IR 05000280/2017009: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 May 17, 2017 Mr. Daniel Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard
[[Issue date::May 17, 2017]]


Mr. Daniel Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711


SUBJECT: ERRATA - SURRY POWER STATION - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009
SUBJECT: ERRATA - SURRY POWER STATION - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009


==Dear Mr. Stoddard:==
==Dear Mr. Stoddard:==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified two administrative errors on the cover letter for NRC Inspection Report 05000280/2017009 and 05000281/2017009, dated April 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17101A808). First, the addressee should have been "Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard". Second, there were extraneous words in the second paragraph. Specifically, the last sentence should have stated: "Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel." As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety to correct these errors.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified two administrative errors on the cover letter for NRC Inspection Report 05000280/2017009 an d 05000281/2017009, dated April 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17101A808). First, the addressee should have been "Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard". Second, there were extraneous words in the second paragraph. Specifically, the last sentence should have stated: "Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities,  
 
and interviews with station personnel." As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety to correct these errors.


This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."


Sincerely,/RA/ Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: NPF-32, NPF-37  
Sincerely,/RA/ Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281  
 
License Nos.: NPF-32, NPF-37  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
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Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ  
Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ  


ML17137A194 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17137A200 NRC IR 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009 ADAMS Accession No. ML17110A808 OFFICE RII:DRP SIGNATURE PMcKenna DATE 5/17/2017 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281 License No.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No.: 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: March 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII (Team Leader) G. MacDonald, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII C. Jones, Resident Inspector, Surry Approved by: Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects  
ML17137A194 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17137A200 NRC IR 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009 ADAMS Accession No. ML17110A808 OFFICE RII:DRP SIGNATURE PMcKenna DATE 5/17/2017 Enclosure  
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281 License No.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No.: 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: March 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII (Team Leader) G. MacDonald, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII C. Jones, Resident Inspector, Surry Approved by: Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects  


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
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Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.
Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.


The inspection covered a one-week inspection by two senior reactor analysts and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in  NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.
The inspection covered a one-week inspection by two senior reactor analysts and one resi dent inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in  NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.


===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
None   
None   


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=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
4. Other Activities  
 
4. Other Activities
 
{{a|4OA5}}
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==
==4OA5 Other Activities==
   (TI 2515/191) The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan, which was described in letters dated  January 25, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16033A353) and July 20, 2015, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15205A342) and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16158A432) and to verify that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and the NRC's safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event. The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262). The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections. 1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
   (TI 2515/191)
The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan, which was described in letters dated  January 25, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16033A353) and July 20, 2015, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15205A342) and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16158A432) and to verify that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and the NRC's safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.
 
The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
 
The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections.
 
1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
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Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
* integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
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* developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
* developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
* trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
* trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
* developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations. The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
* developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
 
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified. 2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
No findings were identified.
 
2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation. Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The team examined the licensee's newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation. Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
* installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
* trained their staff to ensure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
* trained their staff to ensure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
* developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation. The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
* developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
 
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensee's staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensee's multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite  
 
power scenario as described in the licens ee's staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensee's multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the  
 
attachment.
 
b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC'S March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the


b. Assessment  The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC'S March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
following:
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach. The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
 
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
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==4OA6 Exit==
==4OA6 Exit==


=====Exit Meeting Summary=====
===Exit Meeting Summary===
 
On March 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Simmons and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
On March 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Simmons and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.


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===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
None  
None  


===Discussed===
===Discussed===
None   
None   


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: Unit 1, Revision 9  
: Unit 1, Revision 9  
: 1301019-2-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
: 1301019-2-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
: 2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station - Unit 2, Revision 3 1301019-1-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
: 2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station
: 2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station - Unit 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-18HT, Wiring Diagram, BDB Receptacle Panel 01-BDB-DB-3, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-13A, Wiring Diagram, Lighting Distribution, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HR, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-1, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-11D, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IA & 1-IIIA, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11E, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IIA & 1-IVA, Surry Power Station - Unit 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HS, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-2, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11B, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-II & 1-IV, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11A, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-I & 1-III, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-1L, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 0 1301019-11448-FE-1M, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 0
- Unit 2, Revision 3 1301019-1-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
: 2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station
- Unit 1, Revision 3  
: 1301019-11448-FE-18HT, Wiring Diagram, BDB Receptacle Panel 01-BDB-DB-3, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-13A, Wiring Diagram, Lighting Distribution, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HR, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-1, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-11D, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IA & 1-IIIA, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11E, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IIA & 1-IVA, Surry Power Station - Unit 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HS, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-2, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11B, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-II & 1-IV, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11A, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-I & 1-III, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-1L, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 0 1301019-11448-FE-1M, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit
- 1, Revision 0  
: Modifications Design Change
: Modifications Design Change
: SU-13-00015, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2  
: SU-13-00015, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2  
: Design Change Update 15-0002, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2 Design Change
: Design Change Update 15-0002, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2 Design Change
: SU-13-01042, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installations, Revision 12 Design Change Update
: SU-13-01042, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installations, Revision 12 Design Change Update
: SU-13-01042-007, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installation  
: SU-13-01042-007, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installation
===Calculations===
===Calculations===
: Breaker Coordination Curve for 120/240V BDB panels (Pages from Calculation
: Breaker Coordination Curve for 120/240V BDB panels (Pages from Calculation
: EE-864) Power Cable Details for
: EE-864) Power Cable Details for
: DC-SU-13-01019, Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop, (Pages from Calculation
: DC-SU-13-01019, Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop, (Pages from Calculation
: EE-864 Rev. 3 Attachment 13.2)  
: EE-864 Rev. 3 Attachment 13.2)
===Condition Reports===
===Condition Reports===
: Reviewed
: Reviewed
Line 210: Line 255:
: 1062547, Unterminated Cable in U1 ECST Valve Vault
: 1062547, Unterminated Cable in U1 ECST Valve Vault
: 1062548, Review Cables in U2 ECST Valve Vault (Extent of Condition for CR1062547)
: 1062548, Review Cables in U2 ECST Valve Vault (Extent of Condition for CR1062547)
: 1062544, Drawing Error on Project Drawing 1301042-1-E-001  
: 1062544, Drawing Error on Project Drawing 1301042-1-E-001
===Work Orders===
===Work Orders===
: WO 38103535843, Loop Calibration on Support of DC
: WO 38103535843, Loop Calibration on Support of DC
Line 219: Line 264:
: WO 38103707242, Perform Level Loop Calibration
: WO 38103707242, Perform Level Loop Calibration
: WO 38103693824, 00-BDB-P-2C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 6, 2016
: WO 38103693824, 00-BDB-P-2C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 6, 2016
: WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
: March 22, 2016
: WO 38103693864, 00-BDB-P-3B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated  
: WO 38103693864, 00-BDB-P-3B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
: WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: March 22, 2016
: March 22, 2016
: WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
: WO 38103693904, 00-BDB-GEN-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
: WO 38103693904, 00-BDB-GEN-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
: WO 38103693912, 00-BDB-GEN-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
: WO 38103693912, 00-BDB-GEN-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
Line 231: Line 275:
: WO 38103694016, 00-BDB-P-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: WO 38103694016, 00-BDB-P-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: April 11, 2016
: April 11, 2016
: WO 38103694072, 00-BDB-P-1-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
: WO 38103694072, 00-BDB-P-1-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: WO 38103694080, 01-FP-P-4-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
: March 22, 2016
: March 22, 2016
: WO 38103694080, 01-FP-P-4-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
: WO 38103694128, 00-BDB-P-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 11, 2016
: WO 38103694128, 00-BDB-P-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 11, 2016
: WO 38103694184, FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103694184, FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103694192, 00-BDB-LF-1A-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103694192, 00-BDB-LF-1A-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103694200, 00-BDB-LF-1B-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103694200, 00-BDB-LF-1B-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
: WO 38103732208, 365 Day Freq. PT: Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite Communications, dated February 3, 2017
: WO 38103732208, 365 Day Freq. PT: Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite Communications, dated February 3, 2017  
: Other Safety Evaluation Report - Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
: Other Safety Evaluation Report - Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related  
 
to Orders
: EA-12-049 and
: EA-12-049 and
: EA-12-051 CAC nos. MF1002, MF1003, MF1004, and MF1005 dated August 4, 2016ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7
: EA-12-051 CAC nos. MF1002, MF1003, MF1004, and MF1005 dated August 4, 2016ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7, Attachment 1.
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7, Attachment 1.
: ETE-CPR-2014-1010, Surry Power Station BDB Flex Validation for Time Sensitive Actions, Revision 1
: ETE-CPR-2014-1010, Surry Power Station BDB Flex Validation for Time Sensitive Actions, Revision 1
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, SPS Flex Strategy Basis Document 10.7.3 Development Strategy BDB Fuel, Revision 7
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, SPS Flex St rategy Basis Document 10.7.3 Development Strategy BDB Fuel, Revision 7
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, Section 7.2.11, Strategies for Repowering Remote Monitoring Panel if Flooding of the ESGR Occurs, Revision 7   
: ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, Section 7.2.11, Strategies for Repowering Remote Monitoring Panel if Flooding of the ESGR Occurs, Revision 7   
: AREVA 51-9199717-015, National SAFER Response Center Equipment Technical Requirements, Revision 15 Letter of Agreement, Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Emergency Management, dated August 15, 2016
: AREVA 51-9199717-015, National SAFER Response Center Equipment Technical Requirements, Revision 15 Letter of Agreement, Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Emergency Management, dated August 15, 2016
Line 257: Line 303:
: BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel Gen. 1A Preventive Work Order 38103693960 performed June 14, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2B-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693912 performed June 15, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2A-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693904 performed June 15, 2016 Simulator Scenario developed for ELAP demonstration dated March 17, 2017  
: BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel Gen. 1A Preventive Work Order 38103693960 performed June 14, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2B-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693912 performed June 15, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2A-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693904 performed June 15, 2016 Simulator Scenario developed for ELAP demonstration dated March 17, 2017  
: Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2
: Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2
: BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test, completed October 13, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2
: BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test,  
: DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test, completed October 28, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1
 
completed October 13, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2
: DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test,  
 
completed October 28, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1
: BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1
: BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1
: DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015
: DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015
}}
}}

Revision as of 19:25, 29 June 2018

Errata - Surry Power Station - NRC Team Inspection Report 05000280/2017009 and 05000281/2017009
ML17137A194
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/17/2017
From: McKenna P J
Reactor Projects Branch 7
To: Stoddard D G
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2017009
Download: ML17137A194 (13)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 May 17, 2017 Mr. Daniel Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: ERRATA - SURRY POWER STATION - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified two administrative errors on the cover letter for NRC Inspection Report 05000280/2017009 an d 05000281/2017009, dated April 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17101A808). First, the addressee should have been "Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard". Second, there were extraneous words in the second paragraph. Specifically, the last sentence should have stated: "Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities,

and interviews with station personnel." As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety to correct these errors.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA/ Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281

License Nos.: NPF-32, NPF-37

Enclosure:

IR 05000280/2017009 and 05000281/2017009

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ

ML17137A194 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17137A200 NRC IR 05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009 ADAMS Accession No. ML17110A808 OFFICE RII:DRP SIGNATURE PMcKenna DATE 5/17/2017 Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281 License No.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No.: 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: March 13 - 16, 2017 Inspectors: S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII (Team Leader) G. MacDonald, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII C. Jones, Resident Inspector, Surry Approved by: Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009; 03/13/2017 - 03/16/2017; Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation

Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.

The inspection covered a one-week inspection by two senior reactor analysts and one resi dent inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

4. Other Activities

4OA5 Other Activities

(TI 2515/191)

The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan, which was described in letters dated January 25, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16033A353) and July 20, 2015, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15205A342) and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16158A432) and to verify that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and the NRC's safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.

The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).

The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections.

1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensee's established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted.

Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
  • integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
  • protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
  • developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
  • trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
  • developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensee's newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation. Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
  • installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
  • trained their staff to ensure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
  • developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information

a. Inspection Scope

Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite

power scenario as described in the licens ee's staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensee's multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the

attachment.

b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC'S March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the

following:

  • Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
  • EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
  • Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On March 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Simmons and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

F. Mladen, Site Vice President
R. Simmons, Plant Manager
R. Johnson, Operations Manager
T. Shell, Assistant Operations Manager
H. Johnson, Superintendent of Shift Operations
J. Rosenberger, Site Engineering Director
J. Henderson, Manager of Design Engineering
J. Holloway, Engineering Supervisor
E. Turko, Engineering Supervisor
D. Lawrence, Director of Nuclear Safety and Licensing
L. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Training
B. Garber, Licensing Manager
L. Helstosky, Licensing Engineer
D. Aitken, Licensing Engineer
A. Elms, FLEX Program Manager
K. Rowland, General Project Manager

NRC personnel

E. Andrews, Acting Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

0-AP-10.15, Loss of the 428 / 469 Line (with 11 Attachments), Revision 29 0-OP-ZZ-021, Severe Weather Preparation, Revision 17
0-AP-37.01, Abnormal Environmental Conditions, Revision 69
0-ICP-FC-L-105-1, Spent Fuel Pool Level (1-FC-L-105-1) Calibration, Revision 4 0-ICP-FC-L-105-2, Spent Fuel Pool Level (1-FC-L-105-2) Calibration, Revision 5 0-NSP-ZZ-002, Inspection of FLEX Equipment, Revision 7
0-NSP-ZZ-003, Inventory of BDB FLEX Equipment, Revision 3
0-NSP-ZZ-004, Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite Communications, Revision 1
0-MPM-1960-01, Semi-Annual or Annual Test of BDB Flex Equipment, Revision 6
0-MPM-1960-02, Annual Testing of BDB Support Equipment, Revision 1 0-MPM-1960-02, Annual Testing of BDB Support Equipment, Revision 2 0-FSG-5, Initial Assessment and Flex Equipment Staging, Revision 3
0-FSG-11, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, Revision 2
1-AP-10.27, Loss of All AC Power While on RHR, Revision 2
1-AP-27.00, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability, Revision 27 1-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 41 1-FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, Revision 1
1-FSG-2, Alternate AFW Suction Source, Revision 1
1-FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 1
1-FSG-4, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed/Management, Revision 1 1-FSG-6, Alternate ECST Makeup, Revision 1 1-FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 0
1-FSG-8, Alternate RCS Boration, Revision 1
1-FSG-9, Low Decay Heat Temperature Control, Revision 0
1-FSG-10, SI Accumulator Isolation, Revision 0
1-FSG-12, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 0 1-FSG-13, Transition From FLEX Equipment, Revision 0 1-FSG-14, Shutdown RCS Makeup, Revision 1
1-FSG-15, 4160 VAC Generator Connection and Operation, Revision 0
2-AP-10.27, Loss of All AC Power While on RHR, Revision 0
2-AP-27.00, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability, Revision 27 2-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 40 2-FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, Revision 1
2-FSG-2, Alternate AFW Suction Source, Revision 1
2-FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 1
2-FSG-4, ELAP DC Load Shed/Management, Revision 0
2-FSG-6, Alternate ECST Makeup, Revision 1 2-FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation and Control Power, Revision 0 2-FSG-8, Alternate RCS Boration, Revision 1
2-FSG-9, Low Decay Heat Temperature Control, Revision 2
2-FSG-10, SI Accumulator Isolation, Revision 1
2-FSG-12, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 0 2-FSG-13, Transition From FLEX Equipment, Revision 0 2-FSG-14, Shutdown RCS Makeup, Revision 1
2-FSG-15, 4160 VAC Generator Connection and Operation, Revision 0
CM-AA-400, 10
CFR 50.59 and 10
CFR 72.48 - Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Revision 7
CM-AA-BDB-10, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Program, Revision 3
CM-AA-BDB-101, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Program Maintenance, Revision 5
CM-AA-BDB-102, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Equipment Unavailability Tracking, Revision 8
DNES-AA-GN-1003, Design Effects and Considerations, Revision 18EPIP-4.03, Dose Assessment Team Controlling Procedure, Revision 18 Drawings 1301042-1-E-001, Master Diagram, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, Surry Power Station -
Unit 1, Revision 1
11448-LP-1S14, Lighting Panelboard Schedule 01-EP-LP-1S14, Surry Power Station -
Unit 1, Revision 9
1301019-2-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station

- Unit 2, Revision 3 1301019-1-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure

2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station

- Unit 1, Revision 3

1301019-11448-FE-18HT, Wiring Diagram, BDB Receptacle Panel 01-BDB-DB-3, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-13A, Wiring Diagram, Lighting Distribution, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HR, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-1, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 3 1301019-11448-FE-11D, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IA & 1-IIIA, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11E, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IIA & 1-IVA, Surry Power Station - Unit 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-18HS, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-2, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11B, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-II & 1-IV, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-11A, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-I & 1-III, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 2 1301019-11448-FE-1L, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 0 1301019-11448-FE-1M, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit

- 1, Revision 0

Modifications Design Change
SU-13-00015, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2
Design Change Update 15-0002, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2 Design Change
SU-13-01042, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installations, Revision 12 Design Change Update
SU-13-01042-007, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument Installation

Calculations

Breaker Coordination Curve for 120/240V BDB panels (Pages from Calculation
EE-864) Power Cable Details for
DC-SU-13-01019, Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop, (Pages from Calculation
EE-864 Rev. 3 Attachment 13.2)

Condition Reports

Reviewed
1019843
1055894
1054005
1041144
1042352
1029092
1015131

Condition Reports

Generated as part of the Inspection
1062547, Unterminated Cable in U1 ECST Valve Vault
1062548, Review Cables in U2 ECST Valve Vault (Extent of Condition for CR1062547)
1062544, Drawing Error on Project Drawing 1301042-1-E-001

Work Orders

WO 38103535843, Loop Calibration on Support of DC
SU-13-01042
WO 38103535844, Loop Calibration on Support of DC
SU-13-01042
WO 38103707237, Perform Level Loop Calibration
WO 38103707242, Perform Level Loop Calibration
WO 38103693824, 00-BDB-P-2C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 6, 2016
WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
WO 38103693864, 00-BDB-P-3B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
WO 38103693904, 00-BDB-GEN-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
WO 38103693912, 00-BDB-GEN-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
WO 38103693960, 00-BDB-GEN-1A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
WO 38103693976, 00-BDB-GEN-1C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
WO 38103693968, 00-BDB-GEN-1B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 4, 2016
WO 38103694016, 00-BDB-P-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 11, 2016
WO 38103694072, 00-BDB-P-1-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103694080, 01-FP-P-4-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated March 22, 2016
WO 38103694128, 00-BDB-P-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated April 11, 2016
WO 38103694184, FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
WO 38103694192, 00-BDB-LF-1A-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
WO 38103694200, 00-BDB-LF-1B-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
WO 38103732208, 365 Day Freq. PT: Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite Communications, dated February 3, 2017
Other Safety Evaluation Report - Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related

to Orders

EA-12-049 and
EA-12-051 CAC nos. MF1002, MF1003, MF1004, and MF1005 dated August 4, 2016ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7, Attachment 1.
ETE-CPR-2014-1010, Surry Power Station BDB Flex Validation for Time Sensitive Actions, Revision 1
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, SPS Flex St rategy Basis Document 10.7.3 Development Strategy BDB Fuel, Revision 7
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, Section 7.2.11, Strategies for Repowering Remote Monitoring Panel if Flooding of the ESGR Occurs, Revision 7
AREVA 51-9199717-015, National SAFER Response Center Equipment Technical Requirements, Revision 15 Letter of Agreement, Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Emergency Management, dated August 15, 2016
NE-GL-0035S,
PC-MIDAS Guideline, Rev. 9
NEI 12-01, Phase 2 Extended Loss of Alternating Current Power (ELAP) Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing Analysis Report, Revision 1
NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Rev B1
SU-15-01084, BDB Flood Barriers, Revision 2
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1C-Unit 120-240DG,
BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel Gen. 1C Preventive Work Order 38103693976 performed June 14, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1B-Unit 120-240DG,
BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel Gen. 1B Preventive Work Order 38103693968 performed June 14, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1A-Unit 120-240DG,
BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel Gen. 1A Preventive Work Order 38103693960 performed June 14, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2B-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693912 performed June 15, 2016 Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2A-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693904 performed June 15, 2016 Simulator Scenario developed for ELAP demonstration dated March 17, 2017
Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2
BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test,

completed October 13, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2

DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test,

completed October 28, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1

BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015 Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1
DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test, completed May 16, 2015
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