, Sht. 1,U2,120V AC One Line Diagram, Rev. 3110080-RE-1AM, Sht. 5, U2, 120V AC One Line Diagram, Rev. 161 0080-RE- 1 AP , U2, 1 20V AC Vital Bus l & ll, Rev. 510080-RE-1AR, Sht. 1, U2, 125V DC One Line Diagram, Rev. 2210080-RE-1AT, Sht. 3, U2,125V DC One Line Diagram, Rev. 1710080-RE-1AW, Sht. 1,U2, One Line Vital Bus System, Rev. 2110080-RE-1AX, U2, One Line Diagram - Vital Bus, Rev. 2210080-RE-1DJ,U2, Sht. 34, 4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 610080-RE-3EAA, BVPS U2, Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel, Rev. 510080-RE-3EAB, BVPS U2, Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel, Rev. 410080-TLD-24A-060-01,l)2, Test Loop Diagram, Main Feed Water System Steam Generator2RCS.SG21B Wide Range Level, Rev. 2122241-E-5D1, Sht. 1,U2, Elementary Diagram 4160V, Charging Pump (High Head Safetylnjection) 2CHS*P21A, Rev. 1512241-E-11F2, Sht. 2, U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 1 1Attachment

241-E-11F2, Sht. 3, U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 1 112241-E-11F2, Sht. 5,U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 108700-RE-80C, Sht. 1, Communication System - Service Building, Rev. 318700-RE-80D, Sht. 2, Communication System - Service Building, Rev. 338700-RE-80E, Sht. 1, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 58700-RE-80F, Sht. 2, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 118700-RE-80G, Sht. 3, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 128700-RE-80H, Sht. 1, Communication System - Auxiliary Building, Rev. 88700-RE-80K, Communication System - Fuel, Diesel Generator, Primary Water SupplyPump & Decontamination Buildings, Rev. 108700-RE-80L, Communication System - Duct Lines & Miscellaneous Buildings, Rev. 168700-RE-80R, Communications System - Miscellaneous Buildings and Areas, Rev. 28700-10.1-708, Quench Spray and Aux. Feed Pump El 735'-6" Floor Pens, Fire Walls & Data,Rev. C01.035-0169, West Cable Vault El. 735'-6" Wall and Floor Penetrations, Rev. J8700-10.001-0689, Intake Structure Cubicle No. 3 3 Hr. Fire Floor and Walls, Rev. J8700-10.1-800-A, Typicals

MS-1,

MS-2,

MS-3 &

MS-4 Mechanical Wall/Floor Fire SealsElectrical Protective Device Settinq Sheets and Electrical Svstem Coordination CurvesBV1-RBN-1, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder from 1000/1333 KVA Transformer, Rev 4BV1-RBN-7, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder to

MCC-1-E5 (Breaker 8NO), Rev 6BV1-RBN-9, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder to

MCC-1-E3 (Breaker 8N8), Rev 5BV1-VBE-6, 4160V Emergency Bus 14 to 1AE Tie (Breakers 410 & E7), Rev. 1BV1-VBE-7,4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker 1E7), Rev.2BV1-VBE-9,4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker IE9XEDG 1), Rev. 5BV1-VBE-10,4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker lE9XEDG 1), Rev. 4BV1-VBE-1 1 , 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker l E9XEDG 1), Rev. 1BV1-VBE-1 2, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker l E9XEDG 1), Rev. 3BV1-VBE-13,4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker 1E9), Rev. 1BV1-VBE-15, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E11)(Charging Pump 1A Motor), Rev. 3BV1-VBE-16, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(Transformer 1-8N), Rev. 4BV1-VBE-17, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(Transformer 1-8N1), Rev. 4BV1-VBE-18, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(41601480V Bank Feeder), Rev. 1BV1-VBE-26, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE Under Voltage Motor Protection, Rev. 9BV2-DG1-1, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E10XEDG 2-1), Rev. 4BV2-DG1-2, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E1OXEDG 2-1), Rev.2BV2-DG1-3, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E1OXEDG 2-1), Rev. 1BV2-DG1-4, 4160V Auxiliary Diesel Generator 2-1, Rev. 3BV2-DG1-5, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E10XEDG 2-1), Rev. 4BV2-DG1-6,4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1BV2-DG1-7,4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1BV2-DG1-8, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1BV2-RBN-1,480V Bus 2N Incoming Feederfrom 1500/2000 KVA, Rev.2BV2-RBN-4, 480V

MCC.2-E09 Feeder, Rev. 6BV2-RBN-5, 480V

MCC.2-E13 Feeder, Rev. 4BV2-RBN-6, 480V MCC*2-E05 Feeder, Rev. 4BV2-RBN-7, 480V MCC"2-E01 Feeder, Rev. 5Attachment

A-10BV2-RBN-8, 480V

MCC.2-E08 Feeder, Rev. 5BV2-RBN-9, 480V

MCC.2-E07 Feeder, Rev. 6BV2-RBN-10, 480V

MCC.2-E10 Feeder, Rev. 5BV2-RBN-15, 480V

MCC.2-E-15 Feeder (Breaker 3C), Rev. 4BV2-VBE-4, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E12)(Charging Pump, 2CHS-P21A), Rev. 4BV2-VBE-8, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2ETXSupply from 4160V Bus 2A), Rev. 4BV2-VBE-9,4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E11), Rev.2BV2-VBE-16, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E4XRHR Pump (2RHS-P21A), Rev. 4BV2-VBE-20, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E18)(Aux. Feed Pump (Motor)), Rev. 41 1 700-ESK-1 15G 1 , U 1 , Incoming Supply to 4160V Bus 1AE from 4160V Bus 1A, 4160 Bus 1AE,Breaker 1E7, Rev. 111700-ESK-115G2, U1, lncoming Supply to 4160V Bus 1AE from 4160V Bus '1A, 4160 Bus 1AE,Breaker 1E7, Rev.111700-ESK-1151, U1, 2850KTV Gen. Auxiliary Diesel Generator#1, 4160V Bus 1AE,Breaker 1E9, Rev.11 1 700-ESK-1 1 5K, U 1 , 600 HP Motor Charging Pump High Head Safety Injection, 4160VBus 1AE, Breaker 1E11, Rev. 11 1700-ESK-1 151, U1, 1000/1333 KVA Trans.Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E12, Rev.211700-ESK-128A, U1, Incoming Feeder fromBreaker 8N1. Rev. 111700-ESK-128F, U1, Motor Control Center

MCC-1-E05, 480V Bus 1-8N, Breaker 8N6, 611510511700-ESK-128H, U1, Motor Control Center

MCC1-E03, 480V Bus 1-8N, Breaker 8N8, 6/15/0512241-ESK-115D, U2, 300 HP Motor for Residual Heat Removal Pump, 2RHS-P21A, 4160VBus 2AE, Breaker 2E4, Rev. 112241-ESK-115G, U2, Incoming Supply from Bus 2A, 4160V Bus 2AE Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E7,Rev. 112241-ESK-1 15J, U2, 5298 KVA Generator, Auxiliary Diesel Generator 2-1, 416QV Bus 2AE,Breaker 2E10, Rev. 112241-ESK-115K, V2,150012000 KVA Transformer 2-8N, Feeder to Emergency 480V Bus 2N,4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E11, Rev. 112241-ESK-115L,U2,600 HP Motorfor Charging Pump High Head Safety lnjection, 2CHS-P21A,4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E12, Rev. 112241-ESK-1 15R, U2, 400 HP Motor for Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pump, 2FWE-P23A,4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E18, Rev. 112241-ESK-128A, U2, Feeder Breaker to Emergency 480V Bus 2N480V Bus 2N,Breaker 38, Rev. 212241-ESK-1288, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E15 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 48, Rev. 312241-ESK-128C, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E03 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 4C, Rev. 312241-ESK-128D, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E05 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 58, Rev. 212241-ESK-128E, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E07 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 5C, Rev. 412241-ESK-128F, U2,480V

MCC-2-E09 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 68, Rev. 312241-ESK-128G, U2,480V

MCC-2-E11 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 6C, Rev. 312241-ESK-128H, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E13 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 6D, Rev. 212241-ESK-128W, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E15 Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 3C, Rev. 21-8N and 1-8N1 , Feeder to 480V Sub. 1-8, 4160V1000/1333 KVA Trans. 1-80, 480V Bus 1-8N,Attachment

A-11Pipino and Instrumentation Diaqrams10080-RM-0433-001A,

BV-2 Fire Protection P&lD, Rev. 2110080-RM-0433-0018,

BV-2 Fire Protection P&lD, Rev.810080-RM-0433-001C,8V-2 Fire Protection P&lD, Rev. 1910080-RM-0433-001D,

BV-2 Fire Protection P&lD, Rev. 1210080-RM-0433-002A,

BV-2 Fire Protection P&lD, Rev. 178700-RM-00378, Sht. 2, U1, Flow Diagram, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 398700-RM-0406-002, U1, Valve Oper. NO Diagram, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 218700-RM-0407-001, U1, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 318700-RM-0424-002, U1, Feedwater System, Rev. 1410080-RM-0045A, U1, Feedwater Piping, Rev. 3510080-RM-0407-001A, Sht.1, U2, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev.2010080-RM-0407-002, U2, Charging System, VCT and Make-up, Rev. 1910080-RM-0410-001, U2, Residual Heat Removal Piping, Rev. 1610080-RM-0424-003, U2, Auxiliary Feedwater, Rev. 148700-RM-444E-3, Switchgear Ventilation, Rev. 38700-RM-0406-002, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 21RM-0407-001A, Sheet 1, Valve Oper No Diagram Chemical and Volume Control, Rev.20Vendor Manuals2563.831-000-001, 3M Interam Fire mat 3-hour Wrap for Electrical Raceways, Rev. ETSlTechnical Note 20684, Thermo-Lag 330 Installation Manual, Rev. V2501.931-852-001,12Ydc Emergency Lighting Installation and Maintenance Instructions, Rev. LPre-Fire Plans1 -PFP-SFGB-722-Safeguards Area, Rev. 11-PFP-SFGB-735-Aux FW & QS Pumps, Rev. 11-PFP-SFGB-735-East Cable Vault, Rev. 2't-PFP-SFGB-735-West Cable Vault, Rev. 21 -PFP-SFGB-7S1 -West Safeguards, Rev. 11-PFP-SRVB-713-AE Switchgear, Rev. 11 -PFP-SRVB-71 3-DF Switchgear, Rev. 22-PFP-MSCV-735-EasI Cable Vault, Rev. 32-PFP-SRVB-760-Normal Switchgear, Rev. 0Fire Brioade Documents2010 Annual Fire Brigade Qualification Status Report2009 Annual Fire Brigade Qualification Status ReportFire Drills and CritiquesFire Drill 1-YARD-O4, performed

4119111,

5125111, U1An1Fire Drill 2-CB-05, performed

514111,

5111111,7118111,

11116111, 1217111Event Response to Unit-2

SOSB-3, performed 516111Attachment

2Event Response to Unit-2 PAB Elev. 768 ft., performed 614111Fire Drill 1-YARD-03, performed 6122111Fire Drill 1-SFGD-02, performed

813111,8117111,8124111,8131111,9129111,10119111Fire Drill 2-CB-07, performed 1112111Fire Drill 1-58-06, performed

1219111, 12130111Fire Drill 2-MSCV-04, performed

12114111,

5116112,

5123112,

619112,

6113112,

6120112,

6123112,6t30t12Fire Drill 2-CB-05, performed

12121111, 12129111Fire Drill 1-PAB-06, performed

1125112,218112,211112,218112,2129112,3128112Fire Drill 2-DG-04, performed 3114112Fire Drill 1-STOREROOM-01, performed

811112, 818112Fire Drill 1-GDC-01, performed 11110110Fire Drill 1-ERFS-O2, performed

12128110,

12131110,

12110110,7128110,611110,

4128110,

5112110,5t19t10,5126110Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed 11117110Fire Drill 1-PAB-05 performed 11120110Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed 11128110Fire Drill 1-DG-02 performed 1214110Fire Drill 1-ERFS-02 performed 11119110Fire Drill 2-MSCV-01 performed 11122110Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed 1218110Fire Drill 2-YARD-03 performed 12111110Fire Drill 1-TB-02 performed 12112114Fire Drill 2-MSCV-01 performed 12l9l10Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed 7121110Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed 8118110Fire Drill2-DG-02 performed 9/1 8/1 0Fire Drill 2-DG-03 performed 8111110Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed 8125110Fire Drill 2-DG-04 performed 6/19/10Fire Brioade TraininqFB-9324, Portable Fire Extinguisher Hands-On Practical, Rev. 1, lssue 1FB-9337, Fire Brigade, Rev. 4, lssue 6Operator Safe Shutdown TraininqlSQS-56C.1, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Rev.81PL-162, STA Alternate Safe Shutdown - Initial Conditions, Rev.01PL-156, STA Establishing Stable Hot Standby Conditions, Rev.1lOJT-1.56C, Operate and Test the Backup lndicating Panel and Equipment, Rev. 21CR-609, Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 41PL-030, Safe Shutdown from the Switchgear Room, Rev. 131PL-034, Establish Manual Control of Atmospheric Steam Dumps, Rev. 101PL-154, Perform Source Range Drawer and Calibration at BlP, Rev. 11PL-155, Open FWlValve per 1OM-56C.4F-10, Rev.22010 Cycle 6 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 0Attachment

2011 Cycle 2 Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 02012Cycle 2 Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 02SQS-56C.1, Alternate Safe Shutdown, Rev.6Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Annual Topic Plan: Level 2 Schedule,Rev.07111l12Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training 3-Year Cycle and NLO Curriculum: Level 1Schedule, Curriculum 20, Rev. 3Hot Work and lqnition Source Permits200502844640752947Miscellaneous DocumentsFire Protection System Engineer Walkdown Report, dated

5123112 & 6122112ITL Report 87-12-4131, Three Hour Fire Endurance Test on Thermo-Lag 330, Rev. 1NFPA Fire Protection Handbook 15th EditionNRC BTP CMEB 9.5-1 (ML070660454), Rev. 2NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2Operations Fire Protection System lmpairment Log, dated 7124112Operations Standing Order 09-002, NFPA Compliance lssues, dated 3110109NFPA 13-20Q2, lnstallation of Sprinkler SystemsNFPA 20-1990, Installation of Centrifugal Fire PumpsNEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Rev. 22701.620-000-005, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Report, Rev. BUnit 1 Maintenance Rule Monthly Monitoring Report for Fire Protection (System 33), July 2012Unit 2 Maintenance Rule Monthly Monitoring Report for Fire Protection (System 33), July 2012Unit 2 Operations Midnight Shift Roster tor Q7126112PKM-NFPA-12-0009, BVPS Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator ManualActionFeasibility Study, Rev. 0BV1RevSF, Fire PRA Quantification Notebook, Rev. 576

FR 40777,Interim Enforcement Policy for Certain Fire Protection lssuesCondition ReportscR-2004-01965cR 2006-1 1337cR-2007-26308cR-2009-60058cR 2009-61136cR2009-62272cR 2009-63473cR-2009-68607cR 2010-86528cR-2011-05658cR 2011-92162cR-2011-97021cR 2006-11007

CR-2006-11702

CR-2006-11704cR-2006-6932-002

CR-2007-21798

CR-2007-25818cR-2008-40050 cR-2009-55017

CR 2009-59917cR 2009-60350

CR 2009-60545

CR 2009-61061cR-2009-61329

CR-2A09-62244

CR 2009-62268cR 2009-62709

CR-2009-62461

CR-2009-62471cR 2009-63473

CR 2009-64936

CR 2009-64939cR-2010-74290

CR 2014-75120

CR-2010-85168cR 2010-87586

CR-2011-04769

CR-2011-04959cR-2011-07153

CR-2011-87677

CR-2011-90757cR-2011-93603

CR-2011-94964

CR 2011-96673cR 2011-97315

CR-2011-97411

CR-2012-00565Attachment

cR-2012-01514

CR-2012-02496cR-2012-03667

CR-2012-03736cR-2012-04257

CR-2012-04801cR2012-07558

CR-2012-07608cR-2012-09911

CR-2012-10368.cR-2012-10588

CR-2012-10719cR-2012-11557*

CR-2012-11659.cR-2012-12077*

CR-2012-12142cR-2012-12282.

CR-2012-09911cR-2012-12055*A-14cR-2012-02900

CR-2012-03663cR-2012-04017

CR-2012-04037cR-2012-04958 CR2012-A7207cR 2012-08570

CR-2012-09868cR-2012-10841

CR-2012-10157cR-2012-109454

CR-201

2-11116cR-2012-11660.

CR-2012-11662*cR-2012-12254

CR-2012-12265.cR-2012-09960

CR-2012-11877.cR-G203-2009-62268cR-G203-2009-62532cR-G203-2009-66414cR-G203-2010-70650cR-G203-2010-75115cR-G203-2010-75917cR-G203-2010-75971cR-G203-2010-77654cR-G203-2010-82394cR-G203-2010-85675cR-G203-201

1-96801cR-G203-2009-60055cR-G203-2009-62272cR-G203-2009-62700cR-G203-2009-66546cR-G203-2010-71023cR-G203-2010-75156cR-G203-2010-75919cR-G203-2010-77652cR-G203-2010-77655cR-G203-2010-84985cR-G203-2010-87586* NRC identified during this inspection.Work OrderscR-G203-2009-62244cR-G203-2009-62471cR-G203-2009-62745cR-G203-2009-68607cR-G203-2010-71428cR-G203-2010-75913cR-G203-2010-75920cR-G203-2010-77653cR-G203-2010-81544cR-G203-2010-85509cR-G203-201

1-939632001 35884200351149200399089200416638200453166200475373200404890Notifications60076646960076647060060979960067650960067652620013642920035117820040361 420044184020046253920047537920044817820027550420037555920040380820044504020046493820006568720043481320032183920038561

620041 31 s8200450948200474868200065688Attachment

ACADAMSAFWAPCSBASPBIPBVPSBTPCFRCozDBDDRSEDGEGMElev.FAFENOCFHAFPPFZHPKVAKWtMcIPIPEIPEEEIRMCCMOVMSONFPANRCPARPRAP&IDRHRRWSTSCBASERSOVSSDATRMUFSARVACVDCA-15

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Alternating CurrentAgencyrvide Documents Access and Management SystemAuxiliary Feed Water[NRC] Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems BranchAlternate Shutdown PanelBackup Indicating PanelBeaver Valley Power StationINRCI Branch Technical PositionCode of Federal RegulationsCarbon DioxideDesign Basis DocumentDivision of Reactor SafetyEmergency Diesel GeneratorEnforcement Guidance MemorandumElevationFire AreaFirst Energy Nuclear Operating CompanyFire Hazards AnalysisFire Protection ProgramFire ZoneHorsepowerKilovolt AmpereKilowatt[NRC] Inspection Manual ChapterInspection Procedurelndividual Plant ExaminationIndividual Plant Examination of External Events[NRC] lnspection ReportMotor Control CenterMotor Operated ValveMultiple Spurious OperationNational Fire Protection AssociationNuclear Regulatory CommissionPublicly Available RecordsProbabilistic Risk AssessmentPiping and Instrumentation DrawingResidual Heat RemovalReactor Water Storage TankSelf-Contained Breathing ApparatusSafety Evaluation ReportSolenoid Operated ValveSafe Shutdown AnalysisTechnical Requirements ManualUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportVolts Alternating CurrentVolts Direct CurrentAttachment