IR 05000416/2017001
| ML17135A406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/2017 |
| From: | Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Emily Larson Entergy Operations |
| Greg Warnick | |
| References | |
| IR 2017001 | |
| Download: ML17135A406 (43) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TX 76011
-4511 May 15, 2017 Mr. Eric Larson Site Vice President Entergy Operations, In Grand Gulf Nuclear Station P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150
SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000 416/2017001 Dear Mr. Larson
- On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Statio On April 11, 2017 , the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staf The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed repor NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this repor T h is finding involved a violation of NRC requirement The NRC is treating th is violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Polic Further, inspectors documented three licensee-identified violation s , which were determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), in this repor The NRC is treating these violation s as NCV s consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Polic If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
. If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Statio E. Larson 2 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
"
Sincerely,/RA/
, Branch Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-416 License No
. NPF-29
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000 416/2017001 w/
Attachments:
1. Supplemental Information 2. Request for Information for the Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection
x SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available x Non-Sensitive By: x Yes No x Publicly Available Sensitive OFFICE SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/C C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2 NAME MYoung NDay TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy HGepford SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 5/10/2017 5/15/2017 5/11/2017 5/11/2017 5/10/2017 5/11/2017 OFFICE TL:DRS/IPAT SPE:DRP/C C:DRP/C NAME THipschman CYoung GWarnick SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 5/10/2017 5/10/2017 5/15/2017 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000 416 License: NPF-29 Report: 05000 416/20 17 0 01 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: 7003 Baldhill Road Port Gibson, MS 39150 Dates: January 1 through March 3 1 , 20 17 Inspectors:
M. Young, Senior Resident Inspector N. Day, Resident Inspector L. Carson II, Senior Health Physicist M. Phalen, Senior Health Physicist P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector E. Uribe, Project Engineer Approved By: Greg Warnick Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects
2
SUMMARY
IR 05000 416/20 17 0 01; 01/01/2017
- 03/31/2017
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
- Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and March 31, 2017 , by the resident inspectors at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green)is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.
Additionally, NRC inspectors documented in this report three licens ee-identified violation s of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Green , greater than Green, White, Yellow, or Red), determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG
-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process
," dated July 2016.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- Green.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) associated with the licensee's failure to conduct a drill required by the site emergency plan in 2014. The licensee was required to conduct a drill involving both the site first-aid team and a local hospital. This violation is not an immediate safety concern because drills were conducted involving the site first-aid team and other drills were conducted at local hospitals. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2017-00311. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the emergency response organization performance (drills and exercises)cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of being capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," dated September 22, 2015. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was not associated with the risk-significant planning standards, and was not a degraded planning standard function. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with training because the licensee did not maintain a workforce knowledgeable about the requirements of the emergency plan
[H.9]. (Section 1EP5)
Licensee-Identified Violations
Violations of very low safety significance (Green) that were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
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PLANT STATUS
The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station began the inspection period in Mode 4. On January 31 , 2017, operations personnel commenced power ascension, and on February 9 , 2017, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station reached 100 percent power.
On February 10, 2017, operations personnel reduced power to 74 percent power due to an issue with the condensate booster pump B outboard mechanical seal.
On February 13 , 2017, operations personnel commenced power ascension and reached 100 percent power.
On February 24, 2017, operations personnel reduced power to 74 percent power to perform planned maintenance and testing, and remained at that power level to support troubleshooting a problem with the condensate booster pump C outboard mechanical seal.
On March 9 , 2017, operations personnel commenced power ascension to 100 percent power following replacement of condensate booster pump A and C outboard mechanical seals
. The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station finished the inspection period at 100 percent power.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R 01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
On February 7, 2017, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for impending adverse weather conditions.
The inspectors reviewed plant design features , the licensee's procedures to respond to tornado es and high winds, and the licensee's implementation of these procedures.
The inspectors' evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
These activities constitute d one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather condition s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a. Inspection Scope
One January 29, 2017, inspectors performed a partial system walk
-down of the reactor core isolation cooling system following a valve operability test. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the system. They visually verified that critical portions of the system were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration
. These activities constitute d one partial system walk
-down sample
, as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety
- January 6, 2017, northeast auxiliary building passage , 166 f ee t elevation, Fire Area 8, Zone 1A401 January 24, 2017, auxiliary building corridors and passages
, 93 fee t and 103 fee t elevations, Fire Areas 7 and 8, Zones 1A101, 1A117, 1A121, and 1A123 March 3, 2017, Unit 1 , turbine building, 93 feet elevation, Fire Area TB 1 , Zone TB 1-01 March 3, 2017, Unit 2 , auxiliary building, 119 feet and 139 feet elevations, Fire Area AB 2, Zones AB 2-01 and AB 2-02 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constitute d four quarterly inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
From January 31 , 2017 , to February 14 , 2017, the inspectors completed inspection s of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected three underground vault s that contained risk
-significant or multiple
-train cables whose failure could disable risk
-significant equipment
- SP45MH01 SP45MH02 SP45MH03 The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the vaults and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion.
The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
These activities constitute d completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
January 6, 2017, operation with a potential for draining the reactor vessel during control rod exercising and control rod drive vent valve manipulations February 17, 2017, risk associated with preventative maintenance of fuel pool cooling and cleanup pump A, with fuel pool time to 200 degrees Fahrenheit less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> March 6 - 7, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel generator verification of extended allowed outage time risk management actions required by technical specifications The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result s of the assessments.
The inspectors also observed portions of two emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event
- February 10, 2017, secured condensate booster pump B and subsequent downpower due to elevated temperatures on the pump's outboard mechanical seal February 28, 2017, following a downpower for testing, secured condensate booster pump C due to elevated temperatures on the pump's outboard mechanical seal The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and components (SSCs).
These activities constitute d completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations and functionality assessments that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components (SSCs):
January 12, 2017 , operability determination of high pressure core spray following restricting orifice leakage January 28 , 2017, operability determination of the high pressure core spray cables due to being wetted March 23, 2017, functionality assessment for FLEX debris removal equipment (1FLEXE001 and 1FLEXE002) unable to be started due to dead batteries March 23, 2017, functionality assessment of the fire brigade during the time two operators were locked on top of the standby service water basin and during times when brigade members perform ed walk-downs in the switchyard March 24, 2017, operability determination of the Division 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators due to potential crankcase pressure trip condition The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC
. These activities constitute d completion of five operability and functionality review sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No Findings were identified
. 1 R 18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications that affected SSCs:
January 31, 2017, installation and removal of the autostart feature for standby service water pumps A and B only when a manual start of residual heat removal system occurred during the outage February 24 , 2017, modification to remove the linear velocity transducer for flow control valve B The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed these temporary modifications in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that these modifications did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modifications to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
These activities constitute d completion of two samples of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk
-significant SSCs:
February 2 8, 2017, control room air conditioning A following replacement of the compressor seal March 6, 2017, condensate booster pump A following replacement of the outboard mechanical seal and orifice installation March 12, 2017, Division 2 emergency diesel gener ator following an extend ed maintenance outage The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design
-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.
The inspectors observed the performance of the post
-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constitute d completion of three post-maintenance testing inspection samples , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. 1 R 22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed two risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service test s: February 13 , 2017, standby service water pump A quarterly surveillance test Other surveillance tests:
January 29, 2017, intermediate
-range monitor E surveillance test The inspectors verified that these test s met techn ical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constitute d completion of two surveillance testing inspection samples , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone:
Emergency Preparedness 1 EP 3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency response organization on
-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan commitments. The inspectors reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on
-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensee's methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensee's ability to staff pre
-planned alternate facilities. The inspectors also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments.
These activities constitute d completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1 EP 5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following documents for the period November 2014 through December 2016: After-action reports for emergency classifications and events After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises Independent audits and surveillances of the licensee's emergency preparedness program Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the licensee Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program Maintenance records for equipment supporting the emergency preparedness program Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records The inspectors reviewed summaries of 161 corrective action program reports associated with emergency preparedness, and selected 30 to review against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspectors verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments.
The inspectors reviewed summaries of 91 licensee evaluations of the impact of changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures, and selected 14 to review against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspectors verified that evaluations of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified the impact of the changes prior to being implemented.
The inspectors reviewed summaries of records pertaining to the maintenance of equipment and facilities used to implement the emergency plan to determine the licensee's ability to maintain equipment in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E. The inspectors verified that equipment and facilities were maintained in accordance with the commitments of the licensee's emergency plan
.
These activities constitute d completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensee's emergency preparedness program
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a Green
, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) associated with the licensee's failure to follow their emergency plan. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Emergency Plan
, Revision 72, Section 8.3.2(d), which requires that a drill involving the first-aid team and local support hospital(s) be conducted on an annual basis. The licensee failed to conduct a drill involving the first
-aid team and local support hospitals during 2014.
Description.
The inspectors reviewed drills and exercises conducted by the licensee between July 2014 and December 2016, and compared the drill and exercise evaluation reports to the requirements of the licensee Emergency Plan.
The inspectors determined that Emergency Plan
, Revisions 70 through 72, Section 8.3.2(d), required that a drill involving the first
-aid team and local support hospital(s) be conducted on an annual basis. The inspectors identified that an on
-site drill involving the site first
-aid team was conducted in August 2014 and that a Medical Service - 1 (MS-1) drill simulating a contaminated and injured person was conducted on April 16, 2014, involving Northeast Louisiana Ambulance Service and Riverland Medical Center, Ferriday, Louisiana. The inspectors reviewed the post drill evaluation report(s)for the Riverland Medical Center and determined that licensee staff did not materially participate in this drill. Specifically, licensee staff were only present as observers.
The inspectors determined, from a review of letters of agreement between the licensee and offsite hospitals, that the hospitals relied upon by the licensee to treat contaminated and injured individuals originating at the licensee's site were Claiborne County Hospital, River Region Medical Center, and Ochsner Clinic. The inspectors determined that the April 2014 drill was not conducted at a hospital credited in the site emergency plan as being relied upon to treat contaminated and injured employees from the licensee's site.
The inspectors found that licensee Document 2014/00183, "2014 Annual Site Medical Drill," dated September 2, 2014, reported that although hospital response was not observed, hospital response
, "was demonstrated during the FEMA-evaluated MS
-1 drill earlier this year." However, the inspectors concluded the licensee was required to drill with a hospital relied upon to treat contaminated and injured employees from the licensee's site to ensure that proficiency was maintained for rarely
-performed tasks that directly affect the radiological protection of site employees.
The inspectors reviewed site implementation procedures and conducted licensee staff interviews. Emergency preparedness staff explained that they believed they were in compliance with the emergency plan because, although the site first
-aid team and local hospitals were not evaluated at the same time, the direction of the site drill and exercis e procedure was met. Procedure EN-EP-306, "Drills and Exercises," Revisions 5 through 8, Attachment 9.1, stated for drill/exercise, Type 6 , that the annual Medical Emergency Drill
, "contains provisions for participation by the local medical support service agencies." While the site procedure state d this, the procedure also contain ed a site-specific emergency plan commitment list (Section 8.0). This list document ed that the text in Attachment 9.1 was subject to site commitments in the Emergency Plan , Section 8.3.2. Licensee emergency preparedness staff failed to recognize that the wording of the site emergency plan commitment require d the site to complete the drill requirement in a manner different than the general description in the site procedure.
The inspectors determined that the licensee did not conduct a drill in which both the site first-aid team and a hospital participated. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensee did not follow the requirements of the site emergency plan.
Analysis.
The failure to conduct a drill required by the licensee's emergency plan is a performance deficiency within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the emergency response organization performance (drills and exercises) cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of being capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The licensee's ability to take adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public is degraded when the licensee does not perform drills and exercises to ensure emergency response organization proficiency. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," dated September 22, 2015. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was not associated with the risk significant planning standards, and was not a loss of planning standard function. The planning standard function was not lost because the licensee conducted other required drills during 2014, including drills involving the first
-aid team. The finding had a cross
-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with training because the licensee did not maintain a workforce knowledgeable about the requirements of the emergency plan
. Specifically, the review of drill report's text and responses in licensee interviews showed examples of insufficient knowledge of content of the site emergency plan by emergency preparedness staff. This contributed to the misconception by the licensee that their actions were in compliance with the plan
[H.9].
Enforcement.
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires, in part, that a power reactor licensee follow an emergency plan which meets the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) requires, in part, that the licensee conduct periodic drills to maintain key skills. Emergency Plan, Revisions 70 through 72, Section 8.3.2(d), requires, in part, that, "[a] drill involving the first-aid team and local support hospitals is conducted on an annual basis." Contrary to the above, between December 31, 2014, and January 13, 2017, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station failed to follow an emergency plan which met the requirements of Appendix E and the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Specifically, the licensee failed to conduct an annual drill involving the first
-aid team and local support hospital(s)as required by Emergency Plan
, Revisions 70 through 72, Section 8.3.2(d), to maintain key emergency response organization skills. The licensee's ability to take adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public is degraded when the licensee does not perform drills and exercises to ensure emergency response organization proficiency. The inspectors determined that all drills required to be conducted by the emergency plan were conducted in 2015 and 2016. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2017-00311. Because this violation has been determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
-0 1, "Failure to Conduct a Drill Required by the Site Emergency Plan in 2014") 1 EP 6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 22, 2017, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensee's assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the Technical Support Center and the simulator, and attended the post
-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off
-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constitute d completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones:
Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety 2 RS 1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in assessing the radiological hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed the licensee's implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control measures for both individual and collective exposures. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various areas in the plant, performed independent radiation dose rate measurements, and observed postings and physical controls. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
Radiological hazard assessment, including a review of the plant's radiological source terms and associated radiological hazards. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's radiological survey program to determine whether radiological hazards were properly identified for routine and nonroutine activities and assessed for changes in plant operations
. Instructions to workers, including radiation work permit requirements and restrictions, actions for electronic dosimeter alarms, changing radiological condition, and radioactive material container labeling
. Contamination and radioactive material control, including release of potentially contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, radiological survey performance, radiation instrument sensitivities, material control and release criteria, and control and accountability of sealed radioactive sources.
Radiological hazards control and work coverage. During walk
-downs of the facility and job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions, radiological postings, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls. The inspectors also evaluated dosimetry selection and placement as well as the use of dosimetry in areas with significant dose rate gradients. The inspectors examined the licensee's controls for items stored in the spent fuel pool and evaluated airborne radioactivity controls and monitoring.
High radiation area and very high radiation area controls. During plant walk-downs, the inspectors verified the adequacy of posting and physical controls, including areas of the plant with the potential to become risk
-significant high radiation areas.
Radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency with respect to radiation protection work requirements. The inspectors determined if workers were aware of significant radiological conditions in their workplace, radiation work permit controls/limits in place, and electronic dosimeter dose and dose rate set points. The inspectors observed radiation protection technician job performance, including the performance of radiation surveys.
Problem identification and resolution for radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls. The inspectors reviewed audits, self
-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute d completion of the seven required samples of radiological hazard assessment and exposure control program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2 RS 3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee controlled in
-plant airborne radioactivity concentrations are consistent with ALARA principles
, and that the use of respiratory protection devices did not pose an undue risk to the wearer. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various areas in the plant, and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
Engineering controls, including the use of permanent and temporary ventilation systems to control airborne radioactivity. The inspectors evaluated installed ventilation systems, including review of procedural guidance, verification the systems were used during high
-risk activities, and verification of airflow capacity, flow path, and filter/charcoal unit efficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed the use of temporary ventilation systems used to support work in contaminated areas such as high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)/charcoal negative pressure units. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's airborne monitoring protocols, including verification that alarms and set points were appropriate.
Use of respiratory protection devices, including an evaluation of the licensee's respiratory protection program for use, storage, maintenance, and quality assurance of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified equipment, air quality and quantity for supplied air devices and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles, qualification and training of personnel, and user performance
. Self-contained breathing apparatus for emergency use, including the licensee's capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions, hydrostatic testing of SCBA bottles, status of SCBA staged and ready for use in the plant including vision correction, mask sizes, etc., SCBA surveillance and maintenance records, and personnel qualification, training, and readiness.
Problem identification and resolution for airborne radioactivity control and mitigation. The inspectors reviewed audits, self
-assessments, and corrective action documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute d completion of the four required samples of in
-plant airborne radioactivity control and mitigation program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.03.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of January 1, 2016 , through December 31, 2016 , to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these LERs to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period.
The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Docume nt 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7 , to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicato r , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating power reports for the period of January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016 , to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
(Opened) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000416/2017001
-02 , "Grand Gulf Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator
"
Introduction.
The inspectors identified an URI associated with the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator related to events that occurred on June 17, 2016.
Description.
On June 17, 2016, during turbine stop valve testing, stop valve B was to be cycled closed. Upon performing that action, stop valve B closed as expected; however, stop valve D unexpectedly closed. In response to the unexpected valve closure, the electro-hydraulic control trip fluid pressure fluctuated at an increase d rate which caused the turbine control valves to cycle. This valve cycling resulted in numerous unplanned reactor pressure and power changes for approximately 42 minutes. During this time, operations personnel repeatedly performed troubleshooting activities by attempting to reset the stop valves, which caused additional system instability and increased the magnitude of the power oscillations. Ultimately, operations personnel decided to insert control rods in an attempt to stabilize the power and pressure oscillations. The operator action to insert control rods failed to stabilize the power and pressure oscillations, and approximately 1 minute later, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to a valid oscillating power range monitor input to the reactor protection system. This event was documented in Licensee Event Report 05000416/2016004
-00, and NRC Inspection Reports 05000416/201600 2 and 05000416/2016003.
The unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator measures the rate of unplanned power changes per year of operation at power and provides an indication of initiating event frequency. The licensee did not include any unplanned power changes as inputs into this performance indicator for the second quarter of 2016. The inspectors questioned whether any unplanned power changes should have been reported with this performance indicator, and the licensee submitted a frequently asked question (FAQ) to the NRC reactor oversight process working group (ADAMS Accession No. ML17100A235, "03/23/2017 Reactor Oversight Process Working Group Public Meeting"). This FAQ (FAQ 17-01) is currently under review to determine whether the above events should be captured as inputs to the unplanned power changes performance indicator.
The inspectors concluded that additional inspection would be required to assess whether the unplanned power changes should have been reported in the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator. This issue was identified as UR I 05000416/2017001
-0 2 , "Grand Gulf Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator."
.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred from January 1, 2016 , through December 31, 2016. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constitute d verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records documenting unplanned exposures and losses of radiological control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period of January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically controlled area exit transactions showing exposures greater than 100 millirem. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the occupational exposure control effectiveness performance indicator
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid and gaseous effluent releases, and leaks and spills that occurred between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016, to verify the performance indicator data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the RETS/ODCM radiological effluent occurrences performance indicator
, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA 2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA 5 Other Activities (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/192, "Inspection of the Licensee's Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems
"
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of this performance based temporary instruction is to verify implementation of interim compensatory measures associated with an open phase condition design vulnerability in electric power systems for operating reactors. The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine if the licensee had implemented the following interim compensatory measures. These compensatory measures are to remain in place until permanent automatic detection and protection schemes are installed and declared operable for the open phase condition design vulnerability. The inspectors verified the following: The licensee identified and discussed with plant staff the lessons learned from the open phase condition events at the United States operating plants, including the Byron Station open phase condition and its consequences. This included conducting operator training for promptly diagnosing, recognizing consequences, and responding to an open phase condition.
The licensee updated plant operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on off
-site power sources credited for safe shutdown of the plant.
The licensee established and implemented periodic walk
-down activities to inspect switchyard equipment such as insulators, disconnect switches, and transmission line and transformer connections associated with the off-site power circuits to detect a visible open phase condition.
The licensee ensured that routine maintenance and testing activities on switchyard components have been implemented and maintained. As part of the maintenance and testing activities, the licensee assessed and managed plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspector identified that the licensee did not implement any operator training focused on the changes to operating procedures related to the open phase condition vulnerability. The licensee documented this feedback in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGN-2017-0 3246. 4OA 6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On January 13, 2017, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Mr. V. Fallacara, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On February 22, 2017, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results via teleconference, to Mr.
T. Coutu, Director, Regulatory and Performance Improvement, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On March 30, 2017, the inspectors presented the open phase temporary instruction inspection results via teleconference, to Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On April 11 , 2017, the inspectors presented the quarterly baseline inspection results to Mr. E. Larson , Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
4OA 7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following licensee
-identified violation s of NRC requirements were determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and meet the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria for being dispositioned as n on-cited violation s: Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires, in part, that a power reactor licensee follow an emergency plan which meets the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the licensee.
Contrary to the above, on June 7, 2015, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station failed to follow an emergency plan which met the requirements of Appendix E and the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Specifically, the licensee failed to accurately classify a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with the licensee's emergency action level scheme. The licensee declared the emergency based on a fire condition , which did not exist, as identified in the licensee's after
-action report dated July 13, 2015. The finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," dated Septem ber 22, 2015, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was associated with a risk
-significant planning standard, and was not a lost or degraded planning standard function. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-GGN-2015-03345 and CR-GGN-2017-00288.
Technical Specification 5.7.1 states, in part, that each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area. Contrary to the above, on April 20, 2016, an accessible area of the auxiliary building 185 feet south, new fuel pool heat exchanger room, was a high radiation area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and was not barricaded or conspicuously posted. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure or potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised.
The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGN-2016-03482.
Technical Specification 5.7.2 states, in part, that in addition to the requirements of Specification 5.7.1, areas with radiation levels greater than 1000 mrem/hr shall be provided with locked or continuously guarded doors to prevent unauthorized entry. Contrary to the above, on April 6, 2016, the reactor water cleanup pump B room had accessible areas with radiation level s greater than 1000 mrem/hr and was not locked or continuously guarded to prevent unauthorized entry. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure or potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised.
The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGN-2016-03146.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- R. Benson, Manager (Acting), Radiation Protection
- A. Burks, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- D. Burnett, Director, Emergency Preparedness, Entergy South
- T. Coutu, Director, Regulatory Assurance and Performance Improvement
- J. Dorsey, Manager, Security
- V. Fallacara, Acting Site Vice President
- E. Garrison, Manager, Training
- J. Keir, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- R. Meister, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Nadeau, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
- K. Petersen, Manager, Recovery
- J. Seiter, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- P. Stokes, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- S. Sweet, Licensing Specialist
- P. Williams, Director, Engineering
- E. G. Wright, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- R. Young, Auditor
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
-0 2 URI Grand Gulf Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator (Section 4OA1)
Opened and Closed
-0 1 NCV Failure to Conduct a Drill Required by
the Site Emergency Plan
in 2014 (Section
1EP5) Closed 2515/192 TI Inspection of the Licensee's Interim Compensatory Measures Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (Section
4OA5)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Miscellaneous
- Document Number Title Date LBDR 2016-026 Removal of LBDCR 95
-017 concerning TORMIS from the UFSAR February 11, 2016
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 01-S-18-6 Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities
- 018 05-1-02-VI-02 Hurricanes, Tornados, and Severe Weather
- 130
- Condition Repor
t (CR-GGN-) 2015-04760
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Miscellaneous
- Documents Number Title Date GG USFAR Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Appendix 9A
- Fire Hazards Analysis Report
- MC-QSP64-86058 Fire Calculation for Fire Loads August 8 , 2001
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 10-S-03-8 Fire Watch Program Fire Pre-Plan A-01 Fire preplan for Unit 1 auxiliary building corridors and passages, 93' and 103' elevations Fire Pre-Plan A-29 Fire preplan for Unit 1 auxilary building northeast passage area, elevation 166' Fire Pre-Plan AB 2-01 Fire preplan for Unit 2 auxiliary building, 119' elevation Fire Pre-Plan AB 2-02 Fire preplan for Unit 2 auxiliary building, 139' elevation Fire Pre-Plan
- TB1-01 Fire preplan for Unit 1 turbine building, elevation 93'
Procedures
- Number Title Revision Section 9A.5.19.4 Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Zone 1A424
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2016-09877 2017-00113 2017-01481 2017-00209 2017-02232
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Procedure
- Number Title Revision
- EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2017-01092 2017-01356 2017-01359
Work Orders
(WOs)
- 2735565
- 52737575 52737576
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Miscellaneous
- Document
s Number Title Date
- Daily Plant Status Report February 17 , 2017 Section 9.1.3
- Final Safety Analysis Report for Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 01-S-18-6 Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities
- 018 03-1-01-2 Attachment VII:
- Rapid Power Reduction
- 168 04-1-03-C11-8 Control Rod Exercising, Modes 3, 4 or 5
- 104 05-S-02-V-1 Response to Fires
- 004
- Condition Repor t (CR-GGN-) 2017-00174 2017-01486 2017-01494 2017-01516 2017-01736 2017-01940 2017-02068 2017-02193 2017-02275 2017-02362 2017-02949
Work Orders
(WOs)
- 00378922
- 00468484
- 52737575
- 52737576
Drawings
- Number Title Revision FSAR Figure 9.1
-28 Filter Demineralizer System
-29 Filter/Demineralizer System
-30 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- M-1088C Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- 23 M-1088D Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- 011 M-1088E Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- 21 M-1088X Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System
- 3
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date
- Component Report for 1CA7021 Cabling January 28 , 2017
- Component Report for 1ACTDG01 Cable Tray January 28 , 2017
- Cable Construction for E029.0
-QSR21T000A
-1.3-001 December 13 , 1979
- Specification for 9645
-E-029.0 8 16-0018 Standing Order for Tornado Warning issued for GGNS
- July 18, 2016
- Section 8.2
- Final Safety Analysis Report for Onsite Emergency Power Distribution System Section 8.3
- Final Safety Analysis Report for Emergency Power Distribution System
Procedure
- Number Title Revision 02-S-01-27 Operations Section Procedure
- Operation's Philosophy
- 069 05-S-01-FSG-005 Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging
- 10-S-03-2 Response to Fires
- 27
- EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process
- 011
- EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations
- 018
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2017-00047 2017-00085 2017-00093 2017-00748 2017-01559 2017-02202 2017-02915 2016-09582 FIRE CR
Drawings
- Number Title Revision A-0010 General Floor Plan 93' & 103'
- E-KB1673 Raceway Plan Aux. Bldg. Elev. 93'
-0", Area 8
- B
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision
- EC 69522 Removal of the Velocity Feedback Signal for Recirculation Flow Control Valve B
- Section 15.1
- Final Safety Analysis Report for Transient Analysis
Procedure
- Number Title Revision 04-1-01-P41-1 Standby Service Water System
- 143
- Condition Repor
t (CR-GGN-) 2017-01145 2017-02693
Section 1R19:
- Post
-Maintenance Testing
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date
- Equipment Failure Evaluation for 01/27/2017 HPCS Jockey Pump Failure
- PRG meeting notes, for management discretion to categorize CR
-GGN-2017-00917 from A to B February 2 , 2017 2017-001-00 Licensee Event Report for High Pressure Core Spray Jockey Pump Trip March 28 , 2017
Procedure
- Number Title Revision 04-S-01-Z51-1 Control Room HVAC System
- 056 04-1-03-P75-1 Div 1/2 Diesel Generator Unexcited Run
- 008
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2017-00132 2017-00917 2017-01943 2017-02607
Work Orders
(WOs)
- 00378922
- 00466256 00468479
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Miscellaneous
- Document Number Title Date MAI00
- 310583 Flow Balance SSW A Loop March 29, 2002
Procedures
- Number Title Revision/Date 06-OP-1C51-V-0002-6 IRM Functional Test January 30, 2017 06-OP-1P41-Q-0004 Standby Service Water Loop A Valve AND Pump Operability Test 122
- EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations
- 018
- Condition Repor
t (CR-GGN-) 2017-01559
- Work Order (WO
) 52730530
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response
- Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Date 2015-00033 Off-Hours Unannounced Drill Report, First Quarter 2015
- February 5, 2015 2015-00129 Off-Hours Unannounced Drill Report, Second Quarter 2015
- June 30, 2015 2015-00177 Off-Hours Unannounced Drill Report, Third Quarter 2015
- September 29, 2015 2015-00232 Off-Hours Unannounced Drill Report, Fourth Quarter 2015
- December 3, 2015 2016-00092 Off-Hours Unannounced Drill Report, First Quarter 2016
- May 3, 2016
- 2016-00132 Quarterly Off
-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test, Second Quarter 2016
- June 29, 2016 2016-00195 Off-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test Report, Third Quarter 2016
- September 28, 2016 2016-00243 Off-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test Report, Fourth Quarter 2016
- December 14, 2016
Procedure
- Number Title Revision
- EN-EP-310 Emergency Response Organization Notification System
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2015-00548 2015-03906 2015-05682 2015-05685 2015-05686 2015-05687 2015-05688 2015-05699 2015-05969 2015-06201 2015-06485 2015-06862 2015-07036 2016-03024 2016-05770 2016-06344 2016-06350 2016-07759
Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date
- 10CFR50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation for
Procedure
- 10-S-01-1, Revision 124
- October 23, 2014
- 10CFR50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation for
Procedure
- 10-S-01-1, Revision 125
- February 16, 2015
- 10CFR50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation for
Procedure
- 10-S-01-12, Revision 44
- October 23, 2014
- 10CFR50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation for
Procedure
- 10-S-01-19, Revision 21
- Emergency Preparedness Surveillance Log, 2014, 2015, 2016
- Evaluation Report for the On
-Shift Chemist Drill December 10, 2016
- Evaluation Report for the Semi
-Annual Health Physics Drill conducted December 15, 2016
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Nuclear Independent Oversight Function Area Performance Report, Group A
- March 8, 2016
- Nuclear Independent Oversight Function Area Performance Report, Group A
- May 8, 2016
- Nuclear Independent Oversight Function Area Performance Report, Group A
- July 13, 2016
- Nuclear Independent Oversight Function Area Performance Report, Group A
- October 26, 2016
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report February 14, 2015
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report March 14, 2015
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report April 9, 2015
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report June 17, 2015
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report July 27, 2015
- Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report September 15, 2015
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date Nuclear Oversight Monthly Functional Area Summary Report November 12, 2015
- Training Observation Category Trend Report, July 1, 2014, through January 5, 2017
- 2014/00183
- Evaluation Report for the Medical Drill conducted August 20, 2014 September 2, 2014 2014/00209
- Evaluation Report for the Red Team DEP Mini Drill 2014
-003 October 1, 2014 2014/00303
- Evaluation Report for the 2014 On
-Shift Chemist Drill December 29
- 2014 2015/00074
- Quarterly Emergency Response Facilities Inventory Report, First Quarter 2015
- April 16, 2015
- 2015/00103
- Evaluation Report for the Medical Drill conducted May 28, 2015 June 2, 2015
- 2015/00112
- Evaluation Report for the
- 2014-004 Blue Team DEP Mini-Drill June 15, 2015 2015/00113
- Evaluation Report for the Third Quarter 2014 Green Team Exercise June 15, 2015 2015/00115
- Evaluation Report for the Second Quarter 2015 Yellow Team Exercise June 17, 2015 2015/00138
- Quarterly Emergency Response Facilities Inventory Report, Second Quarter 2015
- July 27, 2015
- 2015/00140
- Evaluation Report for the July 2015 Red Team Exercise July 29, 2015
- 2015/00161
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 2015 Annual ETE Update September 8, 2015 2015/00176
- Evaluation Report for the MS
-1 Drill conducted September 28, 2015, for River Region Medical
- Center September 29, 2015 2015/00186
- Quarterly Emergency Response Facilities Inventory Report , Third Quarter 2015
- October 26, 2015 2015/00187
- Evaluation Report for the Red Team Hostile Action Exercise November 4, 2015 2016/00003
- Evaluation Report for the Fourth Quarter Blue Team Exercise January 10, 2016 2016/00006
- Evaluation Report for the 2015 On-Shift Chemist Drill December 29, 2015 2016/00007
- Evaluation Report for the Off
-Hours On-site Accountability Drill conducted December 15, 2015
- January 10, 2016
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date
- 2016/00013
- Quarterly Emergency Response Facilities Inventory Report, Fourth Quarter
- 2015 January 14, 2016 2016/00090
- Evaluation Report for the Second Quarter Yellow Team Exercise May 9, 2016
- 2016/00124
- Evaluation Report for the Red Team DEP 2016
-002 June 22, 2016 2016/00148
- Evaluation Report for DEP Mini Drill 2016
-002, Operations Crew E July 28, 2016
- 2016/00155
- Evaluation Report for DEP Mini Drill 2016
-002, Yellow Team August 4, 2016 2016/00169
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 2016 Annual ETE Update August 24, 2016 2016/00181
- Evaluation Report for the OSC Manager Drill conducted September 13, 2016 September 13, 2016 2016/00203
- Evaluation Report for the Fourth Quarter Blue and Red Team Exercise October 18, 2016 2016/00215
- Evaluation Report for the Yellow Team DEP 2016
-003 October 26, 2016 2016/00216
- Evaluation Report for the Medical Drill conducted October 26, 2016 October 26, 2016 2016/00219
- Evaluation Report for the MS
-1 Drill at RiverLand Medical Center October 31, 2016 2016/00242
- Evaluation Report for the Off
-Hours On-site Accountability Drill conducted December 11, 2016
- December 14, 2016
- CR-GGN-2015-4475 CA6 Effectiveness Review March 29, 2016
- LO-GLO-2015-00030 GGNS Pre NRC Inspection/Exercise Assessment May 1, 2015
- LO-GLO-2016-00023 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Pre NRC Inspection/INPO Evaluation Assessment August 12, 2016
- LO-GLO-2016-00083 2016 EP FLEX Drill Snapshot Benchmark May 24, 2016
- LO-GLO-2016-00084 Self-Assessment: Weekly ERO Proficiency Testing June 27, 2016
- QA-07-2015-GGNS-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness May 12, 2015
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Revision/Date
- QA-07-2016-GGNS-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness May 2, 2016
Procedures
- Number Title Revision/Date
- 01-S-10-3 Emergency Planning Department Responsibilities
- 21, 22 01-S-10-5 Control of Emergency Response Equipment and Facilities
- 14, 15 01-S-10-6 Emergency Response Organization
- 30, 31 05-S02-VI-3 Off-Normal Event Procedure Earthquake, Revision 113
- March 19, 2015 10-S-01-38 EAL Contingency Planning, Revision 4
- March 17, 2015 10-S-02-1 ERF Inspections, Inventories, Operability Checks, and Maintenance
- 10-S-04-1 Emergency Operations Facility Equipment
- 2, 3
- EN-EP-305 Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program
- 3, 4
- EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program
- 27, 28
- EPP 33-14 Back Up Emergency Operations Facility
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2014-0 4271 2014-0 5230 2014-0 5236 2014-0 5539 2014-0 7052 2014-0 8338 2015-0 0713 2015-0 1236 2015-0 2375 2015-0 2582 2015-0 2596 2015-0 4256 2015-0 4475 2015-0 4512 2015-0 4689 2015-0 5126 2015-0 5131 2015-0 5679 2015-0 5967 2015-0 6217 2016-0 3351 2016-0 3352 2016-0 3353 2016-0 3362 2016-0 3386 2016-0 3765 2016-0 4379 2016-0 8383 2016-0 8394 2016-0 8731 2017-00288 2017-00289 2017-00363 2017-00364 2017-00365 2017-00366
- Work Tracking System (WT
-GGN) 2014-00023 2016-00194
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 05-S-01-EP-3 Containment Control
- 29 10-S-01-1 Activation of Emergency Plan
- 26
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
- Audits and Self
-Assessments Number Title Date
- CFAM Deep Dive Assessment Report
- Grand Gulf Radiation Protection May 2016
- GLO-2015-00037 Pre-NRC Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls - Focused Assessment August 2015
- GLO-2016-00019 Pre-NRC Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls September
- 2016
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Date
- Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Records January 17, 2017
- National Source Tracking System GG Source Records January 17, 2017
- 00459752-01 Work Order
- Unnecessary Items Stored in the Pools are of FME Concern January 04, 2017 52638633.01
- 2015 Source Leak and Inventory Records November 11, 2015 52664731.01
- 2016 Source Leak and Inventory Records June 20, 2016
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 07-S-14-428 Operation and Maintenance of the TRI
-NUC Underwater Filtration System
- 08-S-02-075 Radiation Protection Instruction
- Coverage and Control of Refueling Operations and Movement of Irradiated Materials
- EN-RP-100 Radiation Worker Expectations
Procedures
- Number Title Revision
- EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas
- EN-RP-106 Radiological Survey Documentation
- EN-RP-106-01 Radiological Survey Guidelines
- EN-RP-108 Radiation Protection Posting
- EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control
- EN-RP-123 Radiological Control for Highly Radioactive Objects 01
- EN-RP-143 Source Control
- EN-RP-152 Conduct of Radiation Protection
- EN-RP-202 Personnel Monitoring
- EN-RP-203 Dose Assessment
- EN-RP-204 Special Monitoring Requirements
- EN-RP-204-01 Effective Dose Equivalent (EDEX) Monitoring
- EN-RP-205 Prenatal Monitoring Radiation Surveys Number Title Date
- GG-1610-0252 113 TB Condensate Demineralizers October 24, 2016
- GG-1701-0117 93' RW Spent Resin Tank and Pump Room January 9, 2017
- Radiation Work Permits Number Title Revision
- 20171003 Chemistry Sampling, Surveillances, and Tours
- 20171006 Rad Waste Tank and Pump Room Decon
- 20171300 Drywell Entry
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2016-00473 2016-01673 2016-02783 2016-03146 2016-03151 2016-03482 2016-03698 2016-03507 2016-03703 2016-06532
- 2016-06813 2016-07566 2016-08022 2016-08811 2016-09268
Section 2RS3:
- In
-plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation Audits, Self
-Assessments, and Surveillances Number Title Date
- Selected Records of Monthly SCBA and Face Piece Inspection Log
- 2015 - 2016
- LO-GLO-2016-0019 Pre-NRC Inspection for In
-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Controls and Mitigation Assessment September 28, 2016
Miscellaneous Documents
Procedures
- Number Title Revision
- Vacuum Cleaners and HEPA Ventilation Units
- EN-RP-501 Respiratory Protection Program
- EN-RP-502 Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection Equipment 9
- EN-RP-502-01 Fire Hawk M7 SCBA
- EN-RP-502-03 Air Hawk II SCBA
- EN-RP-503 Selection, Issue, and Use of
- Respiratory Protection Equipment 7
- EN-RP-504 Breathing Air
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2014-00325 2014-00965 2016-02668 2014-03704 2015-04319
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
- Number Title Revision/Date
- EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process, Unit 1
- 7
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours st Quarter 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours nd Quarter 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours rd Quarter 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours 4 th Quarter 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- 1st Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- 2nd Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- 3rd Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- 4th Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours
- 1st Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours
- 2nd Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours
- 3rd Quarter
- 2016
- EN-LI-114 NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours
- 4th Quarter
- 2016
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
- Number Title Revision
- EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program
- 28
- EN-LI-118 Causal Evaluation Process
- 23
- EN-LI-118 Causal Evaluation Process
- 24
- 6
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Miscellaneous Documents
- Number Title Date 14-0002 Guidelines for Single Phase Failure Events
- 17-0006 Single Phase Failure Events
- GNRO-2012/200126
- 90-Day Response to Bulletin 2012
-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System October 24, 2012 GNRO-2014/00009
- Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Bulletin 2012
-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System"), dated December 20, 2013
- February 3, 2014
Procedures
- Number Title Revision 02-S-01-35 Outside Rounds
- 081 05-1-02-I-4 Loss of AC Power
- 048 05-1-02-I-4 Loss of AC Power
- 049 05-1-02-I-4 Loss of AC Power
- 050
Condition Reports
(CR
-GGN-) 2012-01836 2015-05384 2016-01787 2016-05471 2016-05472 2016-05473 2016-06341 2017-02358* 2017-03192* 2017-03245* 2017-03246* *Issued as a result of inspection activities
- Attachment 2
- The following items are requested for the Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant Inspection Dates February 13 to 17, 2017
- Integrated Report
- 2017001
- Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.
- Please provide the requested information on or before January 17, 2017.
- Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.
- For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.0
should be in a file/folder titled
"1- A," applicable organization charts in file/folder "
- 1- B," etc.
- If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report.
- In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.
- The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting.
- If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies.
- Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found.
- If you have any questions or comments, please contact Martin Phalen at (817) 200
-1158 or martin.phalen@nrc.gov.
- PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
- This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
- Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150
-0011.
- 1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
- Date of Last Inspection:
- March 7 through 18, 2016
- A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff and Technicians.
- B. Applicable organization charts.
- C. ALL radiation protection related licensee (Grand Gulf) and corporate (Entergy) assessments and audits, all independent or third party radiation protection related assessments and audits, all radiation protection related self
-assessments, and all radiation safety related LERs, including but not limited to radiation monitoring instrumentation and radioactive effluents, releases and / or spills, written since January 1, 2016.
- D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures.
- E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.
- Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
- 1. Radiation Protection Program Description
- 2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations
- 3. Personnel Dosimetry Program
- 4. Posting of Radiological Areas
- 5. High Radiation Area Controls
- 6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions
- 7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys
- 8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control
- 9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program
- F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub
-tiered systems) since January 1, 2016.
a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization
b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization
- NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
- Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches.
- If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since January 1, 2016 involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)
- Additionally, a copy of ALL radiation protection AND chemistry department root cause evaluations, apparent cause evaluation, and condition evaluations performed since January 1, 2016.
- G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period (if the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose estimate for the work activity).
- H. List of active radiation work permits.
- I. Radioactive source inventory list
. a. All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested.
b. All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2 and above threshold.
- Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity (w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.
- J.
- The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be leak tested.
- If applicable, spe cifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have failed its leak test within the last two years.
- K. A current listing of any non
-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm).
- L. Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date.
- The printout should include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).
- 3.
- In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
- Date of Last Inspection:
- February 24 through 28, 2014
- A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
- 1. Respiratory Protection Program
- 2. Self-contained breathing apparatus
- B. Applicable organization charts
- C. Copies of audits, self
-assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits for contractor support (SCBA), and LERs, written since date of last inspection related to:
- 1. Installed air filtration systems
- 2. Self-contained breathing apparatuses
- D. Procedure index for:
- 1. Use and operation of continuous air monitors
- 2. Use and operation of temporary air filtration units
- 3. Respiratory protection
- E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.
- Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
- 1. Respiratory protection program
- 2. Use of self
-contained breathing apparatuses
- 3. Air quality testing for SCBAs
- 4. Use of installed plant systems, such as containment purge, spent fuel pool ventilation, and auxiliary building ventilation
- F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub
-tiered systems) written since date of last inspection, related to the Airborne Monitoring program including:
- 1. Continuous air monitors
- 2. Self-contained breathing apparatuses
- 3. Respiratory protection program
- NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
- Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches.
- G. List of SCBA qualified personnel
- reactor operators and emergency response personnel.
- H. Inspection records for self
-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) staged in the plant for use since date of last inspection.
- I. SCBA training and qualification records for control room operators, shift supervisors, STAs, and OSC personnel for the last year.
- A selection of personnel may be asked to demonstrate proficiency in donning, doffing, and performance of functionality check for respiratory devices.