Text

IR 05000293-13-004; 07/01/2013 - 09/30/2013; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Problem Identification and Resolution
	ML13318A304
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/14/2013
From:	Raymond McKinley; NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Dent J; Entergy Nuclear Operations
	McKinley R R
References
	IR 13-004
	Download: ML13318A304 (45)
	v • d • e

November 14, 2013

Mr. John Dent Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5508

SUBJECT: PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2013004

Dear Mr. Dent:

On September 30, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 23, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green).

This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements.

However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-

0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at PNPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at PNPS. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Managem ent System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Raymond R. McKinley, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000293/2013004

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML13318A304 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME MSchneider/SMS via email SShaffer/SWS RMcKinley/RRM DATE 11/13/13 11/8/13 11/14/13

1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No: 50-293

License No: DPR-35

Report No: 05000293/2013004

Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS)

Location: Plymouth, MA 02360

Dates: July 1, 2013 through September 30, 2013 Inspectors: M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP B. Scrabeck, Resident Inspector, DRP T. Moslak, Health Physicist, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) H. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS T. Burns, Reactor Inspector, DRS N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Rady, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Lally, Operations Engineer, DRS C. Newport, Operations Engineer, DRS

Approved By: Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

2 Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000293/2013004; 07/01/2013 09/30/2013;

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Problem Identification and Resolution.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas," dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," because Entergy did not complete a design control review for the station blackout (SBO) fuel oil transfer system in a timely manner. Entergy extended the corrective action due date out to greater than a year from the discovery of the original condition. Entergy has increased the priority of this design review and captured this issue in condition report CR-PNP-2013-6906.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to complete a timely design review of a credited support system for the onsite power safety function further extends the vulnerability of the safety function if the design review determines the system is inadequate. The inspectors used IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening." The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in the loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Entergy did not take appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance. P.1(d). (Section 4OA2)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station began the inspection period operating at 100 percent reactor power. On July 17, Pilgrim reduced power to 85 percent due to the high temperature of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), and returned to 100 percent reactor power later the same day. On July 18, Pilgrim reduced power to 90 percent due to the high temperature of the UHS, and returned to 100 percent reactor power later the same day. On July 25, Pilgrim reduced power to 90 percent due to the high temperature of the UHS, and returned to 100 percent reactor power on July 26. On August 20, Pilgrim reduced power to 50 percent to perform a condenser thermal backwash, and returned to 98 percent reactor power on August 21. On August 22, Pilgrim initiated a manual scram due to a loss of feedwater and entered forced outage 20-1 to perform repairs to the feedwater system. On August 25, Pilgrim performed a startup and reached 23 percent power on August 26, where the unit remained due to a loss feedwater heating. On August 28, operators increased power to 75 percent power, where the unit remained for troubleshooting of the 'A' reactor feed pump (RFP). On September 8, Pilgrim shut down and

entered Forced Outage 20-2 to perform repairs to the 'A' RFP, and to repair steam leaks in the feedwater heating system. On September 15, Pilgrim performed a startup and reached 75 percent reactor power on September 16, where power remained for completion of repairs to the 'A' RFP. Pilgrim returned to 98 percent power on September 17. On September 18, Pilgrim reduced power to 77 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment, and returned to 98 percent reactor power later that same day, and power remained at 98 percent due to troubleshooting on the ultrasonic feedwater flow instrumentation. Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power on September 20 and continued to operate at 100 percent power for the remainder of the quarter.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Main article: IP 71111.01

.1 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of August 5, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of the external flood protection measures for Entergy. The inspectors reviewed technical specifications (TS), procedures, design documents, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 2.4.2.4, which depicted the design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general site walkdown of external areas of the plant to ensure that Entergy had maintained flood protection barriers in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine if Entergy planned or established adequate measures to protect against external flooding events. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the

.

5 Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

Main article: IP 71111.04

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

'A' residual heat removal (RHR) system alignment during heavy load lift over 'B' safety-related train components on July 26 Electric fire pump alignment during diesel fire pump maintenance on July 31 Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system quarterly surveillance on August 14 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TS, work orders (WO), condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operat ing parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

Main article: IP 71111.04S

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of August 5, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the 'A' train of the RHR system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, system health reports, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of t he systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment 6 Enclosure to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6

samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.

'B' reactor building component cooling water system on August 7 'A' reactor building component cooling water system on August 7 HPCI pump/turbine room on August 15 RCIC pump quadrant on August 15 RCIC quadrant mezzanine level on August 15 'A' switchgear and load center room on September 4

b. Findings

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the controls on chlorination of the SSW system and the water quality of the fresh closed loop cooling water with the plant chemistry department as to the frequency and extent of chemistry analysis. For the "A" RBCCW HX, the inspectors reviewed the HX efficiency test process records and results for the test performed on April 2. The test method and the calculation basis were discussed with the responsible design engineer. During the inspection, the SSW intake temperature approached the UHS TS limit of 75 degrees Fahrenheit maximum. The inspectors reviewed the basis for this limit and the associated calculations with the responsible design engineer.

9 Enclosure Heat Exchangers Cooled by Closed Loop Cooling Water.

The inspectors reviewed the programs and procedures for maintaining the safety functions of the "A" RHR HX which is cooled by closed cooling water output from one of the RBCCW HXs. The inspectors reviewed the HX efficiency test, process records and results for the test performed on April 15. The test method and the calculation basis were discussed with the responsible design engineer.

The inspectors walked down and observed conditions of the RHR components, including piping, pumps, valves, and HXs with the system engineer.

The inspectors reviewed the most recently completed inspection/cleaning work orders to verify that the as-found and as-left condition of the RHR HXs was bounded by assumptions in the engineering analyses and provided reasonable assurance of continued operability. The inspectors compared RHR surveillance test data to the established acceptance criteria to verify that the results were acceptable and that operation was consistent with design. The inspectors reviewed the RHR flow balance calculation to verify that the minimum calculated flowrate, in conjunction with the heat transfer capability of the RHR HX, supported the minimum heat transfer rates assumed during accident and transient conditions described in the UFSAR.

Air-Cooled Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

The inspectors walked down each of the air cooled EDGs, reviewed the EDG system health reports and discussed the EDG cooling adequacy with the responsible system engineer. The plans for an instrumented test of the EDG oil lubrication system and turbocharger oil cooling were reviewed by the inspectors.

Review of Corrective Action Reports The inspectors selected and reviewed a sample of CAP reports related to the UHS, RBCCW, RHR and EDG HXs. The review verified that Entergy is appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components, and that the planned or completed corrective actions for the reported issues were appropriate.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 7

samples)

.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on July 25, which included a major loss of coolant accident and subsequent loss of primary containment. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness 10 Enclosure of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify

and document crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant activities listed below, the inspectors observed and reviewed operator performance in the main control room. See section

4OA3 for specific discussion of

these activities. The inspectors reviewed operational and alarm response, implementation of procedural guidance, and Emergency Action Level evaluations. The inspectors also observed control room conduct and control of evolutions and events.

Loss of main control room annunciators and declaration of unusual event on July 15 Exceedance of UHS temperature limits and reactor plant downpowers to address this condition from July 8 to Ju ly 10, and from July 15 to July 18 Primary containment isolation system logic testing on August 7 Reactor plant downpower to support a condenser thermal backwash on August 19 Reactor plant scram following a loss of all 3 RFPs on August 22 Reactor plant shutdown for repair of restricting orifice on feedwater heater bypass line on September 8

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12Q

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)

(2) performance criteria established by Entergy staff was reasonable.

As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a) (1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of

11 Enclosure goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a) (2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.

Review of Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan to return EDG system from MR (a)(1)status to MR (a)(2) Review of Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation for control rod drive pump failures

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment from service. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

'A' EDG and SBO diesel out of service for emergent maintenance on July 3 Elevated risk during low pressure coolant injection testing on July 11 Qualitative and quantitative risk assessment during maintenance and testing on standby gas treatment and control room high efficiency air filtration systems and half scram during scram discharge instrument volume maintenance and emergent orange/yellow risk due to reactor building component cooling water inoperability on July 29 Shutdown risk assessment following a complicated reactor scram and plant cooldown with a short time to boil on August 23

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 6

samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:

Degraded condition resulting from the loss of all annunciators on July 15 Operational decision making issue to address operational philosophy for high UHS temperature conditions on July 24 Pipe support for RBCCW suction header 'A' severely degraded on July 30 Safety relief valve (SRV) 3C failed to release after lift on the test stand on August 6 RCIC high suction pressure on August 27 SRV 3C leaking on September 15 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to Entergy's evaluations to determine

whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5

Cold and hot shutdown temperature control Shutdown risk assessment and risk management Implementation of TS Outage control center activities Plant startup Licensee identification and resolution of problems

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TS, the UFSAR, 14 Enclosure and Entergy procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

Standby gas treatment system exhaust f an logic test and instrument calibration on July 29 High drywell pressure, low water level, and high radiation logic system A-inboard functional test on August 8 SSW flow rate operability test on August 8 HPCI quarterly in-service test on August 12 Functional test of initiation circuit associated with start-up transfer and bus A6 on September 11 'B' EDG monthly surveillance on September 16

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Main article: IP 71114.06

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Entergy emergency drill on July 25 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspectors observations with those identified by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergy's critique and to verify whether Entergy staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

15 Enclosure

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Public and Occupational Safety

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Main article: IP 71124.05

a. Inspection Scope

From August 12 through 15, the inspectors assessed the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments used to monitor and quantify liquid and gaseous effluents. The inspectors used the requirements contained in the offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM), applicable industry standards, and Entergy's procedures, as criteria for determining compliance.

Calibration and Testing Program for Effluent Monitors The inspectors reviewed the current calibration records and alarm set points for installed liquid and gaseous effluent monitors; i.e. liquid radwaste monitor (RM 1705-30) and the main stack monitors (RM 1705-18 A/B). This review included an assessment of the methodology Entergy uses to determine sampler and process flow rates for these effluent instruments.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Main article: IP 71124.06

a. Inspection Scope

Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) Program From August 12 through 15, the inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results and changes to Entergy's program for identifying, mitigating, and monitoring contaminated spills/leaks to on-site groundwater pathways. The inspectors used the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI), to evaluate the licensee's implementation of the GPI. Walkdowns and Observations The inspectors walked down the monitoring wells from which groundwater samples are taken and analyzed for tritium. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's measures to monitor and analyze groundwater samples, and the plans for installing additional monitoring wells to measure the effectiveness of the contamination controls. The inspectors assessed the current on-site ground water sample results to determine the trends in the concentrations of tritiated water in the monitoring wells. The inspectors reviewed relevant condition reports and subsequent actions related to the identification of a separation in the discharge line from the Waste Neutralizing Sump that resulted in contaminating the surrounding soil on site. The inspectors reviewed the data from soil samples and discussed with the project manager the scope of the 16 Enclosure investigation, mitigating actions, and repair strategies. The inspectors confirmed that the soil condition and related condition reports were contained in the 50.75

(g) decommissioning files. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the GPI program are being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and are properly addressed for resolution in Entergy's CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Main article: IP 71124.07

From August 12 through 15, the inspectors verified that the radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) quantifies the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validates the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program.

The inspectors used the requirements contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, the Pilgrim ODCM, applicable industry standards, and Entergy's procedures as criteria for determining compliance to the REMP.

a. Inspection Scope

Inspection Planning The inspectors reviewed the Pilgrim Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 2011 and 2012, and the results of Entergy assessments since the last inspection to verify that the REMP wa s implemented and reported in accordance with the TSs and ODCM. This review assessed whether environmental monitoring had been appropriately performed at the required sampling locations and at the proper frequencies, that a land use census had been performed, and that the inter-laboratory comparison program was implemented, and that data was analyzed. The inspectors reviewed the Pilgrim ODCM, and related procedures, to identify locations of environmental monitoring stations and the sample collection frequency. The inspectors reviewed the Pilgrim FSAR for information regarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological monitoring instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed the Pilgrim Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports and the most recent results from waste stream analysis, to determine if Entergy is sampling and analyzing for the predominant radionuclides likely to be released in effluents. Environmental Sampling Inspection The inspectors walked down 11 air sampling stations and 12 thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) monitoring stations to determine whether they are located as described in the ODCM and to determine the equipment material condition.

17 Enclosure For the selected air samplers, the inspectors reviewed the calibration and maintenance records to verify the operability of the samplers' pump and dry gas meter. The inspectors observed the collection and preparation of environmental samples from different environmental media, including surface water (discharge canal, Bartlett Pond, Powder Point), to verify that environmental sampling is representative of the release pathways as specified in the ODCM and that sampling techniques are in accordance with procedures. Based on direct observation and review of records, the inspectors assessed whether the meteorological instruments were operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with procedures. The inspectors assessed whether the meteorological data readout and recording instruments in the control room and the meteorological tower instruments were operable and reading similar values. The inspectors evaluated whether missed and/or anomalous environmental samples were identified and reported in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports.

The inspectors selected events that involved a missed sample, inoperable air sampler, lost TLDs, or anomalous measurement to verify that Entergy has identified the cause and has implemented corrective actions. The inspectosr reviewed any potential changes made to the ODCM as the result of changes in the land census, changes in long-term meteorological conditions, or modifications to the sampler stations, since the last inspection. The inspectors assessed whether the detection sensitivities for environmental samples were below the lower limits of detection specified in the ODCM. The inspectors reviewed the results of the Entergy inter-laboratory comparison programs to verify the adequacy of environmental sample analyses performed by the licensee. The inspectors assessed whether the results included the radionuclide mix appropriate for the facility. Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the REMP were being identified by Entergy at an appropriate threshold and appropriate corrective actions are assigned for resolution in their CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

Mitigating Systems Performance Index (3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Entergy's submittal of the mitigating systems performance index for the following systems for the period of July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013:

High pressure injection system (HPCI) Heat removal system (RCIC) RHR system To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's operator narrative logs, condition reports, mitigating systems

performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution," the

inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into their CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended condition report screening meetings.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Sample: Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System Design Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's apparent cause analysis associated with condition report CR-PNP-2012-3428, incorrect hose staged to support the SBO fuel oil transfer system. This condition report was also referenced in NCV 05000293/2012005-01, Failure to Verify the Adequacy of the Design of the SBO Fuel Oil Transfer System, and was selected for review as a follow-up to this NCV.

The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analysis, extent of condition review, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timelines of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

19 Enclosure In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions.

b. Findings and Observations

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action,"

because Entergy did not complete a design control review for the SBO fuel oil transfer system in a timely manner. Specifically, the failure to implement design control measures when this system was first proposed in 1999 was initially identified in August 2012 and has not been completed as of the conduct of this inspection in September

2013.

Description.

In August 2012, the inspectors identified that Entergy did not have a documented design basis for crediting the SBO fuel oil transfer system to meet the seven day underground fuel oil storage tank requirement to support the EDG onsite power safety function. In the apparent cause analysis of this issue, Entergy determined that the SBO fuel oil transfer system had not been subjected to a design change or modification process and, as a result, the necessary design inputs, evaluations, and reviews were not performed. Entergy concluded that a design modification process was not implemented at the time the SBO fuel oil transfer system was established in 1999 to support the safety function of onsite standby power provided by the EDGs.

In September of 2012, Entergy established a corrective action in the subject condition

report to develop, implement, and close an engineering change for the equipment and process used to execute the EDG fuel oil transfer process. The original due date for the completion of this action was March 29, 2013.

On March 25, 2013, Entergy extended the due date to July 31, citing the unavailability of personnel to perform design change reviews due to refueling outage preparations. On July 24, an additional extension was requested and approved to move the corrective action completion date out to January 31, 2014, citing additional rigor being applied to the design as part of the nuclear change process and the refueling outage mentioned previously. This additional extension would allow approximately 16 months to pass between problem identification and corrective action completion.

The inspectors review of the status of Entergy's corrective actions associated with this original condition report and the subsequent NCV concluded that Entergy's corrective actions were not timely nor commensurate with the importance of this system and its support of the EDG onsite power safety function. In addition, the lack of timely corrective action has and will extend the vulnerability of this safety function should the design review determine there is an inadequacy in the design of the system.

Analysis.

The inspectors determined that Entergy's failure to take timely corrective action to complete the design change process for crediting the SBO fuel oil transfer system in support of the EDG emergency AC power safety system, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable 20 Enclosure consequences. Specifically, the failure to complete a timely design review of a credited support system for the onsite power safety function further extends the vulnerability to the safety function if the design review determines the system is inadequate.

In accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because

it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not result in the loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time.

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Correction Action Program, because Entergy did not take appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance [P.1.(d)].

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, from August 2012 through September 2013, Entergy did not complete a design control process to ensure that the SBO fuel oil transfer system would support the EDG onsite power safety function. A corrective action specified to complete this activity was extended twice in 2013 with a current due date of January 2014. The extension of the completion of the design modification process is not commensurate with the potential impact of the issue to the safety function of onsite power. Corrective actions included Design Engineering establishing a higher priority for the completion of this design review in 2013. Entergy has captured this issue in condition report CR-PNP-2013-6906. (NCV 05000293/2013004-01, Failure to Complete a Design Control Review for the SBO Fuel Oil Transfer System in a Timely Manner)

.3 Annual Sample: Review of the Operator Workaround Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds, operator burdens, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and open main control room deficiencies to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated whether station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewed operator workarounds as specified in Entergy's procedures (EN-OP-117, Operations Assessments and EN-FAP-OP-006, Operator Impact Index Performance Indicator).

The inspectors reviewed Entergy's process to identify, prioritize and resolve main control room distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspectors reviewed the system used to track these operator workarounds and recent Entergy self-assessments of the program. The inspectors also toured the control room and discussed the current operator workarounds with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance.

21 Enclosure The inspectors also verified that Entergy entered operator workarounds and burdens into the CAP at an appropriate threshold and planned or implemented corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors identified that there are a significant number of operator work arounds, operator burdens, control room deficiencies and alarms, and other main control room deficiencies that are not receiving the appropriate attention and priority for resolution.

Entergy has recognized the impact of these issues and have identified and re-prioritized a number of main control room deficiencies to reduce the burden on control room operations personnel.

.4 Annual Sample: 250VDC Back-up Battery Charger Erratic Output Voltage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's failure analysis and corrective actions associated with condition report CR-PNP-2012-02174 that documented an occurrence on May 10, 2012, where the 250VDC (voltage direct current) back-up battery charger output voltage was erratic and unable to maintain the normal bus voltage without constant monitoring and adjustments. Based on the 250VDC back-up battery charger's failure, the back-up battery charger was taken out of service and the 250VDC normal battery charger was placed in service to restore proper voltage to the 250VDC safety-related bus.

The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, causal analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action." In addition, the inspectors reviewed documentation associated with this issue, including condition and failure analysis reports, and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions to complete full resolution of the issue.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the apparent cause of the issue. The apparent cause was determined to be a potentiometer on the 250VDC battery charger's voltage control module board. The potentiometer was inspected and cleaned which subsequently eliminated the erratic behavior of the battery charger's output voltage.

Entergy promptly investigated the issue and completed a detailed troubleshooting plan to identify the faulty component. In addition to correcting the back-up battery charger's erratic voltage issue, Entergy procured the services of an outside vendor to re-engineer 22 Enclosure equivalent control module boards to be used for future replacement within the back-up battery charger. Entergy updated their battery charger maintenance procedure to inspect and clean battery charger potentiometers that are susceptible to dust and debris build-up.

The inspectors determined Entergy's overall response to this issue was timely, commensurate with the safety significance, and that actions taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the erratic output voltage of the 250VDC back-up battery charger.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Main article: IP 71153

.1 Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to the appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's follow-up actions related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

Operator response to loss of all annunciator capability and declaration of an Unusual Event on July 15 Operator response to increasing UHS temperatures from July 8 through July 10 and from July 15 through July 18, including two downpowers Operator response to reactor feedwater bypass line leak in the condenser bay on August 1 through 13 Operator response to a complicated reactor scram following the loss of all 3 RFPs on August 22

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000293/2013-003-00: Loss of Off-Site Power Events due to Winter Storm Nemo

The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000293/2013-003-00, which is addressed in CR-PNP-2013-00798. On February 8, during Winter Storm Nemo, Pilgrim experienced a loss of off-site power resulting in a load reject and reactor scram. The cause of the loss of off-site power was due to faults external to the Pilgrim switchyard. Upon re-energizing offsite power, subsequent loss of off-site power events occurred due to flashovers in the switchyard from snow and ice buildup on insulators and electrical components. During and following the storm, all plant safety systems responded as designed and operators were able to maintain safe 23 Enclosure shutdown conditions. Procedure changes and a feasibility study to upgrade switchyard components have been implemented to prevent this event from recurring. The inspectors did not identify any new issues during the review of the LER. This LER is closed.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000293/2013-004-00: Manual Scram Inserted during Reactor Shutdown

The inspectors reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000293/2013-004-00, which is addressed in CR-PNP-2013-2275. On April 14, during a normal reactor shutdown, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure decreasing faster than normal. It was determined that the root cause of the pressure reduction was due to the operation of a steam seal bypass valve above its steam line pressure operating limit. Entergy revised the applicable procedure to preclude recurrence. The inspectors did not identify any new issues during the review of the LER. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Strike Contingency Plan

Main article: IP 92709

a. Inspection Scope

Entergy developed a Staffing Contingency Plan to ensure a sufficient number of qualified personnel were available to continue operations in the event that Local 25 United Government Security Officers of America (UGSOA) personnel engaged in a job action upon the expiration of their contract on October 1. Using the guidance contained in NRC Inspection Procedure 92709, "Licensee Strike Contingency Plans," the inspectors reviewed Entergy's plans to address a potential job action at the site. The inspection included an evaluation of the Staffing Contingency Plan content and the actions needed to implement the plan; a review to determine whether the number of qualified personnel needed for the proper operation of the facility would be available; a review to determine if security operations would be maintained, as required; and a review to determine if the plan complied with NRC requirements. On September 17, Entergy and UGSOA, Local 25, tentatively agreed to a new contract and union members approved the contract on September 19. No job action was taken.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Buried Piping, Temporary Instruction (TI)-2515/182, Phase 2

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee's buried piping and underground piping and tanks program were inspected in accordance with paragraphs 03.02.a of the Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/182, and it was confirmed that activities which correspond to the completion dates, specified in the program, which have passed since the Phase 1 inspection was conducted, have been

24 Enclosure completed. The licensee's buried piping and underground piping and tanks program were inspected in accordance with paragraph 03.02.b of the TI and responses to specific questions found in www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/buried-pipe-ti-phase-2-insp-req-2011-11-16.pdf were submitted to NRC headquarters staff.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 23, 2013, the inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results to Mr. John Dent, Site Vice President, and other members of the PNPS staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Dent Site Vice President

B. Ahern Electrical System Engineer G. Blankenbiller Chemistry Manager G. Bradley Component Engineer

S. Brewer Radiation Protection Manager

D. Brugman Supervisor ALARA/Technical Support

D. Burke Security Manager R. Byrne Licensing Engineer B. Chenard Engineering Director

D. Cook I&C Supervisor

S. Cook Chemistry Supervisor

J. Couto Senior Reactor Operator J. Cox Radiation Protection Operations Supervisor M. Dagnello Superintendent FIN Team

B. Diorgi I&C Supervisor

K. Drown Nuclear Oversight and Recovery Manager

J. Falconieri Senior Lead Engineer

J. Fitzsimmons Radiation Protection Supervisor K. Garrell Chemistry Technician M. Gatslick Security Compliance Supervisor

R. Hargat Radiation Protection Technician

P. Harizi Design Engineer

C. Lewis Instrumentation and Control Technician W. Lobo Compliance Engineer J. Lynch Licensing Manager

J. Macdonald Operations Manager

D. Mannai Senior Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing

W. Mauro Supervisor Radiation Protection Support

T. McElhinney Training Manager F. McGinnis Licensing Engineer R. Metthe Senior Engineer

A. Muse Superintendent Operations Training

J. Norris Radiological Engineer

D. Noyes Nuclear Safety Assurance Director K. O'Brien Electrical Maintenance J. O'Donnell System Engineer

J. Ohrenberger Maintenance Manager

R. Pace Design Engineer Supervisor

J. Priest Emergency Preparedness Manager

K. Sejkora Senior Health Physicist/Chemistry Specialist W. Smith Chemistry Supervisor M. Thornhill Radiation Protection Supervisor

S. Verrochi General Manager Plant Operations

T. F. White Design Engineering Manager

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Open/Closed

05000293/2103004-01 NCV Failure to Complete a Design Control

Review for the SBO Fuel Oil Transfer

System in a Timely Manner (section 4OA2)

Closed

05000293/LER-2013-003-00 LER Loss of Off-Site Power Events due to Winter

Storm Nemo (section 4OA3)

05000293/LER-2013-004-00 LER Manual Scram Inserted during Reactor Shutdown (section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

2.1.42, Operation During Severe Weather, Revision 12

2.3.37, Coastal Storm Preparations and Actions, Revision 37

Miscellaneous

Pilgrim Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Staff Evaluation of IPEEE Submittal on Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

UFSAR

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

2.2.19, Residual Heat Removal, Revision 107

2.2.22, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC), Revision 72

2.2.25, Fire Water Supply System, Revision 59

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-5437, NRC identified valve missing its locking device

CR-PNP-2013-5793, NRC identified discrepancies during protected RCIC system walkdown.

CR-PNP-2013-5818, NRC inspector noted that the

MO-1301-62 RCIC cooling water supply valve condulet cover is loose

CR-PNP-2013-5879, NRC identified packing leak on isolation valve for

PI-1360-12, Turbine Inlet Steam Pressure

Drawing P&ID M241 Sh1, RHR, Revision 87

Attachment

Miscellaneous

'A' RHR Breaker Checklist 'A' RHR Valve Checklist Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Maintenance Rule Basis Document, Residual Heat Removal

RHR System Health Report (dated August 1, 2013)

SDBD-10, Design Basis Document for RHR, Revision 3

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

5.5.2, Special Fire Procedure, Revision 52

EN-DC-161, Control of Combustibles, Revision 7

EN-MA-118, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 9

EN-TQ-125, Fire Brigade Drills, Revision 2

Miscellaneous

Fire Hazards Analysis

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Procedure

EN-DC-346, Cable Reliability, Revision 5

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2012-2039, Corroded supports identified in Manhole 'L' and Cable Pit #3

CR-PNP-2012-2126, Cable Pit #1 cable supports rusted, cables on the bottom of the manhole, wetted cables

CR-PNP-2013-4857, Submerged cables and corroded supports identified during inspection of Cable Pit #1

CR-PNP-2013-4884, Regulator challenges whether assumptions in

CR-PNP-2012-2126 were still valid

CR-PNP-2013-5818, NRC identified condulet cover loose with visible air gap to RCIC cooling water supply valve

MO-1301-62

Miscellaneous

Manhole and Cable Pit Pumping and Inspection Schedule Pilgrim In-Scope Cable List

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

2.2.19.5, RHR Modes of Operation for Transients, Revision 23 2.2.32, Part 5.2, SSW Administrative limits and Part 5.3, Precautions, Revision 87

3.M.4-98, RBCCW

HX Tube, Channel Cover, Channel Shell and Partition Plate Repair, Revision 24

7.8.1, Chemistry Sample and Analysis Program, Revision 66 8.5.3.14, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test, Revision 34 8.5.3.14.2, RHR Heat Exchanger Thermal Performance Test, Revision 7

EN-DC-184, NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water Program, Revision 2

EN-DC-316, Heat Exchanger Program, Revision 2

Attachment

EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 21

EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 6

Condition Reports

Drawings

P&ID M212, SH 1, Screen Wash System, SH 2, Rev 80, Screen Wash System, Revision 94

P&IDs M215, SH 1, Revision 52, SH 2, Revision 50, SH 3, Revision 41, and SH 4, Revision 46

Cooling Water System, Reactor Building P&IDs M216, SH 1, Revision 35, SH 2, Revision 314, SH 3, Revision 34, and SH 4, Revision

32, Turbine Building Cooling Water System

P&IDs M241, SH 1, Revision 87, and SH 2, Revision 48, Residual Heat Removal System

P&ID M272, Revision 9, Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooling System

M11-26-2 SH 2, Revision 12, RBCCW

E209A Tube Layout including plugged tube locations M11-26-2 SH 3, Revision 10, RBCCW E209B Tube Layout including plugged tube locations

Work Orders

WO 52366878, Task 1 Perform Loop 'A' RHR Performance Heat Exchanger Thermal

Performance Test during

RFO-19

WO 52366879 for the "A" RBCCW Heat Exchanger Thermal Performance test done on

4/15/2013

Miscellaneous

'A' RHR Performance Tests for 2013, 2009, and 2005

ASME

OM-S/G-1994, Standards and Guides for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power

Plants Calculation M-664, Containment Heat Removal, Revision 1

Calculation M-1276, EDG X-107A/B Design Basis Thermal Operating Limits, Revision 0

EC#

0000044093, Evaluation of RBCCW "B" HX, E-209B, Eddy Current Results, Revision 0

EDRI

NP-7552, Heat Exchangers Performance Monitoring Guidlelines Engineering Report

PNP-ME-08-00002, on Activities for Resolution of NRC

GL 2008-01 and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) SER 2-05 to minimize gas accumulation in piping systems, Revision 1 Engineering Report

PNP-ME-11-00002, on Activities for Resolution of Category 2, Safety Systems for INPO SER 2-05, per

EN-DC-219 to minimize gas accumulation in piping systems, Revision 0 EPRI

NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines

MRAP-2011-005, Maintenance Rule Tracking for CR -PNP-2011-03989 on SSW system Pilgrim Plant Self-Assessment,

LO-PNPLO-2013-00012, of the Ultimate Heat Sink, completed on 6/20/2013

SDBD-29, Design Basis Document for the Salt Service Water (SSW) System, Revision E1

SDBD-30A, Design Basis Document for the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System, Revision 1 Specification M591, SSW & RBCCW SR Piping and HX Inspection, Maintenance and Test Requirements in Response to

GL 89-13

Attachment

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

2.2.32, Salt Service Water System (SSW), Revision 87

2.4.155, Loss of Annunciator System, Revision 8

8.M.2-1.5.8.1, High Drywell Pressure, Low Water Level, and High Radiation Logic System A -

Inboard Functional Test, Revision 36

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-5595, During the July EP drill, the NRC resident noted simulator indications that were not the same as the present conditions at the plant

Miscellaneous

10

CFR 50.72 Report Dated 7/15/2013 Emergency Action Level Classification Criteria Emergency Planning Drill Scenario date 7/25/2013

Power Maneuver Plan

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

EN-DC-198, Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability Program, Revision 2

EN-DC-203, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 1

EN-DC-205, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, Revision 4

EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 2

EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 2

EN-LI-100, Process Applicability Determination, Revision 13

2.2.87, Control Rod Drive System, Revision 131

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2012-5034, Received a Ground on EDG "B"

CR-PNP-2013-0061, During Performance of 8.9.2 for EDG "A", Emergency Shutdown Signal was Received On Start.

Cause of Shutdown Was Crankcase Exhauster Failure

CR-PNP-2013-0186, Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan

CR-PNP-2005-3643, Bussman Fuse Failure Report

Miscellaneous

Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda

MRAP-2013-01, Emergency Generator Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

1.5.22, Risk Assessment Process, Revision 17

1.5.22, Attachment 6, Qualitative Risk Considerations

3.M.1-45, Outage Shutdown Risk Assessment, Revision 14 8.M.3-18, Standby Gas Treatment System Exhaust Fan Logic Test and Instrument Calibration,

Revision 49

Attachment

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-5435, Qualitative Risk Assessments are not documented as required by

Procedure

1.5.22

Miscellaneous

Equipment Out of Service Quantitative Risk Assessment Tool Integrated Risk Summary Form for Week of 7/29/2013

Risk Sheet for Week of 7/1/2013

Scheduler's Evaluation for Risk for Week of 7/29/2013 Shutdown Risk Assessment Work Week Schedule

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

Procedures

EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 6 2.2.23, Automatic Depressurization System, Revision 35

ARP-C903L-A2, Relief/Safety Valve Leaking, Revision 14

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2002-11733, Plant Hatch identified a problem with Target Rock SRVs

CR-PNP-2009-3338, RBCCW suction header piping in both RBCCW bays show surface corrosion

CR-PNP-2010-0063, RCIC high suction pressure

CR-PNP-2010-0658, 2010 UHS Self-Assessment identified a repeat concern regarding external corrosion for the RBCCW Header Supply Piping

CR-PNP-2013-5208, Failure of both primary and backup controllers for Beta Annunciator System

CR-PNP-2013-5229, Operating crew elected NLO to perform communicator duties contrary to recent training

CR-PNP-2013-5246, Increasing ultimate heat sink temperatures requiring entry into TS 3.5.8.4

CR-PNP-2013-5457, Both pipe supports for RBCCW suction header A are severely degraded

CR-PNP-2013-5651, 3-stage SRV failed to reclose after lift on the test stand

CR-PNP-2013-5990, Leakage past

MO-1301-49 causes high suction pressure after RCIC run and associated operability evaluation

CR-PNP-2013-6187, SRV 'C" tailpipe temperature has risen over the last 7 days

CR-PNP-2013-6428, Plant SRV 3C tailpipe temp 208F and rising

Drawings

Drawing H30-1-68, Pipe Support RBCCW, Revision E1

Drawing M1G3-4, RCIC Functional Diagram

Miscellaneous

ARP-C904L-A3, RCIC Pump Suction Pressure, Revision 17

Calculation H30168, Analysis of Pipe Support base plates in accordance with

IE 79-02

Calculation M-1036, Evaluation of RBCCW Suction Header Piping, Revision 0

Compensatory Measures Log for Week of 8/26/2103

EC45906, Temp Pipe Support for Degraded Pipe Support H30-1-68 Information Notice (IN-2003-01), Failure of a Boiling Water Reactor Target Rock Main Steam Safety/Relief Valve ODMI for

CR-PNP-2013-5246

Attachment PNPS Technical Specifications Target Rock Report 8696

Transient Combustible Evaluation 2013-53

UFSAR Vendor Manual V-0083, Panalarm Annuciator System, Revision 5

Vendor Manual V-1217, Annunciator System for the Control Room and Panel C100, Revision

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

3.M.3-24.15, Valve Stem Lubrication, Revision 10

3.M.4-6, Safety Related Relief Valve Test Procedure, Revision 7

3.M.4-92, Bolting and Torquing Guidelines, Revision 19 8.E.11, Standby Liquid Control System Instrument Calibration-Critical Maintenance, Revision 26 8.I.45, IST Instrument Calibration

8.M.3-18, Standby Gas Treatment System Exhaust Fan Logic Test and Instrument Calibration, Revision 49 8.Q.3-3, 480V AC Motor Control Center Testing and Maintenance, Revision 58 8-Q.3-8.2, Limitorque Type HBC, SB/SMB-0 through SB/SMB-3 Valve Operatory Maintenance -

Critical Maintenance, Revision 20

EN-HU-102, Human Performance Traps & Tools, Revision 12

EN-WM-107, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 4

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2012-4884, Potential for trip of breaker 52-103

CR-PNP-2012-4887, Standby Gas Fan "B" tripped on undercurrent condition

CR-PNP-2013-6505,

PSV-203-7 did not lift at 130% of set pressure

CR-PNP-2013-6693, It was discovered after review of

WO 52313614-03, installed

PSV-203-7, the incorrect procedure revision of 3.M.4-92 Bolting and Torquing Guidelines was referenced to apply valve fastener torque

Drawings

Drawing E8-11-8, Arrangement Diagram Motor Control Center B15, Revision 32

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 0245945-03

WO 336467, Inspect Relays

OC-37-1516A1/A2/A3 and Relay Sockets

WO 52313614, Task 2, Test

PSV-203-7 Setpoint

WO 52313614, Task 3, Install

PSV-203-7

WO 52313614, Task 4, Post Maintenance Test after

PSV-203-7 Installation

WO 52313614, Task 5,

PSV-203-7, Setpoint Verification

WO 52324617, Task 1, 8.Q.3-3, 52M-1516A & 52M-1516B, Breaker Testing (SBGT and

CHREAFS)

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

2.1.1, Startup from Shutdown, Revision 182 2.1.4, Approach to Critical and Plant Heatup, Revision 34

2.1.5, Controlled Shutdown from Power, Revision 115

Attachment 2.1.7, Vessel Heatup and Cooldown, Revision 54 2.2.19, Residual Heat Removal, Revision 107

2.2.19.1, Residual Heat Removal System Shutdown Cooling Mode of Operation, Revision 36

2.4.150, Loss of Feedwater Heating, Revision 21

3.M.1-45, Outage Shutdown Risk Assessment, Revision 14

EN-OP-117, Assessment of Operator Performance Post Scram, Revision 6

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2011-5012, There is a differing professional opinion on the adequacy of the Abort Criteria (Section 3.0) in 2.2.31.1

CR-PNP-2013-0626,

Commenced plant shutdown to repair condenser bay leaks on E-101B, E-

105A, and

RO-3490

CR-PNP-2013-0629,

2 adverse conditions were discovered while working E -101B manway

CR-PNP-2013-4332, Identified the south end bell of both 5th point feed water heaters E-101A and E-101B leaking

CR-PNP-2013-5569, RP reported water coming out the Main Condenser door by the K111 Air Compressor.

Made a Condenser Bay entry found the leak at the Blank Flange installed where

RO-3490 used to be installed

CR-PNP-2013-5949, At 0755 a manual reactor scram was inserted due to RFP loss of cooling trip signal.

Subsequently all RFPs tripped

CR-PNP-2013-5982, During troubleshooting of Y1 breaker 24 trip, found steady steam leak from manway on E-105A

CR-PNP-2013-6018, We need to challenge ourselves honestly if we are serious about improving and continuing to operate Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

CR-PNP-2013-6037, Y1 Breaker 24 tripped, resulting in control annunciator RFP B Cooling Water Low Flow (C1L-F-2) and inability to place feedwater heating in service

CR-PNP-2013-6040, The NRC resident raised several concerns regarding the Post Trip Review for August 22, 2013 manual reactor scram

CR-PNP-2013-6074, 1

st point feedwater heater A dump valve would not open from

LIC-3151 in auto or manual while placing feedwater heaters in service

CR-PNP-2013-6253, On 9/6/2013 RFP A 4160 v motor start was attempted and tripped.

This has not been documented in PCRS

CR-PNP-2013-6311, Procedure 3.M.1-45 "Outage Shutdown Risk Assessment" provides vague guidance on the involvement of the PRA Specialist during Forced Outages.

CR-PNP-2013-6345, While working on the reassembly of the B fifth point Feedwater Heater (E-101B) under Work Order

355440-02 Mechanical Maintenance observed two depressions in the seating surface

CR-PNP-2013-6346, Work order

361777-01 for installation of

EC 46587 for repair of

RO-3490 lacks sufficient detail for performance of post weld heat treatment (PWHT)

CR-PNP-2013-6367, While performing

WO 361777,

RO-3490 remove and replace flange, it was determined by the UT vendor that the welds made would not allow the probe to have full contact with the surface of the weld.

CR-PNP-2013-6389,

WO 00361766 task 09 allowed the lay out of temporary cables from 'A' Feed pump to 'A' Switchgear Room

CR-PNP-2013-6399, During troubleshooting of the A RFP Breaker, A101, the breaker was attempted to be closed from the MCR. However, the breaker never closed

CR-PNP-2013-6406, During the troubleshooting of the "A" RFP testing we found a problem with the Neutral CT not providing the correct current output to the 150N relay

CR-PNP-2013-6411, EC46579 for the Temp. Mod. for RFP P-103A temporary power includes instructions for installing a type IIIC Fire Seal per Specification M570.

That seal design is not acceptable for a floor penetration and is not an approved three hour rated seal.

Attachment

CR-PNP-2013-6413, During the repair of

RO-3490 during this forced outage after the restricting orifice pipe flanges were removed significant pipe movement [spring] occurred

CR-PNP-2013-6416, No SREVS testing is currently contained in the EC or work plan

CR-PNP-2013-6423, Received ""RELIEF/SFTY VALVE LEAKING" (C903L-A2). Check of EPIC showed SRV 3B tailpipe temp of approximately 210F and rising

CR-PNP-2013-6428, Check of PI showed SRV 3C tailpipe temp of approximately 208dF and rising. Temp indication rose to 210dF and stabilized. All other SRV tailpipe temps show on PI show approximately 90F for their tail pipe temps (including SRV 3B)

CR-PNP-2013-6437, A small section of the 6 temporary power cables which are installed from the P-103A motor to switchgear cubicle A101 (as part of temp mod

EC 46579) is currently running on safety related cable tray AT03 in the upper switchgear room

CR-PNP-2013-6438, While attempting to place feedwater heating in service IAW 2.2.152 the 'A' train 2nd point heater normal drain valve is not controlling FW heater level

CR-PNP-2013-6440, Received ""RELIEF/SFTY VALVE LEAKING" (C903L-A2). Check of EPIC showed SRV 3C tailpipe temp of approximately 178 deg F and rising.

Miscellaneous

C20F1 Forced Outage Schedules

C20F1 Outage OCC Meeting Updates C20F1 Outage Meeting and Communication Schedule

C20F3 Forced Outage Schedules

C20F3 Outage OCC Meeting Updates

C20F3 Outage Meeting and Communication Schedule Compensatory Actions and Disabled Annunciator Logs

Control Room Logs Electrical Troubleshooting Documentation Emergent Issues Listings

Emergent Issues Open Items Lists Forced Outage Shift Turnover Sheets Just In Time Training

NEI-99-02, Regulatory Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6 PNPS Technical Specifications

Post Trip Report Power Maneuver Plans Risk Assessment Review Checklists Technical Specifications Y1 Breaker 24 Load List

Attachment

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

3.M.3-47, Load Shed Relay Operational/Functional Test-Critical Maintenance, Revision 83

8.5.3.14, SSW Flow Rate Operability Test, Revision 34

8.5.4.1, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Pump and Valve Quarterly and Biennial Comprehensive Operability, Revision 112 8.9.1, Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance, Revision 126

8.9.1.1, Attachment 2, Diesel Oil Transfer System Skid-Mounted Valve Operability and Supplemental Pump Testing, Revision 22 8.A.15, HPCI System Integrity Surveillance, Revision 16

8.C.34, Operations Technical Specifications Requirements for Inoperable Systems/

Components, Revision 55

8.M.2-1.5.8.1, High Drywell Pressure, Low Water Level, and High Radiation Logic System A -

Inboard Functional Test (Drywell Sump Pump Drain Isolation, TIP withdrawal Recirc

Loop Sample Valve Isolation), Revision 37

8.M.3-18, Standby Gas Treatment System Exhaust Fan Logic Test and Instrument Calibration, Revision 49

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-6517, During an NRC review of Procedure 3.M.3.47, Load Shed Relay Operational/Functional Test, Attachment 4 it was discovered that Step[8](c) states at Switchgear Cubicle A5-4 to BOOT contact 9-10 on relay 127-604/1.

It is unclear as to the correct Switchgear Cubicle location of relay 127-604/1

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 52498795, Task 1, 8.5.3.14 (See 8.1), Perform SSW Operability Test (Loop A)

WO 525475445, SBGT Logic Test and Leak Check for Train A

Miscellaneous

HPCI System Testing Schedule, Week of 8/12/13

Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution Briefing Checklist Technical Specifications

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-5574, Weaknesses were discovered in the drill scenario used for the July 25,

2013 combined functional drill

CR-PNP-2013-5578, During the 7/25/2013 drill, offsite notification message form number 5 for the simulated General Emergency condition and associate Protective Action Recommendation indicated an "Emergency Release IS NOT in Progress." "Emergency Radioactive Release IS in progress" should have been selected

CR-PNP-2013-5579, Below standard performance of an ERO member was identified in the post drill facility critique using the performance objective measures found in

EN-EP-308, Emergency Planning Critiques

Miscellaneous

Emergency Action Level Classification Criteria Emergency Planning Drill Scenario date 7/25/2013

Attachment

Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Procedures

3.M.2-6.4, NUMAC Process Radiation Monitor Calibration, Revision 19

7.4.47, Calibration of the Radwaste Effluent PRM, Revision 12

7.4.63, Process Radiation Monitor Setpoints, Revision12

8.E.8, Off gas Instrument Calibration, Revision 51

8.M.3-17.1, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Alternate Flow Rate (Liquid Level) Instrument Functional & Calibration, Revision 11

8.M.3-17, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Flow Rate Instrument Functional & Calibration,

Revision 20

Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Procedures

7.9.12, Liquid Effluent Releases with RETDAS, Revision 8

EN-RP-113, Response to Contaminated Spills/Leaks, Revision 7

Condition Reports

Groundwater related:

2013-04250, 2013-04169, 2013-02163, 2013-01870, 2013-02040,

2013-1784,

Miscellaneous

Reports Consultant's Report on the Pilgrim Groundwater Protection Program Environmental Laboratory Analysis Report for Soil Samples taken at the Waste Neutralizing Sump Groundwater Monitoring Well Tritium Sample Results 2013

Sump Discharge Line separation location

Section 2RS7: Radioactive Environmental Monitoring Program

Procedures

7.12.25, Air Particulate and Air Iodine Filter Preparation and Collection, Revision 15 7.12.40, Exchanging TLDs, Revision 10

7.12.80, Maintenance and Calibration of the REMP Air Sampler, Revision 9

8.E.72, Surveillance, Maintenance, and Calibration of the 220' Met Tower MeDAP Equipment, Revision 5

Sampling Sites TLD Location Codes:

EW, EB, PL, ER, WR, WS, PB, OA, MS, CR, PC, TT

Air Sampler Location Codes:

EW, EB, PL, ER, WR, WS, PB, OA, MS, CR, PC Surface Water Location Codes: PP, DIS, BP

Quality Assurance Audit

QA-2-6-2011-PNP-1, Combined Chemistry, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit

Attachment

Condition Reports

Meteorlogical Tower related: 2013-057452, 2013-03335, 2013-03322, 2013-03081,

2013-01254, 2013-00919, 2013-00916, 2013-05742,

2012-04759, 2012-02884

REMP related:

2012-03539, 2012-03545, 2012-02690, 2012-04771, 2012-02602

Calibration Records Air Sampler Dry Gas Meter

Nos.

3601316,

9001363,

3601307,

3601308,

3601318,

31220014,

3601040,

3601042 Air Sampler Pump

Nos. 606, 607,528, 7867, 2495, 2496, 608, 4372

Meteorological Tower Instrumentation calibrated 7/22/2013

Miscellaneous

Reports: 2011 and 2012 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports

2012 Land Use Census

50.75 (g) Decommissioning Files for Leaks & Spills Environmental Cross Check Samples 1st Quarter 2013, 3

rd & 4 th Quarter 2012 Inter-laboratory Comparison Program Results: 1

st , 2 nd , 3 rd, and 4 th Quarter 2012 Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual (Rev 10)

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-4774, NRC resident identified that all three of the reactor coolant system (RCS)

Leak Rate Data Collection Sheets had discrepancies

CR-PNP-2013-5638, During a review of the first quarter 2013 (1Q13) NRC Performance Indicator (PI) data for Pilgrim, the NRC Resident staff questioned why an Unplanned

Power Change was not documented for the January 20, 2013 forced outage

Miscellaneous

NRC Inspection Reports 3

rd Quarter 2012 through 2

nd Quarter 2013 NRC Performance Indicator Website Pilgrim Control Room Logs Pilgrim NRC Performance Indicator Data Sheets

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

2.1.26, Inventory of Alternate Shutdown and EOP Support Tools and Materials, Revision 43

2.2.8, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generators), Revision 103 2.2.13, 250VDC Battery System, Revision 28 3.M.3-42, Battery Charger Maintenance and Calibration, Revision 22

5.3.30, Loss of 250VDC Power Bus D10, Revision 9

8.9.8.3, 250VDC Battery Acceptance, Performance or Service Test - Critical Maintenance, Revision 22 8.9.1, Emergency Diesel Generator and Associated Emergency Bus Surveillance, Revision 125 8.9.19, Diesel Fuel Oil Emergency Transfer Skid Aging Management Surveillance, Revision 1

Attachment 8.C.14, Weekly Pilot Cell, Overall Battery Check, and Battery Charger Test, Revision 58 8.C.16.1, 250V Battery Quarterly Inspection/Surveillance, Revision 8

EN-FAP-OP-006, Operator Aggregate Impact Index Performance Indicator, Revision 0

EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Revision 14

EN-OP-117, Operations Assessments, Revision 6

EP-IP-210, Control Room Augmentation, Revision 9

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-1998-9462, the Tech Spec 3.9.A.3 minimum requirements of 19,800 gallons per EDG tank (39,600 gallons total) is insufficient to support the loads for seven days

CR-PNP-1998-9052, During review of safety related calculation S&SA 55 "minimum onsite diesel requirement", revision 5, and review of M223, four discrepancies were noted

CR-PNP-1998-9530, Engineering evaluation 98-076 written to support operability judgment for PR98.9462 may not be bounding in terms of EDG fuel consumption

CR-PNP-2010-3813, 250VDC back-up battery charger low float voltage

CR-PNP-2011-1179, In response to IER

LI 11-1, the following discrepancies were found:

Simulator:

EMG-100 (Emergency Management Guideline) is missing

AEOF: EOP's and

EMG-100 are not the current revision

EMG-100 includes procedures that are no longer active

EP-SAG-100 requires some editorial changes

EP Surveillance does not include the requirement to ensure the current revision and does not include

EMG-100 in any of the required emergency response facilities

CR-PNP-2011-1199, A fuel management strategy does not exist for obtaining/maintaining a long term fuel oil supply for the portable B.5.b and K-117 diesel powered air compressor.

An additional supply of 400 gallons is maintained onsite in two 200 gallon portable "pony" tanks.

This supply will provide an adequate inventory until deliveries are requested

CR-PNP-2012-2174, Apparent Cause Evaluation: 250Vdc Back-Up Battery Charger D15

Erratic Operation, Revision 1 System Health Report, 2

nd Qtr. 2013

CR-PNP-2012-2385, Update to maintenance rule action plan for 250VDC back-up battery charger

CR-PNP-2012-3334, During performance of 8.9.19 found 2in Boston royal flex wire reinforced black suction hose showing signs of cracking on August 1, 2012

CR-PNP-2012-3428, During performance of 8.9.19 found 2in Boston royal flex wire reinforced black suction hose showing signs of cracking.

Identified that the hose staged in the field does not match the description given in procedure 8.9.19 and shown on drawing M100C76

CR-PNP-2012-3501, NRC Senior Resident Inspector expressed concerns with Pilgrim's operability determination for

CR-2012-PNPS-3428

CR-PNP-2013-3512, In addition to the concern of relying on SER content in operability assessments identified in

CR 2012-3501, the NRC Senior Resident also expressed the following concerned regarding the operability determination for

CR 2012-3428

CR-PNP-2013-5867, Valve

SV-5065-82 could not be stroke time tested during 8.7.4.1 as the green "CLOSED" light will not illuminate

CR-PNP-2013-5891, The NRC Senior Resident identified a potential "Operator Work Around" (OWA)

CR-PNP-2013-5955, 250Vdc back-up battery charger below normal operating range

CR-PNP-2013-5956, Untimely replacement of 250VDC back-up battery charger circuit Cards Attachment

CR-PNP-2013-6199, The "Ops Aggregate Impact" for the month of August 2013 rose to a value of 1.95 making this performance indicator RED

CR-PNP-2013-6906, Corrective actions under

CR-2012-3428 have been untimely for resolving the design aspects of the fuel transfer strategy of the design basis for the 7 day fuel supply for the EDGs

Work Orders

WO 314767

WO 315015

Calculation S&SA055, EDG Low Sulfur Fuel Consumption and Ultra Low sulfur Density Limits over Seven

Days in Response to a LOCA with LOOP

Drawings

C20, Revision 1, Yardwork Underground Piping & Culverts Plan

C64A1-1, Revision E1, Blackout Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks T-160A and T-160B

C664-1-1, Revision 1, Underground Storage Tanks T-126A & B and T-129A & B

M100C70, Revision E1, Station Blackout Diesel Generator Diesel Oil Storage Tanks Fill & Vent Piping M100C76, Revision 2, Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Skid - SBO D/G T160A & B to EDG

T-126A & B

Technical Specification

TS 3.9, Auxiliary Electrical System

Miscellaneous

CDCN Log No.99-042, EDG Fuel Consumption Over Seven Days in Response to a LOCA with LOOP Using EOFs, S&SA 119 Emergency Diesel Generators O-NL-03-01-08, Revision 8 E11-13-2, Schematic Diagram 250Vdc Battery Chargers D13 and D15, Rev. E2 E13, Single Line Relay and Meter Diagram 125V and 250V DC Systems, Revision E80

FSAR 8.5, Standby AC Power Source

FSAR 8.10, Blackout AC Power Source

LER-98-001-01, Single-Failure Vulnerability of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply System

LER-98-021-01, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Supply

LO-PNPLO-2013-00118, Operator Aggregate Assessment of Plant Deficiencies - Snapshot, Assessment/Benchmark Report Template NRC Information Notice 93-53, Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station and Lessons Learned, July 20, 1993 Open Operator Aggregate Work Orders, Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Operability Evaluation (OE) Form 98-067,

EE 98-083 for PR#98.9530

Operator Aggregate Impact Index Operator Compensatory Measure Log

Pilgrim Integrated Inspection Report No. 50-293/99-05, October 8, 1999

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Issuance of Amendment Re: Emergency Diesel Fuel (TAC NO. MA5392), March 17, 2000

PR 98.9462, EE98-0076, Emergency Diesel Generator Storage Tanks T-126A/B

PR 98.9530, EE98-083, Revision 1

Attachment Proposed License Amendment to Revise On-site Fuel Storage Requirements for Emergency Diesel Generators, BECo Ltr. #2.99.029, May 5, 1999

Regulatory Guide 1.137, Fuel Oil Systems for Emergency Power Supplies, Revision 2

Standard Review Plan, Branch Technical Position 8-8, Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) and Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions V-0265, Battery Chargers Model USF Vendor Manual, Revision 11

Section 4OA3: Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

2.2.32, Salt Service Water System, Revision 87

2.4.155, Loss of Annunciator System, Revision 8

EN-OP-117, Operations Assessment, Revision 6

EN-OP-117, Attachment 9.2, Transient Snapshot Assessment Documentation Form for Reactor Scram on 8/22/2013 following a Loss of all 3 Main Feed Pumps

Condition Reports

CR-PNP-2013-0798, During a severe winter storm PNPS experienced a loss of offsite power and subsequent Rx scram

CR-PNP-2013-3256, Both SSW loops declared inoperable

CR-PNP-2013-5093, Control room noted high discharge canal temperatures

CR-PNP-2013-5125, Both SSW header alarms in solid

CR-PNP-2013-5175, SSW inlet temperatures nearly exceeded the TS limit

CR-PNP-2013-5208, Failure of both primary and backup controllers for the Beta Annunciator System

CR-PNP-2013-5228, Local authority follow-up notification not conducted in a timely manner

CR-PNP-2013-5229, Did not use designated communicator during an Unusual Event

CR-PNP-2013-5569, Blank flange leaking on feedwater system bypass line

CR-PNP-2013-6099, Procedure 2.1.5, Attachment 1, Section C, Operation after reactor scram with the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) closed does not contain guidance for the operators to open the turbine bypass valves

CR-PNP-2013-6100, During the reactor scram event on August 22, 2013 an excessive amount of water overflowed into the condenser bay floor and migrated to the Turbine Building floor sumps.

This dirty water challenged Radwaste operations and station water management

CR-PNP-2013-6101, During the reactor scram event on August 22, 2013 both recirculation pumps were tripped

CR-PNP-2013-6102, Procedure 2.1.5, Attachment 1, Section C, Operation after reactor scram with the MSIVs closed step [12] has a reference that should be enhanced or removed.

This procedure guidance led to delays in opening the MSIVs after the reactor scram event on August 22, 2013

CR-PNP-2013-6103, The station's Radwaste system was challenged by Thermex operation prior to the reactor scram event on August 22, 2103.

The Thermex PLC issue caused Radwaste water processing to suffer.

Shortly after the reactor scram occurred on August 22, 2013 it was difficult for the Radwaster operator to process water to clear tank volumes that allowed torus letdowns at the frequency that control room operators

required during HPCI and RCIC operations

Attachment

CR-PNP-2013-6104, During the reactor scram event on August 22, 2013 all three Reactor Feed Pumps tripped at ~100 percent power.

Reactor water level shortly lowered to -46

inches.

The MSIVs went closed on this low level.

Re-opening of the MSIVs took longer than anticipated.

Recovering from a condition were the MSIVs have been closed is not routinely trained in the simulator environment

CR-PNP-2013-6106, When reopening the main condenser vapor valves following the reactor scram event on August 22, 2013 both OFF GAS A PRESS/TEMP RESET and OFF GAS B PRESS/TEMP RESET push buttons had to be pushed to re-open the main condenser vapor valves

Drawings

M208, Sheet 1, Revision 69, P&ID Condensate and Feedwater

Miscellaneous

10

CFR 50.72 Notification dated 8/22/2013

CFR 50.72 Report Dated 7/15/2013

Control Room Logs Emergency Action Level Criteria Emergency Operating Procedures

IMC 0309 Reactive Inspection Decision Documentation Inspection Manual Chapter 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors

LER 05000293/2013-003-00

Main Control Room Annunciator

Plant Pressure and Level Traces Post Trip Report dated 8/25/2013

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Program Documents

EN-DC-143, Program and Component Health Reports and Action Plans

EN-DC-329, Engineering Programs Control and Oversight, Revision 5

EN-DC-343, Underground Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring Program, Revision 8

EN-DC-343, Attachment 9.4, Ranking of Low Risk Component

Miscellaneous Documents

BOP-UT-12-015 thru 021 Ultrasonic Examination of Wall Thinning Using Procedure Calculation A11168-C-001, Revision 0 Calculation A12321-C-001, Revision 2

CEP-UPT-0100, Underground Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring, Revision 0

CEP-NDE-0505, Ultrasonic Thickness Examination Procedure, Revision 4

CR-PNP-2013-00969 Pipe wall examination reveals low but acceptable wall thickness

EN-EP-S-002-MULTI, Underground Piping and Tanks Engineering Standard (General Visual Inspection), Revision 2

ECH-EP-10-00001, Underground Piping and Tanks Inspection and Monitoring, Revision 0

Integrated Direct Inspection (Excavation) Schedule Target End Date 06/30/13

NEI 09-14, December 2010 Guideline for the Management of Underground Piping, Revision 1

NEI-09-14, April 2013 Guideline for the Management of Underground Piping, and Tank Integrity

Revision 3

Attachment NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/182, 08/08/13; Review of the Implementation of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks Procedure No. 2.2.18, Cathodic Protection, Revision 12

SEP-U1P-PNPS, Underground Components Inspection Plan, Revision 8 05-09-2013, Apparent Cause Evaluation Report - Discharge Line Failure, Revision 0

Attachment