IR 05000334/2006004

IR 05000334-06-004, IR 05000412-06-004, on 07/01/06 - 09/30/06, Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Temporary Modification, Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

ML063130485
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/09/2006
From:	Ronald Bellamy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB7
To:	Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Bellamy R Rgn-I/DRP/Br7/610-337-5200
References
IR-06-004
Download: ML063130485 (51)

Text

November 9, 2006

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2006004 AND 05000412/20006004

Dear Mr. Lash:

On September 30, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 30, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one (1) NRC-identified finding and two (2) self-revealing findings of very low safety significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issues have been entered in the corrective action program, the NRC is treating the findings as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any of the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000334/2006003; 05000412/2006003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I==

Docket Nos.

50-334, 50-412 License Nos.

DPR-66, NPF-73 Report Nos.

05000334/2006004 and 05000412/2006004 Licensee:

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates:

July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006 Inspectors:

P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector D. Werkheiser, Resident Inspector R. Bhatia, Reactor Inspector A. Defrancisco, Reactor Inspector T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer G. Johnson, Operations Engineer S. Lewis, Reactor Inspector M. Marshfield, Resident Inspector A. Patel, Reactor Inspector Approved by:

R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure ii TABLE of

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000334/2006004, IR 05000412/2006004; 7/1/06-9/30/06; Beaver Valley Power Station,

Units 1 & 2; Temporary Modification; Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional reactor inspectors, and a regional health physics inspector. Three (GREEN) non-cited violations (NCV)were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,

Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3 dated July 2000.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program, was identified for failure to follow plant fire protection procedures related to hot work and ignition control. On August 18, 2006, failure to assess all fire hazards and remove or protect combustible items in the vicinity of hot work resulted in welding activities in the PCA Shop igniting transient combustible material, subsequently igniting plastic sheeting and causing a small class A fire in the adjacent West Cable Vault. The licensee immediately extinguished the fire and stopped all hot work. The event was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR-06-04924). A root cause evaluation was initiated by the licensee.

The finding is more than minor because it had a direct impact on the Initiating Events cornerstone objective and could be viewed as a precursor to a more significant event if left uncorrected. Specifically, the licensees performance deficiency was directly responsible for a Class A fire in the Unit 1 safety-related West Cable Vault of the Safeguards Building. The finding is of very low safety significance because all other normally required fire prevention measures were in place, allowing the fire to be quickly detected and suppressed. No safety-related equipment was affected. The inspectors determined that a contributor of this finding was related to the work practice component of the cross-cutting area of human performance. (Section 4OA3.3)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,

Design Control, was identified for failure to provide for verifying the adequacy of design associated with a temporary design modification installed on the Unit 2 chilled water system. In particular, adequate justification and bases for assumptions, positions, and conclusions were not adequately provided where necessary, were not identified during reviews, and ultimately challenged the functional capabilities of the system upon implementation. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program, iv performed an apparent cause assessment, will use this modification in engineering training as a case study, will revise design interface review checklist questions to prevent similar issues in the future, and has repaired the system and removed the temporary modification.

This finding was considered more than minor since the modification resulted in degrading temperature trends that if left uncorrected, could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, components necessary to achieve safe shutdown were exposed to higher temperatures for normal operation than credited in the design qualification records. In addition, increasing temperatures in containment under less than favorable external conditions (high ambient temperatures) could have led to exceeding the technical specification limit to support containment operability, and resulted in a plant shutdown. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no loss of system safety function and was not impacted by external events. (Section 1R23)

Green.

A self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50,Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

Corrective Action, was identified on July 17, 2006, when the Unit 1 3B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump [1FW-P-3B] inboard motor bearing oil was sampled and determined to contain babbit (CR-06-04345). The finding was determined to be inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of a prior sleeve-type journal bearing failure, caused by improper positioning of bearing housing set screws, and resulted in recurrent bearing failures of the 3B MDAFW pump motor. Specifically, corrective actions for a prior failure of a similar bearing did not adequately resolve the proper positioning of the bearing housing set screws, thereby preventing proper bearing alignment within the bearing housing. The licensee has performed a root cause evaluation, has determined proper positioning of the bearing housing set screws, and has performed an extent of condition review for other pump motors with sleeve-type journal bearings.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding is related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross cutting area in that the bearing set screw position was not thoroughly evaluated and resolved.

(Section 4OA3.1)

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100% power and essentially remained at full power until August 17, 2006, when the Unit power was adjusted to 97% based on rescaled instrumentation prior to implementation of the first of three phases (3%) of an approximately 8% power uprate. The Unit remained at 97% until an August 24th shutdown to perform a main turbine shaft balance adjustment, and a foreign object search in the C steam generator due to indications on their loose parts monitoring system. The Unit returned to the new, full power level of 100% on August 29th, and remained at full power until a reactor trip occurred on September 7th, due to a failed solid state protection card. Following repairs, the unit returned to full power on September 9th, and remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100% power and essentially remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period. However, due to cooling tower performance associated with warm, humid, environmental conditions, the unit manually down-powered approximately 3-5% several times throughout the inspection period to maintain secondary plant parameters within specification.

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one sample of system readiness for cold weather conditions associated with the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) backup water source, demineralized water storage tank TK-23. The inspection verified that the indicated equipment, its instrumentation, and supporting structures were configured in accordance with FENOCs procedures and that adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the system. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and walked down the system. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial equipment alignment inspections, during conditions of increased safety significance, such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also completed after equipment was returned to service following significant maintenance activities. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems, including associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:

• Unit 1 B Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) system during inboard motor bearing replacement on the A MDAFW system on July 19, 2006;

• Unit 2 C Centrifugal Charging Pump on August 9, 2006; and

• Unit 2 C Service Water System on August 10, 2006.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and operational condition of the Unit 2 A Charging System on September 26, 2006. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the system to verify that critical components, such as valves, control switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned in accordance with applicable procedures, and that any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability were appropriately identified and being addressed.

The inspectors also conducted a review of outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that the deficiencies did not significantly affect the charging system safety function. In addition, the inspectors discussed the status of the system health with the system engineer, and reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the fire protection conditions of the fire areas listed below, to verify compliance with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900, Fire Protection. This review included FENOCs control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 & 2, Intake Structure (Fire Area IS-3, IS-4)

• Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater and Quench Spray Pump Room (Fire Area QP-1)

• Unit 1 Primary Auxiliary Building Elevation 735 (Fire Area PA-1E)

• Unit 2 Alternate Shutdown Panel Room (Fire Area ASP)

• Unit 2 Instrument and Relay Room (Fire Area CB-1)

• Unit 2 Fan Room (Fire Area CB-5)

• Unit 2 West Communication Room (Fire Area CB-6)

• Unit 2 Auxiliary Boiler Area (Fire Area SOB-1)

• Unit 2 SOB Railway Bay (Fire Area SOB-2)

• Unit 2 SOSB (Fire Area SOB-3)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Fire Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed personnel performance during an actual fire brigade response on August 18, 2006, due to a fire in the Unit 1 West Cable Vault. (See Section 4OA3).

The inspector verified whether the fire brigade members used appropriate protective clothing (turnout gear) with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus, and that the fire area was entered in a controlled manner. The inspectors verified whether appropriate fire fighting equipment was brought to the fire scene to effectively control and extinguish a fire. The inspector observed the fire fighting directions, which were partly based on pre-fire plans for the identified fire area, and the command and control provided by the brigade leader. Communications between fire brigade members and the control room were also observed. The inspector observed dress-out activities in the brigade room and at the scene. In addition, the inspector observed the stationing of a reflash watch after the fire was extinguished.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

.1 Internal Flooding Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two samples of flood protection measures for equipment in the areas listed below. This review was conducted to evaluate FENOCs protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, related internal flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 B Charging Pump (1B-CH-P) Cubicle

• Unit 2 Instrumentation and Relay Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the conduct of Unit 1 licensed-operator requalification training, during an annual evaluation conducted in the plant-reference simulator on August 17, 2006. Additionally, on September 15, 2006, the inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed-operator training on the plant-reference simulator, which was conducted as just-in-time training in preparation for risk-significant evolutions that would be performed during an upcoming outage. The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding command and control, implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures, communications, technical specification review and compliance, and emergency plan implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee training personnel to verify that deficiencies in operator performance were identified, and that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the licensees corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator appropriately modeled the applicable in-plant control room. The inspectors verified that the training evaluators adequately addressed that the applicable training objectives had been achieved.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Regional Inspector Biennial Review of Requalification Training

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program, NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP), and 10 CFR 55.46 Simulator Rule (sampling basis) as acceptance criteria.

The inspectors reviewed documentation of plant operating history since the last requalification program inspection, including facility operating events. This review also included NRC inspection reports, plant performance insights, licensee event reports (LERs), and licensee condition reports (CRs) that involved human performance issues for licensed operators, to ensure that operational events were not indicative of possible training deficiencies (see Attachment).

The inspectors reviewed four exam sets (i.e., weeks 1, 2, 3 and 4) for both the comprehensive Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) written exams, as well as scenarios and job performance measures (JPMs) administered during this current exam cycle to ensure the quality of the exams met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10CFR 55.59.

During the onsite week of the inspection, the inspectors observed the administration of operating examinations to operating Shift #5. The operating examinations consisted of two simulator scenarios and one set of five JPMs administered to each individual. The inspectors observed training department staff administer two scenarios to a crew of four individuals, four simulator JPMs, and four in-plant JPMs. The inspectors also observed facility training staff administer the comprehensive written exam.

Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46 The inspectors observed simulator performance during the conduct of the examinations and reviewed discrepancy reports to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors also reviewed:

• a list of open and closed Simulator Deficiency Reports (DR). Seven DRs were selected for a detailed review to determine if deficiencies are being adequately prioritized and are being corrected in a timely manner.

• controlling documents to review simulator capability, configuration control, and testing, to ensure compliance with guidance in ANSI/ANS 3.5 1985.

• completed simulator test schedules for 2004-2006. All annual transient tests and seven malfunction simulator tests performed in 2006 were reviewed. This review was performed to verify that the tests were being performed at the appropriate frequency and that the tests compared the simulator data to actual plant data or best estimate data, as appropriate.

Conformance with operator license conditions The inspectors verified conformance with operator license conditions by reviewing the following records:

• Remediation training records for two individuals were reviewed during the past two-year training cycle.

• Proficiency watch-standing and reactivation records. Specifically, a sample of licensed-operator reactivation records were reviewed, as well as a random sample of watch-standing documentation (i.e., all staff license individuals) for time on-shift to verify currency and conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.

Licensees Feedback System The inspectors interviewed instructors, training/operations management personnel, and operators, to obtain feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed-operator requalification program. The interviews were conducted to ensure the requalification program was meeting the needs of those personnel that were interviewed, and that the program was responsive to their noted deficiencies/recommended changes. The inspectors also reviewed 25 individual feedback forms.

Licensees Requalification Exam On September 05, 2006, the inspectors conducted an in-office review of licensee requalification exam results for Beaver Valley Unit 1, which included the annual operating tests administered in 2006. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors verified that:

• Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator was less than 20%.

(Failure rate was 0%.)

• Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 0%.)

• Individual failure rate on the walkthrough test (JPMs) was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 0%.)

• Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written exam was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 5.6 %)

• More than 75% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.4% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam).

• Note: One RO had been removed from licensed duties due to an extended illness and did not take the Requalification Exam. He will be administered the Requalification Exam as part of his Re-Activation process. The results of this exam will have minimal effect on overall results.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listed below. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping, characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk characterization of SSCs, SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 and the licensees program for MR implementation. For the selected SSCs, the inspectors evaluated whether performance was properly dispositioned for MR category (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents were also reviewed, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• CR 06-4457, Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Hand Control Valve Hydraulic Pump Cycling

• CR 06-04725, Work Management Process Allows Unavailability Time Goal To Be Exceeded

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Regional Inspector Biennial Periodic Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the periodic evaluation of MR activities as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) for Beaver Valley Unit 1 and Unit 2. The evaluation covered a period from July 2003 to February 2005. The purpose of this review was to ensure that FENOC effectively assessed Beaver Valleys MR (a)(1) goals and corrective actions, (a)(2) performance criteria, system monitoring, and preventive maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that the evaluation was completed within the required time period and that industry operating experience was utilized, where applicable.

Additionally, the inspectors verified that FENOC appropriately balanced equipment reliability and availability and made adjustments when appropriate.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of six risk-significant systems that were either in (a)(1) status, had been in (a)(1) status at some time during the assessment period, or experienced degraded performance. This review verified that:

(1) the structures, systems, and components were properly characterized;

(2) goals and performance criteria were appropriate;

(3) corrective action plans were adequate; and (4)performance was being effectively monitored in accordance with station procedure 1/2-ADM-2114, Maintenance Rule Program. The following systems were selected for this detailed review:

• Reactor Control and Protection (System 1 - Unit 1)

• 4 KV Station Service (System 36B - Unit 1)

• Main Steam (System 21 - Unit 2)

• Compressed Air (System 34 - Unit 1)

• Emergency Diesel Generator (System 36A - Unit 2)

• Auxiliary Feedwater (System 24B - Unit 2)

Additionally, the inspectors interviewed station personnel, and reviewed corrective action documents for malfunctions and failures of these systems to determine if:

(1) system failures had been correctly categorized as functional failures; and

(2) system performance was adequately monitored to determine if classifying a system as (a)(1)was appropriate. The documents that were reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of five activities, and evaluated the effect on overall plant risk. This review also determined the adequacy of risk reviews for planned and emergent work, as well as the implementation of risk management actions, as applicable. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with applicable requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:

• Planned maintenance activities for July 10, 2006.

• Emergent maintenance activities on July 17, 2006, associated with the repairs and other activities following the failure of the inboard motor bearing of the Unit 1 B Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump. This review also included the second bearing failure that occurred during a retest on July 18, 2006, which required an expansion of work scope, deferment of prior-planned maintenance activities and a revision to the risk assessment.

• Planned yellow risk assessment on July 27, 2006, associated primarily with maintenance activities on the A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

• Planned yellow risk assessment on August 4, 2006, associated primarily with maintenance activities on the boric acid to blender flow control valve 2CHS-FCV-113A.

• Planned green risk assessment on September 8, 2006, associated with planned work on switchyard 4KV relays and monthly emergency diesel generator testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of selected operability determinations (OD), Basis for Continued Operations (BCO), or operability assessments, to verify that determinations of operability were justified, as appropriate. In addition, the inspectors verified that TS limiting conditions for operation (LCO) requirements and UFSAR design basis requirements were properly addressed. Documents reviewed are listed in the

. The following six activities were reviewed:

• The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment regarding deficiencies noted during licensee inspection of manhole 1EMH-20A as documented in CR-06-04144. Specifically, standing water was identified in this manhole that services cables for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Intake Structure. The inspectors verified that questions of seismic/structural integrity were addressed since it was identified that cable supports were rusted. The inspectors noted that the standing water was pumped out, and that the licensee inspected the general condition of the manhole, including cable penetration seals. The inspectors also verified the acceptability of the licensees conclusion that the cables and supporting structure were determined to be unaffected.

• The inspectors reviewed the failure mode analysis associated with CR 06-04138, which addressed the possible assembly error reported by a vendor affecting four

(4) Nuclear Instrumentation Bistable Relay Driver PC Cards. The error resulted in the possible installation of capacitors of an incorrect value onto the PC cards.

The capacitors purpose is for noise rejection. The failure mode analysis concluded that the capacitors would not affect normal circuit operation. The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment and verified that appropriate technical issues were addressed.

Subsequent inspection of the suspect PC cards revealed the correct capacitors were originally installed.

• The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment during the restoration of the Unit 1 B Charging pump (1CH-P-1B)after maintenance activities. In particular, a floor plug in the overhead of the pump cubicle had been removed to allow access during the maintenance activities and had been reinstalled, and was being sealed when the pump was declared operable. This issue was identified by the licensee and documented in CR-06-04515. The inspector verified the acceptability of the licensees conclusion that the pump was capable of fulfilling its safety function. The inspector also reviewed an extent of condition review that was conducted and conclude that no other systems were affected. The inspector noted that an apparent cause evaluation was conducted.

• The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOCs operability assessment that involved incorrect valve capacities associated with the Unit 1 atmospheric steam dump valves and the residual heat removal valve. These capacities were utilized in the Westinghouse Extended Power Uprate calculation, and captured in CR-06-04837. The inspectors verified the acceptability of the licensees conclusion that the results of the revised analysis bounded any changes in the analyses of record from a dose consequence resulting from a steam generator tube rupture event.

• The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment and verified that appropriate technical issues addressed a discolored oil sample of the Unit 1 A Quench Spray Pump motor, identified under work order (WO) 200166779, (CR-06-04955). The inspectors verified licensee actions, which included:

(1) external analysis of the oil sample at Beta Labs, which showed increased levels of Tin with satisfactory chemical and lubricating properties;

(2) the oil was changed under WO 20016678, with provisions to flush, if necessary;

(3) the pump was run for a surveillance test in accordance with 1OST-13.1, satisfactorily; and

(4) a second oil sample was obtained and showed satisfactory results. The bearing was subsequently replaced during planned outage 1POAC2 (section 1R20) under WO 200222360.

• The inspectors reviewed conditions related to elevated noise levels from the Unit 2 A charging pump, 2CHS-P21A (CR-06-6867). The inspectors verified the licensee addressed technical specifications as they made preparations to substitute the C charging pump for the A pump. The inspectors observed other actions, which included:

(1) vibrations levels were obtained that identified BOP limits exceeded for the gear box; and

(2) the pump was shutdown and declared inoperable. The inspectors assessed the adequacy and acceptability of FENOC's operability assessment and verified that appropriate technical issues were addressed. It was subsequently discovered that the high-speed gear in the speed increaser had chipped gear teeth. The licensee investigation continues.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the design basis impact of the modifications listed below.

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening, verified that attributes and parameters within the design documentation was consistent with required licensing and design bases, as well as credited codes and standards, and walked down the systems to verify that changes described in the package were appropriately implemented. The inspectors also verified the post-modification testing was satisfactorily accomplished to ensure the system and components operated consistent with their intended safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Unit 1 ECP 05-0280, Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Recirculation modification (Credited for NRC Extended Power Uprate Inspections)

• Unit 2 ECP 02-0734, Plant Computer Replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following seven maintenance activities and associated PMTs were evaluated:

• On July 1st, Unit 2 RCS letdown filter (CHS-FLT-22) change-out (Work Order (WO) 200127687) following planned maintenance activity.

• 2OST-24.2,Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [2FWE*P23A] Rev.

33, performed on July 05th, following corrective maintenance on the 2FWE-P23A breaker performed under WO 200215994.

• 1OST-36.7, Offsite to Onsite Power Distribution System Alignment Verification, Rev. 11, performed on July 6th, following maintenance (relay replacement and calibration) on the Unit 1 A 4kV tap changer.

• 1OST-24.3,Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [1FW-P-3B], Rev. 34, performed on July 19th, following corrective maintenance on the Unit 1 B MDAFW pump motor. The inboard motor bearing was replaced under WO 01-009600-001.

• 2OST-47.3G,Containment Penetration and ASME Section XI Valve Test-Work Week 2, Rev. 5, performed on July 24th, following corrective maintenance on the Unit 2 B feed control valve, 2FWE-HCV100B. The actuator zero and span were re-calibrated under WO 200189579.

• 1OST-7.5,Operating Surveillance Test-Centrifugal Charging Pump Test [1CH-P-1B], Rev. 35, performed on July 25th, following an extended maintenance outage on the Unit 1 B charging pump.

• 2MSP-24.26-I, 2FWS-F476, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Channel IV Calibration, Issue 4, Rev. 12, performed on August 17, following replacement of feedwater transmitter 2FWS-F476.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

.1 Unit 1 Outage (1POAC2)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed selected Unit 1 outage activities from August 24 - August 29, 2006, to determine whether shutdown safety functions (e.g. reactor decay heat removal and containment integrity) were properly maintained as required by TS and plant procedures. The inspectors evaluated specific performance attributes including operator performance, communications, and instrumentation accuracy. The inspectors reviewed procedures and/or observed selected activities associated with this forced, Unit 1 mini-outage. The inspectors verified activities were performed in accordance with procedures and verified required acceptance criteria were met. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality identified during performance of selected outage activities were identified and placed into the corrective action program, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also evaluated the following activities:

• Shutdown Risk Evaluation

• Plant Shutdown and Cooldown

• Containment Entry Preparation

• Mockup Training for Removal of the C S/G Secondary handhold

• Preparation and Removal of the C S/G Secondary handhold

• Foreign Object Search and Recovery Efforts on C S/G

• Secondary Plant Recovery, including deliberate turbine roll evolutions

• Reactor Startup

• Plant Startup and Heatup, including heatup rate monitoring and data review

• Restart readiness management review activities

• Mode Hold Resolution meetings

• Containment Closeout inspections

• Main Generator Synchronization

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 1 Forced Outage (1FOAC10)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee performance during a forced outage following a Unit 1 reactor trip on September 7th, 2006, due to a failed Solid State Protection System (SSPS) card (section 4OA3.4). The inspectors reviewed compliance to TS requirements and approved procedures, conduct of outage risk evaluations, configuration control, and maintenance of key safety functions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. During this forced outage, the inspectors monitored FENOCs control of the outage activities listed below:

• Shutdown risk evaluation;

• Startup scheduling;

• Reactor Startup and Criticality;

• Plant Startup;

• Power Ascension; and

• Restart readiness management review activities, including Plant Operations Review Committee meetings that addressed cause analysis of failure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Pre-Job test briefings, observed selected test evolutions, and reviewed the following completed Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were being tested as required by TS, the UFSAR, and procedural requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following seven activities were reviewed:

• 1MSP-21-20-1, P-1MS475, Loop 1 Steamline Pressure Protection Channel 3 Calibration, performed on July 6th.

• 1OST-24.3, Rev. 34, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test [1FW-P-3B],

performed on July 19th.

• 1OST-7.5, Rev. 35, Operating Surveillance Test - Centrifugal Charging Pump

[1CH-P-1B] Test, (IST) performed on July 26th.

• 2OST-30.3, Rev 31, Service Water Pump [2SWS*P21B] Test, (IST) performed on September 11th.

• 2OST-6.2, Rev. 20, Reactor Coolant System Operating Surveillance test Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, performed twice on August 28th.

• 2OST-7.4, Rev. 27, Operating Surveillance Test, Centrifugal Charging Pump

[2CHS-P-21A], performed on September 20th.

• 2RST-2.5, Rev. 6, Moderator Temperature Coefficient determination, conducted between July 30 and August 4th.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications (TM) based on risk significance. The TM and associated 10CFR50.59 screening were reviewed against the system design basis documentation, including the UFSAR and the TS. The inspectors verified the TMs were implemented in accordance with Administrative (ADM) Procedure, 1/2-ADM-2028, Temporary Modifications, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Temporary modification 02-06-01 to add a temporary plant data system, with limited capabilities, during the main plant computer replacement (1R17). For this activity, the inspectors walked down the systems to verify that changes described in the package were actually implemented, and verified the post-modification testing was satisfactorily accomplished.

• Temporary modification 02-06-05, which added a temporary pipe to bypass degraded chilled water booster pumps to effect.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to adequately control and implement design control measures associated with a temporary design modification installed on the Chilled Water System.

Description.

On July 19, 2006, due to emergent degradation of chilled water booster pumps, the licensee implemented previously-approved Temporary Modification (TMOD)2-06-05 to supply cooling water to chiller condenser units. The TMOD effectively bypassed the two installed chilled water booster pumps to supply water from the Service Water System to the chiller condensers.

Subsequently, anomalous indications in the control room (main steam valve room high and high-high temperature alarms, rising average containment temperatures, steam pressure transmitter drift) required plant configuration changes that were not anticipated or originally prescribed by the TMOD or its associated process documents. For example, additional chiller condensing units were added to satisfy load requirements, standby service water pumps were started due to header pressure concerns, and the cooling supply that had been isolated from the main steam valve area was unisolated to restart cooling flow to the area.

Following review of the TMOD, associated procedure changes, 50.59 screening, and a technical evaluation, the inspector identified several deficiencies that were documented in CR 06-05012, which included:

C Equipment qualifications were not evaluated via Design Interface Evaluations (DIE) even though critical components were located in areas that had ventilation cooling isolated to support the TMOD.

C A post-installation functional test was not required even though functional components (booster pumps) were effectively bypassed. As a result, the design was never fully tested to ensure it was operating correctly, contrary to the requirements of the TMOD administrative procedure.

C Failed to identify the main steam valve area as a critical load that should not have been isolated to support the TMOD. Resultant high temperatures above normal ambient temperatures potentially affects the qualified life of electrical components and other equipment in the area. In addition, many components in the affected areas are required to achieve safe shutdown.

C Adequate basis does not exist within each DIE as a stand alone document, e.g.,

the basis is assumed to exist in referred documents, which also lacks adequate basis.

Analysis.

The issue involved a performance deficiency in that FENOC failed to implement design control measures associated with the verification of the adequacy of a design modification. This finding was considered more than minor since the modification resulted in degrading temperature trends that if left uncorrected, could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, components necessary to achieve safe shutdown were exposed to higher temperatures for normal operation than credited in the environmental qualification records. In addition, increasing temperatures in containment under less than favorable external conditions (high ambient temperatures)could have led to exceeding the technical specification limit to support containment operability and would have required a plant shutdown.

The inspectors evaluated this finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination for At-Power Situations. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, since there was the potential of affecting heat removal attributes provided by the associated critical components and equipment. Additionally, this finding was considered to be of very low safety significance since:

(1) it did not result in a loss of function due to a design or qualification deficiency in accordance with GL 91-18;

(2) did not represent a loss of system safety function;

(3) did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time;

(4) did not involve loss of function from a maintenance rule perspective for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and

(5) did not involve external events.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires in part, that measures shall be established that shall provide for verifying the adequacy of designs.

Contrary to the above, FENOC failed to implement adequate design control measures associated with the verification of the adequacy of a temporary design modification. In particular, adequate justification and bases for assumptions, positions, and conclusions were not adequately provided where necessary, and the result of these deficiencies challenged the functional capabilities of the installed temporary modification, upon implementation.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance and FENOC entered this violation into their corrective action program as CR-06-05012, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC enforcement policy. NCV 05000412/2006004-01, Failure to verify the adequacy of a temporary design modification associated with the Unit 2 chilled water system.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a Unit 1 licensed-operator annual simulator evaluation conducted on August 17th, 2006. Senior licensed-operator performance regarding event classifications and notifications were specifically evaluated. The inspector evaluated the simulator-based scenario that involved multiple, safety-related component failures and plant conditions that would have warranted emergency plan activation, emergency facility activation, and escalation to the event classification of Alert. The licensee planned to credit this evolution toward Emergency Preparedness Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Indicators, therefore, the inspectors reviewed the applicable event notifications and classifications to determine whether they were appropriately credited, and properly evaluated consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Rev. 4, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. The inspectors reviewed licensee evaluator worksheets regarding the performance indicator acceptability, and reviewed other crew and operator evaluations to ensure adverse conditions were appropriately entered into the Corrective Action Program. Other documents utilized in this inspection include the following:

• 1/2-ADM-1111, NRC EPP Performance Indicator Instructions, Rev. 2

• EPP/I-1b, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, Rev. 7

• 1/2-EPP-I-2, Unusual Event, Rev. 23

• 1/2-EPP-I-3, Alert, Rev. 21

• 1/2-ADM-111.F01, Rev. 0, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators Classifications/Notifications/Pars

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Review of Problem Identification and Resolution

a Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into FENOC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing summary lists of each CR, attending screening meetings, and reviewing FENOC's computerized CR database.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Sample Reviews

Switchyard Reliability and System Voltage Transients

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee corrective actions in response to condition reports (CRs) 05-04306, 05-05249, 05-01889 and 06-03022. The CRs were initiated to address voltage transients that affected both Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2. The voltage transients occurred due to grid disturbances in the vicinity of the Beaver Valley substation and slow opening of switchyard circuit breakers in the substation. The inspector reviewed the licensees root cause analysis and corrective actions taken to improve the reliability of 138 kV and 500 kV breakers in the substation. The specific corrective actions included the replacement of breaker closing mechanisms and the performance of additional breaker testing.

The inspectors also reviewed two Engineering Design Change Packages (ECPs) that are intended to upgrade the availability of the station air compressor system by minimizing the effect of electrical power transients on the Beaver Valley Unit 2 instrument air system. ECP 02-0540, Rev. 0, Instrument Air Standby Train Installation, has been implemented, and ECP 06-0206, Rev. 0, Change the Control Wiring for Unit 2 Air Compressor 2SAS-C21B, is scheduled for implementation.

The inspector also conducted a walkdown of the switchyard that included the circuit breakers, 125 Vdc batteries, relays and protection panels and concluded that the material condition of the substation components was good and that the components were being properly maintained in accordance with the licensees maintenance and replacement program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The licensees root cause evaluations for the substation breaker problems and for the tripping of the running Unit 2 instrument air compressor due to the transient on the grid system were found appropriate. The cause of the slow opening/closing of the substation breakers was due to sluggish mechanism operation, while the tripping of running air compressors was due to the existing control and power wiring configuration design. As a result, the licensee had appropriately enhanced the preventive maintenance program of substation breakers and replaced the selected breakers mechanisms. The licensee is also implementing two modifications to minimize the effect of transients on in-service/running Unit 2 air compressors. These corrective actions were appropriate to address the above issues.

Large Electrical Motor Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions in response to the failure of large motors and other issues over the past 2 years. The main focus of this inspection concerned the adequacy of corrective actions associated with the failure of the A Service Water Pump motor on Unit 2 as documented in condition report CR-05-05414.

The inspector reviewed condition reports and procedures as well as performed walkdowns and interviews to determine if FENOC has adequately resolved the issues.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

The licensees identification of the cause of the A service water pump motor failure and the associated corrective actions were deemed appropriate. The licensee completed a root cause investigation and determined that lack of specific vendor requirements during overhauls was a contributing cause of the motor failure. As a result, the licensee has updated their testing procedures and increased vendor oversight. The increased vendor oversight has led to the licensee identifying and correcting vendor-related issues before they can be a problem. The licensee is also taking action by replacing and overhauling other large motors on both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

.3 Inspection Module Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed various CRs associated with the inspection activities captured in each inspection module of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 Unit 1 B AFW inboard motor bearing failure on July 17

a. Inspection Scope

On July 17, 2006, during a planned maintenance activity to replace the oil in the motor of the 3B MDAFW pump, babbit was discovered in the inboard bearing oil, indicating a failed motor bearing (CR-06-04345). FENOC had already entered the 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT) in accordance with TS 3.7.1.2 for the maintenance activity. The bearing was replaced and subsequently failed during retest. The inspectors reviewed licensee actions to determine the cause of the failures. The inspectors monitored activities to correct the failure. The 3B MDAFW pump motor bearing was replaced satisfactorily, passed post-maintenance testing, and returned to service prior to the 72-hour allowed outage time (AOT).

b. Findings

Introduction.

A self-revealing, non-cited (Green) violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified due to inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of bearing housing set screw positions, which resulted in recurrent bearing failures on the 3B MDAFW pump motor.

Description.

The 3B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump [1FW-P-3B] was removed from service for planned routine preventive maintenance (PM). Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 was entered and the pump declared unavailable per the maintenance rule. During routine oil sampling on July 17, 2006, babbit was found in the oil for the inboard motor bearing of the pump. Subsequent disassembly and inspection revealed damage to the sleeve-type journal bearing. Plant Engineering reviewed motor performance and parameters to identify the impact of the identified condition. Historical data for motor temperature and vibration data revealed normal values. However, one anomalous temperature peak was noted during the uncoupled motor run (post motor refurbishment) in April 2006. Peak temperature did not rise above the OST limit (200 F)and quickly returned to normal. Oil analysis results showed a high particle count, with normal chemical and lubricating properties. It was determined that foreign material may have been the cause. The bearing was replaced with a new bearing and retested, however, the bearing failed within 12 minutes as indicated by a rapid rise in temperature. Additional evaluation by plant engineering and extent of condition review following the second bearing failure revealed a weak technical basis for the position of the bearing set screws. Corrective actions from a prior failure of a similar sleeve-type bearing (CR-04-06108) resulted in the licensee backing-out the set-screws. Corrective action and final resolution for the current event is to have the set-screws engaged, plus 1/8th turn, per documented vendor communication. The 3B MDAFW pump motor bearing was replaced satisfactorily with bearing housing set screws properly positioned, passed post-maintenance testing, and was returned to service prior to the expiration of the 72-hour AOT. The licensee has formed a root cause team to evaluate the event and assess actions.

Analysis.

The failure to adequately resolve the correct position of the bearing set screws is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. If left uncorrected, this finding would result in a more significant safety concern. This finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. The inspector evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and conducted a Phase 1 characterization and initial screening using Attachment A. The finding was determined to of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function. The finding is related to the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution cross cutting area in that the bearing set screw position was not thoroughly evaluated and resolved.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deficiencies, deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, on July 17, 2006, two successive bearing failures occurred on 1FW-P-3B as a result of inadequate problem evaluation and resolution of bearing housing set screw positions. However, because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into FENOCs corrective action program (CR-06-04345), this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000334/2006004-02, Inadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Sleeve Bearing Set Screw Position.

.2 Unit 2 Loss of Instrument Air on July 23, 2006

a. Inspection Scope

On July 23, 2006, at 3:02 am, a blowdown solenoid-operated valve (SOV) on the A Instrument Air (IA) dryer failed open, resulting in a loss of IA when the dryer auto-cycled from the B bank back to the A bank. The crew identified the lowering pressure and entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 2.34.1, Loss of Station Instrument Air, and manually started the standby Station Air Compressor and Condensate Polishing air compressors. The air leak was isolated per the AOP by placing the Instrument Air bypass filters into service. The AOP was exited five minutes later at 3:07 am. The inspectors reviewed the AOP and verified that operator actions were consistent with expected actions. Inspectors reviewed IA pressure plots and air system alignments and verified that the system responded as designed and assessed the impact of air loads from the air system transient.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3. Unit 1 Fire in West Cable Vault on August 18

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors followed up on a small Class A fire that occurred in the Unit 1 West Cable Vault as a result of hot work on August 18, 2006. The inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection equipment, manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, barriers to fire propagation, and any contingency fire watches that were in effect. In addition, the inspectors reviewed completed elements of the on-going licensees root cause evaluation (RCE) for the event.

b. Findings

Introduction.

A self-revealing, Green non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5, was identified for failure to follow plant fire protection procedures related to hot work and ignition control. This resulted in a Class A fire in a Unit 1 safety-related cable vault.

Description.

On August 18, 2006, activities associated with a ventilation sleeve insert for a penetration between the Unit 1 Potentially Contaminated Area (PCA) Shop and the Unit 1 West Cable Vault were in progress. A Hot Work Permit was granted for work in the PCA Shop and a continuous fire watch was assigned to the area. Prior to commencing hot work, the work supervisor failed to walk down the area for combustible materials and identify potential fire hazards in the area of work or on the opposite side of the walls, as prescribed in the precautions of the Hot Work Permit (1/2-ADM-1900.F01, Rev. 2). This is relevant as welding was to be performed on the PCA Shop side of the wall, adjacent to the West Cable Vault.

At approximately 1:24 pm, while performing welding in the wall penetration between the PCA Shop and the West Cable Vault, transient combustible materials used to temporarily seal a security plate on the West Cable Vault wall ignited and dropped onto plastic sheeting used for dust control. The plastic sheeting ignited, resulting in a smoke detector for the West Cable Vault to alarm in the Control Room. The Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) operator was dispatched to investigate, and upon entry into the West Cable Vault, discovered a small, incipient fire in the overhead, accessed the area via a temporary ladder, and extinguished the fire with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher. The fire subsequently re-flashed while the PAB operator reported the fire to the control room.

The Shift Manager sounded the site Standby Alarm and activated the Fire Brigade. The PAB operator discharged the CO2 extinguisher a second time and completed suppression of the fire. The fire was extinguished in approximately six

(6) minutes. The Fire Brigade established a Command Position in the PCA Shop and a re-flash watch was stationed in the West Cable Vault.

Discussions with the root cause evaluation team identified a potential generic issue concerning the temporary plastic sheeting used for dust control that ignited in the West Cable Vault. The material was purchased and distributed as flame retardant by the licensee and is a non-safety consumable item. However, the plastic sheeting material was sent to an independent laboratory and failed fire retardant tests per Underwriters Laboratory (UL) code 214 and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code 701.

The licensee immediately quarantined and removed all suspect material, entered the issue into their corrective action program (CR-06-6102) and notified other industry operators by issuing fleet and industry Operating Experience notifications. This issue was discussed with, and relevant information forwarded to Regional and Headquarters NRC personnel. The distributor (G/O Corp) has reported to the licensee that their in-stock material also failed flame tests. The licensee has been in contact with the supplier and distributor to address the issue.

Analysis.

The failure to walk down the work and adjacent areas prior to hot work is more than minor because it affects the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone in that it increased the likelihood of an event that could challenge critical safety functions during power and shutdown operations. If left uncorrected, this finding would result in a more significant safety concern. This finding did not represent an immediate safety concern in that other fire protection features allowed rapid detection and suppression of the fire. The inspector evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, and conducted a Phase 1 characterization and initial screening. Because the finding was associated with fire protection, this was accomplished using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, and Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance. Based on the size and location of the fire, the inspectors concluded it could only affect Unit 1, which was at full power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green),because it affected the hot work permit program and was mitigated by other normally required fire prevention measures. These measures were in place and were utilized to successfully suppress the fire with no actual impact to safety-related equipment. The finding was determined to involve the cross-cutting component of work practices of the human performance area in that procedures were not properly followed.

Enforcement.

License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5 requires, in part, that written procedures for the stations fire protection program be established, implemented, and maintained. Contrary to this requirement, on August 18, 2006, licensee personnel failed to implement walkdown provisions prescribed in the precautions of the Hot Work Permit (1/2-ADM-1900.F01, Rev. 2), while conducting hot work in the penetration on the PCA Shop wall. Because this failure to comply with License Condition DPR-66 Section 2.C.5 is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR-06-04924), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NCV 05000334/2006004-03, Hot Work results in Fire in Unit 1 West Cable Vault.

.4 Unit 1 Reactor Trip due to SSPS card failure on September 7

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the events associated with the Unit 1 trip that occurred on September 7th. The inspectors discussed the event with operations, engineering, and licensee management to gain an understanding of the event and assess followup actions. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken in response to the event and reviewed unit and system indications to verify that actions and system responses were as expected. The inspectors also reviewed the event notification report to verify accurate characterization of the event was reported to the NRC.

The licensees root cause evaluation determined the reactor trip to be caused by the failure of a Solid State Protection System (SSPS) A312 universal logic card that resulted in the opening of the B-train reactor trip breaker. The inspectors observed root cause deliberations, management discussions, and attended restart readiness meetings and Plant Operations Review Committee meetings that evaluated information concerning the root cause of the card failure that led to the reactor trip.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 Unit 1 Extended Power Uprate (IP 71004)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed selected plant testing and other power ascension activities during the implementation of the 3% phase (2689 MWt to 2770 MWt) of a planned 3-phase extended power uprate totaling approximately 8% power. Inspectors observed and/or reviewed selected plant changes and testing prior to the power ascension that began on August 30, 2006, as well as post-100% power activities and reviewed selected plant data to determine if significant plant anomolies occurred, and to ensure plant behavior was as predicted by simulator and analysis data.

The inspectors also reviewed operator actions, applicable procedure changes, and reviewed selected plant design changes and other inspection activities conducted under the normal baseline inspection program, to ensure an adequate sample of risk-significant attributes required by the governing procedure were evaluated.

Specific inspections already completed and credited in past NRC inspection reports, as well as those credited in the current report can be found in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

The inspectors presented inspection results to members of licensee management during an interim exit on August 4, 2006. In addition, on September 5, 2006, the licensee was contacted via telecom and a final summary exit was conducted.

On October 30th, 2006, the inspectors presented the normal baseline inspection results to you and other members of your staff. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

G. Alberti

Senior Nuclear Specialist

S. Baker

Site Radiation Protection Manager

A. Beckert

Simulator Instructor

R. Bisbee

Supervisor, Nuclear Performance Improvement

R. Bologna

Manager, Site Operations

R. Boyle

Staff Nuclear Engineer

S. Buffington

Staff Nuclear Engineer

G. Cacciani

Staff Nuclear Engineer

D. Carothers

Plant Engineer

M. Kogelschatz

Fin Superintenedent

G. Davie

Manager, Training

M. Donning

Supply Manager

D. Dwulit

Supervisor, I & C Maintenance

R. Feden

Regulatory Compliance

J. Fontaine

Supervisor, ALARA

R. Gillespie

Reactor Operator for Shift #5

M. Glander

Unit 2 Unit Supervisor

J. Habuda

System Engineer

R. Hansen

Manager, Nuclear Oversight

A. Hartner

U-1 Shift Manager

P. Hess

Supply Director

G. Kayler

I&C Technician

M. Keene

Electrical Engineer

T. King

Reactor Control System Engineer

W. Klinko

System Engineer

T. Kuhar

Licensed Operator Retraining - Lead

J. Lash

Site Vice President

E. Lauck

FENOC System Engineer

G. Loose

Unit 2 Shift Manager

B. Lubert

Design Engineering

C. Mancuso

Supervisor, Nuclear Mechanics

R. Manko

System Engineer

M. Manoleras

Manager, Design Engineering

L. Martino

Reactor Operator for Shift #5

M. Mascio

System Engineer

J. Mauck

Compliance

E. McFarland

Lead, Simulator Configuration Support Group

R. McKay

FENOC Supply

J. Meyers

System Engineer

J. Miller

Fire Protection Engineer

J. Mauck

Senior Nuclear Specialist

R. Mende

Director, Site Operations

D. Mickinac

Senior Nuclear Specialist

J. Miller

Fire Protection Engineer

M. Mitchell

Electrical Engineering Supervisor

M. Mouser

Unit 1 Shift Manager

J. Patterson

Unit 1 Containment System Engineer

P. Pauvlinch

Rapid Response Supervisor

G. Ritz

Nuclear Engineer

C. Rodriguez

Principal Consultant

R. Scheib

Operations Training Supervisor

D. Schwer

Shift Manager

J. Scott

Supervisor, I & C Maintenance

P. Sena

Director Engineering

B. Sepelak

Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

G. Storolis

Unit 2 Shift Manager

H. Szklinski

Nuclear Quality Assessor

W.Toboc

Design Engineering

K. Triplett

Simulator Operator

J. West

System Engineer

R. Williams

Maintenance Rule Coordinator

W. Williams

BACC Program Owner

J. Witter

Shift Manager

K. Wolfson

Superintendent, Nuclear Maintenance

S. Vicinie

Manager, Emergency Planning

J. Zanetta

Mechanical Maint. Supervisor

NRC Personnel

C. Cahill

Senior Reactor Analyst

K. Diederich

Reactor Inspector

D. Orr

Senior Reactor Inspector

T. Kararas

ERDS, NSIR

M. King

Operating Experience, NRR

J. Rogge

Regional Branch Chief

K. Young

Senior Reactor Inspector

S. Weerakkody

Chief, NRR

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Open/Closed

05000412/2006004-01 NCV Failure to verify the adequacy of a temporary design modification associated with the Unit 2 chilled water system. (Section 1R23)

05000334/2006004-02 NCV Inadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Sleeve Bearing Set Screw Position. (Section 4OA3.1)

05000334/2006004-03 NCV Hot Work results in Fire in Unit 1 West Cable Vault (Section 4OA3.3)