IR 05000334/2012007

IR 05000334-12-007 and 05000412-12-007, 07/23/2012 - 08/10/2012, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, Beaver Valley Power Station; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection

ML12265A028
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/20/2012
From:	Christopher Miller Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	Harden P A FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
EA-12-195 IR-12-007
Download: ML12265A028 (34)

Text

t--W UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 21OO RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1OO KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713 September 20, 2012 EA-12-195 Mr. Paul Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P. O. Box4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077 -0004

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION I NSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2012007 and 05000 41212012007, EXERCI SE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Harden:

On August 10,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 10,2012, with yourself and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing large fires and explosions.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

The licensee identified a finding involving a violation of a Beaver Valley Power Station fire protection license condition.

The NRC screened this finding and determined that it warranted enforcement discretion per Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection lssues (10 CFR 50.48)." In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS).ln accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulafions (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/)/\ /H/ZLu--Christopher G. Miller, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

I nspection Report N os. 05000 334 l 20 I 2007 and 050004 1 2l2O 1 2007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformation cc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA by Peter R. Wilson for/Christopher G. Miller, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

I nspection Report Nos. 05000 3341 20 1 2007 and 05000 41 21 20 1 2007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformation cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ DOCUMENT NAME: GTDRS\Engineering Branch 3\FuhrmeisteABvPs 12'07 Rev 1.docx ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML V suNstReview g Non-sensitive tr Sensitive V D Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/ORA RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME RFuhrmeister/JFR for CCahill MMcLaughlin GHunegs/SB for JRogge DATE 9t10t12 9110112 9t10t12 9119112 9t10t12 Distribution w/encl: (via E-mail)W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL Resource)D. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource)J. Clifford, DRP (Ri DRPMail Resource)C. Miller, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)P. Wilson, DRS (RlDRSMail Resource)G. Hunegs, DRP S. Barber, DRP A. Dugandzic, DRP D. Spindler, DRP, SRI E. Bonney, DRP, Rl P. Garrett, DRP, Resident AA S. Kennedy, Rl OEDO RidsNrrPMBeaverValley Resource RidsNrrDorlLpll

-2 Resource ROPreports Resource M. McLaughlin, ORA D. Bearde. DRS R. Fuhrmeister, DRS J. Rogge, DRS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket Nos.: 50-334; 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73 Report Nos.: 05000334/2012007 and 0500041212012007 Licensee:

First Energy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station Location:

Technology Blvd., Shippingport, PA Dates: July 23 - August 10,2012 lnspectors:

R. Fuhrmeister, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Orr, Senior Reactor lnspector Approved by: John F. Rogge, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500033412012007 and 0500041212012007; 0712312012 - 0811012012;

First Energy Nuclear Operating Company; Beaver Valley Power Station; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors.

The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Initiating

Events, Mitigating Systems NRC ldentified and Self-Revealing Findings: No findings were identified.

Other Findings

Violations of very low safety significance or severity level lV that were identified by First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) have been reviewed by the NRC.Corrective actions taken or planned by FENOC have been entered into FENOC's corrective action program. These violations are listed in Section 4OA3 and 4OA7 of this report.Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Backqround This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (lP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection." The objective of the inspection was to assess whether First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). The following fire areas (FAs) and/or fire zones (FZs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the BVPS Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).. FA 1-QP-1 r FA 1-ES-2. FA 2-SB-4 o FA 2-CV-2 lnspection of these areaslzones fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of three samples.The inspection team evaluated FENOC's fire protection program (FPP) against applicable requirements which included the plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C(5) for Unit 1 and 2.F for Unit 2 , NRC Safety Evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) Chemical Engineering Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1.The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9.10 (Unit 1) and 9.5.1 (Unit 2), the fire hazards analysis (FHA), and the post-fire safe shutdown analyses.The team also evaluated eight FENOC mitigating strategies for addressing large fires and explosions as required by Operating License Condition 2.C(11) for Unit 1, Operating License Condition 2.C(13) for Unit 2, and 10 CFR 50.54 (hhx2). Inspection of these strategies fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of one sample.Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.

,1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier lntegrity 1R05 Fire Protection (lP 711 1 1.05T)Protection of Sgfe Shutdown Capabilities Inspection Scope The team reviewed the FHA, safe shutdown analyses, supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The team ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (U1), BTP 9.5-1 (U2), and FENOC's design and licensing Enclosure.01 a.

b.a.b..02.03 2 bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control and instrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Passive Fire Protection lnspection Scope The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to evaluate whether the material conditions of the fire area boundaries were adequate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the fire area boundaries, including walls, ceilings, floors, fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, electrical raceway and conduit fire barriers, and redundant equipment fire barriers to design and licensing basis requirements, industry standards, and the BVPS fire protection program (FPP), as approved by the NRC, to identify any potential degradation or non-conformances.

The team reviewed selected engineering evaluations, installation and repair work orders, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to determine whether the fill material was properly installed and whether the as-left configuration satisfied design requirements for the intended fire rating. The team also reviewed similar records for selected fire protection wraps to verify whether the material and configuration was appropriate for the required fire rating and conformed to the engineering design.The team also reviewed recent FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)inspection records for penetration seals and fire barriers, to verify whether inspections were adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradations were identified.

In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the carbon dioxide (COz) fire damper functionality tests for the Unit 2 east cable vault room to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradations were identified.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Active Fire Protection Inspection Scope The team evaluated manual and automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the selected fire areas to determine whether they were installed, tested, maintained, and operated in accordance with NRC requirements, National Fire Protection Association a.Enclosure 3 (NFPA) codes of record, and the BVPS FPP, assessed whether the suppression systems'extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas.The team reviewed the as-built capability of the fire water supply system to verify whether the design and licensing basis and NFPA code of record requirements were satisfied, and to assess whether those capabilities were adequate for the hazards involved.

The team reviewed the fire water system hydraulic analyses to assess the adequacy of a single fire water pump to supply the largest single hydraulic load on the fire water system plus concurrent fire hose usage. The team evaluated the fire pump performance tests to assess the adequacy of the test acceptance criteria for pump minimum discharge pressure at the required flow rate, to verify whether the criteria was adequate to ensure that the design basis and hydraulic analysis requirements were satisfied.

The team also evaluated the underground fire loop flow tests to verify whether the tests adequately demonstrated that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet design basis requirements.

In addition, the team reviewed recent pump and loop flow test results to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.

The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, vendor requirements, engineering evaluations, and routine functional testing for the CO2 suppression system for the Unit 2 east cable vault room. The team walked down accessible portions of the CO2 system, including storage tanks and supply systems, to independently assess the material condition, operational lineup, and availability of the systems. The team also reviewed and walked down the associated fire fighting strategies and CO2 system operating procedures.

The team walked down accessible portions of the fire detection and fire hose suppression systems in the selected areas and major portions of the fire water supply system, including both diesel and motor driven fire pumps, interviewed system and program engineers, and reviewed selected condition reports to independently assess the material condition of the systems and components.

In addition, the team reviewed recent test results for the fire detection and suppression systems for the selected fire areas to verify whether the testing was adequately conducted, the acceptance criteria were met, and any potential performance degradation was identified.

The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed FENOC's fire fighting strategies (i.e., pre-fire plans) for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability.

The team independently inspected the fire brigade equipment, including personnel protective gear (e.9., turnout gear) and smoke removal equipment, to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.

In addition, the team reviewed FENOC's fire brigade equipment inventory and inspection procedure and recent inspection and inventory results to verify whether adequate equipment was available, and whether any potential material deficiencies were identified.

as approved by the NRC. The team also capabilities were adequate to control and/or Enclosure 4 b..04 Findinqs No findings were Protection From Damaqe From Fire Suppression Activities Inspection Scope The team walked down the selected fire areas and adjacent areas, and reviewed selected documents to determine whether redundant safe shutdown trains could be potentially damaged from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. During the walkdowns, the team evaluated the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

Specifically, to determine whether a potential existed to damage redundant safe shutdown trains, the team evaluated whether: o A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not release smoke, heat, or hot gases that could cause unintended activation of suppression systems in adjacent fire areas which could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains;. A fire suppression system rupture, inadvertent actuation, or actuation due to a fire, in one of the selected fire areas, could not directly damage all redundant trains (e.g., sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); and r Adequate drainage was provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.Findinqs No findings were identified.

Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capabilitv - Normal and Alternative lnspection Scope The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings (P&lDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supporting documents for the selected fire areas to verify that the licensee had properly identified the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.

The team assessed the adequacy of the selected systems and components for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

This review included verification that alternative post-fire shutdown could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.Plant walkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses.

The team verified that the systems and components credited for use during shutdown would remain free from fire damage.b..05 Enclosure 5 The team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operators included alternative shutdown capability.

The team also verified that personnel required for safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures are trained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown and performed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures.

The team also verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included the following:. 1OM-568.4,1, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Service Building, Rev. 13 o 1OM-568.4.H, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in Safeguards, Rev. 20 o 1OM-56C.4.A, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room - Intent and Methodology, Rev.9 o 1OM-56C.4.8, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Shift Manager Procedure, Rev. 44. 1OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -NCO Procedure, Rev. 35 o 1OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Rev. 32 r 1OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Shift Technical Advisor's Procedure, Rev. 21. 1OM-56C.4.G, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #2 Procedure, Rev. 3 o 1OM-56C.4.H, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside Control Room -Nuclear Operator #3 Procedure, Rev. 0 o 2OM-568.4.8, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Cable Vault Building, Rev.22;o 2OM-56B.4.1, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in the Service Building, Rev. 12;2OM-56C.4.B, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Unit Supervisor Procedure, Rev. 30;2OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NCO Procedure, Rev. 18;2OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Rev. 22;2OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #2 Procedure, Rev. 21;2OM-56C.4.F-1, ASP Activation, Rev. 12;Enclosure b.a..06 6. 2OM-56C.4.F-15, Manual Operation of Hydraulically Operated Valves, Rev. 4;and,. 2OM-56C,4.F-19, Operation of Reactor Head Vent Valves, Rev. 0.The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed and approved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each fire area. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests are adequate to ensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.

No findings were identified.

Circuit Analvsis Inspection Scope The team reviewed FENOC's post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas to ensure the analysis identified both required and associated electrical circuits and cables for the systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The team reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for the power and control cables associated with selected components.

Specifically, the team evaluated the selected circuits and cables to determine whether they were (a) adequately protected from potential fire damage, or (b) analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown, or (c) analyzed to show that any adverse effect of potential damage could be mitigated with approved operator manual actions, in order to verify fire-induced faults would not adversely impact safe shutdown capabilities.

The team's evaluations considered credible fire scenarios, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, cable routing, and common power supply or electrical bus configurations.

ln addition, the team reviewed cable raceway drawings and cable routing databases for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to determine whether those cables were routed as described in the safe shutdown analysis.

The team also reviewed equipment important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to assess whether FENOC's safe shutdown methodologies were appropriate, conformed to design and licensing basis requirements, and appropriately considered the guidance in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2.Circuit analysis was performed for the following components:

b.o LT-RC-460, Pressurizer Level {(at Backup Indicating Panel (BlP)};. MOV-CH1158, Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) lsolation to Charging o MOV-CH115D, RWST lsolation to Charging Pump;o MOV-CH289, Charging Pump Header Containment lsolation Valve; and. SOV-RC1028, Reactor Vessel Vent Valve (at BIP).. 2CHS*P21A, Charging Pump A, (High Head Safety Injection);. 2FWE*P23A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump A;o 2FWS*L1487F,218 Steam Generator Wide Range Level {(at Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP));. 2RHS*P21A, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump A; and o 2E10, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-1 ACB Output Circuit Breaker.The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker over-current protection coordination studies to determine whether equipment needed for post-fire safe shutdown activities could be adversely affected due to a lack of coordination that could result in a common power supply or common electrical bus concern. The team also evaluated whether coordination studies appropriately considered multiple faults due to fire. In addition, the team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records, for components required for safe shutdown, to determine whether the breakers were properly maintained.

The team assessed the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown locations to determine whether it would be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.9., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).

Findinos No findings were identified.

Communications lnspection Scope The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, and associated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would be available to plant operators following a fire. During this review, the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability, and coverage patterns.The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and for plant operators.

The team also.07 Enclosure

.09 8 verified that communications

equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not be affected by a fire.Findinqs No findings were identified.

Emersencv Liqhtinq lnspection Scope The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lights throughout the selected fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire safe shutdown.

The team also verified that the battery power supplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity.

Preventive maintenance procedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests, and battery replacement practices were also reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintained consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and in a manner that would ensure reliable operation.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Cold Shutdown Repairs Inspection Scope The team verified that the licensee had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which might be damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the time frames specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repair equipment, components, tools, and materials (e.9., pre-cut cables with prepared attachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.Findinos No findings were identified.

Compensatorv Measures Inspection Scope The team verified whether compensatory measures were in place for outof-seryice, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.9., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or b..10 a.Enclosure b..11 9 capabilities).

The team evaluated whether the short term compensatory measures adequately compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and whether FENOC was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.Findinqs No findings were identified.

Fire Protection Proqram Chanqes Inspection Scope The team reviewed recent changes to the approved fire protection program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.Findinos No findings were identified.

Control of Transient Combustibles and lonition Sources Inspection Scope The team reviewed FENOC's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were reviewed to assess the adequacy of FENOC's fire protection program administrative controls.

The team performed plant walkdowns to independently verify whether transient combustibles and ignition sources were being properly controlled in accordance with the administrative controls.Findinqs No findings were identified.

Laroe Fires and Explosions Mitioation Strateoies lnspection Scope The team reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing eight licensee mitigating strategies to verify they continue to meet 10 CFR 50.54 (hhx2) by determining that:. Procedures are being maintained and adequate;r Equipment is properly staged and is being maintained and tested; and, r Station personnel are knowledgeable and can implement the procedures.

.12.1 3 Enclosure

10 b.Findinqs No findings were identified.

oTHER ACTTVTTTES

[OA]ldentification and Resolution of Problems Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies Inspection Scope The team verified that the licensee was identifying fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The team also reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that the licensee had taken or planned appropriate corrective actions.b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement

Discretion (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-334/2011-01:

Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Not Conforming To a Tested Configuration

Introduction.

The licensee identified a finding of low to moderate safety significance involving a violation of a Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 (Beaver Valley 1) fire protection license condition, in that FENOC identified that the coatings on some flexible conduits installed through fire barrier penetration seals in Unit 1 did not conform to tested and approved configurations.

The finding has been screened by the NRC and determined to warrant enforcement discretion per Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection lssues (10 CFR 50.48)."

Description.

As a result of transitioning to NFPA 805, FENOC identified that samples taken of the coatings of flexible steel conduits from certain Unit 1 fire barrier penetrations did not exhibit expected flame resistant characteristics and were not in conformance with previously-tested and approved configurations.

Specifically, while the original tests of the penetration seal material (silicon foam) used rigid steel conduit as penetrating items, the licensee identified that some seals contained aluminum conduit or liquid{ight flexible conduit which were coated with poly vinyl chloride (PVC). Further, the licensee identified that the PVC material and thickness varied by manufacturer, and identified up to 16 different types of coating material on conduit within approximately 924 of the 2843 tire barrier penetrations.

Since these penetrations differed from the previously-tested and approved configuration, Beaver Valley postulated that the potential could exist for a fire in one fire area to eventually spread to another fire area by burning or melting the seal.4.4c.A2.01 a..01 Enclosure 11 The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR-2011-Q4769, CR-201 1-96801 , and CR-2011-97411.

FENOC implemented fire watch tours in all affected areas, and established combustible free zones around each affected penetration.

FENOC continues to pursue resolution of this issue through review of tests with aluminum conduits for another facility, analysis, comparison with UL listed designs, and may perform additionalfire tests. The NRC concluded that FENOC's interim compensatory measures were commensurate with the risk significance.

Analvsis.

FENOC failed to analyze the acceptability of using aluminum conduit or PVC-coated liquid{ight flexible steel conduit in lieu of rigid steel conduit as the penetrating items through numerous fire barrier penetrations.

The licensee evaluated this issue through use of its fire probabilistic safety assessment (PRA), and determined that the change in core damage frequency attributed to the issue was 8X10' per reactor year (White). NRC staff reviewed this evaluation and concluded that the risk numbers were artificially inflated by the rules for fire PRA. Namely, the NRC staff considered that NUREG/CR-6850 imposes a 317 kW transient combustible material fire in all compartments, with an ignition frequency of 3.9X10-3 per year for the control and primary auxiliary buildings, and 4.9X10-3 for general plant areas. The inspection team did not observe this level of transient combustible material in any area of the plant. Therefore, the NRC concluded that FENOC's risk estimate is conservative and that this issue would be of no greater than low to moderate safety significance.

NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection issues (10 CFR 50.48)," provides, in part, for the exercise of enforcement discretion for certain noncompliances with fire protection license conditions that are identified as a result of a licensee's transition to NFPA 805. The NRC staff concluded that this issue qualifies for discretion since: 1) FENOC identified the violation as a result of the voluntary initiative to adopt NFPA 905; 2) FENOC took immediate compensatory measures and actions to correct the violation as described above; 3) the issue was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee activities; 4) the violation was not willful; and, 5) the violation is not associated with a finding of high safety significance.

Cross-cutting aspects are not applicable to findings involving enforcement discretion.

Enforcement.

Beaver Valley Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.5 requires that FENOC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the facility, and that FENOC may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Beaver Valley Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.10, "Fire Protection System," states, in part, that fire protection features to satisfy the provisions of Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP)APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1 , 1976," are reflected in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Beaver Valley Unit 1 issued by the NRC, and documented as Amendment No. 18 to the Technical Specifications, dated June 6, 1979. The Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report for Beaver Valley Unit 1, Section 4.9.3 states that The licensee has conducted a Enclosure 12 survey of penetrations in safety-related areas and will upgrade them where necessary to the fire rating of the wall. Ceiling or floor they pass through.Contrary to the above, on November 2,2011, while preparing for its transition to NFPA 805, Beaver Valley identified that electrical conduit installed through certain Unit 1 fire barrier penetrations were covered with an outer coating that had not a part of the tests conducted to determine the acceptability of the electrical penetration seal material.Consequently, the ability of the affected seals to provide protection at least equivalent to the fire barriers could not be verified.Beaver Valley is in transition to NFPA 805 and, therefore, the licensee-identified violation was evaluated in accordance with the criteria established in Section 9.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, "Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection issues (10 CFR 50.48)." Because allthe criteria were met, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion for this issue. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no additional findings were identified.

4OAO Meetinos.

includinq Exit Exit Meetinq Summary The team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. Paul Harden, Site Vice President, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on August 10,2012.No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.4C.A7 Licensee ldentified Violations

.01 Requirement

for Seismic Water Supplv for Firefiohtino Not Met License Condition 2.F tor Unit 2 requires FENOC to implement and maintain the fire protection program as approved in the Safety Evaluation Reports. UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Revision 14, states, in part, "The BVPS-2fire suppression system is capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within reach of areas containing safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown following a safe shutdown earthquake." Supplement 5 to NUREG-1057, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2," Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection Program," documented the review of Amendment 14 of the FSAR.Contrary to the above, in the year 2000, BVPS abandoned the booster pump which provided the seismic water supply to the standpipe system feeding the areas containing safety-related equipment.

This condition was identified by the FENOC NFPA 805 Project Team in 2006. At that time, a procedure was developed to align a 6-inch bypass line around the abandoned booster pump to provide water from the River Water System to the standpipe system in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). FENOC did not perform an evaluation at that time to determine the capability of the line to provide adequate water pressure and flow to ensure effective hose streams for firefighting purposes.Enclosure 13 In response to questions from the team, FENOC performed an informal, undocumented calculation which determined that the 6-inch bypass line would not provide sufficient flow and pressure to enable effective hose streams at normal river water system operating conditions.

FENOC revised an operations standing order to direct operators to isolate unnecessary river water flow paths after an earthquake to raise river water system pressure to improve flow and pressure provided to the PAB standpipe system.This issue only pertains following a safe shutdown earthquake.

The safety-related equipment is designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake.

Non safety-related equipment in proximity to safety-related equipment is also designed so that an earthquake will not cause it to fail in such a way that it will adversely impact safety-related equipment.

FENOC's seismic-fire interaction study indicates that while there may be some seismically induced fires following a safe shutdown earthquake, none will be in areas containing safety-related equipment.

With this "seismic 2 over 1 design," there will be no safety-related equipment damaged by a seismic induced fire, so delta CDF will be zero (Green). Since this issue is of very low safety significance and has been entered into FENOC's corrective action program as CR-2012-12265, it is being treated as a Green, licensee identified NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.ATTACHMENT:

=SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION=

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

P. Harden, Site Vice President

D. Benyak, Manager of Regulatory

Compliance

R. Bologna, Director of Engineering

R. Kurkienicz, Manager of Fleet Oversight

J. Belfiore, Design Engineer (Fire Protection)

T. Collopy, Design Engineer (Electrical)

K. Farzan, Compliance

Engineer (Licensing)

J. Flaherty, Design Engineer (Electrical)

H. Kahl, Design Engineer (Fire ProtectioniSafe

Shutdown)

B. Sepelak, Nuclear Compliance

Supervisor

M. Tobin, Electrical

Contractor

R. Price, Operator Training

J. Bosilevac, Telecommunications

Supervisor

M. Unfried, Design Engineer

C. Eberle, Operations

Procedure

Writer

D. Gmys, Fire Protection

System Engineer

J. Miller, Site Fire Marshall

NRC Personnel

J. Rogge, Chief, Engineering

Branch 3, Division of Reactor Safety

C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety

D. Spindler, Senior Resident lnspector, Beaver Valley Power Station

E. Bonney, Resident lnspector, Beaver Valley Power Station

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened NONE Opened and Closed NONE Closed LER 50-334t11-01

Discussed NONE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED Fire Protection Licensinq

Documents

UFSAR, BVPS, Unit 1, Section 9.10, Fire Protection System UFSAR, BVPS, Unit 2, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Rev. 20 UFSAR, BVPS, Unit 2, Section 9.5A, Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Rev. 20

BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 36 Exemption dated

3114183, BVPS, Unit 1, Request for Exemption from some Requirements of Appendix R to CFR Part 50 SER dated

616179, BVPS, Unit 1, SER Related to Amendment No. 18 to Facility Operating License No.

DPR-66 SER dated

115183, BVPS, Unit 1, SER for Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, ltems lll.G and lll.L SERdated 10/1985, BVPS, Unit2, NUREG-1057

SER dated 11l1986, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement

SER dated 5/1987, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement

SER dated

811987, BVPS, Unit 2,

NUREG-1057, Supplement Updated Fire Protection Appendix R Review - Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1, Rev. 30 10080-8-085, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 14 8700-8-084, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 12 Desiqn Basis Documents 2DBD-33B, Fire Protection System Design Basis Document, Rev. 10 Desion Chanqes Design Change Package No. 684, Communications - Alternate Shutdown, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluations of Modifications and Desiqn Chanoes

ECP 02-0532, CO2 Operator Action Point Level Limits, Rev. 0

ECP 06-01 47, Evaluation of Caulking in West Cable Mezzanine, Rev. 0

ECP 09-0356-000, 2FDP-AOV203

Replacement in CO2 System, Rev. 1

ECP 12-0180-000, Temporary Cooling for Unit 2 Battery Rooms, Rev. 2 Notification

2Q0465469, Battery 2-2 Replacement, dated

7111112 Notification

600740609, Battery 2-1 Replacement, dated

716112 Calculations/Enoineerino Evaluation Reports 10080-8-436,

BV-2 Sprinkler Supply Requirement for TB, Rev. 0 10080-8-438,

BV-2 Turb. Bldg Sprinkler System Conformance to

NFPA-850, Rev. 0 10080-8-438,

BV-2 Turb. Bldg Sprinkler System Conformance to

NFPA-850, Addendum 1 Attachment

10080-DEC-0182, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag

330 Deviations, Rev. 1 10080-DEC-0188, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag

330 Configurations, Rev.0 10080-DEC-0190, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag

330 J-Box Configurations, Rev. 1 10080-DEC-0191, Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Non-rated Assemblies, Rev. 0 211-8-41A,BV-z Aux Bldg Hose Rack Pipe Sizing, Addendum 1 211-B-41A,BV-z Aux Bldg Hose Rack Pipe Sizing, Rev.0 21 1-N-265 , BV-z Flooding Analysis Outside Containment, Rev. 6 211-N-44,

BV-2 Sprinkler

& Water Spray Hydraulic Calculation, dated

117176 211-N-44A,

BV-2 Fire Water Available Pressure, Rev. A 2601.337-844-078, Promatec Seismic Gap Seal Procedure, Rev. F 2601.337-844-082, Promatec Electrical Fire Seals Procedure, Rev. B 2701.620.000-021, NFPA 805 Fire PRA Task 5.13 Seismic-Fire Interactions, Rev. A 8700-10.1-819A,

BV-2 Hydraulic

Calculations

for Fire Water Piping, dated

12118187 8700-DMC-3079, Fire Pump Minimum Operating Curve, Rev. 1 B-183, BV-z COz Excess Pressure and Required Vent Area, Rev. 0 Beta Lab Test Report M11462, Fire Water Pipe-1FP11

Degradation Analysis, dated

218112

CTP-1037, 3-6548 RTV Foam Differential Pressure Test, dated

12114182 EM No. 63302, CO2 System Concentration Testing, dated

2122188 BVPS, Unit 1, SSDA - Appendix R Review, Rev. 30 BVPS, Unit 2, SSDA - Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 36 Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation No.12-081, Compensatory Measure Evaluation of Fire Areas

PT-1 and

MS-1 for MSOs, Rev. 0 2701.620-000-005, BV2 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Rept., Rev. B 8700-01 .062-0002, NFPA 805-MSO Expert Panel Review Report, Rev. B 8700-E-308, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1N1, Rev. 0 8700-E-309, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency bus 1N, Rev. 0 8700-E-310, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1P, Rev. 0 8700-E-311, U1 Protective Relay Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1P1, Rev. 0 8700-E-342, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt Emergency Bus 1AE, Rev.0 8700-E-343, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt Emergency Bus 1DF, Rev.0 8700-E-523, U1 Protective Settings Calculations for 125VDC Systems; Batteries

1-1,1-2,1-3, andl-4, Rev.1 8700-E-524, U1 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 120VAC UPS Systems, Rev. 1 8700-E-525, Ul Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for Emergency Diesel Generators No. 1 and No. 2, Rev. 0 10080-E-307 , U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 2N, Rev. 0 10080-E-308, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 480 Volt Emergency Bus 2P, Rev. 0 10080-E-309, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt Emergency Bus 2AE, Rev. 1 10080-E-31

0, U2 Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 4160 Volt Emergency Bus 2DF, Rev. 1 10080-E-524,U2

Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 125VDC Systems Batteries

2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, Rev. 1 Attachment

10080-E-525,U2

Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2-1 and No. 2-2, Rev.0 10080-E526,U2

Electrical Protective Device Settings Calculations for 120VAC UPS Systems, Rev.0 8700-US(P)-276, Beaver Valley Unit 1 Appendix R Loss of AC Power Analysis, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-1352, Emergency Diesel Generator Operating Time with Loss of River Water, Rev.0 8700-DMC-1644, Pressurizer Level Response Following

a Fire, Rev.0 8700-DMC-3232, Minimum Time Required to Overfill a Steam Generator Using Only Auxiliary Feedwater Following

a Plant Trip, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-3233, Time Available for Preventing Re-Criticality Due to an Uncontrolled

RCS Cooldown, Rev.0 8700-DMC-3509, HHSI Pump OilTemperature Following Loss of RW, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-1559,

BVPS-1 Charging Pump Cubicle Heatup Following

a DBA and Loss of All Ventilation, PRA Analysis, Rev.0 8700-DMC-2975,

BV-1 ESGR Area Heat-Up Following Recovery of Loss of All AC, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-3476,

BVPS-1 Service Building Area Heatup Rates Following

a Loss of All HVAC Due to a Fire in

CR-2, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-3507, Emergency Diesel Generator Room 1-2Heat Up with Appendix R Scenario Loss of Ventilation, Rev. 1 10080-DMC-0820, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Loss of Offsite Power + Stuck Open Pressurizer

PORV Analysis, Rev. 0, Addendum 1 10080-DMC-0825, Pressurizer Level Response Following

a Fire, Rev. 1, Addendum 1'10080-DMC-0826, Minimum Time Required to Overfill a Steam Generator Using Only Auxiliary Feedwater Following

a Plant Trip, Rev. 0 10080-DMC-0827, Time Available for Preventing Violation of Shutdown Margin Due to an Uncontrolled

RCS Cooldown, Rev. 0 10080-DMC-0841, Minimum Time Available to lsolate Hydrogen Supply to the VCT for Fire Protection Safe Shutdown, Rev. 0, Addendum 1 10080-N-830, Beaver Valley Unit 2 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Loss of AC Power Analysis, Rev. 0 10772, Unit 2 UFSAR Appendix 9.5A and FPSSR Update for PORV, Rev. 0 8700-DMC-1450, Attachment

2, Fire Tests of 3X3 Ft. Specimens Made With Standard High-Density Cellular Concrete, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation

09-074 Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation

2-047 Fire Protection Program Change Evaluation

2-070 Procedures

1/2OM-53C.4A.75.3, Acts of Nature - Earthquake, Rev. 15 lOST-33.2B, Fire Hose Stations Flow Verification

& Hydrostatic Test, Rev. 8 2OST-33.35, Fire Rated Assemblies Visual Inspection, Rev. 2

ADM-0407, Installation

& Inspection of Penetration Seals, Rev. 6

ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Rev.26

ADM-1901, Pre-Fire Plan Administrative Control, Rev. 3

ADM-1902, Fire Brigade, Rev. 10

ADM-1904, Control of lgnition Sources & Hot Watches, Rev. 3

ADM-1905, Fire ProtectioniFire Barrier lmpairments, Rev. 2 Attachment

ADM-1906, Control of Transient Combustible Materials, Rev. 7

NOP-ER-2077, Underground Piping and Tanks Integrity Program, Rev. 2 S-1 1P, Inspection of Fire Wrap, Rev. 0

ES-E-003, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit No. 2, Rev. 4

ES-E-004, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit No. 1, Rev. 7 Operations

Procedures

10M-56C.4.8., BVPS Unit 1, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Shift Manager Procedure, Rev. 44 10M-56C.4.E., BVPS Unit 1, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Shift Technical Advisor's Procedure, Rev. 21 1OM-53A.1.E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, lssue 1C Rev. 1 1 1OM-56C.4.F-1, BIP Activation, Rev. 22 1OM-56C.4.F-2, Transferring

AFW Pump Suction to River Water Supply, Rev. 14 1OM-56C.4.F-7, Pneumatic Jumpering of Condenser Steam Dump Valves, lssue 2 Rev. 1 1 1OM-56C.4.F-8, Supplying Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank From the Other Diesel Generator Storage Tank, lssue 2 Rev. 11 1OM-56C.4.F-12, Establishing Portable Emergency Ventilation, Rev. 9 1OM-56C.4.F-14, Water-To-Water Heat Exchanger, Rev. 0 2OM-56B.4.B, Safe Shutdown Following

a Serious Fire in the Cable Vault Building, Rev. 22 2OM-568.4.1, Safe Shutdown Following

a Serious Fire in the Service Building, Rev. 12 2OM-56C.4.8, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Unit Supervisor Procedure, Rev.30 2OM-56C.4.C, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, NCO Procedure, Rev. 18 2OM-56C.4.D, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Rev.22 2OM-56C.4.E, Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside Control Room, Nuclear Operator #2 Procedure, Rev. 21 2OM-56C.4.F-1, ASP Activation, Rev. 12 2OM-56C.4.F-15, Manual Operation of Hydraulically Operated Valves, Rev. 4 2OM-56C.4.F-19, Operation of Reactor Head Vent Valves, Rev. 0 2OM-56C.4.G, Transferring Equipment Control - From the Alternate Shutdown Panel- To the Control Room, Rev.7 2OST-45.9, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 1, 2, and 3, Rev. 15 Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitiqation Strateqies

Documents

1/2OM-53C.4A.100.4, Spent Fuel Pool, Rev. 5 1/2OM-53C.4,A.100.6, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, Rev. 6

BV-L-07-009, Response Providing Information Regarding lmplementation Details for Phase 2 and 3 Mitigation Strategies, January 26,20Q7 t-07-150, Commitment Change in Response Providing Information Regarding lmplementation Details for the Phase 2 and 3 Mitigation Strategies, November 21, 2007 Ll-11-177,30-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies", June 9,2011 Ll-1 1-179, 60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2011-01, "Mitigating Strategies", July 11 , 2011 Ll-11-360, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding

60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 201I-01, "Mitigating Strategies," December 29, 2Q1I Attachment Com pleted Tests/Su rveillances

lOST-33.04, Fire Water Hydrant Test, performed

4111112 lOST-33.07, Motor Driven Fire Pump Test, performed

3/31/12 &

4126112 lOST-33.08, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Test, performed

417112 &515112 2OST-33.04, Fire Water Hydrant Test, performed

4117112 2OST-33.12, Fire Water Loop Flow Test, performed

1/17111 &9122111 2OST-33.13A, Annual Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed

9/30/11 2OST-33.13P, CO2 FunctionalTest Zone 2A (east cable vault), performed

6116112 2OST-33.16D, Aux Bldg Early Warning Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed

21111 2OST-33.16E, Service Bldg Early Warning Smoke Detector Functional Test, performed

24112 2OST-33.31, Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory, performed

5111112 2OST-33.31, Fire Brigade Equipment Test, performed

23112

QC-3A.2 Release No. 06529, Penetration

2SWC342P02, performed

131 187

QC-3A.2 Release No. 10098, Penetration

CV-1H (seismic gap), performed

3/30/87

QC-3A.2 Release No. 10187, Penetration

SS-A-1H, performed2l9lST

QCI-5787, Penetration Seal 2WX401N20

Repair Inspection, performed

28111

QCI-5836, Penetration Seal 2FBKUT08 Repair Inspection, performed

1Ol5111

QCI-5850, Penetration Seal 2WBKUT08 Repair Inspection, performed

1017111

SOV-2.33A.01, Main Plant CO2 System Test, performed

1117187 lOST-45.9, BIP Instrumentation and Source Range Indication Test, Rev. 13, completed

1111110 lOST-45.9, BIP Instrumentation and Source Range Indication Test, Rev. 14, completed

416112 lOST-45.10, BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4, completed

10128110 lOST-45.10, BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4, completed

514112 1/2OST-56C.1, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R PAX Phone Verification, Rev, 8, completed

817111 lOST-45.10, Operating Surveillance Test - BIP Valve Control Switch Test, Rev. 4, completed

514112 l

OST-1 .10A, Operating Surveillance Test - Cold Shutdown Valve Exercise Test (Part A) RCS Vents, Rev.0, completed

516112 1/205T-568,1, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R Equipment Verification, Rev. 9 completed

10113110 and

3111112 1/205T-568,2, Operating Surveillance Test - Appendix R Equipment lnventory Verification, Rev. 6, completed

20111 l

PMP-38VB-EL-1E, Appendix R and Non-Appendix

R Emergency Lighting Maintenance, Testing, Inspection, and Repair, Rev. 29, completed

1110112 112-Ml-C-010, Maintenance of Communications Battery, lssue 4 Rev. 5, completed

22112 2OST-45.9, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 1,2,and 3, completed01l03l11,

01110111, and

07128112 2PMP-38-EMERGLGT-4E, Appendix R and Non-Appendix

R Emergency Lighting Operability Test, Inspection and Repair, completed

2109110,12110/10, and

12114110 1/2-OST-33.12, Fire Protection System Loop Flow Test, Rev. 1 1, completed

111212011 Qualitv Assurance Audits and Self-Assessments

BV-C-10-06-04/05, Fleet Oversight Audit Repoft,

6124110 -

7115110 Attachment Svstem Health Reports

BV-O Fire Protection Program SHR, 4th Quarter 2011

BV-2 Fire Protection System SHR, 1st Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 1, System-36A-Unit Emergency Diesel Generators, 4th Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 1, System-368-Unit

4 KV Station Service System, 4th Quarter 201 1 BVPS Unit 1, System-37-Unit

480 Volt Station Service System, 4th Quarter.2011

BVPS Unit 1, System-38-Unit

120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 4tn Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 1, System-39-Unit

125 VDC Distribution System, 4'n Quarter 201 1 BVPS Unit 1, System-36A-Unit Emergency Diesel Generators, 1" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 1, System-368-Unit

4 KV Station Service System, 1" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 1, System-37-Unit

480 Volt Station Service System, 1" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 1, System-38-Unit

120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, l" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 1, System-39-Unit

125 VDC Distribution Systeffi, 1" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit2, System-36A-Unit Emergency Diesel Generators, 4th Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 2, System-368-Unit

4KV Station Service System, 4th Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 2, System-37-Unit

480 Volt Station Service System, 4tn Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 2, System-38-Unit

120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 4th Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit 2, System-39-Unit

125 VDC Distribution System, 4'n Quarter 2011 BVPS Unit2, System-36A-Unit Emergency Diesel Generators, 1" Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 2, System-36B-Unit

4 KV Station Service System, 1"'Quarter

2012 BVPS Unit 2, System-37-Unit

480 Volt Station Service System, 1'I Quarter 2012 BVPS Unit 2, System-38-Unit

120 VAC Distribution and Lighting System, 1u'Quarter

2012 BVPS Unit 2, System-39-Unit

125 VDC Distribution System, l" Quarter 2012 Drawinqs and Wirinq Diaqrams 10080-RA-9F, Shake Space Fire Stops, Rev. 5 10080-RB-168, Vent & Air Conditioning - Reactor Contiguous Areas, Rev. 11 10080-RB-3A,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 12 10080-RB-38,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 10 10080-RB-3C, BV-z Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 6 10080-RB-3D,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 7 10080-RB-3E,

BV-2 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 5 10080-RE-37L, Cable Tunnel Conduit & Sleeves, Rev. 15 1 0080-RM-301A,

BY-2 Hazard Boundaries Lower Elevations, Rev. 6 10080-RM-3018,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 735 ft., Rev. 15 10080-RM-301C,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 752ft., Rev. 14 10080-RM-301D,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 760 ft., Rev. 15 10080-RM-301E,

BY-2Hazard Boundaries Elev. 735 ft., Rev. 12 2010210185045, Fire Damper Specification, Rev. J 2866.624-000-001, Ruskin Back Draft Damper, Rev. D 8700-RB-2S,

BV-0 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 6 8700-RB-2V,

BV-0 Fire Protection Arrangement, Rev. 4 8700-RE-1A, Sht. 1, U1, Main One Line Diagram, Rev.25 8700-RE-18, Sht. 2, U1, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 25 8700-RE-1

D, U1 , 4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 18 8700-RE-1E, U1,4160V One Line Diagram, Rev.23 Attachment

8700-RE-1F, U1,4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 19 8700-RE-1K, U1, 480V One Line Diagram, Rev. 28 8700-RE-1S, U1, 480V One Line Diagram, Rev. 37 8700-RE-1U, U1, 120V AC Vital Bus - l, Rev. 38 8700-RE-1V, U1 ,125V DC, Rev. 30 8700-RE-1Z,U1, Vital Bus and DC One Line Diagram, Rev.28 8700-RE-1AE, Sht. 5, U1, 125 VDC One Line Diagram, Rev. 18 8700-RE-3GK, U1, Wiring Diagram, BIP Transfer Switch Panel No. 1, Rev. 2 8700-RE-21DN, U1, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Coolant Vent System, Rev. 6 8700-RE-22B,J, U1, Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer Level Protection

CH. ll Level Control System Loop Diagram,

LT-RC-460, Rev.9 8700-RE-21FR, Sht.4, Elementary Diagram, Charging and Volume Control, Rev. 13 8700-RE-27A, Arrgt.-Control

& Computer Rooms, Rev. 40 8700-RE-34AC, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Control & Switchgear Area, Rev. 52 8700-RE-34AH, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 14 8700-RE-34AN, U1, Cable Tray Designations, Cable Vault Area, Rev. 17 8700-RE-34H, U1, Cable Tray Plan, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 16 8700-RE-37J,U1, Conduit Sleeve Details, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 10 8700-RE-378C, Sleeve Designation, Control & Computer Room, Rev. 36 8700-RE-42K, U1, Conduit Plan, Cable Vault, Rev. 32 8700-RE-48D, Sht. 4,U1, Conduit Plan, Auxiliary Building, Rev. 24 10080-E-5D8, l)2, Elementary Diagram, 4160V Emergency Diesel Generator

2-1 ACB, Rev. 20 10080-E-5DF, Sht. 1,1)2, Elementary Diagram,4160V

Residual Heat Removal Pump (2RHS.P21A), Rev.23 10080-E-1

2C,l)2, Elementary Diagram, Motor Operated Ground Disconnect Switch, Rev. 6 10080-RE-1A, Sht. 1,U2, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 17 10080-RE-1F, Sht. 3,U2,4160V

One Line Diagram, Rev.20 10080-RE-1J, Sht. 3, U2, 480V US One Line Diagram, Rev. 18 10080-RE-1

U, Sht. 10, U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 28 10080-RE-1V, Sht. 11,U2,480V

MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 34 10080-RE-1W, Sht. 12,U2,480V

MCC One Line Diagram, Rev.28 10080-RE-1X, Sht. 13, U2,480V MCC One Line Diagram, Rev. 26 10080-RE-1Y, Sht. 14,U2,480V

MCC One Line Diagram, Rev.25 10080-RE-1AH, Sht. 1,U2,120V

AC One Line Diagram, Rev. 31 10080-RE-1AM, Sht. 5, U2, 120V AC One Line Diagram, Rev. 16 1 0080-RE- 1 AP , U2, 1 20V AC Vital Bus l & ll, Rev. 5 10080-RE-1AR, Sht. 1, U2, 125V DC One Line Diagram, Rev. 22 10080-RE-1AT, Sht. 3, U2,125V DC One Line Diagram, Rev. 17 10080-RE-1AW, Sht. 1,U2, One Line Vital Bus System, Rev. 21 10080-RE-1AX, U2, One Line Diagram - Vital Bus, Rev. 22 10080-RE-1DJ,U2, Sht. 34, 4160V One Line Diagram, Rev. 6 10080-RE-3EAA, BVPS U2, Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel, Rev. 5 10080-RE-3EAB, BVPS U2, Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel, Rev. 4 10080-TLD-24A-060-01,l)2, Test Loop Diagram, Main Feed Water System Steam Generator 2RCS.SG21B

Wide Range Level, Rev. 2 122241-E-5D1, Sht. 1,U2, Elementary Diagram 4160V, Charging Pump (High Head Safety lnjection)

2CHS*P21A, Rev. 15 12241-E-11F2, Sht. 2, U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 1 1 Attachment

12241-E-11F2, Sht. 3, U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 1 1 12241-E-11F2, Sht. 5,U2, Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Rev. 10 8700-RE-80C, Sht. 1, Communication System - Service Building, Rev. 31 8700-RE-80D, Sht. 2, Communication System - Service Building, Rev. 33 8700-RE-80E, Sht. 1, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 5 8700-RE-80F, Sht. 2, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 11 8700-RE-80G, Sht. 3, Communication System - Reactor Containment, Rev. 12 8700-RE-80H, Sht. 1, Communication System - Auxiliary Building, Rev. 8 8700-RE-80K, Communication System - Fuel, Diesel Generator, Primary Water Supply Pump & Decontamination Buildings, Rev. 10 8700-RE-80L, Communication System - Duct Lines & Miscellaneous Buildings, Rev. 16 8700-RE-80R, Communications System - Miscellaneous Buildings and Areas, Rev. 2 8700-10.1-708, Quench Spray and Aux. Feed Pump El 735'-6" Floor Pens, Fire Walls & Data, Rev. C 01.035-0169, West Cable Vault El. 735'-6" Wall and Floor Penetrations, Rev. J 8700-10.001-0689, Intake Structure Cubicle No. 3 3 Hr. Fire Floor and Walls, Rev. J 8700-10.1-800-A, Typicals

MS-1,

MS-2,

MS-3 &

MS-4 Mechanical Wall/Floor Fire Seals Electrical Protective Device Settinq Sheets and Electrical Svstem Coordination Curves

BV1-RBN-1, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder from 1000/1333

KVA Transformer, Rev 4

BV1-RBN-7, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder to

MCC-1-E5 (Breaker 8NO), Rev 6

BV1-RBN-9, 480V Bus 1-8N, Feeder to

MCC-1-E3 (Breaker 8N8), Rev 5

BV1-VBE-6, 4160V Emergency Bus 14 to 1AE Tie (Breakers

410 & E7), Rev. 1

BV1-VBE-7,4160V

Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker 1E7), Rev.2

BV1-VBE-9,4160V

Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker IE9XEDG 1), Rev. 5

BV1-VBE-10,4160V

Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker lE9XEDG 1), Rev. 4

BV1-VBE-1

, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker l E9XEDG 1), Rev. 1

BV1-VBE-1

2, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker l E9XEDG 1), Rev. 3

BV1-VBE-13,4160V

Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker 1E9), Rev. 1

BV1-VBE-15, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E11)(Charging Pump 1A Motor), Rev. 3

BV1-VBE-16, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(Transformer

1-8N), Rev. 4

BV1-VBE-17, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(Transformer

1-8N1), Rev. 4

BV1-VBE-18, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE (Breaker E12)(41601480V

Bank Feeder), Rev. 1

BV1-VBE-26, 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE Under Voltage Motor Protection, Rev. 9

BV2-DG1-1, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E10XEDG 2-1), Rev. 4

BV2-DG1-2, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E1OXEDG 2-1), Rev.2

BV2-DG1-3, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E1OXEDG 2-1), Rev. 1

BV2-DG1-4, 4160V Auxiliary Diesel Generator

2-1, Rev. 3

BV2-DG1-5, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E10XEDG 2-1), Rev. 4

BV2-DG1-6,4160V

Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1

BV2-DG1-7,4160V

Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1

BV2-DG1-8, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (EDG 2-1), Rev. 1

BV2-RBN-1,480V

Bus 2N Incoming Feederfrom

1500/2000

KVA, Rev.2

BV2-RBN-4, 480V

MCC.2-E09

Feeder, Rev. 6

BV2-RBN-5, 480V

MCC.2-E13

Feeder, Rev. 4

BV2-RBN-6, 480V MCC*2-E05

Feeder, Rev. 4

BV2-RBN-7, 480V MCC"2-E01

Feeder, Rev. 5 Attachment

BV2-RBN-8, 480V

MCC.2-E08

Feeder, Rev. 5

BV2-RBN-9, 480V

MCC.2-E07

Feeder, Rev. 6

BV2-RBN-10, 480V

MCC.2-E10

Feeder, Rev. 5

BV2-RBN-15, 480V

MCC.2-E-15

Feeder (Breaker 3C), Rev. 4

BV2-VBE-4, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E12)(Charging Pump, 2CHS-P21A), Rev. 4

BV2-VBE-8, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2ETXSupply from 4160V Bus 2A), Rev. 4

BV2-VBE-9,4160V

Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E11), Rev.2

BV2-VBE-16, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E4XRHR Pump (2RHS-P21A), Rev. 4

BV2-VBE-20, 4160V Emergency Bus 2AE (Breaker 2E18)(Aux.

Feed Pump (Motor)), Rev. 4 1 1 700-ESK-1

15G 1 , U 1 , Incoming Supply to 4160V Bus 1AE from 4160V Bus 1A, 4160 Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E7, Rev. 1 11700-ESK-115G2, U1, lncoming Supply to 4160V Bus 1AE from 4160V Bus '1A, 4160 Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E7, Rev.1 11700-ESK-1151, U1, 2850KTV Gen. Auxiliary Diesel Generator#1, 4160V Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E9, Rev.1 1 1 700-ESK-1

5K, U 1 , 600 HP Motor Charging Pump High Head Safety Injection, 4160V Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E11, Rev. 1 1 1700-ESK-1

151, U1, 1000/1333

KVA Trans.Bus 1AE, Breaker 1E12, Rev.2 11700-ESK-128A, U1, Incoming Feeder from Breaker 8N1. Rev. 1 11700-ESK-128F, U1, Motor Control Center

MCC-1-E05, 480V Bus 1-8N, Breaker 8N6,

6115105 11700-ESK-128H, U1, Motor Control Center

MCC1-E03, 480V Bus 1-8N, Breaker 8N8, 6/15/05 12241-ESK-115D, U2, 300 HP Motor for Residual Heat Removal Pump, 2RHS-P21A, 4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E4, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-115G, U2, Incoming Supply from Bus 2A, 4160V Bus 2AE Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E7, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-1

15J, U2, 5298 KVA Generator, Auxiliary Diesel Generator

2-1, 416QV Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E10, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-115K, V2,150012000

KVA Transformer

2-8N, Feeder to Emergency

480V Bus 2N, 4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E11, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-115L,U2,600

HP Motorfor Charging Pump High Head Safety lnjection, 2CHS-P21A, 4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E12, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-1

15R, U2, 400 HP Motor for Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pump, 2FWE-P23A, 4160V Bus 2AE, Breaker 2E18, Rev. 1 12241-ESK-128A, U2, Feeder Breaker to Emergency

480V Bus 2N480V Bus 2N, Breaker 38, Rev. 2 12241-ESK-1288, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E15

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 48, Rev. 3 12241-ESK-128C, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E03

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 4C, Rev. 3 12241-ESK-128D, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E05

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 58, Rev. 2 12241-ESK-128E, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E07

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 5C, Rev. 4 12241-ESK-128F, U2,480V

MCC-2-E09

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 68, Rev. 3 12241-ESK-128G, U2,480V

MCC-2-E11

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 6C, Rev. 3 12241-ESK-128H, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E13

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 6D, Rev. 2 12241-ESK-128W, U2, 480V

MCC-2-E15

Feeder Breaker, 480V Bus 2N, Breaker 3C, Rev. 2 1-8N and 1-8N1 , Feeder to 480V Sub. 1-8, 4160V 1000/1333

KVA Trans. 1-80, 480V Bus 1-8N, Attachment Pipino and Instrumentation Diaqrams 10080-RM-0433-001A,

BV-2 Fire Protection

P&lD, Rev. 21 10080-RM-0433-0018,

BV-2 Fire Protection

P&lD, Rev.8 10080-RM-0433-001C,8V-2

Fire Protection

P&lD, Rev. 19 10080-RM-0433-001D,

BV-2 Fire Protection

P&lD, Rev. 12 10080-RM-0433-002A,

BV-2 Fire Protection

P&lD, Rev. 17 8700-RM-00378, Sht. 2, U1, Flow Diagram, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 39 8700-RM-0406-002, U1, Valve Oper. NO Diagram, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 21 8700-RM-0407-001, U1, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 31 8700-RM-0424-002, U1, Feedwater System, Rev. 14 10080-RM-0045A, U1, Feedwater Piping, Rev. 35 10080-RM-0407-001A, Sht.1, U2, Chemical and Volume Control, Rev.20 10080-RM-0407-002, U2, Charging System, VCT and Make-up, Rev. 19 10080-RM-0410-001, U2, Residual Heat Removal Piping, Rev. 16 10080-RM-0424-003, U2, Auxiliary Feedwater, Rev. 14 8700-RM-444E-3, Switchgear Ventilation, Rev. 3 8700-RM-0406-002, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 21

RM-0407-001A, Sheet 1, Valve Oper No Diagram Chemical and Volume Control, Rev.20 Vendor Manuals 2563.831-000-001, 3M Interam Fire mat 3-hour Wrap for Electrical Raceways, Rev. E TSlTechnical Note 20684, Thermo-Lag

330 Installation Manual, Rev. V 2501.931-852-001,12Ydc Emergency Lighting Installation and Maintenance Instructions, Rev. L Pre-Fire Plans 1 -PFP-SFGB-722-Safeguards Area, Rev. 1 1-PFP-SFGB-735-Aux

FW & QS Pumps, Rev. 1 1-PFP-SFGB-735-East Cable Vault, Rev. 2't-PFP-SFGB-735-West Cable Vault, Rev. 2 1 -PFP-SFGB-7S1 -West Safeguards, Rev. 1 1-PFP-SRVB-713-AE

Switchgear, Rev. 1 1 -PFP-SRVB-71

3-DF Switchgear, Rev. 2 2-PFP-MSCV-735-EasI

Cable Vault, Rev. 3 2-PFP-SRVB-760-Normal Switchgear, Rev. 0 Fire Brioade Documents 2010 Annual Fire Brigade Qualification Status Report 2009 Annual Fire Brigade Qualification Status Report Fire Drills and Critiques Fire Drill 1-YARD-O4, performed

4119111,

5125111, U1An1 Fire Drill 2-CB-05, performed

514111,

5111111,7118111,

11116111,

1217111 Event Response to Unit-2

SOSB-3, performed

516111 Attachment Event Response to Unit-2 PAB Elev. 768 ft., performed

614111 Fire Drill 1-YARD-03, performed

22111 Fire Drill 1-SFGD-02, performed

813111,8117111,8124111,8131111,9129111,10119111

Fire Drill 2-CB-07, performed

1112111 Fire Drill 1-58-06, performed

219111,

12130111 Fire Drill 2-MSCV-04, performed

2114111,

5116112,

5123112,

619112,

6113112,

6120112,

6123112, 6t30t12 Fire Drill 2-CB-05, performed

2121111,

12129111 Fire Drill 1-PAB-06, performed

25112,218112,211112,218112,2129112,3128112

Fire Drill 2-DG-04, performed

3114112 Fire Drill 1-STOREROOM-01, performed

811112,

818112 Fire Drill 1-GDC-01, performed

11110110 Fire Drill 1-ERFS-O2, performed

2128110,

12131110,

12110110,7128110,611110,

4128110,

5112110, 5t19t10,5126110

Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed

11117110 Fire Drill 1-PAB-05 performed

11120110 Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed

11128110 Fire Drill 1-DG-02 performed

214110 Fire Drill 1-ERFS-02

performed

11119110 Fire Drill 2-MSCV-01

performed

11122110 Fire Drill 1-PAB-04 performed

218110 Fire Drill 2-YARD-03

performed

2111110 Fire Drill 1-TB-02 performed

2112114 Fire Drill 2-MSCV-01

performed

2l9l10 Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed

21110 Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed

8118110 Fire Drill2-DG-02

performed

9/1 8/1 0 Fire Drill 2-DG-03 performed

8111110 Fire Drill 2-DG-02 performed

25110 Fire Drill 2-DG-04 performed

6/19/10 Fire Brioade Traininq

FB-9324, Portable Fire Extinguisher Hands-On Practical, Rev. 1, lssue 1

FB-9337, Fire Brigade, Rev. 4, lssue 6 Operator Safe Shutdown Traininq lSQS-56C.1, Alternate Safe Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Rev.8 1PL-162, STA Alternate Safe Shutdown - Initial Conditions, Rev.0 1PL-156, STA Establishing Stable Hot Standby Conditions, Rev.1 lOJT-1.56C, Operate and Test the Backup lndicating Panel and Equipment, Rev. 2 1CR-609, Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 4 1PL-030, Safe Shutdown from the Switchgear Room, Rev. 13 1PL-034, Establish Manual Control of Atmospheric Steam Dumps, Rev. 10 1PL-154, Perform Source Range Drawer and Calibration at BlP, Rev. 1 1PL-155, Open FWlValve per 1OM-56C.4F-10, Rev.2 2010 Cycle 6 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 0 Attachment

2011 Cycle 2 Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 0 2012Cycle Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training Plan, Rev. 0 2SQS-56C.1, Alternate Safe Shutdown, Rev.6 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Annual Topic Plan: Level 2 Schedule, Rev.07111l12

Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training 3-Year Cycle and NLO Curriculum:

Level 1 Schedule, Curriculum

20, Rev. 3 Hot Work and lqnition Source Permits

200502844

640752947 Miscellaneous

Documents

Fire Protection System Engineer Walkdown Report, dated

5123112 &

6122112 ITL Report 87-12-4131, Three Hour Fire Endurance Test on Thermo-Lag

330, Rev. 1 NFPA Fire Protection Handbook 15th Edition NRC BTP CMEB 9.5-1 (ML070660454), Rev. 2 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2 Operations Fire Protection System lmpairment Log, dated

7124112 Operations Standing Order 09-002, NFPA Compliance lssues, dated

3110109 NFPA 13-20Q2, lnstallation of Sprinkler Systems NFPA 20-1990, Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps

NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis, Rev. 2 2701.620-000-005, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Report, Rev. B Unit 1 Maintenance Rule Monthly Monitoring Report for Fire Protection (System 33), July 2012 Unit 2 Maintenance Rule Monthly Monitoring Report for Fire Protection (System 33), July 2012 Unit 2 Operations Midnight Shift Roster tor Q7126112

PKM-NFPA-12-0009, BVPS Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Operator ManualAction Feasibility Study, Rev. 0 BV1RevSF, Fire PRA Quantification Notebook, Rev. 5 76

FR 40777,Interim Enforcement Policy for Certain Fire Protection lssues Condition Reports cR-2004-01965

cR 2006-1 1337 cR-2007-26308

cR-2009-60058

cR 2009-61136

cR2009-62272

cR 2009-63473

cR-2009-68607

cR 2010-86528

cR-2011-05658

cR 2011-92162

cR-2011-97021

cR 2006-11007

CR-2006-11702

CR-2006-11704

cR-2006-6932-002

CR-2007-21798

CR-2007-25818

cR-2008-40050

cR-2009-55017

CR 2009-59917

cR 2009-60350

CR 2009-60545

CR 2009-61061

cR-2009-61329

CR-2A09-62244

CR 2009-62268

cR 2009-62709

CR-2009-62461

CR-2009-62471

cR 2009-63473

CR 2009-64936

CR 2009-64939

cR-2010-74290

CR 2014-75120

CR-2010-85168

cR 2010-87586

CR-2011-04769

CR-2011-04959

cR-2011-07153

CR-2011-87677

CR-2011-90757

cR-2011-93603

CR-2011-94964

CR 2011-96673

cR 2011-97315

CR-2011-97411

CR-2012-00565

cR-2012-01514

CR-2012-02496

cR-2012-03667

CR-2012-03736

cR-2012-04257

CR-2012-04801

cR2012-07558

CR-2012-07608

cR-2012-09911

CR-2012-10368.

cR-2012-10588

CR-2012-10719

cR-2012-11557*

CR-2012-11659.

cR-2012-12077*

CR-2012-12142

cR-2012-12282.

CR-2012-09911

cR-2012-12055*

cR-2012-02900

CR-2012-03663

cR-2012-04017

CR-2012-04037

cR-2012-04958

CR2012-A7207

cR 2012-08570

CR-2012-09868

cR-2012-10841

CR-2012-10157

cR-2012-109454

CR-201

2-11116 cR-2012-11660.

CR-2012-11662*

cR-2012-12254

CR-2012-12265.

cR-2012-09960

CR-2012-11877.

cR-G203-2009-62268

cR-G203-2009-62532

cR-G203-2009-66414

cR-G203-2010-70650

cR-G203-2010-75115

cR-G203-2010-75917

cR-G203-2010-75971

cR-G203-2010-77654

cR-G203-2010-82394

cR-G203-2010-85675

cR-G203-201

1-96801 cR-G203-2009-60055

cR-G203-2009-62272

cR-G203-2009-62700

cR-G203-2009-66546

cR-G203-2010-71023

cR-G203-2010-75156

cR-G203-2010-75919

cR-G203-2010-77652

cR-G203-2010-77655

cR-G203-2010-84985

cR-G203-2010-87586

• NRC identified during this inspection.

Work Orders

cR-G203-2009-62244

cR-G203-2009-62471

cR-G203-2009-62745

cR-G203-2009-68607

cR-G203-2010-71428

cR-G203-2010-75913

cR-G203-2010-75920

cR-G203-2010-77653

cR-G203-2010-81544

cR-G203-2010-85509

cR-G203-201

1-93963 2001 35884

200351149

200399089

200416638

200453166

200475373

200404890 Notifications

600766469

600766470

600609799

600676509

600676526

200136429

200351178

20040361 4

200441840

200462539

200475379

200448178

200275504

200375559

200403808

200445040

200464938

200065687

200434813

200321839

20038561 6 20041 31 s8

200450948

200474868

200065688 Attachment

AC ADAMS AFW APCSB ASP BIP BVPS BTP CFR Coz DBD DRS EDG EGM Elev.FA FENOC FHA FPP FZ HP KVA KW tMc IP IPE IPEEE IR MCC MOV MSO NFPA NRC PAR PRA P&ID RHR RWST SCBA SER SOV SSDA TRM UFSAR VAC VDC A-15

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Alternating

Current Agencyrvide

Documents

Access and Management

System Auxiliary

Feed Water[NRC] Auxiliary

and Power Conversion

Systems Branch Alternate

Shutdown Panel Backup Indicating

Panel Beaver Valley Power Station INRCI Branch Technical

Position Code of Federal Regulations

Carbon Dioxide Design Basis Document Division of Reactor Safety Emergency

Diesel Generator Enforcement

Guidance Memorandum

Elevation Fire Area First Energy Nuclear Operating

Company Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Protection

Program Fire Zone Horsepower

Kilovolt Ampere Kilowatt[NRC] Inspection

Manual Chapter Inspection

Procedure lndividual

Plant Examination

Individual

Plant Examination

of External Events[NRC] lnspection

Report Motor Control Center Motor Operated Valve Multiple Spurious Operation National Fire Protection

Association

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Publicly Available

Records Probabilistic

Risk Assessment

Piping and Instrumentation

Drawing Residual Heat Removal Reactor Water Storage Tank Self-Contained

Breathing

Apparatus Safety Evaluation

Report Solenoid Operated Valve Safe Shutdown Analysis Technical

Requirements

Manual Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Volts Alternating

Current Volts Direct Current Attachment