IR 05000416/2012004: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 52: | Line 52: | ||
-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | -rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | ||
Sincerely,/RA/ Bob Hagar, Chief (Acting) Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: | Sincerely, | ||
50-416 License No: NPF-29 | /RA/ Bob Hagar, Chief (Acting) Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: | ||
50-416 License No: NPF-29 Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report 05000416/2012004 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region IV Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 3003 Chamblee | |||
Inspection Report 05000416/2012004 w/ | |||
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region IV Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 3003 Chamblee | |||
-Tucker Road Atlanta, GA 30341 Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region VI Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 800 North Loop 288 Federal Regional Center Denton, TX 76201-3698 Electronic Distribution for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station | -Tucker Road Atlanta, GA 30341 Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region VI Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 800 North Loop 288 Federal Regional Center Denton, TX 76201-3698 Electronic Distribution for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station | ||
Revision as of 04:20, 12 May 2019
| ML12306A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2012 |
| From: | Hagar B NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Mike Perito Entergy Operations |
| Hagar B | |
| References | |
| IR-12-004 | |
| Download: ML12306A258 (45) | |
Text
November 1, 2012
Mike Perito Vice President Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station P.O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150
SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000416/
201200 4
Dear Mr. Perito:
On September 21, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 10, 2012, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission
's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
One NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection.
This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Further, a licensee-identified violation
, which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report.
The NRC is treating these violations as non
-cited violations (NCV s) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest these non-cited violations , you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of U N I T E D S T A T E S N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N R E G I O N I V1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD A R L I N G T O N , T E X A S 7 6 0 1 1-4511 NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ Bob Hagar, Chief (Acting) Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.:
50-416 License No: NPF-29 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000416/2012004 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region IV Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 3003 Chamblee
-Tucker Road Atlanta, GA 30341 Chairperson, Radiological Assistance Committee Region VI Federal Emergency Management Agency Department of Homeland Security 800 North Loop 288 Federal Regional Center Denton, TX 76201-3698 Electronic Distribution for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
- 06/23/2012 - 09/21/2012; GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1, Integrated Resident and Regional Report
- Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments
. The report covered a 3
-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspection s by region-based inspectors. One Green non-cited violation of significance was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG
-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006
.
A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," regarding the licensee's failure to follow the requirements of Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determinations." Specifically, for Condition Report CR-GGN-2012-09690, which documents an oil leak on the standby liquid control pump B, and for Condition Report CR
-GGN-2012-09889, which documents degraded bolts on a flanged connection on standby service water B piping, the licensee failed to validate that operability evaluations completed for prior non-conforming conditions bounded the conditions documented in the new condition reports. As immediate corrective action s, the license e re-performed the evaluations and established an adequate basis for operability for the conditions described in the two condition reports listed above. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-GGN-2012-09735 and CR-GGN-2012-10664. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, not performing operability determinations in accordance with procedure could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if a condition renders a safety related system inoperable and because of this performance deficiency the licensee incorrectly determines that the system is operable, then this performance deficiency could result in a safety related system remaining inoperable for a long period of time. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the issue affect ed the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power
," the inspectors determined that the issue has very low safety significance (Green) because although it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating system, the system maintained its operability.
The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area, corrective action program component because the licensee failed to properly evaluate for operability conditions adverse to quality P.1(c)
(Section 1R15).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee ha s been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
This violation and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) began the inspection period at 73% thermal power following refueling outage 18 and the plant achieved 100% power on June 24, 2012
. During this inspection period GGNS was granted a license amendment to increase power from their current license thermal power (CLTP) of 3898 mwth to the extended power uprate (EPU) level of 4408 mwth.
On July 3, 2012, the operators reduced power to 73% CLTP due to an elevated temperature on one of the generator stator bar s. The licensee determined the cause to be a faulty thermocouple giving false indications, and the plant was returned to 100% CLTP the same day.
On July 27, 2012, operators reduced power to 57% CLTP for a planned rod pattern adjustment in preparation to increase power to the EPU power level
.
On July 28, 2012, operators increased power to 90% CLTP for the initial phase of extended power uprate tests (equivalent power of 78% EPU).
On July 30, 2012, operators increased power to 100% CLTP (equivalent power of 88% EPU).
On August 1, 2012, operators increase d power above 100% CLTP for the first time. Power was increased to 90% EPU (equivalent power of 102.5% CLTP), and the plant remained at this power level for extended power uprate testing in accordance with the license amendment.
On August 10, 2012, operators increase d power to 92.5% EPU , and the plant remained at this power level for extended power uprate testing in accordance with the license amendment.
On August 24, 2012, operators increase d power to 95% EPU
, and the plant remained at this power level for extended power uprate testing in accordance with the license amendment.
On August 28, 2012, operators increase d power to 97.5% EPU , and the plant remained at this power level for extended power uprate testing in accordance with the license amendment.
On September 8, 2012, operators increased power to 100% EPU and performed extended power uprate testing in accordance with the license amendment
.
On September 15, 2012, operators reduced power to 70% EPU for planned control rod sequence exchange and turbine testing. The plant was returned to 100% EPU power on September 1 8, 2012.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions a. Due to Hurricane Isaac, thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for August 29 and 30, 2012.
The inspectors reviewed the plant personnel's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On August 28, 2012, the inspectors walked down the standby service water system basins because their safety
-related functions could be affected
, or required
, as a result of high winds or tornado
-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the plant staff's preparations against the site's procedures and determined that the staff's actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant
-specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant
-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee
-identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown a. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk
-significant systems: Inspection Scope Division II emergency diesel generator following a surveillance Low pressure core injection/residual heat removal C following a surveillance Division I emergency diesel generator while division II emergency diesel generator was inoperable due to emergent work Standby fresh air A while Standby fresh air B was inoperable due to maintenance on control room air conditioning system B The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four partial system walkdown sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours a. The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk
-significant plant areas:
Inspection Scope Low pressure core spray room A119, 93 foot elevation of the auxiliary building Division III emergency diesel generator room D304, 133 foot elevation of the diesel generator builing Division I switchgear rooms A208 & A219, 119 foot elevation of the auxiliary building Division II switchgear rooms A207 & A221, 119 foot elevation of the auxiliary building The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed
- that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four quarterly fire
-protection inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also inspected the areas listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Sco pe July 11, 2012, internal sump pump level switches for reactor core isolation cooling/high pressure core spray rooms and 93 foot elevation of the auxiliary building These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 a. Quarterly Review
of Licensed Operator Requalification Prog r am On June 28, 2012, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during training. The inspectors assessed the following areas:
Inspection Scope Licensed operator performance during simulator training evaluation at 4408 mwth power The ability of the licensee to administer the evaluations The quality of post
-scenario critiques Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for identified discrepancies
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.2 Quarterly Observation
of Licensed Operator Performance a. On July 3, 2012, the inspectors observed the performance of on
-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to an unplanned down power in response to a hig h temperature alarm on the generator stator slot 55 upper bar. The operators reduced reactor power from 100% to 73% CLTP by decreasing recirculation pump speed and inserting 4 control rods. The operators also verified all other associate d parameters, Inspection Scope e.g. turbine building cooling water and other stator bar temperatures
, were in normal range and stable. The licensee determined the cause of the alarm was a failed thermocouple on the generator stator slot 55 upper bar. The licensee developed an alternate monitoring plan per standing order 12
-0005 and returned reactor power to 100% CLTP. In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including EN-OP-115, Revision 12 , "Conduct of Operations", and other operations department policies.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed
-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems:
Inspection Scope Maintenance Rule a(3) assessment Review The inspectors reviewed the a(3) assessment report that addressed events where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
Implementing appropriate work practices Identifying and addressing common cause failures Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
Characterizing system reliability issues for performance Charging unavailability for performance Trending key parameters for condition monitoring Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or
-(a)(2) Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk
-significant and Inspection Scope safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
Week of June 25, 2012, due to emergent repair of bypass valves hydr aulic trip Week of July 30, 2012, due to emergent issue making division II diesel generator inoperable/non
-functional and extended power uprate power ascension activities Week of August 6, 2012, due to emergent issue concerning a containment vent valve failed surveillance Week of August 17, 2012, risk management with divers in standby service water basin Week of August 20, 2012, during low pressure core spray outage and extended power uprate power ascension activities The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings 1R15 Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)a. The inspectors reviewed the following assessments
- Inspection Scope Standby liquid control pump B oil leak, CR
-GGN-2012-09690 Standby service water flange bolts degraded, CR
-GGN-2012-09889 The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of two operability evaluations inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-0 5. b.
Introduction.
The inspectors identified two examples of a Green non
-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
regarding the licensee's failure to follow the requirements of Procedure EN
-OP-104, "Operability Determinations." Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples in which the licensee failed to establish an adequate basis for operability when a degraded or nonconforming condition had been identified.
Findings
Description.
Procedure EN
-OP-104, "Operability Determinations," Revision 6, provides the guidance used by operations staff at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station to perform operability determinations. Paragraph 5.3.7 requires that if a condition report indentifies a degraded condition that has been previously identified and evaluated, the evaluation is validated to confirm that it bounds the condition described in the new condition report. As described below, the inspectors identified two examples of operability determinations that did not meet this requirement.
In the first example, Condition Report CR
-GGNS-2012-09690 was initiated to document an oil leak on a bolted connection on the standby liquid control pump B gear box. The pump was declared operable based on an evaluation performed for Condition Report CR-GGNS-2010-00283, which also described an oil leak on the standby liquid control pump. The inspectors challenged the validity of the previous evaluation because the standby liquid control system was modified in the spring of 2012 during refueling outage 18 and the initial evaluation was for a leak around a loose fitting plug versus a bolted connection. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action process under Condition Report CR
-GGNS-2012-09735. Upon further inspection of the standby liquid control pump, the licensee determined there was no active oil leak on the pump gear box and declared the system operable.
In the second example, Condition Report CR
-GGNS-2012-09889 was initiated to document degraded flange bolts on the 24 inch HBC
-82 piping in the B standby service system basin. The pipe was declared operable based on an evaluation performed for Condition Report CR
-GGNS-2011-05009, which also described degraded flange bolts on 24 inch HBC
-82 piping in the B standby service water basin. The inspectors challenged the validity of the previous evaluation because the calculations used the wrong design pressure for calculating the number of bolts required to maintain the integrity of the flange. Mechanical Standard 02 (MS
-02) provides two design requirements for 24 inch HBC
-82 piping. The design pressure the licensee used for the operability evaluation, 180 psig, is for applications above ground level (133 foo t elevation). The pipe that was the subject of the evaluation is below ground level, in which MS-02 requires the design pressure of 195 psig be used. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-GGNS -2012-10664. As an immediate corrective action, the license re
-performed the evaluation with the correct design parameters and determined the number of non
-degraded flange bolts was sufficient to declare the system operable. Also, since the nature of the degradation was such that the material strength of the bolts was not impacted, the bolts were cleaned, re
-coated with a protective coating, and will be replaced during the next scheduled inspection.
Analysis.
The failure to perform operability determinations in accordance with procedure was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor and is a finding because if left uncorrected, not performing operability determinations in accordance with procedure could lead to a more significant safety concern.
Specifically, if a condition renders a safety related system inoperable and because of this performance deficiency the licensee incorrectly determines that the system is operable, then this performance deficiency could result in a safety related system remaining inoperable for a long period of time.
Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the issue affect ed the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power ," the inspectors determined that the issue has very low safety significance (Green) because although it affected the design or qualification of a mitigating system , that system maintained its operability.
The inspectors determined that the apparent cause of this finding was that in both examples, the licensee had identified and used previously completed operabi lity evaluations without verifying that the previously completed evaluations were fully applicable to the identified conditions.
Therefore, the finding had a cross
-cutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area, corrective action progra m component because the licensee failed to properly evaluate for operability conditions adverse to quality P.1(c).
Enforcement.
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or drawings. Procedure EN-OP-140, "Operability Determinations," Revision 6, in part, requires the licensee to validate that if an operability evaluation was completed for a prior non
-conforming condition, the operability evaluation bounds the condition documented in the new condition report. Contrary to this requirement, on August 7 and August 14, 2012, the licensee failed to validate that if an operability evaluation was completed for a prior non
-conforming condition, the operability evaluation bounds the condition documented in the new condition report. Specifically, Condition Reports CR
-GGN-2012-09690 and CR-GGN-2012-09889 document non
-conforming conditions in which the licensee failed to validate that operability evaluations completed for prior non
-conforming conditions bounded the conditions documented in the new condition reports. As an immediate corrective action, the license re
-performed the evaluations and established an adequate basis for operability for the conditions described in the two condition reports described above. This violation is being treated as a non
-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because it was of very low safety significance (Green) with no actual safety consequence, and it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-GGN-2012-09735 and CR
-GGN-2012-10664 to address recurrence. (NCV 05000 416/201200 4-02 , "Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Inadequate Operability Determinations"
) 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)a. The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
Inspection Scope Plant air compressor B scheduled maintenance Standby service water fan A scheduled maintenance Diesel drive n fire pump A scheduled maintenance Containment airlock inner door on the 119' auxiliary building elevation The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four post-maintenance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following
- Preconditioning Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures Jumper/lifted lead controls Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability Test equipment removal Restoration of plant systems Updating of performance indicator data Reference setting data Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
On July 6, 2012, chemistry reactor coolant system sample On July 28, 2012, average power range monitoring (APRM) gain adjustment On August 14, 2012, scram discharge volume (C51) 1/2 Scram On September 18 and 20, 2012, routine low pressure turbine stop and control valve testing and main turbine bypass valve testing Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four surveillance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. The inspector discussed with licensee staff the operability of offsite emergency warning systems and backup alerting methods, to determine the adequacy of licensee methods for testing the alert and notification system in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Inspection Scope Appendix E.
The licensee's alert and notification system testing program was compared with the following:
NUREG-0654, "A Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 1
-10, "A Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" The FEMA-approved design for the licensee's alert and notification system is addressed in the following document:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station REP-10 Design Review Report dated January 2010.
The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation
a. The inspector discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting on
-shift staff to determine the adequacy of licensee methods for staffing emergency response facilities in accordance with their emergency plan and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, including provisions for staffing alternate or backup facilities. The inspector also reviewed licensee training on augmentation procedures, augmentation system testing programs, and selected entries in the licensee corrective action system related to emergency response facility staffing. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (IP 71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in
-office review of the latest revision of an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) located under ADAMS accession number ML12129A106 as listed in the Attachment.
The licensee transmitted the EPIP revision to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, "Implementing Procedures."
The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee
-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
.
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
a. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action program requirements as stated in the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station procedures. The inspector reviewed summaries of corrective action program documents assigned to the emergency preparedness department and emergency response organization between November 2010 and September 2012, and selected 29 for detailed review against the program requirements. The inspector evaluated the response to the corrective action requests to determine the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with the licensee program requirements, planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope The inspector also reviewed: Licensee audits, assessments, drill evaluations, and post
-event after action reports conducted between November 2010 and September 2012; Memorandum of Understanding between the licensee and offsite agencies and organizations relied upon to support site emergency response efforts; Licensee procedures and training for the evaluation of changes to the site emergency plans; Maintenance records for equipment relied upon to support site emergency response efforts; and, Alternate facilities for the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility, Technical Support Center, and Operational Support Center
. These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on September 6, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Emergency Operati ons Facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector
-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.2 Training Observations
a. The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on Inspection Scope July 12, 2012, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Data Submission Issue
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed data submitted by the licensee for the fourth quarter 201 1 , first quarter 2012, and second quarter 2012 emergency preparedness performance indicators to identify any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."
This review was performed as part of the inspector's normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
.13 Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)
a. The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the Drill and Exercise Performance, performance indicator for the period from the 4 th quarter 2011 through the 2 nd quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revisions 6, was used. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspector reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator; assessments of performance indicator opportunities during predesignated control room simulator training sessions, performance during the 2011 biennial exercise, and performance during other drills. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of the drill/exercise performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.14 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)
a. The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation performance indicator for the period from the 4 th quarter 2011 throug h the 2 nd quarter 2012
. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, was used. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspector reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator, rosters of personnel assigned to key emergency response organization positions, an d exercise participation records. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of the emergency response organization drill participation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.15 Alert and Notification System (EP03)
a. The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the Alert and Notification System performance indicator for the period from the 4 th quarter 2011 through the 2 nd quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, was used. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records associated with the performance indicator to verify that the licensee accurately reported the indicator in accordance with relevant procedures and the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance. Specifically, the inspector reviewed licensee records and processes including procedural guidance on assessing opportunities for the performance indicator and the results of periodic alert notification system operability tests. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of the alert and notification system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
(71152)
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed. Inspection Scope
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.2 Daily Corrective Action
Program Reviews a. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow
-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings
.3 Selected Issue Follow
-up Inspection Review of Technical Rigor of Title 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings a. The inspectors chose to review CR
-GGN-2011-08185, which addressed the condition described as "10 CFR 50.59 screenings lack technical rigor to confirm a change has no adverse effects and thus does not require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. As a result, changes to the facility have been implemented without conducting an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 screening/evaluation."
The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and associated corrective actions for not only CR
-GGN-2011-08185, but also several related condition reports. The inspectors also reviewed associated procedures and interviewed several members of the involved licensee staff. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope b. No findings were identified.
Findings Review of Multiple Control Rod Drive Pump Trips During Mode Switch Surveillance a. The inspectors chose to review CR
-GGN-201 2-04007, which addressed the condition described as "two CRD pump trips while performing the Mode Switch Surveillance
." The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and associated corrective actions for not only CR
-GGN-2011-0 4007, but also several related condition reports. The inspectors also reviewed associated procedures and interviewed several members of the involved licensee staff. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Power Uprate Related Inspection Activities: Monitor Major Integrated Tests
(71004)
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed portions of the power ascension testing which are described in Appendix 9 of the license amendment request. T he inspectors reviewed the following:
Core performance, which included evaluating the core thermal power and flow and determining whether the maximum linear heat generation rate, the minimum critical power ratio, and the maximum average planar linear heat generation rate were within limits Water leve l set point, manual feed water flow changes, which verified that the feedwater system had been adjusted to provide acceptable reactor water level control APRM calibration, which calibrated the APRM system to the EPU power level These activities constitute completion of one inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71004, Section 2.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Power Uprate Related Inspection Activities: Integrated Plant Operations at the Uprated Power Level
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed operator actions during integrated plant evolutions conducted during the power ascention to uprated power levels. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures that were amended due to the power uprate. The ins pectors observed the operators increase power from the original license power of 3898 MWth to the extended power uprate power level of 4408 MWth by incrementally increasing power by 2.5%. Following each incremental power increase, the inspectors observed operators actions during the power ascension testing program accordance with Appendix 9 of the extended power uprate license amendment.
The operator actions observed were:
Operators adjusted the reactor water level set point to test the response of the feedwater system Operators adjusted the feed water flow to test the response of the feedwater system Operators calibrated the average power range monitoring system for the new EPU power level These activities constitute completion of one inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71004, Section 2.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Power Uprate Related Inspection Activities: Simulator Upgrade and Training for EPU
b. Inspection Scope
On June 28, 2012, the inspectors performed a simulator training evaluation at 4408 mwth power. As documented in Section 1R11 of this report, t he inspectors verified that EPU upgrades such as the power range neutron monitoring system and the thermohydraulic instability indicators were incorporated in the simulator. The inspectors observed crew performance with in terms of clarity and formality of communication, the crew's ability to take timely action in the safe direction, prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms. The inspectors also verified the operators correctly implemented procedures and Technical Specifications that had been updated for EPU. The inspectors determined the crew performed timely control board manipulations and had proper oversight and direction from the shift supervisor. The inspectors also observed the licensee's critique of the licensed operators performance following the training scenario. These activities constitute completion of one inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71004, Section 2.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Licensee Strike Contingency Plans
a. Inspection Scope
On September 13, 2012, the bargaining unit security officers at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station voted against the ratification of the contract due to expire on September 30, 2012. The inspectors initiated inspection procedure 92709," Licensee Strike Contingency Plans." The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the strike contingency plan by reviewing the plan for required minimum number of qualified personnel available for proper security of the facility
. The inspectors attended the meeting in which the onsite safety review committee reviewed the plan for adequacy.The inspectors interviewed security management and security training personnel and observed training excercises to ensure strike contingency personnel met all the requirements to fill in for potential striking staff.
Documents reviewed as part of this inspection are listed in the attachment
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 14, 2012, the inspector presented the onsite emergency preparedness inspection results to Mr. M. Perito, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On October 10, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Perito and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. Th e inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements
, which meet s the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a Non
-Cited Violation.
Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), states
, in part, that before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, before performing a certain maintenance activity, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from that activity. Specifically, on September 5, 2012, the licensee performed Surveillance Procedures 06
-IC-1C61-R-0005, "RCIC Turbine Speed Calibration," Revision 101
, and 06-IC-1C11-Q-0003, "Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level Float Switch Functional Test," Revision 103, concurrently without assessing and managing the increase in risk, which resulted in the unplanned occurrence of an Orange risk configuration. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program in Condition Report CR
-GGN-2012-10454. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human error, and it affected the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and that challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," Flowchart 1, "Assessment of Risk Deficit," and consulting with the regional senior risk analyst, the inspectors determined that finding has very low safety significance (Green) based on a licensee's calculated determination of the incremental core damage probability deficit of 9.36E
-11. Using the current revision of the plant-specific SPAR model, an NRC senior reactor analyst validated that result
.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Browning, General Plant Manager
- J. Dorsey, Security Manager
- H. Farris, Assistant Operations Manager
- D. Fearn, Emergency Planner
- J. Giles, Manager, Training
- K. Higgenbotham, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
- D. Jones, Manager, Design Engineering
- C. Justiss, Licensing
- C. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- W. Mashburn, EPU Director
- J. Miller, Manager, Operations
- L. Patterson, Manager, Program Engineering
- C. Perino, Licensing Manager
- M. Perito, Vice President, Operations
- R. Pownall, Quality Assurance
- W. Renz, Corporate Director, Emergency Planning
- M. Richey, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
- R. Scarbrough, Specialist and Lead Offsite Liaison, Licensing
- J. Seiter, Senior Licensing Specialist
- J. Shaw, Manager, System Engineering
- T. Trichell, Manager, Radiation Protection
ner
- R. VanDenAkker, Senior Emergency Planner
- D. Wiles, Engineering Director
NRC Personnel
- R. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Rice, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000416-2012-004-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Adequate Operability Determinations (Section 1R15)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION 05-1-02-VI-2 Hurricanes, Tornados, and Severe Weather
- 118
- ENS-EP-302 Severe Weather Response
- EN-EP-303 Severe Weather Recovery
- EN-EP-301 Emergency Planning Assessment of Offsite Emergency Reponses Capability Following a Natural Disaster
- CONDITION REPORTS
- OTHER DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Tropical Storm Isaac Advisory 34
- August 26, 2012
- Event Web EOC Logs August 23, 2012
- GGNS CR Log Entries August 26,2012-Septmeber 4, 2012
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
- PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISION 04-1-01E12-1 Residual Heat Removal C
- 141 04-1-01-P75-1 Standby Diesel Generator System
- 04-1-01E12-1 Residual Heat Removal A
- 2
- CONDITION REPORTS
- CR-GGN-2012-10279 CR-GGN-2012-10649
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
- PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISION Fire Pre-Plan
- DG-04 HPCS Diesel Generator Fire Pre-Plan A-11 RHR C and Pipe Penetration Room
- 01-S-07-43 Control of Loose Items, Temporary Electrical Power, and Access to Equipment
- EN-MA-133 Control of Scaffolding Fire Pre-Plan A-13 Electrical SWGR Rooms 1A201 & 1A208, Area 8
-7, Elevation 119' 2 Fire Pre-Plan A-16 Electrical SWGR Rooms 1A219 & 1A221, Area 10
-9, Elevation 119'
- DRAWING S NUMBER TITLE REVISION M-1093C HPCS Diesel Generator System, Unit 1
- M-1093B HPCS Diesel Generator System 24 M-1857 Blockouts & Penetrations Auxiliary Building
- EL 119'0" Area
-9 Unit 1 15
- CALCULATION
- S NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
- CC-N1A57-91041 Temporary Scaffolding at ECCS Pumps (HPCS, LPCS, RHR A, B & C) October 14, 1991
- CC-N1000-92068 Evaluation of Standard Scaffolding Configurations for Standard No. GGNS
-CS-05 December 11, 1992
- MC-QSP64-86058 Fire Zone 1A207
- CONDITION REPORTS
- ENGINEERING CHANGES
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
- CONDITION REPORTS
- WORK ORDERS
- WO 00080859 01
- WO 00117235 01
- WO 00245168 01
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
- PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations
- EN-LI-118-08 Failure Modes Analysis
- 04-S-01-Z 51-1 System Operating Instruction Control Room HVAC System
- OTHER DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE DATE GIN 2012/00171
- Simulator Evaluation on 6/28/12 "B" Shift June 28, 2012 GIN 2012/00182
- Simulator Evaluation on 7/12/12 "D" Shift July 12, 2012
- 2012 Cycle 5 Licensed Operator Requal Simulator Training Plan Simulator Differences
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-DC-207 Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment
- EN-DC-150 Condition Monitoring of Maintenance Rule Structures
- OTHER DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ DATE
- LO-GLO-2011-00073 Manager's Focused Assessment Grand Gulf Maintenance Rule Program July 19, 2012
- GGNS Maintenance Rule Assessment Fuel Cycle 18 and Refueling Outage 18 (RF18)
- June 1, 2010
-June 1, 2012
- GGNS-C-399.0 GGNS Program Plan For Maintenance Rule Inspection of Structures, Tanks, and Transformers
- CONDITION REPORTS
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls
- PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-WM-101 Attachment 9.1 Online Emergent Work Add/Delete Approval Form (Additions for Work Week July 30
- August 5, 2012)
- EN-DC-324 Attachment 9.8 SSW Cooling Tower Fan AR# 150760
- EN-WM-101 On-line Work Management Process
- EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment
- EN-WM-105 Planning 10
- EN-EM-109 Scheduling
- 05-1-02-VI-2 Off-Normal Event Procedure Hurricanes, Tornados, and Severe Weather
- 118
- EN-WM-101 Attachment 9.1: Online Emergent Work Add/Delete Form (Week of August 5, 2012)
- EN-OP-119 Protected Equipment Postings
- EN-WM-101 Attachment 9.1: Online Emergent Work Add/Delete Form (Week of August 20, 2012)
- CONDITION REPORTS
- WORK ORDERS
Section 1R15: Operability
- Evaluations
- OTHER DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-LI-101-ATT-9.1 10
- CFR 50.59 EVALUATION FORM
for EC No. 38230
- EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination for EC No. 38230
- EN-DC-136 Temporary Modification to install bypass signals for "B" Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Sensor for EC No. 38230
Section 1R15: Operability
- Evaluations
- OTHER DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-OP-104 Technical Evaluation for Operability CR
-GGN-2012-8314 6
- EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination for
- EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process
- GGNS-MS-02 Mechanical Standard for Piping Class Summary
- CONDITION REPORTS
- ENGINEERING CHANGES
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance
- Testing PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N 06-ME-SP64-R-0001 Fire Protection Water System Diesel Check
- 103
- EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
- 07-S-14-374 Personnel Airlock Inflatable Seal Replacement
- 06-ME-1M23-V-0002 Personnel Airlock Local Leak Rate Test
- 115 01-S-17-5 Engineering Evaluation Request: 1M23Y005, Drywell Personnel Airlock
- 01-S-02-3 Personnel Airlock Door Seal Air System Leak Test
- 119 06-ME-1M23-R-0001 Personnel Airlock Door Seal Air System Leak Test
- 113
- DRAWING S NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE M-1062D Turbine Building Cooling Water System Unit 1
- CONDITION REPORTS
- WORK ORDER
- S
- WO52379477 01
- WO 00274277 01
- WO 52299697 01
- WO 52371043 01
- WO 52299697 04
- WO 52299697 05
- WO 52361064 01
- WO 52370066 01
- WO 52361063 01
- WO 52361242 01
- WO 00304957 01
- WO 00324275 01
- WO 00317319 04
- WO 00264248 01
- WO 00248797 01
- WO 52392133 01
- WO 52361241 01
- WO 00264252 01
- ENGINEERING CHANGE EC No. 28202
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
- PROCEDURE S NUMBER TITLE REVISION 06-RE-1C51-W-0001, Attachment I
- APRM Gain Adjustment
- Manual Method
- 105 06-CH-1B21O-0002 Reactor Coolant Routine Chemistry
- 108 06-IC-1C11-Q-0003 Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level Float Switches (RPS) Functional Test
- 103 06-OP-1N32-V-0001 Turbine St op and Control Valve Operability
- 118
- CONDITION REPORTS
- WORK ORDERS
- WO 52404331 01
- WO 52419554 01
- WO 52437708 01
Section 1EP2: Alert Notification System Testing
- REPORT NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station REP
-10 Design Review Report January 2010
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing
- REPORTS NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Quarterly Off
-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test nd Qtr. 2012
- Quarterly Off
-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test st Qtr. 2012
- Quarterly Off
-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test th Qtr. 2011
- Quarterly Off-Hours Unannounced Everbridge Test rd Qtr. 2011
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
- PROCUDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION 10-S-01-1 Activation of the Emergency Plan
- 21
Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
- PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 10-S-01-37 Communications Drills
- 000 10-S-01-39 Grand Gulf Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness
- 000
- EN-EP-202 Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness
- EN-EP-306 Drills and Exercises 3
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Plan
- DRILLS AND EVENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- GIN 2012-00077 Semi-annual Health Physics Drill March 8, 2012
- GIN 2012-00118 Emergency Activation Report for the April 11, 2012 Unusual Event April 11, 2012
- EAL Usage Spreadsheet Emergency Preparedness Letter of Agreement Annual Review 2011
- AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- LO-GLO-2011-0104 Pre-NRC 2012 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Assessment July 2, 2012
- LO-GLO-2011-0175 Equipment Important to Emergency Response November 9, 2011
- QS-2011-GGNS-012 Quality Assurance Surveillance Report August 5, 2011
- QS-2012-GGNS-016 Quality Assurance Surveillance Report May 10, 2012
- QS-2012-GGNS-018 Quality Assurance Surveillance Report May 1, 2012
- AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- QA-07-2011-GGNS-1 QA Audit Report (E
-Plan) May 16, 2011
- CONDITION REPORTS
- CR-GGN-20 10-344
- CR-GGN-20 10-5748
- CR-GGN-20 10-7456
- CR-GGN-20 10-8108
- CR-GGN-20 10-7744
- CR-GGN-20 10-7857
- CR-GGN-20 11-715
- CR-GGN-20 11-846
- CR-GGN-20 11-1221
- CR-GGN-20 11-2229
- CR-GGN-20 11-2312
- CR-GGN-20 11-3030
- CR-GGN-20 11-4839
- CR-GGN-20 11-5063
- CR-GGN-20 11-7032
- CR-GGN-20 11-7806
- CR-GGN-20 11-7832
- CR-GGN-20 11-7838
- CR-GGN-20 11-1520
- CR-GGN-20 11-1842
- CR-GGN-20 11-8494
- CR-GGN-20 11-3239
- CR-GGN-20 11-4646
- CR-GGN-20 11-7839
- CR-GGN-20 11-7179
- CR-GGN-20 11-7680
- CR-GGN-20 12-448
- CR-GGN-20 12-6246
- CR-GGN-20 12-8117
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
- PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EN-EP-307 Hostile Action Based Drills & Exercises
- OTHER DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE DATE
- Red Team Quarterly Drill August 28, 2012
- CONDITION REPORT
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
- PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISIO N 02-S-01-27 Operation's Philosophy
- 05-1-02-IV-1 Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions
- 114
- EN-OP-115-09 Log Keeping
- ER-GG-2005-0128-000 Approve Bussman type BAF
-03 fuse to replace MIN
-3 fuses in scram circuit of HCU's
- EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination
- EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination
- EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 6
- CONDITION REPORT
- S
- ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION
- EC 22768 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION OF TURBINE "B" 1ST STAGE PRESSURE SENSING INSTRUMENTATION -
- EC 31752 UPDATE UFSAR 8.3.1.1.5.4 TO ALLOW LIMITED CONNECTION OF RPS A AND RPS B TO THEIR ALTERNATE SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT EMERGENT PLANT SITUATIONS
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION/ DATE
- EN-OM-119 On-Site Safety Review Committee
- 01-S-06-5 Event Notification Worksheet: GGNS Negotiations Update September 17, 2012
- OTHER DOCUMENTS
- NUMBER TITLE DATE
- GGNS Strike Contingency Plan
- GGNS Letter to Security Employees September 20, 2012
- Q & A's Regarding Security Lockout
- CONDITION REPORT
- CR-GGN-2012-09637 CR-GGN-2012-10546
Section 4OA7:
- Licensee
-Identified Violations
- PROCEDURES
- NUMBER TITLE REVISION 06-IC-1C61-R-0005 RCIC Turbine Speed Calibration
- 101 06-IC-1C11-Q-0003 SCRAM Discharge Volume High Water Level Float Switches (RPS) Functional Test
- 103
- CONDITION REPORT