IR 05000237/2016008
| ML16098A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/2016 |
| From: | Hills D E NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2016008 | |
| Download: ML16098A255 (22) | |
Text
April 6, 2016
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC DESIGN BASES INSPECTION (TEAM) INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2016008; 05000249/2016008
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On February 26, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the team portion of the pilot Design Bases Inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on February 26, 2016, with Mr. P. Karaba, and other members of your staff. Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ David E. Hills, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50237, 50249 License Nos. DPR19; DPR25 Enclosure: IR 05000237/2016008; 05000249/2016008 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket Nos: 05000237; 05000249 License Nos: DPR19; DPR25 Report No: 05000237/2016008; 05000249/2016008 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: Morris, IL Dates: February 8 12, 2016 February 22 26, 2016 Inspectors: Kobylarz Observer: by: David E. Hills, Acting Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety 2
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000237/2016008; 05000249/2016008, 02/08/2016 02/26/2016; Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Pilot Design Bases Inspection (Team). The inspection was a 2-week onsite baseline inspection that focused on the design of components. The inspection was conducted by regional engineering inspectors and two consultants. No findings of significance were identified by the inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-,5, dated February 2014.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified during this inspection.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings were identified during this inspection.
3
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
===Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R21 Design Bases Inspection (Team)
.1 Introduction The objective of the pilot Design Bases Inspection is to verify that design bases have been correctly implemented for the selected risk-significant components and that operating procedures and operator actions are consistent with design and licensing bases.
As plants age, their design bases may be difficult to determine and an important design feature may be altered or disabled during a modification. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment model assumes the capability of safety systems and components to perform their intended safety function successfully. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance. Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to the report.
.2 Inspection Sample Selection Process The inspectors selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review Probabilistic Risk Assessment and the Dresden Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model.
In general, the selection was based upon the components and operator actions having a risk achievement worth of greater than 1.3 and/or a risk reduction worth greater than 1.005. Based on this process, a number of risk-significant components, including those with Large Early Release Frequency implications, were selected for the inspection. The operator actions or operating procedures selected for review included actions taken by operators both inside and outside of the control room during postulated accident scenarios associated with the selected components. In addition, the inspectors selected operating experience issues associated with the selected components.===
The inspectors performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design reductions caused by design modification, or power uprates, or reductions due to degraded material condition. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance activities, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) status, components requiring an operability evaluation, system health reports, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resident inspector input of problem areas/equipment. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. A summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report.
4 The inspectors also identified procedures and modifications for review that were associated with the selected components. In addition, the inspectors selected operating experience issues associated with the selected components. This inspection constituted 13 samples (8 components, 2 components with Large Early Release Frequency implications, and 3 operating experience) as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.21M-2.01.
.3 Component Design
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS), design basis documents, drawings, calculations and other available design basis information, to determine the performance requirements of the selected components. The inspectors used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards, design. The NRC also evaluated licensee actions, if any, taken in response to NRC issued operating experience, such as Bulletins, Generic Letters, Regulatory Issue Summaries, and Information Notices (INs). The review was to verify that the selected components would function as designed when required and support proper operation of the associated systems. The attributes that were needed for a component to perform its required function included process medium, energy sources, control systems, operator actions, and heat removal. The attributes to verify that the component condition and tested capability was consistent with the design bases and was appropriate may include installed configuration, system operation, detailed design, system testing, equipment and environmental qualification, equipment protection, component inputs and outputs, operating experience, and component degradation. For each of the components selected, the inspectors reviewed the maintenance history, preventive maintenance activities, system health reports, operating experience-related information, vendor manuals, electrical and mechanical drawings, and licensee Corrective Action Program (CAP) documents. Field walkdowns were conducted for all accessible components to assess material condition, including age-related degradation and to verify that the as-built condition was consistent with the design. Other attributes reviewed are included as part of the scope for each individual component. The following 10 components (samples) were reviewed: Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 (2-6601): The inspectors reviewed EDG loading calculations focusing primarily on core spray pump loading. The EDG output breaker control logic, protective relaying, and control voltage were reviewed to verify adequate voltage would be available to close the output breaker when needed. The inspectors reviewed the licensee had analyzed equipment operation considering the voltage and frequency bounds identified in the TS. Surveillance procedures were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the the EDG initiation logic. The inspectors also reviewed completed TS surveillances including the endurance test to ensure that the loading test was conducted in accordance with the TS. The EDG operating 5 and standby readiness procedures were reviewed to verify operations conformed to design requirements and complied with TS. The inspectors also reviewed the following EDG sub-components: EDG 2 Air Start (2-4600): The inspectors reviewed the sizing of the air start receivers to verify system capacity to support the minimum number of required starts for the EDG. The inspectors reviewed EDG surveillances to verify that all various combinations of air start compressor and air filter alignment were properly tested. In addition, the modifications replacing the air start air filters and one air compressor were reviewed to verify the system design basis was maintained. EDG 2 Jacket Water (2-6600): The inspectors examined the operational history, condition reports, and testing of the jacket water system to ensure it was capable to support EDG operations. Vendor manuals were reviewed to verify recommended operating limits were properly incorporated in station procedures. Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (2-3903): The inspectors reviewed the system hydraulic calculations such as, net positive suction head, vortexing, and minimum required flow to ensure that the pump was capable of performing its safety function. The inspectors also reviewed the vendor manual for the pump to determine whether the pumps characteristics met the design basis requirements and these requirements were accurately incorporated in periodic testing of the pump. Inservice testing results were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins. Pump operation from various ide the required flow from each source. The inspectors reviewed pump control logic, pump voltage requirements, thermal overload sizing, and voltage drop calculations to verify adequate voltage would be available to operate the pump when required. The inspectors reviewed the normal and abnormal operating procedures for the pump to verify operations conformed to design requirements and complied with TS. EDG 2 Room Ventilation Fan (2-5790): The inspectors reviewed calculations addressing the room airflow required to maintain the EDG room below the maximum design basis temperature limit with the EDG at full load. Modifications and maintenance records, including the replacement of a damaged fan, were reviewed to verify correct components were used and post maintenance testing was adequate to verify operational readiness. Periodic testing and corrective action for the inlet, outlet, and temperature control ventilation dampers were reviewed to verify if TS requirement were satisfied. Corrective actions for out of specification ventilation flow readings were examined to verify the cause of the problem and actions were adequate to resolve the issue. Normal and abnormal operating procedures were reviewed to verify the procedures were properly updated after implementation of the modifications. The inspectors reviewed the supply fan maximum brake horsepower requirements to verify the adequacy of the motor capability to supply power during worse case design basis conditions. The results of load flow and voltage regulation analyses were reviewed to assess the adequacy of motor starting and running during degraded offsite voltage conditions coincident with a postulated design basis accident. The inspectors 6 reviewed the motor breaker settings to assess the adequacy of motor overcurrent protection during the most limiting design basis operating conditions. The EDG operating and standby readiness procedures were reviewed to verify operations of the EDG ventilation system operation conformed to functionality and design requirements. The inspectors also reviewed instrumentation used for the automatic operation of the room ventilation, including power supplies and setpoints to ensure proper system operation. 250 Volts Direct Current (VDC) Turbine Building Motor Control Center (MCC) #2 (2-83250-2): The inspectors reviewed the design basis loading calculations, breaker settings, and the available short circuit current at the MCC to assess the capability of the selected breakers to operate reliably during design basis conditions and to withstand limiting maximum short circuit conditions. The load flow and voltage analysis for the MCC was reviewed to verify the adequacy of voltage at selected components during limiting design basis conditions. The inspectors reviewed an engineering change that installed structural bracing to improve the capability of the MCC to withstand seismic forces. The applicable operating procedures for MCC 2 were reviewed to verity operations conformed to design requirements and complied with TS. 480 Volts Alternating Current (VAC) Switchgear Bus 29 (2-7329-2): The inspectors reviewed the load flow analysis short circuit calculation to verify breakers were adequately sized for interrupt capability. Bus supply transformer T29 replacement modification was reviewed to ensure design adequacy. The low pressure coolant injection swing bus cross-connect between MCC 29-7 and MCC 28-7 was reviewed to verify the automatic transfer on loss of Bus 29. The inspectors also reviewed the time delay setpoint calculations, and recent surveillances to verify the transfer would occur within limits assumed in the loss-of-offsite-power/loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) accident analysis. The inspectors reviewed the normal and abnormal operating procedures for the 480 VAC distribution system to verify operations conformed to design requirements and complied with TS. Unit 2 Essential Service System Power Supply Inverter, Distribution Panel, and Automatic Transfer Switch (2-0902-49): The inspectors reviewed the calculations that determined the maximum loading on the inverter to assess the adequacy of the inverter capacity rating and the voltage supplied to the inverter from the station battery during design basis operating conditions. The breaker settings for the safety-related VDC power supplied to the inverter were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the selected trip settings. The inspectors also reviewed vendor test documentation to verify the capability of the inverter for reliably operation at maximum expected loading conditions. The essential service systems distribution panel loading and voltage drop analysis were reviewed to assess the adequacy of the available voltage during design basis operating conditions. The inspectors also reviewed an engineering change that incorporated vendor recommended capacitor replacements to ensure equipment reliability. The inspectors also observed control room operator actions and the plant safety-system response for a simulated design basis accident scenario at the plant control room simulator. Operating procedures applicable to the inverter 7 power supply were reviewed to verify that periodic tests conformed to the TS requirements and industry standards. The inverter testing procedures were also reviewed to verify they conformed to the requirements for functionality of equipment that supports TS equipment operability. 2B Core Spray Pump (2-1401-2B): The inspectors reviewed the core spray pump and motor design basis including performance, net positive suction head, and electrical power requirements. The inspectors reviewed the function of the pump during postulated small and large break LOCAs including required minimum flow and runout limits. The emergency operating procedure associated with transferring the pump suction for post-LOCA operation from the torus to the condensate storage tank was reviewed. The inspectors also reviewed setpoints associated with the transfer of the pump suction from the torus to the condensate storage tank. Surveillance test procedures and recent test results were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were appropriate and met, and performance degradation would be identified. The inspectors reviewed motor sizing, pump brake horsepower requirements, vendor ratings, and pump test data to ensure the pump and motor were sufficient for design basis load conditions. The load flow analysis was reviewed to determine the adequacy of voltage at motor terminals during degraded voltage conditions. The motor protective device coordination curves were reviewed to determine the adequacy of electrical protection. The inspectors also reviewed core spray initiation logic and associated surveillances to verify conformance with design and TS requirements.
2B Core Spray Pump Discharge Valve(2-1402-25B): The inspectors reviewed the motor-operated valve (MOV) calculations, including required thrust, weak link, voltage drop, and maximum differential pressure, to assess its capability to perform its functioning under design and licensing bases conditions. Inservice test results, including diagnostic testing, leak rate testing, valve exercising, and remote pushbutton control stations were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met The inspectors also reviewed the maintenance activities associated with the s remote push button station to ensure it was adequate to resolve a previous issue that prevented an MOV from operating when called upon. The inspectors reviewed the valve control logic to ensure design interlocks and permissive functioned as designed, and conformed to design requirements and operating procedures. This included reviewing calibration surveillances for the low pressure injection permissive. The inspectors reviewed thermal overload ttle valve. The procedures used to throttle the core spray discharge valves when the injection system would be used to aid in long term control of reactor vessel level was reviewed to ensure the valve would continue to be able to perform its design functions in this mode of operation.
Unit 2 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Relief Valve (2-1601-20B): The inspectors reviewed the design basis of the air-operated vacuum relief valve including requirements for the valve to operate under postulated transient and accident conditions. This review included the capacity of the safety-related portion of the pneumatic supply system to operate the valve under the most limiting conditions. Surveillance test procedures, as well as the results of recent tests, were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance 8 degradation would be identified. The inspectors also reviewed the capability of the valve to operate under the most limiting temperature and pressure conditions. The inspectors reviewed the vacuum relief valve pilot solenoid valve schematic diagrams for operational requirements and the environmental conditions required for the solenoid to operate during design basis events. The solenoid valve voltage rating was reviewed to assess operational capability during a postulated design basis accident.
Unit 2 Torus Vent and Purge Valve (2-1601-56): The inspectors reviewed the design basis of the air-operated torus vent and purge valve including requirements for the valve to operate under postulated transient and accident conditions. This review included the capacity of the safety-related portion of the pneumatic supply system to operate the valve under the most limiting conditions. The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures, as well as the results of recent tests, to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance degradation would be identified. This included verifying testing of stroke times for primary containment isolation valves was consistent with design limits specified in the UFSAR and Technical Requirements Manual. The inspectors also reviewed the capability of the valve to operate under the most limiting temperature and pressure conditions. The inspectors reviewed the vent and purge valve pilot solenoid valve schematic diagrams for operational requirements and the environmental conditions required for the solenoid to operate during design basis events. The solenoid valve voltage rating was reviewed to assess operational capability during a postulated design basis accident. The inspectors reviewed the engineering change to upgrade the solenoid valve qualification requirements to environmental qualification level 1. The inspectors reviewed control logic and schematic diagrams to verify operation of valve conformed to design requirements and operating procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three operating experience issues (samples) to ensure that NRC generic concerns had been adequately evaluated and addressed by the licensee. The operating experience issues listed below were reviewed as part of this inspection: Generic Letter 96-f Safety-Related Logic Circuits; IN 89--Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil, and Lube Oil Systems Which Render Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable; and IN 2010-f Emergency Diesel Generat
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five permanent plant modifications related to selected risk significant components to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components had not been degraded through modifications. The modifications listed below were reviewed as part of this inspection effort: Engineering Change (EC) 330522, Replace Existing Transformer T29 with New Style; EC 376572, Replace Emergency Core Cooling System Low Pressure Permissive Pressure Switch 2-0263-52B; EC 331868, Replace VERSA Solenoid Valves 2-1601-22, -23, -56 and -63 with Environmentally Qualified ASCO Solenoid Valves; EC 341875, Install Bracing on 250 VDC MCCs and 125 VDC Distribution Panel Seismic Qualification Utility Group -U2; and EC 377973, Replace Capacitors C201, C202 & C203, Located on Essential Service System Inverter.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.6 Operating Procedure Accident Scenarios
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the procedures listed below associated with a sample of the selected risk-significant components selected for this inspection, specifically EDG 2, 480 VAC Bus 29, and the Unit 2 essential service system power supply and distribution panel 902-49. The procedures were compared to the UFSAR, design assumptions, and training materials to ensure consistency. For identified significant operator actions, the inspectors performed a detailed review and walk through of associated procedures, including observing the performance of operator actions in the , to assess operator knowledge level and training effectiveness. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed adequacy of selected procedural use and operator actions during execution of the following simulator scenario event. Unit 2 was initially at full rated power, and the operators responded to a loss of offsite power, with a failure of EDG 2/3 to start/run, and no operator actions occur for the initial 10 minutes of the event. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following operating procedures in detail: DGA- DOA 6600- DOP 6700-DOP 6800- DEOP 0100- The inspectors also performed a margin assessment and detailed review of four time critical operator actions. These aOperator Response Time program, and focused on the use of risk significant components selected for review during this inspection. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times compared to validation performance times documented by job performance measures results. For the selected operator actions, the inspectors performed a detailed review and walk through of associated procedures, including observing the performance of simulated licensed operator control room, and in the plant by qualified plant operators to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, and availability of special equipment where required. The following operator actions were reviewed: Time Critical Action 4; Initiate Low Pressure Coolant Injection Torus Cooling (Control Room Action) during Loss of Offsite Power; Time Critical Action 16; Initiate Station Blackout Diesel Generators to Provide Power to 4kV Busses in Each Unit Following a Station Blackout; Time Sensitive Action 21; Align Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling System Pumps to the Condensate Storage Tanks (Specifically using the core spray pump); and Time Sensitive Action ELAP6; Supply Power to 480 VAC Safety Related Busses (Specifically to provide power to Bus 902-49).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the selected component problems identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the CAP. The specific corrective action documents sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.
11 The inspectors also selected two issues identified during previous Component Design Bases Inspections to verify that the concern was adequately evaluated and corrective actions were identified and implemented to resolve the concern, as necessary. The following issues were reviewed: NCV [Non-Cited Violation] 05000237/2013007-01; 05000249/2013007-01; Adequate Voltage not Assured for EDG Air Start Solenoid Valve; and FIN [Finding] 05000237/2013007-03; 05000249/2013007-03; Failure to Ensure Functionality of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Supply Valve during an Anticipated Transient Without Scram.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary On February 26, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. P. Karaba, and other members of the licensee staff.
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. Several documents reviewed by the inspectors were considered proprietary information and were either returned to the licensee or handled in accordance with NRC policy on proprietary information. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- P. Karaba, Site Vice President
- J. Washko, Station Plant Manager
- J. Biegelson, Plant Engineering Manager
- M. Budelier, Senior Engineering Manager
- P. DiSalvo, Senior Engineer
- D. Eaman, Electrical Design Engineer
- J. Feigl, Engineering Manager
- B. Franzen, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- F. Gogliotti, Engineering Director
- J. Hansen, Mechanical Design Engineer
- M. Hosain, Site Equipment Qualification Engineer
- B. Madderom, Engineering Manager
- G. Morrow, Operations Director
- M. Murskyj, Senior Engineering Manager
- F. Polak, Mechanical Design Engineer
- P. Prater, Operations Training Manager
- D. Walker, Regulatory Assurance NRC Coordinator
- F. Winter, Operations
- D. Wolverton, Engineering Manager
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. Hills, Chief, Engineering Branch 1
- G. Roach, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Elliot, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
- Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
- Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. CALCULATIONS Number Description or Title Revision 3C2/3-0489-001 Verification of Adequacy of Accumulator Capacity for SOER 88-01 Response 0 8900-77-19-1 Calculation for Contactor/lnterposing Relay Coil Voltage During Starting 010 8982-13-19-4 Evaluation of 460 V Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Minimum Starting Voltage 001A 8982-15-19-1 Non-Size 2 Motor Control Center (MCC) Control Voltage Contactor Circuit Lengths fed from Switchgear 29 4 9389-46-19-2 Calculation For Diesel Generator 2 Loading Under Design Bases Accident Condition 003,A,B,C
- AOV-MEDP-DRE-16-001
- 2-1601-20A/B DP CALC Report Airbase Version 3.1 0
- CE-QC-004
- 1
- DG-1 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Load Verification 001B DR019-E002 4kV Bus 23-1 /33-1 and 24-1 /34-1 - Coordination Study 003,A,B DRE
- 2-1402-25B MIDACALC
- 2-1402-25B AC Motor Operated
- GL 95-06 Gate Valve 3 DRE00-0107 LPCI Swing Bus Automatic Transfer Time Delay Relay Setpoint Change for Extended Power Uprate (EPU) 002 DRE01-0041 Updated EQ Zone Parameter Tables Following Implementation of Extended Power Uprate 3 DRE02-0052 Motor Operated Valve AC Motor Terminal Voltage Calculation for Dresden System 1402, Unit 2 001 DRE03-0025 Baseline Calculation for 125 VDC
- ELMS-DC Conversion to DCSDM 002 DRE03-012 Core Spray System Combined DBD and DP Calculation 0 DRE04-0003 Baseline Calculation for 250VDC
- ELMS-DC Conversion to DCSDM 1 DRE05-0038 Auxiliary Power Analysis for Dresden Unit 2 003 DRE06-0023 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation
- 2 DRE06-0041 Unit 2 Turbine Building MCC Thermal Overload Relay Heater Sizing for AC Loads at Post LOCA Temperature 001 DRE07-0001 EDG Loading for CS Pump- LOCA Long Term Cooling 00 DRE07-0005 Determination of Connected Loading on 120/240 VAC ESS Bus Dist. Panel 902-49 Powered from UPS at Panel 902-63 4 DRE09-0026 Reactor Low Pressure (350 psig) ECCS Permissive Setpoint Error Analysis for Pressure Switch 2(3)-0263-52B and 2(3)-0263-52B1 at Normal Operating Conditions 000A DRE96-0149 Breaker Settings for Bus 28 and 29 004
- CALCULATIONS Number Description or Title Revision DRE96-0196 CSPs Ability to Deliver 4700 gpm at Discharge Pressure of 235 psig or Greater 0 DRE97-0021 Dresden LPCI/Core Spray NPSH Temperature Limits 2 DRE97-0162 Diesel Generator Cooling Water and HPCI Room Cooler Hydraulic Model 0 DRE98-0031 Unit 2 Reactor Building MCCs Thermal Overload Relay Heater Sizing for AC Loads at Post LOCA Temperature 004
- NED-I-EIC-0099 Reactor Low Pressure (350 psig) ECCS Permissive Setpoint Error Analysis at Normal Conditions 004A
- PMED-8684-80-01 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Suction Piping Minimum I.D. 0
- CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS GENERATED DUE TO THE INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date
- 02621525 Error on Drawing M-974 02/03/16
- 02622831 Ceiling Lights Burnt out in U2 250VDC Battery Room 02/07/16
- 02623024 U2 Battery Room Light Bulbs Need to be Replaced 02/08/16
- 02623349 DGCW Pump Floor Slab Thickness 02/08/16
- 02623369 Bus 29 Cub 1C Door Latch Needs Adjustment 02/08/16
- 02623651
- DOA 0010-01 Error in Elevation on Intake Canal Lip 02/09/16
- 02624064 Passport and
- DOP 6600-01 PR Setting Mismatch 02/10/16
- 02624237 Correction Required in
- DOS 1500-01 02/10/16
- 02624262 Unapproved Operator Aids:
- 2-5772-100 02/10/16
- 02624275 -Near ATS Panels 02/10/16
- 02624364 Missing Labels on Dampers/Drawing Error 02/10/16
- 02624371 U2 Intake Damper Paint on Actuator 02/10/16
- 02624646 Keys for Local MOV Control Station 02/11/16
- 02627008 Evaluate
- DEP 0040-09 02/16/16
- 02627629 Drawing Change Required for M-974 02/17/16
- 02628767 NRC Questions M-974 Note 4 Wording 02/19/16
- 02629741 TRM and Test Procedure Failed to Specify Max Closing Time from UFSAR for Valves 2(3)-1601-20A&B and TIP Valves 02/19/15
- 02630415 Administrative Errors in Calculation DRE04-0003 02/23/16
- 02630942 Change Calc
- PMED-8684-80-01 to Historical 02/24/16
- 02631136 Discrepancies in ESS UPS VTIP Binder D2015 02/24/16
- 02631300 Potential Discrepancy Between 250VDC and UPS Calc 02/24/16
- 02631818 Calculation DRE04-0003 02/25/16
- CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED DURING THE INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date
- 01151887 3-1501-3A Breaker Control Power Xfmr Burnt Up 12/13/10
- 01462897 Potential Mounting Issue with ESS BUS ABT Panel 01/15/13
- CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED DURING THE INSPECTION Number Description or Title Date
- 01513428 ESS Bus Undervoltage Relay Timing
- OOT 05/13/13
- 01533722 MOV
- 2-1402-25B Motor Cannot be Internally Borescoped 07/09/13
- 01546078 Receipt of NRC CDBI Inspection Report 2013-007 08/13/13
- 01582591 Issues While Racking in
- BUS 29 XTIE
- TO 28 11/08/13
- 01585176 MCC28-7/29-7 Did not Transfer as Expected 11/14/13
- 01586918 MOV
- 2-1402-25B Stem Nut Degraded 11/18/13
- 01620296 SER Point 0615 Failed to Activate 02/12/14
- 01620362 SER Point 0617 Failed to Activate 02/12/14
- 01692683 Excess Buildup on Intake Screens to 2B CSP Motor 08/14/14
- 02389466 U2 Swing Bus Transfer Time did not Meet Acceptance Criteria 10/01/14
- 02395698 Breaker Failed
- PM 10/15/14
- 02414006 U3 ESS Bus Normal Supply Inverter Operation 11/18/14
- 02432819
- SPC 023881320 03 (Lab Rpt on 2EDG Air Start Components) 01/05/15
- 02484471 -01 NRC Test Prep 04/13/15
- 02488474 U2 EDG Fail to Start 04/21/15
- 02496795 2B Core Spray Discharge Press High 05/06/15
- 02496986 Issues with
- OP-DR-102-106, Time Sensitive Actions 05/07/15
- 02509849 Common Cause ACE Requested for Critical Component Failures 07/07/15
- 02531455 Revision to
- OP-DR-102-106 Needed 07/22/15
- 02532555 UHS INSP
- Calc For DGCW Pump Based At Elevation 501 07/24/15
- 02532734 UHS NRC INSP
- Basis for UHS Volume (2 Million Gallons) 07/25/15
- 02533713 Further Info on
- 0253255
- DGCW Pump Calculation 07/28/15
- 02541257 SPC- U3 EDG Start Failure 08/13/15
- 02546029 Engineering Review Needed for Time Critical Action 4 08/25/15
- 02549329 PS
- 2-0263-52A As Found Reset
- OOT 09/01/15
- 02549334 PS
- 2-0263-52B As Found Trip
- OOT 09/01/15
- 02558925 Request Inspection/Cleaning of U2 EDG Air Start Piping 09/22/15
- 02587677 Small Air Leaks Found On
- 2-1601-20B 11/15/15
- 02587682 Small Air Leak on
- 2-1601-56 11/15/15
- 02588761
- 2-1601-20B Has No Closed Indication 11/17/15
- 02592404
- 2-1601-56 Timed Closed in the Alert Range During
- DOS 1600-03 11/25/15
- 02602366 10 Minute Limit for TCA4, Torus Cooling Requires Revisiting 12/18/15
- 02621708 DG FASA: Issues Observed During System Walkdowns 02/04/16
- 02621795 DG FASA: Maintenance Rule Reliability Reporting 02/04/16
- 02621828 DG FASA: Engine Analysis Not Being Performed 02/04/16
- DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Revision 12E-2096 --
- DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Revision 12E-2304 Key Diagram 4160V Switchgears 23-1 and 24-1 V 12E-2305 Key Diagram Turbine Building 480V Switchgears 25, 26, 27
- AT 12E-2346, Sh. 3 Schematic Diagram 4160V Bus 24-1 Undervoltage Relays Standby Diesel Generator 2 Overvoltage Relays
- AT 12E-2350B, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2 Auxiliaries & Start Relays
- 2-1401-A
- 2-1401-B
- AD 12E-2430, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Core Spray System 1
- BU 12E-2430, Sh. 2 Schematic Diagram Core Spray System 2
- BW 12E-2431, Sh. 1 Schematic Diagram Core Spray MOVs
- 2-1402-24A &
- 2-1402-25A
- AE 12E-2431, Sh. 2 Schematic Diagram Core Spray MOVs
- 2-1402-24B &
- 2-1402-25B
- AD 12E-2512 Schematic Diagram Primary Containment Isolation System Drywell & Torus Vent & Purge Isolation Control
- AL 12E-2550 Schematic Diagram Pressure Suppression System V 12E-2682 Wiring Diagram 120/240 V AC Dist Panels ESS Serv Bus Dist Panel 902-49 Instrument Bus Dist Panel 902-50
- BB 12E-2769A Wiring Diagram Instrument Rack 2202-5 Section A Reactor Instrument & Protection
- AE 12E-2770A Wiring Diagram Reactor Instrument & Protection Local Rack 2202-6 Section A
- BC 12E-6400A MOV Limit Switch Development E B-47 Crib House Section C - C G M-173 Diagram of Corrosion Test & Diesel Start-up Air Piping BE M-192 Crib House Piping Sections Z M-194 Outdoor Piping U M-22 Diagram of Service Water Piping ED M-22, Sh. 1 Diagram of Service Water Piping K M-270 Diagram of Turbine Building Ventilation AJ M-355 Diagram of Service Water Piping SJ M-517, Sh.1 Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water
- H M-974 Diagram of Diesel Generator Room Ventilation 1
- MISCELLANEOUS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 480V Switchgear System Health Report Q3-2015
- System Health Report for Primary Containment 4Q2015 Q4-2015
- System Health Report for Primary Containment 2Q2015 Q2-2015
- System Health Report for Core Spray and Flooding
- Q4-2015
- System Health Report for Core Spray and Flooding Q3-2015
- Cyberex Inc. Test Report 35 KVA Uninterruptible Power Supply Serial No. 10049-1, 10049-2, 10050-1, 10050-2 05/07/81 06-001 EDG Ventilation Flow Less Than Design 09/07/06 25235 Bingham Pump Test Curve for 2B Core Spray pump
- 260805 01/10/68 25243 Bingham Pump Test Curve for 2B Core Spray pump
- 260804 01/11/68 D-11 Manual NA D2015 Vendor Technical Manual Cyberex 35 KVA Uninterruptible Power Supply 3 D2064 Pratt Butterfly Valves Installation and Service Manual 12/11/96
- 2-4611-B Air Supply 1
- EC-383274 Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation Fan Damage 0
- LTR 89-418 Dresden Review of NTC Information Notice 89-07 (Failure Of Small Diameter Tubing Rendering EDG Inoperable) 06/02/89 GE
- SIL 300 Instrumentation for Core Spray Sparger Line Break Detection 09/1979
- NP 408 Joy Manufacturing Series 1000 Axivane Fan Maintenance and Installation Manual NA S-1500-11 Job Performance Measure-Line Up LPCI to the CST 4 TODI 06-021 Inputs for Evaluation of Diesel Generator Room Temperature
- DG Ventilation Fan Curve 0 VETIP D1995 General Electric Tri-Clad Vertical Induction Motors 001
- MODIFICATIONS
- Number Description or Title Revision
- EC 330522 Replace Existing Transformer T29 with New Style 001
- EC 331868 Replace VERSA Solenoid Valves
- 2-1601-22, -23, -56 and -63 with EQ ASCO Solenoid Valves 2
- SQUG-U2 0
- 2-0263-52B 001
- EC 377973 Replace Capacitors C201, C202 & C203, Located on ESS Inverter 0
- PROCEDURES
- Number Description or Title Revision
- DAN 902(3) F-8 ESS UPS Trouble 5 DEOP 0010-00 Guidelines for Use of Dresden Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines 15 DEOP 0500-03 Alternate Water Injection Systems 23
- DEP 0040-09 Limitorque Valve Operator Maintenance 15
- DES 8100-01 Electrical Surveillance of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) for Essential Service System (ESS) (W-7) 16
- DGA-12 Loss of Offsite Power 74
- DIS 1400-05 Core Spray System Logic System Functional Test 49
- DIS 1400-09 Core Spray System Load Shedding Circuitry Logic System Functional Test 07
- DIS 1600-04 ECCS Drywell Pressure Switches Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test 25
- DOA 0010-01 Dresden Lock and Dam Failure 34
- DOA 2300-03 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Local Manual Operation 17
- DOA 6600-01 Diesel Generator Failure 16
- DOA 6800-01 Loss of Power to Essential Service System Bus or Instrument Bus 34
- DOA 6900-04 Failure of Unit 2(3) 250VDC Power Supply 20
- DOP 1400-01 Core Spray System Preparation for Standby Operation 13
- DOP 1600-01 Normal Pressure Control of the Drywell or Torus 24
- DOP 6600-01 Diesel Generator 2(3) Preparation for Standby Operation 28
- DOP 6600-02 Diesel Generator 2(3) Startup 35
- DOP 6600-E1 Unit 2 Standby Diesel Generator 4
- DOP 6600-M1 Unit 2 Standby Diesel Generator 29
- DOP 6700-02 Transferring 480 Volt Busses 16
- DOP 6800-01 Essential Service System 31
- DOP 6800-E1 Unit 2 Essential Service Bus Electrical Checklist 8
- DOP 6900-01 250 VDC Electrical System 36
- DOS 1600-03 Unit 2 Quarterly Valve Timing 52
- DOS 6600-05 Bus Undervoltage and ECCS Integrated Functional Test for Unit 2 Diesel Generator 66
- MA-DR-771-402 Unit 2
- 4 KV Tech Spec Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Relay Routines 14
- OP-DR-102-106 Operator Response Time Program at Dresden 6
- WORK DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date
- D95703 Replace Damaged Piping in DGCW Suction Piping 10/18/90
- 00512060 5RFL PM Lube/Inspect Limitorque Valve
- 2-1402-25B 11/12/13
- WORK DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date
- 00719926 D2 2Y PM Baker Test Core Spray Pump Motor
- 2-1401-B 08/11/08
- 00874153 5RFL MOV Elec Inspection and Diagnostic Test
- 2-1402-25B 11/14/13
- 00988302 FNE Replace Solenoid
- 2-5790-EP1 02/12/07
- 01085111 4Y PM Inspect 480V BKR
- UTC 0001281363 08/29/13
- 01087118 DGCWP Suction Pipe Corrosion 01/11/08
- 01224197 EM Replace Capacitors C201, C202 and C203 per
- EC 377973 11/24/09
- 01224197 ESS: Field Service Note to Replace Capacitors on Rectifer 11/24/09
- 2-1601-20B 03/09/11
- 2-1601-56 09/11/12
- 01291088 2RFL PM Inspect Cubicle 2B at Bus 29 11/13/13
- 01410694 U-2 EDG Fan Blades Found Damaged 02/18/11
- 01412826 Need to Secure Door Handles to Prevent Damage to EDG Ventilation 02/14/12
- 01429081 D2 2Y EDG Perform Post-Maintenance Engine Analysis 04/10/13
- 01466171 D2 2Y EQ
- DIS 1600-20 Torus to Rx Bldg DP Xmtr Cal/Insp
- 02/12/14
- 01485168 1RFL IST Seat Leak Test
- 2-1402-25B 11/15/13
- 01493791 2Y PM Lubricate Valve Stem, Threads
- 2-1402-25B 08/22/13
- 01504014
- D2 30M/RFL TS LLRT
- DOS 7000-31
- 11/18/13
- 01583632 D2 24M TS Test LPCI Swing Bus Relays 10/02/14
- 01618704
- 02/08/15
- 01635025 24M TS D/G Test/Endurance & Margin/Full Load Reject/ECCS 04/23/15
- 01672038 D2 2Y
- DOS 0040-07 TS Verify Remote Cnmt Vlv Position Ind.
- 09/11/15
- 01692539 OP D2 RFL DATR Func Test of ESS UPS Power Supply Operability 11/14/15
- 01694719 EM RFL DATR Maint/Insp/ESS
- UPS 11/14/15
- DOS 1400-05 12/11/15
- 01861632
- 11/25/15
- 12/14/15
- 01885356 D2 1M TS Unit Diesel Generator Operability 01/07/16
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- USED [[]]
- NRC [[]]
VDC Volts Direct Current
April 6, 2016 Mr. Bryan
- POWER [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- DESIGN [[]]
- BASES [[]]
- REPORT 05000237/2016008; 05000249/2016008 Dear Mr. Hanson: On February 26, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (
- NRC ) completed the team portion of the pilot Design Bases Inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on February 26, 2016, with Mr.
- NRC [[inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspePublic Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).]]
- NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely, /RA/ David