IR 05000219/2010004: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 11/02/2010
| issue date = 11/02/2010
| title = IR 05000219-10-004, on 07-31-10 - 09-30-10, Oyster Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report
| title = IR 05000219-10-004, on 07-31-10 - 09-30-10, Oyster Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report
| author name = Bellamy R R
| author name = Bellamy R
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
| addressee name = Pacilio M J
| addressee name = Pacilio M
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Nuclear Generation Corp, Exelon Nuclear
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Nuclear Generation Corp, Exelon Nuclear
| docket = 05000219
| docket = 05000219
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Mr. Michael UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406*1415 November 2, 2010 Senior Vice President, Exelon Generating Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Rd Warrenville, IL 60555
{{#Wiki_filter:November 2, 2010


SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION -NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2010004
==SUBJECT:==
OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2010004


==Dear Mr. Pacilio:==
==Dear Mr. Pacilio:==
On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 19, 2010, with Mr. M. Massaro, Oyster Creek Generating Station Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 19, 2010, with Mr. M.


Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
Massaro, Oyster Creek Generating Station Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.


In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.


Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter. Docket No. License No.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.


===Enclosure:===
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
 
Docket No.
 
License No.
 
Enclosure:
50-219 DPR-16  
50-219 DPR-16  


Sincerely,Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Report 05000219/2010004  
Sincerely,
 
~am~~~
===w/Attachment:===
Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Report 05000219/2010004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc: Distribution via ListServ
Supplemental Information cc: Distribution via ListServ


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000219/2010004; 07/01/2010  
IR 05000219/2010004; 07/01/2010 - 09/30/2010; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek  
-09/30/2010;
Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek Generating Station; Integrated report. The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an emergency preparedness inspector.


No findings were identified.
Generating Station; Integrated report.


5
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an emergency preparedness inspector. No findings were identified.


=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
Summary of Plant Status The Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating at 100% (full power). On twenty-four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of less than or equal to 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions.


These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.
===Summary of Plant Status===
The Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating at 100% (full power).


On four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of greater than 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions.
On twenty-four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of less than or equal to 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.


These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.
On four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of greater than 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.


On August 1, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment.
On August 1, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to full power later that day.


The plant returned to full power later that day. On August 10, operators performed an unplanned power reduction to 80% power to maintain the plant's circulating water discharge temperatures below Oyster Creek's environmental discharge permit requirements due to a trip of the #1 dilution pump. The plant returned to 100% power on August 10, following the start of the standby dilution pump. On September 3, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The plant returned to full power on September
On August 10, operators performed an unplanned power reduction to 80% power to maintain the plant's circulating water discharge temperatures below Oyster Creek's environmental discharge permit requirements due to a trip of the #1 dilution pump. The plant returned to 100%
power on August 10, following the start of the standby dilution pump.


===4. On September ===
On September 3, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The plant returned to full power on September 4.


13, operators performed a planned power reduction to 61% power to perform troubleshooting for a ground indication on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) occupational dose considerations when conducting troubleshooting in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations.
On September 13, operators performed a planned power reduction to 61% power to perform troubleshooting for a ground indication on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) occupational dose considerations when conducting troubleshooting in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 14.


The plant returned to full power on September 14. On September 16, operators performed a planned power reduction to 64% power to perform repairs on grounds identified on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for ALARA occupational dose considerations when conducting repairs in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations.
On September 16, operators performed a planned power reduction to 64% power to perform repairs on grounds identified on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for ALARA occupational dose considerations when conducting repairs in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 17.


The plant returned to full power on September 17. Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period. Enclosure 
Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones:
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 {{a|R01}}
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
(2 samples) The inspectors performed two site specific weather-related condition inspections.


The inspectors reviewed Exelon's preparations for Hurricane Earl from August 31 through September
==R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
a.


===2. The inspectors ===
===Inspection Scope (2 samples)===
The inspectors performed two site specific weather-related condition inspections.


performed walkdowns of areas that could be potentially impacted by the weather conditions, such as the intake structure, diesel structure, and transformers, and verified that station personnel secured loose materials staged for outside work prior to the forecast high winds. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's preparations for Hurricane Earl from August 31 through September 2. The inspectors performed walkdowns of areas that could be potentially impacted by the weather conditions, such as the intake structure, diesel structure, and transformers, and verified that station personnel secured loose materials staged for outside work prior to the forecast high winds. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.


The inspectors reviewed Exelon's response to the declaration of a tornado watch on September 28. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's response to the declaration of a tornado watch on September 28. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.
Line 89: Line 93:
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
1 {{a|R04}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
==R04 Equipment Alignment==
(3 samples) The inspectors performed three partial equipment alignment inspections.
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
a.


The partial equipment alignment inspections were completed during conditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions, or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance.
===Inspection Scope (3 samples)===
The inspectors performed three partial equipment alignment inspections. The partial equipment alignment inspections were completed during conditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions, or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable, the associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:
* Containment spray system 2 with containment spray system 1 unavailable for surveillance testing on July 7;
*
#1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) with #2 EDG inoperable for corrective maintenance on August 9; and
*
'B' Isolation condenser (IC) while 'A' IC unavailable for surveillances on September 27.


The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable, the associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
* Containment spray system 2 with containment spray system 1 unavailable for surveillance testing on July 7; * #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) with #2 EDG inoperable for corrective maintenance on August 9; and * 'B' Isolation condenser (IC) while 'A' IC unavailable for surveillances on September 27. Enclosure 7 Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 105: Line 115:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(71111.05A 1 sample; 71111.050 6 samples) The inspectors observed one plant fire drill and performed a walkdown of six plant areas to assess their vulnerability to fire. The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill on September 29 to assess the readiness of Exelon's fire brigade to respond to fires within the plant. The drill scenario involved a simulated fire in the 'C' safety related battery room. The inspectors attended Exelon's drill critique to evaluate its adequacy in assessing personnel performance in responding to the postulated fire. During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, and the adequacy of compensatory measures (when applicable).
(71111.05A 1 sample; 71111.050 6 samples)
The inspectors observed one plant fire drill and performed a walkdown of six plant areas to assess their vulnerability to fire.
 
The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill on September 29 to assess the readiness of Exelon's fire brigade to respond to fires within the plant. The drill scenario involved a simulated fire in the 'C' safety related battery room. The inspectors attended Exelon's drill critique to evaluate its adequacy in assessing personnel performance in responding to the postulated fire.


The inspectors reviewed "Oyster Creek Fire Hazards Analysis Report" and "Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans" for risk insights and design features credited in these areas. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identified problems were being evaluated and corrected.
During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, and the adequacy of compensatory measures (when applicable). The inspectors reviewed "Oyster Creek Fire Hazards Analysis Report" and "Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans" for risk insights and design features credited in these areas. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identified problems were being evaluated and corrected.


Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. The following plant areas were inspected:
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. The following plant areas were inspected:
Line 120: Line 133:
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
1 {{a|R06}}
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
(2 samples) The inspectors performed one internal flood protection inspection activity and one internal flood protection inspection activity associated with bunkers and manholes.


The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection activity in the northeast corner room of the reactor building which contains the containment spray system 1 pumps and heat exchangers.
==R06 Flood Protection Measures==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
a.


The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood Enclosure 8 barriers, floor drains, and floor sumps. The inspectors evaluated these items to determine if internal flood vulnerabilities existed and to assess the physical condition of the equipment and components in the northeast corner room. The inspectors reviewed preventative maintenance activities associated with flood protection equipment.
===Inspection Scope (2 samples)===
The inspectors performed one internal flood protection inspection activity and one internal flood protection inspection activity associated with bunkers and manholes.


The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's procedures related to flooding of the northeast corner room. The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection associated with bunkers and manholes.
The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection activity in the northeast corner room of the reactor building which contains the containment spray system 1 pumps and heat exchangers. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood barriers, floor drains, and floor sumps. The inspectors evaluated these items to determine if internal flood vulnerabilities existed and to assess the physical condition of the equipment and components in the northeast corner room. The inspectors reviewed preventative maintenance activities associated with flood protection equipment. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's procedures related to flooding of the northeast corner room.


Inspections of the startup transformer cable vault and four station blackout cable vaults were performed as they are subject to flooding and contained significant cables. The inspectors performed walkdowns of these vaults to verify found water levels in the vaults and reviewed Exelon's photographs and documentation to verify the physical condition of the cables and cable supports.
The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection associated with bunkers and manholes. Inspections of the startup transformer cable vault and four station blackout cable vaults were performed as they are subject to flooding and contained risk-significant cables. The inspectors performed walkdowns of these vaults to verify as-found water levels in the vaults and reviewed Exelon's photographs and documentation to verify the physical condition of the cables and cable supports. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's actions to monitor cable degradation and actions to minimize water accumulation and submergence of medium voltage cables contained in these areas.


The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's actions to monitor cable degradation and actions to minimize water accumulation and submergence of medium voltage cables contained in these areas. Documents associated with these reviews are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
Documents associated with these reviews are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
1 {{a|R11}}
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
(1 sample) The inspectors observed one simulator training scenario to assess operator performance and training effectiveness on September
 
===1. The inspectors ===


observed training scenario "2612.CREW.1 0-5.01 ". The inspectors assessed whether the simulator adequately reflected the expected plant response, operator performance met Exelon's procedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crew performance problems.
==R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
a.


Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
===Inspection Scope (1 sample)===
The inspectors observed one simulator training scenario to assess operator performance and training effectiveness on September 1. The inspectors observed training scenario "2612.CREW.1 0-5.01 ". The inspectors assessed whether the simulator adequately reflected the expected plant response, operator performance met Exelon's procedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crew performance problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R12}}
{{a|1R12}}
==1R12 Maintenance==
 
Effectiveness (71111.12)


====a. Inspection Scope====
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
(2 samples) The inspectors performed two maintenance effectiveness inspection activities.
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
a.


The inspectors reviewed the following degraded equipment issues in order to assess the effectiveness of maintenance by Exelon:
===Inspection Scope (2 samples)===
The inspectors performed two maintenance effectiveness inspection activities. The inspectors reviewed the following degraded equipment issues in order to assess the effectiveness of maintenance by Exelon:
* Control Room/Cable spreading room HVAC (IR 759293) on August 6: and
* Control Room/Cable spreading room HVAC (IR 759293) on August 6: and
* Drywell equipment drain tank (IR 1110290) on September  
* Drywell equipment drain tank (IR 1110290) on September 9.
 
===9. Enclosure  ===


9 The inspectors also verified that the systems or components were being monitored in accordance with Exelon's maintenance rule program requirements.
The inspectors also verified that the systems or components were being monitored in accordance with Exelon's maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to those being tracked by Exelon. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work orders and procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipment performance issues. The inspectors also reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action program condition reports, operator narrative logs, and vendor manuals.


The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to those being tracked by Exelon. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work orders and procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipment performance issues. The inspectors also reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action program condition reports, operator narrative logs, and vendor manuals. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental I nformation attachment to this report.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental I nformation attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
1 {{a|R13}}
 
==R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
a.


====a. Inspection Scope====
===Inspection Scope (5 samples)===
(5 samples) The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through direct observation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:
The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through direct observation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:
* Risk evaluation on core spray system check valves due to missed surveillances on August 26; * #2 emergency diesel generator inoperable due to an overspeed trip on August 9;
* Risk evaluation on core spray system check valves due to missed surveillances on August 26;  
* Master automatic recirculation speed control unavailable due to unplanned maintenance on August 19; .
*  
#2 emergency diesel generator inoperable due to an overspeed trip on August 9;
* Master automatic recirculation speed control unavailable due to unplanned maintenance on August 19;  
.
* Core spray system #2 unavailable due to planned maintenance and receipt of spurious half-scrams on reactor protection system #2 on August 23; and
* Core spray system #2 unavailable due to planned maintenance and receipt of spurious half-scrams on reactor protection system #2 on August 23; and
* Declaration of tornado watch with 0-1029 offsite power line unavailable for Jersey Central Power and Light (JCPL) planned maintenance on September 28. The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly and reassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with Exelon's procedures.
* Declaration of tornado watch with 0-1029 offsite power line unavailable for Jersey Central Power and Light (JCPL) planned maintenance on September 28.
 
Exelon's actions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns.
 
The inspectors also used Exelon's on-line risk monitor (Paragon)to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations.
 
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations.


Documents reviewed for this ins'pection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly and reassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with Exelon's procedures. Exelon's actions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used Exelon's on-line risk monitor (Paragon) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed for this ins'pection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
1 {{a|R15}}
 
==R15 Operability Evaluations==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
a.


====a. Inspection Scope====
===Inspection Scope (4 samples)===
(4 samples) The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with: Enclosure 10
The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with:
* Water in the turbine building radioactive gaseous environmental monitoring system (RAG EMS) filter cartridge on July 16 (IR 1091519);
* Water in the turbine building radioactive gaseous environmental monitoring system (RAG EMS) filter cartridge on July 16 (IR 1091519);
* Average power range monitor (APRM) #1 did not insert half-scram during surveillance testing on August 7 (IR 1099066);  
* Average power range monitor (APRM) #1 did not insert half-scram during surveillance testing on August 7 (IR 1099066);  
* #1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure evaluation on July 27 (IR 1078312);
*  
and
#1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure evaluation on July 27 (IR  
 
===1078312); and
* Core spray system check valves past surveillance dates on August 13 (lR 1097964).
* Core spray system check valves past surveillance dates on August 13 (lR 1097964).


The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to ensure the conclusions were technically justified:
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to ensure the conclusions were technically justified: The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of equipment to corroborate the adequacy of Exelon's operability evaluations.
The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of equipment to corroborate the adequacy of Exelon's operability evaluations.


Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
=====Introduction.=====
=====Introduction.=====
The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) to review Exelon's equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE) for the #1 EDG cooling fan shaft block bearing failure to determine whether a performance deficiency exists that was within Exelon's ability to foresee and prevent. The inspectors will review Exelon's EACE when it is complete, which had not occurred by the end of this inspection period.
The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) to review Exelon's equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE) for the #1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure to determine whether a performance deficiency exists that was within Exelon's ability to foresee and prevent. The inspectors will review Exelon's EACE when it is complete, which had not occurred by the end of this inspection period.


=====Description.=====
=====Description.=====
During the routine overhaul and inspection of the #1 EDG on June 8, maintenance personnel noticed damage to the cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing. Exelon removed the bearing for further analysis by an offsite lab and replaced the bearing and shaft with new components on June 9. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 1078312 and IR 1103610 and is performing an EACE to review the offsite lab report to determine the cause of the failure and any additional corrective actions. (URI 05000219/2010004-01:
During the routine overhaul and inspection of the #1 EDG on June 8, maintenance personnel noticed damage to the cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing.
EDG Pillow-Block Bearing) 1 R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
 
Exelon removed the bearing for further analysis by an offsite lab and replaced the bearing and shaft with new components on June 9. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 1078312 and IR 1103610 and is performing an EACE to review the offsite lab report to determine the cause of the failure and any additional corrective actions. (URI 05000219/2010004-01: EDG Pillow-Block Bearing)1
{{a|R18}}
 
==R18 Plant Modifications==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(1 temporary modification sample) The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that was implemented by Exelon personnel at Oyster Creek. The inspectors reviewed the following modification:
(1 temporary modification sample)
* Temporary configuration change package (TCCP) to lift lead to lock in electromatic relief valve (EMRV) open alarm (ECR 10-00284)on August 17. The inspectors reviewed the engineering/procedure change packages, design basis, and licensing basis documents associated with each of the modifications to ensure that the systems associated with each of the modifications would not be adversely impacted by the change. The inspectors walked down portions of the systems associated with the modification when applicable and prudent. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to ensure they were performed in accordance with Exelon's modification process. The inspectors also ensured that revisions to licensing/design basis documents and operating procedures were properly revised to support implementation of the modification.
The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that was implemented by Exelon personnel at Oyster Creek. The inspectors reviewed the following modification:
 
* Temporary configuration change package (TCCP) to lift lead to lock in electromatic relief valve (EMRV) open alarm (ECR 10-00284) on August 17.
The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's 10 CFR 50.59 screening for this modification.


Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. Enclosure 11
The inspectors reviewed the engineering/procedure change packages, design basis, and licensing basis documents associated with each of the modifications to ensure that the systems associated with each of the modifications would not be adversely impacted by the change. The inspectors walked down portions of the systems associated with the modification when applicable and prudent. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to ensure they were performed in accordance with Exelon's modification process. The inspectors also ensured that revisions to licensing/design basis documents and operating procedures were properly revised to support implementation of the modification. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's 10 CFR 50.59 screening for this modification. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
1 {{a|R19}}
 
==R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(7 samples) The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of seven maintenance tests for the following equipment:
===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 10783|count=7}}
The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of seven post-maintenance tests for the following equipment:
* V-21-17 stem lubrication and packing retorque on July 7 (R2126779);
* V-21-17 stem lubrication and packing retorque on July 7 (R2126779);
* Standby gas treatment system #2 filter replacement on August 2 (C2023814);
* Standby gas treatment system #2 filter replacement on August 2 (C2023814);
Line 237: Line 258:
* Core spray system 2 relay replacement and oil change on August 25 (R2163871);
* Core spray system 2 relay replacement and oil change on August 25 (R2163871);
* V-14-30 stem lubrication and packing retorque on September 29 (R2142502);  
* V-14-30 stem lubrication and packing retorque on September 29 (R2142502);  
* 'E' EMRV pressure switch replacement on September 24 (R2119341).
*  
 
'E' EMRV pressure switch replacement on September 24 (R2119341).
The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate for the scope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functional capability.


Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate for the scope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functional capability. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


1 R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
1 {{a|R22}}
 
==R22 Surveillance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(2 In-service test (1ST) samples and 2 routine surveillance samples) The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of four surveiliance/lST tests:
(2 In-service test (1ST) samples and 2 routine surveillance samples)
The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of four surveiliance/lST tests:
* Reactor building to suppression chamber self actuating vacuum breaker surveillance test and 1ST on July 1;
* Reactor building to suppression chamber self actuating vacuum breaker surveillance test and 1ST on July 1;
* Containment spray and emergency service water system 1 pump operability, 1ST and containment spray pump trip surveillance on July 7;
* Containment spray and emergency service water system 1 pump operability, 1ST and containment spray pump trip surveillance on July 7;
* Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak detection surveillance on July 15; and
* Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak detection surveillance on July 15; and
* Automatic scram contactor surveillance on August 30. The inspectors verified that test data was complete and met procedural requirements to demonstrate that the systems and components were capable of performing their intended function.
* Automatic scram contactor surveillance on August 30.
 
The inspectors verified that test data was complete and met procedural requirements to demonstrate that the systems and components were capable of performing their intended function. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports that documented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests.


The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports that documented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. Enclosure 12
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===Cornerstone:===
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]===
 
1 EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness  
[EP] 1 EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(71114.02 -1 Sample) The inspectors conducted an onsite review to assess the maintenance and testing of the Oyster Creek alert and notification system (ANS). During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) design report to ensure Exelon's compliance with design report commitments, the system maintenance and test records, and applicable ANS procedures.
(71114.02 - 1 Sample)
 
The inspectors conducted an onsite review to assess the maintenance and testing of the Oyster Creek alert and notification system (ANS). During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) design report to ensure Exelon's compliance with design report commitments, the system maintenance and test records, and applicable ANS procedures. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.  
The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria . .
.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
1 EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERa) Staffing and Augmentation System
1 EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERa) Staffing and Augmentation System


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(71114.03 -1 Sample) The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's emergency response organization (ERa) augmentation staffing requirements, training program, and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERa. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key licensee staff to respond to an emergency event and to ensure Exelon's ability to activate their emergency facilities in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's ERa duty roster, sampling of training records, call-in reports, applicable procedures, and condition reports (CR) related to the ERa staffing augmentation system. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
(71114.03 - 1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's emergency response organization (ERa)augmentation staffing requirements, training program, and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERa. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key licensee staff to respond to an emergency event and to ensure Exelon's ability to activate their emergency facilities in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's ERa duty roster, sampling of training records, call-in reports, applicable procedures, and condition reports (CR) related to the ERa staffing augmentation system. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 284: Line 308:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(71114.04 -1 Sample) Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Exelon implemented changes to their emergency action levels (EAL), emergency plan and implementing procedures.
(71114.04 - 1 Sample)
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Exelon implemented changes to their emergency action levels (EAL), emergency plan and implementing procedures.


Exelon had determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), any change made to the plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, and that the revised emergency plan continued to meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the reqUirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. Enclosure 13 The inspectors reviewed all EAL changes and a sample of emergency plan changes to evaluate any potential decreases in effectiveness of the emergency plan. However, this review by the inspectors was not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
Exelon had determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), any change made to the plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, and that the revised emergency plan continued to meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the reqUirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.


The requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed all EAL changes and a sample of emergency plan changes to evaluate any potential decreases in effectiveness of the emergency plan. However, this review by the inspectors was not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
1 EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses
1 EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
(71114.05 -1 Sample) The inspectors reviewed Exelon's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedure for evaluating their EP program and performance.
(71114.05 - 1 Sample)
 
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedure for evaluating their EP program and performance. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of drill reports, self assessment reports, 10 CFR 50.54(t) audits, and EP-related CRs from drills and audits. The inspectors assessed Exelon's response to and documentation of two actual declarations of Unusual Events which occurred on February 1, 2009 and July 12,2009. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed a sampling of drill reports, self assessment reports, 10 CFR 50.54(t) audits, and EP-related CRs from drills and audits. The inspectors assessed Exelon's response to and documentation of two actual declarations of Unusual Events which occurred on February 1, 2009 and July 12,2009. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 304: Line 327:


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
lOA] 40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
lOA]
40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)a.
 
===Inspection Scope (5 Samples)===
The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data associated with five Pis. The inspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported by Exelon between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.


====a. Inspection Scope====
.
(5 Samples) The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data associated with five Pis. The inspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported by Exelon between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. . The inspectors reviewed the following Pis:
The inspectors reviewed the following Pis:
* Drill and exercise performance (DEP);
* Drill and exercise performance (DEP);
* Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill participation;
* Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill participation;
Line 316: Line 343:
====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.
40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)


14 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
===.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program===
 
The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Exelon's corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follOW-Up. This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, or accessing Exelon's computerized database.
===.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective===
 
Action Program The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Exelon's corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follOW-Up.
 
This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, or accessing Exelon's computerized database.


Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified.
Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified.


40A3 Event Followup (71153) (1 sample) The inspectors performed one event follow-up inspection activity.
40A3 Event Followup (71153) (1 sample)
 
The inspectors performed one event follow-up inspection activity. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report.  
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report . . 1 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Increase
. 1 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Increase


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On September 7, operators noted that drywell unidentified leak rate (UILR) rose to a peak of 2.63 gpm from its prior value, which had been trending from 0.92 to 1.02 gpm. Exelon determined that the problem was a result of a failed open valve in the drywell equipment drain tank recirculation line and installed a temporary modification (ECR 10-00530) to correct the problem. The UILR subsequently returned to its previous values. The inspectors verified that operations personnel responded in accordance with procedures and equipment responded as intended by reviewing the completed procedures, control room narrative logs, corrective action program condition reports, and through interviews of operations personnel.
On September 7, operators noted that drywell unidentified leak rate (UILR) rose to a peak of 2.63 gpm from its prior value, which had been trending from 0.92 to 1.02 gpm.


The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operating license. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the main control room panels and indications to verify equipment status and plant parameters.
Exelon determined that the problem was a result of a failed open valve in the drywell equipment drain tank recirculation line and installed a temporary modification (ECR 10-00530) to correct the problem. The UILR subsequently returned to its previous values.


The UILR increase is described and evaluated in corrective action program condition report IR 1110290.
The inspectors verified that operations personnel responded in accordance with procedures and equipment responded as intended by reviewing the completed procedures, control room narrative logs, corrective action program condition reports, and through interviews of operations personnel. The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operating license. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the main control room panels and indications to verify equipment status and plant parameters. The UILR increase is described and evaluated in corrective action program condition report IR 1110290.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


40A6 Meetings, Including Exit Resident Inspector Exit Meeting. On October 19, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of Exelon's management led by Mr. M. Massaro, (Site Vice President), and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings.
40A6 Meetings, Including Exit Resident Inspector Exit Meeting. On October 19, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of Exelon's management led by Mr. M. Massaro, (Site Vice President), and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.


The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period. Enclosure 15 Commissioner Site Visit. On August 31, a site visit was conducted by Mr. William Magwood, Commissioner for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Martin Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Operations.
Commissioner Site Visit. On August 31, a site visit was conducted by Mr. William Magwood, Commissioner for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Martin Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Operations. During Mr. Magwood's visit, he toured the plant and met with Exelon managers. Mr. Marc Dapas, Acting Regional Administrator (RA) for the NRC Region 1 office, accompanied Mr. Magwood on his visit.


During Mr. Magwood's visit, he toured the plant and met with Exelon managers.
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations None.


Mr. Marc Dapas, Acting Regional Administrator (RA) for the NRC Region 1 office, accompanied Mr. Magwood on his visit. 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations None. ATTACHMENT:  
ATTACHMENT:  


=SUPPLEMENTAL
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
INFORMATION=


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
: [[contact::D. Dicello]], Director, Work Management  
: [[contact::D. Dicello]], Director, Work Management  
: [[contact::J. Dostal]], Director, Operations  
: [[contact::J. Dostal]], Director, Operations  
: [[contact::A. Farenga]], Emergency
: [[contact::A. Farenga]], Emergency Preparedness Manager  
Preparedness
Manager  
: [[contact::R. Peak]], Director, Engineering  
: [[contact::R. Peak]], Director, Engineering  
: [[contact::R. Reiner]], Director, Training  
: [[contact::R. Reiner]], Director, Training  
: [[contact::P. Colgan]], Director, Maintenance  
: [[contact::P. Colgan]], Director, Maintenance  
: [[contact::J. Barstow]], Manager, Regulatory
: [[contact::J. Barstow]], Manager, Regulatory Assurance  
Assurance  
: [[contact::T. Keenan]], Manager, Security  
: [[contact::T. Keenan]], Manager, Security  
: [[contact::R. Wiebenga]], Senior Manager, System Engineering  
: [[contact::R. Wiebenga]], Senior Manager, System Engineering  
: [[contact::H. Ray]], Senior Manager, Design Engineering  
: [[contact::H. Ray]], Senior Manager, Design Engineering  
: [[contact::M. McKenna]], Shift Operations
: [[contact::M. McKenna]], Shift Operations Superintendent  
Superintendent  
: [[contact::D. Peiffer]], Manager, Nuclear Oversight  
: [[contact::D. Peiffer]], Manager, Nuclear Oversight  
: [[contact::J. Kerr]], Manager, Corrective
: [[contact::J. Kerr]], Manager, Corrective Action Program  
Action Program  
: [[contact::M. Ford]], Manager, Environmental/Chemistry Manager  
: [[contact::M. Ford]], Manager, Environmental/Chemistry
: [[contact::J. Renda]], Manager, Radiation Protection  
Manager  
: [[contact::K. Barnes]], Regulatory Assurance Specialist
: [[contact::J. Renda]], Manager, Radiation
Others:
Protection  
State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering  
: [[contact::K. Barnes]], Regulatory
Assurance
Specialist
Others: State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering  


==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
===Opened===
===Opened===
: 05000219/2010004-01
: 05000219/2010004-01 URI EDG Pillow-Block Bearing (Section 1R15)  
URI EDG Pillow-Block
Bearing (Section 1R15)  
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS==
REVIEWED In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report, the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records. Section 1 R01: Adverse Weather Protection 
===Procedures===
: OP-OC-1 08-1 09-1 001 , "Preparation for Severe Weather T&RM for Oyster Creek"
: OP-OC-1 08-1 09-1 004, "Hurricane Staffing T&RM for Oyster Creek"
: OP-AA-1 08-111-1001, "Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines"
: WC-AA-107, "Seasonal Readiness"
: OP-OC-1 08-1 001, "Preparation for Severe Weather T&RM for Oyster Creek"
: ABN-31, "High Winds" Attachment
===Condition Reports===
(IR) 1118951
 
==Section 1R04: Equipment==
: Alignment 
===Procedures===
: 310, "Containment Spray System Operation" 307, "Isolation Condenser System" A-2 609.3.002, "Isolation Condenser Isolation Test and Calibration
-A1/B1 Sensors First" Drawings
: GE 148F740, "Flow Diagram -Containment Spray System" Section 1 R05: Fire Protection 
===Procedures===
: ABN-29, "Plant Fires" 101.2, "Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program"
: CC-AA-211, "Fire Protection Program" 333, "Plant Fire Protection System" Other Documents
: RB-FZ-1 F4, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "NE Corner Room"
: RB-FZ-1O, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "51' Elevation"
: TB-FZ-11 B, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "Turbine Building Basement/Mezzanine
(0'-0" Elevation)
: North End (27' 0" Elevation)"
: TB-FZ-11 D, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "Basement Floor South End (3' 6" Elevation)
: OB-FZ-5, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "Control Room"
: OB-FZ-9, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "Office Building"
: TB-FA-26, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, '''C' Battery Room" Fire Drill Scenario, "C Battery Room Fire", dated September
: 29,2010 Section 1 R06: Flood Protection Measures Procedures
: MA-OC-773-001, "Testing/Condition Monitoring of Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables not Subject to 10CFR50.49
: Environmental Qualification"
: ER-AA-3003, "Cable Condition Monitoring Program"
: MA-AA-723-500, "Inspection of Non-EQ Cables and Connections for Managing Adverse Localized Environments" 117.3, "Alternate
: AC System Reliability Monitoring" Drawings
: GE 148F740, Containment Spray System GU 3D-153-07, 001, General Arrangement Floor and Equipment Drains -Reactor Building Condition Reports OR)
: 852474
: 828327
: 828338
: 890453
: 373114
: 1086111
: 1066334
: 1076306
: 1113908
: 330592 Work Orders (AR) R2095953 R2139427 R2162105 R2103165 A2193092 A2193908 A2193907 A2187171 A2073455 R2116819 R213.9427
: R2146232 R2157294 R2153284 
===Other Documents===
: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR section 9.3.3.2.2, "Reactor Building Floor and Equipment Drains"
: RB-FZ-1 F4, Oyster Creek Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan, "NE Comer Room" Design and Licensing Basis for Flooding at OCGS Intemal Flood Evaluation Summary and Notebook -Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
: EQIS-315403-003, "Flooding due to HELBs Outside Containment"
: TDR 779, "Evaluation of Possible Internal Flooding of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Power Plant Buildings"
: C-1302-822-E61
: 0-076, "Flooding due to HELBs Outside Containment" Oyster Creek Generating Station License Renewal Application Section B.1.36, "Inaccessible Medium-voltage Cables not subject to 10CFR50.49
: Environmental Qualification Requirements" Exelon letter, "Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients"", dated May 7, 2007 Exelon Letter, "Exelon Generation Company, LLC/AmerGen Energy Company, LLC Response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Resolution of NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients"", dated December 7, 2007 Report # 2009-09, "Cable System Assessment Provided for Exelon Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Forked River, NJ, February 24-March 5, 2009" System Engineer Spreadsheet of Cablewise Testing Results, updated for 2010 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR, Section 8.3.4, "Station Blackout" USNRC Letter, "Safety Evaluation
-Station Blackout Analysis Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (TAC NO. 68577)", dated August 23, 1991 USNRC Letter, "Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSE) -Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Blackout Rule (TAC NO. 68577)", dated February 12, 1992 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout" Section 1 R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Other Documents
: EOP User's Guide (2000-BAS-3200.02)
: 2612.CREW.10-5.01
 
==Section 1R12: Maintenance==
: Effectiveness 
===Procedures===
: ER-AA-310, "Implementation of Maintenance Rule"
: ER-AA-31 0-1 005, "Maintenance Rule -Disposition Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)" LS
: AA-125-1003, "Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual" 351.2, "High Purity Waste System"
: OP-AA-102-103, "Operator Work-Around Program"
: ER-AB-331-1006, "BWR Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitoring and Action Plan" Drawings
: JC 147434, "Sump and Waste Collection System" Attachment
===Condition Reports===
(IR)
: 744793
: 749568
: 967366
: 1008461
: 1110762 Work Orders (AR)
: 754608
: 1055518 A-4
: 790158
: 1080887
: 804233
: 1098953
: 940266
: 1110290 A0700924 A0705758
: C0528074
: C2002414
: C2019099
: C2024198 R0800924 Other Documents
: NEI 93-01, "Industry Guideline for monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" Oyster Creek Generating Station Technical Specification
: 3.3.0, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage" ECR 10-00530
 
==Section 1R13: Maintenance==
: Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Procedures
: ER-AA-600-1042, "On-line Risk Management"
: ER-AA-600-1
: 21, "Risk Management Application Methodologies"
: ER-AA-600-1
: 014, "Risk Management Configuration Control"
: ER-AA-600-1
: 011, "Risk Management Program"
: WC-OC-1 01-1 001, "On-line Risk Management and Assessment" 2400-SMI-3422.02, "Digital FW and Recirc Speed Control System Maintenance"
: WC-AA-104, "Integrated Risk Management"
: ER-AA-600-1045, "Risk Assessments of Missed or Deficient Surveillances" Condition Report OR)
: 1102779
: 1056730 Work Orders (AR)
: C2024102 Other Documents
: 1093256 Oyster Creek Generating Station Technical Specification Section 4, "Surveillance Requirement Applicability"
: OC-SURV-01, "Risk Analysis for Missed Surveillance, Failure to Open and Inspect Core Spray Main Pump Discharge Check Valves"
 
==Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations==
 
===Procedures===
: OP-AA-1 08-115, "Operability Determination" 620.4.002, "APRM Surveillance Test -Front Panel Check"
: ABN-39, "RPS Failures"
: LS-AA-125-1003, "Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual"
: MA-OC-861-101, "Diesel Generator Inspection
(24 Month) -Mechanical"
: MA-OC-861
: 03-100, "Diesel Generator Fan Belt Replacement" Drawings
: GU-3E-661-21-1001, "Radiation Monitor System, RAGEMS II, Turbine Building" Attachment
===Condition Reports===
(lR)
: 1093256
: 1056730
: 1097964
: 1091519
: 1099444
: 658467
: 814754
: 1099066
: 1100447
: 1093120
: 1099180
: 1089395
: 1103610
: 1078312
: 370560
: 1081766
: 1078411 Work Orders (AR) A2256877 R2165933 A2255578
: C2023739 R2017655 R2085970
: R2125850 A2089090 R2096800 R2113198 Other Documents
: NRC Inspection Manual -Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations
& Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety" NRC Letter, "Safety Evaluation of the Inservice Testing Program Relief Requests for Pumps and Valves, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station", dated September
: 24, 1992 NRC Letter, "Safety Evaluation of the Inservice Testing (1ST) Program Relief Requests for Pumps and Valves, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station", dated August 14, 1993
: GL 89-04, "Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs" Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification
: 4.4, "Emergency Cooling" ASME OM Code-1995, "Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants"
: NUREG-1482, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 1 Oyster Creek Generating Station Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, "Protective Instrumentation Requirements"
: OYS-99753, Exelon PowerLabs report, "Failure Evaluation of the No.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Fan Shaft Pillow-Block Bearing, EMD General Motors" M.1.1200, "Maintenance Instruction
-MP45 Cooling Fan and Related Drive Train Assembly"
 
==Section 1R18: Plant Modifications==
 
===Procedures===
: LS-AA-104-1001, "50.59 Review Coversheet Form"
: ABN-40, "Stuck Open EMRV" Condition Report OR)
: 1083235
: 1072166 Work Order (AR)
: C2022310 Other
: 1064669
: OC-2010-S-0080, 50.59 Screening form for
: ECR 10-00284 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR section 6.3.1.2, "Automatic Depressurization System" Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR section 6.3.2.2, "Equipment and Component Description" Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR section 7.3.1.3.5, "Automatic Depressurization System" Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR section 7.3.5.2, "Non-RPS Systems" Attachment
 
==Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance==
: Testing Procedures
: MA-AA-716-012, "Post Maintenance Testing"
: OP-MA-1 09-1 01, "Clearance and Tagging" 607.4.014, "Containment Spray and ESW System 1 Pump Operability, 1ST and Containment Spray Pumps Trip"
: MA-OC-741-101, "Diesel Generator Inspection
{24 Month} -Electrical" 636.4.013, "Diesel Generator
#2 Load Test" 334, "Instrument and Service Air System" 651.3.002, "SGTS Particulate Filter In-Place Leak Test" 610.4.022, "Core Spray System 2 Pump Operability and Quarterly In-Service Test"
: ER-AA-321, "Administrative Requirements for Inservice Testing" 609.4.001, "Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and In-Service Test" 602.3.004, "Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration" Drawings
: EM 8397907 Sheet 3, "Emergency Diesel Generator
#2 Electrical Elementary Wiring Diagram, DG DC Control Circuits"
: GE 885D781, "Core Spray System Flow Diagram"
: GE 729E182, "Elementary Diagram, Auto Depressurization System" Condition Report (IR)
: 794100
: 1099299
: 1105435
: 553984
: 1062804 Work Order (AR) R2126779 R2146198
: C2023814 R2163871 Other
: 1096095
: 553996
: C2024062 R2119622
: 1096375
: 1027679
: 587926
: 618201
: C2010504 A2256817 R2142502 R2119341
: 531101354
: 660529 R2166827 R2119343
: VM-OC-0096, "Engine Maintenance Manual -645E4 Turbo Charge Engine (Diesel Generators
)" Safety Evaluation
: 212-036, "Core Spray System Operability Criteria" Safety Evaluation
: 212-046, "Core Spray Main Pump Operability Criteria" Safety Evaluation
: 212-061, "Core Spray System 2 Main Pump Operability Criteria"
: ECR 02-00927
: GL 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" GPU Nuclear letter, "Generic Letter 88-14", dated February 21,1989 Safety Evaluation
: 000212-029, "EMRV Setpoint and Tolerance" Oyster Creek Generating Station Technical Specification
: 2.3{D}, "Limiting Safety System Settings, Reactor High Pressure, Relief Valves Initiation" Section 1 R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures
: SA-AA-129, "Electrical Safety"
: MA-AA-1000, "Conduct of Maintenance" 604.4.003, "Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Self Actuating Vacuum Breaker Surveillance Test and 1ST" 607.4.014, "Containment Spray and ESW System 1 Pump Operability, 1ST and Containment Spray Pumps Trip" Attachment
: ER-AA-302-1006, "Generic Letter 96-05 Program Motor-Operated Valve Maintenance and Testing Guidelines" 619.4.025, "Automatic Scram Contactor Test" Condition Reports (lR)
: 1088380
: 1088608
: 794100
: 1088397
: 1104183
: 1107302 Work Orders (AR) R2160886 R2146198
: R2168080 Other Documents
: NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Maintenance-
: Preconditioning of Structures, Systems, and Components Before Determining Operability"
: C-1302-243-531
: 0-041, "OCNGS 20" RB to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Verification oft est Procedure
#604.4.003" Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification
: 3.5.A.4, "Reactor Building to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker System"
 
==Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification==
: System IANS) Evaluation 
===Procedures===
: EP-MA-121-1004, "Exelon East ANS Corrective Maintenance"
: EP-MA-121-1005, "Exelon East ANS Preventive Maintenance Program"
: EP-MA-121-1006, "Exelon East ANS Siren Monitoring, Troubleshooting, and Testing"
: EP-MA-121-1002, "Exelon East Alert Notification System (ANS) Program"
: EP-AA-125-1
: 001, "EP Performance Indicator Guidance" Other Documents Oyster Creek Alert Notification System, Upgraded System Design Report, April 2005 Section 1 EP3: Emergency Response Organization
: IERO) Staffing and Augmentation System Procedures
: EP-AA-112-200, "TSC Activation and Operation"
: EP-AA-112-100-F-07, "Mid-Atlantic
: ERa Notification or Augmentation"
: EP-AA-121-1001, "Automated Call-out System Maintenance"
: EP-AA-122-1001, "Drill and Exercise Scheduling, Development and Conduct"
: TQ-AA-113, "ERa Training and Qualification"
: EP-AA-121, "Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Readiness" Other Documents
: ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated June 26,2010 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated March 23, 2010 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated December 9, 2010 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated December 1, 2009 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated September
: 24, 2009 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated March 21, 2009 ERa Call-in Augmentation Drill Results, dated May 29, 2009
 
==Section 1EP4: Emergency==
: Action Level lEAL) and Emergency Plan Changes Procedures
: LS-AA-104, "Exelon 50.59 Review Process"
: EP-AA-120-1
: 001, "10
: CFR 50.54(q) Change Evaluation" Attachment
===Other Documents===
: 09-57,
: EP-MA-114-1
: 00, State/Local Notification Form Change Package 10-03,
: EP-MA-114-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form Change Package 09-111,
: EP-MA(MW)-124-1
: 001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests 10-56, TSC/OSC Equipment Test -Software and Reference Document Inventory
: 10-25, Various Inventory Sheets 09-105,
: EP-MA-124-1001-F-10, EOF Inventory
: 09-27,
: EP-AA-1010, Emergency Plan Annex for Oyster Creek Station 10-06, DAPAR Computer Program and Procedures Change Package 10-24,
: EP-MA-124-1001-F-34, OC Main Access Facility Inventory, Revision A
 
==Section 1EP5: Correction==
 
of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses 
===Procedures===
: LS-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure", Revision 14
: EP-AA-122, "Drills and Exercises", Revision 10
: EP-AA-111, "Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations", Revision 16 Other Documents
: 988339-02, Oyster Creek 2010 NRC EP Program Inspection self-assessment
: 854071-02, Oyster Creek NRC Exercise Readiness Self-Assessment
: NOSA-OYS-10-03 (AR 1045049), Emergency Preparedness Audit Report -Oyster Creek, dated April 19, 2010 -April 23, 2010
: NOSA-OYS-09-04 (AR 896453), Oyster Creek Generating Station Audit Report, dated April 20, 2009 -April 24, 2009
: ENS 44822, "Unusual Event and Reactor Scram due to Main Transformer Fire"
: ENS 45196, "Unusual Event Declared Due to a Loss of Offsite Power"
 
==Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation==
 
===Condition Reports===
: IIR)
: 00817140
: 00817140
: 00832379
: 01012042
: 00864370
: 01081466
: 00943775
: 01103095
: 01103052
: 01081398
: 00976430
: 00955014
: 00991833
: 00995622
: 01031628
: 00825242
: 00832454
: 00864388
: 00995076 01031660


==Section 40A1: Performance==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
: Indicator Verification 
===Procedures===
: 01048223
: 01080731
: 01081564
: 00976439
: 00963878
: 01039079
: 00895806
: 00995622
: EP-AA-125-1003, "ERO Readiness
-Performance Indicators Guidance"
: EP-AA-125-1004, "Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Performance Indicators Guidance"
: EP-AA-125-1002, "ERO Performance Indicators Guidance"
: EP-AA-125-1
: 001, "EP Performance Indicators Guidance" Performance Indicator Data, 4th quarter 2009 -2 nd quarter 2010 Other Documents
: NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6 Reactor coolant chemistry logs, dated July 2009 through September
: 2010 Drywell identified and unidentified leak rate logs, dated July 2009 through September
: 2010 Attachment


==Section 40A3: Event Followup Procedures==
: 351.2, "High Purity Waste System" A-9
: OP-AA-1 02-103, "Operator Work-Around Program"
: ER-AB-331-1006, "BWR Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitoring and Action Plan" Drawings
: JC 147434, "Sump and Waste Collection System" Condition Reports IIR)
: 754608
: 1008461
: 1110762 Work Orders (AR)
: 1055518
: 1110290
: 790158
: 1080887 A0700924
: C0528074
: C2024198 A0705758
: C2002414 R0800924 Other Documents
: NEI 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants" Oyster Creek Generating Station Technical Specification
: 3.3.D, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage"
: ECR 10-00530, "Drywell Drain Tank Temperature Spare Relay Addition"
: NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines
: CFR 50.72 and 50.73" ABN ADAMS ALARA APRM ANS ASME CAP CFR CR DEP EACE EAL ECR EDG EMRV ENS
: EOF EOP EP EQ ERO
: ESW
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
Abnormal Operating
Procedure
Agency-wide
Documents
Access and Management
System As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Average Power Range Monitor Alert and Notification
System American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Corrective
Action Program Code of Federal Regulations
Condition
Report Drill and Exercise Performance
Equipment
Apparent Cause Evaluation
Emergency
Action Level Engineering
Change Request Emergency
Diesel Generator
Electromatic
Relief Valve Emergency
Notification
System Emergency
Operations
Facility Emergency
Operating
Procedure
Emergency
Preparedness
Environmental
Qualification
Emergency
Response Organization
Emergency
Service Water Attachment
Exelon
: [[FEMA]] [[]]
: [[FZ]] [[]]
: [[GL]] [[]]
: [[GPU]] [[]]
: [[HELB]] [[]]
: [[HVAC]] [[]]
: [[IC]] [[]]
: [[IR]] [[]]
: [[1ST]] [[]]
: [[JCPL]] [[]]
: [[NEI]] [[]]
: [[NRC]] [[]]
: [[NUREG]] [[]]
: [[OB]] [[Oyster Creek]]
: [[PI]] [[]]
: [[RAG]] [[]]
: [[EMS]] [[]]
: [[RB]] [[]]
: [[RCS]] [[]]
: [[RCSA]] [[]]
: [[RCSL]] [[T&]]
: [[RM]] [[]]
: [[TB]] [[]]
: [[TCCP]] [[]]
: [[TSC]] [[]]
: [[UILR]] [[]]
: [[URI]] [[]]
: [[VDC]] [[]]
: [[WO]] [[A-10 Exelon Energy Company,]]
LLC Federal Emergency
Management
Agency Fire Zone Generic Letter General Public Utilities
High Energy Line Break Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning
Isolation
Condenser
Issue Report Inservice
Test Jersey Central Power and Light Nuclear Energy Institute
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
NRC technical
report designation (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission)
Office Building Oyster Creek Generating
Station Performance
Indicator
Radioactive
Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
System Reactor Building Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant System Activity Reactor Coolant System Identified
Leak Rate Training & Reference
Material Turbine Building Temporary
Configuration
Change Package Technical
Support Center Unidentified
Leak Rate Unresolved
Item Voltage Direct Current Work Order Attachment
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 02:06, 14 January 2025

IR 05000219-10-004, on 07-31-10 - 09-30-10, Oyster Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report
ML103060033
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 11/02/2010
From: Ronald Bellamy
NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To: Pacilio M
Exelon Nuclear Generation Corp, Exelon Nuclear
BELLAMY RR
References
IR-10-004
Download: ML103060033 (28)
v • d • e


Text

November 2, 2010

SUBJECT:

OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2010004

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 19, 2010, with Mr. M.

Massaro, Oyster Creek Generating Station Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.

Docket No.

License No.

Enclosure:

50-219 DPR-16

Sincerely,

~am~~~

Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Report 05000219/2010004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000219/2010004; 07/01/2010 - 09/30/2010; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek

Generating Station; Integrated report.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an emergency preparedness inspector. No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating at 100% (full power).

On twenty-four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of less than or equal to 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.

On four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of greater than 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.

On August 1, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to full power later that day.

On August 10, operators performed an unplanned power reduction to 80% power to maintain the plant's circulating water discharge temperatures below Oyster Creek's environmental discharge permit requirements due to a trip of the #1 dilution pump. The plant returned to 100%

power on August 10, following the start of the standby dilution pump.

On September 3, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The plant returned to full power on September 4.

On September 13, operators performed a planned power reduction to 61% power to perform troubleshooting for a ground indication on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) occupational dose considerations when conducting troubleshooting in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 14.

On September 16, operators performed a planned power reduction to 64% power to perform repairs on grounds identified on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for ALARA occupational dose considerations when conducting repairs in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 17.

Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1

R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Main article: IP 71111.01

a.

Inspection Scope (2 samples)

The inspectors performed two site specific weather-related condition inspections.

The inspectors reviewed Exelon's preparations for Hurricane Earl from August 31 through September 2. The inspectors performed walkdowns of areas that could be potentially impacted by the weather conditions, such as the intake structure, diesel structure, and transformers, and verified that station personnel secured loose materials staged for outside work prior to the forecast high winds. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.

The inspectors reviewed Exelon's response to the declaration of a tornado watch on September 28. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

a.

Inspection Scope (3 samples)

The inspectors performed three partial equipment alignment inspections. The partial equipment alignment inspections were completed during conditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions, or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable, the associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:

  1. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) with #2 EDG inoperable for corrective maintenance on August 9; and

'B' Isolation condenser (IC) while 'A' IC unavailable for surveillances on September 27.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1 ROS Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

(71111.05A 1 sample; 71111.050 6 samples)

The inspectors observed one plant fire drill and performed a walkdown of six plant areas to assess their vulnerability to fire.

The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill on September 29 to assess the readiness of Exelon's fire brigade to respond to fires within the plant. The drill scenario involved a simulated fire in the 'C' safety related battery room. The inspectors attended Exelon's drill critique to evaluate its adequacy in assessing personnel performance in responding to the postulated fire.

During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, and the adequacy of compensatory measures (when applicable). The inspectors reviewed "Oyster Creek Fire Hazards Analysis Report" and "Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans" for risk insights and design features credited in these areas. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identified problems were being evaluated and corrected.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. The following plant areas were inspected:

  • RB-FZ-1 F4, "Northeast corner room" on July 29;
  • TB-FZ-11 B, "Turbine Building Basement/Mezzanine North End" on September 1;
  • OB-FZ-5, "Control Room" on September 3;
  • OB-FZ-9, "Office Building" on September 3;
  • RB-FZ-1D, "Reactor Building 51' Elevation" on September 17 and
  • TB-FZ-11D, "Turbine Building Basement South End" on September 17.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R06 Flood Protection Measures

Main article: IP 71111.06

a.

Inspection Scope (2 samples)

The inspectors performed one internal flood protection inspection activity and one internal flood protection inspection activity associated with bunkers and manholes.

The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection activity in the northeast corner room of the reactor building which contains the containment spray system 1 pumps and heat exchangers. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood barriers, floor drains, and floor sumps. The inspectors evaluated these items to determine if internal flood vulnerabilities existed and to assess the physical condition of the equipment and components in the northeast corner room. The inspectors reviewed preventative maintenance activities associated with flood protection equipment. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's procedures related to flooding of the northeast corner room.

The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection associated with bunkers and manholes. Inspections of the startup transformer cable vault and four station blackout cable vaults were performed as they are subject to flooding and contained risk-significant cables. The inspectors performed walkdowns of these vaults to verify as-found water levels in the vaults and reviewed Exelon's photographs and documentation to verify the physical condition of the cables and cable supports. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's actions to monitor cable degradation and actions to minimize water accumulation and submergence of medium voltage cables contained in these areas.

Documents associated with these reviews are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Main article: IP 71111.11

a.

Inspection Scope (1 sample)

The inspectors observed one simulator training scenario to assess operator performance and training effectiveness on September 1. The inspectors observed training scenario "2612.CREW.1 0-5.01 ". The inspectors assessed whether the simulator adequately reflected the expected plant response, operator performance met Exelon's procedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crew performance problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12

a.

Inspection Scope (2 samples)

The inspectors performed two maintenance effectiveness inspection activities. The inspectors reviewed the following degraded equipment issues in order to assess the effectiveness of maintenance by Exelon:

  • Control Room/Cable spreading room HVAC (IR 759293) on August 6: and
  • Drywell equipment drain tank (IR 1110290) on September 9.

The inspectors also verified that the systems or components were being monitored in accordance with Exelon's maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to those being tracked by Exelon. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work orders and procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipment performance issues. The inspectors also reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action program condition reports, operator narrative logs, and vendor manuals.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental I nformation attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a.

Inspection Scope (5 samples)

The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through direct observation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:

  1. 2 emergency diesel generator inoperable due to an overspeed trip on August 9;
  • Master automatic recirculation speed control unavailable due to unplanned maintenance on August 19;

.

  • Declaration of tornado watch with 0-1029 offsite power line unavailable for Jersey Central Power and Light (JCPL) planned maintenance on September 28.

The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly and reassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with Exelon's procedures. Exelon's actions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used Exelon's on-line risk monitor (Paragon) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed for this ins'pection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R15 Operability Evaluations

Main article: IP 71111.15

a.

Inspection Scope (4 samples)

The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with:

  • Water in the turbine building radioactive gaseous environmental monitoring system (RAG EMS) filter cartridge on July 16 (IR 1091519);
  • Average power range monitor (APRM) #1 did not insert half-scram during surveillance testing on August 7 (IR 1099066);
  1. 1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure evaluation on July 27 (IR

===1078312); and

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to ensure the conclusions were technically justified: The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of equipment to corroborate the adequacy of Exelon's operability evaluations.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) to review Exelon's equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE) for the #1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure to determine whether a performance deficiency exists that was within Exelon's ability to foresee and prevent. The inspectors will review Exelon's EACE when it is complete, which had not occurred by the end of this inspection period.

Description.

During the routine overhaul and inspection of the #1 EDG on June 8, maintenance personnel noticed damage to the cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing.

Exelon removed the bearing for further analysis by an offsite lab and replaced the bearing and shaft with new components on June 9. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 1078312 and IR 1103610 and is performing an EACE to review the offsite lab report to determine the cause of the failure and any additional corrective actions. (URI 05000219/2010004-01: EDG Pillow-Block Bearing)1

R18 Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.18

a. Inspection Scope

(1 temporary modification sample)

The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that was implemented by Exelon personnel at Oyster Creek. The inspectors reviewed the following modification:

  • Temporary configuration change package (TCCP) to lift lead to lock in electromatic relief valve (EMRV) open alarm (ECR 10-00284) on August 17.

The inspectors reviewed the engineering/procedure change packages, design basis, and licensing basis documents associated with each of the modifications to ensure that the systems associated with each of the modifications would not be adversely impacted by the change. The inspectors walked down portions of the systems associated with the modification when applicable and prudent. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to ensure they were performed in accordance with Exelon's modification process. The inspectors also ensured that revisions to licensing/design basis documents and operating procedures were properly revised to support implementation of the modification. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's 10 CFR 50.59 screening for this modification. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

a. Inspection Scope

=

Main article: IP 10783

The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of seven post-maintenance tests for the following equipment:

  • V-21-17 stem lubrication and packing retorque on July 7 (R2126779);
  • V-28-23 replacement on August 19 (R2119622);
  • Core spray system 2 relay replacement and oil change on August 25 (R2163871);
  • V-14-30 stem lubrication and packing retorque on September 29 (R2142502);

'E' EMRV pressure switch replacement on September 24 (R2119341).

The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate for the scope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functional capability. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1

R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

(2 In-service test (1ST) samples and 2 routine surveillance samples)

The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of four surveiliance/lST tests:

  • Reactor building to suppression chamber self actuating vacuum breaker surveillance test and 1ST on July 1;

The inspectors verified that test data was complete and met procedural requirements to demonstrate that the systems and components were capable of performing their intended function. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports that documented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]

1 EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

(71114.02 - 1 Sample)

The inspectors conducted an onsite review to assess the maintenance and testing of the Oyster Creek alert and notification system (ANS). During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) design report to ensure Exelon's compliance with design report commitments, the system maintenance and test records, and applicable ANS procedures. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERa) Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

(71114.03 - 1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's emergency response organization (ERa)augmentation staffing requirements, training program, and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERa. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key licensee staff to respond to an emergency event and to ensure Exelon's ability to activate their emergency facilities in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's ERa duty roster, sampling of training records, call-in reports, applicable procedures, and condition reports (CR) related to the ERa staffing augmentation system. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP4 Emergency Action Level lEAl) and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

(71114.04 - 1 Sample)

Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Exelon implemented changes to their emergency action levels (EAL), emergency plan and implementing procedures.

Exelon had determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), any change made to the plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, and that the revised emergency plan continued to meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the reqUirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.

The inspectors reviewed all EAL changes and a sample of emergency plan changes to evaluate any potential decreases in effectiveness of the emergency plan. However, this review by the inspectors was not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses

a. Inspection Scope

(71114.05 - 1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed Exelon's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedure for evaluating their EP program and performance. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of drill reports, self assessment reports, 10 CFR 50.54(t) audits, and EP-related CRs from drills and audits. The inspectors assessed Exelon's response to and documentation of two actual declarations of Unusual Events which occurred on February 1, 2009 and July 12,2009. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

lOA]

40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)a.

Inspection Scope (5 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data associated with five Pis. The inspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported by Exelon between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

.

The inspectors reviewed the following Pis:

  • Drill and exercise performance (DEP);
  • Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill participation;
  • Alert and notification system (ANS);

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program

The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Exelon's corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follOW-Up. This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, or accessing Exelon's computerized database.

Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified.

40A3 Event Followup (71153) (1 sample)

The inspectors performed one event follow-up inspection activity. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report.

. 1 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Increase

a. Inspection Scope

On September 7, operators noted that drywell unidentified leak rate (UILR) rose to a peak of 2.63 gpm from its prior value, which had been trending from 0.92 to 1.02 gpm.

Exelon determined that the problem was a result of a failed open valve in the drywell equipment drain tank recirculation line and installed a temporary modification (ECR 10-00530) to correct the problem. The UILR subsequently returned to its previous values.

The inspectors verified that operations personnel responded in accordance with procedures and equipment responded as intended by reviewing the completed procedures, control room narrative logs, corrective action program condition reports, and through interviews of operations personnel. The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operating license. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the main control room panels and indications to verify equipment status and plant parameters. The UILR increase is described and evaluated in corrective action program condition report IR 1110290.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A6 Meetings, Including Exit Resident Inspector Exit Meeting. On October 19, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of Exelon's management led by Mr. M. Massaro, (Site Vice President), and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.

Commissioner Site Visit. On August 31, a site visit was conducted by Mr. William Magwood, Commissioner for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Martin Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Operations. During Mr. Magwood's visit, he toured the plant and met with Exelon managers. Mr. Marc Dapas, Acting Regional Administrator (RA) for the NRC Region 1 office, accompanied Mr. Magwood on his visit.

40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations None.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

D. Dicello, Director, Work Management
J. Dostal, Director, Operations
A. Farenga, Emergency Preparedness Manager
R. Peak, Director, Engineering
R. Reiner, Director, Training
P. Colgan, Director, Maintenance
J. Barstow, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
T. Keenan, Manager, Security
R. Wiebenga, Senior Manager, System Engineering
H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering
M. McKenna, Shift Operations Superintendent
D. Peiffer, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
J. Kerr, Manager, Corrective Action Program
M. Ford, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry Manager
J. Renda, Manager, Radiation Protection
K. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

Others:

State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000219/2010004-01 URI EDG Pillow-Block Bearing (Section 1R15)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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