ML20140G906
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( $37 May 1, 1970 L IIsso to File (Midland Plant)
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IERTING PIANT STEAMTO DISCUSS 3T TEE AECCtBtPANT DOW CBEMICAL REQUIREMENTS / PLAN
_FURPOSE:
This meeting was set-up to brief the ACRS Subcommittee Chatraen (L en the requirements and plans of the AEC with respect. Squires) to the licensing Consumers Power Company and/or the Dow Chemical Osesecandary anyoffor use of steam from the Midland Plant in the Dow tserka at Midland.
ATTENDEES: _
ACRS L. Squires R. F. Fraley, Staff AEC Resulstory Staff C. K. Beck, Reg.
M. M. Mann, Reg.
i L. S . Rogers, SA; F. A. Morris, DEL R. Shaper, OGC (Reg.)
! R. E. Cunningham, DML
, F. J. Veerling, DHL D. seith, RPS .
J. Murphy, DRL DISCUSSION:
14s Rogers noted that fission products in the steam being need b y Dow will normslly ine a factor of 100 - 1,000 below Part 20 limits.
not be sero, however, (it would be sero if the steam generator rofrem had a seIt w leak rate) sad will therefore require a licanae er exemption e AEC th for Consumers material - if any. to transfer the material and for n seeDowthe to receive geese monitor proposed (set at'3 1 10-6The Staff is planning to require the sentin of beta activity (with a limit en beta activity ofuc/ml) and frequent grab samples the most setettive practical methoda of acmitoring 10 10-9 for oc/ml) as i radioacti v ty.
A. latermination viel have to be made that these limits cueawill pre l d detectable level of added radioactivity in Dow products the ABC.han'say,v.in effect, .
With this system '
being added (conf'd an page 2)that no detectable amount of radianctivity is 3._ .w Of71CE > -
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Form AEC-5:e (Rev.g.53) AECM 0240 $Y$602 PDR fp/$ -85#$0W Bll1
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We Bow products, although it cannot certify that the assuat is absolately ,,
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. Mr. Sgstres inquired if it is .consideoed practicable to meet thesellimita '
an attivity. Mr. Rogers noted that~the fuel failures and steem generator leek rates for the Midland plaat weald have to be lower them the levels O that axist in plaats that have experMace to date.
Dr. Beck acted that the licensing requirement by the ABC any presset a problem to Dew in M1 with FDA since the AgC can certify that se detectable radioactTvity is being introduced in the Dew prodmet'but it esanot certify that absolutely me radianctivity is being added. Es meted that, in other cases, FDA has accepted concentrations below the 1eenst detectable level as representing zero in the monitoring of impurities is products.
It nos noted that fission products (eg. Ze -132) may represset a signifi-cant fraction of the grees gamme activity in the steam. It was acted that Ne- 132 is act considered bielegically significant;henever, Bev is to provide additiona?! data regarding the relationship between 3 I 10* ac/a1 gross ganma limit 'and the F. P. inventory in the steam and Bow predacts.
Part 20 concentratten limits are not censideeed applicable for the steam sinceitistobejssedinaprocess.(Part20limitsareconsidered applicable only to material being released to the enviremment). In some cases, the radioactivity in process steam could be considerably I higher than Part 20, however, in this case, it will have to be much lower. (e.g. Iow esengh se added activity in Dow products is andetectable).
It was noted that Dow plans a program to determine the background levels of their products before the suelear plantsegoes:.into.>operati:on.
In response to a question by Mr. squires, Pete Morris meted that he percen-ally did not feel that all of these issues have to be fully resolved i
before a construction permit for Midland. We suggested that, it is only necessary to deternise that ad8quate R&D is in progress and/or alternate solutions can be implimented at the operating license stage. Mr. Squires
! meted that use of this steam by Dow is a beste consideration to this plant j and should be resolved before the project gets tee far aleag.
R. F. Fraley Executive Secretary
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Form AEC-518 (Rev.9 53) AECM 0240
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JCN:bjk 5/5/70 Protect: Midland Plant Status: Construction Permit - second of two scheduled ACES meetings, letter requested
Background:
November 7,1968, Volumes I & II of PSAR received January 10, 1969, Preliminary DEL report ressived January 13, 1969, Application formally filed January 22, 1969 Site visit and Subcommittee. nesting / j January 23, 1969 DEL site report received 1
February 4, 1969 Subcommittee meeting '
February 6-8, 1969 ACRS meeting on site related issues -
j March 6, 1970, BEL report received ,
i March 24, 1970, Subcommittee meeting ' l April 9-11, 1970, ACRS meeting j l April 24, 1970 Subcommittee meeting /
I The Midland Plant Units 1 and 2 are two loop (4 pumps) Babeeck and Wilsom PWRs with design power levels of 2452 W t. The plant is owned and will be operated by Consumers Power Company with the Bechtel Corporation as the A-E. The reactors are similar to the units provided for the Rancho Seco.
Arkansas Nuclear One, and Three Mile Island Plants.
A unique feature of the Midland Plant is the intent to supply approximately j
4,050,000 lb/hr of process steam to the adjacent Dow Chemical Company plant.
At the April 24, 1970 Subccannittee meeting the applicant oss requested to prepare presentations on the radioactivity in the process steam exported to Dow and the hasard to the control room from off-site accidents (ehlorine tank rupture).
DEL was requested to provide a written supplementary report sovering:
(1) An assessment of the prosess steam proposal, including the accept-ability of the licensing-or-exemption approach, and of criteria which the applicant may propose regarding the use of the steam in Dov's process.
(2) An estimate of the gaseous affluent releases from the Midland
- complex vs a more standard PWR.
(3) (n assessment of the "shlorine accident."
(4) ECC8 and reactor trip signal diversity.
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' Form AEC-31s (Rev.9-53) AECM 0240 *v Sh8
Midland Plant May 5, 1970 Status Report (7) Subsidence at the site.
(8) Vessel savity design.
l Other topics for possible discussion include:
I (1) Emergency plans - discussed briefly by the Subcommittee, there appears j to be a built in delay of 15-20 minutes between the accident and moti-fication to Dew.
(2) Consequences of an undetected fuel enrichment error and of the pro-pagation of fuel failures - identified for Subcomsnittee eensideration but not discussed.
l (3) Failure to scram on anticipated transients - identified for Subcommittee consideration but act discussed.
(4) Turbine missiles - the applicant has orally agreed to protect Class I equipment from turbine missiles.
(5) Vibration tests - the applicant has agreed in witing to perform een-firmat$gry vibration tests of the reactor internals.
(6) Bydrogen generation - the applicant has agreed to preeedd to the next required step if it is concluded that purging is not acceptable.
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Form AEC-518 $ev.9-53) AECM 0240
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EXCERPT FROM 121ST ACRS MEETING ,
SPECIAL PROJECTS Midland Plant Units 1 and 2 - The Committee held its second meeting to review the application by Consumers Power Company for authoriza- ,
A third meeting has tion to construct Midland Plant Units 1 and 2.
been scheduled for the June (122nd) ACRS Meeting. Items discussed during the meeting included:
- a. Reactor Vessel Cavity - The applicant stated that the reaction forces and pressures resulting from a primary coolant pipe rupture having an opening of 3 ft.2 was the basis for the current reactor vessel cavity design. The applicant stated that I he was prepared to design the cavity to withstand forces similar to those considered at the Indian Point / Zion plants. Consumers ,
believes that the brittle fracture of a reactor pressure ves'sel
' is incredible. They had not considered a ductile tear mode of j failure, however. Mr. Allen ' stated that Consumers would not want
- to operate any nuclear plant where a reactor vessel split was considered a credible occurrence.
Dr. Hendrie informed Consumers that it would be desirable for them to submit a written statement that the vessel cavity design will be equivale.nt to the Indian Point / Zion designs.
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- b. Anticiosted Transients (no scram) - B&W stated that they had recently discussed with the Regulatory Staff the results of the B&W studies of *vsrious systematic failures. B&W added that the Staff had additions 1 requirements regarding the studies, and, therefore, B&W would have to wait for a clarification of these requirements before continuing the studies. B&W had not analyzed a number of anticipated transients, e.g., loss of all primary coolant pumps, loss of off-site power. The possible benefits of additionni safety valves and of rapid injection of boron into the recctor moderstor were mentioned by the Committec. Dr. Hendrie advised the applicant to be prepared to continue discussion of
- i. this mstter at the next meeting.
Dr. Hansuer prepared a list of anticipated transients for the applicant to anslyze before the next meeting. (This list has i
been given to the Reguistory Staff for transmittal to the applicsnt.)
- c. Subsideng - The applicant indicated that there was an informal understsnding between Consumers and Dow restriction mining opersticns in the vicinity of the Midland resctor site. The
- Reguistory Staff has requested the applicant to have wells 19
- l. and 20 absndoned and plugged in additicn to the other wells in the arca which hsve been or will be pluggcd. It was suggested by Dr. Hendrie that considcration be given to an agreement between Dow and Consumers which identifies the zone around the nucle.sr plent where mining operations would bc prohibited. Such an agree.msnt should be made a p art of the application.
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EXCERPT FROM 121ST ACRS MEETING SPECIAL PROJECTS .
- d. Chlorine Storage - (effect of chlorine leakage on nuclear plant operations) - Dow representatives reviewed the provisions made to limit the quantity cf chlorine released to the atmosphere in the event of a catsstrophic failure of a chlorine storage tank.
The applicant believes that, for the worst chlorine accident, the nuclear plant operators could be protected throu,gh use of Scott Air-Facs (in the worst case they would be required for about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) and with charcoal filters in the control room
, bypass ventilation system.
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The applicant stated his intent to strive for a design which 4
would permit the operators to work without air packs under the worst chlorine accident conditions. One ppm chlorine in air is considered by the applicant to be a tolerable level for restricted work.
The Staff felt that the use of air packs was not a satisfactory approach for the continued operation of the nuclear plant.
Dr. Hendrie suggested to the applicant that it would be desirable to arrive at an agreement with the Staff on the criteria to which the control room ventilation system will
' be designed for operational safety and comfort.The desirability of the use of air packs seems questionable, e
- j' e. Containment Sprays - The applicant was notified by the Committee 1 : that he should be prepared to discuss the B&W sodium thiosulfate spray research program and the Consumers-supported borated water spray R&D program.
I f.
Seismic Cr!tcria for Class T Syste.ms - Dr. Okrent asked the Regulatory Staff to be prepared to discuss, at the June ACRS meeting, the seismic criteria which should be established for Class I systems prier te the completion of a construction permit review of Midland.
(Ref: ' Millstone Section, pg. 4, para. i.)
- g. Other Items Dis _ cussed with itsff - Discussions were held with the Regulatory Scaff regarding: (1) cable separaticn criteria *
(the Staff is satisfied with the applicant's proposal); (2) containmerit overpressure margias va. Indian Point / Zion (the Staff is satisfied with the present design); and (3) process
, steam (the Staff reported that the applicant is still Studying means of detestion and of ensering that the radioactivity present is below the limits established by the AEC for the i process secam).
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