IR 05000334/2006004
| ML063130485 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2006 |
| From: | Bellamy R R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB7 |
| To: | Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| Bellamy R R Rgn-I/DRP/Br7/610-337-5200 | |
| References | |
| IR-06-004 | |
| Download: ML063130485 (51) | |
Text
November 9, 2006
Mr. James LashSite Vice President, Beaver Valley Power Station FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000334/2006004 AND 05000412/20006004
Dear Mr. Lash:
On September 30, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completedan inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 30, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one (1) NRC-identified findingand two (2) self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issues have been entered in the corrective action program, the NRC is treating the findings as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any of the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
J. Lash2We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have anyquestions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-334, 50-412License Nos:DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/2006003; 05000412/2006003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:G. Leidich, President and Chief Nuclear Officer J. Hagan, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight L. Myers, Executive Vice President, Special Projects R. Anderson, Vice President, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Manager, Fleet Licensing, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company R. Mende, Director, Site Operations T. Cosgrove, Director, Maintenance P. Sena, Director, Engineering L. Freeland, Director, Site Performance Improvement and Manager, Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Attorney, FENOC B. Sepelak, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA D. Allard, PADEP C. O'Claire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club J. Lash3Distribution w/encl
- S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA D. Lew, DRP J. Clifford, DRP R. Bellamy, DRP R. Fuhrmeister, DRP B. Sosa, OEDO R. Laufer, NRR T. Colburn, PM, NRR R. Guzman, NRR P. Cataldo - Senior Resident Inspector P. Garrett - Resident OA M. Satorius, DRS-RIII (Only Inspection Reports)
ROPreports@nrc.gov (All Inspection Reports)
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML063130485.wpdSUNSI Review Complete: RRB (Reviewer's Initials)After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:
" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRPRI/DRPRI/DRP NAMEPCataldo/RLF for ARosebrook/RLF for RBellamy/RRBDATE11/09/0611/09/0611/09/06 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Enclosure iU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.50-334, 50-412License Nos.DPR-66, NPF-73 Report Nos.05000334/2006004 and 05000412/2006004 Licensee:FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:Post Office Box 4Shippingport, PA 15077Dates: July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006 Inspectors:P. Cataldo, Senior Resident InspectorD. Werkheiser, Resident Inspector R. Bhatia, Reactor Inspector A. Defrancisco, Reactor Inspector T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer G. Johnson, Operations Engineer S. Lewis, Reactor Inspector M. Marshfield, Resident Inspector A. Patel, Reactor InspectorApproved by:R. Bellamy, Ph.D., ChiefReactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure iiTABLE of
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2006004, IR 05000412/2006004; 7/1/06-9/30/06; Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2; Temporary Modification; Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement
Discretion.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional reactorinspectors, and a regional health physics inspector. Three (GREEN) non-cited violations (NCV)were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3 dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition DPR-66 Section2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to follow plant fire protection procedures related to hot work and ignition control. On August 18, 2006, failure to assess all fire hazards and remove or protect combustible items in the vicinity of hot work resulted in welding activities in the PCA Shop igniting transient combustible material, subsequently igniting plastic sheeting and causing a small class 'A' fire in the adjacent West Cable Vault. The licensee immediately extinguished the fire and stopped all hot work. The event was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CR-06-04924). A root cause evaluation was initiated by the licensee.The finding is more than minor because it had a direct impact on the Initiating Eventscornerstone objective and could be viewed as a precursor to a more significant event if left uncorrected. Specifically, the licensee's performance deficiency was directly responsible for a Class 'A' fire in the Unit 1 safety-related West Cable Vault of the Safeguards Building. The finding is of very low safety significance because all other normally required fire prevention measures were in place, allowing the fire to be quickly detected and suppressed. No safety-related equipment was affected. The inspectors determined that a contributor of this finding was related to the work practice component of the cross-cutting area of human performance. (Section 4OA3.3)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,"Design Control," was identified for failure to provide for verifying the adequacy of design associated with a temporary design modification installed on the Unit 2 chilled water system. In particular, adequate justification and bases for assumptions, positions, and conclusions were not adequately provided where necessary, were not identified during reviews, and ultimately challenged the functional capabilities of the system upon implementation. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program, ivperformed an apparent cause assessment, will use this modification in engineeringtraining as a case study, will revise design interface review checklist questions to prevent similar issues in the future, and has repaired the system and removed the temporary modification.This finding was considered more than minor since the modification resulted indegrading temperature trends that if left uncorrected, could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, components necessary to achieve safe shutdown were exposed to higher temperatures for normal operation than credited in the design qualification records. In addition, increasing temperatures in containment under less than favorable external conditions (high ambient temperatures) could have led to exceeding the technical specification limit to support containment operability, and resulted in a plant shutdown. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of system safety function and was not impacted by external events. (Section 1R23)*Green. A self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50,Appendix B, Criterion XVI,"Corrective Action," was identified on July 17, 2006, when the Unit 1 '3B' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump [1FW-P-3B] inboard motor bearing oil was sampled and determined to contain babbit (CR-06-04345). The finding was determined to be inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of a prior sleeve-type journal bearing failure, caused by improper positioning of bearing housing set screws, and resulted in recurrent bearing failures of the '3B' MDAFW pump motor. Specifically, corrective actions for a prior failure of a similar bearing did not adequately resolve the proper positioning of the bearing housing set screws, thereby preventing proper bearing alignment within the bearing housing. The licensee has performed a root cause evaluation, has determined proper positioning of the bearing housing set screws, and has performed an extent of condition review for other pump motors with sleeve-type journal bearings.This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipmentperformance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding is related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross cutting area in that the bearing set screw position was not thoroughly evaluated and resolved.
(Section 4OA3.1)
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
- Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100% power and essentially remained atfull power until August 17, 2006, when the Unit power was adjusted to 97% based on rescaled instrumentation prior to implementation of the first of three phases (3%) of an approximately 8% power uprate. The Unit remained at 97% until an August 24th shutdown to perform a main turbine shaft balance adjustment, and a foreign object search in the 'C' steam generator due to indications on their loose parts monitoring system. The Unit returned to the new, full power level of 100% on August 29th, and remained at full power until a reactor trip occurred on September 7th, due to a failed solid state protection card. Following repairs, the unit returned to full power on September 9th, and remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100% power and essentially remained atfull power for the remainder of the inspection period. However, due to cooling tower performance associated with warm, humid, environmental conditions, the unit manually down-powered approximately 3-5% several times throughout the inspection period to maintain secondary plant parameters within specification.1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed one sample of system readiness for cold weather conditionsassociated with the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) backup water source, demineralized water storage tank TK-23. The inspection verified that the indicated equipment, its instrumentation, and supporting structures were configured in accordance with FENOC's procedures and that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the system. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and walked down the system. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04).1Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial equipment alignment inspections, during conditions ofincreased safety significance, such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also completed after equipment was returned to service following significant maintenance activities. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems, including associated electrical distribution components andcontrol room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:*Unit 1 'B' Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) system during inboard motor bearing replacement on the 'A' MDAFW system on July 19, 2006;*Unit 2 'C' Centrifugal Charging Pump on August 9, 2006; and
- Unit 2 'C' Service Water System on August 10, 2006.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and operational conditionof the Unit 2 'A' Charging System on September 26, 2006. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the system to verify that critical components, such as valves, control switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned in accordance with applicable procedures, and that any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability were appropriately identified and being addressed.The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders toverify that the deficiencies did not significantly affect the charging system safety function. In addition, the inspectors discussed the status of the system health with the system engineer, and reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3Enclosure1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q - 11 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the fire protection conditions of the fire areas listed below, toverify compliance with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900, "Fire Protection." This review included FENOC's control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Unit 1 & 2, Intake Structure (Fire Area IS-3, IS-4)
- Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater and Quench Spray Pump Room (Fire Area QP-1)
- Unit 1 Primary Auxiliary Building Elevation 735 (Fire Area PA-1E)
- Unit 2 Alternate Shutdown Panel Room (Fire Area ASP)
- Unit 2 Instrument and Relay Room (Fire Area CB-1)
- Unit 2 Fan Room (Fire Area CB-5)
- Unit 2 West Communication Room (Fire Area CB-6)
- Unit 2 Auxiliary Boiler Area (Fire Area SOB-1)
- Unit 2 SOB Railway Bay (Fire Area SOB-2)
- Unit 2 SOSB (Fire Area SOB-3)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector observed personnel performance during an actual fire brigade responseon August 18, 2006, due to a fire in the Unit 1 West Cable Vault. (See Section 4OA3).
4EnclosureThe inspector verified whether the fire brigade members used appropriate protectiveclothing (turnout gear) with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus, and that the fire area was entered in a controlled manner. The inspectors verified whether appropriate fire fighting equipment was brought to the fire scene to effectively control and extinguish a fire. The inspector observed the fire fighting directions, which were partly based on pre-fire plans for the identified fire area, and the command and control provided by the brigade leader. Communications between fire brigade members and the control room were also observed. The inspector observed dress-out activities in the brigade room and at the scene. In addition, the inspector observed the stationing of a reflash watch after the fire was extinguished.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 2 samples).1Internal Flooding Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two samples of flood protection measures for equipment in theareas listed below. This review was conducted to evaluate FENOC's protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, related internal flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.* Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump (1B-CH-P) Cubicle
- Unit 2 Instrumentation and Relay Room
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11).1Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the conduct of Unit 1 licensed-operator requalification training,during an annual evaluation conducted in the plant-reference simulator on August 17, 2006. Additionally, on September 15, 2006, the inspectors observed Unit 2 5Enclosurelicensed-operator training on the plant-reference simulator, which was conducted asjust-in-time training in preparation for risk-significant evolutions that would be performed during an upcoming outage. The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding command and control, implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures, communications, technical specification review and compliance, and emergency plan implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee training personnel to verify that deficiencies in operator performance were identified, and that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the licensee's corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator appropriately modeled the applicable in-plant control room. The inspectors verified that the training evaluators adequately addressed that the applicable training objectives had been achieved.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Regional Inspector Biennial Review of Requalification Training (71111.11B - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, Rev. 9,"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Inspection Procedure 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)," and 10 CFR 55.46 Simulator Rule (sampling basis) as acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed documentation of plant operating history since the lastrequalification program inspection, including facility operating events. This review also included NRC inspection reports, plant performance insights, licensee event reports (LERs), and licensee condition reports (CRs) that involved human performance issues for licensed operators, to ensure that operational events were not indicative of possible training deficiencies (see Attachment).The inspectors reviewed four exam sets (i.e., weeks 1, 2, 3 and 4) for both thecomprehensive Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) written exams, as well as scenarios and job performance measures (JPMs) administered during this current exam cycle to ensure the quality of the exams met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10CFR 55.59. During the onsite week of the inspection, the inspectors observed the administration ofoperating examinations to operating Shift #5. The operating examinations consisted of two simulator scenarios and one set of five JPMs administered to each individual. The inspectors observed training department staff administer two scenarios to a crew of four 6Enclosureindividuals, four simulator JPMs, and four in-plant JPMs. The inspectors also observedfacility training staff administer the comprehensive written exam.Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46The inspectors observed simulator performance during the conduct of the examinationsand reviewed discrepancy reports to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors also reviewed:*a list of open and closed Simulator Deficiency Reports (DR). Seven DRs wereselected for a detailed review to determine if deficiencies are being adequately prioritized and are being corrected in a timely manner. *controlling documents to review simulator capability, configuration control, andtesting, to ensure compliance with guidance in ANSI/ANS 3.5 1985. *completed simulator test schedules for 2004-2006. All annual transient testsand seven malfunction simulator tests performed in 2006 were reviewed. This review was performed to verify that the tests were being performed at the appropriate frequency and that the tests compared the simulator data to actual plant data or best estimate data, as appropriate.
Conformance with operator license conditionsThe inspectors verified conformance with operator license conditions by reviewing the following records:*Remediation training records for two individuals were reviewed during the pasttwo-year training cycle. *Proficiency watch-standing and reactivation records. Specifically, a sample oflicensed-operator reactivation records were reviewed, as well as a random sample of watch-standing documentation (i.e., all staff license individuals) for time on-shift to verify currency and conformance with the requirements of
10 CFR 55.Licensee's Feedback System The inspectors interviewed instructors, training/operations management personnel, and operators, to obtain feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed-operator requalification program. The interviews were conducted to ensure the requalification program was meeting the needs of those personnel that were interviewed, and that the program was responsive to their noted deficiencies/recommended changes. The inspectors also reviewed 25 individual feedback forms.
7EnclosureLicensee's Requalification Exam On September 05, 2006, the inspectors conducted an in-office review of licenseerequalification exam results for Beaver Valley Unit 1, which included the annual operating tests administered in 2006. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The inspectors verified that: *Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator was less than 20%. (Failure rate was 0%.)*Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to20%. (Failure rate was 0%.)*Individual failure rate on the walkthrough test (JPMs) was less than or equal to20%. (Failure rate was 0%.)*Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written exam was less thanor equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 5.6 %)*More than 75% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.4% of theindividuals passed all portions of the exam).*Note: One RO had been removed from licensed duties due to an extendedillness and did not take the Requalification Exam. He will be administered the Requalification Exam as part of his Re-Activation process. The results of this exam will have minimal effect on overall results.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12).1Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (71111.12Q - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listedbelow. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping, characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk characterization of SSCs, SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 and the licensee's program for MR implementation. For the selected SSCs, the inspectors evaluated whether performance was properly dispositioned for MR 8Enclosurecategory (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents werealso reviewed, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*CR 06-4457, "Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Hand Control Valve Hydraulic Pump Cycling"
- CR 06-04725, "Work Management Process Allows Unavailability Time Goal ToBe Exceeded"
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Regional Inspector Biennial Periodic Evaluation (71111.12B - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the periodic evaluation of MR activities asrequired by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) for Beaver Valley Unit 1 and Unit 2. The evaluation covered a period from July 2003 to February 2005. The purpose of this review was to ensure that FENOC effectively assessed Beaver Valley's MR (a)(1) goals and corrective actions, (a)(2) performance criteria, system monitoring, and preventive maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that the evaluation was completed within the required time period and that industry operating experience was utilized, where applicable.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that FENOC appropriately balanced equipment reliability and availability and made adjustments when appropriate.The inspectors reviewed a sample of six risk-significant systems that were either in(a)(1) status, had been in (a)(1) status at some time during the assessment period, or experienced degraded performance. This review verified that:
- (1) the structures, systems, and components were properly characterized;
- (2) goals and performance criteria were appropriate;
- (3) corrective action plans were adequate; and (4)performance was being effectively monitored in accordance with station procedure 1/2-ADM-2114, "Maintenance Rule Program." The following systems were selected for this detailed review:*Reactor Control and Protection (System 1 - Unit 1)*4 KV Station Service (System 36B - Unit 1)
- Main Steam (System 21 - Unit 2)
- Compressed Air (System 34 - Unit 1)
- Emergency Diesel Generator (System 36A - Unit 2)
- Auxiliary Feedwater (System 24B - Unit 2)Additionally, the inspectors interviewed station personnel, and reviewed corrective actiondocuments for malfunctions and failures of these systems to determine if:
- (1) system failures had been correctly categorized as functional failures; and
- (2) system performance was adequately monitored to determine if classifying a system as (a)(1)was appropriate. The documents that were reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of five activities, and evaluated theeffect on overall plant risk. This review also determined the adequacy of risk reviews for planned and emergent work, as well as the implementation of risk management actions, as applicable. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with applicable requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:*Planned maintenance activities for July 10, 2006.
- Emergent maintenance activities on July 17, 2006, associated with the repairsand other activities following the failure of the inboard motor bearing of the Unit 1
'B' Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump. This review also included the second bearing failure that occurred during a retest on July 18, 2006, which required an expansion of work scope, deferment of prior-planned maintenance activities and a revision to the risk assessment.*Planned yellow risk assessment on July 27, 2006, associated primarily withmaintenance activities on the "A" motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.*Planned yellow risk assessment on August 4, 2006, associated primarilywith maintenance activities on the boric acid to blender flow control valve 2CHS-FCV-113A.*Planned green risk assessment on September 8, 2006, associated with plannedwork on switchyard 4KV relays and monthly emergency diesel generator testing.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of selected operability determinations(OD), Basis for Continued Operations (BCO), or operability assessments, to verify that determinations of operability were justified, as appropriate. In addition, the inspectors verified that TS limiting conditions for operation (LCO) requirements and UFSAR design 10Enclosurebasis requirements were properly addressed. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment. The following six activities were reviewed:*The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operabilityassessment regarding deficiencies noted during licensee inspection of manhole 1EMH-20A as documented in CR-06-04144. Specifically, standing water was identified in this manhole that services cables for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Intake Structure. The inspectors verified that questions of seismic/structural integrity were addressed since it was identified that cable supports were rusted. The inspectors noted that the standing water was pumped out, and that the licensee inspected the general condition of the manhole, including cable penetration seals. The inspectors also verified the acceptability of the licensee's conclusion that the cables and supporting structure were determined to be unaffected.
- The inspectors reviewed the failure mode analysis associated with CR 06-04138,which addressed the possible assembly error reported by a vendor affecting four
- (4) Nuclear Instrumentation Bistable Relay Driver PC Cards. The error resulted in the possible installation of capacitors of an incorrect value onto the PC cards.
The capacitors' purpose is for noise rejection. The failure mode analysis concluded that the capacitors would not affect normal circuit operation. The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment and verified that appropriate technical issues were addressed.
Subsequent inspection of the suspect PC cards revealed the correct capacitors were originally installed. *The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operabilityassessment during the restoration of the Unit 1 'B' Charging pump (1CH-P-1B)after maintenance activities. In particular, a floor plug in the overhead of the pump cubicle had been removed to allow access during the maintenance activities and had been reinstalled, and was being sealed when the pump was declared operable. This issue was identified by the licensee and documented in CR-06-04515. The inspector verified the acceptability of the licensee's conclusion that the pump was capable of fulfilling its safety function. The inspector also reviewed an extent of condition review that was conducted and conclude that no other systems were affected. The inspector noted that an apparent cause evaluation was conducted.*The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operabilityassessment that involved incorrect valve capacities associated with the Unit 1 atmospheric steam dump valves and the residual heat removal valve. These capacities were utilized in the Westinghouse Extended Power Uprate calculation, and captured in CR-06-04837. The inspectors verified the acceptability of the licensee's conclusion that the results of the revised analysis bounded any changes in the analyses of record from a dose consequence resulting from a steam generator tube rupture event.
11Enclosure*The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operabilityassessment and verified that appropriate technical issues addressed a discolored oil sample of the Unit 1 'A' Quench Spray Pump motor, identified under work order (WO) 200166779, (CR-06-04955). The inspectors verified licensee actions, which included:
- (1) external analysis of the oil sample at Beta Labs, which showed increased levels of Tin with satisfactory chemical and lubricating properties;
- (2) the oil was changed under WO 20016678, with provisions to flush, if necessary;
- (3) the pump was run for a surveillance test in accordance with 1OST-13.1, satisfactorily; and
- (4) a second oil sample was obtained and showed satisfactory results. The bearing was subsequently replaced during planned outage 1POAC2 (section 1R20) under WO 200222360.*The inspectors reviewed conditions related to elevated noise levels from theUnit 2 'A' charging pump, 2CHS-P21A (CR-06-6867). The inspectors verified the licensee addressed technical specifications as they made preparations to substitute the 'C' charging pump for the 'A' pump. The inspectors observed other actions, which included:
- (1) vibrations levels were obtained that identified BOP limits exceeded for the gear box; and
- (2) the pump was shutdown and declared inoperable. The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment and verified that appropriate technical issues were addressed. It was subsequently discovered that the high-speed gear in the speed increaser had chipped gear teeth. The licensee investigation continues.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17A - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the design basis impact of the modifications listed below.The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening, verified that attributes and parameters within the design documentation was consistent with required licensing and design bases, as well as credited codes and standards, and walked down the systems to verify that changes described in the package were appropriately implemented. The inspectors also verified the post-modification testing was satisfactorily accomplished to ensure the system and components operated consistent with their intended safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.*Unit 1 ECP 05-0280, Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Recirculation modification(Credited for NRC Extended Power Uprate Inspections)*Unit 2 ECP 02-0734, Plant Computer Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19
- 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following seven maintenance activities and associated PMTs were evaluated:*On July 1st, Unit 2 RCS letdown filter (CHS-FLT-22) change-out (Work Order(WO) 200127687) following planned maintenance activity.*2OST-24.2,"Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [2FWE*P23A]" Rev.33, performed on July 05th, following corrective maintenance on the 2FWE-P23A breaker performed under WO 200215994.*1OST-36.7, "Offsite to Onsite Power Distribution System Alignment Verification,"Rev. 11, performed on July 6th, following maintenance (relay replacement and calibration) on the Unit 1 'A' 4kV tap changer.*1OST-24.3,"Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [1FW-P-3B]," Rev. 34,performed on July 19th, following corrective maintenance on the Unit 1 'B' MDAFW pump motor. The inboard motor bearing was replaced under WO 01-009600-001.*2OST-47.3G,"Containment Penetration and ASME Section XI Valve Test-WorkWeek 2," Rev. 5, performed on July 24th, following corrective maintenance on the Unit 2 'B' feed control valve, 2FWE-HCV100B. The actuator zero and span were re-calibrated under WO 200189579.*1OST-7.5,"Operating Surveillance Test-Centrifugal Charging Pump Test [1CH-P-1B]," Rev. 35, performed on July 25th, following an extended maintenance outage on the Unit 1 'B' charging pump.*2MSP-24.26-I, "2FWS-F476, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Channel IV Calibration,"Issue 4, Rev. 12, performed on August 17, following replacement of feedwater transmitter 2FWS-F476.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples).1Unit 1 Outage (1POAC2)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed selected Unit 1 outage activities from August 24 - August 29,2006, to determine whether shutdown safety functions (e.g. reactor decay heat removaland containment integrity) were properly maintained as required by TS and plant procedures. The inspectors evaluated specific performance attributes including operator performance, communications, and instrumentation accuracy. The inspectors reviewed procedures and/or observed selected activities associated with this forced, Unit 1 mini-outage. The inspectors verified activities were performed in accordance with procedures and verified required acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality identified during performance of selected outage activities were identified and placed into the corrective action program, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also evaluated the following activities:*Shutdown Risk Evaluation*Plant Shutdown and Cooldown
- Containment Entry Preparation
- Mockup Training for Removal of the 'C' S/G Secondary handhold
- Preparation and Removal of the 'C' S/G Secondary handhold
- Foreign Object Search and Recovery Efforts on 'C' S/G
- Secondary Plant Recovery, including deliberate turbine roll evolutions
- Reactor Startup
- Plant Startup and Heatup, including heatup rate monitoring and data review
- Restart readiness management review activities
- Mode Hold Resolution meetings
- Containment Closeout inspections
- Main Generator Synchronization
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Unit 1 Forced Outage (1FOAC10)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee performance during a forced outage following a Unit 1reactor trip on September 7th, 2006, due to a failed Solid State Protection System 14Enclosure(SSPS) card (section 4OA3.4). The inspectors reviewed compliance to TSrequirements and approved procedures, conduct of outage risk evaluations, configuration control, and maintenance of key safety functions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. During this forced outage, the inspectors monitored FENOC's control of the outage activities listed below:*Shutdown risk evaluation;*Startup scheduling;
- Reactor Startup and Criticality;
- Plant Startup;
- Power Ascension; and
- Restart readiness management review activities, including Plant OperationsReview Committee meetings that addressed cause analysis of failure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed Pre-Job test briefings, observed selected test evolutions, andreviewed the following completed Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were being tested as required by TS, the UFSAR, and procedural requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following seven activities were reviewed:*1MSP-21-20-1, "P-1MS475, Loop 1 Steamline Pressure Protection Channel 3Calibration," performed on July 6th.*1OST-24.3, Rev. 34, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [1FW-P-3B],"performed on July 19th.*1OST-7.5, Rev. 35, "Operating Surveillance Test - Centrifugal Charging Pump[1CH-P-1B] Test," (IST) performed on July 26th.*2OST-30.3, Rev 31, "Service Water Pump [2SWS*P21B] Test," (IST) performedon September 11th.*2OST-6.2, Rev. 20, "Reactor Coolant System Operating Surveillance testReactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance," performed twice on August 28th.*2OST-7.4, Rev. 27, "Operating Surveillance Test, Centrifugal Charging Pump[2CHS-P-21A]," performed on September 20th.
15Enclosure*2RST-2.5, Rev. 6, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient determination,"conducted between July 30 and August 4th.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications (TM) based on risksignificance. The TM and associated 10CFR50.59 screening were reviewed against the system design basis documentation, including the UFSAR and the TS. The inspectors verified the TMs were implemented in accordance with Administrative (ADM) Procedure, 1/2-ADM-2028, "Temporary Modifications," Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed inthe Attachment.*Temporary modification 02-06-01 to add a temporary plant data system, withlimited capabilities, during the main plant computer replacement (1R17). For this activity, the inspectors walked down the systems to verify that changes described in the package were actually implemented, and verified the post-modification testing was satisfactorily accomplished.*Temporary modification 02-06-05, which added a temporary pipe to bypassdegraded chilled water booster pumps to effect.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50,Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to adequately control andimplement design control measures associated with a temporary design modification installed on the Chilled Water System.Description. On July 19, 2006, due to emergent degradation of chilled water boosterpumps, the licensee implemented previously-approved Temporary Modification (TMOD)2-06-05 to supply cooling water to chiller condenser units. The TMOD effectively bypassed the two installed chilled water booster pumps to supply water from the Service Water System to the chiller condensers.Subsequently, anomalous indications in the control room (main steam valve room highand high-high temperature alarms, rising average containment temperatures, steam pressure transmitter drift) required plant configuration changes that were not anticipated or originally prescribed by the TMOD or its associated process documents. For example, additional chiller condensing units were added to satisfy load requirements, standby service water pumps were started due to header pressure concerns, and the 16Enclosurecooling supply that had been isolated from the main steam valve area was unisolated torestart cooling flow to the area.Following review of the TMOD, associated procedure changes, 50.59 screening, and atechnical evaluation, the inspector identified several deficiencies that were documented in CR 06-05012, which included:Equipment qualifications were not evaluated via Design Interface Evaluations(DIE) even though critical components were located in areas that had ventilation cooling isolated to support the TMOD. A post-installation functional test was not required even though functionalcomponents (booster pumps) were effectively bypassed. As a result, the design was never fully tested to ensure it was operating correctly, contrary to the requirements of the TMOD administrative procedure.Failed to identify the main steam valve area as a critical load that should nothave been isolated to support the TMOD. Resultant high temperatures above normal ambient temperatures potentially affects the qualified life of electrical components and other equipment in the area. In addition, many components in the affected areas are required to achieve safe shutdown.Adequate basis does not exist within each DIE as a stand alone document, e.g.,the basis is assumed to exist in referred documents, which also lacks adequate basis.
Analysis.
The issue involved a performance deficiency in that FENOC failed toimplement design control measures associated with the verification of the adequacy of a design modification. This finding was considered more than minor since the modification resulted in degrading temperature trends that if left uncorrected, could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, components necessary to achieve safe shutdown were exposed to higher temperatures for normal operation than credited in the environmental qualification records. In addition, increasing temperatures in containment under less than favorable external conditions (high ambient temperatures)could have led to exceeding the technical specification limit to support containment operability and would have required a plant shutdown.The inspectors evaluated this finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A,"Significance Determination for At-Power Situations." This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, since there was the potential of affecting heat removal attributes provided by the associated critical components and equipment. Additionally, this finding was considered to be of very low safety significance since:
- (1) it did not result in a loss of function due to a design or qualification deficiency in accordance with GL 91-18;
- (2) did not represent a loss of system safety function;
- (3) did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time;
- (4) did not involve loss of function from a maintenance rule perspective for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and
- (5) did not involve external events.
17EnclosureEnforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires in part,that measures shall be established that shall provide for verifying the adequacy of designs.Contrary to the above, FENOC failed to implement adequate design control measuresassociated with the verification of the adequacy of a temporary design modification. In particular, adequate justification and bases for assumptions, positions, and conclusions were not adequately provided where necessary, and the result of these deficiencies challenged the functional capabilities of the installed temporary modification, upon implementation.Because this violation was of very low safety significance and FENOC entered thisviolation into their corrective action program as CR-06-05012, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCenforcement policy. NCV 05000412/2006004
-01, "Failure to verify the adequacy of atemporary design modi fication associated with the Unit 2 chilled water system."
Cornerstone:
Emergency Preparedness [EP]1EP6Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a Unit 1 licensed-operator annual simulator evaluationconducted on August 17th, 2006. Senior licensed-operator performance regarding event classifications and notifications were specifically evaluated. The inspector evaluated the simulator-based scenario that involved multiple, safety-related component failures and plant conditions that would have warranted emergency plan activation, emergency facility activation, and escalation to the event classification of Alert. The licensee planned to credit this evolution toward Emergency Preparedness Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Indicators, therefore, the inspectors reviewed the applicable event notifications and classifications to determine whether they were appropriately credited, and properly evaluated consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Rev. 4, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline." The inspectors reviewed licensee evaluator worksheets regarding the performance indicator acceptability, and reviewed other crew and operator evaluations to ensure adverse conditions were appropriately entered into the Corrective Action Program. Other documents utilized in this inspection include the following:*1/2-ADM-1111, "NRC EPP Performance Indicator Instructions," Rev. 2*EPP/I-1b, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions," Rev. 7
- 1/2-EPP-I-2, "Unusual Event," Rev. 23
- 1/2-EPP-I-3, "Alert," Rev. 21
- 1/2-ADM-111.F01, Rev. 0, "Emergency Preparedness Performance IndicatorsClassifications/Notifications/Pars
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution.1 Daily Review of Problem Identification and Resolution aInspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into FENOC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing summary lists of each CR, attending screening meetings, and reviewing FENOC's computerized CR database.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Annual Sample Reviews (71152 - 2 samples)Switchyard Reliability and System Voltage Transients
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee corrective actions in response to condition reports(CRs) 05-04306, 05-05249, 05-01889 and 06-03022. The CRs were initiated to address voltage transients that affected both Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2. The voltage transients occurred due to grid disturbances in the vicinity of the Beaver Valley substation and slow opening of switchyard circuit breakers in the substation. The inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause analysis and corrective actions taken to improve the reliability of 138 kV and 500 kV breakers in the substation. The specific corrective actions included the replacement of breaker closing mechanisms and the performance of additional breaker testing. The inspectors also reviewed two Engineering Design Change Packages (ECPs) thatare intended to upgrade the availability of the station air compressor system by minimizing the effect of electrical power transients on the Beaver Valley Unit 2 instrument air system. ECP 02-0540, Rev. 0, "Instrument Air Standby Train Installation,"
has been implemented, and ECP 06-0206, Rev. 0, "Change the Control Wiring for Unit 2 Air Compressor 2SAS-C21B," is scheduled for implementation.
19EnclosureThe inspector also conducted a walkdown of the switchyard that included the circuitbreakers, 125 Vdc batteries, relays and protection panels and concluded that the material condition of the substation components was good and that the components were being properly maintained in accordance with the licensee's maintenance and replacement program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The licensee's root cause evaluations for the substation breaker problems and for the tripping of the running Unit 2 instrument air compressor due to the transient on the grid system were found appropriate. The cause of the slow opening/closing of the substation breakers was due to sluggish mechanism operation, while the tripping of running air compressors was due to the existing control and power wiring configuration design. As a result, the licensee had appropriately enhanced the preventive maintenance program of substation breakers and replaced the selected breaker's mechanisms. The licensee is also implementing two modifications to minimize the effect of transients on in-service/running Unit 2 air compressors. These corrective actions were appropriate to address the above issues.Large Electrical Motor Failures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions in response to the failure of largemotors and other issues over the past 2 years. The main focus of this inspection concerned the adequacy of corrective actions associated with the failure of the 'A' Service Water Pump motor on Unit 2 as documented in condition report CR-05-05414.
The inspector reviewed condition reports and procedures as well as performed walkdowns and interviews to determine if FENOC has adequately resolved the issues.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
The licensee's identification of the cause of the 'A' service water pump motor failure andthe associated corrective actions were deemed appropriate. The licensee completed a root cause investigation and determined that lack of specific vendor requirements during overhauls was a contributing cause of the motor failure. As a result, the licensee has updated their testing procedures and increased vendor oversight. The increased vendor oversight has led to the licensee identifying and correcting vendor-related issues before they can be a problem. The licensee is also taking action by replacing and overhauling other large motors on both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
20Enclosure.3Inspection Module Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed various CRs associated with the inspection activities capturedin each inspection module of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA3Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153).1Unit 1 'B' AFW inboard motor bearing failure on July 17
a. Inspection Scope
On July 17, 2006, during a planned maintenance activity to replace the oil in the motorof the '3B' MDAFW pump, babbit was discovered in the inboard bearing oil, indicating a failed motor bearing (CR-06-04345). FENOC had already entered the 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT) in accordance with TS 3.7.1.2 for the maintenance activity. The bearing was replaced and subsequently failed during retest. The inspectors reviewed licensee actions to determine the cause of the failures. The inspectors monitored activities to correct the failure. The '3B' MDAFW pump motor bearing was replaced satisfactorily, passed post-maintenance testing, and returned to service prior to the 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT).
b. Findings
Introduction.
A self-revealing, non-cited (Green) violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified due to inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of bearing housing set screw positions, which resulted in recurrent bearing failures on the 3B MDAFW pump motor.Description. The 3B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump [1FW-P-3B] wasremoved from service for planned routine preventive maintenance (PM). Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 was entered and the pump declared unavailable per the maintenance rule. During routine oil sampling on July 17, 2006, babbit was found in the oil for the inboard motor bearing of the pump. Subsequent disassembly and inspection revealed damage to the sleeve-type journal bearing. Plant Engineering reviewed motor performance and parameters to identify the impact of the identified condition. Historical data for motor temperature and vibration data revealed normal values. However, one anomalous temperature peak was noted during the uncoupled motor run (post motor refurbishment) in April 2006. Peak temperature did not rise above the OST limit (200 F)and quickly returned to normal. Oil analysis results showed a high particle count, with normal chemical and lubricating properties. It was determined that foreign material may have been the cause. The bearing was replaced with a new bearing and retested, 21Enclosurehowever, the bearing failed within 12 minutes as indicated by a rapid rise intemperature. Additional evaluation by plant engineering and extent of condition review following the second bearing failure revealed a weak technical basis for the position of the bearing set screws. Corrective actions from a prior failure of a similar sleeve-type bearing (CR-04-06108) resulted in the licensee backing-out the set-screws. Corrective action and final resolution for the current event is to have the set-screws engaged, plus 1/8th turn, per documented vendor communication. The '3B' MDAFW pump motor bearing was replaced satisfactorily with bearing housing set screws properly positioned, passed post-maintenance testing, and was returned to service prior to the expiration of the 72-hour AOT. The licensee has formed a root cause team to evaluate the event and
assess actions.Analysis. The failure to adequately resolve the correct position of the bearing setscrews is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. If left uncorrected, this finding would result in a more significant safety concern. This finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. The inspector evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and conducted a Phase 1 characterization and initial screening using Attachment A. The finding was determined to of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding is related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross cutting area in that the bearing set screw position was not thoroughly evaluated and resolved.Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires inpart, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, on July 17, 2006, two successive bearing failures occurred on 1FW-P-3B as a result of inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of bearing housing set screw positions. However, because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into FENOC's corrective action program (CR-06-04345), this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation,consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000334/2006004-02, "Inadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Sleeve Bearing Set Screw Position.".2Unit 2 Loss of Instrument Air on July 23, 2006
a. Inspection Scope
On July 23, 2006, at 3:02 am, a blowdown solenoid-operated valve (SOV) on the'A' Instrument Air (IA) dryer failed open, resulting in a loss of IA when the dryer auto-cycled from the 'B' bank back to the 'A' bank. The crew identified the lowering pressure and entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 2.34.1, "Loss of Station Instrument Air," and manually started the standby Station Air Compressor and Condensate Polishing air compressors. The air leak was isolated per the AOP by 22Enclosureplacing the Instrument Air bypass filters into service. The AOP was exited five minuteslater at 3:07 am. The inspectors reviewed the AOP and verified that operator actions were consistent with expected actions. Inspectors reviewed IA pressure plots and air system alignments and verified that the system responded as designed and assessed the impact of air loads from the air system transient.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..3.Unit 1 Fire in West Cable Vault on August 18
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors followed up on a small Class 'A' fire that occurred in the Unit 1 WestCable Vault as a result of hot work on August 18, 2006. The inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection equipment, manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, barriers to fire propagation, and any contingency fire watches that were in effect. In addition, the inspectors reviewed completed elements of the on-going licensee's root cause evaluation (RCE) for the event.
b. Findings
Introduction.
A self-revealing, Green non-cited violation (NCV) of License ConditionDPR-66 Section 2.C.5, was identified for failure to follow plant fire protection procedures related to hot work and ignition control. This resulted in a Class 'A' fire in a Unit 1 safety-related cable vault.Description. On August 18, 2006, activities associated with a ventilation sleeve insertfor a penetration between the Unit 1 Potentially Contaminated Area (PCA) Shop and the Unit 1 West Cable Vault were in progress. A Hot Work Permit was granted for work in the PCA Shop and a continuous fire watch was assigned to the area. Prior to commencing hot work, the work supervisor failed to walk down the area for combustible materials and identify potential fire hazards in the area of work or on the opposite side of the walls, as prescribed in the precautions of the Hot Work Permit (1/2-ADM-1900.F01, Rev. 2). This is relevant as welding was to be performed on the PCA Shop side of the wall, adjacent to the West Cable Vault.At approximately 1:24 pm, while performing welding in the wall penetration between thePCA Shop and the West Cable Vault, transient combustible materials used totemporarily seal a security plate on the West Cable Vault wall ignited and dropped onto plastic sheeting used for dust control. The plastic sheeting ignited, resulting in a smoke detector for the West Cable Vault to alarm in the Control Room. The Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) operator was dispatched to investigate, and upon entry into the West Cable Vault, discovered a small, incipient fire in the overhead, accessed the area via a temporary ladder, and extinguished the fire with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher. The 23Enclosurefire subsequently re-flashed while the PAB operator reported the fire to the control room. The Shift Manager sounded the site Standby Alarm and activated the Fire Brigade. The PAB operator discharged the CO2 extinguisher a second time and completed suppression of the fire. The fire was extinguished in approximately six
- (6) minutes. The Fire Brigade established a Command Position in the PCA Shop and a re-flash watch was stationed in the West Cable Vault.Discussions with the root cause evaluation team identified a potential generic issueconcerning the temporary plastic sheeting used for dust control that ignited in the West Cable Vault. The material was purchased and distributed as flame retardant by the licensee and is a non-safety consumable item. However, the plastic sheeting material was sent to an independent laboratory and failed fire retardant tests per Underwriters Laboratory (UL) code 214 and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code 701.
The licensee immediately quarantined and removed all suspect material, entered the issue into their corrective action program (CR-06-6102) and notified other industry operators by issuing fleet and industry Operating Experience notifications. This issue was discussed with, and relevant information forwarded to Regional and Headquarters NRC personnel. The distributor (G/O Corp) has reported to the licensee that theirin-stock material also failed flame tests. The licensee has been in contact with the supplier and distributor to address the issue.Analysis. The failure to walk down the work and adjacent areas prior to hot work ismore than minor because it affects the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone in that it increased the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during power and shutdown operations. If left uncorrected, this finding would result in a more significant safety concern. This finding did not represent an immediate safety concern in that other fire protection features allowed rapid detection and suppression of the fire. The inspector evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and conducted a Phase 1 characterization and initial screening. Because the finding was associated with fire protection, this was accomplished using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet," and Attachment 2, "Degradation Rating Guidance." Based on the size and location of the fire, the inspectors concluded it could only affect Unit 1, which was at full power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green),
because it affected the hot work permit program and was mitigated by other normally required fire prevention measures. These measures were in place and were utilized to successfully suppress the fire with no actual impact to safety-related equipment. The finding was determined to involve the cross-cutting component of work practices of the human performance area in that procedures were not properly followed.Enforcement. License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5 requires, in part, that writtenprocedures for the station's fire protection program be established, implemented, and maintained. Contrary to this requirement, on August 18, 2006, licensee personnel failed to implement walkdown provisions prescribed in the precautions of the Hot Work Permit (1/2-ADM-1900.F01, Rev. 2), while conducting hot work in the penetration on the PCA Shop wall. Because this failure to comply with License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5 is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective 24Enclosureaction program (CR-06-04924), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent withSection VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NCV 05000334/2006004-03, "Hot Workresults in Fire in Unit 1 West Cable Vault.".4Unit 1 Reactor Trip due to SSPS card failure on September 7
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the events associated with the Unit 1 trip that occurred onSeptember 7th. The inspectors discussed the event with operations, engineering, and licensee management to gain an understanding of the event and assess followup actions. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken in response to the event and reviewed unit and system indications to verify that actions and system responses were as expected. The inspectors also reviewed the event notification report to verify accurate characterization of the event was reported to the NRC. The licensee's root cause evaluation determined the reactor trip to be caused by thefailure of a Solid State Protection System (SSPS) A312 universal logic card that resulted in the opening of the 'B'-train reactor trip breaker. The inspectors observed root cause deliberations, management discussions, and attended restart readiness meetings and Plant Operations Review Committee meetings that evaluated information concerning the root cause of the card failure that led to the reactor trip.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA5Other.1Unit 1 Extended Power Uprate (IP 71004)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed selected plant testing and other power ascension activitiesduring the implementation of the 3% phase (2689 MWt to 2770 MWt) of a planned 3-phase extended power uprate totaling approximately 8% power. Inspectors observed and/or reviewed selected plant changes and testing prior to the power ascension that began on August 30, 2006, as well as post-100% power activities and reviewed selected plant data to determine if significant plant anomolies occurred, and to ensure plant behavior was as predicted by simulator and analysis data.The inspectors also reviewed operator actions, applicable procedure changes, andreviewed selected plant design changes and other inspection activities conducted under the normal baseline inspection program, to ensure an adequate sample of risk-significant attributes required by the governing procedure were evaluated.
25Specific inspections already completed and credited in past NRC inspection reports, aswell as those credited in the current report can be found in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA6Management Meetings (71111.11)The inspectors presented inspection results to members of licensee management duringan interim exit on August 4, 2006. In addition, on September 5, 2006, the licensee was contacted via telecom and a final summary exit was conducted.On October 30th, 2006, the inspectors presented the normal baseline inspection resultsto you and other members of your staff. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
G. AlbertiSenior Nuclear Specialist S. BakerSite Radiation Protection Manager
A. BeckertSimulator Instructor
- R. BisbeeSupervisor, Nuclear Performance Improvement
- R. BolognaManager, Site Operations
R. BoyleStaff Nuclear Engineer
S. BuffingtonStaff Nuclear Engineer
G. CaccianiStaff Nuclear Engineer
D. CarothersPlant Engineer
M. KogelschatzFin Superintenedent
- G. DavieManager, Training
M. DonningSupply Manager
- D. DwulitSupervisor, I & C Maintenance
R. FedenRegulatory Compliance
R. GillespieReactor Operator for Shift #5
M. GlanderUnit 2 Unit Supervisor
J. HabudaSystem Engineer
- R. HansenManager, Nuclear Oversight
A. HartnerU-1 Shift Manager
P. HessSupply Director
G. KaylerI&C Technician
M. KeeneElectrical Engineer
T. KingReactor Control System Engineer
W. KlinkoSystem Engineer
T. KuharLicensed Operator Retraining - Lead
J. LashSite Vice President
E. LauckFENOC System Engineer
G. LooseUnit 2 Shift Manager
B. LubertDesign Engineering
- C. Mancuso Supervisor, Nuclear Mechanics
R. MankoSystem Engineer
- M. ManolerasManager, Design Engineering
L. MartinoReactor Operator for Shift #5
M. MascioSystem Engineer
J. MauckCompliance
- E. McFarlandLead, Simulator Configuration Support Group
R. McKayFENOC Supply
J. MeyersSystem Engineer
J. Miller Fire Protection Engineer
A-2AttachmentAttachment
- J. MauckSenior Nuclear Specialist R. MendeDirector, Site Operations
D. Mickinac Senior Nuclear Specialist
J. MillerFire Protection Engineer
M. MitchellElectrical Engineering Supervisor
M. MouserUnit 1 Shift Manager
J. PattersonUnit 1 Containment System Engineer
P. PauvlinchRapid Response Supervisor
G. RitzNuclear Engineer
C. RodriguezPrincipal Consultant
R. ScheibOperations Training Supervisor
D. SchwerShift Manager
- J. ScottSupervisor, I & C Maintenance
P. SenaDirector Engineering
- B. SepelakSupervisor, Regulatory Compliance
G. StorolisUnit 2 Shift Manager
H. SzklinskiNuclear Quality Assessor
W.TobocDesign Engineering
K. TriplettSimulator Operator
J. WestSystem Engineer
R. WilliamsMaintenance Rule Coordinator
W. WilliamsBACC Program Owner
J. WitterShift Manager
- K. WolfsonSuperintendent, Nuclear Maintenance
- S. VicinieManager, Emergency Planning
J. ZanettaMechanical Maint. Supervisor
NRC Personnel
C. CahillSenior Reactor AnalystK. DiederichReactor Inspector
J. RoggeRegional Branch Chief
K. YoungSenior Reactor Inspector
A-3AttachmentAttachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Open/Closed05000412/2006004-01NCVFailure to verify the adequacy of a temporary designmodification associated with the Unit 2 chilled water
system. (Section 1R23)05000334/2006004-02NCVInadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Sleeve BearingSet Screw Position. (Section 4OA3.1)05000334/2006004-03NCVHot Work results in Fire in Unit 1 West Cable Vault(Section 4OA3.3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
- Notification 600331097CR
- 972325, 2WTD-TK23 Heater control problems
- 2OST-45.11, Cold Weather Protection Verification Work Order 200159267
Section 1R04:
- Equipment AlignmentProcedures1/2-CMP-M-7-001, "High Head Safety Injection Charging Pump Overhaul", Issue 4, Rev. 72OST-7.4, "Operating Surveillance Test", Rev. 27
- 2OST-30.6B, "Service Water Pump [2SWS*P21C] Test on Train B Header", Rev. 12
- 2OM-30.3.B.1, "Valve List -2SWS," Rev. 37
- 2OM-30.3.C, "Power Supply and Control Switch List," Rev. 15
- 2OM-7.3.B.1, "Valve List - 2CHS," Rev.18
- 2OM-7.3.B.1, "Power Supply and Control Switch List," Rev. 14Diagrams8700-RM-407-1, Rev. 25, "Valve Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System"8700-RM-407-3, Rev. 19, "Valve Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System"
- 8700-RM-424-2, Rev. 11, "Valve Diagram Feedwater System "
- 8700-RM-424-3, Rev. 13, "Valve Diagram Feedwater System "
- 10080-RM-407-1A, Rev. 14, Sheet 1, "Valve Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System"
- 10080-RM-407-2, Rev. 14, "Valve Diagram Charging System VCT and Make-Up"
- 10080-RM-430-1, Rev. 29, "Valve Diagram Service Water Supply and Distribution"
- 10080-RM-430-2, Rev. 31, "Valve Diagram Service Water Primary Cooling"
- A-4AttachmentAttachmentTechnical Specifications - Unit 2 (through Amendments dated February 10, 2006)Unit 2-3/4.7.4 "Service Water System (SWS)"BVPS UFSAR (Unit 1 Rev.22 / Unit 2 Rev. 15)Unit 2 Section 9.2.1, "Station Service Water System'Unit 2 Section 9.3.4, "Chemical and Volume Control System" Unit 1 Section 10.3.5.1.2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System"Condition Reports06-741606-6985 06-686706-652606-647206-601506-507606-4849MiscellaneousECP 03-0213, Unit 2 'A' Charging PumpUnit 2 Operations Log dated September 26, 2006
- Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump Vibration data, dated September 26, 2006
Section 1R05:
- Fire ProtectionPre-Fire Plans1/2OM-56B.3A.A.6, Rev. 02PFP-CV-755-Rod Control Area
- 2PFP-CNTB-735-Fan Room
- 2PFP-MSCV-755-Alternate Shutdown Panel RoomProcedures1/2-ADM-1900, "Fire Protection Program," Rev 131/2-ADM-1902, "Fire Brigade," Rev. 3
- 1/2-ADM-1336, "Fire Protection Training," Rev. 1
- 2OST-33.20, "Halon System Test," Rev. 8
- 2OST-33.18, "Halon Fire Detection And Actuation System Inspection", Rev. 4OtherBVPS UFSAR Unit 1, Rev 22, Section 10.3.5.2.3, "Dedicated Auxiliary Feedwater System"BVPS Unit 1 Updated Fire Protection Appendix "R" Report, Rev 26
- Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis & Fire Area Review, Addendum 28
- Fire Hazards Analysis Plan - Personnel Access Between Buildings Lower Elevations National Fire Protection Assoc. (NFPA) 600, "Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades," 2000 Ed.
- CRs06-739706-684706-679506-610206-492405-209102-591006-6707
- A-5AttachmentAttachment
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Methods1/2-ADM-2021, Control of Penetrations, Rev 387700-DMC-3111, Unit 1 Internal Flooding Calculation, Rev. 0
- BVPS Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.1 Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 22
- PIPS M16.3 Rev. 5
- TER8323, Evaluation of Unit 1 Charging pump Floor plug Seals, October 31, 1993
- CR-06-04515, "Unit 1 Charging Pump 1B Declared Operable with Incomplete Floor Plug Flood
- Seal"
- CR-06-04496, "Order Discrepancies for 1CH-P-1B Floor Plug Penetration Seals"
- CR-06-04469, "Operation for Identifying Correct Component Not Signed"
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramRequalification Program Procedures1/2-ADM-1301.F06, "Licenced Operator Retraining, 2LRTS-2R12
- SHUTDOWN", Rev. 01/2-ADM-1351 "Licensed Operator Retraining Program," Revision 4
- 1/2-ADM-1362 "Security Provisions for Licensed Operator Examinations," Revision 7
- BVBP-TR-0008 "Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Exam Development and Administration", Revision 4
- NOP-TR-1001, "FENOC Conduct of Training", Revision 3
- 1/2-ADM-1357.F11, Rev. 0, Simulator Evaluation Scenario No. 1DRLS-ES-1.1.003
- 1/2-ADM-1357.F07, rev. 0, Team Evaluation Form for Scenario 1DRLS-ES-1.1.003
- 1/2-ADM-1357.F09, rev. 0, SRO Evaluation Form for Scenario 1DRLS-ES-1.1.003
- 1/2-ADM-1357.F08, rev. 0, RO Evaluation Form for Scenario 1DRLS-ES-1.1.003Simulator Procedures/Documents1/2-ADM-1359, "Simulator Configuration Control", Revision 9ANSI 3.5, 1985, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Evaluation"Simulator Test DocumentationTransient Tests:SQT-5.1, Manual Reactor TripSQT-5.2, Complete Loss of All Feedwater
- SQT-5.3, MSIV Closure
- SQT-5.4, Complete Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow
- SQT-5.5, Partial Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow
- SQT-5.6, Turbine Trip w/o Direct Reactor Trip
- SQT-5.7, Maximum Rate Power Ramp
- SQT-5.9, DBA Steamline Rupture in Containment
- SQT-5.10, Stuck Open PZR Safety Valve w/o HHSI
- A-6AttachmentAttachmentMalfunction TestsSQT-4.3, IA Leak outside ContainmentSQT-4.5, SA Header Isolation Valve Failure
- SQT-4.54, Plugged Seal Water Injection Filter
- SQT-4.71, Charging FCV Failure
- SQT-4.99, AFW Pump Trip
- SQT-4.180, Spurious CI, Phase A
- SQT-4.181, Automatic SI Actuation FailureEngineering Changes (Reviewed four plant changes that resulted in physical changes to theUnit 1 control room)
- ECP-02-0222, "Eliminate Quench Spray Cutback Feature"ECP-02-0891, "containment Pressure Indicator Replacement"
- ECP-02-0170, "Containment Conversion to Atmosphere Hardware"
- ECP-02-0386, "Replace Accumulator Pressure Indicators"Condition Reports (Reviewed Unit 1 summary report of CRs 2004-2006 related to humanperformance, approximately 125 CRs, to determine which were likely to be licensed operator-
related.
- The inspectors reviewed nine in detail) 06-03538, Unit 1 control rod bank overlap did not respond as expected06-02808, RCS pressurized to 250 psig w/o placing seal return i/s
- 05-06794, Incorrect EPP classification during simulator evaluation
- 05-04908, U-1
- OST-36.2 steps not performed to run EE-P-1C
- 05-00560, Recorder media not changed out when required
- 04-07745, Error in reading valve stroke time from stopwatch
- 04-06283, Steps performed out of sequence
- 04-05655, Control room recorder data missed
- LER'sLER 2004-001-00, "Control Rod Shutdown Bank Anomaly causes Entry Into T S 3.0.3
- Biennial Written Exams 2006Exams for Weeks #1, 2, 3, and 4
- Reviewed Scenarios and JPMs - 2006 Annual Operating ExamsExams for Weeks #1, 2, 3, and 4
- OtherUnit 1 UFSAR Section 12.2, "Training", Revision 23Unit 2 UFSAR Section 13.2, "Training", Revision 15
- LRT Long Range Master Schedule, Dated August 8, 2006
- Retraining Cycle Report, Dated February 20, 2006
- Memo NPD3DOT: 3575, Operator License Status Summary of Recommendations, Dated February 22, 2006
- A-7AttachmentAttachmentSection 1R12: Maintenance Rule ImplementationAdministrative Documents1/2-ADM-2114, Maintenance Rule Program Administrative Procedure, Revision 3Corrective Action Program04-086304-0265804-0555704-0658504-0685704-0703604-0717604-08680
- 05-0224005-0310305-0363005-04096
- 05-0410105-0410605-0410705-04333
- 05-0518205-0664505-0739806-02534
- 06-0409906-0475606-0502606-6024
- 06-6302*06-6331*06-6333*06-6344
- 06-712206-714406-8413* Condition Reports issued as a result of the inspection.
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Disposition ReviewsUnit 2 120VAC Distribution, September 22, 2005Unit 1 4KV System, April 19, 2006
- Unit 2 4KV System, March 20, 2006
- Unit 1 480V AC Distribution System, December 9, 2003
- Unit 2 Compressed Air, September 22, 2005
- Unit 2 Heater Drains, May 9, 2005
- Unit 2 Main Steam, November 17, 2005
- Unit 2 Main Unit Generator, June 6, 2006Reactor Control and Protection System, July 13, 2006
- Unit 2 Compressed Air, September 21, 2006Miscellaneous Documents2OST-47.3G, Rev. 4, "Containment System Operating Surveillance Test, Containment
- Penetration and ASME Section XI Valve Test - Work Week 2", dated July 24, 2006BV-SA-05-115, Periodic Assessment of Maintenance Rule Program BVPS, July '03 - Feb '05
- BV Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes, September '04-August '06
- BV Maintenance Rule Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, September '04 - August '06
- System Health Report - Unit 1 4KV Station Service System, 2
nd Quarter 2006System Health Report - Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater, 2
nd Quarter 2006System Health Report - Unit 2 Compressed Air, 2
nd Quarter 2006System Health Report - Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators, 2
nd Quarter 2006System Health Report - Unit 2 Main Steam, 2
nd Quarter 2006System Health Report - Unit 1 Reactor Control and Protection, 2
nd Quarter 20064KV Station Service System - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 7
- Auxiliary Feedwater System - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 1
- Compressed Air - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 5
- Emergency Diesel Generator & Support Systems - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 5
- Main Steam System - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 6
- A-8AttachmentAttachmentReactor Control and Protection System - Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Rev. 8Kerry Actuator Replacement Project Post-Install Evaluation, dated April 25, 2005
- SSM-Kerry Valve Controller/Timer Configuration Data Sheet, Revision 0
- Unit 2 Operations Log dated July 24, 2006
- WO 200189579Technical Specifications - Unit 2 (through Amendments dated February 10, 2006)3/4.7.1.2.b, Auxiliary Feedwater System
Section 1R13:
- Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work ControlProcedures1/2-ADM-0804, "On-Line Work Management and Risk Assessment," Rev. 41/2-ADM-2033, "Risk Management Program," Rev. 3
- 1/2-ADM-2114, "Maintenance Rule Program Administrative Procedure," Rev. 2
- 1OST-24.3, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test [1FW-P-3B]
- NOP-WM-2001, "Work Management Process," Rev. 4
- NOP-ER-3001 Probelm Solving and Decision Making, Rev. 2
- Conduct of Operations Procedure 1/2OM-48.1.I, "Technical Specification Compliance," Rev. 18Work Orders200160661, 1FW-P-3B Motor Oil Change200217976, 1FW-P-3B Motor Oil Change
- 01-009600-001, 1FW-P-3B Bearing Temperature "Bearings replaced motor re-aligned"Condition ReportsCR-06-04345, Babbit Found in Oil SampleCR-06-04872, Oil Sample Scheduled Inappropriately
- CR-06-04873, Repair Time Inaccurately IdentifiedTechnical Specifications - Unit 1 (through Amendments dated August 11, 2006)3/4.7.2.1, Auxiliary Feedwater System OtherBVPS Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 10, 20006, Rev 0BVPS Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 10, 20006, Rev 0
- BVPS Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 17, 20006, Rev 0, 1, 2
- BVPS Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 24, 20006, Rev 0, 1, 2
- BVPS Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 31, 20006, Rev 0, 1, 2
- BVPS Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of September 4, 20006, Rev 0
- BVPS Unit 2 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of September 4, 20006, Rev 0
Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsProcedures1/2-ADM-2101, Predictive Monitoring, Rev. 3
- A-9AttachmentAttachmentTechnical Specifications - Unit 2 (through Amendments dated February 10, 2006)3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation3/4.3.5, Remote Shutdown InstrumentationCondition Reports (* denotes a CR generated as a result of this inspection)CR-06-04138, NIS Bistable PC Cards Installed with Incorrect Capacitor Rating OtherUnit 1 Operations Log dated July 1 July 3, July 26, August 21, 2006Unit 2 Operations Log dated September 26, 2006
Section 1R17:
- Permanent Plant ModificationsCondition Reports06-854706-830106-829506-810606-805806-734606-718506-6962
- 06-686406-685806-680706-6599
- 06-659306-604606-5105Regulatory Applicability Determination and 10
- CFR 50.59 Screens06-01987, for TMOD 2-06-0106-02183, for ECP-02-0734Procedures1/2-EPP-IP-1.41/2-EPP-IP-1.4.F02
- 2OM-54.4.C1, Daily Heat Balance, Rev. 13
- 2OST-6.2, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Rev. 20Work OrdersWO
- 200199045, Inputs to Control Room Monitors Drawings10080-DCS-0068, Rev. 2 PCS System Block Diagram OtherEvent Notification #42802, Plant Computer System (PCS) Will Be taken Out of Service for Approximately Five Weeks, dated August 25, 2006Event Notification #42802, Plant Computer System (PCS) Will Be taken Out of Service for Approximately Five Weeks, updated September 26, 2006Section 1R19
- Post-Maintenance Testing Condition ReportsCR-06-04099CR-06-04100CR-06-04383CR-06-04457CR-06-04464
- A-10AttachmentAttachmentNotifications600311363600315110Procedures1OM-7.4w, Rev. 24, "Placing the spare/Stby Charging Pump into Operation"1OST-24.3, "Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Tes [1FW-P-3B]"
- 1/2CMP-75-325, "Removal /Installation Of Rosemount Alphaline Pressure Transmitters, Models1151, 1152, 1153B, 1153D and 1154," Issue 4, Rev. 02MSP-24.26-I, "2FWS-F476, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Channel IV Calibration," Issue 4, Rev. 12Technical Specifications - Unit 1 (through Amendments dated August 11, 2006)Section 3/4.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Specifications - Unit 2 (through Amendments dated February 10, 2006)Section 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip InstrumentationSection 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System InstrumentationBVPS UFSAR Unit 2Section 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater System, Rev. 15
- Work Orders200015095,
- ECP 02-0736-01; Replace Transmitter 2FWS-FT476200166163, Transmitter Calibration of 2FWS-FT476
- 200166796, Loop Calibration of Feedwater Flow Loop
- 200211310OtherECP 02-0736-0, "2FWS-FT476 to Support 9.4% Power Uprate," Rev. 02OM-24.1.D, "Instrumentation and Controls," Rev. 5
- 2OM-24.1.E, "Specific Instrumentation and Controls," Rev. 6
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage ActivitiesProcedures1OM-50.4.D, "Reactor Startup From Mode 3 to Mode 2,", Rev. 461OST-47.2B, "Containment Closeout Inspection," Rev. 4
- NOBP-OM-4010, Restart Readiness for Plant Outages, Rev. 3 and 4
- NOP-OP-1005, "Shutdown Safety," Rev. 8
- MRS-SSp-1387-DLW/DMW, Rev. 3, Tubesheet Inspection-Westinghouse Model 54F Steam GeneratorsCondition Reports06-07236, Loose Parts High Alarm on Channel 5 'C' SG Primary Side06-06818, Loose Parts High Alarm on Channel 5 'C' SG Primary Side
- 06-05204, BV1 Loose Parts Monitoring System Findings
- 06-05095, 1POAC2 inspection Results for leaking Bergen-Paterson Snubber,
- RC-HC-10C
- A-11AttachmentAttachment06-05088, BV1 Loose parts Monitoring System Deficiencies06-05062, 1RC-E-1C FOSAR Results (1POAC2)
- 06-05055, Procedure Non-Compliance (Missed QC Holdpoint)
- 06-05035, Feedwater isolation Valve
- HYV-1FW-100B Low Nitrogen Pressure
- 06-05019, Unit 1 Containment Liner paint Cracked and Flaking
- 06-02283, Foreign Material Observed in SG 'C' Crossover LoopMiscellaneous1FOAC10 Restart Readiness Review1POAC2 Mode Hold List dated August 28, 2006
- Digitial Metal Impact Monitoring System-DX Data Report, July 1, 2006 - Sept 15, 2006
- Loose Part Logic Chart, Rev. 0, dated August 14, 2006
- Technical Specifications - Unit 1 (through Amendments dated August 11, 2006)
- Technical Specifications - Unit 2 (through Amendments dated February 10, 2006)Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingCondition Reports06-6694, Re-Performance of 2OST-6.206-6666, 2CHS-873 Leaks When 2CHS-MOV275A is Closed
- 06-6202, 2SWS-P21B Head Ratio Low
Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsCondition ReportsCR-06-6700; 06-04869; 06-04870; 06-05012Regulatory Applicability Determination and 10
- CFR 50.59 Screens06-01987, for TMOD 2-06-0106-02183, for
- ECP-02-0734ProceduresNOP-LP-4006, Rev. 2, "Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)"NOP-CC-2004, Rev. 5, "Design Interface Reviews and Evaluations"
- 1/2-ADM-2028, Rev. 6, "Temporary Modifications"
- 2OM-29.4.I, Rev. 0, "Operation of [2CDS-CHL23C], Chiller Unit, with Chiller Cond Wtr Booster pumps Out of Service"2OM-44B.4.AAH, Rev. 3, "Main Steam Valve Area Temperature High"
- NOP-LP-4003, Rev. 3, "Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments" Quality Assurance Program manual, Rev. 8
- BV2 Electrical Equipment Qualification Master List System Component Evaluation Worksheets for various components
- 2AttachmentAttachmentOther10CFR50 Appendix E10CFR50.54q Assessment of Acceptability for Temporary Mod 2-06-01 for ECP 02-0734
- ECP-02-0734, U2 Plant Computer Replacement, Rev. 1
- Unit 2 Operations Log dated, August 21, 2006
Section 1EP4:
- Emergency Action Level (EAL) Revision ReviewBeaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness PlanSection 1, Definitions, Rev 16Section 2, Scope and Applicability, Rev 15
- Section 3, Summary, Rev 15
- Section 4, Emergency Conditions, Rev 19
- Section 5, Emergency Organization, Rev 20
- Section 6, Emergency Measures, Rev 23
- Section 7, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, Rev 21
- Section 8, Maintaining Preparedness, Rev 20
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
- Procedures1/2OM-53C.4A.35.1, Rev. 3, Degraded Grid for Unit 1 / 2 1OM-35.2.A, Rev. 6, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Precautions and Limitations
- 1/2OM-35.4.A, Rev. 4, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 / 2 Voltage Schedule Guidance
- NPDAP-3.15, Rev. 9, Beaver Valley Substation Access and Vehicle Control
- 10080-DES-0517, "Electric Motor Repair," Rev. 02
- 1/2-MI-E-75-204, "Offline Motor Testing Using Baker Advanced Winding Analyzer," Rev. 01
- 1/2-PMP-E-75-001, "4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication," Rev. 08Drawings11700-RE-1B-25,
- Rev. 25, BV Power Station Unit 1 Main One Line Diagram10080-RE-1DH, Rev. 3, BV Power Station Unit 2 Main One Line Diagram
- 10080-RE-1AB, Rev. 6, BV Power Station Unit 2 One Line Diagram Standby Diesel 480V-Substa
- 2-510080-RE-1GB, Rev. 8, BV Power Station Unit 1 4160V One Line Diagram Emer Res Facil Substa 8700-RE-1C, Rev. 23, BV Power Station Unit 1 Equipment One Line Diagram
- 10080-RE-1C, Rev. 12, BV Power Station Unit 2 Equipment One Line DiagramCondition ReportsCR 04-09136CR 05-00953CR 05-01319CR 05-05414CR 05-06278CR 05-06279CR 05-06406CR 05-06549
- CR 05-06653CR 06-02552CR 06-02586CR 06-04889
- CR 05-04306CR 05-05249CR 05-01889CR 06-03022
- A-13AttachmentAttachmentEngineering Change PackagesECP 02-0540, Rev. 0, Instrument Air Standby Train InstallationECP 06-0206, Rev. 0, Change the Control Wiring for Unit 2 Air Compressor 2SAS-C21BMiscellaneousSwitchyard Meeting Minutes dated June 8, 2006BV-SA-03-37 dated 12/19/2003, BVPS Switchyard Assessment
- BV-1-80-System-Unit 1 Electrical Grid Equipment BV/Mi System Health Report(2006-02 Second Quarter)BV-2-90-System-Unit 2 Midland Substation System Health Report (2006-02 Second Quarter)
- 2OM-30.1.B, "Summary Description," Rev. 05
- DCP 2424
- NORM-ER-3102, "Component Basis Document," Rev. 01
- OE 21383 Service Water Pump Motor Failure
- OE 21409 Service Water System Pump Trip Due to Motor Insulation Breakdown (Beaver Valley Unit 2)
Section 4OA3: Event ResponseCondition Reports06-609006-611606-613206-614106-6181Unit 1Appendix R Analysis, Rev. 26Section 3.4.17, East and West Cable Vaults (CV-1 and
- CV-2)Section 6.8, Cable Tunnel (CV-3)
- Section 7, Procedures Section 11, Exceptions and DeviationsProcedures1/2-ADM-1336, "Fire Protection Training," Rev. 11/2-ADM-1900, "Fire Protection Program," Rev 13
- 1/2-ADM-1902, "Fire Brigade," Rev. 3
- 1/2-ADM-2021, "Control of Penetrations"
- 2OM-53C.4.2.34.1, Rev. 8, "Loss of Station Instrument Air"
- BVBP-SITE-0050.Rev.0, "Control of Transient Combustibles"
- BVBP-SITE-0051.Rev.1," Control of Ignition Sources and Firewatches"Drawings8700-RM-0063B.Rev.11 Hazard Boundaries Elev. 735'VTI 01.010-0189, Rev. D Sleeve BearingCalculations8700-B-084, Fire Hazard Analysis (BV1), Rev. 9
- OtherBeta Lab Results, Failure Analysis Report for Plastic Sheeting, dated September 9, 2006 and September 12, 2006
- A-14AttachmentAttachmentBeta Lab Report M06237BVPS Unit 1 Updated Fire Protection Appendix "R" Report, Rev. 26
- CARB Meeting Notes, Root Cause
- CR-06-04924, dated October 11, 2006
- Cable List for Unit 1 West Cable Vault in 1TC459O
- Certificate of Conformance, Fastenal, PO VAPA5764, J-FLEXX (P/N 8594957)
- FEN PAT, Chapter 5 Fire Protection, Rev. 2
- Hot Work Permits for
- WO 200194214 from July 19 - August 18, 2006
- Root Cause personnel interview statements for CR-06-04924
- Master Counterstock List, Rev. Aug 8, 2006
- National Fire Protection Assoc. (NFPA) 600, "Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades," 2000 Ed.
- NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films, 2004
- NOTF 600315619
- Oil Sample Report for 1FW-P-3B Motor, dated March 29, 2004 - July 17, 2006 (Beta Labs)
- Primavera Emergent Action Schedule, 1FW-P-3B, July 2006
- Purchase Order
- 46100866, Fastenal Company, dated July 11, 2006
- Purchase Order
- 47133766, Fastenal Company, dated July 11, 2006
- Purchase Order 55103833n Refurbishment Package of 1-FW-P-3B Motor by Schulz Electric, April 2006Unit 1 System 24B Design Basis Document - Auxiliary Feedwater
- UL 214, Tests for Flame-Propagation of Fabrics and Films, 1997
- Unit 1 Station Logs, dated July 17 - 19, 2006
- Unit 1 Station Logs, dated August 18, 2006
- Unit 2 Station Logs, dated August 23, 2006
- Unit 1 UFSAR Section 10.3.5.2.2
- WO 200135714, Remove
- BV-1FW-P-3B-Motor for Refurbishment, April 2006
- WO 200194214, Installation of BVPS 1 E/W Cable Vault Wall CO2 Pressure Relief DampersCondition ReportsCR-06-07397, Corrective Action Program Categorization of Fire EventsCR-06-06795, Evaluate the MSDS for Visqueen to Determine Hazards, Training, and Response
- CR-06-06102, Flammable Plastic Sheeting Distributed as Fire Retardant
- CR-06-05119, Integrity of Root Cause Team
- CR-06-04924, Fire in West Cable Vault
- CR-06-04345, Babbit Found in Oil Sample CR-06-05092CR-06-05050CR-06-04826CR-06-04715CR-06-04697CR-06-04454CR-06-04440CR-06-04385
- CR-06-04356CR-06-04353CR-05-06052CR-01-03785Technical Specifications - Unit 1 (through Amendments dated August 8, 2006)Section 3/4.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System
- A-15AttachmentAttachmentOtherManufacturer: Midwest CanvasDistributor: G/O Corporation Supplier: Fastenal Corporation Model Number: N/A
- Part Number: G/O Corporation P/N GA-1045
- Description: "20 X 100ft, 6 Mil, J-FLEXX String Reinforced Polyethylene, Diamond Shaped, Fire Retardant per NFPA 701"
Section 4OA5:
- OtherProcedures1-SPT-52-40440-2, Issue 1, Rev. 0, "3% Power Uprate Escalation to Power (2770 Mwt)"Work Orders1RST-2.6 Incore/Excore Axial Imbalance Check, September 6, 20061RST-3.1 Incore Movable Detector Normalization, August 31, 2006
- 1RST-3.2 Incore Movable Detector Flux Mapping, September 6, 2006
- 200159236, Unit 1 Incore/Excore Axial Imbalance Check, dated August 23, 2006
- 200159236, Unit 1 Incore Flux Map at 100%, dated August 23, 2006
- 200159235, Incore Detector Normalization, dated August 23, 2006Extended Power Uprate (EPU) - Related Inspection ActivitiesInspectionProcedureTitleInspectionReportDescription and 71004 Section71004Power Update06-04BV1 EPU Phase 1 (3%) powerascension control room observations and plant walkdowns (2.02.d)06-04BV1 EPU post-Phase 1 data review ofactual plant parameters and predicted data, iaw 1-SPT-52-40440-2, Rev. 0
and 1, "3% Power Uprate Escalation to Power (2770 MWt)" (2.02.d/e)06-04BV1 EPU post-Phase 1 neutron fluxmapping. (2.02.d/e)06-04BV1 EPU Phase 1/post-Phase 1 powerascension vibration and displacement inspections. (2.02.e/g)
"Operational Alignment of Process Temperature Instrumentation," and
- 1OM-54.4.C1-3, "Daily Heat Balance," and Work Order 200210952. (2.02.c)06-04BV1 post-Phase 1 reactor trip on9/7/06; analysis of plant and simulator response, actual versus expected plant response; (2.02.e)71111.02Evaluations ofChanges, Tests, or Experiments03-03BV1 Installation of fast-acting feedwaterisolation valves (2.02.a)71111.11BLicensed OperatorRequalification06-04BV1 elimination of QSS cutback featuredesign modification (2.02.d)71111.15Operability Evaluations04-05BV1 containment metal mass basis forcontinued operation for ACC (2.02.a)06-05BV2 Operability Assessment and 50.59EPU-related safety analysis for SGTR
(2.02.a/d/g)71111.17APermanent PlantModifications06-04BV1 simultaneous hot and cold leginjection during recirculation phase of
- LOCA (2.02.b/c)06-05BV2 "A" charging pump rotatingassembly changeout (4th Qtr 2006)
(2.02.c)71111.17BPermanent PlantModifications03-03BV1 Installation of fast-acting feedwaterisolation valves (2.02.b)05-06BV1 addition of cavitating venturi's inAFW system for ACC. (2.02.b)71111.19Post-MaintenanceTesting04-06BV1 Installation of fast-acting feedwaterisolation valves (2.02.c)03-05BV2 "C" charging pump rotatingassembly changeout (2.02.c)
- A-17AttachmentAttachment05-08BV2 "B" charging pump rotatingassembly changeout (2.02.c)06-05BV2 "A" charging pump rotatingassembly changeout (4th Qtr 2006)
(2.02.c)71111.21Engineering Design Bases
- Inspection
(CDBI)06-08BV1/BV2 RCP seal operation coredamage impact at EPU power levels.
(02.02.a)BV1 EPU-related impact on #1 EDGloading calculations (2.02.a/c)BV2 EPU-related impact on recirc.spray pump (2RSS-P21C) (2.02.a/c)BV2 EPU-related impact on emergencybus 2DF (2.02.a/b/c)BV1 EPU-related impact on SIaccumulator level and pressure instrumentation (2.02.a/b/c)BV1 EPU-related impact on 480VAC9P substation (2.02.a/b/c)BV1 simultaneous hot leg/cold leginjection and EPU-related impact on
- 1SI-MOV-890C (2.02.a/b/c)BV1 EPU-related impact on emergencybus 1AE (2.02.a/b/c)BV2 EPU-related impact of SGTR onoperator actions and timing, and AFW
isolation actions (2.02.a/d/g)BV1 EPU-related emergency procedurechanges, verification of physical plant modifications, and EPU analysis operator action timing to support simultaneous hot leg/cold leg injection;
verified appropriate failure analyses and design adequacy of flowpath.
(2.02.a/b/c/d/g)
- A-18AttachmentAttachment71111.20Refueling and OutageActivities06-04BV1 post-EPU phase 1 reactor/PlantStartup and grid synchronization.
(2.02.d)50001Steam generatorreplacement06-03BV1 replacement steam generators tosupport EPU (2.02.a/b/c/d/e/f/g)
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADMAdministrative ProcedureAFW Auxiliary Feedwater
AOPAbnormal Operating Procedure
ASMEAmerican Society Mechanical Engineers
BVPSBeaver Valley Power Station
CAQCondition Adverse to Quality
CFRCode of Federal Regulations
CRCondition Report(s)
DEPDrill/Exercise Performance
DRDeficiency Report
ECPEngineering Change Package
EDGEmergency Diesel Generator
EREngineering Request
ERFEmergency Response Facility
FENOCFirst Energy Nuclear Operating Company
IPInspection Procedure
JPMJob Performance Measures
LCOLimiting Conditions for Operation
LRLicensing Requirement
MRMaintenance Rule
MRBManagement Review Board
MSPMaintenance Surveillance Package
MSSVMain Steam Safety Valve
NCVNon-cited Violation
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
NRRNuclear Reactor Regulation
ODOperability Determination
ODMIOperational Decision Making Issue
OEOperating Experience
OSTOperations Surveillance Test
A-19AttachmentAttachmentPIPerformance IndicatorPI&RProblem Identification and Resolution
PMTPost-maintenance Testing
PRAProbability Risk Analysis
psigPounds per Square Inch Gage
RHRResidual Heat Removal System
SDPSignificance Determination Process
SESafety Evaluation
SGSteam Generator(s)
SGTRSteam Generator Tube Rupture
SLCRSSupplemental Leak Collection and Release System
SROSenior Reactor Operator
SSCStructure, System, and Component
SSPSSolid State Protection System
TITemporary Instruction
TMTemporary Modification
TSTechnical Specification
UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report
VdcVolts Direct Current