Text

IR 05000254-03-009, IR 05000265-03-009; on 07/01/03-09/30/03, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2; Surveillance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution, and Event Followup
	ML033040094
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/27/2003
From:	Ring M; NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB1
To:	Skolds J; Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
	-RFPFR IR-03-009
	Download: ML033040094 (57)
	v • d • e

October 27, 2003 Mr. John L. Skolds, Presi dent Exelon N uclear Exelon Ge neration Compa ny, LLC Quad Cities Nuclear Pow er Station 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUB JEC T: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POW ER STATION, UNIT S 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REP ORT 05000254/2003 009;05000265/2003 009 Dear Mr. S kolds: On September 30, 2 003, the U.S. N uclear Regula tory Commissi on (NRC) compl eted an integrated inspe ction at y our Quad Citi es Nuclear Power Stati on, Units 1 and 2. The enc losed report docume nts the insp ectio n findi ngs wh ich w ere di scusse d on S eptembe r 30, 2 003, w ith Mr. Tu lo n a nd oth er m emb ers of y our sta ff.The in specti on ex amined activ ities condu cted u nder y our li cense as the y rel ate to safety and to compli ance w ith th e Commi ssion's rul es and regula tions and w ith th e cond ition s of yo ur li cense. The inspectors re viewe d selected p rocedures and records, observ ed activi ties, and in terview ed personnel.

Based on the resul ts of thi s insp ectio n, the inspe ctors i denti fied four issue s of ve ry lo w safe ty significance (Gr een). Three of the se issues were determined to involve violations of NRC requir ement s. However, because of thei r very low saf ety sign ifican ce and bec ause the y have been entered i nto your corre ctive acti on program, the NRC is treating the se issues a s Non-Cit ed Violatio ns in accor dance with Se ction VI.A.1 of the NRC's En forc ement Policy.If you contest the subject or sev erity of these Non-Cited V iolations, you shoul d provide a respon se wi thin 3 0 day s of the date o f this i nspect ion re port, w ith th e basi s for yo ur den ial, to the U.S. Nucl ear Regulation Commission, A TTN: Document Contro l Desk, Washington, DC 20 555-00 01, w ith a copy to the Regio nal A dmini strator , U.S. Nucle ar Regu latory Commission - R egion III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisl e, IL 60532-435 1; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuc lear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2 0555-0001; and the Resident Insp ector Office at the Quad C ities Nucl ear Power Station.

J. Skolds-2-In accordance w ith 10 CFR 2.790 of the NR C's "Rules o f Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Docume nt Roo m or from t he Pub licl y Av aila ble R ecords (PARS) compo nent o f NRC's document syste m (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessi ble from the NRC Web site at http://w ww.nrc.gov/readi ng-rm/ada ms.html (the P ubli c Ele ctroni c Read ing Ro om).Sincere ly,/RA/Mark A. Rin g, Chief Branch 1 Divi sion of Reac tor Pro jects Docket Nos. 50-25 4; 50-265 License No s. DPR-29; DP R-30

Enclosure:

Inspection Re port 05000254/2 003009; 05000 265/2003009 w/Attachmen t: Supplemental Information

REGION III Docket Nos:

50-254; 50-265 License No s: DPR-29; DPR-30 Report No:

05000254/2003 009; 05000265

/2003009 Licensee: Exelon N uclear Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Pow er Station, Un its 1 and 2 Location: 22710 206th Aven ue Nor th Cordova, IL 61242 Dates: July 1 th rough September 30, 2003 Inspectors:

K. Stoedter, Sen ior Reside nt Inspector R. Telson, Acti ng Senior Res ident Inspecto r M. Kurth, R esident Inspe ctor S. Caudill, Resident Inspector - Duane Arnold J. Jacobson, Se nior Inspector R. Ganser, Illi nois Emergency Management A gency Observers:

A. Garmo e, Summe r Intern A. Wichman, S ummer In tern Approved by: Mark Ring, Ch ief Branch 1 Divi sion of Reac tor Pro jects Enclo sure TABLE OF CONTENTS SUM MAR Y OF FI NDINGS..........

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..1 REPORT DETAILS

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........3 Summary of Plan t Status..........

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...3 1.REA CTOR SAF ETY..........

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.3 1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)

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.........3 1R04 Equipment Ali gnment (71111.04)

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......4 1R05 Fire Protecti on (71111.05)

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.5 1R06 Flood Protec tion (71111.06)

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5 1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on (71111.11)

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......6 1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness (71111.12)

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.7 1R13 Mai ntenan ce Ri sk and E mergent Work (71111.13)

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..7 1R15 Operability Evaluati ons (71111.15)

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....8 1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

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....9 1R17 Permanent Pla nt Modifica tions (71111.17)

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........9 1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing (71111.19)

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.10 1R22 Surveill ance Testing (71111.22)

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......10 1R23 Temporary Mo difications (71111.23)

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..13 1EP6 Drill Ev aluation (71114.06)

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14 4.OTHER ACTIVIT IES..........

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14 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)..........

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.......14 4OA2 Identi ficatio n and Resol ution of Prob lems (71152)..........

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..15 4OA3 Event Fol low-up (71153)..........

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.20 4OA4 Cros s-Cu ttin g Asp ects of Fi ndi ngs..........

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....24 4OA5 Other Activi ties..........

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.........24 4OA6 Mee ting s..........

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...24 SUPPL EME NTAL IN FORM ATION..........

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......1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

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1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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.........1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEW ED..........

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....3 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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.........17 Enclo sure 1 SUMMA RY OF F INDING S IR 05000254/2 003009, 05000 265/2003009; 0 7/01/03-09/30/03; Quad Cities Nuclear Pow er Station, Uni ts 1 & 2; Surv eillance Testing, Problem Id entification a nd Resoluti on, and Ev ent Follow up.This report cov ers a 3-month peri od of baselin e resident i nspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III in spectors and the resident in spectors. Three No n-Cited Vi olations (NCV) and four Green Findings w ere identified. The significance of most findings is i ndicated by their c olor (Green, White, Yellow , Red) using Ins pection M anual Chap ter (IMC) 060 9,"Significance D etermination P rocess" (SDP).

Findings for w hich the SD P does not a pply may be "Green" or be assigned a sev erity lev el after NRC man agement review. The NRC's program for overseeing the saf e operation of commer cial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "R eactor Oversight Process," Rev ision 3, d ated July 2000.A.Inspector-Identified and Self-Rev ealed Findings Corne rstone: Initia ting E vents*Green. A self-revealing half scram occurred on July 10, 2003, due to the f ailure to fully eval uate a change to the test e quipmen t configu ration speci fied i n surv eill ance p rocedu re QCIS 0500-01, "U nit 1 Div ision 1 L ow Conde nser Vacuum Sc ram Calibrati on and Functional Test." The failure to properly e valuate th e configuration ch ange was considered a human performance i ssue and a N on-Cited Vi olation of Techni cal Specification 5.4.1.This f inding was more th an minor because it impact ed the pr ocedur e qualit y, configuration control , and design c ontrol attribute s of the initi ating events cornerstone, and affected the corners tone objectiv e of limiting the likelihoo d of events tha t upset plant stability. The inspectors determined tha t the finding w as of very l ow safety s ignificance because the e xposure time was short, all other mi tigating systems w ere avail able, and the co ndens er cou ld ha ve be en rec overe d if ne eded. The li censee's imm ediat e corrective a ctions incl uded removi ng the test equipment, restoring the lo w condens er vacuum circu itry, and p roperly de termining an al ternate means to p erform the surveill ance test. (Sec tion 1R22)

Green. The inspe ctors determined that the failure to perform visual inspection of the dryer's i nternal surfaces a nd complete a n extent of con dition rev iew w hich eva luated the full spectrum of frequencies acting on the Unit 2 steam d ryer follow ing a June 20 02 failure contrib uted to a repeti tive failure in June 2 003.This finding w as more than min or because i t impacted the e quipment performance attribute of the i nitiating ev ents cornerstone and affected the corners tone objectiv e of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant s tability. The inspectors determined tha t this finding w as of very l ow risk signi ficance because the failed ste am dryer did not contri bute to a loss of safet y funct ion for any mitig ating s ystem. The licens ee's corr ective actio ns in clude d repa iring the ste am dry er and imple mentin g addi tiona l meas ures to Enclo sure 2 ensure that a ppropr iate e xtent of cond ition revi ews w ere co mplete d wh en requ ired. (Section 4OA2.3

)Corne rstone: Mitiga ting S yst ems*Green. The inspe ctors identified a Green finding a nd a Non-Ci ted Violati on due to the failure to follow procedures af ter discovering that a shutdown cooling suction valve would not operate from the co ntrol room. The fail ure to follow procedures resu lted in se veral human performance is sues inclu ding: the failu re to initi ate a work reques t when required, the performance of troubleshooti ng activiti es prior to de velopin g a formal troubleshooti ng plan, the us e of repetitiv e cycli ng to resolve equipment deficie ncies, and the us e of the equip ment cy clin g resul ts as a basi s for con tinue d compo nent o perabi lity. The deficiencies in work reque st initiation subsequently contributed t o the licensee's failur e to corr ect this equipm ent def iciency.The inspectors determ ined that the failure to f ollow procedures after discovering this equipment deficien cy was more than minor b ecause if left unco rrected, this prac tice could lead to the failu re to a ppropr iatel y id entify and c orrect subsequ ent de ficien cies. The inspectors d etermined that the finding was of very lo w safety si gnificance becaus e the sh utdow n cool ing suc tion v alve coul d be ma nuall y ope rated i f neede d and adequa te decay hea t removal co uld be main tained usin g the remaining resi dual heat re moval equipment. The licensee's cor rective actions included maintaining the ability to manually open the sucti on valv e, performing preven tive mainte nance on the valve's breaker, and re-enfor cing th e acti ons to be take n upon disco veri ng an e quipmen t defici ency. (Section 4OA2.2

)Corne rstone: Barr ier Inte grity*Green. The inspe ctors identified a Green finding a nd a Non-Ci ted Violati on due to the disco very of a rea ctor co olant pressu re bou ndary leak o n the U nit 1 reacto r press ure vessel he ad vent pi ping in M ay 2003.The in specto rs dete rmined that th e pres ence o f a react or coo lant s ystem pressu re boundary l eak was more th an minor beca use it impacte d the equipment p erformance attribute and th e objective of the initia ting events c ornerstone and the reactor cool ant syste m and b arrier performa nce at tribut e and objecti ves o f the ba rrier i ntegrit y corner stone. The i nspect ors de termin ed tha t this findi ng was of ver y lo w safe ty significance be cause additi onal equipment not credited i n the Probabi listic Ri sk Assessment w as avail able to miti gate the leak and the contributi on of this typ e of event to the baseli ne core damage frequency was smal l. Correctiv e actions i ncluded cutti ng out the we ld defect wh ich caused the leak and re pairing the pi pe. (Section 4OA3.2)B.Licensee-Identified Violations No viol ations of significa nce were i dentified.

Enclo sure 3 REPORT D ETA ILS Summary o f Plant Status Unit 1 opera ted at full pow er, with the exceptio n of minor pow er reductions for condenser flow rever sal a ctiv ities , unti l Sep tember 14, w hen op eratio ns per sonne l low ered re actor p ower to 850 megawatts e lectric (M We) to conduct control rod mane uvers. Uni t 1 returned to ful l power later the sa me day. On Se ptember 21, op eratio ns per sonne l low ered re actor p ower to 600 MWe to perform addition al control ro d maneuvers and conduct mai ntenance on th e 1A rea ctor feed wate r pump. Unit 1 end ed the insp ectio n peri od ope rating at full pow er.Unit 2 began the in specti on per iod a t 845 M We followi ng compl etion of the s team dr yer re pairs. On July 29, operations personnel began increas ing power to 912 MWe.

At approximately 890 MWe, the control roo m received multiple se quence of event re corder alarms for the 3D power operated relief valve (PORV). In addition, chatter was observed on the 1D/2D main steam isolati on valv e closure rel ay and the C main steam line low pressure rela y. Due to the relay cha tter and the 3D PORV alarm frequency , the operators re turned Unit 2 to 845 M We on July 30. A second p ower ascen sion from 845 M We to 912 MWe was conducted from August 13 through A ugust 16. On August 1 7, operations personnel di scovered a leak on the 2B condensate pump inboard bearing cool ing water su pply li ne whic h required a po wer reduction to 7 75 MWe to repair. Fol lowing thi s repair, Uni t 2 operated at full power for the remainder of the i nspection pe riod.1.REACTOR SAFETY Corne rstone: Initia ting E vents , Mitiga ting S yst ems, an d Barr ier Inte grity 1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)

a.Inspection Sc ope On July 20 and 27, 200 3, the licen see entered QCOA 0010-10, "Tornado Watch/W arning or Sev ere Winds,"

due to expe rienc ing sev ere thu nderst orms an d high win ds in the ar ea. Follow ing these occurre nces, the ins pectors revi ewed QCOA 0 010-10 to determi ne the actio ns to b e taken prior to ex perie ncing t his ty pe of w eather condi tion. The in specto rs toured outside areas, incl uding the sw itchyard, an d verified th at the licen see appropriately controlled items whi ch could be come missile s during adv erse weathe r conditions.

The inspectors also interv iewed o perations pers onnel on s hift during the adve rse w eather condi tions to ens ure tha t acti ons l isted in QC OA 001 0-10 w ere completed as re quired. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

Enclo sure 4 1R04 Equipment Ali gnment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walkdowns a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors p erformed partial w alkdowns o f the followi ng risk-significant miti gating systems equipmen t during times w hen the equipmen t was of inc reased importanc e due to redundant sy stems or other equip ment being unav ailable:*Unit 1 scram d ischarge vol ume;*Unit 1 high p ressur e cool ant in jectio n and the sa fe shutd own makeup p ump; *Unit 1 resi dual heat re moval loo p A; and*Unit 2 residual heat removal loop B.

The in specto rs uti liz ed the val ve an d brea ker chec klists list ed at t he end of this report to verify that th e components w ere properly positioned and that supp ort systems w ere lined up as required. The inspector s examined the material condition of each access ible component and o bserved equi pment operating pa rameters to confirm that th ere were n o obvious material cond ition defici encies. The i nspectors rev iewed w ork orders and condi tion r eports assoc iated wit h the i nspect ed equi pment to veri fy that those docume nts did not rev eal issues that could a ffect equipment functionali ty. The insp ectors used the informat ion i n the a ppropr iate s ectio ns of the Updat ed Fi nal S afety A naly sis R eport t o determine the functi onal requirements of the systems.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.2 Comp lete W alkd own a.Inspection Sc ope During the w eek of September 15, the inspectors p erformed a complete w alkdown of the emergenc y di esel generat ors (on e sampl e). The dies el gen erators were sele cted d ue to their high safety-significance and risk-significance.

The inspection consisted o f the following a ctivitie s:*a review of plant proced ures (includ ing selected abnormal and emergency procedures), draw ings, the syste m health report, Technical Sp ecifications, a nd the Updated F inal Safety Analysi s Report to de termine overa ll system health, proper system a lignment, and the system's l icensing basi s;*a review of outstanding main tenance wo rk requests to determine items in nee d of repai r;*a rev iew of outst andin g or comp leted tempor ary a nd per manent modific ation s to the system; and

an el ectric al an d mecha nical wal kdown of the s ystem to ve rify p roper a lignme nt, component access ibility , availa bility, and conditi on.

Enclo sure 5 The in spe cto rs a lso rev ie we d se le cte d i ssu es d ocu men ted in con di tio n re por ts t o v eri fy that the issue s were app ropriately addressed.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protecti on (71111.05)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors p erformed a routine w alkdown of acc essible po rtions of the follo wing risk significant fire z ones: C Fire Zone 1

.1.1.6, Unit 1/2 R eactor Buil ding 690'-6" El evation;*Fire Z one 6.3, Uni t 1/2 Aux ilia ry Ins trument Room;*Fire Z one 8.2.1.A, Unit 1 Conde nsate Pump R oom;*Fire Zone 8

.2.3.A, Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Pu mp Area;*Fire Zone 8

.2.7.A, Unit 1 Turbine Buil ding Hydrogen Seal Oil Area and M otor Control Cente rs; and*Fire Z one 8.2.8.E, Unit 1 Mai n Turbi ne Fl oor.The inspectors v erified that transi ent combustibl es were co ntrolled i n accordance with the licensee's procedures.

During a w alkdown of eac h fire zone, th e inspectors observed the physical condition of fire suppression devices a nd passiv e fire protection equipment such as fire doors, barri ers, and penetra tion seals.

The inspectors observed the condition and placement of fire ex tinguishers and hoses against the Pre-Fire P lan fire zon e maps. The phys ical condi tion o f access ible passi ve fir e prote ction feature s such as fire doors , fire dampers, fire barrie rs, fire zone p enetration sea ls, and fire reta rdant structural s teel coatings were also insp ected to veri fy proper insta llation a nd physi cal conditi on. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protec tion (71111.06)

External F looding Rev iew a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors c onducted an a nnual rev iew of the l icensee's external floo ding procedures. The re view included discussing the procedure step s with o perations, maintenance, en gineering, and se curity perso nnel to confirm th at the actions could be Enclo sure 6 accomplished within the required ti me; verifyin g that flooding-related equipment wa s readily availab le, in the specified lo cation, approp riately l abeled, and in good materi al condition; e nsuring that prev entive mai ntenance tasks on external floo ding related equipment were completed; and verifyin g that flooding probl ems entered in to the corrective a ction program w ere adequately addressed.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on (71111.11)

a.Inspection Sc ope On July 18 and September 8, 2003, the i nspectors observ ed operations crews in the simul ator (tw o sampl es). Th e Jul y 18 scenar io co nsiste d of a re actor r ecircu latio n pump speed signal failure, a reac tor recirculati on pump driv e motor breaker trip, and a recirculatio n loop di scharge pipe rup ture. The scenari o simulated on September 8, included a master feedwate r regulator val ve controll er failure, a sp urious turbin e trip, an anticipated transient w ithout scram, fuel d amage, and a conta inment breach.

The in spe cto rs e va lu ate d cr ew pe rfor man ce i n th e a rea s of:*clarity a nd formality o f communications;

ability to make timely actions in the safe directi on;*prioritiz ation, interpre tation, and v erification of al arms;*procedure use;

control board manipulatio ns;*oversight and direction from su pervisors; a nd*group dynamics

. Crew performance in these area s was compa red to licen see management ex pectations and guideli nes as presen ted in the foll owing docu ments:*OP-AA-101-111, "R ules and R esponsibil ities of On-Shift Pe rsonnel," Rev ision 0;*OP-AA-103-102, "Watchstanding Practi ces," Revi sion 1;*OP-AA-103-104, "R eactivity Management C ontrols," Rev ision 1; a nd*OP-AA-104-101, "C ommunications," R evision 0.The insp ectors verified that th e crews com pleted t he critic al task s listed in t he above scenarios. If cri tical tasks w ere not met, the i nspectors ve rified that crew and operator performance errors w ere detected an d adequately addressed by the eval uators. The inspectors v erified that the evaluators effectively i dentified crew s requiring remedi ation and appropri ately in dicated w hen removal from shift activiti es was w arranted. Lastl y, the inspectors observed the licensee's critique to verify that weaknesses identified during this observation were note d by the e valuators a nd discussed with the respective crews.

Enclo sure 7 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness (71111.12)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the lice nsee's hand ling of performance iss ues and the associ ated i mpleme ntatio n of the Mai ntenan ce Rul e (10 C FR 50.65) to eval uate maintenance effectiv eness for the sy stem listed be low. This system w as selected based on it bein g designated as ri sk significant unde r the Mai ntenance Rul e, being in i ncreased monitoring (M aintenance R ule category a(1) group), or due to an inspec tor identified issue or prob lem that potenti ally i mpacted system w ork practices, reli ability , or common cause failures:

Reacto r Buil ding V entil ation (Func tion Z 5704).The inspectors re view included an examina tion of specific system issue s, an eval uation of maintenance rul e performance criteri a, maintenance work practices , common cause issues, ex tent of condition review s, and trendin g of key parameters. The i nspectors also rev iew ed th e li cens ee's mai nten ance rul e sc opi ng, go al s etti ng, p erfor manc e mon itor ing, functional failu re determinatio ns, and current equipment performance sta tus. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R13 Mai ntenan ce Ri sk and E mergent Work (71111.13)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the documents listed in the "List of Doc uments Revi ewed"section of this report to determine if the risk associ ated with the activ ities li sted below agreed with the results pro vided by the licen see's risk asse ssment tool. In each case, the inspectors conducted w alkdowns to ensure that redu ndant mitigating sy stems and/or barrie r inte grity equipme nt cred ited b y the lice nsee's risk a ssessme nt rema ined avai labl e. When compensatory actions were required , the inspecto rs conducted pl ant inspecti ons to valid ate that the compe nsatory acti ons were a ppropriately implemented.

The inspectors al so discussed emergent work acti vities w ith the shift mana ger and work w eek manager to ensure th at these addi tional acti vities d id not change the risk assessment results.*Work Week July 7 through 11, 2003 , includi ng Unit 1 hi gh pressure cool ant inje ctio n su rve ill ance test ing;*W ork W eek July 20 through 25, 2003, including Unit 2 "A" con tainment air monitor system maintenance an d Unit 1 hi gh pressure cool ant injection vacuum brea ker fu ncti onal test ing; Enclo sure 8*Unit 2 high pressure cool ant injection surveil lance testin g conducted on August 13;

W ork W eek August 18 throug h 22, including a 2A control rod drive pump oil change and 1A service ai r compressor mainte nance; and

Unit 2 reacto r core isola tion cooli ng system beari ng oil change out and subsequent testin g conducted on S eptember 3.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluati ons (71111.15)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors a ssessed the op erability evaluati ons associate d with th e followi ng condition re ports or issue s:*Cond ition Repor t 154 716, Failu re of Valve 2-100 1-43 A to O pen on Two Attempts, dated Ap ril 19, 200 3;*Con diti on R epor t 165 978, Spe cifi c Va lve Lin eups hav e Po tent ial to R ende r Hi gh Pressure Cool ant Injection S ystem Inoperabl e, dated July 2, 2003;*Condi tion R eport 1 67467 , Unit 2 Die sel Ge nerato r Cool ing Water Pump Vibration A nalysis Adverse Trendi ng, dated July 14, 2003;

Condition Report 167721 , 1A Dryw ell Radi ation Detector Not Fully Inserted, dated July 14, 2003;

Condition Report 168367 , Extended Power Up rate Loadings o n the Unit 1 Steam Dryer M ay Produce Flow In duced Pressure Oscillati on Forces that Exceed Allowa bles, dated J uly 24, 2 003;*Condition Report 169869 , Non-conforming Desi gn for Main Ste am Line Low Pressure due to Extended Power Up rate, dated Jul y 31, 2003

and*Potent ial S eismi c Qual ificati on Issu e due to Lac k of Door s on A uxil iary Equipment Elec tric Room Pane ls, vario us dates.The inspectors re viewe d the technic al adequacy of each eval uation agains t the Technical Specification s, Updated Fi nal Safety A nalysis Report, and oth er design informatio n;determined w hether compensato ry measures, i f needed, were taken; and determi ned whether the evaluati ons were c onsistent w ith the requiremen ts of LS-AA-105,"Operability Determination Process," Rev ision 0.

The inspectors a lso revi ewed is sues entered into the corrective action prog ram to verify that the issues were appropriate ly characterize d and corrected

.

Enclo sure 9 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors a ssessed the foll owing opera tor workaround:

03-00 OWA, Contain ment H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample Li ne Heat Trace Temperature Issue, date d February 27, 2003.The inspectors re viewe d the detail s of the workaroun d to assess an y potentia l effect on the functionali ty of mitigating sy stems. The inspec tors review ed the techni cal adequacy of the workaround documentation a gainst the Upda ted Final Safety Analy sis Report an d other design inform ation to assess if the workarou nd conflicted with any design basis information. When procedure cha nges were requi red, the inspe ctors verified that the proced ure chan ges were technic ally corre ct and im plement ed in a time ly manner. Lastly, the inspectors compared the i nformation in abn ormal and emergency operating procedures to th e workaround information to ens ure that the ope rators maintaine d the ability to implement th ese procedures when require d. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Pla nt Modifica tions (71111.17)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d documentation associated with repa irs to the Un it 2 steam dry er which fail ed in June 2003. The rev iew in cluded ev aluating the re sults of GE Nucl ear Energy (GENE) F ield Dev iation Di sposition R equests, GENE desi gn drawings for the dryer modificati ons, repair w elding and i nspection pro cedures, GE and Stearns-Roger assembly d rawings of the d ryer, and stres s results from the l icensee's computerized finite eleme nt ana lysi s of the modifie d dry er stru cture. The in specto rs als o met w ith Exelon p ersonnel to d iscuss the dry er repairs and the analy tical basi s supporting the repai r. b.Fin din gs Prior to compl eting this in spection, the NRC initi ated a speci al inspecti on to revi ew the circumstances w hich led to the repeat dry er failure and assess the ade quacy of the licensee's dryer repairs. The results of this inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Re port 05000265/2 003011.

Enclo sure 10 1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing (71111.19)

a.Inspection Sc ope For each post maintenance ac tivity selected, the inspectors rev iewed th e Technical Speci ficatio ns and Updat ed Fi nal S afety A naly sis R eport a gainst the mai ntenan ce wo rk package to determine the safety function(s) that may hav e been affected by the maintenance. F ollowi ng this revi ew the i nspectors ve rified that the p ost maintenance test activity adequately tested the safety function(s) affected by th e maintenance, that acceptance cri teria were consistent w ith licen sing and desi gn basis informatio n, and that the pro cedure was proper ly re view ed and appro ved. When possi ble th e ins pector s observed the post maintenan ce testing activ ity and v erified that the structure, system, o r component operate d as expe cted; test equipment used was within its required ran ge and accura cy; ju mpers a nd li fted le ads w ere ap propri ately contro lled; test r esult s wer e accurate, comple te, and val id; test equipmen t was remov ed after testing; and any problems ide ntified during tes ting were ap propriately documented.

QCOP 1400-01, Co re Spray S ystem Preparati on For Standb y Operation, Revisio n 14, on M ay 21;*QCIS 2400-01, U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functional Test, Revisi on 13, on Jul y 14;*QCOS 6600-43, Un it 1/2 Diesel Generator Load Test, Revisi on 12, on Jul y 18;*QCOS 13 00-05, Quarter ly R eactor Core I solat ion C ooli ng Pump Operab ilit y Test, on September 3

and*QCOS 10 00-04, Resi dual Heat R emova l Serv ice Water Pu mp Opera bili ty Test , Revisio n 36, and QCOS 1000-06, Resi dual Heat R emoval Pu mp/Loop Operability Test, Revisi on 34, on Se ptember 5.

b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

1R22 Surveill ance Testing (71111.22)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors o bserved surv eillance testing activ ities and/or review ed completed surve illan ce te st pa cka ges for the t ests liste d belo w:*QCIS 2400-01, U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functional Test, Revisi on 13, on Se ptember 19, 2002 , and March 13 and 19, 2003

QCIS 0500-01, U nit 1 Div ision 1 L ow Conde nser Vacuum Sc ram Calibrati on and Functional Test, Revisi on 10, on Jul y 11, 2003

Enclo sure 11*QCOS 2300-15, High Pressu re Coolant Injection Drain Pot Level Switch, Drain Valve, Gland Seal Condenser High Level Alarm, and Steam Line Drain Functional Verification, R evision 18, on Jul y 11, 2003

QCOS 6600-02, 03 , 05, 06, 15, an d 42, Unit 2 Emergency Di esel Generator Surveill ance Procedure s, Various R evision s, on August 6 a nd 7, 2003;

QCOS 23 00-05, Unit 2 Quarte rly H igh Pre ssure C oolan t Inject ion P ump Operability Test, Revisi on 47, on Au gust 13, 2003; and

QCOS 13 00-05, Unit 2 Quarte rly R eactor Core I solat ion C ooli ng Pump Operability Test, Revisi on 35, on Se ptember 13, 2003

.The in specto rs ve rified that th e struc tures, syste ms, and compon ents te sted w ere capable of performing the ir intended safety function b y comparing the surveil lance procedure acceptance crit eria and results to design basis infor mation contained in Technical Sp ecifications, th e Updated Fi nal Safety A nalysis Report, and l icensee procedures. The i nspectors ve rified that each test was pe rformed as written , the test data was c omplete and met the requirements of the procedure, and the test equipment range and accurac y were consistent w ith the appl ication by observin g the performance of the surveil lance test. F ollowi ng test completion , the inspecto rs conducted w alkdowns o f the test areas to verify that th e test equipment h ad been remov ed and that the system was returned to its normal standby co nfiguration.

b.Fin din gs Low Cond enser Vacuum S cram Calibrati on and Functi onal Test Introduction

A self-revea ling half scram oc curred due to th e failure to full y eval uate a change to the test equ ipment configu ration speci fied i n surv eill ance p rocedu re QCIS 0500-01, "U nit 1 Div ision 1 L ow Conde nser Vacuum Sc ram Calibrati on and Functional Test." This issue was consi dered to be o f very low safety significan ce (Green)

and was dispositio ned as a No n-Cited Vi olation.Description

On July 10 instrument mai ntenance techn icians attempte d to conduct surveill ance testing in accordance w ith QCIS 0500-01. This surv eillance test implemented the use of a test box to prevent the initia tion of reactor prote ction syste m half scrams during testing. Step H.6 of Q CIS 0500-01 directed the technicians to insta ll a test box o n spec ific te rminal posts with in the reacto r prote ction syste m cabi nets. During the in stallation, the technici ans encountere d difficulty du e to a recorder already being insta lled in th e same locat ion a nd cl earanc e issu es in side the ca binet.The tech nici ans i mmedia tely commun icate d thei r inab ilit y to i nstal l the test bo x to operations pe rsonnel. The i nstrument maintenan ce supervi sor was no t contacted. The technicians and operators review ed QCIS 0500-0 1, the associ ated electric al prints, an d the recorder in stallation and identi fied a point o n the recorder w hich they believ ed was electrically equivalent to the procedurally specified term inal posts. Based upon this review , a decisio n was made to install the test box at the equiv alent poin t and continu e performing the survei llance. D uring as found testi ng of low cond enser vacuu m

Enclo sure 12 switch 1-0 503-A, an une xpected hal f scram occurred on re actor protection system channel A.

Follow ing the half scram, th e technicia ns stopped al l work and placed the equipment in a safe condition.

The licensee determined tha t the half scram occ urred because the operators an d the technicians failed to full y eval uate the affects of connecti ng the test box to the back of the recorder prior to installa tion. Altho ugh the alternate point chose n by the te chnicians and the operators w as electrica lly equi valent to the point spe cified in QCIS 0500-01, the fact that th e reco rder te st lea ds con taine d 0.1 a mp fuses whi ch wo uld b low whe n subje cted to the 1.12 amp curre nt experie nced during the surveil lance test w as not recogniz ed.Analysi s: The inspecto rs determined tha t the failure to fully ev aluate the i mpact of installi ng the test box to the back of the re corder prior to installati on was more than minor because it i nvolve d the procedure quality, co nfiguration control , and design c ontrol attributes of the i nitiating ev ents cornerstone and resulted in a half scra m which u pset plant stabil ity. This i ssue affected the cross-cu tting area of human p erformance in that the tec hnici ans an d the o perato rs did not re cogniz e the n eed to imple ment the tempor ary procedure chan ge process and e valuate th e impact of insta lling the tes t box in an alternate loc ation prior to installa tion.The inspectors d etermined that thi s finding shoul d be eval uated using the Significance Determination Process descri bed in Inspe ction Ma nual Chapte r 0609, "Significa nce Determination Process," becaus e the finding w as associated with an increase i n the likelihood of an initia ting event. The inspectors co nsulted the S ignificance Dete rmination Process Phase 1 Worksheet and determined that a Phase 2 e valuatio n was requi red based upon th e finding contrib uting to both the likelihoo d of a reactor trip and that the condenser (miti gating equipment) w ould not be availa ble.The inspectors u sed the Ris k-Informed Inspection Note book for Quad Citie s Nuclear Power Stati on, Units 1 and 2, Rev ision 1, d ated May 2, 2002, to co mplete the Pha se 2 evaluatio n. The ins pector s deter mined th at the expo sure tim e was less tha n 3 days since the pl ant w as rest ored to a safe c ondit ion i mmedia tely follo win g the ha lf scram. For ea ch Si gnifica nce De termin ation Proce ss wo rksheet comple ted, th e ins pector s assume d that all mi tigati ng sys tems equ ipment was avai labl e exc ept for t he con dense r. The inspectors a llowed credit for recov ering the conde nser. Using the se assumptions, the inspectors evaluated six core damage sequences. Worksheet results ran ged from 9 to 14 poi nts. The most domin ant core damage se quence invo lved a tra nsient and th e loss o f the po wer c onve rsion syste m wit h the c ontai nment h eat rem oval and l ate inventory makeup equipment av ailable. The inspectors concluded th at this findin g was of very lo w safety si gnificance (Green) be cause the ex posure time w as short, all other mitigating system s were available, and the condenser could have been recovered if needed.Enforce ment: Technical Specification 5.4.1 required th at written p rocedures be established , implemented, a nd maintaine d coverin g the applica ble procedure s recomme nded i n Regul atory Guide 1.33, Revi sion 2, App endix A, Feb ruary 1978. Section 1.a of Regulatory Gui de 1.33 required administrati ve procedure s governing the procedure adhe rence process.

Procedure HU-A A-104-101, "Proc edure Use an d Adherence," w as the procedu re establish ed by the licensee to implement the Enclo sure 13 require ments o f Techni cal S pecifi catio n 5.4.1 and R egulat ory Gu ide 1.33, Se ction 1.a. Proced ure HU-AA-10 4-101, Step 4.1.1, re quired proce dures to be fo llow ed as writ ten. Step 4.1.7 of HU-AA-104-101 required a procedure user to stop and notify their superv isor w hen a proced ure co uld n ot be p erformed as wr itten. Lastl y, Ste p 4.2.1 required that a p rocedure change re quest be initi ated when a procedure c ould not be performed as w ritten. Cont rary t o the a bove , on Ju ly 1 0, 200 3, the techni cians faile d to notify their s upervisor after identifying th at QCIS 0500-01 could not be performed as writ ten. In addi tion, neith er the techni cians nor th e oper ators i nitia ted a p rocedu re change request to revise QCIS 0500-01 prior to installing the req uired test equipment in an alternate l ocation. This violati on is bei ng treated as a N on-Cited Vi olation con sistent with Sectio n VI.A.1 of the NRC Enfo rceme nt Policy (NCV 050002 54/2003009-01). This viol ation is i n the l icens ee's correc tive actio n progra m as Co nditi on Rep ort 167 044. Immediate correctiv e actions i ncluded remov ing the test equip ment, restoring the condenser v acuum circuitry , and determini ng another method to safely perform the surveill ance test. Other co rrective acti ons includ ed briefing instru ment maintenance personnel on procedure adh erence and no tification require ments and conti nuing the implementation of the instrument mai ntenance depa rtment performance improv ement initiativ e.1R23 Temporary Mo difications (71111.23)

a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d documentation for the followi ng temporary configurati on changes:*Engine ering C hange 3 40650 , Setpo int Ch ange for C ontai nment H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample He at Trace Controll ers TIC 2-2400-2A and TIC 2-2400-2B , dated April 30, 2 003;*Engineering Changes 3436 83 and 344103, Change the Setpoint f or the Main Steam Line Lo w Pressure Reactor Protecti on System S witch, date d August 5, 2003; a nd*Engineering Cha nge 344148; Li ft Leads at 2-2202-3 2 Panel to Eliminate a False Open Indicatio n on the PORV 2-0203-3D An nunciator Ci rcuit; dated August 4, 2003.

The inspectors a ssessed the ac ceptability of each temporary configuration cha nge by comparing the 10 CFR 50.59 sc reening and ev aluation i nformation against the Updated Final Safety Anal ysis Repor t and Te chnic al Sp ecific ation s. The c ompari sons w ere performed to ensure that the new configurat ions remained consistent with design basis information. The i nspectors performed fiel d verificati ons to ensure that the modificati ons were insta lled as d irected; the modi fications operate d as expe cted; modification testing adequately d emonstrated conti nued system o perability , availa bility, and reliab ility, a nd that operation of the modifications did not i mpact the operabi lity of any interfacing systems. The i nspectors also review ed conditio n reports ini tiated during o r followin g the Enclo sure 14 temporary modifica tion instal lation to e nsure that probl ems encountered during the installati on were a ppropriately resolved. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparednes s 1EP6 Drill Ev aluation (71114.06)

a.Inspection Sc ope On September 15, th e inspectors observed an operations c rew partici pate in an emergency prepare dness simula tor drill w hich contrib uted to the Emergenc y Preparedness D rill and Exercise Performance Indicator.

The inspectors monitored the operations cre w's respo nse to a dry well ra diation moni tor failure, a rea ctor recirculati on pump sea l fai lure , and a sm all brea k los s of c ool ant a cci dent wh ich resu lted in h igh drywel l temperature, a loss of reactor w ater level indicati on, and floodi ng the reactor pressure ves sel. The ins pectors veri fied that appropri ate actions w ere taken by th e ope rat ors , th e p rop er e mer gen cy pro ced ure s w ere imp le men ted , an d th at t he shi ft manager made the app ropriate emergency classificati ons in a ti mely manner.

The inspectors atten ded the li censee's cri tique to veri fy that trainin g personnel an d operations department management ad equately ev aluated the crew's ab ility to implement the emergency plan

. b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

4.OTHER ACT IVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)Mitigating S ystems Performance In dicator Veri fication a.Inspection Sc ope The in specto rs int ervi ewed lice nsee p ersonn el an d rev iew ed Nuc lear E nergy Instit ute Document 99-02, "Regulatory A ssessment Performance In dicator Guidel ine," licen see memoran da, op erator logs, c ondit ion re ports, and pr evio us NR C ins pecti on rep orts to verify the a ccuracy of the p erformance indicato rs listed be low for both units from January 200 2 until Ap ril 2003:*Safety Syste m Functional Failures;

Residual Heat Remova l Unava ilabili ty; and*Alterna ting Cur rent Power Unavailabilit y.

Enclo sure 15 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

4OA2 Identi ficatio n and Resol ution of Prob lems (71152).1 Record Keeping W eakness Results in Determining Root Cause Based Upon Reasonable Assurance Rath er than Fact a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the lice nsee's impl ementation of the p roblem identi fication and resolution p rogram followin g the discov ery of a large a mount of air in the 1B core sp ray disch arge pi ping. The in specto rs rev iew ed the root c ause i nves tigati on cha rter to determine the sc ope of the inv estigation and the root cause report to determi ne the circumstances w hich resulte d in the 1B core spray system being i noperable.

The inspectors i nterview ed the root cau se investi gation team, operati ons personnel , the root cause sponso ring man ager, an d membe rs of the managem ent rev iew commit tee to assess the actio ns tak en to det ermine the root cause and the prop osed cor rective actions. b.Issues On May 20, during a Unit 1 shutdown, operations personnel conducted test ing in accord ance w ith QC TS 0600-20, "C ore Sp ray Is olati on Val ve Lo cal L eak Rat e Test." The 1B core spra y discharge piping wa s drained to complete the tes t. Upon test completion, op erations perso nnel filled and vente d the 1B core spray sy stem as directed by system operating procedu re QCOP 1400-01, "Core Spray System Prep aration for Standb y Oper ation."On Ma y 29, opera tions perso nnel place d Uni t 1 in a mode whi ch requi red the 1B co re spray sys tem to be operab le. Approx imately 5 days late r, the licens ee discov ered approximatel y 7 minutes of air in the discharge pipi ng while conducting the 1 B core spray vent veri fication test usi ng surveill ance procedure QCOS 1400-10, "C ore Spray Operability Verification." (See Inspecti on Report 050 00254/2003005

05000265/200 3005 for deta ils.)The licensee initiated a conditi on report and root cause in vestigation for this event.

The root ca use i nves tigati on tea m concl uded t hat the large amount of air w as in troduc ed in to the 1B core spray system due to the failure to com plete a procedure step in QCOP 14 00-01 on M ay 21. While the insp ectors agreed with this root ca use, th ey w ere concerned that the license e stated that the root cause de termination w as based on

"reaso nable assura nce" ra ther th an fact.The inspectors ques tioned the roo t cause inv estigation team to determine w hy the root cause determina tion was based upon re asonable as surance. The i nspectors learn ed that the term "reason able assuran ce" was us ed because th e actual cop y of QCOP 1400-01 us ed on Ma y 21 w as no longer a vailabl e. In additi on, the operators that restored the IB core spray system t o service could not recall if the procedure step in Enclo sure 16 QCOP 1400-01 had been perf ormed. The inspectors noted that the root cause repor t did not contain a discussio n regarding the di fficulties encounte red by the root cause team due to unav ailabil ity of the QCOP 1400-01 compl eted on M ay 21. H owever, a condition report on this topic was initiated during the in spection.The inspectors ques tioned members o f the operations d epartment to determi ne why the QCOP 1400-01 co nducted on M ay 21 w as not kept. The i nspectors we re informed that operating procedu res were no t required to be kept because thi s type of proced ure was not ty pical ly c onsid ered a record whi ch demo nstrate d the c apabi lity for safe o perati on. Conversel y, survei llance proc edures such a s QCOS 1400-10 were kept for the l ife of the plant since they formed a b asis for continu ed safe operation. The inspectors concluded that al though operat ing pro cedure s like QCOP 1 400-01 were not re quired to be kept, operat ions person nel u sed QC OP 140 0-01 i n pla ce of QCO S 1400-10 to demons trate compli ance w ith Tec hnica l Spe cifica tion S urvei llan ce Requ iremen t 3.5.1.1 on M ay 21. As a result, th e QCOP 1400-01 used on M ay 21 sho uld have been kept sin ce it formed the ba sis w hich demons trated the ca pabil ity fo r safe op eratio n..The inspectors c onsulted Insp ection M anual Chap ter 0612, Appe ndix E, "E xamples of Minor Issu es," Section 1.c, and determine d that the record keeping issue was more tha n minor. This dete rmination w as based on the fact that a thorou gh review of the QCOP 1400-01 us ed on Ma y 21 may have id entified the pro cedure steps tha t were not performed. In ad ditio n, the resul ts of a s ubseque nt ve nting t est sho wed that th e 1B c ore spray sys tem was in operable. The failure to ensu re the 1B core spray sy stem was operable pri or to changing Un it 1 operati ng modes on M ay 29 resu lted in the licensee violati ng Technical S pecification 3

.0.4. This vi olation of Techni cal Speci fication require ments w as doc umented in Se ction 4OA7 o f Inspec tion R eport 05000254/2003 005; 05000265

/2003005. The d ocument retention issues w ere include d in Conditi on Report 172 680. Correcti ve action s for this issue included initiati ng an Operations Dep artment Standing Order which e xplaine d the appropri ate methods to be used when returning equipmen t to an operabl e status and re vising the equipment operabili ty procedure to clarify the document retenti on requirements.

.2 Procedure Imple mentation Weaknesses Result i n Failure to Identify Roo t Cause and Implement Appropri ate Correctiv e Actions a.Inspection Sc ope As part of the resi dual heat re moval sy stem unavai lability performance indi cator inspection, the inspectors performed a word search of all condition re ports initia ted during the las t year loo king for equipment failures associated w ith the resid ual heat removal sy stem. The inspecto rs used their system knowl edge to revie w the w ord search results and s elected Con dition Rep ort 154716 for further i nspection. C ondition Report 154716 documented two unsuccess ful attempts to open residual heat removal A shutdo wn co olin g sucti on va lve 2-1001-43A fro m the co ntrol room. Th e ins pector s interview ed operations , maintenance, a nd engineerin g personnel an d review ed pertinent contro l room log en tries to dete rmine the se quence of eve nts pri or to th e val ve's failu re to open, the actions taken to det ermine the cause of the valve failure, and the licensee's correc tive actio ns. The insp ectors revi ewed the Up dated Final Safety Anal ysis Repor t Enclo sure 17 and the Techni cal Speci fications to dete rmine the opera bility requirements and th e licensing a nd design bas is of the val ve. b.Fin din gs Introduction The in specto rs ide ntifie d a Gree n findi ng and a Non-Cited Viol ation due to the fai lure t o follow proc edures after disco vering that a shutdown c ooling sucti on valv e would not operate from the control room. The failure to follow p rocedures resul ted in sev eral human performance is sues inclu ding: the failu re to initi ate a work reques t, the performance of troublesho oting activi ties prior to developi ng a formal troublesh ooting plan, the use of repetitive cyclin g to resolve equipment deficien cies, and the use of the equipme nt cy clin g resul ts as a basi s for con tinue d compo nent o perabi lity. The w ork request initi ation defici encie s subs equentl y con tribut ed to t he li censee's fail ure to promp tly identif y and corr ect this equipm ent def iciency.Description On April 19 , 2003, val ve 2-1001-4 3A failed to open from the control room. Operations personnel atte mpted to open th e valv e a second ti me and were unsuccessful. A fter the two unsuccessful attempt s, operations personnel check ed the valve's breaker. No abnorm al co nditi ons w ere id entifi ed. Fo llow ing the breaker check, the op erators contacted the e lectrical mai ntenance depa rtment for assistance.

The electrici ans reco mmen ded that the oper ator s cy cle the brea ker. Fol low ing t he b reake r cy cli ng, operat ions person nel s uccess fully opene d val ve 2-1001-4 3A from t he con trol ro om.Operati ons pe rsonne l ini tiated Condi tion R eport 1 54716 to doc ument th e val ve's failu re to open. The i nspectors performed a review of this even t and identi fied the follow ing deficiencies:

Procedure OP-AA-108-105, "Equipmen t Deficiency Identification and Docume ntatio n," Ste p 3.2.3 , requi red op eratio ns per sonne l to i nitia te a w ork reque st fol low ing t he i dent ific atio n of a n equ ipme nt de fici ency. Al thou gh operations pe rsonnel docu mented the failure of valve 2-1001-43A to open in th e control room l ogs and in a condition re port, a work request was not i nitiated.*Procedure M A-AA-716-004, "C onduct of Troublesh ooting," Step 2.5 defined troubl eshoo ting as a task t hat in volv ed det ectio n, dia gnosis and re pair o f faulty equipment. In addition, Step 4.2.2 of the same proce dure required that all physical troubleshooti ng work be done via the work control p rocess. The inspectors dete rmined that nei ther operations nor electric al maintenan ce person nel i denti fied th e need to gene rate a work re quest an d ente r the w ork control process prior to cond ucting troublesh ooting on va lve 2-100 1-43A. As a result, the troub leshooting pe rformed on valv e 2-1001-43A was performed outside the w ork control process and was not documented on any reta ined record.

Enclo sure 18*Procedure OP-AA-108-105, Step 4.1.1, stated that c oaxing (w hich incl uded cycling) w as not normall y an accep table method for co rrecting equipment deficiencies.

Step 4.1.2 state d that coaxi ng should not be used as a means of maintaining op erability. The inspectors determined tha t operations a nd maintenance personnel used the result s of the breaker cycling to inappropriately determine that the deficiency associated with v alve 2-10 01-43A had b een corrected. This s ame logic w as also use d to inappro priately justify the conti nued operab ilit y of v alve 2-100 1-43A from the c ontrol room.*The supervis ory revi ew sectio n of Conditio n Report 1547 16 stated that th e valve's failure to open could have been attributed to a deficiency with the valve's breaker or operator.

Howeve r, a work request to troubleshoot a nd/or repair the breaker or operator w as not generated.

As a result, th e actual con dition of the valve's breaker and ope rator were un known.*Two su pervi sors, mu ltipl e depa rtmenta l corr ectiv e acti on pro gram coo rdina tors and the management re view committee revi ewed Con dition Rep ort 154716 pri or to the condition report being closed.

However, none of these individuals recognized th at the root caus e of the valv e's failure to stroke had not be en identified. S ince the cau se was no t identified, c orrective ac tions were not implemented.

Analysis The inspectors c onsulted the Technical Sp ecification B ases for the resid ual heat remov al shutdown c ooling equipmen t and determine d that val ve 2-1001-4 3A could b e considered operable as long as the ab ility to reposition the valv e locall y was availab le. The inspectors dete rmined that al though an elec trical probl em could ex ist with the breaker or valve operator, this p roblem shoul d not impact the ability to operate v alve 2-10 01-43A locally using the declutch lever and valve handwheel.

The inspectors determ ined that the failure to f ollow procedures after discovering this equipment deficien cy was more than minor b ecause if left unco rrected, this prac tice could lea d to the failure to appropria tely ide ntify and corre ct subsequent defici encies.Since Quad C ities Uni t 2 was i n a shut dow n condition when thi s issue occu rred, the inspectors ass essed the si gnificance of this i ssue using Insp ection M anual Chap ter 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Si gnificance Determin ation Process

," Table 1, for boiling w ater reactors in cold shutdo wn wi th a time to bo il of greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and a reactor coolan t system lev el less tha n 23 feet abov e the top of the flan ge. Page T-21 of Table 1 required two residual heat removal shutdown cooling subsystem s to be operable with one system in operation. The inspectors dete rmined that the Table 1 requiremen t was m et as t he rema inin g three resid ual h eat rem oval pumps were avai labl e to pe rform the sh utdow n cool ing func tion a nd the B pump was place d in s ervi ce. The insp ectors referred to Page T-22 of Table 1 and determi ned that the fail ure to identi fy and correct the deficiency which led to the i nability to operate v alve 2-10 01-43A from the contro l room was of v ery low risk significance (Green) since 2-1 001-43A coul d be operated locally and adequate d ecay heat removal cap ability was main tained.

Enclo sure 19 Enforcement Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 5 0, Appendix B required that activiti es affecting quality be prescribed by documented i nstructions, proc edures, or draw ings appropria te to the circumstance. C ontrary to the above, on April 19, 2 003, the li censee performed troubleshooti ng on a safety-rel ated residual heat removal valve (an activ ity affecting quality) w ithout documente d instruction s, procedures, or drawings ap propriate to the circ umst ance. Thi s la ck of d ocum ente d in stru ctio ns, p roce dure s, an d dra wi ngs contributed to the fa ilure to promptly identify and correct the con ditions which resulted in the valv e's failure to open. This v iolation is being treate d as a Non-C ited Viol ation consistent w ith Section VI.A.1 of the NRC

's Enforcement Pol icy (NCV 050002 65/2003009-02). This iss ue was enter ed into th e licensee

's corre ctive action program as Condition Report 169407. Correctiv e actions for thi s issue in cluded discussing thi s event w ith vario us departments, emph asizing the process to be used when equip ment deficienci es occur, and performing an inspec tion of the breaker associated with valve 2-1001-43A.

.3 Review of 2002 Steam Dry er Failure Corrective Actions a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors re viewe d the correctiv e actions from the 2002 Unit 2 steam dryer fail ure, interview ed license e personnel, and attended me etings betwe en the NRC and Quad Citie s manage ment to determi ne if co rrecti ve ac tions follo win g the 20 02 dry er fail ure should hav e prevented the 2003 fail ure. b.Fin din gs Introduction:

One Green findi ng was ide ntified due to the failure to p erform a visual examinatio n of the internal steam dryer su rfaces and complete an extent of condition review which evaluated the full range o f frequencies acting upon the Unit 2 dryer following th e June 2002 failure. This pro blem identi fication and re solution w eakness contributed to a second stea m dryer failure in June 2 003.Description:

In February 2002, the l icensee impl emented a 17.8 percent exten ded powe r uprate on Quad Cities Unit 2. Approximately 3 months later, unexpect ed changes in reacto r pow er, pre ssure, leve l, mai n stea m line flow and moi sture c arryo ver b egan to occur. The li censee determ ined that th e unex pected change s in t he abo ve pa rameter s were cause d by a fail ure of th e stea m drye r cov er pla te (see Inspe ction Repor t 05000265/2002 007 for details

). The cover p late failed b ecause of high-cy cle fatigue due to high frequenc y aco ustic resona nce. C orrecti ve ac tions incl uded mo difyi ng both Unit 2 steam dryer cov er plates and completing an extent of condi tion revi ew on the remaining dryer compone nts.In June 2003, the license e experie nced a secon d failure of the U nit 2 steam dry er (see Inspection Re port 05000265/2 003011 for detai ls). The lic ensee conduc ted a root caus e analysi s and determin ed that the sec ond dryer fail ure occurred du e to high cy cle fatigue resulting from low frequency pressure oscillati ons.

Enclo sure 20 The inspectors d iscussed both dryer failure s with l icensee pers onnel. The l icensee stated that the re sults of a post-mortem e xamination of the fractured drye r surfaces show ed tha t the d ryer c racks be gan on the in side of the d ryer. In add ition , the i nspect ors determi ned th at the exten t of cond ition revi ew p erformed follow ing the first dr yer fai lure focused on other high f requencies acting on the dr yer rather than evaluating the full spectru m of frequen cies a cting o n the d ryer.Analysi s: The inspecto rs determined tha t the failure to conduct an ex tent of condition review which considered a broad frequency ra nge and conduct a visual inspection of the dryer's internal surfaces f ollowing the 2002 dryer failure was more than minor because it impacted the equi pment performance attribu te of the initi ating events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective o f limiting the l ikelihood o f events that up set plant stability. The inspectors also determi ned that this finding should be evalu ated using the Significance D etermination P rocess describ ed in Inspec tion Man ual Chapter 0609,"Significance D etermination P rocess," because the finding impa cted the structural integrity of the d ryer whi ch was requi red to ensure th e operabil ity of multip le mitigating systems. The i nspectors comple ted the Phase 1 Significance Determination Process Work sheet and con cluded that th is finding w as of very l ow safety s ignificance (Green)

as the dryer fail ure did not result in a loss of safety functio n for any miti gating system (FIN 05000265

/2003009-03). In additi on, the drye r failure did not impact any of the assumptions i ncluded i n the lice nsee's Indi vidual Plant Ex amination of Ex ternal Eve nts.Enforce ment: This issue was not subject to NRC enforcement action since the ste am dryer is a non-safety-relate d component. The licensee i nitiated Co ndition Re port 162964 to document the e xtent of condi tion revi ew issue s. Correctiv e actions i ncluded imple mentin g addi tiona l rev iew s to en sure th at the exten t of cond ition issue s are identified an d evalua ted.4OA3 Event Fol low-up (71153).1 Revi ew o f Powe r Asce nsion Foll owi ng Uni t 2 Dry er Fai lure a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors a ssessed the l icensee's readiness for con ducting a Uni t 2 power ascension from 845 MWe to 912 MWe by attendin g the Plant Onsi te Review Committee meetings, revie wing the po wer ascens ion procedure s to verify that plant para meters used to assess steam d ryer structural integrity w ere incorporate d, and conduc ting a revie w of previousl y identi fied problems to ensure that the problems w ere appropriate ly corrected prior to inc reasi ng react or pow er. Du ring po wer a scensi on act ivi ties, the in specto rs monitored the p lant parameters l isted in the power asc ension proce dure and determi ned that the dryer performed as expe cted. The lic ensee suspen ded the pow er ascension and initiate d Conditio n Report s 169535 a nd 169596 on July 30 when two s afet y-relat ed relays began c hatteri ng and frequent a larms a ssoci ated w ith th e 3D P ORV w ere rec eive d. Prior to resumi ng the power ascension o n August 13, the inspectors di scussed the resolution o f the condition reports liste d above w ith operation s, engineering, an d maintenance pe rsonnel to v erify that addi tional rel ay chatterin g should not h ave an adverse impact on plant safety. Resolution of the 3D PORV alarms was documented in Secti on 1R2 3 of thi s repo rt.

Enclo sure 21 b.Fin din gs No findings of signi ficance were identified.

.2 Revi ew o f Licen see Ev ent Re ports a.Inspection Sc ope The inspectors p erformed an onsite review of records to ev aluate the roo t cause and corrective a ctions for the li censee eve nt reports discu ssed in the

"Findings" secti on below. The inspectors e valuated the timeline ss, completeness , and adequacy of the root cause and co rrective acti ons in acco rdance wi th the requirements of 10 CFR Part 5 0, Appendix B, as approp riate. b.Fin din gs (Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report 050 00254/2003-002-00: Mode C hange with Core Spray Loop Inoperabl e due to Fai lure to Prope rly Fil l and Vent.

The inspectors documented a licensee i dentified vi olation i n Section 4 OA7 of Inspection Report 050002 54/2003005; 05000265/2003 005 based up on an ini tial revi ew of this e vent. On August 1, 2003, the licensee submitt ed the even t repor t which docu mente d the roo t cause a nd corr ective action informatio n. The inspec tors review ed the eve nt report and de termined that the docume nted i nformati on di d not c hange t he in specto rs' i nitia l asse ssment of the e vent.(Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report 050 00265/2003-002-00: Self-Actuation of Main S team Reli ef Valv e due to Ex cessi ve Le akage Thro ugh Pi lot Va lve Seat. The in specto rs documented a find ing in Secti on 1R2 of Inspec tion Report 0 5000265/20030 06 based on the in itial revi ew o f the ev ent. On June 12, 20 03, the lice nsee s ubmitte d the e vent report whi ch doc umented the ro ot cau se and correc tive actio n infor mation. The i nspect ors review ed the eve nt report and de termined that the documented informati on did not change the in specto rs' i nitia l asse ssment of the e vent.(Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report 050 00265/2003-004-00: Reac tor Shu tdow n due to Degraded Reactor Steam Dryer a s a Result of Increased Steam V elocities from Exten ded Po wer U prate. This i ssue w as di scusse d in S ectio n 4OA2.3 of thi s repo rt. One Green finding w as identified due to the l icensee's failure to asses s the full range o f frequencies acting up on the drye r followin g the first failure.(Closed) Li censee Ev ent Report 050 00254/2003-001-00: Unit 1 R eactor Shutdow n Due to Reactor Hea d Vent Steam L eak Constitutin g Pressure Bound ary Leakage. The inspectors ev aluated the facts and circumstanc es surroundin g the reactor head vent pressure bound ary leakage.

Introduction

The i nspect ors id entifi ed a Gre en find ing an d a No n-Cite d Vio latio n due to the discov ery of a reactor coolant sy stem pressure bou ndary lea k on the Unit 1 reactor pres sure ves sel hea t ve nt pi pin g.Description

During a M ay 20, 200 3, drywe ll entry, the license e identified a steam leak on the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel head vent line. The rea ctor pressure v essel head Enclo sure 22 vent lin e was a carbon steel pipe approx imately 2 inches in diameter. The le ak was determined to be upstream of the isolation valves and located at a coupling socket weld joint in a vertical pipe sectio n.After shutting dow n Unit 1, the licensee cut out the cou pling socket w eld joint. The joint was sent to an offsite laborato ry for analy sis. The lab oratory anal ysis (Projec t Number QDC-65394) id entified the ch aracteristics o f the leakage path surfaces on the failed reactor head v ent line.

Specificall y, the report stated, "Leaking steam h ad eroded a portion of the surro unding wel d." In additi on, a caption included with Fi gure 5 of the report stated, "The l eak path was oxidiz ed/corroded and appeared to have been eroded from the escaping steam."

The cause of the l eak was a p oor quality weld as shown b y the si gnifica nt amou nt of po rosity , lack o f fusion and ex cessi ve ov erlap in th e fail ure region. The defect con tinued unti l the leak oc curred due to l ong term corrosion and possible fatigue. A causal factor for the poor w eld quality was due to the pipi ng being located in close proximity to the bioshield wall making it difficult f or welding access. This was an o riginal cons truction we ld dating bac k to 1970. Als o based on a review of the licensee's failure anal ysis in formation, an NRC engineering spec ialist de termined that the steam leak had e xisted for greater th an 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The inspectors re viewe d drywe ll leakage da ta to determine when the leak began. The inspectors dete rmined that the average dryw ell unid entified leakage tren ded upwa rd from approximatel y 0.25 gall ons per minute to 0.67 gallo ns per minute between F ebruary 17 and M ay 20. The i nspect ors rev iew ed the resul ts of the lice nsee's Ma y 20 dryw ell e ntry and de termin ed tha t the i ncreas e in d ryw ell u niden tified leakage was most li kely d ue to the leaking reacto r head ven t piping w eld. How ever, the i nspectors noted that the licensee also disco vered a pud dle of wat er near t he C drywell coo ler which cou ld have been caused by a lea k or the accumulati on of condensati on. The lice nsee isola ted the cooler and e lected not to investigate this potentia l leak. Base d on this i nformation, the inspectors con cluded that n o other leaks, oth er than the reac tor head ve nt piping w eld, contributed to the increase in dryw ell unid entified leakage.

Analysis: The inspectors determined tha t the leak in the reactor pressu re vessel head vent line was also a reac tor coo lant s ystem pressu re bou ndary leak. The in specto rs determined there were tw o performance deficie ncies associ ated with the leak: (1) p oor initi al w eld qu ality and (2) opera ting w ith i ncreas ed uni denti fied l eakage a nd fail ing to identify the source of leakage. Ul timately, the leakage was determined to b e reactor coolant pressu re boundary leakage. The ins pectors determine d that the opera tion of Unit 1 with reactor coolant pressure boundary leakag e was more than minor because it impacted the equi pment performance attribu te of the initi ating events cornerstone and the rea ctor co olant syste m and b arrier performa nce at tribut e of the barri er int egrity cornerstone.

The inspectors d etermined that thi s finding shoul d also be evaluated using the Significance D etermination P rocess in acc ordance wi th Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,"Significance D etermination P rocess," because the finding w as associated with an increase in the likeli hood of an ini tiating even t and was associated w ith maintain ing the integrity of the re actor coolant system. The in spectors consul ted the Significa nce Determination Process Phase 1 Worksheet and determined that a Phase 2 e valuatio n Enclo sure 23 was required due to the find ing impacting bo th the initi ating events and the barri er integrity corn erstones.Using the Ri sk-Informed Inspection No tebook for Quad Citi es Nuclear Power Stati on Units 1 and 2, Revi sion 1, dated May 2, 2002, the i nspectors determin ed that the exposure time was greater than 30 days since the leak existed f rom February 17 until May 20. The inspectors also determi ned that a Si gnificance Determin ation Process Worksheet wa s not a vail able to asse ss the signifi cance of the re actor h ead v ent le ak. The in specto rs dis cussed the w orkshee t issu e wi th the senio r react or ana lyst and w ere instructed to u se the small break loss of cool ant accident worksheet in an effort to bound the size of the leak. Prior to completing the worksheet, the inspector s assumed that all mitigating capabi lity w as avail able. Usi ng this assumptio n, the inspec tors evalua ted four core damage sequ ences. The small break loss of coolant accident with early containment con trol sequence (S LOCA -EC) w as given a value of 6 points and w as considered to be potentia lly ris k significant. Due to these resul ts, the senior reactor analyst w as required to co mplete a Phas e 3 eval uation of this issue.During the Phase 3 evaluation, the senior reactor analyst identified that the SLOCA-EC sequence was overly conservati ve. Speci fically, the early co ntainment control portion of the sequence repre sented vapo r suppression of the containmen t. Early c ontainment contro l wa s cons idere d to be succe ssful i f 12 out of 12 v acuum b reakers functio ned. I n review ing the lice nsee's proba bilistic risk assessment, the senior reactor analyst n oted that the lice nsee defined su ccess of vapor suppression as either 12 out of 12 vacu um brea kers funct ion ing (a pa ssi ve a ctio n), a ctua ting the cont ain ment spra ys o r com ple ting a reactor pressure v essel blow down; how ever, the Si gnificance Determin ation Process worksh eets d id no t all ow a dditi onal credi t for the conta inment spray s or th e blo wdow n. If additional credit wa s provide d for the containme nt sprays (a multi-train sy stem) in the early containment control fun ction, the full point value for the seq uence would be 8. This would re sult in the sequence being o f very low risk significance.

Additiona lly, the licensee's probabili stic risk assessme nt identified the small bre ak loss of coolan t accident's contribution to the overa ll core da mage frequency to be l ess than 1 pe rcent of the baselin e core damage frequency of 2.2 E-06 per re actor-year. Thi s results in an overall contribution from all sources o f small pipin g breaks to be les s than 2.2 E-0 8 per reactor-year. L astly, the N RC has recen tly remove d the SLOCA-EC sequence from the Signi ficance Determ inati on Pro cess w orkshee ts at re centl y ben chmarked plan ts due to its small co ntribution to small break lo ss of coolant ac cidents. Bas ed upon the information disc ussed abov e, the inspec tors concluded that this findi ng was of ve ry low safety signifi cance (Green).Enforcement

Techn ical Speci ficatio n 3.4.4 stated that n o reac tor coo lant p ressur e bound ary l eakage w as al low ed w hen th e reac tor w as ope rated i n Mo des 1, 2, or 3. W hen pressure boundary leakage existed, Technical Specification 3.4.4 , Condition C, require d that the li censee be in Mod e 3 w ithin 12 ho urs an d Mo de 4 w ithin 36 ho urs. Contra ry to the ab ove, a reac tor coo lant p ressur e boun dary leak ex isted on the Unit 1 reactor while operating in Mode 1 from February 17 until May 19, 2003. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consist ent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enfor cement Policy (NCV 050002 54/2003009-04). This violation is in the licensee's corrective a ction program as C ondition R eport 159607.

Corrective actions for this issue Enclo sure 24 consi sted o f repai ring th e lea k to eli minate the re actor c oolan t press ure bo undary lea kage a nd e xam ini ng ad diti onal we lds both ups trea m and dow nstr eam o f the lea k.4OA4 Cros s-Cu ttin g Asp ects of Fi ndi ngs A finding descri bed in Sec tion 1R22 o f this report had, a s its primary cause, a human performan ce defi cienc y, in that, o perati ons an d main tenanc e pers onnel faile d to implement the p rocedure change p rocess whe n a survei llance proc edure could not be performed as wri tten.A finding descri bed in Sec tion 4OA2.2 of thi s report had, as its primary cause, a human performance deficiency , in that, opera tions and mai ntenance perso nnel failed to follow procedural requi rements when a safety-related valve failed to opera te as expe cted from the control roo m. The procedure a dherence defici encies contri buted to a sub sequent failure to ide ntify the cause of the equipment mal function and the failure to impl ement appropriate co rrective acti ons.A finding descri bed in Sec tion 4OA2.3 of thi s report had, as its primary cause, a prob lem identificatio n and resolu tion deficien cy, in tha t, the full spectru m of frequencies acting on the Unit 2 s team dryer w ere not address ed as part of an extent of condi tion revi ew following th e 2002 steam d ryer failure.

This resulted in a second failure of the stea m dryer in J une 2003.4OA5 Other Activi ties Revi ew o f Institu te Of Nuc lear P ower Operati ons Re port The inspectors c ompleted a rev iew of the fin al report for the In stitute of Nucle ar Power Operations, June 2003 Eva luation, da ted September 10 , 2003.4OA6 Mee ting s The inspectors p resented the i nspection resu lts to Mr.

T. Tulon and othe r members of licensee man agement at the concl usion of the i nspection on September 30, 2 003. The inspectors asked the license e whether any material s examined during the in spection should be considered p roprietary.

Some analy ses performed by GE were con sidered propri etary. Those porti ons of th e anal ytic al w ork by GE cons idere d prop rietar y w ere revi ewed by th e NRC insp ectors; how ever, they are no t disc ussed in de tail in thi s repo rt.ATTACHM ENT: S UPPLE MEN TAL INF ORMA TION Attachment 1 SUPPL EMENT AL INFORM AT ION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Tulon, Site Vi ce President B. Swenso n, Plant M anager D. Barker, Radia tion Protectio n Manager W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance M anager G. Boerschig, Work Control Mana ger R. Gideon, En gineering Ma nager T. Hanley, M aintenance M anager D. Hieggelke, Nucl ear Oversight M anager K. Leech, Sec urity M anager K. Moser, C hemistry/Env iron/Radw aste Mana ger M. Perito, Operations M anager Nuclear Regul atory Commissi on M. Ring, Ch ief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 L. Rossbach, P roject Manager LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000254/2003 009-01 NCV Unex pected Half S cram Occ urred d ue to F ailu re to Evaluate Change in Equi pment Configuration via the Procedure Cha nge Process Pri or to Installa tion 05000265/2003 009-02 NCV Condition Adverse to Quality no t Identified and Corrected due to Fail ure to Foll ow Troubles hooting and Equi pment Deficiency Procedures 05000265/2003 009-03 FIN Failure to Perform Thorough Extent of Condition Review and Internal D ryer Inspecti on Follow ing First Steam Dryer Fail ure 05000254/2003 009-04 NCV Operati on of Un it 1 w ith Re actor C oolan t Press ure Boundary L eakage which Exceeded Technical Speci ficatio n Requi rements Closed 05000254/2003 009-01 NCV Unex pected Half S cram Occ urred d ue to F ailu re to Evaluate Change in Equi pment Configuration via the Procedure Cha nge Process Pri or to Installa tion Attachment 2 05000265/2003 009-02 NCV Condition Adverse to Quality no t Identified and Corrected due to Fail ure to Foll ow Troubles hooting and Equi pment Deficiency Procedures 05000265/2003 009-03 FIN Failure to Perform Thorough Extent of Condition Review and Internal D ryer Inspecti on Follow ing First Steam Dryer Fail ure 05000254/2003 009-04 NCV Operati on of Un it 1 w ith Re actor C oolan t Press ure Boundary L eakage which Exceeded Technical Speci ficatio n Requi rements 05000254/2003-002-00 LER Mode Change wit h Core Spray Loop Inoper able due to Failure to Properly F ill and Vent 05000265/2003-004-00 LER Reactor Shutdo wn due to Degraded Reac tor Steam Drye r as a Resul t of Increased Steam Velocitie s from Extended Powe r Upra te 05000254/2003-001-00 LER Unit 1 Rea ctor Shutdow n Due to Re actor Head Ve nt Stea m Lea k Con stit utin g Pre ssur e Bo unda ry L eaka ge 05000265/2003-002-00 LER Self-Ac tuatio n of M ain S team Re lief V alve Due to Excessiv e Leakage Through Pil ot Valve Seat Discussed None Attachment 3 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The followi ng is a lis t of documents rev iewed d uring the insp ection. Incl usion on thi s list does not imply that the NRC inspectors rev iewed th e documents in their entire ty but rather that selected secti ons of portions o f the documents w ere evalu ated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a d ocument on this list does not imply NRC acceptan ce of the document o r any p art of i t, unl ess thi s is s tated i n the b ody o f the in specti on rep ort.1R01 Adverse Weather Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port QCOA 0010-10; Tornad o Watch/W arning or Sev ere Winds; Revision 11 Control Room Logs dated July 20 and 27, 2003 1R04 Equipment Ali gnment QOM 1-0300-04; Unit 1 Con trol Rod Dri ve Valv e Checklist; R evision 4 QCOP 0300-32; CR D Scram Disch arge Volume Isol ation and D raining; Rev ision 7 QCOP 1000-02; RH R System Pre paration for Stand by Operation

Revisi on 22 QCOP 2300-01; HP CI Preparation for Standby Ope ration; Rev ision 39 QCOP 2900-01; Sa fe Shutdown M akeup Pump Sy stem Preparation for Standby Operation; Rev ision 19 Condition Report 170249

4KV Sw itchgear 31 Di rect Current Transfer Con trol Swi tch out of Position on Safe Shutdow n Makeup P ump Local Pa nel; dated A ugust 4, 2003 Piping and Instrumentation Di agram M-69; Di agram of Service Water Piping D iesel Generator Cooli ng Water; Revision N Piping and Instrumentation Di agram M-22; Di agram of Service Water Piping D iesel Generator Cooli ng Water; Revision U Technical Sp ecifications Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Mont hly Syste m Heal th Rep ort for th e Emerge ncy D iesel Genera tors Maintena nce Rule E valuatio n History for the Emergency Di esel Generators; dated September 3, 200 3 Open Emergency D iesel Genera tor Work Orders; dated September 3, 2003 Attachment 4 QOM 1-6600-01; Unit 1 Di esel Generator V alve Ch ecklist; Rev ision 16 QOM 1-6600-0 2; Uni t 1 Di esel Generat or Sy stem Fu se and Breake r Chec klist;Revisio n 3 QOM 2-6600-01; Unit 2 Di esel Generator V alve Ch ecklist; Rev ision 18 QOM 2-6600-02; Diesel Gene rator 2 Fuse C hecklist; Rev ision 4 QOM 1/2-6600-01; U nit 1/2 Diese l Generator Val ve Checkli st; Revisi on 12 QCOP 6600-01; Di esel Generator 1 (2) Preparation for Standby Ope ration; Rev ision 29 QCOP 6600-04; Di esel Generator 1/2 Preparation for Sta ndby Operati on; Revis ion 22 Figure 8.3-1; Emergency Power S ystem; Revi sion 5 1R05 Fire Protecti on OP-AA-201-001; F ire Marsh all Tours; Rev ision 1 Various Sec tions; Quad Ci ties Pre-Fire Plans; date d 2002 Various Sec tions; Quad Ci ties Fire H azards Ana lysis; R evision 13; dated Au gust 2001 1R06 Flood Protec tion Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Technical Re quirements Man ual QCOA 0010-16; Fl ood Emergency Procedure; Rev ision 8 QCOP 4100-11; Us ing Diesel Fire Pumps V ia Safe Shutdo wn Hose Line For Re actor Vessel Lev el Control or Flood Eme rgency Injection Source; Rev ision 8 QCOA 0010-14; Lo ck and Dam #14 F ailure; Rev ision 7 QCOP 4100-02; Po rtable Dies el Pump Operati on; Revis ion 6 Work Order 474079; P erform Maintenan ce on the Ex ternal Portabl e Pump Used for Flood M itigation; date d July 1 0, 2003 Condition Report 103243

12-volt B attery for the Darl ey Portabl e Pump (extern al flooding response equipme nt) is Drain ed Out; dated Ap ril 10, 200

Attachment 5 1R11 Licensed Opera tor Requalificati on LOCT-1171 EPU; Recircula tion Pum p Speed Sig nal Failur e - Recirc ulation Pu mp Drive Moto r Breake r Trip - Reci rcula tion L oop Di scharge Pipe Ruptu re LOCT-0102 EPU; M aster Feedw ater Regulator V alve Co ntroller- Spu rious Turbine Trip-ATWS, Fu el D amage and Con tain ment Bre ak QGA 100; Reactor P ressure Vessel Control; Rev ision 7 QGA 101; RPV C ontrol (ATWS); Revision 10 QGA 200; Primary Containment C ontrol; Rev ision 8 QGA 500-1; RPV Blowdow n; Revisi on 11 EP-AA-1006; R adiological Emergency Pl an Annex for Quad Cities S tation; Rev ision 18 1R12 Maintena nce Effectiveness Listing of Ma intenance R ule Performance C riteria for Functi on Z5704 - R eactor Buil ding Ventilatio n System; date d July 1 6, 2003 Technical Sp ecifications QCOP 5750-02; Re actor Build ing Ventila tion Syste m; Revisio n 16 QCOS 5750-10; Re actor Build ing Ventila tion Isolati on Dampers Pne umatic Accumul ator System Pressu re Decay a nd Fail S afe Test; Revisi on 9 Operator/Initial Continuing Trai ning Lesson P lan LNF-575 0.doc; Plant B uilding Ventilatio n; Revisi on 2 Condition Report 152288

Reactor Bui lding Venti lation Dampe rs Failed QCOS 5750-10; dated April 4, 2003 Condition Report 93865; Unit 1 Rea ctor Buildi ng Exhaust Fa ns Tripped and Caused Los s of Building D ifferential Pressure

dated Septembe r 18, 2001 Condition Report 100785

2A and 2C Reactor Bui lding Exh aust Fans Trippe d Unexpected ly; dated February 24 , 2002 Condi tion R eport 1 10665; 2A an d 2B R eactor Buil ding E xhau st Fan s Trip and Au to Star t due to Weather; dated June 5, 2002 Condition Report 131349

Standby Gas Treatment System S tarted to Control Reactor Building D ifferential Pressure

dated Nov ember 12, 2002 Attachment 6 Condition Report 156774

2A Reactor B uilding Su pply Fan Damper Did Not Fully Close When System Placed in Standby; d ated May 1, 2003 Condi tion R eport 1 54869; Area Alarm High Te mperatu re Stea m Leak D etecti on Al arm Received; dated April 21, 2003 Maintenan ce Rule Evalua tion Hist ory Repor t for Function Z5704; da ted Janu ary -June 2003 List o f Open M ainte nance Work Requests on the React or Bui ldin g Venti latio n Sys tem;dated August 6, 2 003 Reactor Buil ding Ventil ation Unav ailabil ity Trend; date d August 6, 2003 Piping and Instrument Diagram M-373; Diagram of Uni t 2 Reactor Bu ilding Ven tilation and Drywell Air Conditioning; Sheet 1; Revision AM 1R13 Mai ntenan ce Ri sk Asse ssment and Em ergent Work Work Week Safety Profile; Weeks of July 6, 20, and Au gust 10, 17, and 31, 2003 Online Work Schedules; Weeks of July 6, 20, and August 10, 1 7, and 31, 20 03 OU-QC-104; Dail y Risk Facto r Chart, Attachment 1; Revisi on 1 WC-AA-104; Review and Screeni ng for Production R isk; Revisi on 4 Condition Report 165978; Specific Valve Lineups Have Potential to Render HPCI Inoperable; da ted July 2, 2003 QCOS 2300-05; Quarte rly HPCI Pump Operabil ity Test; Rev ision 47 1R15 Operability Evaluati ons Condition Report 169869

Non-conforming Desi gn for Main Ste am Line Low Pressure; dated July 30, 2003 Condition Report 169596

Main S team Line Low Pressure Rel ay Chatter; d ated July 30, 2003 Condition Report 169407

Troubleshooti ng Should Ha ve Been B etter Documented; d ated July 29, 2003 Condition Report 154716

Failure o f Valve 2-10 01-43A to Open on Two Attempts; dated April 19, 2 003 Condition Report 167467

Unit 2 Di esel Generator C ooling Water Pump Vibration Analysi s Adverse Trending; dated Jul y 14, 2003

Attachment 7 Con diti on R epor t 165 978; Spe cifi c Va lve Lin eups hav e Po tent ial to R ende r Hi gh Pressure Cool ant Injection S ystem Inoperabl e; dated July 2, 2003 Condition Report 167721

1A Dryw ell Radi ation Detector Not Fully Inserted; dated July 14, 2003 QCIS 2400-01; U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functi onal Test; Revisi on 13 LS-AA-105; Opera bility Determinations

Revisi on 1 Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Technical Sp ecifications NRC A dmini strati ve Le tter 98-10; Di sposi tioni ng of Tech nical Speci ficatio ns tha t are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety

dated Decembe r 1998 QCNPS Calc ulation NE D-I-EIC-033; M ain Steam Li ne Low P ressure Setpoi nt Error Analysi s at Normal Opera ting Conditi ons; Revi sion 4A QCNPS Calculation QDC-0261-I-0813; Instrument Drif t Analysis for Barksdale Model B 2T; Revisi on 00 QCOS 6600-06; Di esel Generator C ooling Water Pump Flow Rate Test; Rev ision 25 QCAP 0400-17; Station Lubri cation Program; Re vision 24 MA-AA-716-230-1005; CSI RBMWARE Database S etup Guideli ne; Revis ion 0 MA-AA-716-230-1002; Vi bration Anal ysis Acce ptance Guidel ine; Revi sion 0 Engine ering C hange R equest 5 5973; Determi ne Why Ele ctrica l Pan els i n the A uxil iary Electric Ro om and the Rel ay House do not hav e Panel C overs; dated July 6, 1 999 Condition Report Q1999-020 19; Unguarded E lectrical P anels; dated June 14, 1999 Condition Report Q2001-019 64; Several Panels i n the Auxi liary E lectric Room do not have Back P anels; dated June 22, 2001 Condition Report 145704

Missi ng Electrical Panel Co vers; dated F ebruary 21, 2003 Condition Report 168367

Extended Power Up rate Loadings o n the Unit 1 Steam Dryer may Produce Flow Ind uced Pressure Oscillation Forces that Ex ceed Allo wables; d ated July 24, 2003 Attachment 8 1R16 Operator Workarounds OWA 03-00; Co ntain ment H 2 O 2 Mon itor To rus Sa mple L ine H eat Trac e Temper ature Issue (Units 1 and 2); dated February 27 , 2003 EC 340 650; Setp oint Chang e fo r CAM H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample Li ne Heat Trace Controllers TIC 2-2400-2A an d TIC 2-2400-2B; dated April 30, 2003 Condi tion R eport 1 38067; Conta inment H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample Li ne Temperature; dated January 3, 2003 QCOP 2400-01; CA M Subsy stem Operation; Re vision 14 EC 344736; C AM Sy stem Sample Li ne Heat Trace; da ted September 17 , 2003 Condition Report 175405

Heat Tracing Not Functioning P roperly; da ted September 11, 20 03 QGA 200-5; Hyd rogen Control; R evision 5 1R17 Permanent Pla nt Modifica tions GE Drawin g series 728E9 47; Steam Dry er; dated Decemb er 2, 1966 Stearns-Roger Asse mbly Draw ing L-21571; Ste am Dryer, Genera l Electric , Dresden; and L-21573 through L-21581; Steam Dry er, Dresden - Qua d Cities; d ated 1968-1969 GE Drawin g 104R921, She ets 2 and 3; R eactor Assembly

Quad Cities 1&2; dated May 29 , 1968 GE Field D eviation Dispositi on Request No.

EE2-0525; De scription of Quad Cities Stea m Dryer Instal lation of (Vortex) Mitigati on Braces; date d June 19, 20 03 GE Field D eviation Dispositi on Request No.

EE2-0532; De scription of Re moval of Cracked Section s of Dryer Hoo d and Repl acement of Remove d Sections; d ated June 18, 2003 Commonweal th Edison D rawing No.

M-101; M ain Steam Pi ping Plans a nd Sections; Rev. M GE Drawing 105E3655; Steam Dryer (Modif ications); Rev. 1 (Proprie tary)GE Report GENE-0 000-0018-0985-0

Stress Anal yses for The Quad C ities Uni t 2, Stream Dryer R epair (Propri etary); Rev ision 1 ANSYS Compu ter Cod e Vers ion 6.1 GE Procedure GEN E-0000-012-001 8-1651; Root C ause Eval uation Proce ss (Proprietary);

dated June 20

Attachment 9 GE Report GENE-0 000-012-0017-65 45; Reverse Stress Anal yses for The Quad C ities Unit 2 Stream Dryer Repa ir; (to be pub lished)GE Des ign Sp ecific ation 26A54 50; Ho ld Do wn R eplac ement, S team Dr yer (P roprie tary); Revisio n 1 GE Report GENE-0 000-0017-7600-0 1; Quad Citie s Unit 2 D ryer Repai r CFD Clas s 3 (Proprietary);

dated June 20 03 GE Docum ent DRF-0000-00 09-4020; Dryer T est Desig n Review (Prop rietar y)GE Document GENE-189-11-0292; S team Dryer Vi bration M easurement Program Class III (Propri etary); dated M arch 1992 GE Report M DE 199-0985 DRF-B11-0031 4; Susquehanna-1 Steam Dryer Vibration, Steady State and Transient Response (Pro prietary); date d October 1985 GE Report NED E-0000-0018-16 36; Steam Dry er Outer Hood Time History An alyses;(to be publi shed)1R19 Post Mai ntenance Testing QCOP 1400-01; Co re Spray S ystem Preparati on For Standb y Operation; Revisio n 1 QCTS 0600-20; Core Spray Isol ation Valv e Local Le ak Rate Test; Rev ision 12 QCOS 1400-10; Co re Spray Opera bility Verification; R evision 13 QCAP 0230-19; Equipment Operabi lity; Rev ision 12 Technical Sp ecifications QCIS 2400-01; U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functi onal Test; Revisi on 13 Condition Report 167721

1A Dryw ell Radi ation Detector Not Fully Inserted; dated July 14, 2003 Condition Report 164026

Excess Gas Discovere d in 1B C ore Spray S ystem; dated June 4, 2003 QCOS 0010-07; Equi pment External Leak Test; Revi sion 1 QCAP 0400-17; Station Lubri cation Program; Re vision 24 Fragnet Associate d with R esidual H eat Removal and Resid ual Heat R emoval Se rvice Water Maintenance; dated August 28, 2003 QCEPM 02 00-11; Inspectio n and Ma intenance of Ho rizontal 4kV Cubicles

Revisi on 16 Attachment 10 QCOS 1000-06; Re sidual He at Removal Pump/Loop Operab ility Test; Revisio n 34 QCOS 10 00-04; Resi dual Heat R emova l Serv ice Water Pu mp Opera bili ty Test;Revisio n 36 Condition Report 167736

Unit 1/2 EDG B us 13-1 Breaker F ailed to C lose; dated July 15, 2003 Work Order 590775-01

Contingency Troubleshooti ng Package to Perform Elec trical Troubleshootin g on the Unit 1/2 EDG; dated Jul y 15, 2003 QCOS 6600-43; Un it 1/2 Diesel Generator Load Test; Revisi on 12 QCOS 6600-43; Un it 1/2 Diesel Generator Load Test; Revisi on 13 QCOS 1300-05; Quarte rly RCIC Pump Operabil ity Test; Rev ision 35 QCOS 1600-31; Su ppression Po ol Water Temperature Monitori ng; Revisi on 4 Work Orde r 552 617; Samp le a nd C hang e Oi l for Uni t 2 R CIC Pump Outb oard Bea ring Work Order 552618; S ample and C hange Oil for Uni t 2 RCIC Pump Inboard Beari ng MA-AA-716-230-1001; Used Oil Data In terpretation Guid elines; Re vision 0 1R22 Surveill ance Testing QCOS 230 0-15; HP CI D rain Pot Lev el S wi tch, Dra in V alv e, Gl and Sea l Co nden ser H igh Level Al arm, and Steam Li ne Drain Fu nctional V erification; Re vision 18 MA-QC-741-2 06; Un it 2 E CCS L PCI Re circul ation Rise r High D/P Fu nctio nal Te st;Revisio n 0 QCIS 0500-01; U nit 1 Div ision 1 L ow Conde nser Vacuum Sc ram Calibrati on and Functional Test; Revisi on 10 Condition Report 164221

3-Valve Manifold Misposi tioning; dated June 20, 2003 HU-AA-101; H uman Performance Tools and Verificati on Practices; Revisio n 1 HU-AA-104-101

Procedure Us e and Adhere nce; Revi sion 0 OP-AA-108-101-100 1; Component P osition De termination; Re vision 0 QCOS 1300-05; Un it 2 Quarterly RCIC Pump Ope rability Test; Revisi on 35 Condition Report 167721

1A Dryw ell Radi ation Detector Not Fully Inserted; dated July 14, 2003 Attachment 11 QCIS 2400-01; U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functi onal Test; Revisi on 13 Technical Sp ecifications Update d Fin al Sa fety An alys is Re port Condition Report 167044

Unexpecte d Reactor Prote ction Sys tem Channel A Trip Signal Received During Performance o f Surveill ance Test due to Blown F use in Rec order Test Lead; dated Ju ly 10, 20 03 Apparent Caus e for Condition Report 16704 4; dated August 1 5, 2003 QCOS 2300-05; Quarte rly HPCI Pump Operabil ity Test; Rev ision 47 Condition Report 165978; Specific Valve Lineups have Potential to Render HPCI Inoperable; da ted July 2, 2003 QCIS 2400-01; U nit 1 Div ision 1 D rywell Radiation Monitor Calibratio n and Functi onal Test; Revisi on 13 QCOS 6600-05; Di esel Generator F uel Oil Transfer P ump Flow Rate Test; Rev ision 20 QCOS 6600-03; Di esel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump M onthly Opera bility; Revisio n 16 QCOS 6600-06; Di esel Generator C ooling Water Pump Flow Rate Test; Rev ision 25 QCOS 66 00-15; Funct ional Test for D iesel Genera tor Ven t Nitro gen Bac kup Sy stem;Revisio n 15 QCOS 6600-42; Un it 2 Diese l Generator Loa d Test; Revis ion 13 QCOS 6600-02; Di esel Generator A ir Compressor Ope rability; Revisi on 16 CY-QC-130-700; D iesel Fue l Oil Testing; R evision 6 1R23 Temporary Plan t Modificati ons Engineering Cha nges 343683 an d 344103; Ch ange the Setpoi nt for the Mai n Steam Line Low Pressu re Reactor Prote ction Sys tem Switch; dated August 5, 2 003 CC-MW-112-1001; Temporary C onfiguration Chan ge Packages; Revi sion 3 CC-AA-112; Tempora ry Configuration Change Process

Revisi on 7 Calculati on QDC-0261-I-081 3; Instrument Drift Ana lysis for Ba rksdale Mod el No.B2T-A12SS/B2T-M 12SS-TC [PS-1(2)-0 261-30A, B, C , D]; Revi sion 0 Attachment 12 Calculati on NED-I-EIC-00 33; Main Steam Line Low Pressu re Setpoint E rror Analys is;Revisio n 004A Diagram 4E-2789E

Wiring Diagram Auto Blow down Rel ay Panel 2202-32; Rev ision T Diagram 4E-2575A K; Control R oom Annuncia tor Panel 90 2-3 PT-9 of 11; Rev ision F Diagram 4E-2461 Sheet 2; Schem atic Diagram Auto Blowdown; Revision AJ Diagram 4E-2816B; W iring Diagram - Low Voltage Power Penetration X-104A;Revision AT QCAN 902-3; R elief Valv e 2-203-3C/3D and/or 3E is Open; Revi sion 3 Engineered Ch ange 344148; Li ft Leads at 2-2202-3 2 Panel to Eliminate a False Open Indication o n the PORV - 3 D Annuncia tor Circuit; d ated August 4, 20 03 OWA 03-00; Co ntain ment H 2 O 2 Mon itor To rus Sa mple L ine H eat Trac e Temper ature Issue (Units 1 and 2); dated February 27 , 2003 EC 340 650; Setp oint Chang e fo r CAM H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample Li ne Heat Trace Controllers TIC 2-2400-2A an d TIC 2-2400-2B; dated April 30, 2003 Condi tion R eport 1 38067; Conta inment H 2 O 2 Monitor Torus Sample Li ne Temperature; dated January 3, 2003 QCOP 2400-01; CA M Subsy stem Operation; Re vision 14 EC 344736; C AM Sy stem Sample Li ne Heat Trace; da ted September 17 , 2003 Condition Report 175405

Heat Tracing Not Functioning P roperly; da ted September 11, 20 03 QGA 200-5; Hyd rogen Control; R evision 5 1EP6 Emergency Prepa redness Dril l Eval uation EP-AA-1006; R adiological Emergency Pl an Annex for Quad Cities S tation; Rev ision 18 Technical Sp ecifications QCGP 2-3; Reactor Scram; Revi sion 45 QGA 100; Reactor P ressure Vessel Control; Rev ision 7 QGA 200; Primary Containment C ontrol; Rev ision 8 QGA 500-1; Reactor Pressure Vesse l Blow down; Rev ision 11 Attachment 13 QGA 500-4; Reactor Pressure Vesse l Floodi ng; Revisi on 12 QCAN 901(2)-4 C-7; Reactor Rec irculation Pump B High V ibrations; R evision 3 QCOA 0202-06; Re actor Recircul ation Pump S eal Fail ure; Revis ion 16 QCOA 0202-04; Re actor Recircul ation Pump Trip - Single Pu mp; Revisi on 19 QCOS 1600-06; Emergen cy Core C ooling Sy stem and Primary Containment Is olation Trip Instrumentation Outage Report; Rev ision 14 QCOS 1600-05; Po st Accident M onitoring Instrumenta tion Outage Repo rt; Revisi on 12 QCAN 901(2)-3 A-16; Primary C ontainment Hi gh Pressure; Rev ision 10 QCOA 0201-01; Incre asing Dryw ell Pressu re; Revisi on 16 QOA 900-55 A-1; R ow A An nunciator Proc edures; Rev ision 6 QCOS 0202-09; Re actor Recircul ation Singl e Loop Outage Re port; Revis ion 12 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Condition Report 168364

Performance Indica tor for Scrams wi th Loss of Normal Heat Removal i s in the Ac tion Range; date d July 2 1, 2003 Condition Report 159693

Failure o f 1-1001-43A to Fu lly Stroke; d ated May 30, 2003 Condition Report 154716

2-1001-43A V alve Fai led to Open o n Two Attempts; d ated April 19, 2 003 Condition Report 158654

Valve 1-1001-26A Fai led to Open D uring Logic Test; date d May 14 , 2003 Condition Report 139835

Extent of Con dition Rev iew for GE HM A Type Rel ay Fail ure;dated January 16, 2003 10 CFR Part 2 1 Noti ficatio n; Dev iatio n in B arton I nstrume nt Differ entia l Pres sure Indicating Sw itches; dated May 10 , 2002 Condition Report 112996

Barton Mo del 288A a nd 289A Di fferential Pressure In dicating Switches may Drift Durin g Seismic Ev ent; dated June 24, 2002 Condition Report 111121

Pinhole Leak on the Di scharge of the 1B R esidual H eat Removal S ervice Water Low Pres sure Pump; dated June 8, 2002 Condition Report 110756

As Found C ondition o f the Intake Bay; da ted June 5, 20

Attachment 14 Condition Report 171034

NRC Identi fied: Past Operabi lity and Reportabil ity Not Addressed Fol lowing D iscovery of a Leak on the D ischarge of the 1B Residual Heat Removal S ervice Water Low Pres sure Pump; dated August 9, 2003 LS-AA-2070; M onthly Pe rformance Indicator D ata Elements for S afety System Unavail ability - Residual Heat Remov al Systems; Revisio n 3 LS-AA-2080; M onthly Pe rformance Indicator D ata Elements for S afety System F unctional Failures; R evision 3 LS-AA-2040; M onthly Pe rformance Indicator D ata Elements for E mergency Alterna ting Current Pow er; Revisi on 3 4OA2 Identi ficatio n and Resol ution of Prob lems Condi tion R eport 1 64026-02; Ro ot Cau se Inv estigat ion o f Inadequ ate Ve nting 1 B Core Spray Loop due to Inade quate P rocedu re Adh erence and C oordi natio n of Work Activiti es; dated June 19, 2003 Condition Report 172680

Document Reten tion When Declaring Sy stems Operable; dated August 18, 2003 Condition Report 172621

Some Technical Specificatio n Surveil lance Require ments Not Documented; dated August 22, 2003 QCAP 0230-19; Equipment Operabi lity; Rev ision 13 QCPWG Volume 1; Quad Cities Nuclear Pow er Station Pro cedure Writers Guide (General Writers Guide); Revi sion 6 HU-AA-101; H uman Performance Tools and Verificati on Practices; Revisio n 1 HU-AA-108-101

Control of Equip ment And Sy stem Status; Rev ision 1 HU-AA-104-101

Procedure Us e and Adhere nce; Revi sion 0 QCOP 1400-01; Co re Spray S ystem Preparati on For Standb y Operation; Revisio n 1 QCTS 0600-20; Core Spray Isol ation Valv e Local Le ak Rate Test; Rev ision 12 Technical Sp ecifications QCOS 1400-10; Co re Spray Opera bility Verification; R evision 13 Tagging Order 1-1402-25B for Pe rformance of QCTS 0600-20 Condition Report 169407

Troubleshooti ng Should Ha ve Been B etter Documented; d ated July 29, 2003 Attachment 15 LS-AA-125; Co rrective Acti on Program Procedu re; Revisi on 5 OP-AA-108-105; E quipment Deficien cy Identificati on and Docu mentation; Rev ision 1 MA-AA-716-004; Conduct o f Troubleshooting; Re vision 1 Condition Report Q2001-016 15; Non-Cited Violatio n NRC IR 0 0-20 Failu re to Implement Required Acti ons of Technical Specificatio ns; dated Janu ary 19, 200 1 Licensee Ev ent Report 050 00265/2002-03; Reactor Shutdo wn due to Failure o f Reactor Steam D ryer fro m Flow-Induc ed Vi bratio ns as a Resul t of Ex tended Pow er Upr ate Condition Report 157494

Elevated Moisture Carryov er Indicated o n Unit 2; da ted June 9, 2003 Condition Report 158145

Unit 2 M oisture Carry over Increase

dated Ma y 9, 2003 Condition Report 160858

Unit 2 M oisture Carry over is E levated; d ated May 28, 2003 Condition Report 162964

Unit 2 Dry er Failure; dated June 12 , 2003 Root Cause for C ondition R eport 162964; d ated July 23, 2003 Condition Report 115510

Steam Dryer Found Damaged D uring Visual Inspection; d ated July 12, 2002 Root Cause for C ondition R eport 115510; d ated September 9 , 2002 4OA3 Event Fol lowup Condition Report 169995

Narrow R ange Reactor Pres sure is Out of Tolera nce; dated August 1, 2003 Condition Report 169535

Main S team Isolation Valve 20 3-1D2D Clo sure Scram Signal Relay 5 90-102H Chatte ring; dated Jul y 30, 2003 Condition Report 169596

Main S team Line Low Pressure Rel ay Chatter; d ated July 30, 2003 Condition Report 169603

D Mai n Steam Line Vibrations Potential Iss ues; dated July 30, 2003 Condition Report 170060

Unexpecte d Automatic De pressurizati on System S ystems 1 and 2 Ma in Direct C urrent Powe r Failure A larm/Reset; dated August 1, 2003 Condition Report 170097

Unexpecte d Automatic De pressurizati on System S ystems 1 and 2 Ma in Direct C urrent Powe r Failure A larm/Reset; dated August 2, 2003 Attachment 16 Condition Report 169984

Narrow R ange Pressure Out o f Calibration; dated August 1, 2003 Main S team Line Vi bration Data; dated May 16, July 30, and August 14, 2003 TIC-678; New Procedure to M onitor Unit 2 Parameters Duri ng and After Pow er Ascension to Extended Power Up rate Power to Ensure Dry er Repairs w ere Effective; dated July 17, 2003 TIC-682; New Procedure to M onitor Reactor and Plant P arameters to M onitor Steam Dryer Performance and Investi gate Main Steam Line C Low Pres sure Swi tch Actuations During and Fo llowi ng Power As cension to E xtended Po wer Uprate Power Lev els; dated August 12, 2003 System Engine ering Department M emorandum; Summary of Action Steps Being Taken to Support Quad Unit 2 Load Increase to 91 2 MWe; dated July 2 4, 2003 Condition Report 159607

Pressure Bou ndary Leakage from 2 In ch Reactor He ad Vent Line; dated May 20 , 2003 QCOS 0010-08; Hi gh Radiation Area Inspecti on Guideli nes; Revi sion 2 Condition Report 154275

2-0203-3B POR V Inadverten tly Opened at Power; d ated April 16, 2 003 QCOS 0203-02; Sa fety and Rel ief Valve Temperature Surve illance; Revisio n 13 4OA5 Other Institute of Nucle ar Power Ope rations Repo rt; Quad Cities June 2003 Evaluati on; dated September 10, 20

Attachment 17 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED EC Early Co ntainment Contro l GENE Gene ral Ele ctri c Nu cle ar E nergy IM Instrument Mai ntenance IMC Inspection M anual Chap ter MW e Megawatts Electric NCV Non-Cited V iolation PORV Power Ope rated Re lief Valve SLOCA Small Break Lo ss of Coolant A ccident SLOCA-EC Small Break Lo ss of Coolant A ccident - Earl y Contain ment Control

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2003 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 10(0) 7(0) 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) 11(0) 12(0) 13(0) 14(0) 11(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

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