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| author name = Pressley L | | author name = Pressley L | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 | ||
| addressee name = Stoddard D | | addressee name = Stoddard D | ||
| addressee affiliation = Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) | | addressee affiliation = Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) | ||
| docket = 05000280, 05000281 | | docket = 05000280, 05000281 | ||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:/ | {{#Wiki_filter:==SUBJECT:== | ||
SURRY UNITS 1, 2 - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2019001 AND 05000281/2019001 | |||
==Dear Mr. Stoddard:== | |||
On March 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Units 1, 2. On April 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | |||
** | NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. | ||
The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. | |||
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at Surry. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket Nos.: 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | |||
Inspection Report 05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001 | |||
==Inspection Report== | |||
Docket Numbers: | |||
05000280 and 05000281 | |||
License Numbers: | |||
DPR-32 and DPR-37 | |||
Report Numbers: | |||
05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001 | |||
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-001-0028 | |||
Licensee: | |||
Virginia Electric & Power Co. | |||
Facility: | |||
Surry, Units 1 and 2 | |||
Location: | |||
Surry, VA 23883 | |||
Inspection Dates: | |||
January 01, 2019 to March 31, 2019 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
B. Lin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector | |||
C. Read, Acting Senior Resident Inspector | |||
D. Bacon, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B) | |||
M. Meeks, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B) | |||
Approved By: | |||
Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief | |||
Reactor Projects Branch 4 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
=SUMMARY= | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Quarterly inspection at Surry Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below. | |||
===List of Findings and Violations=== | |||
Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Open/Closed | |||
[H.13] - | |||
Consistent Process 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB) roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during Tropical Storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus. | |||
===Additional Tracking Items=== | |||
Type Issue number Title Report Section Status LER 05000280, 05000281/ | |||
2018-002- | |||
LER 2018-002-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1, | |||
Regarding Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator. | |||
71153 Closed LER 05000280, 05000281/ | |||
2018-003- | |||
LER 2018-003-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' | |||
Reserve Station Service Transformer. | |||
71153 Closed | |||
=PLANT STATUS= | |||
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period. | |||
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period. | |||
==INSPECTION SCOPE== | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | |||
==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | |||
===Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
From January 30 to February 1, 2019, the inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal freezing temperatures for the following systems and components: | |||
* condensate storage tanks | |||
* auxiliary feedwater systems | |||
* fire protection system | |||
* emergency diesel generators | |||
==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment== | |||
===Partial Walkdown (IP Section 02.01) (4 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | |||
: (1) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system on January 23, 2019, while the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was unavailable | |||
: (2) Unit 1 charging pumps' service water and component cooling water systems on March 16, 2019 | |||
: (3) Unit 1 outside recirculation spray (RS) System on March 20, 2019, following lowered inventory in the 'A' RS pump seal head tank | |||
: (4) Units 1 and 2 uninterruptable power supplies and batteries for vital loads on March 29, 2019 | |||
==71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual)== | |||
===Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on February 7, 2019. | |||
==71111.05Q - Fire Protection== | |||
===Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas: | |||
(1) | |||
'A' and 'B' fuel oil pump house CO2 system testing on January 29, 2019 (2)1-FS-FP-142, Rev. 1, Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) on January 3, 2019 | |||
: (3) Compensatory measures for fire protection piping replacement project in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings on February 14, 2019 (4)0-OPT-FP-008, Fire Pump Flow Rate Test, on the diesel-driven fire pump on March 1, 2019 | |||
==71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures== | |||
===Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the: | |||
Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building basements, including water level detection, alarms, automatic controls, and flooding response procedures | |||
===Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in: | |||
Unit 2 alleyway in cable vault 1-EP-MH-2 and at the Unit 2 trackbay in cable vaults 1-EP-MH-3E and 1-EP-MH-3W | |||
==71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance== | |||
===Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)=== | |||
Biennial Requalification Written Examinations | |||
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered in March of 2018. | |||
Annual Requalification Operating Tests | |||
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test. | |||
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives. | |||
Requalification Examination Security | |||
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised. | |||
Remedial Training and Re-examinations | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination. | |||
Operator License Conditions | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses. | |||
Control Room Simulator | |||
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46. | |||
Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance. | |||
==71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance== | |||
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 power reduction to 98 percent and high pressure heater drain pump swaps on February 6, 2019 and March 13, 2019. | |||
===Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
On February 5, 2019, the inspectors observed and evaluated a scenario in which a main steam flow transmitter fails, an electrical bus is lost, emergency diesel generators fail to start and load, and the station loses all offsite power. | |||
==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness== | |||
===Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions: | |||
: (1) Main control room chiller service water pumps, including replacement of the 'B' main control room chiller service water pump on February 19, 2019 | |||
: (2) On the 'A' emergency service water pump, alignment of the motor due to a degraded concrete pedestal on February 20, 2019, and replacement of the oil cooler on February 21, 2019, after foreign material caused a through-wall leak | |||
==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | |||
===Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities: | |||
: (1) Unit 2 yellow risk due to intake canal level logic testing concurrent with the '1B' circulating water pump being out for maintenance, on February 5, 2019 | |||
: (2) Unit 2 unplanned orange risk during plant heatup when transitioning from the site shutdown risk model to the probabilistic risk assessment model on December 3, 2018 | |||
: (3) Unit 2 risk during replacement of the 'A' bearing cooling heat exchanger, including flooding mitigation and movement of the heat exchanger beside sensitive equipment, on March 5-6, 2019 | |||
: (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during emergency diesel generator #2 testing with transformer | |||
#1 and Bus 5 tagged out for maintenance in the switchyard, on March 11, 2019 | |||
==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | |||
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Sample (IP Section 02.01) (5 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | |||
: (1) CR 1115210, NRC identified foreign material in relay 2-EP-86-25H6 (CH PUMP 1C LOCKOUT RELAY) | |||
: (2) CR 1113542, K-10 CERPI indication erratic during performance of 1-OPT-RX-005, retested on 1/9/2019 | |||
: (3) CR 1114684, Service Water piping low pipe wall thickness on January 25, 2019. | |||
: (4) CRs 1111789 and 1112113, 'A' main feedwater pump breaker closed in test without entering technical specifications | |||
: (5) CR 1116136, safeguards exhaust fan rotating backwards while secured with opposite fan running | |||
==71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing== | |||
===Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests: | |||
(1)1-OPT-RX-005, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, following erratic Computer Enhanced Control Rod Position Indication (CERPI) indications and corrective maintenance, on January 9, 2019 (2)0-OPT-VS-002, Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test, after preventative maintenance and pressure switch calibration for the 'A' Auxiliary Building filtered exhaust fan, on February 13, 2019. | |||
(3)1-OSP-IA-001, Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test, following controller reprogramming and modification to testing strategy, on February 19, 2019 (4)0-OPT-SW-001, Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1A, performance test following motor alignment and oil cooler replacement, on February 21, 2019. | |||
==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | |||
===In Service Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=1}} | |||
(1)2-OPT-CS-002, Containment Spray System Test, on February 26, 2019 | |||
===Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | |||
(1)2-OPT-EG-001, Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise Test, Revision 77 on January 15, 2019 (2)1-OPT-FW-002, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B, Revision 36 on January 3, 2019 (3)0-OSP-AAC-001, Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DC-0M, alternate AC Diesel Generator, Revision 45 on March 18, 2019 | |||
==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation== | |||
Drill and/or Simulator-Based Licensed Operator Requalification Training (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample) | |||
On March 26, 2019, the inspectors evaluated a full-scale emergency preparedness drill that involved a flammable atmosphere in the emergency service water pump house leading to an Alert declaration, followed by a loss of fuel clad barrier and loss of coolant accident outside of containment leading to a General Emergency declaration. | |||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | |||
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | |||
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=2}} | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples) | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples) | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018) | |||
==71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution== | |||
===Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues: | |||
A review of recent actuations of thermal overload protection devices on breakers for plant equipment and other condition reports related to design adequacies of thermal overloads. | |||
These issues were chosen due to the importance the thermal overload devices. Failures can prevent plant equipment from performing safety functions. These issues were reviewed for deficiencies in maintenance and engineering. Specifically, inspectors reviewed the issues for deficiencies in maintenance practices, preventative maintenance schedules, foreign material exclusion practices, design attributes, and change management. | |||
===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153|count=2}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx: | |||
: (1) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator (ADAMS accession: | |||
ML18351A089). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section. | |||
: (2) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (ADAMS accession: ML19016A133). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section. | |||
==INSPECTION RESULTS== | |||
Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events | |||
Green FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Open/Closed | |||
[H.13] - | |||
Consistent Process 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB)roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during tropical storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus. | |||
=====Description:===== | |||
On October 11, 2018, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J 4kV emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG). At the time of the event, the site was experiencing rain and winds (approximately 55 miles per hour (mph)) associated with tropical storm Michael. The licensee evaluated this issue with a level of effort evaluation, CA 7407559. This evaluation determined, in part, that documentation and tracking of deficiencies associated with the TB roof, as identified in vendor inspection reports, have not been tracked in the CAP. The TB roof was determined to be degraded during a roof inspection by a vendor in 2016 and again in June of 2018. The vendor estimated the overall remaining life of the TB roof as 2 to 4 years following the roof inspections in 2016 and 2018, while noting specific deficiencies associated with loose flashing and loose or degraded fasteners. While the licensee did not track the TB roof condition in the CAP, the TB roof replacement project was tracked with the stations long range plan and originally planned to begin in 2017. It was subsequently rescheduled for 2019. The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not adequately evaluate the condition of the TB roof following the vendor inspections or implement a bridging strategy/interim corrective actions before the TB roof could be replaced. This was due in part, because the issue was not tracked in the stations CAP. | |||
The licensee informed the NRC of the event on October 11, 2018 with licensee event report (LER) 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and also made an 8-hour non-emergency event notification (EN | |||
#53662) on October 12, 2018. | |||
Corrective Actions: The licensee conducted inspections and tests of the A RSST and restored the normal alignment of the #3 EDG and the 1J emergency bus. TB roof repairs were made so that the damaged materials were replaced and new anchoring strips and fasteners were installed. The frequency of roof inspections has been increased until the roof is replaced, and all deficiencies are being entered into the CAP. The TB roof replacement project was scheduled to begin in 2020. | |||
Corrective Action Reference: CR1107393 | |||
=====Performance Assessment:===== | |||
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions upon discovery of TB roof degradation in accordance with the corrective action program. Specifically, licensee procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 34 paragraph 3.1.4 required, in part, a condition report (CR) for any issue or concern that does not meet specific requirements of procedures, policies, management expectations, or accepted industry standards. | |||
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, as a result of the PD and high winds at the site, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on October 11, 2018. | |||
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. This finding was determined to be Green, very low safety significance, because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributed to the likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event that also affected mitigation equipment. | |||
Cross-cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because; while the licensee has conducted TB roof inspections, they were controlled informally and were not conducted or tracked by a procedure or preventive maintenance (PM) task/assignment. | |||
=====Enforcement:===== | |||
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding. | |||
Observation 71153 The licensee conducted a level of effort evaluation (LEE) and determined the cause of the failed underground splice was poor craftsmanship by a company transmission team in 2009. To detect degradation of cabling, including splices, tan delta testing is performed on a six-year frequency. | |||
The splice that failed had been tan delta tested satisfactorily in 2009 and 2012. During testing in 2018, a few days before the fault occurred, two separate test sets were used, both producing erratic results. These results were attributed to issues with the testing equipment. The licensee deferred the tan delta testing based on recommendations from electrical subject matter experts given tan delta testing was not required as a part of the reserve station service transformer (RSST)replacement project. The inspectors determined that cable splice degradation was identified by the erratic results and further testing could have identified the degraded splice prior to returning the RSST to service. After the cable fault and RSST lockout, all plant safety systems responded as designed. This observation was associated with closure of Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer. | |||
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | |||
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | |||
* On February 7, 2019, the inspector presented the Telephonic Exit Meeting for Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection (IP 71111.11B) to F. Mladen, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
* On April 17, 2019, the inspector presented the Quarterly Resident Inspector Exit Meeting to Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
71111.01 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-OP-ZZ-021 | |||
Severe Weather Preparation | |||
Rev. 21 | |||
71111.04 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1088426 | |||
CR1111368 | |||
CR1111510 | |||
CR1093547 | |||
CR1111509 | |||
CR1053312 | |||
CR1118589 | |||
CR1114023 | |||
71111.04 | |||
Drawings | |||
11448-FE-11B | |||
Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 1-II & 1-IV Unit 1 | |||
Rev. 44 | |||
11448-FE-1G | |||
25V DC One Line Diagram Unit 1 | |||
Rev. 42 | |||
11448-FM-071B | |||
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Circulating and | |||
Service Water System Unit 1 | |||
Sheet 1 Rev. | |||
63, Sheet 2 | |||
Rev. 39 | |||
11548-FE-11B | |||
Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 2-II & 2-IV Unit 2 | |||
Rev. 36 | |||
11548-FE-1G | |||
25V DC One Line Diagram Unit 2 | |||
Rev. 37 | |||
11548-FM-075D | |||
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Compressed Air | |||
System Surry Power Station Unit 2 | |||
Rev. 39 | |||
71111.04 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-OP-SW-002A | |||
Emergency Service Water System Alignment | |||
Rev. 10 | |||
1-OP-51.5A | |||
Charging Pump CC and SW Systems Valve Alignment | |||
Rev. 20 | |||
1-OP-RS-001A | |||
Outside Recirc Spray System Alignment | |||
Rev. 10 | |||
2-OP-FW-001A | |||
Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment | |||
Rev. 8 | |||
71111.04 | |||
Work Orders | |||
38103676030 | |||
38103774764 | |||
203871003 | |||
203875616 | |||
204179424 | |||
71111.05A | |||
Procedures | |||
SA-AA-115 | |||
Conduct of Fire Drills | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
71111.05Q Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1115033 | |||
CR1090227 | |||
71111.05Q Drawings | |||
11448-FB-047B | |||
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Fire Protection | |||
System | |||
Sheet 2 Rev. | |||
25, Sheet 3 | |||
Rev. 27 | |||
71111.05Q Fire Plans | |||
1-FS-FP-142 | |||
Emergency Switchgear Room | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
71111.05Q Miscellaneous | |||
N/A | |||
Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose Stations in U2 | |||
Turbine Building, Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose | |||
Stations in U1 Turbine Building | |||
2/14/2019 | |||
71111.05Q Procedures | |||
0-LPT-FP-022 | |||
Operability Test of Fuel Oil Pump Houses High Pressure | |||
CO2 System | |||
Rev. 12 | |||
71111.05Q Procedures | |||
0-LSP-FP-102 | |||
Establishment of Hose House or Hose Station | |||
Compensatory Measures | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
71111.05Q Procedures | |||
0-OPT-FP-008 | |||
Fire Pump Flow Rate Test | |||
Rev. 24 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
CR1115416 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Drawings | |||
11448-ESK-11M | |||
Elementary Diagram Circulating Water Flooding Trip | |||
Rev. 11 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-AP-13.00 | |||
Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding | |||
Rev. 31 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-AP-13.01 | |||
Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding | |||
Rev. 10 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
1-ECM-0102-01 | |||
Turbine Building Flood control Novus Micro 1000 UPS | |||
Inverter and Battery Maintenance | |||
Rev. 6 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
1-EPM-0805-01 | |||
Turbine Building Flood Control Testing | |||
Rev. 11 | |||
71111.06 | |||
Work Orders | |||
38103850377 | |||
71111.11B | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
1. | |||
Licensed Operator Medical Records | |||
71111.11B | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
2. | |||
Qualification Revocation/Reinstatements (TR-AA-600 Att. | |||
4) and Remedial Training Plans (TR-AA-400 Attachment 5) | |||
for seven (7) Licensed Operators from 2018 examinations | |||
3. | |||
Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 17.1-17.7 Training | |||
Attendance Records | |||
4. | |||
Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 18.1-18.7 Training | |||
Attendance Records | |||
71111.11B | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
5. | |||
Shift B Licensed Personnel Quarterly Proficiency Time | |||
Records (OP-AA-103 Att. 7) | |||
Job Aid 030 | |||
Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on | |||
05/31/18, 06/01/18, and 06/02/18 | |||
Rev. 2 | |||
71111.11B | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Job Aid 030 | |||
Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on | |||
11/11/16, 11/12/16, and 01/05/17 | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Job Aid 033 | |||
Simulator Simultaneous Trip of All Main Steam Isolation | |||
Valves (ANSI12), test performed on 09/23/18 | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
Job Aid 036 | |||
Simulator Main Turbine Trip From Maximum Power Level | |||
(<10%) That Does Not Result in Immediate Reactor Trip | |||
(ANSI15), test performed on 10/9/18. | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
Job Aid 037 | |||
Simulator Maximum Rate Ramp (5%/min) From 100% | |||
Down To 75% (ANSI16), test performed on 07/25/18. | |||
Rev. 2 | |||
Job Aid 043 | |||
Simulator Real Time and Repeatability (ANSI20), tests | |||
performed on 08/03/18 | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
JPM LO18-01 | |||
Locally Operate a 4160V AC Breaker | |||
Rev. 16 | |||
JPM LO23-04 | |||
Respond to a Secondary System Transient | |||
Rev. 25 | |||
JPM LO26-02 | |||
Locally Isolate the AFW Header | |||
Rev. 13 | |||
JPM LO26-05C | |||
Locally Swap AFW Pump Supply to Fire Water | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
JPM LO26-12 | |||
Establish Alternate Feed Source to SGs Using FR-H.1 | |||
Rev. 7 | |||
JPM LO52-03B | |||
Transfer SI System to Hot Leg Recirculation | |||
Rev. 11 | |||
JPM LO81-04 | |||
Load AAC Diesel Onto Unit One J Bus | |||
Rev. 23 | |||
JPM LO88-34 | |||
Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01 | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
JPM LO88-44 | |||
Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01 | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
JPM LO99-20C | |||
Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
RQ-18.2-XB-5 | |||
Biennial Written Examination (RO and SRO) | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Scenario Based | |||
Test (SBT) Records | |||
Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-3, LBLOCA with | |||
Multiple ECCS Failures, Test performed on 12/06/2018 | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Scenario Based | |||
Test (SBT) Records | |||
Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-4, LOCA Outside | |||
Containment From Charging Line, Test performed on | |||
2/06/2018 | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Scenario RQ-19.1- | |||
SE-3 | |||
LBLOCA with Multiple ECCS Failures | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
71111.11B | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Scenario RQ-19.1- | |||
SE-4 | |||
LOCA Outside Containment From Charging Line | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Scenario RQ-19.1- | |||
SE-7 | |||
Ruptured and Faulted Steam Generator | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
Scenario RQ-19.1- | |||
SE-8 | |||
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
71111.11B | |||
Procedures | |||
DTS-001 | |||
Test and Exam Security | |||
Rev. 3 | |||
NISP-TR-01 | |||
Systematic Approach to Training Process | |||
Rev. 1 | |||
OP-AA-103 | |||
Operator Qualifications | |||
Rev. 7 | |||
SA-AA-122 | |||
Medical Evaluation | |||
Rev. 7 | |||
TR-AA-10 | |||
Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) Process | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
TR-AA-101 | |||
Conduct of Training | |||
Rev. 13 | |||
TR-AA-710 | |||
NRC Exam Security Requirements | |||
Rev. 8 | |||
TR-AA-730 | |||
Licensed Operator Biennial and Annual Operating | |||
Requalification Exam Process | |||
Rev. 11 | |||
TR-AA-740 | |||
Administrative Requirements for Application and | |||
Maintenance of Operator Licenses | |||
Rev. 2 | |||
TR-AA-750 | |||
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation | |||
Rev. 10 | |||
TR-AA-SIM-100 | |||
Simulator Modification Process | |||
Rev. 9 | |||
TR-AA-SIM-101 | |||
Simulator Configuration Control Committee | |||
Rev. 5 | |||
TR-AA-SIM-200 | |||
Simulator Hardware Management | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
71111.11B | |||
Procedures | |||
TR-AA-SIM-300 | |||
Simulator Software Management | |||
Rev. 4 | |||
TR-AA-SIM-400 | |||
Simulator Performance Testing | |||
Rev. 8 | |||
71111.12 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1046703 | |||
CR1064874 | |||
CR1116581 | |||
CR1116585 | |||
CR1104834 | |||
CR568763 | |||
71111.12 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-MCM-0101-01 | |||
Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul | |||
Rev. 12 | |||
0-MCM-0101-01 | |||
Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul | |||
Rev. 11 | |||
0-MCM-0210-01 | |||
Control Room Chillers Performance Checks | |||
Rev. 30 | |||
71111.12 | |||
Work Orders | |||
38103749617 | |||
38103777224 | |||
38103808936 | |||
38103807372 | |||
203876621 | |||
203876579 | |||
204182357 | |||
203875791 | |||
38103807372 | |||
38103749612 | |||
203575885 | |||
71111.13 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1111789 | |||
CR1112489 | |||
71111.13 | |||
Drawings | |||
11548-FM-088B | |||
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and | |||
Volume Control System | |||
Rev. 49 | |||
71111.13 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
N/A | |||
EOOS Scheduler's Evaluation of Surry Power Station, | |||
February 5-10, 2019 | |||
N/A | |||
High Risk Plan Actions for Unit 2 Bearing Cooling Heat | |||
Exchanger Replacement | |||
3/4/2019 | |||
71111.13 | |||
Procedures | |||
2-PT-8.5 | |||
Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic (Hi-Hi Train) | |||
Rev. 34 | |||
WM-AA-20 | |||
Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities | |||
Rev. 2 | |||
WM-AA-301 | |||
Operational Risk Assessment | |||
Rev. 20 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1115210 | |||
CR1116136 | |||
CR1112113 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Drawings | |||
11448-FB-006D | |||
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Auxiliary | |||
Ventilation System | |||
Sheet 1 Rev. | |||
14, Sheet 2 | |||
Rev. 18 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Engineering | |||
Evaluations | |||
ETE-SU-2014-1017 Safety Re-Classification of Auxiliary Ventilation System | |||
Components | |||
Rev. 0 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Procedures | |||
2-MOP-CN-002 | |||
Returning Secondary Systems to Service | |||
Rev. 20 | |||
2-OP-FW-004 | |||
Main Feedwater System Operation | |||
Rev. 21 | |||
2-OP-FW-004A | |||
Main Feedwater System Alignment | |||
Rev. 13 | |||
OP-AA-1500 | |||
Operational Configuration Control | |||
Rev. 19 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Procedures | |||
OP-AA-200 | |||
Equipment Clearance | |||
Rev. 31 | |||
OP-AA-2000 | |||
Tagging Administration | |||
Rev. 9 | |||
71111.15 | |||
Work Orders | |||
204194067 | |||
71111.19 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1116581 | |||
CR1116585 | |||
CR1116455 | |||
71111.19 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
CR1116455 | |||
71111.19 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-OPT-SW-001 | |||
Emergency Service Water Pump Operation | |||
Rev. 48 | |||
71111.19 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-OPT-VS-002 | |||
Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test | |||
Rev. 31 | |||
71111.19 | |||
Procedures | |||
1-OPT-RX-005 | |||
Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement Test | |||
Rev. 37 | |||
1-OSP-IA-001 | |||
Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test | |||
Rev. 21 | |||
2-LOG-TB-001R | |||
U2 Turbine Building Operations Normal Default Tour | |||
Rev. 173 | |||
2-OSP-IA-001 | |||
Instrument Air Compressor 2-IA-C-1 Performance Test | |||
Rev. 16 | |||
71111.22 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1116811 | |||
CR1117565 | |||
71111.22 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-OSP-AAC-001 | |||
Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DG-0M, Alternate AC Diesel | |||
Generator | |||
Rev. 45 | |||
1-OPT-FW-002 | |||
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B | |||
Rev. 36 | |||
2-OPT-CS-002 | |||
Containment Spray System Test | |||
Rev. 18 | |||
2-OPT-EG-001 | |||
Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise | |||
Test | |||
Rev. 77 | |||
71111.22 | |||
Work Orders | |||
204195718 | |||
71114.06 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1119402 | |||
CR1119470 | |||
CR1118062 | |||
71114.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-AP-35.02 | |||
Response to Potential Toxic, Corrosive, Asphyxiant, or | |||
Flammable Atmosphere | |||
Rev. 3 | |||
1-E-0 | |||
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection | |||
Rev. 74 | |||
EPIP-1.03 | |||
Response to Alert | |||
Rev. 23 | |||
EPIP-1.05 | |||
Response to General Emergency | |||
Rev. 25 | |||
71114.06 | |||
Procedures | |||
EPIP-1.06 | |||
Protective Action Recommendations | |||
Rev. 12 | |||
EPIP-2.01 | |||
Notification of State and Local Governments | |||
Rev. 44 | |||
71151 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
NEI 99-02 | |||
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline | |||
Rev. 7 | |||
Q4/2018 | |||
Performance | |||
Indicators - Surry 1 | |||
and 2 - Unplanned | |||
Power Changes per | |||
7000 Critical Hours | |||
dated | |||
3/8/2019 | |||
Q4/2018 | |||
Performance | |||
Indicators - Surry 1 | |||
and 2 - Unplanned | |||
Scrams per 7000 | |||
Critical Hours | |||
dated | |||
3/8/2019 | |||
71151 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Q4/2018 | |||
Performance | |||
Indicators - Surry 1 | |||
and 2 - Unplanned | |||
Scrams with | |||
Complications | |||
dated | |||
3/8/2019 | |||
71152 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
CR1088022 | |||
CR1110299 | |||
CR1110296 | |||
CR1091318 | |||
CR1056169 | |||
CR1063590 | |||
CR1117624 | |||
CR1116277 | |||
CR1115665 | |||
CR1113049 | |||
CR1113030 | |||
CR1116277 | |||
CR1115665 | |||
71152 | |||
Procedures | |||
1-DRP-007 | |||
Motor Operated Valve Operating Bands | |||
Rev. 46 | |||
71152 | |||
Work Orders | |||
203871020 | |||
203874647 | |||
204195738 | |||
71153 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
1110265 | |||
71153 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
N/A | |||
Vendor Inspection Report of Surry Turbine Building Roof | |||
dated | |||
6/21/2018 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 02:33, 5 January 2025
| ML19130A018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry |
| Issue date: | 05/10/2019 |
| From: | Lundy Pressley NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2019001 | |
| Download: ML19130A018 (19) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SURRY UNITS 1, 2 - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2019001 AND 05000281/2019001
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On March 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Units 1, 2. On April 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at Surry. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000280 and 05000281
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-001-0028
Licensee:
Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Facility:
Surry, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Surry, VA 23883
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2019 to March 31, 2019
Inspectors:
B. Lin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
C. Read, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
D. Bacon, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B)
M. Meeks, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B)
Approved By:
Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Quarterly inspection at Surry Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB) roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during Tropical Storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue number Title Report Section Status LER 05000280, 05000281/
2018-002-
LER 2018-002-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1,
Regarding Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator.
71153 Closed LER 05000280, 05000281/
2018-003-
LER 2018-003-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C'
Reserve Station Service Transformer.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
From January 30 to February 1, 2019, the inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal freezing temperatures for the following systems and components:
- condensate storage tanks
- auxiliary feedwater systems
- fire protection system
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 02.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system on January 23, 2019, while the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was unavailable
- (2) Unit 1 charging pumps' service water and component cooling water systems on March 16, 2019
- (3) Unit 1 outside recirculation spray (RS) System on March 20, 2019, following lowered inventory in the 'A' RS pump seal head tank
- (4) Units 1 and 2 uninterruptable power supplies and batteries for vital loads on March 29, 2019
71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual)
Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on February 7, 2019.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
(1)
'A' and 'B' fuel oil pump house CO2 system testing on January 29, 2019 (2)1-FS-FP-142, Rev. 1, Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) on January 3, 2019
- (3) Compensatory measures for fire protection piping replacement project in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings on February 14, 2019 (4)0-OPT-FP-008, Fire Pump Flow Rate Test, on the diesel-driven fire pump on March 1, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building basements, including water level detection, alarms, automatic controls, and flooding response procedures
Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
Unit 2 alleyway in cable vault 1-EP-MH-2 and at the Unit 2 trackbay in cable vaults 1-EP-MH-3E and 1-EP-MH-3W
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered in March of 2018.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 power reduction to 98 percent and high pressure heater drain pump swaps on February 6, 2019 and March 13, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
On February 5, 2019, the inspectors observed and evaluated a scenario in which a main steam flow transmitter fails, an electrical bus is lost, emergency diesel generators fail to start and load, and the station loses all offsite power.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Main control room chiller service water pumps, including replacement of the 'B' main control room chiller service water pump on February 19, 2019
- (2) On the 'A' emergency service water pump, alignment of the motor due to a degraded concrete pedestal on February 20, 2019, and replacement of the oil cooler on February 21, 2019, after foreign material caused a through-wall leak
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 2 yellow risk due to intake canal level logic testing concurrent with the '1B' circulating water pump being out for maintenance, on February 5, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 unplanned orange risk during plant heatup when transitioning from the site shutdown risk model to the probabilistic risk assessment model on December 3, 2018
- (3) Unit 2 risk during replacement of the 'A' bearing cooling heat exchanger, including flooding mitigation and movement of the heat exchanger beside sensitive equipment, on March 5-6, 2019
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during emergency diesel generator #2 testing with transformer
- 1 and Bus 5 tagged out for maintenance in the switchyard, on March 11, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Sample (IP Section 02.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR 1115210, NRC identified foreign material in relay 2-EP-86-25H6 (CH PUMP 1C LOCKOUT RELAY)
- (2) CR 1113542, K-10 CERPI indication erratic during performance of 1-OPT-RX-005, retested on 1/9/2019
- (3) CR 1114684, Service Water piping low pipe wall thickness on January 25, 2019.
- (4) CRs 1111789 and 1112113, 'A' main feedwater pump breaker closed in test without entering technical specifications
- (5) CR 1116136, safeguards exhaust fan rotating backwards while secured with opposite fan running
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1)1-OPT-RX-005, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, following erratic Computer Enhanced Control Rod Position Indication (CERPI) indications and corrective maintenance, on January 9, 2019 (2)0-OPT-VS-002, Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test, after preventative maintenance and pressure switch calibration for the 'A' Auxiliary Building filtered exhaust fan, on February 13, 2019.
(3)1-OSP-IA-001, Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test, following controller reprogramming and modification to testing strategy, on February 19, 2019 (4)0-OPT-SW-001, Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1A, performance test following motor alignment and oil cooler replacement, on February 21, 2019.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
In Service Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01)
(1)2-OPT-CS-002, Containment Spray System Test, on February 26, 2019
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)2-OPT-EG-001, Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise Test, Revision 77 on January 15, 2019 (2)1-OPT-FW-002, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B, Revision 36 on January 3, 2019 (3)0-OSP-AAC-001, Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DC-0M, alternate AC Diesel Generator, Revision 45 on March 18, 2019
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill and/or Simulator-Based Licensed Operator Requalification Training (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
On March 26, 2019, the inspectors evaluated a full-scale emergency preparedness drill that involved a flammable atmosphere in the emergency service water pump house leading to an Alert declaration, followed by a loss of fuel clad barrier and loss of coolant accident outside of containment leading to a General Emergency declaration.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
A review of recent actuations of thermal overload protection devices on breakers for plant equipment and other condition reports related to design adequacies of thermal overloads.
These issues were chosen due to the importance the thermal overload devices. Failures can prevent plant equipment from performing safety functions. These issues were reviewed for deficiencies in maintenance and engineering. Specifically, inspectors reviewed the issues for deficiencies in maintenance practices, preventative maintenance schedules, foreign material exclusion practices, design attributes, and change management.
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
- (1) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator (ADAMS accession:
ML18351A089). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.
- (2) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (ADAMS accession: ML19016A133). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71153 A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB)roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during tropical storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus.
Description:
On October 11, 2018, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J 4kV emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG). At the time of the event, the site was experiencing rain and winds (approximately 55 miles per hour (mph)) associated with tropical storm Michael. The licensee evaluated this issue with a level of effort evaluation, CA 7407559. This evaluation determined, in part, that documentation and tracking of deficiencies associated with the TB roof, as identified in vendor inspection reports, have not been tracked in the CAP. The TB roof was determined to be degraded during a roof inspection by a vendor in 2016 and again in June of 2018. The vendor estimated the overall remaining life of the TB roof as 2 to 4 years following the roof inspections in 2016 and 2018, while noting specific deficiencies associated with loose flashing and loose or degraded fasteners. While the licensee did not track the TB roof condition in the CAP, the TB roof replacement project was tracked with the stations long range plan and originally planned to begin in 2017. It was subsequently rescheduled for 2019. The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not adequately evaluate the condition of the TB roof following the vendor inspections or implement a bridging strategy/interim corrective actions before the TB roof could be replaced. This was due in part, because the issue was not tracked in the stations CAP.
The licensee informed the NRC of the event on October 11, 2018 with licensee event report (LER) 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and also made an 8-hour non-emergency event notification (EN#53662) on October 12, 2018.
Corrective Actions: The licensee conducted inspections and tests of the A RSST and restored the normal alignment of the #3 EDG and the 1J emergency bus. TB roof repairs were made so that the damaged materials were replaced and new anchoring strips and fasteners were installed. The frequency of roof inspections has been increased until the roof is replaced, and all deficiencies are being entered into the CAP. The TB roof replacement project was scheduled to begin in 2020.
Corrective Action Reference: CR1107393
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions upon discovery of TB roof degradation in accordance with the corrective action program. Specifically, licensee procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 34 paragraph 3.1.4 required, in part, a condition report (CR) for any issue or concern that does not meet specific requirements of procedures, policies, management expectations, or accepted industry standards.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, as a result of the PD and high winds at the site, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on October 11, 2018.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. This finding was determined to be Green, very low safety significance, because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributed to the likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event that also affected mitigation equipment.
Cross-cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because; while the licensee has conducted TB roof inspections, they were controlled informally and were not conducted or tracked by a procedure or preventive maintenance (PM) task/assignment.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Observation 71153 The licensee conducted a level of effort evaluation (LEE) and determined the cause of the failed underground splice was poor craftsmanship by a company transmission team in 2009. To detect degradation of cabling, including splices, tan delta testing is performed on a six-year frequency.
The splice that failed had been tan delta tested satisfactorily in 2009 and 2012. During testing in 2018, a few days before the fault occurred, two separate test sets were used, both producing erratic results. These results were attributed to issues with the testing equipment. The licensee deferred the tan delta testing based on recommendations from electrical subject matter experts given tan delta testing was not required as a part of the reserve station service transformer (RSST)replacement project. The inspectors determined that cable splice degradation was identified by the erratic results and further testing could have identified the degraded splice prior to returning the RSST to service. After the cable fault and RSST lockout, all plant safety systems responded as designed. This observation was associated with closure of Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On February 7, 2019, the inspector presented the Telephonic Exit Meeting for Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection (IP 71111.11B) to F. Mladen, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 17, 2019, the inspector presented the Quarterly Resident Inspector Exit Meeting to Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
0-OP-ZZ-021
Severe Weather Preparation
Rev. 21
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1088426
CR1111368
CR1111510
CR1093547
CR1111509
CR1053312
CR1118589
CR1114023
Drawings
11448-FE-11B
Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 1-II & 1-IV Unit 1
Rev. 44
11448-FE-1G
25V DC One Line Diagram Unit 1
Rev. 42
11448-FM-071B
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Circulating and
Service Water System Unit 1
Sheet 1 Rev.
63, Sheet 2
Rev. 39
11548-FE-11B
Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 2-II & 2-IV Unit 2
Rev. 36
11548-FE-1G
25V DC One Line Diagram Unit 2
Rev. 37
11548-FM-075D
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Compressed Air
System Surry Power Station Unit 2
Rev. 39
Procedures
0-OP-SW-002A
Emergency Service Water System Alignment
Rev. 10
1-OP-51.5A
Charging Pump CC and SW Systems Valve Alignment
Rev. 20
1-OP-RS-001A
Outside Recirc Spray System Alignment
Rev. 10
2-OP-FW-001A
Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment
Rev. 8
Work Orders
38103676030
38103774764
203871003
203875616
204179424
Procedures
Conduct of Fire Drills
Rev. 4
71111.05Q Corrective Action
Documents
CR1115033
CR1090227
71111.05Q Drawings
11448-FB-047B
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Fire Protection
System
Sheet 2 Rev.
25, Sheet 3
Rev. 27
71111.05Q Fire Plans
1-FS-FP-142
Emergency Switchgear Room
Rev. 1
71111.05Q Miscellaneous
N/A
Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose Stations in U2
Turbine Building, Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose
Stations in U1 Turbine Building
2/14/2019
71111.05Q Procedures
0-LPT-FP-022
Operability Test of Fuel Oil Pump Houses High Pressure
CO2 System
Rev. 12
71111.05Q Procedures
0-LSP-FP-102
Establishment of Hose House or Hose Station
Compensatory Measures
Rev. 1
71111.05Q Procedures
0-OPT-FP-008
Fire Pump Flow Rate Test
Rev. 24
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR1115416
Drawings
11448-ESK-11M
Elementary Diagram Circulating Water Flooding Trip
Rev. 11
Procedures
0-AP-13.00
Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding
Rev. 31
Procedures
0-AP-13.01
Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding
Rev. 10
Procedures
1-ECM-0102-01
Turbine Building Flood control Novus Micro 1000 UPS
Inverter and Battery Maintenance
Rev. 6
Procedures
1-EPM-0805-01
Turbine Building Flood Control Testing
Rev. 11
Work Orders
38103850377
Miscellaneous
1.
Licensed Operator Medical Records
Miscellaneous
2.
Qualification Revocation/Reinstatements (TR-AA-600 Att.
4) and Remedial Training Plans (TR-AA-400 Attachment 5)
for seven (7) Licensed Operators from 2018 examinations
3.
Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 17.1-17.7 Training
Attendance Records
4.
Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 18.1-18.7 Training
Attendance Records
Miscellaneous
5.
Shift B Licensed Personnel Quarterly Proficiency Time
Records (OP-AA-103 Att. 7)
Job Aid 030
Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on
05/31/18, 06/01/18, and 06/02/18
Rev. 2
Miscellaneous
Job Aid 030
Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on
11/11/16, 11/12/16, and 01/05/17
Rev. 0
Job Aid 033
Simulator Simultaneous Trip of All Main Steam Isolation
Valves (ANSI12), test performed on 09/23/18
Rev. 1
Job Aid 036
Simulator Main Turbine Trip From Maximum Power Level
(<10%) That Does Not Result in Immediate Reactor Trip
(ANSI15), test performed on 10/9/18.
Rev. 1
Job Aid 037
Simulator Maximum Rate Ramp (5%/min) From 100%
Down To 75% (ANSI16), test performed on 07/25/18.
Rev. 2
Job Aid 043
Simulator Real Time and Repeatability (ANSI20), tests
performed on 08/03/18
Rev. 1
JPM LO18-01
Locally Operate a 4160V AC Breaker
Rev. 16
JPM LO23-04
Respond to a Secondary System Transient
Rev. 25
JPM LO26-02
Locally Isolate the AFW Header
Rev. 13
JPM LO26-05C
Locally Swap AFW Pump Supply to Fire Water
Rev. 4
JPM LO26-12
Establish Alternate Feed Source to SGs Using FR-H.1
Rev. 7
JPM LO52-03B
Transfer SI System to Hot Leg Recirculation
Rev. 11
JPM LO81-04
Load AAC Diesel Onto Unit One J Bus
Rev. 23
JPM LO88-34
Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01
Rev. 4
JPM LO88-44
Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01
Rev. 4
JPM LO99-20C
Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees
Rev. 4
RQ-18.2-XB-5
Biennial Written Examination (RO and SRO)
Rev. 0
Scenario Based
Test (SBT) Records
Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-3, LBLOCA with
Multiple ECCS Failures, Test performed on 12/06/2018
Rev. 0
Scenario Based
Test (SBT) Records
Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-4, LOCA Outside
Containment From Charging Line, Test performed on
2/06/2018
Rev. 0
Scenario RQ-19.1-
LBLOCA with Multiple ECCS Failures
Rev. 0
Miscellaneous
Scenario RQ-19.1-
LOCA Outside Containment From Charging Line
Rev. 0
Scenario RQ-19.1-
Ruptured and Faulted Steam Generator
Rev. 0
Scenario RQ-19.1-
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
Rev. 0
Procedures
DTS-001
Test and Exam Security
Rev. 3
NISP-TR-01
Systematic Approach to Training Process
Rev. 1
Operator Qualifications
Rev. 7
Medical Evaluation
Rev. 7
Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) Process
Rev. 4
Conduct of Training
Rev. 13
NRC Exam Security Requirements
Rev. 8
Licensed Operator Biennial and Annual Operating
Requalification Exam Process
Rev. 11
Administrative Requirements for Application and
Maintenance of Operator Licenses
Rev. 2
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
Rev. 10
TR-AA-SIM-100
Simulator Modification Process
Rev. 9
TR-AA-SIM-101
Simulator Configuration Control Committee
Rev. 5
TR-AA-SIM-200
Simulator Hardware Management
Rev. 4
Procedures
TR-AA-SIM-300
Simulator Software Management
Rev. 4
TR-AA-SIM-400
Simulator Performance Testing
Rev. 8
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1046703
CR1064874
CR1116581
CR1116585
CR1104834
CR568763
Procedures
0-MCM-0101-01
Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul
Rev. 12
0-MCM-0101-01
Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul
Rev. 11
0-MCM-0210-01
Control Room Chillers Performance Checks
Rev. 30
Work Orders
38103749617
38103777224
38103808936
38103807372
203876621
203876579
204182357
203875791
38103807372
38103749612
203575885
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1111789
CR1112489
Drawings
11548-FM-088B
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and
Volume Control System
Rev. 49
Miscellaneous
N/A
EOOS Scheduler's Evaluation of Surry Power Station,
February 5-10, 2019
N/A
High Risk Plan Actions for Unit 2 Bearing Cooling Heat
Exchanger Replacement
3/4/2019
Procedures
2-PT-8.5
Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic (Hi-Hi Train)
Rev. 34
Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities
Rev. 2
Operational Risk Assessment
Rev. 20
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1115210
CR1116136
CR1112113
Drawings
11448-FB-006D
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Auxiliary
Ventilation System
Sheet 1 Rev.
14, Sheet 2
Rev. 18
Engineering
Evaluations
ETE-SU-2014-1017 Safety Re-Classification of Auxiliary Ventilation System
Components
Rev. 0
Procedures
2-MOP-CN-002
Returning Secondary Systems to Service
Rev. 20
2-OP-FW-004
Main Feedwater System Operation
Rev. 21
2-OP-FW-004A
Main Feedwater System Alignment
Rev. 13
Operational Configuration Control
Rev. 19
Procedures
Equipment Clearance
Rev. 31
Tagging Administration
Rev. 9
Work Orders
204194067
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1116581
CR1116585
CR1116455
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR1116455
Procedures
0-OPT-SW-001
Emergency Service Water Pump Operation
Rev. 48
Procedures
0-OPT-VS-002
Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test
Rev. 31
Procedures
1-OPT-RX-005
Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement Test
Rev. 37
1-OSP-IA-001
Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test
Rev. 21
2-LOG-TB-001R
U2 Turbine Building Operations Normal Default Tour
Rev. 173
2-OSP-IA-001
Instrument Air Compressor 2-IA-C-1 Performance Test
Rev. 16
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1116811
CR1117565
Procedures
0-OSP-AAC-001
Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DG-0M, Alternate AC Diesel
Generator
Rev. 45
1-OPT-FW-002
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B
Rev. 36
2-OPT-CS-002
Containment Spray System Test
Rev. 18
2-OPT-EG-001
Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise
Test
Rev. 77
Work Orders
204195718
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1119402
CR1119470
CR1118062
Procedures
0-AP-35.02
Response to Potential Toxic, Corrosive, Asphyxiant, or
Flammable Atmosphere
Rev. 3
1-E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Rev. 74
EPIP-1.03
Response to Alert
Rev. 23
EPIP-1.05
Response to General Emergency
Rev. 25
Procedures
EPIP-1.06
Protective Action Recommendations
Rev. 12
EPIP-2.01
Notification of State and Local Governments
Rev. 44
71151
Miscellaneous
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Rev. 7
Q4/2018
Performance
Indicators - Surry 1
and 2 - Unplanned
Power Changes per
7000 Critical Hours
dated
3/8/2019
Q4/2018
Performance
Indicators - Surry 1
and 2 - Unplanned
Scrams per 7000
Critical Hours
dated
3/8/2019
71151
Miscellaneous
Q4/2018
Performance
Indicators - Surry 1
and 2 - Unplanned
Scrams with
Complications
dated
3/8/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR1088022
CR1110299
CR1110296
CR1091318
CR1056169
CR1063590
CR1117624
CR1116277
CR1115665
CR1113049
CR1113030
CR1116277
CR1115665
Procedures
1-DRP-007
Motor Operated Valve Operating Bands
Rev. 46
Work Orders
203871020
203874647
204195738
Corrective Action
Documents
1110265
Miscellaneous
N/A
Vendor Inspection Report of Surry Turbine Building Roof
dated
6/21/2018