IR 05000443/2008005: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:January 30, 2009 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - | SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - | ||
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2008005 | NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2008005 | ||
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One licensee-identified violation, that was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Seabrook Station. | One licensee-identified violation, that was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Seabrook Station. | ||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the | ||
G. S NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | G. S NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | ||
Sincerely, | Sincerely, | ||
/RA/ | /RA/ | ||
Arthur Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000443/2008005 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: | |||
Arthur Burritt, Chief | |||
Projects Branch 3 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 | |||
Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2008005 | |||
w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information | |||
cc w/encl: | |||
J. Stall, Executive Vice President, Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer M. Nazar, Senior Vice President and Nuclear Chief Operating Officer A. Khanpour, Vice President, Engineering Support M. Warner, Vice President, Nuclear Plant Support M. Mashhadi, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. Ross, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. OKeefe, Manager, Licensing Manager P. Freeman, Plant General Manager K. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training, Seabrook Station R. Poole, FEMA, Region I Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass K. Ayotte, Attorney General, State of NH O. Fitch, Deputy Attorney General, State of NH P. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of MA C. Pope, Director, Homeland Security & Emergency Management, State of NH R. Hughes, Director, Licensing and Performance Improvement J. Giarrusso, MEMA, Commonwealth of Mass D. O'Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, DHHS, State of NH J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company T. Crimmins, Polestar Applied Technology R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, NH Town of Exeter, State of New Hampshire Board of Selectmen, Town of Amesbury S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League | J. Stall, Executive Vice President, Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer M. Nazar, Senior Vice President and Nuclear Chief Operating Officer A. Khanpour, Vice President, Engineering Support M. Warner, Vice President, Nuclear Plant Support M. Mashhadi, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. Ross, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. OKeefe, Manager, Licensing Manager P. Freeman, Plant General Manager K. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training, Seabrook Station R. Poole, FEMA, Region I Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass K. Ayotte, Attorney General, State of NH O. Fitch, Deputy Attorney General, State of NH P. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of MA C. Pope, Director, Homeland Security & Emergency Management, State of NH R. Hughes, Director, Licensing and Performance Improvement J. Giarrusso, MEMA, Commonwealth of Mass D. O'Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, DHHS, State of NH J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company T. Crimmins, Polestar Applied Technology R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, NH Town of Exeter, State of New Hampshire Board of Selectmen, Town of Amesbury S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League | ||
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= | ||
IR 05000443/2008005; 10/01/2008-12/31/2008; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine | IR 05000443/2008005; 10/01/2008-12/31/2008; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine | ||
Integrated Report. | Integrated Report. | ||
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===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings=== | ===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings=== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===Licensee-Identified Violations=== | ===Licensee-Identified Violations=== | ||
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FPLE was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FPLE were entered into FPLEs corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in section 4OA7 of this report. | A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FPLE was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FPLE were entered into FPLEs corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in section 4OA7 of this report. | ||
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===Summary of Plant Status=== | ===Summary of Plant Status=== | ||
Seabrook, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook), operated at or near full power for the entire period, except for brief periods at reduced power for test and maintenance activities. | Seabrook, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook), operated at or near full power for the entire period, except for brief periods at reduced power for test and maintenance activities. | ||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | ||
{{a|1R01}} | {{a|1R01}} | ||
==1R01 Adverse Weather Preparation== | ==1R01 Adverse Weather Preparation== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=1}} | ||
===.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions=== | ===.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed one seasonal extreme weather conditions inspection sample. | The inspectors completed one seasonal extreme weather conditions inspection sample. | ||
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The inspectors assessed FPLEs readiness for the onset of cold weather conditions. | The inspectors assessed FPLEs readiness for the onset of cold weather conditions. | ||
The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) descriptions for related design features and verified the adequacy of the station procedures for adverse weather protection. The inspectors reviewed FPLEs actions per procedure ON1490.09 for seasonal readiness, and procedure OS1200.03 for severe weather. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of susceptible systems, specifically the service water, emergency feedwater and 4 KV electrical systems. The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to extreme weather preparation and verified the issues were entered into the corrective action program. The references used for this review are listed in the | The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) descriptions for related design features and verified the adequacy of the station procedures for adverse weather protection. The inspectors reviewed FPLEs actions per procedure ON1490.09 for seasonal readiness, and procedure OS1200.03 for severe weather. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of susceptible systems, specifically the service water, emergency feedwater and 4 KV electrical systems. The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to extreme weather preparation and verified the issues were entered into the corrective action program. The references used for this review are listed in the | ||
. | . | ||
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{{a|1R04}} | {{a|1R04}} | ||
==1R04 Equipment Alignment== | ==1R04 Equipment Alignment== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04|count=2}} | ||
===.1 Partial System Walkdown=== | ===.1 Partial System Walkdown=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed two partial system walkdown inspection samples for the plant systems listed below. The inspectors verified that valves, switches, and breakers were correctly aligned in accordance with Seabrook's procedures and that conditions that could affect system operability were appropriately addressed. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while certain system components were out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed applicable piping and instrumentation drawings and system operational lineup procedures. | The inspectors completed two partial system walkdown inspection samples for the plant systems listed below. The inspectors verified that valves, switches, and breakers were correctly aligned in accordance with Seabrook's procedures and that conditions that could affect system operability were appropriately addressed. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while certain system components were out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed applicable piping and instrumentation drawings and system operational lineup procedures. | ||
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{{a|1R05}} | {{a|1R05}} | ||
==1R05 Fire Protection== | ==1R05 Fire Protection== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05Q|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05Q|count=2}} | ||
===.1 Fire Protection=== | ===.1 Fire Protection=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed two quarterly fire protection inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed Seabrooks fire protection program to evaluate the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, compensatory measures, and fire mitigation procedures to assess the fire protection program for the following areas: | The inspectors completed two quarterly fire protection inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed Seabrooks fire protection program to evaluate the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, compensatory measures, and fire mitigation procedures to assess the fire protection program for the following areas: | ||
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====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R11}} | No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R11}} | ||
sample) | ==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 Q-2 samples, 71111.11B - 1 sample) | ||
== | |||
===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Review=== | ===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Review=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed two quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection samples. Specifically, the inspectors observed simulator examination of licensed operators on October 2 and 16, 2008. The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high-risk activities, the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation of procedures. The inspectors observed and reviewed the training evaluators critique of operator performance and verified that deficiencies were adequately identified, discussed, and entered into the corrective action program, as needed. The inspectors reviewed the simulators physical fidelity in order to verify similarities between the Seabrook control room and the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | The inspectors completed two quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection samples. Specifically, the inspectors observed simulator examination of licensed operators on October 2 and 16, 2008. The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high-risk activities, the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation of procedures. The inspectors observed and reviewed the training evaluators critique of operator performance and verified that deficiencies were adequately identified, discussed, and entered into the corrective action program, as needed. The inspectors reviewed the simulators physical fidelity in order to verify similarities between the Seabrook control room and the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | ||
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===.2 Review of Requalification Program Exam Results=== | ===.2 Review of Requalification Program Exam Results=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
On December 22, 2008, a region-based inspector conducted an in-office review of the results of the licensee-administered annual operating tests for 2008. Results from the comprehensive written exams were not included in this review because those exams were part of the 2007 testing cycle. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, AOperator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP).@ The inspector verified that: | On December 22, 2008, a region-based inspector conducted an in-office review of the results of the licensee-administered annual operating tests for 2008. Results from the comprehensive written exams were not included in this review because those exams were part of the 2007 testing cycle. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, AOperator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP).@ The inspector verified that: | ||
* Crew failure rate was less than 20%. (Crew failure rate was 0%) | * Crew failure rate was less than 20%. (Crew failure rate was 0%) | ||
* Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%. | * Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%. | ||
(Individual failure rate was 0%) | |||
* Individual failure rate on the walk-through test was less than or equal to 20%. | * Individual failure rate on the walk-through test was less than or equal to 20%. | ||
(Individual failure rate was 2.3%) | |||
* Overall pass rate among individuals for all portions of the exam was greater than or equal to 75%. (Overall pass rate was 97.7%) | * Overall pass rate among individuals for all portions of the exam was greater than or equal to 75%. (Overall pass rate was 97.7%) | ||
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{{a|1R12}} | {{a|1R12}} | ||
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness== | ==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12Q|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12Q|count=2}} | ||
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{{a|1R13}} | {{a|1R13}} | ||
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation== | ==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=1}} | ||
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{{a|1R15}} | {{a|1R15}} | ||
==1R15 Operability Evaluations== | ==1R15 Operability Evaluations== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=2}} | ||
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====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R18}} | No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R18}} | ||
==1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 1 Sample) | |||
== | |||
===.1 Temporary Modifications=== | ===.1 Temporary Modifications=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed one plant modification inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed a temporary plant modification documented in Temporary Change 07-012, Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil Supply System. This modification changed the normal operating configuration of system components by adding two temporary 30,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed the change to ensure that it did not adversely affect systems important to safety. The inspectors compared the temporary change with the UFSAR to verify that the modification did not affect system operability or availability. The inspectors ensured that station personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the issued design documents and the temporary configuration change process. Inspectors verified that the condition monitoring actions that were specified in the modification were performed at the appropriate frequency and in accordance with procedures or authorized work documents. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing system procedures to verify the appropriate revisions were made to reflect this temporary configuration change. The documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the | The inspectors completed one plant modification inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed a temporary plant modification documented in Temporary Change 07-012, Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil Supply System. This modification changed the normal operating configuration of system components by adding two temporary 30,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed the change to ensure that it did not adversely affect systems important to safety. The inspectors compared the temporary change with the UFSAR to verify that the modification did not affect system operability or availability. The inspectors ensured that station personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the issued design documents and the temporary configuration change process. Inspectors verified that the condition monitoring actions that were specified in the modification were performed at the appropriate frequency and in accordance with procedures or authorized work documents. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing system procedures to verify the appropriate revisions were made to reflect this temporary configuration change. The documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the | ||
. | . | ||
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{{a|1R19}} | {{a|1R19}} | ||
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing== | ==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=4}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=4}} | ||
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{{a|1R22}} | {{a|1R22}} | ||
==1R22 Surveillance Testing== | ==1R22 Surveillance Testing== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=2}} | ||
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The inspectors completed two surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of surveillance testing activities for safety-related systems to verify that the system and components were capable of performing their intended safety function, to verify operational readiness, and to ensure compliance with the technical specifications and surveillance procedures. The inspectors attended selected pre-evolution briefings, performed system and control room walkdowns, observed operators and technicians perform test evolutions, reviewed system parameters, and interviewed the applicable system engineers and field operators. The test data recorded was compared to procedural and technical specification requirements, and to prior test results to identify any adverse trends. The following surveillance procedures were reviewed. | The inspectors completed two surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of surveillance testing activities for safety-related systems to verify that the system and components were capable of performing their intended safety function, to verify operational readiness, and to ensure compliance with the technical specifications and surveillance procedures. The inspectors attended selected pre-evolution briefings, performed system and control room walkdowns, observed operators and technicians perform test evolutions, reviewed system parameters, and interviewed the applicable system engineers and field operators. The test data recorded was compared to procedural and technical specification requirements, and to prior test results to identify any adverse trends. The following surveillance procedures were reviewed. | ||
* OX1456.21, Train A ESFAS Slave Relay K601 Quarterly Go Test, Rev. 9, performed on October 21, 2008 | * OX1456.21, Train A ESFAS Slave Relay K601 Quarterly Go Test, Rev. 9, performed on October 21, 2008 | ||
* OS1402.04, Train B CCP Oil Cooler Alternate Cooling Supply Flow Test, Rev. 0, performed on November 4, 2008 The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to surveillance testing and verified that the issues were entered into the corrective action program. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | * OS1402.04, Train B CCP Oil Cooler Alternate Cooling Supply Flow Test, Rev. 0, performed on November 4, 2008 | ||
The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to surveillance testing and verified that the issues were entered into the corrective action program. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
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{{a|1EP6}} | {{a|1EP6}} | ||
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation== | ==1EP6 Drill Evaluation== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06|count=1}} | ||
===.1 Annual Licensed Operator Requalification=== | ===.1 Annual Licensed Operator Requalification=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample. On October 2, 2008, the inspectors observed a drill from the control room simulator during annual licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance relative to developing event classifications and notifications. The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook Emergency Initiating Condition Matrix. The inspectors referenced Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 5, and verified that FPLE correctly counted the drills contribution to the NRC PI for drill and exercise performance. | The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample. On October 2, 2008, the inspectors observed a drill from the control room simulator during annual licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance relative to developing event classifications and notifications. The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook Emergency Initiating Condition Matrix. The inspectors referenced Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 5, and verified that FPLE correctly counted the drills contribution to the NRC PI for drill and exercise performance. | ||
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==RADIATION SAFETY== | ==RADIATION SAFETY== | ||
===Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety=== | ===Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety=== | ||
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 9 samples) | 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 9 samples) | ||
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===Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety=== | ===Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety=== | ||
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02 - 6 samples) | 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02 - 6 samples) | ||
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During the period September 29 - October 2, 2008, the inspectors conducted the following activities to verify that the licensee=s radioactive material processing and transportation programs complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 61, and 71; and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations 49 CFR 170-189. | During the period September 29 - October 2, 2008, the inspectors conducted the following activities to verify that the licensee=s radioactive material processing and transportation programs complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 61, and 71; and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations 49 CFR 170-189. | ||
Radioactive Waste Systems Walkdown The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the radioactive liquid processing systems with the senior technical specialist-radwaste, and a site systems engineer. | Radioactive Waste Systems Walkdown | ||
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the radioactive liquid processing systems with the senior technical specialist-radwaste, and a site systems engineer. | |||
During this tour, the inspectors verified that systems and facilities were consistent with the descriptions contained in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and the process control program (PCP), evaluated general material conditions of systems and facilities, and identified changes to these systems. The inspectors evaluated recently completed, and pending changes, made to solid and liquid radwaste processing systems including their potential radiological impact, the current processes for transferring radioactive resin/ sludge to shipping containers, and the subsequent de-watering process. | During this tour, the inspectors verified that systems and facilities were consistent with the descriptions contained in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and the process control program (PCP), evaluated general material conditions of systems and facilities, and identified changes to these systems. The inspectors evaluated recently completed, and pending changes, made to solid and liquid radwaste processing systems including their potential radiological impact, the current processes for transferring radioactive resin/ sludge to shipping containers, and the subsequent de-watering process. | ||
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The inspectors inspected various radioactive material storage locations, with the supervisor, radiological waste services, including the waste processing building, the radioactive materials storage building (RMSB), the Unit 2 cooling tower, and sea vans stored on site. The inspectors confirmed that inventories were current, that material was properly labeled, and that containers were in satisfactory material condition. | The inspectors inspected various radioactive material storage locations, with the supervisor, radiological waste services, including the waste processing building, the radioactive materials storage building (RMSB), the Unit 2 cooling tower, and sea vans stored on site. The inspectors confirmed that inventories were current, that material was properly labeled, and that containers were in satisfactory material condition. | ||
Waste Characterization and Classification The inspection included a review of the waste characterization and classification program for regulatory compliance, including; | Waste Characterization and Classification | ||
The inspection included a review of the waste characterization and classification program for regulatory compliance, including; | |||
* the radio-chemical sample analysis results for various radioactive waste streams, including spent resins, dry active waste, and mechanical filters. | * the radio-chemical sample analysis results for various radioactive waste streams, including spent resins, dry active waste, and mechanical filters. | ||
* the development of scaling factors for hard-to-detect radionuclides. | * the development of scaling factors for hard-to-detect radionuclides. | ||
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* characterization and classification of waste relative to 10 CFR 61.55 and determination of DOT shipment subtype per 49 CFR 173. | * characterization and classification of waste relative to 10 CFR 61.55 and determination of DOT shipment subtype per 49 CFR 173. | ||
Shipment Preparation The inspection included a review of radioactive waste program records, shipment preparation procedures, and observations of in-progress activities for regulatory compliance, including: | Shipment Preparation | ||
The inspection included a review of radioactive waste program records, shipment preparation procedures, and observations of in-progress activities for regulatory compliance, including: | |||
* Verified compliance with the relevant Certificates of Compliance and related cask handling procedures for shipping casks used for past shipments. | * Verified compliance with the relevant Certificates of Compliance and related cask handling procedures for shipping casks used for past shipments. | ||
* Verified that FPLE had the current amendment for NRC (or agreement state) license authorization for the shipment recipients for six shipments | * Verified that FPLE had the current amendment for NRC (or agreement state) license authorization for the shipment recipients for six shipments | ||
* Verified that training was provided to personnel responsible for classifying, handling, and shipping radioactive materials in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-19, and 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. | * Verified that training was provided to personnel responsible for classifying, handling, and shipping radioactive materials in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-19, and 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. | ||
Shipment Records The inspectors selected and reviewed records associated with six non-excepted shipments of radioactive materials completed since the last inspection of this area. The shipments were Nos.08-075, 08-007, 08-002, 07-040, 07-038, and 08-053. The following aspects of the radioactive waste packaging and shipping activities were reviewed: | Shipment Records | ||
The inspectors selected and reviewed records associated with six non-excepted shipments of radioactive materials completed since the last inspection of this area. The shipments were Nos.08-075, 08-007, 08-002, 07-040, 07-038, and 08-053. The following aspects of the radioactive waste packaging and shipping activities were reviewed: | |||
* implementation of applicable shipping requirements including proper completion of manifests; | * implementation of applicable shipping requirements including proper completion of manifests; | ||
* implementation of specifications in applicable certificates-of-compliance, for the approved shipping casks, including limits for package contents; | * implementation of specifications in applicable certificates-of-compliance, for the approved shipping casks, including limits for package contents; | ||
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* notification by the recipient that the radioactive materials had been received. | * notification by the recipient that the radioactive materials had been received. | ||
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the 2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 25 condition reports, a Quality Assurance Audit Report, and Seabrook Daily Quality Summary Reports related to radioactive material control and shipping. The inspectors assessed FPLE=s threshold for identifying problems and the promptness and effectiveness of corrective actions. This review was conducted using the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.11(c), the technical specifications, and FPLE procedures. | Problem Identification and Resolution | ||
The inspectors reviewed the 2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 25 condition reports, a Quality Assurance Audit Report, and Seabrook Daily Quality Summary Reports related to radioactive material control and shipping. The inspectors assessed FPLE=s threshold for identifying problems and the promptness and effectiveness of corrective actions. This review was conducted using the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.11(c), the technical specifications, and FPLE procedures. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
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==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | ==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | ||
{{a|4OA1}} | |||
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification== | ==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=2}} | ||
===.1 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness=== | ===.1 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed implementation of FPLE=s Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator (PI) Program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed condition reports, and associated documents, for occurrences involving locked high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned exposures against the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify that all occurrences that met the NEI criteria were identified and reported. The review covered the period from August 2007 through October 2008. | The inspectors reviewed implementation of FPLE=s Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator (PI) Program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed condition reports, and associated documents, for occurrences involving locked high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned exposures against the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify that all occurrences that met the NEI criteria were identified and reported. The review covered the period from August 2007 through October 2008. | ||
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===.2 RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences=== | ===.2 RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed relevant effluent release reports for the period August, 2007 through October 2008, for issues related to the public radiation safety performance indicator, which measures radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr whole body or 5.0 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; 5 mrads/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrad/qtr beta air dose, and 7.5 mrads/qtr for organ dose for gaseous effluents. | The inspectors reviewed relevant effluent release reports for the period August, 2007 through October 2008, for issues related to the public radiation safety performance indicator, which measures radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr whole body or 5.0 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; 5 mrads/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrad/qtr beta air dose, and 7.5 mrads/qtr for organ dose for gaseous effluents. | ||
| Line 329: | Line 353: | ||
{{a|4OA2}} | {{a|4OA2}} | ||
==4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems== | ==4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=4}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=4}} | ||
===.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program=== | ===.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the Seabrook corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by accessing FPLE's computerized database. The inspectors also reviewed FPLE actions to address the control of heavy loads per Nuclear Energy Institute initiative NEI 08-05, as described in condition reports 200712475 and 200804903. | As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the Seabrook corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by accessing FPLE's computerized database. The inspectors also reviewed FPLE actions to address the control of heavy loads per Nuclear Energy Institute initiative NEI 08-05, as described in condition reports 200712475 and 200804903. | ||
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===.2 Semi-annual Review to Identify Trends=== | ===.2 Semi-annual Review to Identify Trends=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors performed a review of the Seabrook CAP and associated documents to identify trends that may indicate existence of safety significant issues. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily CAP item screening. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the Seabrook CAP Quarterly Trend Reports. | As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors performed a review of the Seabrook CAP and associated documents to identify trends that may indicate existence of safety significant issues. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily CAP item screening. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the Seabrook CAP Quarterly Trend Reports. | ||
b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors did not identify any appreciable trends that FPLE had not already identified. | b. | ||
Assessment and Observations | |||
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors did not identify any appreciable trends that FPLE had not already identified. | |||
===.3 Annual Sample: Air operated valve Bailey positioner feedback linkage failures | ===.3 Annual Sample:=== | ||
Air operated valve Bailey positioner feedback linkage failures | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
| Line 361: | Line 389: | ||
FPLE determined that the apparent cause of this deficiency was inadequate procedural guidance and insufficient understanding by maintenance technicians. FPLE developed recurring technical training for instrumentation and controls (I&C) technicians to remedy the insufficient understanding of maintenance technicians. FPLE is revising procedures and maintenance instructions to provide adequate written guidance. | FPLE determined that the apparent cause of this deficiency was inadequate procedural guidance and insufficient understanding by maintenance technicians. FPLE developed recurring technical training for instrumentation and controls (I&C) technicians to remedy the insufficient understanding of maintenance technicians. FPLE is revising procedures and maintenance instructions to provide adequate written guidance. | ||
===.4 Annual Sample: Review of Switchyard Disconnect Switch 1101 Epoxy Drive Rod Failure | ===.4 Annual Sample:=== | ||
Review of Switchyard Disconnect Switch 1101 Epoxy Drive Rod Failure | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
| Line 375: | Line 404: | ||
The inspectors determined that corrective actions were timely and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence for the issue. The corrective actions addressed immediate equipment concerns as well as the extent of condition for the failure. The inspectors determined that adequate tracking mechanisms were in place to ensure all corrective actions will be completed. | The inspectors determined that corrective actions were timely and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence for the issue. The corrective actions addressed immediate equipment concerns as well as the extent of condition for the failure. The inspectors determined that adequate tracking mechanisms were in place to ensure all corrective actions will be completed. | ||
===.5 Annual Sample: Low Strength bolts in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System | ===.5 Annual Sample:=== | ||
Low Strength bolts in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
| Line 386: | Line 416: | ||
{{a|4OA5}} | {{a|4OA5}} | ||
==4OA5 Other Activities== | ==4OA5 Other Activities== | ||
===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities=== | ===.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with FPLE security procedures and regulatory requirements related to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These observations did not constitute an additional inspection sample. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status reviews and inspection activities. | During the inspection period the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with FPLE security procedures and regulatory requirements related to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These observations did not constitute an additional inspection sample. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status reviews and inspection activities. | ||
| Line 405: | Line 434: | ||
No findings of significance were identified. | No findings of significance were identified. | ||
===.3 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176. Emergency Diesel Generator Technical | ===.3 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176.=== | ||
Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing | |||
Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
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===.4 (Closed) URI 07200063/2008001-001, Acceptability of Allowing a Non-Qualified=== | ===.4 (Closed) URI 07200063/2008001-001, Acceptability of Allowing a Non-Qualified=== | ||
Individual to Manipulate the Automated Welding Controls During a Production Weld. | Individual to Manipulate the Automated Welding Controls During a Production Weld. | ||
| Line 427: | Line 454: | ||
{{a|4OA6}} | {{a|4OA6}} | ||
==4OA6 Meetings, including Exit== | ==4OA6 Meetings, including Exit== | ||
===Exit Meeting Summary=== | ===Exit Meeting Summary=== | ||
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Freeman on January 9, 2009. FPLE acknowledged the findings presented and indicated that none of the information presented at the exit meeting was proprietary. | The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Freeman on January 9, 2009. FPLE acknowledged the findings presented and indicated that none of the information presented at the exit meeting was proprietary. | ||
{{a|4OA7}} | {{a|4OA7}} | ||
==4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations== | ==4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations== | ||
The following violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by FPLE It was a violation of NRC requirements that met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV). | The following violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by FPLE It was a violation of NRC requirements that met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV). | ||
| Line 447: | Line 473: | ||
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== | ||
===Licensee personnel=== | ===Licensee personnel=== | ||
: [[contact::R. Arns]], Engineering | : [[contact::R. Arns]], Engineering | ||
: [[contact::J. Ball]], Maintenance Rule Coordinator | : [[contact::J. Ball]], Maintenance Rule Coordinator | ||
: [[contact::R. Belanger]], Design Engineer | : [[contact::R. Belanger]], Design Engineer | ||
: [[contact::M. Bianco]], Radiological Waste Services Supervisor | : [[contact::M. Bianco]], Radiological Waste Services Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::B. Brown]], Plant Engineer | : [[contact::B. Brown]], Plant Engineer | ||
: [[contact::V. Brown]], Senior Licensing Analyst | : [[contact::V. Brown]], Senior Licensing Analyst | ||
: [[contact::K. Browne]], Assistant Operations Manager | : [[contact::K. Browne]], Assistant Operations Manager | ||
: [[contact::B. Buerger]], Nuclear Projects | : [[contact::B. Buerger]], Nuclear Projects | ||
: [[contact::J. Buyak]], Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Respiratory Protection) | : [[contact::J. Buyak]], Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Respiratory Protection) | ||
: [[contact::R. Campione]], Nuclear Oversight Supervisor | : [[contact::R. Campione]], Nuclear Oversight Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::R. Campo]], Plant Engineer | : [[contact::R. Campo]], Plant Engineer | ||
: [[contact::W. Cash]], Chemistry Manager | : [[contact::W. Cash]], Chemistry Manager | ||
: [[contact::D. Chang]], Tagging Support | : [[contact::D. Chang]], Tagging Support | ||
: [[contact::R. Couture]], Reactor Engineer | : [[contact::R. Couture]], Reactor Engineer | ||
: [[contact::W. Cox]], Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst | : [[contact::W. Cox]], Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst | ||
: [[contact::J. Crowley]], I&C Superintendent | : [[contact::J. Crowley]], I&C Superintendent | ||
: [[contact::J. Esteves]], Design Engineer Systems | : [[contact::J. Esteves]], Design Engineer Systems | ||
: [[contact::D. Feeney]], Mechanical Maintenance | : [[contact::D. Feeney]], Mechanical Maintenance | ||
: [[contact::D. Flahardy]], RP Technical Supervisor | : [[contact::D. Flahardy]], RP Technical Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::P. Freeman]], Plant General Manager | : [[contact::P. Freeman]], Plant General Manager | ||
: [[contact::R. Guthrie]], Systems Engineer, Radiation Monitoring System | : [[contact::R. Guthrie]], Systems Engineer, Radiation Monitoring System | ||
: [[contact::D. Hampton]], Radiation Protection Specialist | : [[contact::D. Hampton]], Radiation Protection Specialist | ||
: [[contact::F. Hannify]], Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst | : [[contact::F. Hannify]], Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst | ||
: [[contact::D. Hickey]], Radiation Protection Supervisor | : [[contact::D. Hickey]], Radiation Protection Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::M. Hansen]], Maintenance Manager | : [[contact::M. Hansen]], Maintenance Manager | ||
: [[contact::R. Jamison]], Design Engineer Electrical | : [[contact::R. Jamison]], Design Engineer Electrical | ||
: [[contact::G. Kann]], Dry Cask Storage Project Engineer | : [[contact::G. Kann]], Dry Cask Storage Project Engineer | ||
: [[contact::S. Kessinger]], Work Control Supervisor | : [[contact::S. Kessinger]], Work Control Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::R. Logue]], Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Instrumentation) | : [[contact::R. Logue]], Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Instrumentation) | ||
: [[contact::G. Kim]], Risk Analyst | : [[contact::G. Kim]], Risk Analyst | ||
: [[contact::E. Metcalf]], Operations Manager | : [[contact::E. Metcalf]], Operations Manager | ||
: [[contact::M. Lipman]], Plant Technician | : [[contact::M. Lipman]], Plant Technician | ||
: [[contact::T. Manning]], Engineering | : [[contact::T. Manning]], Engineering | ||
: [[contact::D. Master]], Plant Engineer | : [[contact::D. Master]], Plant Engineer | ||
: [[contact::B. McAllister]], SW System Engineer | : [[contact::B. McAllister]], SW System Engineer | ||
: [[contact::N. McCafferty]], Plant Engineering Manager | : [[contact::N. McCafferty]], Plant Engineering Manager | ||
: [[contact::W. Meyer]],,Radiation Protection Manager | : [[contact::W. Meyer]],,Radiation Protection Manager | ||
: [[contact::D. Merrill]], Maintenance Technical Superintendent | : [[contact::D. Merrill]], Maintenance Technical Superintendent | ||
: [[contact::M. OKeefe]], Licensing Manager | : [[contact::M. OKeefe]], Licensing Manager | ||
: [[contact::K. Mahoney]], Reactor Engineer | : [[contact::K. Mahoney]], Reactor Engineer | ||
: [[contact::R. Noble]], Engineering Manager | : [[contact::R. Noble]], Engineering Manager | ||
: [[contact::M. Ossing]], Engineering Support Manager | : [[contact::M. Ossing]], Engineering Support Manager | ||
: [[contact::V. Pascucci]], Quality Assurance Manager | : [[contact::V. Pascucci]], Quality Assurance Manager | ||
: [[contact::D. Perkins]], Rad Services Supervisor | : [[contact::D. Perkins]], Rad Services Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::E. Piggot]], Unit Supervisor | : [[contact::E. Piggot]], Unit Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::R. Plante]], Maintenance Supervisor | : [[contact::R. Plante]], Maintenance Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::B. Plummer]], Nuclear Projects Manager | : [[contact::B. Plummer]], Nuclear Projects Manager | ||
: [[contact::N. Pond]], Tagging Coordinator | : [[contact::N. Pond]], Tagging Coordinator | ||
: [[contact::K. Purington]], Reactor Operator | : [[contact::K. Purington]], Reactor Operator | ||
: [[contact::K. Randall]], Reactor Engineer | : [[contact::K. Randall]], Reactor Engineer | ||
: [[contact::T. Rossengal]], RHR System Engineer | : [[contact::T. Rossengal]], RHR System Engineer | ||
: [[contact::M. Russell]], Operations Clerk | : [[contact::M. Russell]], Operations Clerk | ||
: [[contact::M. Scannell]], Senior Health Physicist | : [[contact::M. Scannell]], Senior Health Physicist | ||
: [[contact::W. Schmidt]], Electrical Maintenance | : [[contact::W. Schmidt]], Electrical Maintenance | ||
: [[contact::G. Sessler]], EDG System Engineer | : [[contact::G. Sessler]], EDG System Engineer | ||
J, Soucie, Nuclear Plant Operator | J, Soucie, Nuclear Plant Operator | ||
: [[contact::G. St. Pierre]], Site Vice President | : [[contact::G. St. Pierre]], Site Vice President | ||
: [[contact::M. Taylor]], Unit Supervisor | : [[contact::M. Taylor]], Unit Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::R. Thurlow]], Corporate Radiation Protection Manager | : [[contact::R. Thurlow]], Corporate Radiation Protection Manager | ||
: [[contact::J. Tucker]], Security Manager | : [[contact::J. Tucker]], Security Manager | ||
: [[contact::J. Varga]], Reactor Operator | : [[contact::J. Varga]], Reactor Operator | ||
: [[contact::J. Walsh]], CVCS System Engineer | : [[contact::J. Walsh]], CVCS System Engineer | ||
: [[contact::N. Walts]], Unit Supervisor | : [[contact::N. Walts]], Unit Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::S. Wellhofer]], Site Nurse | : [[contact::S. Wellhofer]], Site Nurse | ||
: [[contact::R. White]], Security Supervisor | : [[contact::R. White]], Security Supervisor | ||
: [[contact::K. Wright]], Training Manager | : [[contact::K. Wright]], Training Manager | ||
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED== | ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED== | ||
===Closed=== | ===Closed=== | ||
200063/2008001-001 URI Non-Qualified Welder Manipulated Automated Welding Controls During Production Weld (Section 4OA5) | |||
200063/2008001-001 | |||
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 13:25, 14 January 2025
| ML090330574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/2009 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | St.Pierre G Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook |
| burritt al | |
| References | |
| IR-08-005 | |
| Download: ML090330574 (34) | |
Text
January 30, 2009
SUBJECT:
SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 -
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2008005
Dear Mr. St. Pierre,
On December 31, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings discussed on January 9, 2009, with Mr. P. Freeman and other members of your staff.
These inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
One licensee-identified violation, that was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Seabrook Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the
G. S NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Arthur Burritt, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2008005
w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
J. Stall, Executive Vice President, Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer M. Nazar, Senior Vice President and Nuclear Chief Operating Officer A. Khanpour, Vice President, Engineering Support M. Warner, Vice President, Nuclear Plant Support M. Mashhadi, Senior Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. Ross, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company M. OKeefe, Manager, Licensing Manager P. Freeman, Plant General Manager K. Wright, Manager, Nuclear Training, Seabrook Station R. Poole, FEMA, Region I Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass K. Ayotte, Attorney General, State of NH O. Fitch, Deputy Attorney General, State of NH P. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine R. Walker, Director, Radiation Control Program, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of MA C. Pope, Director, Homeland Security & Emergency Management, State of NH R. Hughes, Director, Licensing and Performance Improvement J. Giarrusso, MEMA, Commonwealth of Mass D. O'Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, DHHS, State of NH J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company T. Crimmins, Polestar Applied Technology R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, NH Town of Exeter, State of New Hampshire Board of Selectmen, Town of Amesbury S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000443/2008005; 10/01/2008-12/31/2008; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine
Integrated Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and regional specialist inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FPLE was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FPLE were entered into FPLEs corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Seabrook, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook), operated at or near full power for the entire period, except for brief periods at reduced power for test and maintenance activities.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Preparation
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one seasonal extreme weather conditions inspection sample.
The inspectors assessed FPLEs readiness for the onset of cold weather conditions.
The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) descriptions for related design features and verified the adequacy of the station procedures for adverse weather protection. The inspectors reviewed FPLEs actions per procedure ON1490.09 for seasonal readiness, and procedure OS1200.03 for severe weather. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of susceptible systems, specifically the service water, emergency feedwater and 4 KV electrical systems. The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to extreme weather preparation and verified the issues were entered into the corrective action program. The references used for this review are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two partial system walkdown inspection samples for the plant systems listed below. The inspectors verified that valves, switches, and breakers were correctly aligned in accordance with Seabrook's procedures and that conditions that could affect system operability were appropriately addressed. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while certain system components were out-of-service. The inspectors reviewed applicable piping and instrumentation drawings and system operational lineup procedures.
Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- Division I, 125Vdc batteries and chargers during maintenance on the Division II 125Vdc system
- Control building air alignment during damper modifications per 08MMOD500
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two quarterly fire protection inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed Seabrooks fire protection program to evaluate the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, compensatory measures, and fire mitigation procedures to assess the fire protection program for the following areas:
- Electric and diesel fire pump rooms, FPH-F-1C-A, FPH-F-1B-A, and FPH-F-1A-A
- Service water pump house, SW-F-IA, IC, ID, IE
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 Q-2 samples, 71111.11B - 1 sample)
==
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection samples. Specifically, the inspectors observed simulator examination of licensed operators on October 2 and 16, 2008. The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors examined the operators ability to perform actions associated with high-risk activities, the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation of procedures. The inspectors observed and reviewed the training evaluators critique of operator performance and verified that deficiencies were adequately identified, discussed, and entered into the corrective action program, as needed. The inspectors reviewed the simulators physical fidelity in order to verify similarities between the Seabrook control room and the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Review of Requalification Program Exam Results
a. Inspection Scope
On December 22, 2008, a region-based inspector conducted an in-office review of the results of the licensee-administered annual operating tests for 2008. Results from the comprehensive written exams were not included in this review because those exams were part of the 2007 testing cycle. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, AOperator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP).@ The inspector verified that:
- Crew failure rate was less than 20%. (Crew failure rate was 0%)
- Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%.
(Individual failure rate was 0%)
- Individual failure rate on the walk-through test was less than or equal to 20%.
(Individual failure rate was 2.3%)
- Overall pass rate among individuals for all portions of the exam was greater than or equal to 75%. (Overall pass rate was 97.7%)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two maintenance effectiveness inspection samples.
The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems or performance and condition history reviews involving selected in-scope structures, systems or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: proper Maintenance Rule (MR) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; characterization of reliability issues; tracking system and component unavailability; 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; identifying and addressing common cause failures, trending key parameters, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified (a)(2)as well as the adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed system health reports, maintenance backlogs, and MR basis documents. Other documents reviewed for the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
The following samples were reviewed:
- Class 1E and Non-class 1E 4.16/13.8 kV electrical system performance; and,
- Reactor vessel level instrumentation system performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one maintenance assessment and emergent risk evaluation inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of the emergent work activity listed below to evaluate the effect on plant risk. The inspectors conducted interviews with operators, risk analysts, maintenance technicians, and engineers to assess their knowledge of the risk associated with the work, and to ensure that appropriate risk management actions were implemented. The actions taken were evaluated using the following Seabrook procedures: Maintenance Manual 4.14, "Troubleshooting, Revision 0 and Work Management Manual 10.1, "On-Line Maintenance, Revision 3. Specific risk assessments were conducted using Seabrook's "Safety Monitor." The inspectors reviewed FPLE actions and risk assessments to address deficiencies related to operation of the moisture separators and verified the issues were entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed the following work activities:
- Emergent maintenance to troubleshoot and repair main turbine stop valve (SV-3)when it failed to move during testing (WO 0842133)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two operability evaluation inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and condition reports to verify that identified conditions did not adversely affect safety system operability or overall plant safety. The evaluations were reviewed using criteria specified in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance formerly contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability and Inspection Manual Part 9900, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety." In addition, where a component was determined to be inoperable, the inspectors verified that TS limiting condition for operation implications were properly addressed. The inspectors also performed field walk downs and interviewed personnel involved in identifying, evaluating or correcting the identified conditions. The following items were reviewed:
- CC Loop A Operability Following CC-P11C Motor Failure, CR200815919
- Vital Battery ID Battery charger control switch intermittent contact, CR200815347
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 1 Sample)
==
.1 Temporary Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one plant modification inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed a temporary plant modification documented in Temporary Change 07-012, Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil Supply System. This modification changed the normal operating configuration of system components by adding two temporary 30,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed the change to ensure that it did not adversely affect systems important to safety. The inspectors compared the temporary change with the UFSAR to verify that the modification did not affect system operability or availability. The inspectors ensured that station personnel implemented the modification in accordance with the issued design documents and the temporary configuration change process. Inspectors verified that the condition monitoring actions that were specified in the modification were performed at the appropriate frequency and in accordance with procedures or authorized work documents. The inspectors also reviewed the impact on existing system procedures to verify the appropriate revisions were made to reflect this temporary configuration change. The documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed four post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples.
The inspectors reviewed PMT activities to ensure: that the specified PMT was appropriate for the scope of the work completed and was in accordance with the guidance provided in procedure MA 3.5, "Post Maintenance Testing;" that the acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operability of the component; and that operators and technicians performed the testing in accordance with plant procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the following PMT activities:
- Retest of B 125 Vdc Battery Charger following 480 Vac MCC Cubicle replacement.
- LX0557.03,Thermal Overload Protection Relay Replacement for Motor Operated Valves," Rev. 02, Chg. 09.
- LX0558.01, 4.16 Kv Breaker Inspection Testing and PM, Rev. 01, Chg. 14.
- Retest of C component cooling water pump CC-p-11C following motor replacement per WOs 0843782 and 0843788
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of surveillance testing activities for safety-related systems to verify that the system and components were capable of performing their intended safety function, to verify operational readiness, and to ensure compliance with the technical specifications and surveillance procedures. The inspectors attended selected pre-evolution briefings, performed system and control room walkdowns, observed operators and technicians perform test evolutions, reviewed system parameters, and interviewed the applicable system engineers and field operators. The test data recorded was compared to procedural and technical specification requirements, and to prior test results to identify any adverse trends. The following surveillance procedures were reviewed.
- OX1456.21, Train A ESFAS Slave Relay K601 Quarterly Go Test, Rev. 9, performed on October 21, 2008
- OS1402.04, Train B CCP Oil Cooler Alternate Cooling Supply Flow Test, Rev. 0, performed on November 4, 2008
The inspectors reviewed deficiencies related to surveillance testing and verified that the issues were entered into the corrective action program. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Annual Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample. On October 2, 2008, the inspectors observed a drill from the control room simulator during annual licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance relative to developing event classifications and notifications. The inspectors reviewed the Seabrook Emergency Initiating Condition Matrix. The inspectors referenced Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline, Revision 5, and verified that FPLE correctly counted the drills contribution to the NRC PI for drill and exercise performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 9 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period November 3 - 6, 2008, the inspectors conducted the following activities to evaluate the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring instrumentation and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program related to maintaining and issuing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Implementation of these programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and FPLE procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify area, process, and emergency monitors that were installed at Seabrook for the protection of workers. The inspectors reviewed the current calibration records for the following instruments: the volume control tank area monitor (RM-6540), the incore seal table radiation monitor (RM 6534), spent fuel area monitor (RM-6549), and the waste gas process area monitor (RM-6551). The inspectors discussed with the system engineer the area monitoring system health reports, instrument reliability trends, and status of system modifications.
The inspectors selected hand-held radiation instruments, contamination monitors, and electronic dosimeters currently in use in the plant, and reviewed the associated calibration records. Included in this review were the calibration records for selected electronic dosimeters (DMC-2000), radiation survey instruments ( ASP-2, E-140N, 451B, Telepoles), contamination monitors (RM-14, SAM-9, ARGOS 4AB-Zeus 46, SPM-906),and the FastScan whole body counting system.
The inspectors observed a technician performing the pre-use safety checks on the Shepherd Model 81 beam irradiator, reviewed the source(s) current activity/dose rate data, and observed the technician perform a calibration of a Fluke 451B ion chamber.
The inspectors evaluated the licensee=s program for assuring quality in the radiation monitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs by reviewing the results of Nuclear Oversight audit No. SBK -08-01, Nuclear Assurance Respiratory Protection Program assessment (07-0086), selected Daily Quality Summary reports and Management Observation Reports for the period of September 2007 to September 2008, a Health Physics instrumentation self-assessment report (07-0212), and seventeen condition reports related to these program areas. The inspectors verified that problems were identified in a timely manner, that extent of condition and cause evaluations were performed, that previous radiation surveys remained valid, and that corrective actions were appropriate to preclude repetitive problems.
The inspectors determined that there were no incidents of personnel internal exposure resulting in a CEDE>50 mrem that would require an in-depth evaluation of whole body counting and bioassay techniques. However, the inspectors reviewed whole body counting instrument calibration and daily quality control data to confirm that the instrumentation was operable and available for use. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the most current Part 61 analysis of the site=s dry active waste stream for difficult-to-measure radioisotopes and determined that the isotopic mix did not significantly change from past analyses and that current whole body counting system parameters do not need to be changed.
The inspectors reviewed relevant condition reports that were initiated since the last inspection, to determine if radiation worker and radiation protection technician errors that resulted from training deficiencies or human factors were evident. The inspectors also verified that the resulting corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors verified calibration dates and observed a technician perform daily operational checks on a variety of survey instruments including telepoles, an RM-14, ASP-2, Fluke 451B, E-140N, and small article monitors (SAM).
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regarding the maintenance and issuance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to emergency response personnel. The inspectors reviewed training and qualification records for licensed operators from all operating shifts, radiation protection personnel, and fire brigade members, who would be required to wear SCBAs in the event of an emergency. Three SCBAs staged for use in the control room and two SCBAs staged in the turbine building were physically checked and the maintenance and hydrostatic/regulator test records for other selected SCBA=s that were staged in other plant areas were reviewed.
The inspectors reviewed the calibration records of the SCBA regulator testing equipment, verified that technicians were qualified to maintain and test regulators, reviewed the testing procedure, and observed a technician performance test five regulators/flow alarms. The inspectors also verified that air used to fill the SCBAs met the Grade D quality criteria of the Compressed Gas Association.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
During the period September 29 - October 2, 2008, the inspectors conducted the following activities to verify that the licensee=s radioactive material processing and transportation programs complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 61, and 71; and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations 49 CFR 170-189.
Radioactive Waste Systems Walkdown
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the radioactive liquid processing systems with the senior technical specialist-radwaste, and a site systems engineer.
During this tour, the inspectors verified that systems and facilities were consistent with the descriptions contained in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and the process control program (PCP), evaluated general material conditions of systems and facilities, and identified changes to these systems. The inspectors evaluated recently completed, and pending changes, made to solid and liquid radwaste processing systems including their potential radiological impact, the current processes for transferring radioactive resin/ sludge to shipping containers, and the subsequent de-watering process.
The inspectors, with a system engineer, walked down portions of laid-up systems that may be retired in-place including components of the boron recovery system, steam generator blowdown system, and asphalt solidification system. The inspectors discussed the status of administrative and physical controls for these systems.
The inspectors inspected various radioactive material storage locations, with the supervisor, radiological waste services, including the waste processing building, the radioactive materials storage building (RMSB), the Unit 2 cooling tower, and sea vans stored on site. The inspectors confirmed that inventories were current, that material was properly labeled, and that containers were in satisfactory material condition.
Waste Characterization and Classification
The inspection included a review of the waste characterization and classification program for regulatory compliance, including;
- the radio-chemical sample analysis results for various radioactive waste streams, including spent resins, dry active waste, and mechanical filters.
- the development of scaling factors for hard-to-detect radionuclides.
- methods and practices to detect changes in waste streams.
- characterization and classification of waste relative to 10 CFR 61.55 and determination of DOT shipment subtype per 49 CFR 173.
Shipment Preparation
The inspection included a review of radioactive waste program records, shipment preparation procedures, and observations of in-progress activities for regulatory compliance, including:
- Verified compliance with the relevant Certificates of Compliance and related cask handling procedures for shipping casks used for past shipments.
- Verified that FPLE had the current amendment for NRC (or agreement state) license authorization for the shipment recipients for six shipments
- Verified that training was provided to personnel responsible for classifying, handling, and shipping radioactive materials in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-19, and 49 CFR 172 Subpart H.
Shipment Records
The inspectors selected and reviewed records associated with six non-excepted shipments of radioactive materials completed since the last inspection of this area. The shipments were Nos.08-075,08-007, 08-002,07-040, 07-038, and 08-053. The following aspects of the radioactive waste packaging and shipping activities were reviewed:
- implementation of applicable shipping requirements including proper completion of manifests;
- implementation of specifications in applicable certificates-of-compliance, for the approved shipping casks, including limits for package contents;
- classification of radioactive materials related to 10 CFR 61.55 and 49 CFR 173;
- labeling of containers relative to container dose rate;
- radiation and contamination surveys of packages;
- placarding of transport vehicles;
- conduct of vehicle checks;
- providing of emergency instructions to the driver;
- completion of shipping papers;
- notification by the recipient that the radioactive materials had been received.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors reviewed the 2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 25 condition reports, a Quality Assurance Audit Report, and Seabrook Daily Quality Summary Reports related to radioactive material control and shipping. The inspectors assessed FPLE=s threshold for identifying problems and the promptness and effectiveness of corrective actions. This review was conducted using the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.11(c), the technical specifications, and FPLE procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed implementation of FPLE=s Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator (PI) Program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed condition reports, and associated documents, for occurrences involving locked high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned exposures against the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify that all occurrences that met the NEI criteria were identified and reported. The review covered the period from August 2007 through October 2008.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed relevant effluent release reports for the period August, 2007 through October 2008, for issues related to the public radiation safety performance indicator, which measures radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr whole body or 5.0 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; 5 mrads/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrad/qtr beta air dose, and 7.5 mrads/qtr for organ dose for gaseous effluents.
The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance indicator reports, and the following documents, to ensure the licensee met all requirements for evaluating the performance indicator from the third quarter 2007 through the third quarter 2008:
- Monthly projected dose assessment results for radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases.
- Quarterly projected dose assessment results for radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases
- Effluent dose assessment procedures
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the Seabrook corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by accessing FPLE's computerized database. The inspectors also reviewed FPLE actions to address the control of heavy loads per Nuclear Energy Institute initiative NEI 08-05, as described in condition reports 200712475 and 200804903.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Semi-annual Review to Identify Trends
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors performed a review of the Seabrook CAP and associated documents to identify trends that may indicate existence of safety significant issues. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily CAP item screening. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the Seabrook CAP Quarterly Trend Reports.
b.
Assessment and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors did not identify any appreciable trends that FPLE had not already identified.
.3 Annual Sample:
Air operated valve Bailey positioner feedback linkage failures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the actions FPLE had taken to prevent recurrence of air operated valve (AOV) Bailey positioned feedback linkage failures. The inspectors reviewed problem identification for timely determination commensurate with risk significance and ease of discovery; resolution of operability and reportability; extent of condition, common cause, and previous occurrences; classification of problem resolution with respect to safety significance; identification of appropriate corrective actions; and completion of corrective actions, including interim and permanent corrective actions.
The inspectors walked down 25% of similarly equipped AOVs that were randomly selected from two populations. The first sample consisted of AOV actuators that FPLE found degraded and subsequently corrected. The second sample consisted of AOV actuators that FPLE found correctly configured.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. In November 2007, Seabrook Generating Station experienced a primary component cooling water (PCCW) transient caused by failure of the Bailey positioner feedback linkage of temperature control valve 1-CC-TV-2271-1. This valve was designed to fail open. However, this particular failure caused the AOV actuator to close the valve. Operators intervened manually to arrest and reverse the PCCW transient.
FPLE determined that the failure occurred because a positioner linkage rod was not secured with adequate thread engagement following preventive maintenance. In response, FPLE inspected all AOVs equipped with a similar positioner and found other deficiencies with AOV positioner feedback linkage including missing jam nuts and diverse use of washers at all connection points. FPLE identified 17 AOVs that required corrective maintenance to restore an acceptable configuration and 59 AOVs that did not require corrective maintenance.
FPLE determined that the apparent cause of this deficiency was inadequate procedural guidance and insufficient understanding by maintenance technicians. FPLE developed recurring technical training for instrumentation and controls (I&C) technicians to remedy the insufficient understanding of maintenance technicians. FPLE is revising procedures and maintenance instructions to provide adequate written guidance.
.4 Annual Sample:
Review of Switchyard Disconnect Switch 1101 Epoxy Drive Rod Failure
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected condition report (CR) 08-00894 for detailed follow-up and review. CR 08-00894 documented a fault in the 345 kV switchyard that resulted in a reactor trip on January 19, 2008. The fault was due to the failure of an epoxy drive rod in switchyard disconnect switch (DS) 1101 north. The inspectors assessed FPLEs problem identification threshold, root cause analyses, extent of condition review, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether FPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these issues and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate to prevent recurrence. Additionally, the inspectors performed a switchyard walkdown and discussed the issue with the switchyard system engineer. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. During the inspection, the inspectors observed that procedure LN0560.11, SF6 SO2 and Purity Sampling did not require that FPLE review the sampling results. FPLEs procedure only required that the switchyard system engineer was informed when the procedure was completed. FPL documented this observation in CR 08-14600 to enhance the procedure to require that the switchyard system engineer review the sampling results for anomalies. During the switchyard walkdown, the inspectors also observed that the gas sample valve was lower in elevation than the disconnect switches. Because the SF6 gas being sampled was denser than the partial discharge byproduct SO2, the inspectors could not determine the adequacy of sampling for byproduct SO2 from this low elevation. FPLE documented this observation in CR 08-14600 to determine the adequacy of the sampling point and evaluate sampling in close proximity to the disconnect switches.
The inspectors determined that FPLE adequately implemented the corrective action process regarding the initial discovery of the above issue. The CR packages were complete and included root cause evaluation, extent of condition reviews, completed corrective actions and planned corrective actions. Additionally, the elements of the CR packages were detailed and thorough.
Specifically, the inspectors determined that corrective actions included replacement of DS 1101 north epoxy drive rod with a new style rod. Also, during refueling outage 12, FPLE replaced 21 epoxy drive rods with the potential to cause a plant trip or place the plant in a 72-hour shutdown action statement upon failure. The inspectors noted that the 52 remaining epoxy rods that were non-critical to plant operations were replaced or scheduled for replacement by refueling outage 13. In addition, the inspectors determined that FPLE increased the frequency of gas sampling to a weekly basis for the remaining rods until they were replaced. FPLE conducted ultra high frequency (UHF)monitoring to inspect the new epoxy rods to detect early partial discharge. The inspectors determined that the results of the UHF monitoring showed no significant partial discharge.
The inspectors determined that corrective actions were timely and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence for the issue. The corrective actions addressed immediate equipment concerns as well as the extent of condition for the failure. The inspectors determined that adequate tracking mechanisms were in place to ensure all corrective actions will be completed.
.5 Annual Sample:
Low Strength bolts in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by FPLE at Seabrook to initiate a program to address the use of low strength bolts in class 150 and class 300 piping applications in the RHR system. The deficiency was identified and documented in the NRC IR 200705 as NCV 2007-05-02. The scope of the review included the FPLEs extent of condition and effectiveness of follow-up actions to resolve the discrepancy.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. This condition was first identified in 1987 during a review of the containment building spray system to assess the effects of check valve leakage. Later, similar deficiencies were identified in 1989, and 2000 but FPLE did not change or update the applicable specification for these affected bolting. CR 06-13980 also documented that a non-conformance existed in the class 150 and 300 pipe flange installed bolting application specification. As follow-up, CR 07-13981 was initiated to document that the implementation of design change control and corrective action process were not satisfactory related to this issue. In addition to a prompt operability review FPLE initiated an investigation and in-depth review of these deficiencies. The review disclosed that the engineering evaluation performed in 1987 did not cause the revision of the specification 248-01, because the engineering evaluation indicated that the use of low strength bolts was technically acceptable in the application. Also, the engineering evaluation process implemented at that time was neither part of, nor was linked to the corrective action process. In response FPLE revised the applicable specification and initiated a program of review for bolting applications in ASME systems in order to identify and replace the low strength bolts.
The applicable bolts were replaced in RHR systems and replacement will continue in other systems as those systems become available for maintenance. The inspectors determined that the FPLEs follow-up for this deficiency was extensive and the corrective action technically adequate and effective.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with FPLE security procedures and regulatory requirements related to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These observations did not constitute an additional inspection sample. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
a. Inspection Scope
An ISFSI inspection was conducted on September 30, 2008, under the NMSS inspection program. Using Inspection Procedure 60855, the inspectors reviewed the ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities for the onsite storage of spent fuel and toured the ISFSI with the project engineer. The ISFSI licensing basis documents and implementing procedures were reviewed as the standards for the inspection. The inspection consisted of observing the condition of the Nuclear Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS) system; performing independent radiation surveys of the storage modules; and review of the surveillance records, including air vent inspections and recent daily air vent outlet temperature readings.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176.
Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of TI 2515/176, Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing, was to gather information to assess the adequacy of nuclear power plant emergency diesel generator (EDG) endurance and margin testing as prescribed in plant-specific TS. The inspectors reviewed emergency diesel generator ratings, design basis event load calculations, surveillance testing requirements, and emergency diesel generator vendors specifications and gathered information in accordance with TI 2515/176.
The inspectors assessment and information gathered while completing this TI was discussed with FPLE personnel. This information was forwarded on to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 (Closed) URI 07200063/2008001-001, Acceptability of Allowing a Non-Qualified
Individual to Manipulate the Automated Welding Controls During a Production Weld.
During welding of the first dry shielded canister (DSC) at Seabrook, it was observed that a welder who was qualified to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code Section IX requirements was assisted during production welding by a weld technician who had expertise in the weld machine control functions but was not documented as having taken the ASME welder performance qualification test. To determine if that situation met the requirements of the ASME Code, a written inquiry was submitted to the ASME Code requesting a review and formal reply. The ASME Code response, file number 08-1607 dated November 26, 2008, confirmed that a person making adjustments to welding equipment settings while under the supervision and control of a qualified welder was not required by QW-301.2 of ASME Section IX to be a qualified welder or welding operator.
The ASME Code reply confirmed that the ASME welder qualification rules had been met for the observed DSC production welding conditions. (URI 07200063/2008001-001 is closed.)
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Freeman on January 9, 2009. FPLE acknowledged the findings presented and indicated that none of the information presented at the exit meeting was proprietary.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) was identified by FPLE It was a violation of NRC requirements that met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV).
TS 6.7.1.a requires that written procedures be established and implemented per Regulatory guide 1.33. Procedure OS1036.01 was written pursuant to the above and requires that steam admission valve MS-V-394 be closed with the control switch in the auto position to align the A emergency feedwater (EFW) pump 37A for standby operation during plant operations at power. Contrary to the above, plant operators did not maintain EFW pump 37A operable during plant operation at full power on October 6, 2008, when the control switch for MS-V-394 was inadvertently moved to open during control board activities. The inadvertent operation of MS-V-394 caused steam generator blowdown to isolate. The operators entered the action statement for TS 3.7.1.2, restored EFW pump 37A to the required standby alignment, and restored steam generator blowdown.
The finding was more than minor because the incorrect operation of EFW controls resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the A EFW system and impacted steam generator blowdown during plant operations. The finding had very low safety significance because it did not involve a loss of safety function or impact the safety function for a time greater than the allowed outage time in the TS. The inspectors determined that the violation was licensee-identified. The issue was entered into FPLEs CAP as CR 08-13779.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- R. Arns, Engineering
- J. Ball, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- R. Belanger, Design Engineer
- M. Bianco, Radiological Waste Services Supervisor
- B. Brown, Plant Engineer
- V. Brown, Senior Licensing Analyst
- K. Browne, Assistant Operations Manager
- B. Buerger, Nuclear Projects
- J. Buyak, Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Respiratory Protection)
- R. Campione, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
- R. Campo, Plant Engineer
- W. Cash, Chemistry Manager
- D. Chang, Tagging Support
- R. Couture, Reactor Engineer
- W. Cox, Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst
- J. Crowley, I&C Superintendent
- J. Esteves, Design Engineer Systems
- D. Feeney, Mechanical Maintenance
- D. Flahardy, RP Technical Supervisor
- P. Freeman, Plant General Manager
- R. Guthrie, Systems Engineer, Radiation Monitoring System
- D. Hampton, Radiation Protection Specialist
- F. Hannify, Radiological Waste Services, Senior Technical Analyst
- D. Hickey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- M. Hansen, Maintenance Manager
- R. Jamison, Design Engineer Electrical
- G. Kann, Dry Cask Storage Project Engineer
- S. Kessinger, Work Control Supervisor
- R. Logue, Senior Radiation Protection Technician, (Instrumentation)
- G. Kim, Risk Analyst
- E. Metcalf, Operations Manager
- M. Lipman, Plant Technician
- T. Manning, Engineering
- D. Master, Plant Engineer
- B. McAllister, SW System Engineer
- N. McCafferty, Plant Engineering Manager
- W. Meyer,,Radiation Protection Manager
- D. Merrill, Maintenance Technical Superintendent
- M. OKeefe, Licensing Manager
- K. Mahoney, Reactor Engineer
- R. Noble, Engineering Manager
- M. Ossing, Engineering Support Manager
- V. Pascucci, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. Perkins, Rad Services Supervisor
- E. Piggot, Unit Supervisor
- R. Plante, Maintenance Supervisor
- B. Plummer, Nuclear Projects Manager
- N. Pond, Tagging Coordinator
- K. Purington, Reactor Operator
- K. Randall, Reactor Engineer
- T. Rossengal, RHR System Engineer
- M. Russell, Operations Clerk
- M. Scannell, Senior Health Physicist
- W. Schmidt, Electrical Maintenance
- G. Sessler, EDG System Engineer
J, Soucie, Nuclear Plant Operator
- G. St. Pierre, Site Vice President
- M. Taylor, Unit Supervisor
- R. Thurlow, Corporate Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Tucker, Security Manager
- J. Varga, Reactor Operator
- N. Walts, Unit Supervisor
- S. Wellhofer, Site Nurse
- R. White, Security Supervisor
- K. Wright, Training Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
200063/2008001-001 URI Non-Qualified Welder Manipulated Automated Welding Controls During Production Weld (Section 4OA5)