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| number = ML18226A175
| number = ML18226A175
| issue date = 08/12/2018
| issue date = 08/12/2018
| title = Wolf Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter
| title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter
| author name = Taylor N H
| author name = Taylor N
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| addressee name = Heflin A C
| addressee name = Heflin A
| addressee affiliation = Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp
| addressee affiliation = Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp
| docket = 05000482
| docket = 05000482
Line 17: Line 17:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:August 12, 2018
[[Issue date::August 12, 2018]]


Mr. Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839
==SUBJECT:==
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018002 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER


SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION
==Dear Mr. Heflin:==
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018 00 2 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
-UP LETTER
 
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
 
Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.


==Dear Mr. Heflin:==
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President , and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violation s as non-cited violation s (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
 
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.


Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555
In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area. On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group.
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station
. If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S.


Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555
Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1), as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staffs progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station
. In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross
-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area.


On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensee's progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/201800 7 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group. Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1)
, as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staff's progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.


This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
Sincerely,
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
/RA/  


"
Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects


Sincerely,/RA/ Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50
Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42  
-482 License No. NPF-42  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 w/Attachment s: 1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice Inspection 3. Request for Information Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection 4. Request for Information Quarterly Baseline Inspection
Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 w/Attachments:  
 
1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice
 
Inspection 3. Request for Information O
 
==Inspection Report==
Docket Number:
05000482
 
License Number:
NPF-42
 
Report Number:
05000482/2018002


1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0012  
05000482 License Number:
 
NPF-42 Report Number:
Licensee:
05000482/2018002 Enterprise Identifier:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation  
I-2018-002-0012 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, Kansas Inspection Dates:
 
April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018 Inspectors:
Facility:
D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector C. Alldredge, Health Physicist I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspecto r J. Melfi, Project Engineer J. O'Donnell, CHP, Health Physicist Approved By:
Wolf Creek Generating Station  
N. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects 2
 
Location:
Burlington, Kansas  
 
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018  
 
Inspectors:
D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector  
 
F. Thomas, Resident Inspector  
 
C. Alldredge, Health Physicist  
 
I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector
 
J. Melfi, Project Engineer  
 
J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist  
 
Approved By:
N. Taylor  
 
Chief, Project Branch B  
 
Division of Reactor Projects  


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
 
===List of Findings and Violations===
Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002-01 Closed
 
Not Applicable 71111.20 -
Refueling and Other Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4),
Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.


NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.


List of Findings and Violations Announcement of an NRC Inspector's Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV  05000482/2018002
Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
-0 1 Closed  Not Applicable 71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," associated with the licensee's failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.


Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool buildin g where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities
Green NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Closed  
, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRC's ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections. Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems  Green NCV 05000482/2018002
[H.3] -
-0 2 Closed [H.3] - Human Performance , Change Management 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2
Human Performance,
,032 foot and 2
Change Management 71152 -
,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelope's ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.
Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.


3 Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000482/2018002
Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events  
-0 3 Closed [H.2] - Human Performance , Field Presence 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V , "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters , and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.


4
Green NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Closed
[H.2] - Human Performance,
Field Presence 71152 -
Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.


=PLANT STATUS=
=PLANT STATUS=


Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22. The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22.
 
The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.


==INSPECTION SCOPES==
==INSPECTION SCOPES==
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/insp
reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program  
-manual/inspection
- Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, "Light
-Water Reactor Inspection Program  
- Operations Phase."  The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, "Plant Status
," and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution."  The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
71111.01-Adverse Weather Protection
===71111.01Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=1}}
 
The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)power systems.
 
===71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04|count=2}}
 
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
: (1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018
: (2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018.
 
===Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)===
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018.


===Summer Readiness===
===71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
{{IP sample|count=1}}


The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems
Quarterly Inspection===
. 71111.04-Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown (2 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05|count=6}}
  (1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018 (2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018


===. Complete Walkdown===
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A-8 on April 21, 2018
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018
: (2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018
.
: (3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018
: (4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
: (5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
: (6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018.


5 71111.05AQ
===71111.06Flood Protection Measures  
-Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection (6 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:  (1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A
-8 on April 21, 2018  (2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB
-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018 (3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB
-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018 (4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB
-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018  (5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB
-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018  (6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F
-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018
. 71111.06-Flood Protection Measures Cables (Partial Sampl e)  The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018


===. 71111.08-Inservice Inspection Activities===
Cables (Partial Sample)
{{IP sample|count=1}}
 
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018.
 
71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06|count=1}}
: (1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities
 
The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:


  (1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.


Visual (VE)
Visual (VE)  
The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:
 
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Weld Number AE F015 and AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012) Ultrasonic
The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:  
 
SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Weld Number AE-04-F015 and AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012)
Ultrasonic SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Steam Generator A Inner Radius - Weld Number EBB01A-11-IR (Data Sheet Number AJS_010)
Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002)
Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003)
Ultrasonic Steam Generator Weld Number EBB01A-11-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_004)
Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005)
Ultrasonic
: (2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities
 
The inspector reviewed the results of the licensees bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded. The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.
 
On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.
: (3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities


6 SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Steam Generator "A" Inner Radius
The Inspector evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance.
- Weld Number EBB01A IR  (Data Sheet Number AJS_010) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Weld Number EBB01A W (Data Sheet Number RAL_004) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005) Ultrasonic (2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded.
: (4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities  


The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.
The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC. The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensees inspection scope was appropriate.
: (5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)


On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code  Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.
The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports, which dealt with inservice inspection activities, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate.


  (3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The Inspector evaluated the licensee's boric acid control program performanc e. (4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC.
===71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11|count=1}}


The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on May 31, 2018.
-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensee's inspection scope was appropriate.


(5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08
===Operator Performance (1 Sample)===
-02.05)  The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports
The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE-211, Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test, during startup activities on May 17, 2018.
, which dealt with inservice inspection activities
, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate
. 71111.11-Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance


===Operator Requalification===
===71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12|count=1}}
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on May 31, 2018


===. Operator Performance===
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017.
{{IP sample|count=1}}
The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety
-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE
-211, "Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test," during startup activities on May 17, 2018.


71111.12-Maintenance Effectiveness
===71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=3}}


===Routine Maintenance Effectiveness===
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017
: (2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018
. 71111.13-Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (3 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities
: (3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressure protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018.
: (1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018 (2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018 (3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressur e protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018. 71111.15-Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (4 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
  (1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018 (2) Operability evaluation of start-u p transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018 8 (3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018 (4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018
.


===71111.18-Plant Modifications===
===71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=4}}
The inspectors evaluated the s pen t fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification
.


71111.19-Post Maintenance Testing (6 Samples)  The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests: (1) Start-u p transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018   (2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018 (3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018 (4) STS EM-100A, "Safety Injection Pump 'A' Inservice Pump Test," following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018 (5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018 (6) STS IC-503B, "Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level," following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
: (1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018
: (2) Operability evaluation of start-up transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018
: (3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018
: (4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018.


===. 71111.20-Refueling and Other Outage Activities===
===71111.18Plant Modifications===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18|count=1}}
The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18 , 2018.
 
The inspectors evaluated the spent fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification.
 
===71111.19Post Maintenance Testing===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=6}}
 
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
: (1) Start-up transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018
: (2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018
: (3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018
: (4) STS EM-100A, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test, following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018
: (5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018
: (6) STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level, following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018.
 
===71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.20|count=1}}
 
The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18, 2018.


The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.
The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.


71111.22-Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
===71111.22Surveillance Testing  


===Routine===
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
{{IP sample|count=1}}
Routine===
  (1) STS KJ-001B, "Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=1}}
: (1) STS KJ-001B, Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B, on May 11, 2018


===- Train B," on May 11, 2018  In-service===
===In-service (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) STS EM-003A, ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test, on May 2, 2018  
  (1) STS EM-003A, "ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test," on May 2, 2018


===Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection===
===Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) STS BB-006, RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer, on June 27, 2018  
  (1) STS BB-006, "RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer
," on June 27, 2018 Containment


===Isolation Valve===
===Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) STS PE-128, Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) of Penetration P-29, on April 24,
  (1) STS PE-128, "Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) of Penetration P-29 ," on April 24, 2018


==RADIATION SAFETY==
==RADIATION SAFETY==
71124.01-Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard
===71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71124.01|count=1}}
 
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.


===Assessment===
===Instructions to Workers (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
The inspectors evaluated worker instructions.


The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls
===Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 Sample)===
The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls.


===. Instructions to Workers===
===Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage.


The inspectors evaluated worker instructions
===High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)===
. Contamination and Radioactive Material
The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.


===Control===
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)
{{IP sample|count=1}}


The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.


===. Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage===
===71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71124.02|count=1}}


The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage
The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:
: (1) RWP 180021, Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
: (2) RWP 182601, Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)
: (3) RWP 182300, Maintenance Support
: (4) RWP 183220, Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP
: (5) RWP 184207, RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs
: (6) RWP 184420, Scaffolding Activities RF22
: (7) RWP 184482, Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly


===. High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls===
===Radiation Worker Performance (1 Sample)===
{{IP sample|count=1}}
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.


The inspectors evaluated risk
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE==
===71151Performance Indicator Verification===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=4}}


===-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls. Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency===
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
{{IP sample|count=1}}
: (1) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
: (2) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
: (3) OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017-3/30/2018)
: (4) PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017-03/30/2018).


The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency
===71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review===
. 71124.02-Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152|count=1}}


===Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls===
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
{{IP sample|count=1}}


The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:
===Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)===
  (1) RWP 180021, "Cartridge Filter Change
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
-Out in Aux and RW Buildings" (2) RWP 182601, "Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)"
: (1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed.
(3) RWP 182300, "Maintenance Support" 10 (4) RWP 183220, "Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP" (5) RWP 184207, "RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCP's" (6) RWP 184420, "Scaffolding Activities RF22" (7) RWP 184482, "Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly"
: (2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level.


===Radiation Worker Performance===
==INSPECTION RESULTS==
{{IP sample|count=1}}
Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002-01 Closed Not Applicable


The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.
==71111.20 - Refueling==
and Other Outage Activities


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector. Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacted the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.
- BASELINE  71151-Performance Indicator Verification (4 Samples)  The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:  (1) BI01:  Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)  (2) BI02:  RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017
-03/31/2018)
  (3) OR01:  Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017
-3/30/2018)
  (4) PR01:  Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017
-03/30/2018
). 71152-Problem Identification and Resolution


===Semiannual Trend Review===
=====Description:=====
{{IP sample|count=1}}
On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be mindful and careful.


The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.


Annual Follow
Corrective Actions: On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.
-up of Selected Issue s (2 Samples)  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
  (1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed
. (2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC
-503B, "Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level."


INSPECTION RESULTS Announcement of an NRC Inspector's Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV  05000482/2018002
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.
-0 1  Closed  Not Applicable


==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities==
=====Performance Assessment:=====
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.


The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," associated with the licensee's failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.
=====Enforcement:=====
The Reactor Oversight Processs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.


Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities
Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impact ed the NRC's ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.


Description
Severity: The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
: On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off
-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11: 00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be "mindful and careful."


The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.
: 30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building
, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred
, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.


Corrective Actions:  On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.
Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspectors. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.


Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.


Performance Assessment:  The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.
Observation


=====Enforcement:=====
==71152 - Problem==
The Reactor Oversight Process's significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRC's ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non
Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the licensees progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRCs review of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8, 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.
-compliance.


12 Severity:  The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated with impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspectors presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspectors presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018.


Violation:  Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.
However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRCs regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.


Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspector s, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector s. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.
The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensees understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically:
* NCV 05000482/2018002-02, Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope, involved a failure to ensure an implementing documentthe boundary matrixidentified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.
* NCV 05000482/2018001-01, Inadequate Functionality Assessment Associated with the Emergency Excess Letdown Flowpath, involved discrepancies between the Technical Specification Bases, procedures, and the updated safety analysis report; these discrepancies contributed to an inadequate functionality assessment.
* NCV 05000482/2017003-02, Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases, involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized.
* NCV 05000482/2017002-02, Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable, related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves importance to the safety-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety-related equipment was not recognized.


Enforcement Action:  This violation is being treated as a n NCV , consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report.


Observation 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the licensee's progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRC's review of the licensee's progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/201800 7 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8 , 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.
Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems


The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated wit h impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002
Green NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Closed
-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspector's presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspector's presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018. However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRC's regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.
[H.3] - Human Performance, Change Management


13 The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensee's understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically
==71152 - Problem==
:  NCV 05000482/2018002
Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.
-02, "Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope
," involved a failure to ensure an implementing document
-the boundary matrix
-identified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.


NCV 05000482/2018001
=====Description:=====
-01, "Inadequate Functionality Assessment Associated with the Emergency Excess Letdown Flowpath," involved discrepancies between th e Technical Specification Bases, procedures, and the updated safety analysis report
On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE-004, Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test, Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation systems ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from nearly no measurable differential pressurerelative to outside airto approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.
; these discrepancies contributed to an inadequate functionality assessment
.


NCV 05000482/2017003
Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications, was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation.
-02, "Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases
," involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized
.


NCV 05000482/2017002
On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while the compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge, demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.
-02, "Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable," related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves' importance to the safety
-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety
-related equipment was not recognized.


In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified
Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements.
. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report
. Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems  Green NCV 05000482/2018002
-0 2 Closed [H.3] - Human Performance , Change Management 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control,"
was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2
,032 foot and 2
,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelope's ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.


Description
The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.
:  On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE
-004, "Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test," Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation system's ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from 14 nearly no measurable differential pressure
-relative to outside air
-to approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.


Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and
The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2,016 foot to 2,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2,016 and 2,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries. WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from A, Boundary Matrix, of AP 10-104, Breach Authorization, Revision 35.
, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, "SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications," was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2
,032 foot and 2
,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation
.


On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while t he compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge , demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.
WCRE-35 notes, The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated. The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundarys importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.


Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements. The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin.


The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120056.
-35, "Boundary Matrix," Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2
,016 foot to 2
,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE
-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2
,016 and 2 ,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries.


WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from Attachment A, "Boundary Matrix," of AP 10-104, "Breach Authorization," Revision 35. WCRE-35 notes, "The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated."  The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundary's importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.
=====Performance Assessment:=====
Performance Deficiency: The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, is a performance deficiency.


Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation systems ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor without compensatory measures in place.
-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin. Corrective Action Reference
:  Condition Report 120056.


15 Performance Assessment
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere. Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required.
: Performance Deficiency:  The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control," is a performance deficiency.


Screening:  The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation system's ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor with out compensatory measures in place.
The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment.


Significance:  The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At
Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results.
-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of th e control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere.


Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required. The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment. Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as
Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.
-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results. Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.


As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).


Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE-35 was recently revised and implemented. As a result, WCRE-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries.
 
=====Enforcement:=====
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
 
Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.
 
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
 
Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
 
Green NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Closed
[H.2] - Human Performance, Field Presence


Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE
==71152 - Problem==
-35 was recently revised and implemented
Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.
. As a result, WCRE
-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries
. Enforcement
:  Violation:  Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that for those structures, systems
, and comp o nents to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.


16 Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality
=====Description:=====
-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B
On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.
, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE
-35, "Boundary Matrix," which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.


Disposition:
During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technicians then informed the control room operator they were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459. As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 percentisolation of letdown, and automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.
This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events  Green NCV 05000482/2018002
-0 3 Closed [H.2] - Human Performance , Field Presence 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V , "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety
-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters , and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.


Description
Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC-503B stated, At C2-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS-1 (LS/460A)to TEST position. This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.
:  On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC
-503B, "Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration," Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one
-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.


During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technician s then informed the control room operator t hey were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459.
Operators responded to the transient using Off-Normal Procedure OFN SB-008, Instrument Malfunctions, Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC-503B.


As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transient
Procedure OFN SB-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected. The technician did not re-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, Place BB LS-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position, before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as 63 percenta second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de-energization of the back-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, stop work.
-level got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 perce nt-isolation of letdown, and automatic de
-energization of the pressurizer back
-up heaters.


17 Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC
The licensees evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for leadership team member implementation oversight as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room. The inspectors agreed with the licensees conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.
-503B stated, "At C2
-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS
-1 (LS/460A) to TEST position."  This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.


Operators responded to the transient using Of f-Normal Procedure OFN SB
Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.
-008, "Instrument Malfunctions," Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off
-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC
-503B. Procedure OFN SB
-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected.


The technician did not re
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120807.
-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, "Place BB LS
-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position," before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transient
-level got as high as 63 percent
-a second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de
-energization of the back
-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, "stop work."  The licensee's evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for "leadership team member implementation oversight" as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room.


The inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.
=====Performance Assessment:=====
Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions:
: (1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure; and
: (2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively.


Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two
-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.


Corrective Action Reference
Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transients, letdown isolation signals, and signals for automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.
:  Condition Report 120807. Performance Assessment
:  Performance Deficiency:  The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was a performance deficienc y. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions
:  (1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure
; and (2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively
. Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and 18 adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transient s, letdown isolation signal s, and signals for automatic de
-energization of the pressurizer back
-up heaters.


Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1 , "Initiating Events Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding was not a deficiency that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined th is finding was not a deficienc y that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).


Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities
Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC-503B by placing eyes on the problem, coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.
. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC
-503B by placing "eyes on the problem," coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.


Enforcement
=====Enforcement:=====
:  Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
: (1) Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position.


  (1) Procedure STS IC
Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.
-503B, "Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration," Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS
: (2) Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed.
-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS
-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position. Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.


(2) Procedure STS IC
Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.
-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS
-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS
-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed. Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.


Disposition:
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.


19 EXIT MEETIN GS AND DEBRIEFS On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.


On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President , and other members of the licensee staff.
On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.


On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.


The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
.
1


=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=


71111.01-Adverse Weather Protection
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision OFN AF-025 Unit Limitations
Number
Drawings Number Title Revision KD-7496 One Line Diagram
Title
Revision
OFN AF-025
Unit Limitations  
 
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
KD-7496
One Line Diagram  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
23867 123954 123955 123956 123957 123958 123959 123961 123962 123963 123968 123969    Miscellaneous
23867
Documents Number Title Date Temporary Operating Guide
23954
23955
23956
23957
23958
23959
23961
23962
23963
23968
23969
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
Temporary
Operating Guide
Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages
Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages
Expires December 31, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0300
Expires
Outage of the Wolf Creek
December 31,
-Benton 345 kV Line
2018
February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0301
Transmission
Outage of the Wolf Creek
Operating
-Rose Hill 345 kV Line
Directive 0300
February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0306
Outage of the Wolf Creek-Benton 345 kV Line
Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345
February 28,
-40 or 345-60 February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0307
2018
Outage of the Wolf Creek
Transmission
-Waverly 345 kV Line
Operating
February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0308
Directive 0301
Outage of the Waverly
Outage of the Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345 kV Line
-LaCygne 345 kV Line
February 28,
February 28, 2018
2018
71111.04-Equipment Alignment
Transmission
Operating
Directive 0306
Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345-40 or 345-60
February 28,
2018
Transmission
Operating
Directive 0307
Outage of the Wolf Creek-Waverly 345 kV Line
February 28,
2018
Transmission
Operating
Directive 0308
Outage of the Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV Line
February 28,
2018  
 
71111.04Equipment Alignment
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision CKL AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup
Number
CKL EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve Lineup/Breaker Checklist
Title
CKL EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup
Revision
Drawings Number Title Revision E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller
CKL AL-120
E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers
Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup
KD-7496 One-Line Diagram
CKL EC-120
M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve
and Clean-up System 23 M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System 7 M-12EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29 M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 42 M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 70 M-K2EF01A Abandoned ESW Equipment
Lineup/Breaker Checklist
M-K2EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 19 M-K2EF03A Abandoned ESW Equipment
CKL EF-120
Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup  
 
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-13EC09
Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power
Supply Motor Controller
E-13GG02
Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers
KD-7496
One-Line Diagram
M-12AL01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater
System
M-12EC01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and
Clean-up System
M-12EC02
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and
Clean-up System
M-12EF01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water
System
M-12EF02
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
System
M-K2EF01
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
System
M-K2EF01A
Abandoned ESW Equipment
M-K2EF03
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water
System
M-K2EF03A
Abandoned ESW Equipment  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
2669 121872 122213 122233 124453
2669
71111.05AQ
21872
-Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly
2213
2233
24453
 
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 10-106 Fire Preplans
Number
18A Drawings Number Title Revision E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis
Title
Revision
AP 10-106
Fire Preplans
18A
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-1F9905
Fire Hazard Analysis  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
21946 122915 122944 123429 123446 123920 123921    71111.06-Flood Protection Measures
21946
Drawings Number Title Revision C-K201 E.S.
2915
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan]], Sections & Schedules SHT.1
2944
C-K201 E.S.
23429
23446
23920
23921
 
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
C-K201
E.S.
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan]], Sections  
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan]], Sections  
& Schedules SHT.1
& Schedules SHT.1
C-K202 E.S.
C-K201
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan]], Sections & Schedules SH
E.S.
: [[contact::T.
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan]], Sections  
-2 10 C-K202 E.S.W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan]], Sections & Schedules SHT.
& Schedules SHT.1
-2 11 C-K209 E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections
C-K202
& Details 9 C-K212 E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections
E.S.
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan]],
Sections & Schedules SHT.-2
C-K202
E.S.
: [[contact::W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan]],
Sections & Schedules SHT.-2
C-K209
E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections & Details
C-K212
E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections 4
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
24380 124381 124382 124383 124397 124409
24380
71111.08-Inservice Inspection Activities
24381
24382
24383
24397
24409
 
71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision 54-ISI-603-009 Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal Sleeves 9 AP-16F-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
Number
I-ENG-023 Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines
Title
LMT-08-PDI-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
Revision
LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf Creek Generating Station
54-ISI-603-009
LMT-08-UT-004 Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base Material > 2.0" in Thickness
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure
SG-SGMP-15-4 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment
Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal
SG-SGMP-16-18 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment
Sleeves
SG-SGMP-18-9 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment for
AP-16F-001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
I-ENG-023
Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines
LMT-08-PDI-UT-1
Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf
Creek Generating Station
LMT-08-UT-004
Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base
Material > 2.0 in Thickness
SG-SGMP-15-4
Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring
and Operational Assessment
SG-SGMP-16-18
Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring
and Operational Assessment
SG-SGMP-18-9
Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring
and Operational Assessment for
Cycle 23 and Cycle 24
Cycle 23 and Cycle 24
STS PE-040E Reactor Pressure Vessel
STS PE-040E
Head Visual Inspection
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Visual Inspection
WCRE-30 Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating Station Interval 4
WCRE-30
Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating
Station Interval 4  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
93748 93749 107686 108888 109175 111055 112584 113666 114073 117639 117827 121438 121439    71111.11-Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
93748
93749
107686
108888
109175
111055
2584
113666
114073
117639
117827
21438
21439
 
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test
Number
SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources
Title
SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers
Revision
STS AE-211
Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test
SYS NB-201
Transferring NB01 Power Sources
SYS NB-320
Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
23853 12395 0 123951    Miscellaneous
23853
Documents Number Title Revision/ Date 17-01 (IC342) 2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario
23950
18-01 (340) 2018 Annual Requalification Exam
23951
STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test
 
Completed May 17, 2018
Miscellaneous Documents
SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources
Number
Completed May 2, 2018
Title
SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers
Revision/
Completed May 2, 2018
Date
71111.12-Maintenance Effectiveness
17-01 (IC342)
2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario
18-01 (340)
2018 Annual Requalification Exam
STS AE-211
Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test
Completed
May 17, 2018
SYS NB-201
Transferring NB01 Power Sources
Completed
May 2, 2018
SYS NB-320
Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers
Completed
May 2, 2018
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
113227 122957    Work Orders
113227
17-428387-001     Miscellaneous
2957
Documents Number Title Date System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
 
April 1, 2015 through June 30, 2015
Work Orders
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
17-428387-001  
October 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
 
April 1, 2016 through December, 2016 System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
Miscellaneous Documents
July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017
Number
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
Title
January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017
Date
Miscellaneous
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
Documents Number Title Date System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
April 1, 2015
July 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017
through
EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
June 30, 2015
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
- EC-01 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
October 1, 2015
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
through December
- EC-02 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
31, 2015
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
- EC-03 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
April 1, 2016
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
through December,
- EC-04 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
2016
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
- EC-05 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
July 1, 2016 through
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
June 30, 2017
- EC-06 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup  
January 1, 2017
- EC-07   71111.13-Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
through June 30,
2017  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling
July 1, 2017 through
December 31, 2017
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-01
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-02
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-03
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-04
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-05
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-06
EC
Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-07  
 
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 21C-001 Wolf Creek Substation
Number
AP 21D-004 Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown Operations
Title
11A AP 22C-008 Qualitative Risk Management
Revision
4B FHP 02-001 Refueling Operations
AP 21C-001
FHP 02-007A Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal
Wolf Creek Substation
2A FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations
AP 21D-004
GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations
Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown
STS GP-001 Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test
Operations
STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification
11A
STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification
AP 22C-008
24A SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor
Qualitative Risk Management
Drawings Number Title Revision M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 36 M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 28 M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 23 M-12EJ01 Piping and
4B
Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
FHP 02-001
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
Refueling Operations
M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
FHP 02-007A
M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line
Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal
2A
FHP 05-001
Equipment Hatch Operations
GEN 00-008
RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations
STS GP-001
Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test
STS GP-006
CTMT Closure Verification
STS GP-006
CTMT Closure Verification
24A
SYS BB-215
RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor  
 
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
M-12BB01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BB02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BB04
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System Test Line  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
21353     Miscellaneous
21353  
Documents Number Title Date APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
 
April 5, 2018 APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
April 5, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Days, Mode 6
Shift: Days, Mode 6
April 6, 2018
April 6, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Nights, Mode 6
April 7, 2018
April 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Nights, Defueled
April 12, 2018
April 12, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Nights, Defueled
April 19, 2018
April 19, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Days, Defueled April 24, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
Shift: Days, Defueled
April 24, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary
Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
May 8, 2018
May 8, 2018
ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50
ET 88-0193
-482: Generic Letter 88
Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay
-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Heat Removal
December 23, 1988
December 23,
Miscellaneous
1988  
Documents Number Title Date ET 92-0001 Docket No.
 
50-482: Change in Commitment Associated with Generic Letter 88
Miscellaneous Documents
-17 January 2, 1992 STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
Number
Completed May 9, 2018
Title
WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50
Date
-482: Generic Letter 88
ET 92-0001
-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated
February 2, 1989 71111.15-Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
with Generic Letter 88-17
January 2,
1992
STS CR-002
Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
Completed
May 9, 2018
WM 89-0041
Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay
Heat Removal
February 2,
1989
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 22A-001 Screening, Prioritization and Pre
Number
-Approval 21 AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
Title
AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations
Revision
Drawings Number Title Revision   Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11
AP 22A-001
M-703-00055 Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly
Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval
W02 M-709-00099 Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details  
AP 26C-004
- Sheet 1 W01 Condition Reports
Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment
2207 122351 122581 123083 123084 123567 123902 123903 123905 123906 123907 123908 123914    Work Orders
AP 28-001
18-438919-000 18-438984-000 18-439282-000   Miscellaneous
Operability Evaluations  
Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 05-013-01 M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection Pump W25
 
Miscellaneous
Drawings
Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition  
Number
- DPEM01A Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating
Title
- CR 122518 May 1, 2018
Revision
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition  
Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11
- DPEM01A Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating  
M-703-00055
- CR 122581 May 3, 2018 APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition  
Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly
- PEM01A RF22 Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact
W02
M-709-00099
Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details - Sheet 1
W01
Condition Reports
2207
2351
2581
23083
23084
23567
23902
23903
23905
23906
23907
23908
23914
 
Work Orders
18-438919-000
18-438984-000
18-439282-000  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
APF 05-013-01
M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection
Pump
W25  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A
Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR
2518
May 1, 2018
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A
Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR
2581
May 3, 2018
APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - PEM01A RF22
Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact
May 9, 2018
May 9, 2018
MRP 2018-010 Electric Power Research Institute  
MRP 2018-010
- Notification of Recent PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and Recommended Plant Actions
Electric Power Research Institute - Notification of Recent
PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control
Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and
Recommended Plant Actions
April 20, 2018
April 20, 2018
XX-E-006 Calculation XX
XX-E-006
-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7  
Calculation XX-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7 -
- Appendix 31  
Appendix 31 - Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting
- Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting Analysis - Output Report
Analysis - Output Report  
71111.18-Plant Modifications
 
Drawings Number Title Revision/Date E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers
71111.18Plant Modifications
E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller
Drawings
M-084A-00010 8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram
Number
January 31, 2018 WIP-E-12EC09-000-A-1 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller
Title
WIP-E-IR0211A-002B-1 Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000'
Revision/Date
-0" 00 WIP-M-1X6906-000-A-1 Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations
E-13GG02
WIP-M-1X6906-001-A-1 Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations
Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers
WIP-M-13EG29-000-A-1 Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Fuel Building
E-13EC09
Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power
Supply Motor Controller
M-084A-00010
8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram
January 31,
2018
WIP-E-12EC09-
000-A-1
Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power
Supply Motor Controller
WIP-E-IR0211A-
2B-1
Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground
Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000-0
WIP-M-1X6906-
000-A-1
Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations
WIP-M-1X6906-
001-A-1
Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations
WIP-M-13EG29-
000-A-1
Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
Fuel Building  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
2629 122684 122959 123060 123146 123193 123195 123259 123584 123592  Miscellaneous
2629
Documents Number Title Date 14403 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation System April 30, 2015
2684
14496 Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup
2959
August 30, 2016 15241 Change Package Engineering
23060
Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling Modification
23146
November 29, 2017 15273 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling Electrical
23193
March 3, 2018 71111.19-Post Maintenance Testing
23195
23259
23584
23592
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
14403
Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
System
April 30, 2015
14496
Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup
August 30,
2016
241
Change Package Engineering Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool
Alternate Cooling Modification
November 29,
2017
273
Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling
Electrical
March 3,
2018
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision STN EC-201 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean
Number
-Up System Valve Test
Title
STN XMR-001 XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification
Revision
STS BG-100A Centrifugal Charging System "A" Train Inservice Pump
STN EC-201
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System Valve Test
STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
STN XMR-001
STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level
XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification
STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level
STS BG-100A
2A STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02
Centrifugal Charging System A Train Inservice Pump
SYS EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup
STS CR-002
Drawings Number Title Revision E-0033.3-009-03 Power Tran
Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
sformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000,  
STS EM-100A
: [[contact::H. V. 345000]],  
Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test
STS IC-503B
Channel Calibration pressurizer Level
STS IC-503B
Channel Calibration pressurizer Level
2A
STS KJ-015B
Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02
SYS EC-120
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup  
 
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-0033.3-009-03 Power Transformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form,
Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H. V.
345000,  
: [[contact::L.V. 13800]],  
: [[contact::L.V. 13800]],  
: [[contact::Y. Y.]], 13800, 60 Hertz
: [[contact::Y. Y.]], 13800, 60 Hertz
E-003.3-00008 CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram
E-003.3-00008
W10
CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram W10
Drawings Number Title Revision E-003.3-00022 Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000,  
 
: [[contact::H. V. 345000]], L  
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-003.3-00022
Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form,
Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H. V.
345000, L  
: [[contact::V. 13800]],  
: [[contact::V. 13800]],  
: [[contact::Y. Y. 13800]], 60 Hertz
: [[contact::Y. Y. 13800]], 60 Hertz
W09 E-11MR01 Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying Diagram 7 M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
W09
M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS
E-11MR01
Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying
Diagram
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
2520 122524 122526 122527 122784 122954 124387 124400 124405  Work Orders
2520
13-366290-005 15-403582-002 17-427200-023 17-432721-000 17-432722-000 18-438909-000 18-438919-001 18-438923-001   Miscellaneous
2524
Number Title Date APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS)  
2526
- Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test
2527
April 23, 2018 STN EM-100A SI Pump A Reference Pump
2784
Completed April 29, 2018 STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test
2954
Completed May 11, 2018
24387
STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02
24400
Completed May 1, 2018
24405
71111.20-Refueling and Other Outage Activities
 
Work Orders
13-366290-005
15-403582-002
17-427200-023
17-432721-000
17-432722-000
18-438909-000
18-438919-001
18-438923-001  
 
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Date
APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS) - Fuel Pool
Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test
April 23,
2018
STN EM-100A
SI Pump A Reference Pump
Completed
April 29,
2018
STS EM-100A
Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test
Completed
May 11, 2018
STS KJ-015B
Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02
Completed
May 1, 2018
71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
AI-07B-024
Instructions For Containment Purge Permits
FHP 05-001
Equipment Hatch Operations
GEN 00-002
Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby
101
 
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AI-07B-024 Instructions For Containment Purge Permits
Number
FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations
Title
GEN 00-002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby
Revision
GEN 00-003
Hot Standby to Minimum Load
101
101
Procedures
GEN 00-008
Number Title Revision  GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load
RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations
101 GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations
INC C-0044
INC C-0044 Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply
Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply
RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing
RXE 01-002
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and
Reload Low Power Physics Testing
84 STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification
STS CR-002
24A SYS BB-112 Vacuum Fill of the RCS
Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor
STS GP-006
47A SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor
CTMT Closure Verification
SYS SB-300 Deenergizing SB Protection Sets
24A
Drawings Number Title Revision E-13NN01 Class IE Instrument AC Schematic
SYS BB-112
E-13SB09 Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4 Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets
Vacuum Fill of the RCS
M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 36 M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 28 M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 23 M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
SYS BB-215
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor
M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
47A
M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System
SYS BB-215
M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line
RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor
SYS SB-300
Deenergizing SB Protection Sets  
 
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
E-13NN01
Class IE Instrument AC Schematic
E-13SB09
Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4
Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets
M-12BB01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BB02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12BB04
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant
System
M-12EJ01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat
Removal System
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM01
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM02
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System
M-12EM03
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant
Injection System Test Line  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
20865 120906 120917 120934 120963 121467 121469 121507 121575 121710 121779 121825 121881 121901 121938 121953 122359 122375 122571 122593 122787 122798 122837 123075 123087 123221 123429 123434 123440 123444 123446 123448 123488 123500 123517 123752 123767    Work Orders
20865
17-426098-000 18-437026-000    Miscellaneous
20906
Documents Number Title Revision/Date  Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22 Failed Fuel Mitigation
20917
- Presenter Daljit Mand
20934
OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule
20963
Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core Testing January 4, 2018  RF22 OCC Shift Update
21467
- Nights April 6, 2018
21469
RF22 OCC Shift Update
21507
- Days April 11, 2018
21575
RF22 OCC Shift Update
21710
- Nights April 11, 2018
21779
RF22 OCC Shift Update
21825
- Nights  April 12, 2018
21881
RF22 OCC Shift Update
21901
- Nights April 13, 2018
21938
RF22 OCC Shift Update
21953
- Day s April 15, 2018
2359
RF22 OCC Shift Update
2375
- Night s April 16, 2018
2571
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Day s April 17, 2018
2593
RF22 OCC Shift Update
2787
- Night s April 18, 2018
2798
RF22 OCC Shift Update
2837
- Nights April 19, 2018
23075
RF22 OCC Shift Update
23087
- Day s April 25, 2018
23221
RF22 OCC Shift Update
23429
- Night s April 26, 2018
23434
RF22 OCC Shift Update
23440
- Day s April 29, 2018  RF22 OCC Shift Update
23444
- Night s April 29, 2018
23446
23448
23488
23500
23517
23752
23767


Miscellaneous
Work Orders
Documents Number Title Revision/Date RF22 OCC Shift Update  
17-426098-000
- Day s April 30, 2018
18-437026-000
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
 
- Night s April 30, 2018
Miscellaneous Documents
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
Number
- Day s May 1, 2018
Title
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
Revision/Date
- Night s May 1, 2018
Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Day s May 2, 2018
Failed Fuel Mitigation - Presenter Daljit Mand
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
 
- Night s May 2, 2018
OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
 
- Day s May 3, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update  
Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core
- Night s May 4, 2018
Testing
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
January 4,
- Night s May 4, 2018
2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
- Day s May 6, 2018
April 6, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
- D ay s May 7, 2018
April 11, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
- Night s May 7, 2018
April 11, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
- Day s May 8, 2018
April 12, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
- Night s May 8, 2018
April 13, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
- Day s May 9, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update  
April 15, 2018
- Night s May 9, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
RF22 OCC Shift Update  
April 16, 2018
- Night s May 10, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 17, 2018
- Day s May 13, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 18, 2018
- Day s May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 19, 2018
- Night s May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 25, 2018
  - Day s May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 26, 2018
- Night s May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 29, 2018
- Day s May 16, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
RF22 OCC Shift Update
April 29, 2018
- Day s May 17, 2018
 
RF22 OCC Shift Update
Miscellaneous Documents
- Night s May 17, 2018
Number
Title
Revision/Date
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
April 30, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
April 30, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 1, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 1, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 2, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 2, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 3, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 4, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 4, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 6, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 7, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 7, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 8, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 8, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 9, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 9, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 10, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 13, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 14, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 15, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 16, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days
May 17, 2018
RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights
May 17, 2018
RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule
RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form  
AIF 21-016-02
- Days - Credited April 3, 2018
Time Verification Form - Days - Credited
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form
- Nights - Credited April 3, 2018
AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form
- Nights - No Credit Taken
April 3, 2018
April 3, 2018
AIF 22D-008-02 Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist
AIF 21-016-02
Time Verification Form - Nights - Credited
April 3, 2018
AIF 21-016-02
Time Verification Form - Nights - No Credit Taken
April 3, 2018
AIF 22D-008-02
Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist
Completed
Completed
May 17, 2108
May 17, 2108  


Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous Documents
Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet  
Number
- Vacuum Fill of the RCS
Title
Revision/Date
APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet - Vacuum Fill of the RCS
Completed
Completed
May 11, 2018
May 11, 2018
APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist  
APF 21-001-02
- On-Coming CRS/WC SRO/RO/BOP Review
Control Room Turnover Checklist - On-Coming CRS/WC
SRO/RO/BOP Review
May 7, 2018
May 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment
APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment Mode 6 Refueling Operations  
Mode 6 Refueling Operations  
>23 Ft. Above Vessel Flange
>23 Ft. Above Vessel
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
Flange 12 APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode  
April 4, 2018
- Defueled April 4, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment
April 7, 2018
No Mode - Defu eled April 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode  
April 11, 2018
- Defueled April 11, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode  
April 14, 2018
- Defueled April 14, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode  
April 15, 2018
- Defueled April 15, 2018
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled
APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode  
April 17, 2018
- Defueled April 17, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
& Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
April 1, 2018
April 1, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
April 3, 2018
April 3, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5
April 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5
April 5, 2018
April 5, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6
April 6, 2018
April 6, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6
April 7, 2018
April 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
April 7, 2018
April 7, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6
May 8, 2018
May 8, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
April 11, 2018
April 11, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
April 14, 2018 APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
April 15, 2018
April 14, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
April 15, 2018
April 15, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled
April 15, 2018


Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous Documents
Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
Number
Title
Revision/Date
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
April 17, 2018
April 17, 2018
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment
Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled
May 8, 2018
May 8, 2018
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package  
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 181102
- RWP Number 181102 January 18, 2018 APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package  
January 18,
- RWP Number 182602
2018
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package  
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602
- RWP Number 183000
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 183000
March 7, 2018
March 7, 2018
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package  
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602
- RWP Number 182602
March 8, 2018
March 8, 2018
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form - RWP Number: 182601
- RWP Number: 182601
10A
10A BGV0365 Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain
BGV0365
C22: R-EN-A-002A Clearance Order
Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain
C22: R-EN-A-
2A
Clearance Order
April 2, 2018
April 2, 2018
C22: R-EN-B-002A Clearance Order
C22: R-EN-B-
2A
Clearance Order
March 31, 2018
March 31, 2018
C22: R-OP-S-001B Clearance Order
C22: R-OP-S-
001B
Clearance Order
May 4, 2018
May 4, 2018
C22: R-OP-S-002A Clearance Order
C22: R-OP-S-
2A
Clearance Order
May 9, 2018
May 9, 2018
C22: R-OP-S-002B Clearance Order
C22: R-OP-S-
2B
Clearance Order
May 11, 2018
May 11, 2018
C22: R-OP-S-003A Clearance Order
C22: R-OP-S-
003A
Clearance Order
May 6, 2018
May 6, 2018
ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50
ET 88-0193
-482: Generic Letter 88
Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of
-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Decay Heat Removal
December 23, 1988 ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50
December 23,
-482: Change in Commitment Associated with Generic Letter 88
1988
-17 January 2, 1992 GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab
ET 92-0001
Report Created April 18, 2018, 02:36 GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab
Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated
Report Created April 18, 2018, 08:43 GTRE 32 Char
with Generic Letter 88-17
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab
January 2,
Report Created April 15, 2018, 14:59
1992
Miscellaneous
GTRE 32
Documents Number Title Revision/Date GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Report Created April 18, 2018, 07:04 GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab
Radiochemistry Lab
Report Created April 18, 2018, 07:05 K04-013 Gas Effluent Release Report
Report Created
April 18, 2018,
2:36
GTRE 32
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Radiochemistry Lab
Report Created
April 18, 2018,
08:43
GTRE 32 Char
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Radiochemistry Lab
Report Created
April 15, 2018,
14:59  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
GTRE 33
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Radiochemistry Lab
Report Created
April 18, 2018,
07:04
GTRE 33
Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department
Radiochemistry Lab
Report Created
April 18, 2018,
07:05
K04-013
Gas Effluent Release Report
April 16, 2018
April 16, 2018
RA 18-0032 Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team Report RA 18
RA 18-0032
-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018
Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team
Report RA 18-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018
March 20, 2018
RPF 02-105-01
Radiation Work Permit - 181102
000
RPF 02-105-01
Radiation Work Permit - 182601
000
RPF 02-105-01
Radiation Work Permit - 182602
000
RPF 02-105-01
Radiation Work Permit - 182602
2
RFP 02-105-01
Radiation Work Permit - 184206
000
RPF 02-210-01
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180225-3 February 25,
2018
RPF 02-210-01
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180320-
March 20, 2018
March 20, 2018
RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit
RPF 02-210-01
- 181102 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180405-
- 182601 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit
April 5, 2018
- 182602 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit
RPF 02-210-01
- 182602 002 RFP 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180416-1 April 16, 2018
- 184206 000 RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map
RPF 02-210-01
- Survey M-20180225-3 February 25, 2018 RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map  
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180407-6 April 7, 2018
- Survey M-20180320-15 March 20, 2018
RPF 02-210-01
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180421-
- Survey M-20180405-26 April 5, 2018
April 21, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map  
RPF 02-210-01
- Survey M-20180416-1 April 16, 2018
WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180406-
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map  
April 6, 2018
- Survey M-20180407-6 April 7, 2018
RXE 01-002
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map  
Reload Low Power Physics Testing
- Survey M-20180421-21 April 21, 2018
RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map  
- Survey M-20180406-27 April 6, 2018
RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing
Completed
Completed
May 17, 2018
May 17, 2018
STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
STS CR-002
Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6
Completed
Completed
May 11, 2018
May 11, 2018
STS GP-006 Containment Closure Verification
STS GP-006
Containment Closure Verification
Completed
Completed
April 6, 2018
April 6, 2018
WM 26-0034 Docket No. 50
WM 26-0034
-482: Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) Information  
Docket No. 50-482: Foreign Ownership, Control or
- Change to Lists of Owners, Officers, Directors and Executive Personne
Influence (FOCI) Information - Change to Lists of
l April 26, 2018
Owners, Officers, Directors and Executive Personnel
April 26, 2018  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
WM 89-0041
Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of
Decay Heat Removal
February 2,
1989
71111.22Surveillance Testing
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
STS BB-004
RCS Water Inventory Balance
STS BB-006
RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer
STS BB-010
Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance
STS CV-210A
ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve
Test
STS EM-003A
ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test
STS KJ-001B
Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B
STS PE-128
LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] Valve Lineup for Penetrations
and 29
 
Condition Reports
2451
2757
2783
23223


Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
Documents Number Title Revision/Date WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50
Number
-482:  Generic Letter 88
Title
-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal
Revision/Date
February 2, 1989  71111.22-Surveillance Testing
STS CV-210A
ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve
Test
Completed
April 29, 2018
STS CV-210A
ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve
Test
Completed
May 1, 2018
STS EM-003A
ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test
Completed
May 2, 2018
WCRE-03
Wolf Creek Tank Document
 
71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision  STS BB-004 RCS Water Inventory Balance
Number
STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer
Title
STS BB-010 Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance
Revision
STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Test 27 STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test
AP 19D-100
STS KJ-001B Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test
Radioactive Source Program
- Train B 61 STS PE-128 LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] Valve Lineup for Penetrations
 
and 29 6  Condition Reports
2451 122757 122783 123223  Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/Date STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Test Completed April 29, 2018
STS CV-210A ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve Test Completed May 1, 2018
STS EM-003A ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test
Completed May 2, 2018
WCRE-03 Wolf Creek Tank Document
71124.01-Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 19D-100 Radioactive Source Program
Number
Procedures
Title
Number Title Revision AP 25A-001 Radiation Protection Manual
Revision
17B AP 25A-100 Access to Locked
AP 25A-001
High or Very High Rad Areas
Radiation Protection Manual
AP 25A-100 Containment Entry
17B
18A AP 25B-100 Radiation Worker Guidelines
AP 25A-100
AP 25B-300 RWP Program
Access to Locked High or Very High Rad Areas
24A RPP 01-105 Radiation Protection Or ganization, Responsibilities and Code of Conduct
AP 25A-100
RPP 02-105 Radiation Work Permit 48 RPP 02-215 Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
Containment Entry
4A RPP 02-405 RCA Access Control
18A
RPP 02-515 Release of Material from the RCA
AP 25B-100
RPP 02-605 Control and Inventory of Radioactive Sources
Radiation Worker Guidelines
AP 25B-300
RWP Program
24A
RPP 01-105
Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and
Code of Conduct
RPP 02-105
Radiation Work Permit
RPP 02-215
Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas
34A
RPP 02-405
RCA Access Control
RPP 02-515
Release of Material from the RCA
RPP 02-605
Control and Inventory of Radioactive Sources  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
2244 112935 112973 113053 113055 113627 113631 114261 116377 116509 116510 117296 119183 119223 120975 121159 121171 121281 121282 121568  Radiation Work Permits
2244
Number Title Revision 180021 Cartridge Filter Change
2935
-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
2973
182601 Routine Outage Access (No LHRA Access)
113053
183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current Testing
113055
184199 Secondary Side S/G FOSAR
113627
184200 Secondary Side S/G Sludge Lance
113631
184420 Scaffolding
114261
184482 RV Head Disassembly  
116377
- Canopy Seal Clamp Activities
116509
184483 RV Head Reassembly  
116510
- Canopy Seal Clamp Activities
117296
186020 Reactor Vessel Head Preparation
119183
119223
20975
21159
21171
21281
21282
21568
Radiation Work Permits
Number
Title
Revision
180021
Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
2601
Routine Outage Access (No LHRA Access)
183220
Primary S/G Eddy Current Testing
184199
Secondary Side S/G FOSAR
184200
Secondary Side S/G Sludge Lance
184420
Scaffolding
184482
RV Head Disassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities
184483
RV Head Reassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities
186020
Reactor Vessel Head Preparation  
 
Radiation Surveys
Radiation Surveys
Number Title Date M-20180305-17 1306 and 1308C
Number
Title
Date
M-20180305-17
1306 and 1308C
March 5, 2018
March 5, 2018
M-20180305-4 Resin Bed, Demin Alley, Filter Pit
M-20180305-4
Resin Bed, Demin Alley, Filter Pit
March 4, 2018
March 4, 2018
M-20180307-16 Seal Water HX & VCT Valve Room
M-20180307-16
Seal Water HX & VCT Valve Room
March 7, 2018
March 7, 2018
M-20180307-2 B RHR HX Room
M-20180307-2
B RHR HX Room
March 7, 2018
March 7, 2018
M-20180308-12 North and South Pipe Pen
M-20180308-12
North and South Pipe Pen
March 8, 2018
March 8, 2018
M-20180324-6 SJ 143 Sample Panel
M-20180324-6
SJ 143 Sample Panel
March 24, 2018
March 24, 2018
M-20180329-1 B RHR Pump
M-20180329-1
B RHR Pump
March 29, 2018
March 29, 2018
M-20180402-20 S/G A&D Secondary
M-20180402-20
S/G A&D Secondary
April 2, 2018
April 2, 2018
M-20180403-2 S/G A&D Secondary
M-20180403-2
S/G A&D Secondary
April 3, 2018
April 3, 2018
M-20180409-19 2000 Aux South
M-20180409-19
2000 Aux South
April 9, 2018
April 9, 2018
M-20180411-11 S/G A&D Secondary
M-20180411-11
S/G A&D Secondary
April 11, 2018
April 11, 2018
M-20180411-21 2047 Containment
M-20180411-21
2047 Containment
April 11, 2018
April 11, 2018
Air Sample Surveys
Air Sample Surveys
Number Title Date 18-0129 Containment RX Cavity April 1, 2018
Number
18-0131 CTMT 2000' O/S Bio
Title
-shield April 1, 2018
Date
18-0147 Fuel Building 2047' & above
18-0129
Containment RX Cavity
April 1, 2018
18-0131
CTMT 2000' O/S Bio-shield
April 1, 2018
18-0147
Fuel Building 2047 & above
April 2, 2018
April 2, 2018
18-0154 CTMT 2047'
18-0154
CTMT 2047'
April 3, 2018
April 3, 2018
18-0181 CTMT 2047 (Marinelli Grab Sample)
18-0181
CTMT 2047 (Marinelli Grab Sample)
April 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow
18-0182
-up West of Cavity) April 4, 2018
CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity)
18-0182 CTMT 2047 (Follow
-up West of Cavity)
April 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
Audits and Self
18-0182
-Assessments
CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity)
Number Title Date 18-01-RP/PC QA Audit Report: Radiation Protection And Process Control
April 4, 2018
Audits and Self-Assessments
Number
Title
Date
18-01-RP/PC
QA Audit Report:
Radiation Protection And Process Control
March 12, 2018
March 12, 2018
QH-2017-1476 Se lf-Assessment:
QH-2017-1476
Radiation Protection Procedures and Radiation Worker Behavior Observations
Self-Assessment:
Radiation Protection Procedures and Radiation
Worker Behavior Observations
May 4, 2017
May 4, 2017
QH-2017-1481 Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, 71124.03, and 71151.OR01
QH-2017-1481
April 24, 2017
Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as
delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01,
71124.03, and 71151.OR01
April 24, 2017  


Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Date 18-0181 Skin Dose From Noble Gas Calculation Sheet
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
18-0181
Skin Dose From Noble Gas Calculation Sheet
April 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
K 03-70 Air Sample Log
K 03-70
Air Sample Log
April 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
RPF 02-605-03 Sealed Source Inventory January 29, 2018
RPF 02-605-03
STS HP-001 Sealed Source Contamination Surveillance Test
Sealed Source Inventory
January 29, 2018 71124.02-Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
January 29, 2018
STS HP-001
Sealed Source Contamination Surveillance Test
January 29, 2018
71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 25A-401 ALARA Program
Number
AP 25A-410 ALARA Committee
Title
AP 25B-300 RWP Program
Revision
24A APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package
AP 25A-401
ALARA Program
AP 25A-410
ALARA Committee
AP 25B-300
RWP Program
24A
APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form
APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form
10A APF 25A-401-07 In-Progress ALARA Review
10A
APF 25A-401-07 In-Progress ALARA Review
APF 25A-401-08 Post-Job ALARA Review
APF 25A-401-08 Post-Job ALARA Review
RPF 02-105-05 RWP Risk Assessment
RPF 02-105-05
16A RPP 02-105 RWP 48 RPP 02-605 Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources
RWP Risk Assessment
Condition Reports 112973 113052 113056 113057 113058 113627 113631 113708 113736 113762 114261 114915 115344 115564 115795 116952 117296 118610 119253 119743 119745 120919 120921 121089 121091 121099 121197 121217 121266 121270 121341 121375 121420 121422 121447 121482
16A
Audits and Self
RPP 02-105
-Assessments
RWP
Number Title Date 18-01-RP/PC Quality Assurance Audit Report
RPP 02-605
Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources  
 
Condition Reports
2973
113052
113056
113057
113058
113627
113631
113708
113736
113762
114261
114915
115344
115564
115795
116952
117296
118610
119253
119743
119745
20919
20921
21089
21091
21099
21197
21217
21266
21270
21341
21375
21420
21422
21447
21482
 
Audits and Self-Assessments
Number
Title
Date
18-01-RP/PC
Quality Assurance Audit Report
Radiation Protection and Process Control
Radiation Protection and Process Control
March 12, 2018
March 12, 2018
QH-2017-1481 Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01, 71124.03, and 71151.OR01
QH-2017-1481
Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as
delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01,
71124.03, and 71151.OR01
April 24, 2017
April 24, 2017
QH-2017-1505 NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.04, Occupational Dose Assessment and NRC 71124.02 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
QH-2017-1505
NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.04, Occupational
Dose Assessment and NRC 71124.02 Occupational
ALARA Planning and Controls
May 22, 2017
May 22, 2017
Radiation Work Permit Packages
Radiation Work Permit Packages
Number Title Revision 180021 Cartridge Filter Change
Number
-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
Title
A 182300 Maintenance Support
Revision
182601 Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)
180021
183220 Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP
Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCP's
A
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCP's
2300
184207 RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCP's
Maintenance Support
184420 Scaffolding Activities RF22
2601
184482 Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly
Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)
183220
Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP
184207
RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs
184207
RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs
184207
RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs
184420
Scaffolding Activities RF22
184482
Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly  
 
Miscellaneous Documents
Miscellaneous Documents
Title Date RF 21 & Pre RF21 Forced Outage Radiation Protection Summary
Title
January 9, 2017 71151-Performance Indicator Verification
Date
RF 21 & Pre RF21 Forced Outage Radiation Protection Summary
January 9, 2017
71151Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 02A-001 Primary Chemistry Control
Number
CHS SJ-143B RCS/CVCS/RHR Sampling at SJ
Title
-143 Panel 2 STS BB-006 RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer
Revision
AP 02A-001
Primary Chemistry Control
CHS SJ-143B
RCS/CVCS/RHR Sampling at SJ-143 Panel
STS BB-006
RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
23874 123885 124426 124427  Miscellaneous
23874
Number Title Date RCS Measurement Reports June 2017 through June 2018
23885
Printed June 20, 2018 STS PE-019B RHR Suction Valve Leak Test
24426
Completed November 18, 2016 STS PE-109E RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test
24427
Completed November 19, 2016 71152-Problem Identification and Resolution
 
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Date
RCS
Measurement
Reports
June 2017 through June 2018
Printed June 20,
2018
STS PE-019B
RHR Suction Valve Leak Test
Completed
November 18,
2016
STS PE-109E
RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test
Completed
November 19,
2016
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
Procedures
Number Title Revision AP 10-104 Breach Authorization
Number
AP 10-104 Breach Authorization
Title
37A AP 23-009 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program
Revision
OFN SB-008 Instrument Malfunctions
AP 10-104
STS IC-503B Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration
Breach Authorization
STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
AP 10-104
Breach Authorization
37A
AP 23-009
Control Room Envelope Habitability Program
OFN SB-008
Instrument Malfunctions
STS IC-503B
Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration
STS PE-004
Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test  
 
Condition Reports
Condition Reports
20056 120807 122587 123642 123823  Work Orders
20056
18-437033-006     Miscellaneous
20807
Number Title Revision/ Date QA-2018-0421 Oversight of Operations During the First Quarter of 2018 from 12/21/17 to 3/29/18
2587
April 20, 2018
23642
23823
Work Orders
18-437033-006  
 
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Revision/
Date
QA-2018-0421
Oversight of Operations During the First Quarter of 2018
from 12/21/17 to 3/29/18
April 20,
2018  
 
Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/ Date QA-2018-0425 QA Assessment of the Maintenance 2018 First Quarter FAO Report on 4/2/19
Number
April 22, 2018 QA-2018-0426 Provide QA Oversight of Engineering for the First Quarter of
Title
2018 April 20, 2018 QA-2018-0434 RF22 QA Assessment of Refuel Pool Overfill on 4
Revision/
-7-18 April 29, 2018 QH-2018-1628 FME Quick Hit Self-Assessment
Date
QA-2018-0425
QA Assessment of the Maintenance 2018 First Quarter FAO
Report on 4/2/19
April 22,
2018
QA-2018-0426
Provide QA Oversight of Engineering for the First Quarter of
2018
April 20,
2018
QA-2018-0434
RF22 QA Assessment of Refuel Pool Overfill on 4-7-18
April 29,
2018
QH-2018-1628
FME Quick Hit Self-Assessment
May 23, 2018
May 23, 2018
QS-2018-2504 QA Surveillance of Clearance Order Removal
QS-2018-2504
February 5, 2018 QS-2018-2510 Surveillance of CARB Meeting 1
QA Surveillance of Clearance Order Removal
-17-18 February 5, 2018 QS-2018-2517 QA Observation of Question About Compensatory Measure Fire Watch on 1/22/18 February 5, 2018 QS-2018-2530 Power Block Roof Leaks
February 5,
February 7, 2018 QS-2018-2587 Attended and Observed Meeting on Effects of Modifications
2018
269 March 26, 2018 QS-2018-2597 QA Walkdown of Turbine and Control Buildings
QS-2018-2510
March 28, 2018 QS-2018-2 601 RF22 Observation of Operations Just In Time Training for Plant Cooldown
Surveillance of CARB Meeting 1-17-18
February 5,
2018
QS-2018-2517
QA Observation of Question About Compensatory Measure
Fire Watch on 1/22/18
February 5,
2018
QS-2018-2530
Power Block Roof Leaks
February 7,
2018
QS-2018-2587
Attended and Observed Meeting on Effects of Modifications
269
March 26,
2018
QS-2018-2597
QA Walkdown of Turbine and Control Buildings
March 28,
2018
QS-2018-2601
RF22 Observation of Operations Just In Time Training for
Plant Cooldown
April 2, 2018
April 2, 2018
QS-2018-2646 RF22 QA Observation of Holes Being Drilled for SGK05 Modification Work on 4/8/18
QS-2018-2646
RF22 QA Observation of Holes Being Drilled for SGK05
Modification Work on 4/8/18
April 8, 2018
April 8, 2018
QS-2018-2649 RF 22 QA Review of FME Monitor Logs in Containment on 4/8/18 April 9, 2018
QS-2018-2649
QS-2018-2679 RF22 QA Observation of BHI Workers 4
RF 22 QA Review of FME Monitor Logs in Containment on
-12-18 April 13, 2018 RA 18-0054 Docket No. 50
4/8/18
-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Cycle 22 and Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report
April 9, 2018
April 29, 2018 STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
QS-2018-2679
Completed March 7, 2018 STS PE-004 Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
RF22 QA Observation of BHI Workers 4-12-18
Completed March 15, 2018 WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix
April 13,
2018
RA 18-0054
Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Cycle
and Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report
April 29,
2018
STS PE-004
Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
Completed
March 7,
2018
STS PE-004
Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test
Completed
March 15,
2018
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix  
 
Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
Number Title Revision/ Date WCRE-35 Boundary Matrix
Number
Title
Revision/
Date
WCRE-35
Boundary Matrix  
 
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the
: [[contact::S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget]], Control Number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number. This letter and
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection
its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for Withholding."
Number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the
requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control
number.
This letter and its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for
Withholding.
Information Request
Information Request
January 24, 2018 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information
January 24, 2018
Notification of Inspection and Request for Information
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station
NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018002
NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018002  
 
INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST
INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST
A. Information Requested for the In
A. Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week
-Office Preparation Week
The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic
The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of
format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of Isaac Anchondo, by March 26, 2018, to
Isaac Anchondo, by March 26, 2018, to facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection week. The inspector will select specific items from the information requested below and then request from your staff additional documents needed
facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection
during the onsite inspection week (Section B of this enclosure). We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be available and ready for review on the first day of inspection. Please provide requested documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection. If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as soon as possible.
week. The inspector will select specific items from the information requested below and then
On April 16, 2018, a reactor inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week  
(NRC) Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Inservice Inspection Activities."  Experience has shown that this inspection is a resource intensive inspection both for the NRC inspector and your staff. The date of this inspection may change dependent on the outage schedule you provide. In order to minimize the impact to your onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for documents needed for this inspection. These documents have been divided into two groups. The first group (Section
(Section B of this enclosure). We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be
A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspector is adequately prepared. The second group (Section
available and ready for review on the first day of inspection. Please provide requested
B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspector will need upon
documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard
arrival at the site. It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.
copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject
We have discussed the schedule for these inspection
documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.
activities with your staff and understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will
If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as
be William Muilenburg
soon as possible.
of your licensing organization. The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:
On April 16, 2018, a reactor inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC)
Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Inservice Inspection
Activities. Experience has shown that this inspection is a resource intensive inspection
both for the NRC inspector and your staff. The date of this inspection may change
dependent on the outage schedule you provide. In order to minimize the impact to your
onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for
documents needed for this inspection. These documents have been divided into two
groups. The first group (Section A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided
prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspector is adequately prepared. The second
group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspector will need upon  
 
arrival at the site. It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in
order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation
and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.
We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and
understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be William Muilenburg of your
licensing organization. The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:  
 
Preparation week: March 26, 2018
Preparation week: March 26, 2018
Onsite weeks: April
Onsite weeks: April 16-27, 2018
16-27, 2018 Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage activities. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please contact Isaac Anchondo at (817) 200
Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage
-1152. (email to: Isaac.Anchondo@nrc.gov
activities. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please
). A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information
contact Isaac Anchondo at (817) 200-1152. (email to: Isaac.Anchondo@nrc.gov).  
 
A.1
ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information
1. A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:
1. A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:
1.1. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.
1.1. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components
1.2. Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in the Section XI scope (If applicable)
performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and
1.3. Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program (Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.)
augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.
1.4. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)
1.2. Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in
2. A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.
the Section XI scope (If applicable)
2.1. A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or component the Code Case is being applied to.
1.3. Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program  
3. A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of the last refueling outage. This should include the previous Section XI pressure test(s) conducted during start up and any evaluations
(Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.)
associated with the results of the pressure tests.
1.4. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming
4. A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category, nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage and/or planned this refueling outage.
outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)
5. If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be
2. A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety
examined and the extent of the planned examination. Please also provide reference numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.
evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.
6. Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.
2.1. A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or
7. A list of any temporary non
component the Code Case is being applied to.
-code repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).
3. A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or
8. Please provide copies of the most recent self
rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of
-assessments for the inservice inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.
the last refueling outage. This should include the previous Section XI pressure test(s)
9. Copy of the procedures for welding techniques, and NDE that will be used during the outage. A.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the
1. Provide a detailed scope of the planned bare metal visual examinations (e.g., volum
pressure tests.
e coverage, limitations, etc.) of the vessel upper head penetrations and/or any nonvisual nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head including the examination procedures to be used.
4. A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category,
A.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement
1. Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid leakage/corrosion evaluation.
activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage
2. Please provide a list of leaks (including code class of the components) that
and/or planned this refueling outage.
have been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action documentation. If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric acid corrosion control program.
5. If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to
A.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections
occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be  
1. A detailed schedule of:
Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the upcoming outage.
Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage (if occurring).
2. Copy of SG history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current (ET) testing of the SGs during the upcoming outage.
3. Copy of procedure containing screening criteria used for selecting tubes for in
-situ pressure testing and
the procedure to be used for in
-situ pressure testing.


4. Copy of previous outage SG tube operational assessment. Also include a copy of the following documents as they become available:
examined and the extent of the planned examination. Please also provide reference
Degradation assessment
numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.
6. Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or
components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been
identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.
7. A list of any temporary non-code repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).
8. Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice
inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.
9. Copy of the procedures for welding techniques, and NDE that will be used during the
outage.
A.2
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
1. Provide a detailed scope of the planned bare metal visual examinations (e.g., volume
coverage, limitations, etc.) of the vessel upper head penetrations and/or any
nonvisual nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head including the
examination procedures to be used.
 
A.3
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
1. Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the
inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid
leakage/corrosion evaluation.
2. Please provide a list of leaks (including code class of the components) that have
been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action
documentation. If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide
documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric
acid corrosion control program.
A.4
Steam Generator Tube Inspections
1. A detailed schedule of:
*
Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the
upcoming outage.
*
Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage
(if occurring).
2. Copy of SG history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current (ET)
testing of the SGs during the upcoming outage.
3. Copy of procedure containing screening criteria used for selecting tubes for in-situ
pressure testing and the procedure to be used for in-situ pressure testing.
 
4. Copy of previous outage SG tube operational assessment. Also include a copy of
the following documents as they become available:  
*
Degradation assessment  
*
Condition monitoring assessment
Condition monitoring assessment
5. Copy of the document defining the planned SG ET scope (e.g., 100 percent of unrepaired tubes with bobbin probe and 20 percent sample of hot leg expansion transition regions with rotating probe) and identify the scope expansion criteria, which will be applied. Also identify and describe any deviations in this scope or expansion criteria from the EPRI Guidelines.
5. Copy of the document defining the planned SG ET scope (e.g., 100 percent of
6. Copy of the document describing the ET acquisition equipment to be applied including ET probe types. Also identify the extent of planned tube examination
unrepaired tubes with bobbin probe and 20 percent sample of hot leg expansion
coverage with each probe type (e.g. rotating probe  
transition regions with rotating probe) and identify the scope expansion criteria,
-0.080 inches, 0.115 inches pancake coils and mid
which will be applied. Also identify and describe any deviations in this scope or
-range +point coil applied at the top
expansion criteria from the EPRI Guidelines.
-of-tube-sheet plus 3 inches to minus 12 inches).
6. Copy of the document describing the ET acquisition equipment to be applied
7. Identify and quantify any SG tube leakage experienced during the previous operating cycle. Also provide documentation identifying which SG was leaking and corrective actions completed and planned for this condition.
including ET probe types. Also identify the extent of planned tube examination
8. Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated eddy current technique specification sheets. Additionally, please provide a copy of EPRI Appendix H, "Examination Technique Specification Sheets," qualification records. 9. Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet condition, crud removal amounts, etc.).
coverage with each probe type (e.g. rotating probe -0.080 inches, 0.115 inches
Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to take place.
pancake coils and mid-range +point coil applied at the top-of-tube-sheet plus 3
A.5 Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities
inches to minus 12 inches).
1. A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control program related issues (e.g., CR) entered into your corrective action program since the beginning of the last refueling outage. For example, a list based upon data base searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME Code, Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or errors in piping examinations.
7. Identify and quantify any SG tube leakage experienced during the previous operating
2. Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are required for the activities described in A.1 through A.3.
cycle. Also provide documentation identifying which SG was leaking and corrective
actions completed and planned for this condition.
8. Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated
eddy current technique specification sheets. Additionally, please provide a copy of
EPRI Appendix H, Examination Technique Specification Sheets, qualification
records.
9. Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of
the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet
condition, crud removal amounts, etc.).
Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to
take place.
A.5
Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities
1. A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control
program related issues (e.g., CR) entered into your corrective action program since
the beginning of the last refueling outage. For example, a list based upon data base
searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME
Code, Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or
errors in piping examinations.
2. Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are
required for the activities described in A.1 through A.3.
3. Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:
3. Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:
Inservice inspection (examination, planning)
Inservice inspection (examination, planning)
Containment exams
Containment exams  


Reactor pressure vessel head exams
Reactor pressure vessel head exams
Line 1,242: Line 2,313:
Boric acid corrosion control program
Boric acid corrosion control program
Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)
Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)
: [[contact::B. Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (April 16]], 2018): B.1 Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information
B.
1. Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities, including planned welding activities, and
Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (April 16,
schedule showing contingency repair plans, if available.
2018):
2. For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for each subject weld:
B.1
Weld data sheet (traveler).
Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information
Weld configuration and system location.
1. Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities,
Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment.
including planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair
Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures.
plans, if available.
Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds.
2. For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from
Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld procedures from B.1.b.v.
section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for
Copies of welder's performance qualification records (WPQ).
each subject weld:  
Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If applicable).
*
Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed).
Weld data sheet (traveler).  
Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds.
*
Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel qualifications records for reviewing. 3. For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspector from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and supporting documentation.
Weld configuration and system location.  
*
Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment.  
*
Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures.  
*
Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds.  
*
Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld
procedures from B.1.b.v.  
*
Copies of welders performance qualification records (WPQ).  
*
Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If
applicable).  
*
Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow
viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed).  
*
Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds.  
*
Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel
qualifications records for reviewing.
3. For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspector
from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and
supporting documentation.  


4. For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant
4. For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on an ASME Code
conditions on an ASME Code Class components selected by the inspector from Section A above, provide a copy of the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective action documents.
Class components selected by the inspector from Section A above, provide a copy of
5. A copy of (or ready access to) most current
the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective
revision of the inservice inspection program manual and plan for the current interval.
action documents.
6. For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspector from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to
5. A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection
perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures). For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification summary sheets). Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.
program manual and plan for the current interval.
B.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
6. For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspector from section A of this
1. Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement.
enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to
2. Provide drawings showing the
perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing
following:
procedures). For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with
Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle configurations
ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the
procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification
summary sheets). Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment
to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and
nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.
B.2
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
1. Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will
perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement.
2. Provide drawings showing the following:  
*
Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle
configurations  
*
Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration
Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration
Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle attachment welds as applicable.
Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle
B.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
attachment welds as applicable.
1. Please provide boric acid walk down inspection results, an updated list of boric acid leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and overall status of planned boric acid inspections.
B.3
2. Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified since the end of the last refueling outage. Please include a status of corrective actions to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks. Please identify specifically which known leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.  
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
1. Please provide boric acid walk down inspection results, an updated list of boric acid
leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and
overall status of planned boric acid inspections.
2. Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified
since the end of the last refueling outage. Please include a status of corrective actions
to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks. Please identify specifically which known
leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.  


B.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections
B.4
1. Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated justification for any revisions.
Steam Generator Tube Inspections
2. Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).
1. Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated
3. Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part
justification for any revisions.
or foreign material is identified in the steam generators.
2. Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the
4. Identify the types of SG tube repair processes which will be implemented for defective SG tubes (including any NRC reviews/evaluations/approvals of this repair process). Provide the flaw depth sizing criteria to be applied for ET indications identified in the SG tubes. 5. Copy of documents describing actions to be taken if a new SG tube degradation mechanism is identified.
steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw
6. Provide procedures with guidance/instructions for identifying (e.g. physically locating the tubes that require plugging) and plugging SG tubes.
characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).
7. List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect to steam generator inspection activities.
3. Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part or foreign material is identified in
B.5 Codes and Standards
the steam generators.
1. Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available):
4. Identify the types of SG tube repair processes which will be implemented for defective
Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program.
SG tubes (including any NRC reviews/evaluations/approvals of this repair process).
2. Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping welds and components (e.g., PDI
Provide the flaw depth sizing criteria to be applied for ET indications identified in the
-UT-1, PDI-UT-2, PDI-UT-3, PDI-UT-10, etc.).
SG tubes.
3. Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook Revision 1  
5. Copy of documents describing actions to be taken if a new SG tube degradation
- EPRI Technical Report 1000975.  
mechanism is identified.
6. Provide procedures with guidance/instructions for identifying (e.g. physically locating
the tubes that require plugging) and plugging SG tubes.
7. List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect
to steam generator inspection activities.
B.5
Codes and Standards
1. Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection
at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available):  
*
Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the
inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program.
2. Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the
latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping
welds and components (e.g., PDI-UT-1, PDI-UT-2, PDI-UT-3, PDI-UT-10, etc.).
3. Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook Revision 1 - EPRI Technical Report 1000975.  


The following items are requested for the
The following items are requested for the
Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection
Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection
Wolf Creek
Wolf Creek
April 9-13, 2018 Integrated Report 2018002
April 9-13, 2018
Integrated Report 2018002
Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.
Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.
Please provide the requested information on or before March 22, 2018
Please provide the requested information on or before March 22, 2018.
. Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below. For example, all contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.0
Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below. For example, all
should be in a file/folder titled  
contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled
"1- A," applicable organization charts in file/folder "
1-A, applicable organization charts in file/folder 1-B, etc.
1- B," etc. If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the information while writing the report.
If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at
In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting. The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the entrance meeting.
least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the
If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies. Enter a note explaining in which file the information can be found.
information while writing the report.
If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200
In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed
-1154 or natasha.greene@nrc.gov.
below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.
The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the
entrance meeting.
If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear
to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies. Enter a note explaining in which
file the information can be found.
If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200-1154 or
natasha.greene@nrc.gov.  
 
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject
: [[contact::S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget]], control number 3150
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information
-0011.
collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget,
1. Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
control number 3150-0011.  
 
1.
Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and
Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
Date of Last Inspection:
Date of Last Inspection:
May 8, 2017
May 8, 2017
A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff and Technicians
A.
B. Applicable organization charts
List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff
: [[contact::C. Audits]], self
and Technicians
-assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection
B.
, related to this inspection area
Applicable organization charts
D. Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures
C.
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below. Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
Audits, self-assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this
inspection area
D.
Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures
E.
Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.
Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews
the procedure indexes.
1. Radiation Protection Program Description
1. Radiation Protection Program Description
2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations
2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations
Line 1,326: Line 2,477:
6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions
6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions
7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys
7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys
8. Radioactive
8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control
Source Inventory and Control
9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program
9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program
F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub
F.
-tiered systems) since date of last inspection
List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub-tiered systems) since
date of last inspection
a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization
a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization
b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization
b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search
of each issue and the search criteria used. Please provide in document formats which are "searchable" so that the inspector can perform word searches. If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last inspection
criteria used. Please provide in document formats which are searchable so that
involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)
the inspector can perform word searches.
: [[contact::G. List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage]], please also include a list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose estimate for the work activity.)
If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last
H. List of active radiation work permits
inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any
I. Radioactive source inventory list
dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety
a. All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested
Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)
b. All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2 and above threshold. Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity (w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.
G.
List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the
inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a
list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose
estimate for the work activity.)
H.
List of active radiation work permits
I.
Radioactive source inventory list
a.
All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested
b.
All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2
and above threshold. Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity  
(w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.  


J. The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be leak tested.
J.
If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have failed its leak test within the last two years
The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be
K. A current listing of any non
leak tested. If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have
-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)
failed its leak test within the last two years
: [[contact::L. Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date. The printout should include the date of entry]], some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).
K.
A current listing of any non-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their
appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)
L.
Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since
the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date. The printout should
include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit
used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose
alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance
Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).  


Initial Request for Information
Initial Request for Information
Integrated
Integrated Inspection
Inspection
Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating
 
Station  Inspection
Inspection Report: 05000482/2018002
Report:
Inspection Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2018
05000482/201
Inspection Procedure: Integrated Inspection Procedures
00 2  Inspection
Lead Inspector: Douglas Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector
Dates:
I.
April 1 - June 30, 201 8  Inspection
Information Requested Prior to March 22, 2018
Procedure:
The following information should be provided in electronic format (Certrec IMS preferred),
Integrated
to the attention of Douglas Dodson by March 22, 2018, to facilitate the reduction in the
Inspection Procedures
items to be selected for a final list during inspection preparation. The inspection team
Lead Inspector:
will finalize its sample selections and will provide an additional information request with
Douglas Dodson, Senior
specific items. This information shall be made available by March 22, 2018. The specific
Resident Inspector
items selected from the lists shall be available and ready for review on the day indicated
I. Information
in this request. *Please provide requested documentation electronically in pdf files,
Requested Prior to March 22, 2018
Excel, or other searchable formats, if possible. The information should contain descriptive
The following information should
names, and be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in lists
be provided in electronic format (Certrec IMS
should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has
preferred), to the attention of Douglas Dodson by March 22, 201 8, to facilitate the reduction in the items to be selected for a final list during
knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology. If requested documents are large
inspection
and/or only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide
preparation.
subject documentation.
The inspection team
1. Any pre-existing evaluation or list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
will finalize its sample selections and will
components and associated calculations with low design margins.
provide an additional
2. A list of high risk spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system maintenance rule
information request with specific items.
components and functions based on engineering or expert panel judgment.
This information shall
3. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operating experience
be made available
evaluations for the last 3 years.
by March 22, 201 8. The specific items selected from the lists shall
4. A list of all spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system time-critical operator actions in
be available
procedures.
and ready for review on the day indicated
5. A list of permanent and temporary modifications related to spent fuel pool cooling
in this request.
and cleanup system sorted by component.
  *Please provide requested documentation
6. A list of current spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operator work
electronically
arounds/burdens.
in "pdf" files, Excel, or other searchable formats, if possible. The information
7. A list of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design calculations, which
should contain descriptive
provide the design margin information for components.  
names, and
be indexed and hyperlinked
to facilitate
ease of use. Information
in "lists" should contain enough information
to be easily understood
by someone who has knowledge of pressurized
water reactor technology.
If requested documents are large and/or only
hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and
provide subject documentation
. 1. Any pre-existing evaluation
or list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system components and
associated calculations with
low design margins.
2. A list of high risk spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system maintenance rule components
and functions based on engineering or expert panel judgment
. 3. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operatin g experience
evaluations for the last 3 years. 4. A list of all spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system time-critical operator actions in procedures.
5. A list of permanent and temporary modifications
related to spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system sorted by component. 6. A list of current spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related "operator work arounds/burdens."
7. A list of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design calculations, which provide the design margin information for components
.
8. List of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system root cause evaluations
associated
with component failures
or design issues initiated/completed
in the last 5 years. 9. A list of any spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system common-cause failures of components
in the last 3 years. 10. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system design bases documents and any open, pending, or recently completed changes. Although not an exhaustive list, please include any open, pending, or recently completed (last 3 years) changes to temporary modifications, permanent modifications, engineering change packages, and/or procedure change packages. Specifically, please include any open, pending, or recently completed changes to emergency operating, abnormal operating, normal operating, alarm response, system alignment, surveillance, or other procedure.
11. An electronic
copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system System Health notebook. 12. A copy of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related audits completed in the last 2 years. 13. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system motor operated valves (MOVs) in the program, design margin and risk ranking. 14. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system air operated valves
(AOVs) in the valve program, design margin
and risk ranking
. 15. Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system structure, system, and components
' maintenance
rule category, scoping, unavailability data, unreliability data, functional failure evaluations, (a)(1) determinations, (a)(1) goals, and any supporting basis documentation
. 16. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system licensee
contacts for the inspection team with
pager or phone numbers
. 17. An excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system related PRA
human action basic events or risk ranking
of operator actions from your site specific
PSA sorted by RAW and
F
: [[contact::V. Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets for these items. 18. In so far as there are recent or pending changes]], please provide an Excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
system related equipment basic events (with definitions) including importance measures sorted by risk achievement worth (RAW) and Fussell
-Vesely (FV) from your internal events probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
Include basic events with RAW value of 1.3 or greater.
19. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a
list of the top 50 cut-sets from your PRA.


20. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide copies of PRA "system notebooks," and the latest PRA summary document.
8. List of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system root cause evaluations
21. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, and if you have an external events or fire PSA model, provide the information requested in items
associated with component failures or design issues initiated/completed in the
17-19 for external events and fire, as it relates to the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup
last 5 years.
system. 22. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a
9. A list of any spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system common-cause failures of
copy of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station IPEEE
components in the last 3 years.
changes, if available electronically.
10. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design bases
documents and any open, pending, or recently completed changes. Although not an
exhaustive list, please include any open, pending, or recently completed (last 3 years)
changes to temporary modifications, permanent modifications, engineering change
packages, and/or procedure change packages. Specifically, please include any open,
pending, or recently completed changes to emergency operating, abnormal operating,
normal operating, alarm response, system alignment, surveillance, or other procedure.
11. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system System Health
notebook.
2. A copy of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related audits completed in the
last 2 years.
13. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system motor operated valves
(MOVs) in the program, design margin and risk ranking.
14. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system air operated valves (AOVs) in
the valve program, design margin and risk ranking.
15. Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system structure, system, and components
maintenance rule category, scoping, unavailability data, unreliability data, functional
failure evaluations, (a)(1) determinations, (a)(1) goals, and any supporting basis
documentation.
16. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system licensee contacts for the
inspection team with pager or phone numbers.
17. An excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related PRA
human action basic events or risk ranking of operator actions from your site specific
PSA sorted by RAW and FV. Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets
for these items.
18. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide an Excel
spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related equipment basic
events (with definitions) including importance measures sorted by risk achievement
worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (FV) from your internal events probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA). Include basic events with RAW value of 1.3 or greater.
19. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a list of the top 50
cut-sets from your PRA.  


20. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide copies of PRA
system notebooks, and the latest PRA summary document.
21. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, and if you have an external events
or fire PSA model, provide the information requested in items 17-19 for external
events and fire, as it relates to the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system.
2. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a copy of the Wolf
Creek Nuclear Generating Station IPEEE changes, if available electronically.
ML18226A175
ML18226A175
SUNSI Review
SUNSI Review
ADAMS:   Non-Publicly Available
ADAMS:
Non-Sensitive Keyword: By: NHTaylor Yes     No Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Non-Sensitive
Keyword:
By:
NHTaylor
Yes No
Publicly Available
Sensitive
Sensitive
NRC-002 OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI: DRP/B C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PSB2
NRC-002
C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 NAME DDodson FThomas VGaddy HGepford TFarnholtz
OFFICE
JDrake SIGNATURE ded fdt vgg hjg WcS for jfd DATE 8/3/2018 08/03/18 8/1/2018 8/1/2018 8/1/18 8/1/18 OFFICE PE:DRP/B BC:DRP/B     NAME JMelfi NTaylor     SIGNATURE jfm NHT     DATE 8/3/18 8/12/18
SRI:DRP/B
RI: DRP/B
C:DRS/OB
C:DRS/PSB2
C:DRS/EB1
C:DRS/EB2
NAME
DDodson
FThomas
VGaddy
HGepford
TFarnholtz
JDrake
SIGNATURE
ded
fdt
vgg
hjg
WcS for
jfd
DATE
8/3/2018
08/03/18
8/1/2018
8/1/2018
8/1/18
8/1/18
OFFICE
PE:DRP/B
BC:DRP/B  
 
NAME
JMelfi
NTaylor  
 
SIGNATURE
jfm
NHT  
 
DATE
8/3/18
8/12/18
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 14:49, 5 January 2025

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter
ML18226A175
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/2018
From: Nick Taylor
NRC Region 4
To: Heflin A
Wolf Creek
References
Download: ML18226A175 (60)
v • d • e


Text

August 12, 2018

SUBJECT:

WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018002 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Dear Mr. Heflin:

On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.

In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area. On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group.

Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1), as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staffs progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 w/Attachments:

1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice

Inspection 3. Request for Information O

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000482

License Number:

NPF-42

Report Number:

05000482/2018002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0012

Licensee:

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

Facility:

Wolf Creek Generating Station

Location:

Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Dates:

April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018

Inspectors:

D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector

F. Thomas, Resident Inspector

C. Alldredge, Health Physicist

I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector

J. Melfi, Project Engineer

J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist

Approved By:

N. Taylor

Chief, Project Branch B

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002-01 Closed

Not Applicable 71111.20 -

Refueling and Other Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4),

Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.

Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.

Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Closed

[H.3] -

Human Performance,

Change Management 71152 -

Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Closed

[H.2] - Human Performance,

Field Presence 71152 -

Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

PLANT STATUS

Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22.

The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program

- Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness

Main article: IP 71111.01

The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)power systems.

71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

Main article: IP 71111.04

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018
(2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018.

Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018.

===71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection===

Main article: IP 71111.05

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A-8 on April 21, 2018
(2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018
(3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018
(4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
(5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018
(6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018.

===71111.06Flood Protection Measures

Cables (Partial Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018.

71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities===

Main article: IP 71111.06
(1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities

The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.

Visual (VE)

The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Weld Number AE-04-F015 and AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012)

Ultrasonic SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Steam Generator A Inner Radius - Weld Number EBB01A-11-IR (Data Sheet Number AJS_010)

Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002)

Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003)

Ultrasonic Steam Generator Weld Number EBB01A-11-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_004)

Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005)

Ultrasonic

(2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities

The inspector reviewed the results of the licensees bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded. The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.

On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.

(3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities

The Inspector evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance.

(4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities

The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC. The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensees inspection scope was appropriate.

(5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)

The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports, which dealt with inservice inspection activities, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate.

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification

Main article: IP 71111.11

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on May 31, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE-211, Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test, during startup activities on May 17, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017.

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018
(2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018
(3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressure protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018.

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018
(2) Operability evaluation of start-up transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018
(3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018
(4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018.

71111.18Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.18

The inspectors evaluated the spent fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification.

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Start-up transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018
(2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018
(3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018
(4) STS EM-100A, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test, following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018
(5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018
(6) STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level, following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018.

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Main article: IP 71111.20

The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18, 2018.

The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.

===71111.22Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine===

Main article: IP 71111.22
(1) STS KJ-001B, Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B, on May 11, 2018

In-service (1 Sample)

(1) STS EM-003A, ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test, on May 2, 2018

Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)

(1) STS BB-006, RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer, on June 27, 2018

Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)

(1) STS PE-128, Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) of Penetration P-29, on April 24,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment

Main article: IP 71124.01

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.

Instructions to Workers (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated worker instructions.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.

71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls

Main article: IP 71124.02

The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:

(1) RWP 180021, Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings
(2) RWP 182601, Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)
(3) RWP 182300, Maintenance Support
(4) RWP 183220, Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP
(5) RWP 184207, RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs
(6) RWP 184420, Scaffolding Activities RF22
(7) RWP 184482, Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly

Radiation Worker Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
(2) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)
(3) OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017-3/30/2018)
(4) PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017-03/30/2018).

71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review

Main article: IP 71152

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed.
(2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC-503B, Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Announcement of an NRC Inspectors Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002-01 Closed Not Applicable

71111.20 - Refueling

and Other Outage Activities

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, associated with the licensees failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector. Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacted the NRCs ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.

Description:

On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be mindful and careful.

The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.

Corrective Actions: On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

The Reactor Oversight Processs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.

Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Severity: The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), Inspections, requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.

Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspectors. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed the licensees progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRCs review of the licensees progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018007 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8, 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.

The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated with impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspectors presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspectors presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018.

However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRCs regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.

The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensees understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically:

  • NCV 05000482/2018002-02, Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope, involved a failure to ensure an implementing documentthe boundary matrixidentified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.
  • NCV 05000482/2017003-02, Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases, involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized.
  • NCV 05000482/2017002-02, Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable, related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves importance to the safety-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety-related equipment was not recognized.

In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report.

Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000482/2018002-02 Closed

[H.3] - Human Performance, Change Management

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelopes ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

Description:

On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE-004, Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test, Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation systems ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from nearly no measurable differential pressurerelative to outside airto approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.

Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications, was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2,032 foot and 2,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation.

On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while the compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge, demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.

Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements.

The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2,016 foot to 2,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2,016 and 2,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries. WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from A, Boundary Matrix, of AP 10-104, Breach Authorization, Revision 35.

WCRE-35 notes, The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated. The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundarys importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.

Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120056.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, Design Control, is a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation systems ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor without compensatory measures in place.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere. Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required.

The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment.

Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results.

Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.

As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE-35 was recently revised and implemented. As a result, WCRE-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE-35, Boundary Matrix, which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green NCV 05000482/2018002-03 Closed

[H.2] - Human Performance, Field Presence

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters, and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

Description:

On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.

During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technicians then informed the control room operator they were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459. As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 percentisolation of letdown, and automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.

Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC-503B stated, At C2-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS-1 (LS/460A)to TEST position. This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.

Operators responded to the transient using Off-Normal Procedure OFN SB-008, Instrument Malfunctions, Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC-503B.

Procedure OFN SB-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected. The technician did not re-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, Place BB LS-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position, before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transientlevel got as high as 63 percenta second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de-energization of the back-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, stop work.

The licensees evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for leadership team member implementation oversight as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room. The inspectors agreed with the licensees conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.

Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 120807.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions:

(1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure; and
(2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transients, letdown isolation signals, and signals for automatic de-energization of the pressurizer back-up heaters.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding was not a deficiency that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC-503B by placing eyes on the problem, coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

(1) Procedure STS IC-503B, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration, Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position.

Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.

(2) Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed.

Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.

Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

OFN AF-025

Unit Limitations

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

KD-7496

One Line Diagram

Condition Reports

23867

23954

23955

23956

23957

23958

23959

23961

23962

23963

23968

23969

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

Temporary

Operating Guide

Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages

Expires

December 31,

2018

Transmission

Operating

Directive 0300

Outage of the Wolf Creek-Benton 345 kV Line

February 28,

2018

Transmission

Operating

Directive 0301

Outage of the Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345 kV Line

February 28,

2018

Transmission

Operating

Directive 0306

Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345-40 or 345-60

February 28,

2018

Transmission

Operating

Directive 0307

Outage of the Wolf Creek-Waverly 345 kV Line

February 28,

2018

Transmission

Operating

Directive 0308

Outage of the Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV Line

February 28,

2018

71111.04Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

CKL AL-120

Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup

CKL EC-120

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve

Lineup/Breaker Checklist

CKL EF-120

Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-13EC09

Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power

Supply Motor Controller

E-13GG02

Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers

KD-7496

One-Line Diagram

M-12AL01

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater

System

M-12EC01

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and

Clean-up System

M-12EC02

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and

Clean-up System

M-12EF01

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water

System

M-12EF02

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water

System

M-K2EF01

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water

System

M-K2EF01A

Abandoned ESW Equipment

M-K2EF03

Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water

System

M-K2EF03A

Abandoned ESW Equipment

Condition Reports

2669

21872

2213

2233

24453

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 10-106

Fire Preplans

18A

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-1F9905

Fire Hazard Analysis

Condition Reports

21946

2915

2944

23429

23446

23920

23921

71111.06Flood Protection Measures

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

C-K201

E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections

& Schedules SHT.1

C-K201

E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections

& Schedules SHT.1

C-K202

E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan,

Sections & Schedules SHT.-2

C-K202

E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan,

Sections & Schedules SHT.-2

C-K209

E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections & Details

C-K212

E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections 4

Condition Reports

24380

24381

24382

24383

24397

24409

71111.08Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

54-ISI-603-009

Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure

Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal

Sleeves

AP-16F-001

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

I-ENG-023

Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines

LMT-08-PDI-UT-1

Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds

LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf

Creek Generating Station

LMT-08-UT-004

Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base

Material > 2.0 in Thickness

SG-SGMP-15-4

Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring

and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-16-18

Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring

and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-18-9

Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring

and Operational Assessment for

Cycle 23 and Cycle 24

STS PE-040E

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Visual Inspection

WCRE-30

Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating

Station Interval 4

Condition Reports

93748

93749

107686

108888

109175

111055

2584

113666

114073

117639

117827

21438

21439

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

STS AE-211

Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test

SYS NB-201

Transferring NB01 Power Sources

SYS NB-320

Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers

Condition Reports

23853

23950

23951

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/

Date

17-01 (IC342)

2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario

18-01 (340)

2018 Annual Requalification Exam

STS AE-211

Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test

Completed

May 17, 2018

SYS NB-201

Transferring NB01 Power Sources

Completed

May 2, 2018

SYS NB-320

Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers

Completed

May 2, 2018

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness

Condition Reports

113227

2957

Work Orders

17-428387-001

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

April 1, 2015

through

June 30, 2015

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

October 1, 2015

through December

31, 2015

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

April 1, 2016

through December,

2016

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

July 1, 2016 through

June 30, 2017

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

January 1, 2017

through June 30,

2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

July 1, 2017 through

December 31, 2017

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-01

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-02

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-03

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-04

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-05

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-06

EC

Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup - EC-07

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 21C-001

Wolf Creek Substation

AP 21D-004

Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown

Operations

11A

AP 22C-008

Qualitative Risk Management

4B

FHP 02-001

Refueling Operations

FHP 02-007A

Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal

2A

FHP 05-001

Equipment Hatch Operations

GEN 00-008

RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations

STS GP-001

Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test

STS GP-006

CTMT Closure Verification

STS GP-006

CTMT Closure Verification

24A

SYS BB-215

RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

M-12BB01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12BB02

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12BB04

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12EJ01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat

Removal System

M-12EM01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-12EM02

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-12EM03

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

21353

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

April 5, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Days, Mode 6

April 6, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Nights, Mode 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Nights, Defueled

April 12, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Nights, Defueled

April 19, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Days, Defueled

April 24, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

May 8, 2018

ET 88-0193

Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay

Heat Removal

December 23,

1988

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

ET 92-0001

Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated

with Generic Letter 88-17

January 2,

1992

STS CR-002

Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

Completed

May 9, 2018

WM 89-0041

Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of Decay

Heat Removal

February 2,

1989

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 22A-001

Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval

AP 26C-004

Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 28-001

Operability Evaluations

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11

M-703-00055

Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly

W02

M-709-00099

Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details - Sheet 1

W01

Condition Reports

2207

2351

2581

23083

23084

23567

23902

23903

23905

23906

23907

23908

23914

Work Orders

18-438919-000

18-438984-000

18-439282-000

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

APF 05-013-01

M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection

Pump

W25

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A

Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR

2518

May 1, 2018

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - DPEM01A

Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating - CR

2581

May 3, 2018

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition - PEM01A RF22

Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact

May 9, 2018

MRP 2018-010

Electric Power Research Institute - Notification of Recent

PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control

Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and

Recommended Plant Actions

April 20, 2018

XX-E-006

Calculation XX-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7 -

Appendix 31 - Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting

Analysis - Output Report

71111.18Plant Modifications

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision/Date

E-13GG02

Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers

E-13EC09

Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power

Supply Motor Controller

M-084A-00010

8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram

January 31,

2018

WIP-E-12EC09-

000-A-1

Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power

Supply Motor Controller

WIP-E-IR0211A-

2B-1

Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground

Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000-0

WIP-M-1X6906-

000-A-1

Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations

WIP-M-1X6906-

001-A-1

Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations

WIP-M-13EG29-

000-A-1

Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

Fuel Building

Condition Reports

2629

2684

2959

23060

23146

23193

23195

23259

23584

23592

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

14403

Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

System

April 30, 2015

14496

Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup

August 30,

2016

241

Change Package Engineering Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool

Alternate Cooling Modification

November 29,

2017

273

Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling

Electrical

March 3,

2018

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

STN EC-201

Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up System Valve Test

STN XMR-001

XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification

STS BG-100A

Centrifugal Charging System A Train Inservice Pump

STS CR-002

Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

STS EM-100A

Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test

STS IC-503B

Channel Calibration pressurizer Level

STS IC-503B

Channel Calibration pressurizer Level

2A

STS KJ-015B

Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02

SYS EC-120

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-0033.3-009-03 Power Transformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form,

Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H. V.

345000,

L.V. 13800,
Y. Y., 13800, 60 Hertz

E-003.3-00008

CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram W10

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-003.3-00022

Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form,

Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000, H. V.

345000, L

V. 13800,
Y. Y. 13800, 60 Hertz

W09

E-11MR01

Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying

Diagram

M-12EM01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS

Condition Reports

2520

2524

2526

2527

2784

2954

24387

24400

24405

Work Orders

13-366290-005

15-403582-002

17-427200-023

17-432721-000

17-432722-000

18-438909-000

18-438919-001

18-438923-001

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Date

APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS) - Fuel Pool

Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test

April 23,

2018

STN EM-100A

SI Pump A Reference Pump

Completed

April 29,

2018

STS EM-100A

Safety Injection Pump A Inservice Pump Test

Completed

May 11, 2018

STS KJ-015B

Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02

Completed

May 1, 2018

71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AI-07B-024

Instructions For Containment Purge Permits

FHP 05-001

Equipment Hatch Operations

GEN 00-002

Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby

101

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

GEN 00-003

Hot Standby to Minimum Load

101

GEN 00-008

RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations

INC C-0044

Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply

RXE 01-002

Reload Low Power Physics Testing

STS CR-002

Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

STS GP-006

CTMT Closure Verification

24A

SYS BB-112

Vacuum Fill of the RCS

SYS BB-215

RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

47A

SYS BB-215

RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

SYS SB-300

Deenergizing SB Protection Sets

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

E-13NN01

Class IE Instrument AC Schematic

E-13SB09

Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4

Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets

M-12BB01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12BB02

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12BB04

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant

System

M-12EJ01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat

Removal System

M-12EM01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-12EM01

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-12EM02

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

M-12EM03

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant

Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

20865

20906

20917

20934

20963

21467

21469

21507

21575

21710

21779

21825

21881

21901

21938

21953

2359

2375

2571

2593

2787

2798

2837

23075

23087

23221

23429

23434

23440

23444

23446

23448

23488

23500

23517

23752

23767

Work Orders

17-426098-000

18-437026-000

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22

Failed Fuel Mitigation - Presenter Daljit Mand

OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule

Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core

Testing

January 4,

2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 12, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 18, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 19, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 25, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 26, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 29, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 29, 2018

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 3, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 9, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 9, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 10, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Days

May 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Nights

May 17, 2018

RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule

AIF 21-016-02

Time Verification Form - Days - Credited

April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02

Time Verification Form - Nights - Credited

April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02

Time Verification Form - Nights - No Credit Taken

April 3, 2018

AIF 22D-008-02

Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist

Completed

May 17, 2108

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet - Vacuum Fill of the RCS

Completed

May 11, 2018

APF 21-001-02

Control Room Turnover Checklist - On-Coming CRS/WC

SRO/RO/BOP Review

May 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment Mode 6 Refueling Operations

>23 Ft. Above Vessel Flange

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 4, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 11, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 14, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 15, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode - Defueled

April 17, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 1, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 3, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 4, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

April 5, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6

April 6, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

May 8, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 11, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

April 14, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 15, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

April 15, 2018

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 17, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment

Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

May 8, 2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 181102

January 18,

2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 183000

March 7, 2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package - RWP Number 182602

March 8, 2018

APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form - RWP Number: 182601

10A

BGV0365

Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain

C22: R-EN-A-

2A

Clearance Order

April 2, 2018

C22: R-EN-B-

2A

Clearance Order

March 31, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-

001B

Clearance Order

May 4, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-

2A

Clearance Order

May 9, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-

2B

Clearance Order

May 11, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-

003A

Clearance Order

May 6, 2018

ET 88-0193

Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of

Decay Heat Removal

December 23,

1988

ET 92-0001

Docket No. 50-482: Change in Commitment Associated

with Generic Letter 88-17

January 2,

1992

GTRE 32

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department

Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created

April 18, 2018,

2:36

GTRE 32

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department

Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created

April 18, 2018,

08:43

GTRE 32 Char

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department

Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created

April 15, 2018,

14:59

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

GTRE 33

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department

Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created

April 18, 2018,

07:04

GTRE 33

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department

Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created

April 18, 2018,

07:05

K04-013

Gas Effluent Release Report

April 16, 2018

RA 18-0032

Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team

Report RA 18-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018

March 20, 2018

RPF 02-105-01

Radiation Work Permit - 181102

000

RPF 02-105-01

Radiation Work Permit - 182601

000

RPF 02-105-01

Radiation Work Permit - 182602

000

RPF 02-105-01

Radiation Work Permit - 182602

2

RFP 02-105-01

Radiation Work Permit - 184206

000

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180225-3 February 25,

2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180320-

March 20, 2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180405-

April 5, 2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180416-1 April 16, 2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180407-6 April 7, 2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180421-

April 21, 2018

RPF 02-210-01

WCGS Radiological Survey Map - Survey M-20180406-

April 6, 2018

RXE 01-002

Reload Low Power Physics Testing

Completed

May 17, 2018

STS CR-002

Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

Completed

May 11, 2018

STS GP-006

Containment Closure Verification

Completed

April 6, 2018

WM 26-0034

Docket No. 50-482: Foreign Ownership, Control or

Influence (FOCI) Information - Change to Lists of

Owners, Officers, Directors and Executive Personnel

April 26, 2018

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

WM 89-0041

Docket No. 50-482: Generic Letter 88-17 - Loss of

Decay Heat Removal

February 2,

1989

71111.22Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

STS BB-004

RCS Water Inventory Balance

STS BB-006

RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer

STS BB-010

Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance

STS CV-210A

ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve

Test

STS EM-003A

ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test

STS KJ-001B

Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test - Train B

STS PE-128

LLRT [Local Leak Rate Test] Valve Lineup for Penetrations

and 29

Condition Reports

2451

2757

2783

23223

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/Date

STS CV-210A

ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve

Test

Completed

April 29, 2018

STS CV-210A

ECCS SI Pump Comprehensive and Inservice Check Valve

Test

Completed

May 1, 2018

STS EM-003A

ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test

Completed

May 2, 2018

WCRE-03

Wolf Creek Tank Document

71124.01Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 19D-100

Radioactive Source Program

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 25A-001

Radiation Protection Manual

17B

AP 25A-100

Access to Locked High or Very High Rad Areas

AP 25A-100

Containment Entry

18A

AP 25B-100

Radiation Worker Guidelines

AP 25B-300

RWP Program

24A

RPP 01-105

Radiation Protection Organization, Responsibilities and

Code of Conduct

RPP 02-105

Radiation Work Permit

RPP 02-215

Posting of Radiological Controlled Areas

34A

RPP 02-405

RCA Access Control

RPP 02-515

Release of Material from the RCA

RPP 02-605

Control and Inventory of Radioactive Sources

Condition Reports

2244

2935

2973

113053

113055

113627

113631

114261

116377

116509

116510

117296

119183

119223

20975

21159

21171

21281

21282

21568

Radiation Work Permits

Number

Title

Revision

180021

Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings

2601

Routine Outage Access (No LHRA Access)

183220

Primary S/G Eddy Current Testing

184199

Secondary Side S/G FOSAR

184200

Secondary Side S/G Sludge Lance

184420

Scaffolding

184482

RV Head Disassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities

184483

RV Head Reassembly - Canopy Seal Clamp Activities

186020

Reactor Vessel Head Preparation

Radiation Surveys

Number

Title

Date

M-20180305-17

1306 and 1308C

March 5, 2018

M-20180305-4

Resin Bed, Demin Alley, Filter Pit

March 4, 2018

M-20180307-16

Seal Water HX & VCT Valve Room

March 7, 2018

M-20180307-2

B RHR HX Room

March 7, 2018

M-20180308-12

North and South Pipe Pen

March 8, 2018

M-20180324-6

SJ 143 Sample Panel

March 24, 2018

M-20180329-1

B RHR Pump

March 29, 2018

M-20180402-20

S/G A&D Secondary

April 2, 2018

M-20180403-2

S/G A&D Secondary

April 3, 2018

M-20180409-19

2000 Aux South

April 9, 2018

M-20180411-11

S/G A&D Secondary

April 11, 2018

M-20180411-21

2047 Containment

April 11, 2018

Air Sample Surveys

Number

Title

Date

18-0129

Containment RX Cavity

April 1, 2018

18-0131

CTMT 2000' O/S Bio-shield

April 1, 2018

18-0147

Fuel Building 2047 & above

April 2, 2018

18-0154

CTMT 2047'

April 3, 2018

18-0181

CTMT 2047 (Marinelli Grab Sample)

April 4, 2018

18-0182

CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity)

April 4, 2018

18-0182

CTMT 2047 (Follow-up West of Cavity)

April 4, 2018

Audits and Self-Assessments

Number

Title

Date

18-01-RP/PC

QA Audit Report:

Radiation Protection And Process Control

March 12, 2018

QH-2017-1476

Self-Assessment:

Radiation Protection Procedures and Radiation

Worker Behavior Observations

May 4, 2017

QH-2017-1481

Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as

delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01,

71124.03, and 71151.OR01

April 24, 2017

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

18-0181

Skin Dose From Noble Gas Calculation Sheet

April 4, 2018

K 03-70

Air Sample Log

April 4, 2018

RPF 02-605-03

Sealed Source Inventory

January 29, 2018

STS HP-001

Sealed Source Contamination Surveillance Test

January 29, 2018

71124.02Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 25A-401

ALARA Program

AP 25A-410

ALARA Committee

AP 25B-300

RWP Program

24A

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package

APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form

10A

APF 25A-401-07 In-Progress ALARA Review

APF 25A-401-08 Post-Job ALARA Review

RPF 02-105-05

RWP Risk Assessment

16A

RPP 02-105

RWP

RPP 02-605

Control & Inventory of Radioactive Sources

Condition Reports

2973

113052

113056

113057

113058

113627

113631

113708

113736

113762

114261

114915

115344

115564

115795

116952

117296

118610

119253

119743

119745

20919

20921

21089

21091

21099

21197

21217

21266

21270

21341

21375

21420

21422

21447

21482

Audits and Self-Assessments

Number

Title

Date

18-01-RP/PC

Quality Assurance Audit Report

Radiation Protection and Process Control

March 12, 2018

QH-2017-1481

Radiation Protection Programmatic Review as

delineated in NRC Inspection Procedures 71124.01,

71124.03, and 71151.OR01

April 24, 2017

QH-2017-1505

NRC Inspection Procedure 71124.04, Occupational

Dose Assessment and NRC 71124.02 Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls

May 22, 2017

Radiation Work Permit Packages

Number

Title

Revision

180021

Cartridge Filter Change-Out in Aux and RW Buildings

A

2300

Maintenance Support

2601

Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)

183220

Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP

184207

RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs

184207

RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs

184207

RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCPs

184420

Scaffolding Activities RF22

184482

Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly

Miscellaneous Documents

Title

Date

RF 21 & Pre RF21 Forced Outage Radiation Protection Summary

January 9, 2017

71151Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 02A-001

Primary Chemistry Control

CHS SJ-143B

RCS/CVCS/RHR Sampling at SJ-143 Panel

STS BB-006

RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer

Condition Reports

23874

23885

24426

24427

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Date

RCS

Measurement

Reports

June 2017 through June 2018

Printed June 20,

2018

STS PE-019B

RHR Suction Valve Leak Test

Completed

November 18,

2016

STS PE-109E

RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test

Completed

November 19,

2016

71152Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

AP 10-104

Breach Authorization

AP 10-104

Breach Authorization

37A

AP 23-009

Control Room Envelope Habitability Program

OFN SB-008

Instrument Malfunctions

STS IC-503B

Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration

STS PE-004

Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test

Condition Reports

20056

20807

2587

23642

23823

Work Orders

18-437033-006

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/

Date

QA-2018-0421

Oversight of Operations During the First Quarter of 2018

from 12/21/17 to 3/29/18

April 20,

2018

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/

Date

QA-2018-0425

QA Assessment of the Maintenance 2018 First Quarter FAO

Report on 4/2/19

April 22,

2018

QA-2018-0426

Provide QA Oversight of Engineering for the First Quarter of

2018

April 20,

2018

QA-2018-0434

RF22 QA Assessment of Refuel Pool Overfill on 4-7-18

April 29,

2018

QH-2018-1628

FME Quick Hit Self-Assessment

May 23, 2018

QS-2018-2504

QA Surveillance of Clearance Order Removal

February 5,

2018

QS-2018-2510

Surveillance of CARB Meeting 1-17-18

February 5,

2018

QS-2018-2517

QA Observation of Question About Compensatory Measure

Fire Watch on 1/22/18

February 5,

2018

QS-2018-2530

Power Block Roof Leaks

February 7,

2018

QS-2018-2587

Attended and Observed Meeting on Effects of Modifications

269

March 26,

2018

QS-2018-2597

QA Walkdown of Turbine and Control Buildings

March 28,

2018

QS-2018-2601

RF22 Observation of Operations Just In Time Training for

Plant Cooldown

April 2, 2018

QS-2018-2646

RF22 QA Observation of Holes Being Drilled for SGK05

Modification Work on 4/8/18

April 8, 2018

QS-2018-2649

RF 22 QA Review of FME Monitor Logs in Containment on

4/8/18

April 9, 2018

QS-2018-2679

RF22 QA Observation of BHI Workers 4-12-18

April 13,

2018

RA 18-0054

Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Cycle

and Cycle 23 Core Operating Limits Report

April 29,

2018

STS PE-004

Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test

Completed

March 7,

2018

STS PE-004

Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test

Completed

March 15,

2018

WCRE-35

Boundary Matrix

Miscellaneous

Number

Title

Revision/

Date

WCRE-35

Boundary Matrix

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection

requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control

Number 31500011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the

requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control

number.

This letter and its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for

Withholding.

Information Request

January 24, 2018

Notification of Inspection and Request for Information

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station

NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2018002

INSERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST

A. Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week

The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic

format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of Isaac Anchondo, by March 26, 2018, to

facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection

week. The inspector will select specific items from the information requested below and then

request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week

(Section B of this enclosure). We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be

available and ready for review on the first day of inspection. Please provide requested

documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard

copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject

documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.

If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as

soon as possible.

On April 16, 2018, a reactor inspector from the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC)

Region IV office will perform the baseline inservice inspection at Wolf Creek Nuclear

Operating Station, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.08, "Inservice Inspection

Activities. Experience has shown that this inspection is a resource intensive inspection

both for the NRC inspector and your staff. The date of this inspection may change

dependent on the outage schedule you provide. In order to minimize the impact to your

onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for

documents needed for this inspection. These documents have been divided into two

groups. The first group (Section A of the enclosure) identified information to be provided

prior to the inspection to ensure that the inspector is adequately prepared. The second

group (Section B of the enclosure) identifies the information the inspector will need upon

arrival at the site. It is important that all of these documents are up to date and complete in

order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation

and/or the onsite portions of the inspection.

We have discussed the schedule for these inspection activities with your staff and

understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be William Muilenburg of your

licensing organization. The tentative inspection schedule is as follows:

Preparation week: March 26, 2018

Onsite weeks: April 16-27, 2018

Our inspection dates are subject to change based on your updated schedule of outage

activities. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please

contact Isaac Anchondo at (817) 200-1152. (email to: Isaac.Anchondo@nrc.gov).

A.1

ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information

1. A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:

1.1. Nondestructive examinations planned for ASME Code Class Components

performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and

augmented inservice inspection programs during the upcoming outage.

1.2. Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in

the Section XI scope (If applicable)

1.3. Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program

(Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.)

1.4. Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming

outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)

2. A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety

evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.

2.1. A list of ASME Code Cases currently being used to include the system and/or

component the Code Case is being applied to.

3. A list of nondestructive examination reports which have identified recordable or

rejectable indications on any ASME Code Class components since the beginning of

the last refueling outage. This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s)

conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the

pressure tests.

4. A list including a brief description (e.g., system, code class, weld category,

nondestructive examination performed) associated with the repair/replacement

activities of any ASME Code Class component since the beginning of the last outage

and/or planned this refueling outage.

5. If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to

occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be

examined and the extent of the planned examination. Please also provide reference

numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.

6. Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to structures, systems, or

components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been

identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

7. A list of any temporary non-code repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).

8. Please provide copies of the most recent self-assessments for the inservice

inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.

9. Copy of the procedures for welding techniques, and NDE that will be used during the

outage.

A.2

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

1. Provide a detailed scope of the planned bare metal visual examinations (e.g., volume

coverage, limitations, etc.) of the vessel upper head penetrations and/or any

nonvisual nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head including the

examination procedures to be used.

A.3

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

1. Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the

inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid

leakage/corrosion evaluation.

2. Please provide a list of leaks (including code class of the components) that have

been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action

documentation. If during the last cycle, the unit was shutdown, please provide

documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric

acid corrosion control program.

A.4

Steam Generator Tube Inspections

1. A detailed schedule of:

Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the

upcoming outage.

Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage

(if occurring).

2. Copy of SG history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current (ET)

testing of the SGs during the upcoming outage.

3. Copy of procedure containing screening criteria used for selecting tubes for in-situ

pressure testing and the procedure to be used for in-situ pressure testing.

4. Copy of previous outage SG tube operational assessment. Also include a copy of

the following documents as they become available:

Degradation assessment

Condition monitoring assessment

5. Copy of the document defining the planned SG ET scope (e.g., 100 percent of

unrepaired tubes with bobbin probe and 20 percent sample of hot leg expansion

transition regions with rotating probe) and identify the scope expansion criteria,

which will be applied. Also identify and describe any deviations in this scope or

expansion criteria from the EPRI Guidelines.

6. Copy of the document describing the ET acquisition equipment to be applied

including ET probe types. Also identify the extent of planned tube examination

coverage with each probe type (e.g. rotating probe -0.080 inches, 0.115 inches

pancake coils and mid-range +point coil applied at the top-of-tube-sheet plus 3

inches to minus 12 inches).

7. Identify and quantify any SG tube leakage experienced during the previous operating

cycle. Also provide documentation identifying which SG was leaking and corrective

actions completed and planned for this condition.

8. Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated

eddy current technique specification sheets. Additionally, please provide a copy of

EPRI Appendix H, Examination Technique Specification Sheets, qualification

records.

9. Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of

the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet

condition, crud removal amounts, etc.).

Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to

take place.

A.5

Additional Information Related to all Inservice Inspection Activities

1. A list with a brief description of inservice inspection, and boric acid corrosion control

program related issues (e.g., CR) entered into your corrective action program since

the beginning of the last refueling outage. For example, a list based upon data base

searches using key words related to piping such as: inservice inspection, ASME

Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or

errors in piping examinations.

2. Provide training (e.g. Scaffolding, Fall Protection, FME, Confined Space) if they are

required for the activities described in A.1 through A.3.

3. Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:

Inservice inspection (examination, planning)

Containment exams

Reactor pressure vessel head exams

Snubbers and supports

Repair and replacement program

Licensing

Site welding engineer

Boric acid corrosion control program

Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)

B.

Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting (April 16,

2018):

B.1

Inservice Inspection / Welding Programs and Schedule Information

1. Updated schedules for inservice inspection/nondestructive examination activities,

including planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair

plans, if available.

2. For ASME Code Class welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from

section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for

each subject weld:

Weld data sheet (traveler).

Weld configuration and system location.

Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment.

Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures.

Applicable welding procedures used to fabricate the welds.

Copies of procedure qualification records (PQRs) supporting the weld

procedures from B.1.b.v.

Copies of welders performance qualification records (WPQ).

Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If

applicable).

Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow

viewing radiographs (if radiographic testing was performed).

Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds.

Readily accessible copies of nondestructive examination personnel

qualifications records for reviewing.

3. For the inservice inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspector

from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and

supporting documentation.

4. For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on an ASME Code

Class components selected by the inspector from Section A above, provide a copy of

the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective

action documents.

5. A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the inservice inspection

program manual and plan for the current interval.

6. For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspector from section A of this

enclosure, provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures used to

perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing

procedures). For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with

ASME Code,Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the

procedure qualification (e.g. the EPRI performance demonstration qualification

summary sheets). Also, include qualification documentation of the specific equipment

to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and

nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.

B.2

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

1. Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will

perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head replacement.

2. Provide drawings showing the following:

Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle

configurations

Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration

Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle

attachment welds as applicable.

B.3

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

1. Please provide boric acid walk down inspection results, an updated list of boric acid

leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and

overall status of planned boric acid inspections.

2. Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified

since the end of the last refueling outage. Please include a status of corrective actions

to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks. Please identify specifically which known

leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.

B.4

Steam Generator Tube Inspections

1. Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated

justification for any revisions.

2. Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the

steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw

characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).

3. Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part or foreign material is identified in

the steam generators.

4. Identify the types of SG tube repair processes which will be implemented for defective

SG tubes (including any NRC reviews/evaluations/approvals of this repair process).

Provide the flaw depth sizing criteria to be applied for ET indications identified in the

SG tubes.

5. Copy of documents describing actions to be taken if a new SG tube degradation

mechanism is identified.

6. Provide procedures with guidance/instructions for identifying (e.g. physically locating

the tubes that require plugging) and plugging SG tubes.

7. List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect

to steam generator inspection activities.

B.5

Codes and Standards

1. Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection

at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available):

Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the

inservice inspection program and the repair/replacement program.

2. Copy of the performance demonstration initiative (PDI) generic procedures with the

latest applicable revisions that support site qualified ultrasonic examinations of piping

welds and components (e.g., PDI-UT-1, PDI-UT-2, PDI-UT-3, PDI-UT-10, etc.).

3. Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook Revision 1 - EPRI Technical Report 1000975.

The following items are requested for the

Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection

Wolf Creek

April 9-13, 2018

Integrated Report 2018002

Inspection areas are listed in the attachments below.

Please provide the requested information on or before March 22, 2018.

Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below. For example, all

contacts and phone numbers for Inspection Procedure 71124.01 should be in a file/folder titled

1-A, applicable organization charts in file/folder 1-B, etc.

If information is placed on ims.certrec.com, please ensure the inspection exit date entered is at

least 30 days later than the onsite inspection dates, so the inspectors will have access to the

information while writing the report.

In addition to the corrective action document lists provided for each inspection procedure listed

below, please provide updated lists of corrective action documents at the entrance meeting.

The dates for these lists should range from the end dates of the original lists to the day of the

entrance meeting.

If more than one inspection procedure is to be conducted and the information requests appear

to be redundant, there is no need to provide duplicate copies. Enter a note explaining in which

file the information can be found.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Natasha Greene at (817) 200-1154 or

natasha.greene@nrc.gov.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information

collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget,

control number 3150-0011.

1.

Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) and

Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

Date of Last Inspection:

May 8, 2017

A.

List of contacts and telephone numbers for the Radiation Protection Organization Staff

and Technicians

B.

Applicable organization charts

C.

Audits, self-assessments, and LERs written since date of last inspection, related to this

inspection area

D.

Procedure indexes for the radiation protection procedures

E.

Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas noted below.

Additional Specific Procedures may be requested by number after the inspector reviews

the procedure indexes.

1. Radiation Protection Program Description

2. Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations

3. Personnel Dosimetry Program

4. Posting of Radiological Areas

5. High Radiation Area Controls

6. RCA Access Controls and Radiation Worker Instructions

7. Conduct of Radiological Surveys

8. Radioactive Source Inventory and Control

9. Declared Pregnant Worker Program

F.

List of corrective action documents (including corporate and sub-tiered systems) since

date of last inspection

a. Initiated by the radiation protection organization

b. Assigned to the radiation protection organization

NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search

criteria used. Please provide in document formats which are searchable so that

the inspector can perform word searches.

If not covered above, a summary of corrective action documents since date of last

inspection involving unmonitored releases, unplanned releases, or releases in which any

dose limit or administrative dose limit was exceeded (for Public Radiation Safety

Performance Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151)

G.

List of radiologically significant work activities scheduled to be conducted during the

inspection period (If the inspection is scheduled during an outage, please also include a

list of work activities greater than 1 rem, scheduled during the outage with the dose

estimate for the work activity.)

H.

List of active radiation work permits

I.

Radioactive source inventory list

a.

All radioactive sources that are required to be leak tested

b.

All radioactive sources that meet the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, Category 2

and above threshold. Please indicate the radioisotope, initial and current activity

(w/assay date), and storage location for each applicable source.

J.

The last two leak test results for the radioactive sources inventoried and required to be

leak tested. If applicable, specifically provide a list of all radioactive source(s) that have

failed its leak test within the last two years

K.

A current listing of any non-fuel items stored within your pools, and if available, their

appropriate dose rates (Contact / @ 30cm)

L.

Computer printout of radiological controlled area entries greater than 100 millirem since

the previous inspection to the current inspection entrance date. The printout should

include the date of entry, some form of worker identification, the radiation work permit

used by the worker, dose accrued by the worker, and the electronic dosimeter dose

alarm set-point used during the entry (for Occupational Radiation Safety Performance

Indicator verification in accordance with IP 71151).

Initial Request for Information

Integrated Inspection

Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection Report: 05000482/2018002

Inspection Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2018

Inspection Procedure: Integrated Inspection Procedures

Lead Inspector: Douglas Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector

I.

Information Requested Prior to March 22, 2018

The following information should be provided in electronic format (Certrec IMS preferred),

to the attention of Douglas Dodson by March 22, 2018, to facilitate the reduction in the

items to be selected for a final list during inspection preparation. The inspection team

will finalize its sample selections and will provide an additional information request with

specific items. This information shall be made available by March 22, 2018. The specific

items selected from the lists shall be available and ready for review on the day indicated

in this request. *Please provide requested documentation electronically in pdf files,

Excel, or other searchable formats, if possible. The information should contain descriptive

names, and be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in lists

should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has

knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology. If requested documents are large

and/or only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide

subject documentation.

1. Any pre-existing evaluation or list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system

components and associated calculations with low design margins.

2. A list of high risk spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system maintenance rule

components and functions based on engineering or expert panel judgment.

3. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operating experience

evaluations for the last 3 years.

4. A list of all spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system time-critical operator actions in

procedures.

5. A list of permanent and temporary modifications related to spent fuel pool cooling

and cleanup system sorted by component.

6. A list of current spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related operator work

arounds/burdens.

7. A list of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design calculations, which

provide the design margin information for components.

8. List of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system root cause evaluations

associated with component failures or design issues initiated/completed in the

last 5 years.

9. A list of any spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system common-cause failures of

components in the last 3 years.

10. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design bases

documents and any open, pending, or recently completed changes. Although not an

exhaustive list, please include any open, pending, or recently completed (last 3 years)

changes to temporary modifications, permanent modifications, engineering change

packages, and/or procedure change packages. Specifically, please include any open,

pending, or recently completed changes to emergency operating, abnormal operating,

normal operating, alarm response, system alignment, surveillance, or other procedure.

11. An electronic copy of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system System Health

notebook.

2. A copy of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related audits completed in the

last 2 years.

13. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system motor operated valves

(MOVs) in the program, design margin and risk ranking.

14. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system air operated valves (AOVs) in

the valve program, design margin and risk ranking.

15. Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system structure, system, and components

maintenance rule category, scoping, unavailability data, unreliability data, functional

failure evaluations, (a)(1) determinations, (a)(1) goals, and any supporting basis

documentation.

16. A list of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system licensee contacts for the

inspection team with pager or phone numbers.

17. An excel spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related PRA

human action basic events or risk ranking of operator actions from your site specific

PSA sorted by RAW and FV. Provide copies of your human reliability worksheets

for these items.

18. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide an Excel

spreadsheet of spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system related equipment basic

events (with definitions) including importance measures sorted by risk achievement

worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (FV) from your internal events probabilistic risk

assessment (PRA). Include basic events with RAW value of 1.3 or greater.

19. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a list of the top 50

cut-sets from your PRA.

20. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide copies of PRA

system notebooks, and the latest PRA summary document.

21. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, and if you have an external events

or fire PSA model, provide the information requested in items 17-19 for external

events and fire, as it relates to the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system.

2. In so far as there are recent or pending changes, please provide a copy of the Wolf

Creek Nuclear Generating Station IPEEE changes, if available electronically.

ML18226A175

SUNSI Review

ADAMS:

Non-Publicly Available

Non-Sensitive

Keyword:

By:

NHTaylor

Yes No

Publicly Available

Sensitive

NRC-002

OFFICE

SRI:DRP/B

RI: DRP/B

C:DRS/OB

C:DRS/PSB2

C:DRS/EB1

C:DRS/EB2

NAME

DDodson

FThomas

VGaddy

HGepford

TFarnholtz

JDrake

SIGNATURE

ded

fdt

vgg

hjg

WcS for

jfd

DATE

8/3/2018

08/03/18

8/1/2018

8/1/2018

8/1/18

8/1/18

OFFICE

PE:DRP/B

BC:DRP/B

NAME

JMelfi

NTaylor

SIGNATURE

jfm

NHT

DATE

8/3/18

8/12/18

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