IR 05000219/2006002

IR 05000219-06-002 on 01/01/06 - 03/31/06 for Amergen Energy Company, LLC; Oyster Creek Generating Station; Maintenance Effectiveness, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

ML061280428
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/04/2006
From:	Bellamy R R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB7
To:	Crane C M AmerGen Energy Co
Bellamy R R Rgn-I/DRP/Br7/610-337-5200
References
IR-06-002
Download: ML061280428 (41)

Text

May 4, 2006

Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and CEO AmerGen Energy Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way, KSA 3-E Kennett Square, PA 19348

SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000219/2006002

Dear Mr. Crane:

On March 31, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atyour Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documentsthe inspection findings, which were discussed on April 7, 2006, with Mr. Swenson and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.The report documents one NRC-identified finding and three self-revealing findings of very lowsafety significance (Green). Three of these findings were determined to involve a violation of

NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because theywere entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these three findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Ifyou contest these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster CreekGenerating Station.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

2C. CraneWe appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have anyquestions regarding this letter.

Sincerely,/RA/Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., ChiefProjects Branch 7 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No.50-219License No.DPR-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000219/2006002

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:Chief Operating Officer, AmerGenSite Vice President, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, AmerGen Plant Manager, Oyster Creek Generating Station, AmerGen Regulatory Assurance Manager, Oyster Creek, AmerGen Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services, AmerGen Vice President - Mid-Atlantic Operations, AmerGen Vice President - Operations Support, AmerGen Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, AmerGen Director Licensing, AmerGen Manager Licensing - Oyster Creek, AmerGen Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, AmerGen T. O'Neill, Associate General Counsel, Exelon Generation CompanyJ. Fewell, Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Nuclear Correspondence Control Desk, AmerGen J. Matthews, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Mayor of Lacey Township K. Tosch, Chief, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, NJ Dept of Environmental Protection R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff N. Cohen, Coordinator - Unplug Salem Campaign W. Costanzo, Technical Advisor - Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch E. Gbur, Chairwoman - Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch E. Zobian, Coordinator - Jersey Shore Anti Nuclear Alliance P. Baldauf, Assistant Director, Radiation Protection and Release Prevention, State of NewJersey 3

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000219/2006002; 01/01/06 - 03/31/06; AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Oyster CreekGenerating Station; Maintenance Effectiveness, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, andAccess Control to Radiologically Significant Areas.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional inspectors,an announced inspection by a regional senior radiation specialist, and in-office inspection by a regional emergency preparedness inspector. Three Green non-cited violation (NCV) and one Green finding were identified. The significance of most findings are indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeingthe safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,"Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing finding was identified regarding untimely corrective actionswhen packing on the 'A' feedwater regulating valve failed on February 10, 2006, and resulted in an upset of plant stability. This finding was determined not to be a violationof NRC requirements. AmerGen's corrective actions involved repairing the valve andreplacing the packing.This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipmentperformance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that challenge plant stability during poweroperation. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Operations," the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and unavailability of mitigatingequipment. The performance deficiency had a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect. (Section 1R12)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate procedure qualitywhen the 'D' emergency service water (ESW) pump did not start on December 19,2005. A preventive maintenance procedure was not adequate to identify a degradedcondition associated with a contact in the pump's circuit breaker prior to placing the breaker in service. This finding was determined to be a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." AmerGen's corrective actions included revising the procedure to ensure that resistance checks areperformed on the contacts which could impact proper operation of the ESW pump breakers.

ivEnclosureThe finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure qualityattribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to maintain thereliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirableconsequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the inspectors conducted a Phase I SDP screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function, did not result in an actual loss of safety function for a single train of equipment for greater than allowed by technical specifications, did not result in an actual loss of safety function of non-technical specification equipment considered risk significant in the maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and was not screened as potentially risk significant from external events. The performance deficiency had a human performance cross-cutting aspect. (Section 1R12)

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green.

The inspectors identified that AmerGen did not properly implementadministrative controls for locked high radiation area (HRA) access keys maintained under the control of operations personnel. This finding was determined to be a non-cited violation of technical specification 6.13.2, "High Radiation Area." As of the end ofthis inspection period, AmerGen was determining the appropriate corrective actions for this issue.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program andprocess attribute of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," because it was an exposure control issue. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve an As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) finding, it did not involve an overexposure, there was no substantial potentialfor an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Theperformance deficiency had a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect.

(Section 2OS1)

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

Green.

A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate procedureadherence when work activities on the main condenser during a forced maintenance outage resulted in an unauthorized, unmonitored effluent discharge to the environment between January 31 and February 2, 2006. This finding was determined to be a non-cited violation of technical specification 6.8.1a, "Procedures and Programs." As of the end of this inspection period, AmerGen was determining the appropriate corrective actions for this issue.

vEnclosureThe finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program andprocess attribute of the public radiation safety cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," because it was a radioactive effluent release program issue. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because AmerGen was able to assess the dose from the release of the radioactive effluent and the radiological release associated with the event was notgreater than 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable' for Radioactive Material in Light -Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents" or 10 CFR 20.1301(d), "Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public," regulatory limits. The performance deficiency had a human performance cross-cutting aspect. (Section 1R20)

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusThe Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating atfull power. On January 25, 2006, operators performed an unplanned downpower to approximately fifty-three

(53) percent in accordance with abnormal procedures due to a trip of the 'B' reactor recirculation pump when the 'A' reactor recirculation pump was out-of-service. On January 28, 2006, operators commenced a planned shutdown to investigate the cause ofthe 'B' reactor recirculation pump trip. Oyster Creek was placed in cold shutdown on January 29, 2006.

AmerGen personnel entered the drywell to investigate the cause of the'B' reactor recirculation pump trip and identified a failed pump motor. AmerGen replaced the

'B' reactor recirculation pump motor with a refurbished spare, replaced the 'A' reactor recirculation pump seal, and repaired a tube leak on the '1C-3' high pressure feedwater heater during the outage. Prior to startup an oil leak was identified on the 'B' reactor recirculationpump motor. AmerGen personnel were unable to repair the motor and the 'B' reactor recirculation pump was tagged out-of-service. Operators started the plant with four operablereactor recirculation pumps; established the reactor critical on February 4, 2006 and synchronized the main generator to the grid on February 5, 2006. During the startup, operatorswere unable to start the 'A' feedwater pump and in accordance with operating procedures operators maintained power at 70% until repairs were completed on the 'A' feedwater pumpground sensing circuit. The plant reached full power on February 8, 2006.On February 10, 2006, operators performed an unplanned downpower to seventy

(70) percent in accordance with operating procedures after identifying a "significant" packing leak on the 'A' feedwater pump regulating valve. Operators removed the 'A' feedwater string from service andmaintenance personnel replaced the packing on the valve. The plant returned to full power on February 12, 2006.On February 26, 2006, Oyster Creek experienced an unplanned reactor power excursion toapproximately one hundred and one (101) percent due to a failure of the speed controller for the 'D' reactor recirculation pump motor generator. Operators immediately reduced reactorpower below 100 percent by lowering the speed on the 'A', 'C' and 'E' reactor recirculationpumps with the master flow controller. The speed controller for the 'D' reactor recirculationpump was locked in place in accordance with operating procedures. Oyster Creek implemented a temporary standing order which directed operations to take manual-local control of the motor generator to reduce pump speed when a power reduction is necessary. The 'D' reactor recirculation pump motor generator is scheduled to be repaired during Oyster Creek's next refueling outage.On March 12, 2006, while operators were performing control rod exercising in accordance withtechnical specification 4.2.D, "Reactivity Control," control rod 06-43 was given a withdraw signal, but inserted. In accordance with abnormal and operating procedures, operators returned control rod 06-43 to its proper position. Oyster Creek personnel performed troubleshooting and minor maintenance on the reactor manual control system because it wasdetermined to be the cause of the problem. On March 13, 2006, operators resumed control rod 2Enclosureexercising, however control rod 06-35 responded in a similar manner as control rod 06-43. Oyster Creek personnel performed additional troubleshooting and identified a problem with the reactor manual control system timer sequencer. In order to complete the technical specificationsurveillance test within its specified time period, AmerGen revised the surveillance test procedure to allow operators to insert all one hundred and thirty seven (137) control rods one notch to verify operability of the control rods and complete the surveillance test. Performing thesurveillance test in this manner resulted in an unplanned power reduction to approximately ninety-three

(93) percent power. After successful completion of the surveillance test, maintenance personnel replaced the timer sequencer for the reactor manual control system,and operators withdrew all control rods to their normal position. Oyster Creek returned to full power on March 14, 2006.On March 26, 2006, while operators were performing control rod exercising in accordance withtechnical specification 4.2.D, "Reactivity Control," control rod 38-41 was given an insert signal, but withdrew. In accordance with abnormal and operating procedures operators returned control rod 38-41 to its proper position. The unexpected control rod response caused a power excursion to approximately one hundred and two (102) percent for a two minute period. The remainder of the control rod exercising was performed by using the revised surveillance testprocedure developed by AmerGen during a similar issue on March 12, 2006 when control rods were given a withdraw signal, but inserted. Oyster Creek personnel performed additional troubleshooting and identified a problem with the reactor manual control logic circuitry.On March 29, 2006, operators performed an unplanned downpower to sixty

(60) percent inaccordance with operating procedures to repair a leak on the 'C' reactor feedpump casing drainline. AmerGen personnel were monitoring the leak since February 19, 2006 when the leak was first identified. On March 28, 2006, leakage increased and AmerGen management directed operations personnel to remove the 'C' reactor feedpump from service to perform repairs.Maintenance personnel removed a portion of the drain line and installed a cap. The plant returned to full power on March 30, 2006.Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's response to one site specific weather-relatedcondition. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's response to winter storm conditions which involvedcold temperatures, high winds, and heavy rain on January 18, 2006. Operators entered 3Enclosureabnormal procedures ABN-31, "High Winds," and ABN-32, "Abnormal Intake Level"during the adverse weather condition due to high winds and low levels in the intake canal. The inspectors verified that procedures were properly implemented and that actions taken were appropriate for the weather conditions. Additionally, during the storm, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the intake structure (including the ESW and service water pumps) and other outdoor safety system equipment (includingstandby gas treatment (SBGT) fans) to verify that any issues noted were appropriately identified and dispositioned by AmerGen.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

(4 samples)The inspectors performed three partial and one complete equipment alignmentinspections. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.Partial System Walkdown. The inspectors performed three partial equipment alignmentinspections. The partial alignment inspections were completed during conditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions; or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable, theassociated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:*'B' isolation condenser on January 10, 2006;*'1' emergency diesel generator (EDG) on January 24, 2006; and

• Diesel driven fire pump fuel oil transfer system on March 6, 2006.Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete system alignmentinspection on the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system to determine whether the system was aligned and capable of providing cooling water in accordancewith design basis requirements. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance test procedures, pipe and instrument drawings, and applicable equipment lineup lists to determine if the equipment was aligned to perform its design function upon actuation. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the system to assessmaterial condition and operational performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

(9 samples)The inspectors performed a walkdown of nine plant areas to assess their vulnerability tofire. During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, andthe adequacy of compensatory measures (when applicable). The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) for risk insights and design features credited in these areas.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identified problems were being evaluated and corrected. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. The following plant areas were inspected:Standby liquid control (SLC) area on January 5, 2006;'1' EDG on January 9, 2006;'2' EDG on January 9, 2006;EDG fuel oil storage tank room on January 10, 2006;RBCCW heat exchanger area on January 17, 2006; Shutdown cooling (SDC) pump room on January 30, 2006; Diesel driven fire pump house on February 28, 2006; 'A'/'B' 125 volt battery room on March 1, 2006; and'A' 480 Volt safety related breaker room on March 2, 2006.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors performed one internal flood protection inspection activity in the reactorfeedwater pump room located in the turbine building. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood barriers, floor drains, and floor sumps. The inspectors evaluated these items to determine if internal flood vulnerabilities existed and to assess thephysical condition of the equipment and components in the reactor feed pump room.

The inspectors also reviewed AmerGen's procedures related to flooding of the reactor feed pump room. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors verified acceptable heat exchanger performance by reviewing the resultsof one heat exchanger maintenance activity. The inspectors observed AmerGen's inspection and cleaning activities associated with the '1-1' RBCCW heat exchanger on March 6, 2006. The inspectors assessed the state of cleanliness and material condition of the heat exchanger by verifying the extent of corrosion, fouling and silting within the heat exchanger. After maintenance was complete, the inspectors performed a walk down of the '1-1' RBCCW heat exchanger and reviewed its operational data (flow, temperatures, and pressures) to assess the effectiveness of the cleaning activities.

Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors observed one simulator training scenario on February 13, 2006, toassess operator performance and training effectiveness. The scenario involved a partial loss of reactor water level indication which resulted in a half scram, a stuck open electromagnetic relief valve (EMRV), and an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)event. The inspectors assessed whether the simulator adequately reflected the plant's response, operator performance met AmerGen procedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crew performance problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

(71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

(3 samples)The inspectors performed three maintenance effectiveness inspection activities. Theinspectors reviewed AmerGen's performance monitoring of the control rod drive (CRD)6Enclosuresystem to determine whether AmerGen was adequately monitoring equipmentperformance in accordance with the "Maintenance Rule" to ensure that maintenance was effective. The inspectors also reviewed the following degraded component issues in order to assess the effectiveness of maintenance by AmerGen:*Containment spray system #1flow circuit failure on January 21, 2006 (IR 444410); and *'A' feedwater regulating valve packing leak on February 10, 2006 (IR 452708).The inspectors verified that the systems or components were monitored in accordancewith AmerGen's maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to those being tracked by AmerGen to evaluate the effectiveness of AmerGen's monitoring activities and determine whether performance goals were being met. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work orders and procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipment performance issues. The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action program condition reports, preventive maintenance ta sks, vendor manuals, and system health reports. Documents reviewedfor this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.Additionally, the inspectors completed their review of AmerGen's apparent causeevaluation (IR 435168) associated with the failure of the 'D' ESW pump to start onDecember 19, 2005. This issue was identified as an unresolved item (URI)05000219/2005005-02 in NRC Inspection Report 05000219/2005005, dated January 25,2006. The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's evaluation and the maintenance history on the 'D' ESW pump and its associated 4160 Volt breaker.

b. Findings

Containment Spray System '1' Flow Instrumentation FailureAn URI was identified to review AmerGen's corrective action program evaluation(IR 444410) regarding the failure of the containment spray system '1' flowinstrumentation on January 21, 2006. The inspectors plan to review this evaluation after it is completed, which had not occurred by the end of this inspection period. (URI 05000219/2006002-01, Containment Spray System #1 Flow Instrumentation Failure)'A' Feedwater Regulating Valve Packing Leak

Introduction.

A self-revealing finding was identified regarding untimely corrective actionswhen packing on the 'A' feedwater regulating valve failed on February 10, 2006, and resulted in an upset of plant stability. The finding was determined not to be a violation of NRC requirements.

7EnclosureDescription. On February 10, 2006, the plant performed an unscheduled downpower toless than seventy

(70) percent reactor power to correct a packing leak on the 'A' feedwater regulating valve. The packing leak was identified on February 5, 2005, andwas left uncorrected until February 10, 2006, when a four

(4) foot steam plume (approximately three

(3) gallon per minute leak) from the 'A' feedwater regulating valve was identified by an operator during turbine building rounds. Operators commenced a downpower in accordance with plant operating procedures to support isolation of the 'A' feedwater piping, in order for maintenance personnel to repack the valve. Oyster Creek returned to full power operation on February 12, 2006.The inspectors noted that AmerGen's corrective action program identified the deficiencyin work order A2107900 on February 5, 2005. The work request initially required no immediate maintenance to correct the deficiency. On September 25, 2005, the workrequest was updated to reflect leakage from the valve had increased and stated that a valve repack should be considered during a maintenance outage. A catch basin was installed under the 'A' feedwater regulating valve on October 8, 2005, when leakage hadincreased to sixty

(60) drops per minute. The work request was updated on October 21, 2005, to annotate that the leakage had increased to a "pencil" size stream. On November 28, 2005, during a forced outage preparation meeting, engineering personnelrequested that operators provide an update on the leakage in order to determine ifmaintenance should be performed on the valve during a forced maintenance outage.

Subsequent to the forced outage meeting in November 2005, no update was providedby operations personnel. On January 28, 2006, Oyster Creek entered into an eight (8)day forced maintenance outage to replace the 'B' reactor recirculation pump. OysterCreek did not perform repairs on the 'A' feedwater regulating valve during the forced maintenance outage. The valve packing subsequently failed shortly after Oyster Creek achieved full power on February 8, 2006, and required a reduction in reactor power to seventy

(70) percent to repair.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this self-revealing equipmentproblem involved untimely corrective actions. AmerGen did not perform corrective actions in a timely manner to ensure the reliability of the 'A' feedwater regulating valve. The performance deficiency had a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect because it involved untimely corrective actions. AmerGen's corrective actions involved repairing the valve.This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipmentperformance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that challenge plant stability during poweroperation. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Operations,"

the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and unavailability of mitigating equipment.

8EnclosureEnforcement. The 'A' feedwater regulating valve is not a safety related component, andtherefore no violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Nonetheless, because thefinding was of very low safety significance and AmerGen has entered this issue into their corrective action program in condition report 452708, this is identified as a finding. (FIN 05000219/2006002-02, Untimely Corrective Actions Causes Unplanned Power Reduction Due to 'A' Feedwater Packing Leakage.)'D' ESW Pump Start FailureIntroduction. A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate procedureguidance when the 'D' ESW pump did not start on December 19, 2005. A preventivemaintenance procedure was not adequate to identify a degraded condition associated with a contact in the pump's circuit breaker prior to placing the breaker in service. This finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and determined to be a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."Description. On October 20, 2005, the installed 'D' ESW pump General Electric (GE)Magne-Blast 4160 Volt circuit breaker was replaced with a spare breaker (S/N 0196A2853-029) under preventive maintenance work order R0806287. The work order required that maintenance personnel verify that portions of maintenance procedure 2400-SME-3915.03, "4160 Volt Breaker Preventive Maintenance," had been performed prior to installing the breaker. Specifically, the work order required that maintenance personnel verify that maintenance procedure 2400-SME-3915.03, exhibit 2, "DataSheet," was completed satisfactorily for the breaker to be installed. Exhibit 2 of the maintenance procedure for the breaker to be installed was completed on November 19, 2004. The spare breaker was installed into the 'D' ESW pump's breaker cubicle, thepump motor was successfully started, and the pump was placed in a standby condition on October 20, 2005. Subsequently, the 'D' ESW pump was successfully started onNovember 19, 2005.On December 19, 2005, the 'D' ESW pump did not start when operators attempted toplace the pump in service during its monthly operational start. Maintenance personnel investigated this issue and identified that one of the four 52Y anti-pump relay contactshad a high resistance reading due to "excessive" oxidation on its contact surface.

Maintenance personnel cleaned (burnished) the contact and measured its resistance to ensure it was adequately cleaned. The pump was successfully started and placed in standby on December 19, 2005.The 52Y relay is a auxiliary control device mounted on the GE 4160 Volt Magne-Blastcircuit breaker. The 52Y contacts are normally closed and in series with the 52X closing coil. Since the contact resistance was high, the relay operated as if it was open, and the start signal was not passed to the closing coil, which resulted in the 'D' ESW pump notstarting.

9EnclosureAmerGen's evaluation (IR 435168) into the cause of the pump failure identified thatmaintenance procedure 2400-SME-3915.03 was not adequate to identify a potentiallydegraded condition with one of the 52Y relay contacts. The procedure did not ensure resistance measurements on the four 52Y relay contacts were taken when the procedure was performed; therefore it was not adequate to determine the reliability(i.e., increased resistance) of the contacts. Specifically, the procedure did not list the four 52Y relay contacts which needed to be measured and did not contain a space for maintenance personnel to record the contact resistance of each 52Y relay contact after it was measured. Additionally, AmerGen determined that the preventive maintenancetask should be re-performed prior to installing a spare breaker if it has been greater thanninety days since it was last performed.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this self-revealing equipmentproblem involved inadequate procedure guidance. AmerGen did not maintain an adequate procedure to ensure each 52Y relay contact was measured in order to determine the reliability of the contacts. The performance deficiency had a humanperformance cross-cutting aspect because it involved a procedure quality issue.

AmerGen's corrective action included revising the preventive maintenance procedure to ensure all 52Y contacts are measured, the contact resistance acceptance value was changed to a lower value, and required measurements of the contact resistance to be taken if it has been greater than ninety days since the performance of the preventivemaintenance task.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure qualityattribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to maintain thereliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirableconsequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the inspectors conducted a Phase I SDP screening and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function, did not result in an actual loss of safety function for a single train of equipment for greater than allowed by technical specifications, did not result in an actual loss of safety function of non-technical specification equipment considered risk significant in the maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and was not screened as potentially risk significant from external events.Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, andDrawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance. Contrary to the above, on November 19, 2004, AmerGen's procedure2400-SME-3915.03 did not provide adequate guidance to ensure that resistance measurements on all the 52Y relay contacts in the GE Magne-Blast 4160 Volt circuit breaker were measured to assess the reliability of the contacts. However, because the finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the AmerGen's corrective action program in condition report 435168, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. URI 10Enclosure05000219/2005005-02 is closed. (NCV 05000219/2006002-03,'D' ESW Pump StartFailure)1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

(5 samples)The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through directobservation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:Control Rod 30-15 unavailable due to a leak on accumulator charging blockvalve V-305-111 on January 12, 2006;'2' EDG unavailable during scheduled maintenance on January 23, 2006;'1' core spray system and '1' combustion turbine unavailable during scheduledmaintenance on February 28, 2006;'1-1' RBCCW system unavailable during heat exchanger cleaning and inspectionon March 6, 2006; and'1' SBGTsystem unavailable during scheduled maintenance on March 14, 2006.The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and controlroom logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly and reassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with AmerGen's procedure guidance.

AmerGen's actions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used AmerGen's on-line risk monitor (ORAM-Sentinal) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

(4 samples)The inspectors evaluated AmerGen's performance and response during four non-routineevolutions to determine whether operator response was consistent with applicableprocedures, training, and AmerGen's expectations. The inspectors observed control room activities and/or reviewed control room logs and applicable operating procedures to assess operator performance. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

11EnclosureTurbine Building Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Fouling. On January 16, 2006, operators received a stator cooling water trouble alarm due to degraded turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchanger performance during elevated grassing conditions. The inspectors verified that operators appropriately implemented abnormal procedure ABN-32, "Abnormal Intake," and operating procedure 309.1, "Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System." The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the intake structure and TBCCW system after operators implemented actions to mitigatethe impact of macro fouling on the TBCCW heat exchangers.'B' Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip. On January 25, 2006, operators experienced a tripof the 'B' reactor recirculation pump. The inspectors responded to the control room when they became aware of the condition and verified operators appropriatelyimplemented abnormal procedure ABN-2, "Recirculation System Failures,"

andoperating procedure 301.2, "Reactor Recirculation System." The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operatedin accordance with its operating license. Please refer to section

4OA3 of this report for

additional details.Augmented Offgas (AOG) System Hydrogen Detonation. On February 13, 2006,operators responded to a hydrogen detonation in the 'B' train of the AOG system. Operators received offgas isolation alarms and two "loud" bangs were heard originating from the AOG building. The detonation caused a high pressure spike in the offgas holdup line causing offgas to isolate. The inspectors verified that operators appropriately implemented abnormal procedure ABN-25, "Off-Gas Explosion," and were able to reset the offgas isolation and restore offgas flow to the stack. The inspectors reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operatedin accordance with its operating license. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors," to determine if this condition was reportable. Please refer to section

4OA3 of this report

for additional details.'D' Reactor Recirculation Pump Speed Controller Failure. On February 26, 2006,operators experienced an unplanned reactor power excursion to approximately one hundred and one (101) percent due to a failure of the speed controller for the 'D' reactorrecirculation pump motor generator. The inspectors verified that operators appropriately implemented abnormal procedure ABN-2, "Recirculation System Failures," and operating procedure 301.2, "Reactor Recirculation System." The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's prompt investigation (IR 459041) to assess the impact on the other in-service reactor recirculation pumps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed implementation of standing order 95, "Reactor Recirculation Pump/System Operation 4Loop with 'D' Pump in Local-Manual Control," which directed operations to take manual-local control of the motor generator to reduce pump speed when a power reduction is necessary. The inspectors reviewed technical specifications requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operating license. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors," to determine if this condition was reportable.

12Enclosureb.Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

(5 samples)The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations for degraded or non-conformingconditions associated with:Core spray vent valves found out of position on January 5, 2006 (IR 439243);RBCCW heat exchanger '1-2' experiencing high differential pressure onJanuary 19, 2006 (IR 442848);*Reactor building 119 foot elevation supply damper solenoid leak on January 23,2006 (IR 445065);*'A' isolation condenser condensate return valve leakage on February 7, 2006 (IR 450749); and*Control rod 06-43 did not withdraw during weekly control rod exercise testing onMarch 13, 2006 (IR 465287).The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations toensure the conclusions were technically justified. The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of AmerGen's operabilitydeterminations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed other AmerGen identified equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability conclusions. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in theSupplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

(7 samples)The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of six post-maintenancetests on the following equipment:*'2' SBGT system on February 14, 2006;*'1' diesel driven fire pump on February 14, 2006;

• 'A' spent fuel pool pump on February 15, 2006;

• '1-1' RBCCW heat exchanger on March 6, 2006;

• 480 Volt safety related switchgear room supply fan '21' on March 10, 2006;

• ESW keep-fill valve V-3-133 on March 9, 2006; and 13Enclosure*'A' SDC pump on March 22, 2006.

The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate forthe scope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functionalcapability. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the SupplementalInformation attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors monitored AmerGen's activities associated with the outage activitiesdescribed below. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.On January 28, 2006, operators initiated and completed a plant shutdown to support aforced maintenance outage to repair the failed motor on the 'B' reactor recirculation pump. The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown from the control room, and reviewed plant logs to determine that technical specification requirements were met for placing the reactor in "hot shutdown" and "cold shutdown." The inspectors also monitored AmerGen's controls over outage activities to determine whether they were in accordance with procedures and applicable technical specification requirements. The inspectors verified that cooldown rates during the plant shutdown were withintechnical specification requirements. The inspectors performed a walkdown of portions of the drywell (primary containment) on January 29, 2006, condenser bay on January 30, 2006, and torus room on February 2, 2006, to verify there was no evidence of leakage or visual damage to passive systems contained in those areas. The inspectorsverified that AmerGen assessed and managed the outage risk. The inspectors confirmed on a sampling basis that tagged equipment was properly controlled and equipment configured to safely support maintenance work. During control room tours, the inspectors verified that operators maintained reactor vessel level and temperature within the procedurally required ranges for the operating condition. The inspectors also verified that the decay heat removal function was maintained through monitoring SDC parameters and performing a walkdown of the system on January 30, 2006. Theinspectors observed Oyster Creek's plant onsite review committee (PORC) startup affirmations on February 2, 2006.The inspectors performed an inspection and walkdown of portions of the drywell prior tocontainment closure on February 3, 2006, to verify there was no evidence of leakage or visual damage to passive systems and determine that debris was not left which couldaffect drywell suppression pool performance during postulated accident conditions. The inspectors monitored restart activities that began on February 4, 2006, to ensure that 14Enclosurerequired equipment was available for operational condition changes, including verifyingtechnical specification requirements, license conditions, and procedural requirements.

Portions of startup activities were observed from the control room to assess operator performance. The inspectors further verified that unidentified leakage and identified leakage rate values were within expected values and within technical specification requirements.b.FindingsIntroduction. A self-revealing finding was identified regarding inadequate procedureadherence when work activities on the main condenser during a forced maintenance outage resulted in an unauthorized, unmonitored effluent discharge to the environment between January 31 and February 2, 2006. This finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and determined to be a non-cited violation of technical specification 6.8.1a, "Procedures and Programs."Description. During a forced maintenance outage, AmerGen conducted 'A' maincondenser tube cleaning between January 31 and February 2, 2006. This activity was performed under work order C2010694 by contractor personnel. After completion of the work activity, the brushes used to perform the tube cleaning caused an alarm in a small article monitor (SAM) while AmerGen personnel attempted to remove the brushes from the radiologically controlled area. Radiation protection personnel performed additional surveys on the brushes, and radioactive isotopes (Cr-51, MN-54, Co-58, Co-60, and Zn-65) were identified. The condenser water boxes are maintained as a radiologically clean area during power and maintenance activities.Upon discovery of the contaminated brushes, AmerGen performed an investigation(IR 449393) to determine the preliminary cause of the contamination. AmerGen determined that contractor personnel changed the water supply connection from the non-contaminated demineralized water system to the contaminated condensate transfersystem. The contractor changed the water supply connection because insufficient waterpressure was available from the demineralized water system to perform an adequatetube cleaning. AmerGen's investigation identified that the contractor personnel assumed thecondensate transfer system water station was acceptable and did not review guidancecontained in maintenance procedure 2400-SMM-3302.01, "Main Condenser Cleaning, Inspection, and Tube Testing." Maintenance procedure 2400-SMM-3302.01 requires the use of demineralized water as the water source for condenser tube cleaning.

Additionally, AmerGen personnel responsible for oversight of the activity did not identify the change in water supply connection.AmerGen personnel performed a dose projection by utilizing the results obtained fromcalculations which determine the amount of water released to the discharged canal during the cleaning activities and results of isotopic analysis of water samples.

AmerGen estimated approximately eleven thousand (11,000) gallons of condensatetransfer water were released to the Oyster Creek discharge canal. Isotopic analysis 15Enclosurewas performed on water samples obtained from the condensate transfer system hoseconnection, 'A' main condenser water box, and main condenser discharge. AmerGen's public dose projections determined the release resulted in an exposure to the public that was less than 0.005% of the applicable quarterly limits specified in the Oyster Creek Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Additionally, AmerGen performed direct and indirect bioassay on workers who performed the maintenance activity and calculated an exposure of less than 1 millirem. AmerGen's dose projections and bioassay results didnot identify a significant public or occupational dose consequence. The inspectors, with assistance from a regional radiation specialist, reviewed AmerGen's calculations, sample results, and dose projections associated with this unmonitored release.AmerGen's was in the process of performing a root cause evaluation (IR 449393) todetermine appropriate corrective actions for this issue. The evaluation had not been completed as of the end of this inspection period.Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this self-revealing findinginvolved inadequate procedure compliance. An AmerGen contractor did not use demineralized water to perform main condenser tube cleaning in accordance with maintenance procedures, and this resulted in an unauthorized, unmonitored radioactive release to the environment. The performance deficiency had a human performance cross-cutting aspect because it involved procedure compliance. As of the end of this inspection period, AmerGen was determining the appropriate corrective actions for this issue. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program andprocess attribute of the public radiation safety cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," because it was a radioactive effluent release program issue. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because AmerGen was able to assess the dose from the release of the radioactive effluent and the radiological release associated with the event was notgreater than 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable' for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents" or 10 CFR 20.1301(d),

"Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public," regulatory limits.Enforcement. Technical specification 6.8.1a, requires, in part, that written proceduresrecommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Requirements," shall be established, implemented, and maintained. Regulatory Guide1.33 section 9e states that general procedures for the control of maintenance, repair,replacement, and modification work should be prepared. Contrary to the above, from January 31 thru February 2, 2006, AmerGen did not properly implement maintenance procedure 2400-SMM-3302.01, "Main Condenser Cleaning, Inspection, and Tube Testing." A water source contrary to that specified in the maintenance procedure was used during 'A' main condenser tube cleaning which resulted in an unauthorized, 16Enclosureunmonitored effluent discharge to the environment. However, because the finding wasof very low safety significance and has been entered into AmerGen's corrective action program in condition report 449393, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000219/2006002-04, Unauthorized Unmonitored Effluent Discharge to the Environment)1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

(7 samples)The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of seven surveillancetests:*'B' SLC pump in-service test (IST) on January 5, 2006;*'A' isolation condenser valve IST on January 10, 2006;

• Primary containment isolation valve IST on January 10, 2006;

• 'A' and 'B' CRD pump surveillance test on January 11, 2006;*'A' spent fuel pool pump functional test on February 14, 2006;

• '2' SBGT system functional test on February 15, 2006; and *Control rod surveillance test on March 13, 2006.The inspectors evaluated the test procedures to verify that applicable systemrequirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and thattest acceptance criteria were consistent with Oyster Creek technical specification requirements and the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). The inspectors also verified that test data was complete, verified, and met procedural requirements to demonstrate that systems and components were capable of performing their intendedfunctioned. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports that documented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests. Documentsreviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

(2 sample)The inspectors reviewed the following two temporary plant modifications installed byAmerGen at Oyster Creek in 2005:*'A' feedwater pump ground sensing setpoint change (ECR 06-00110); and*Bypass of the 'D' reactor recirculation pump speed control signal (C2012233-01).

17EnclosureThe inspectors verified the modifications were consistent with the design and licensingbases of the affected system, and the performance capability of the system was notdegraded by the modification. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to verify applicable technical specification and operability requirements were met duringinstallation. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]1EP4Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

c. Inspection Scope

(1 Sample)During the period of September 2005 and February 2006, the NRC received c hangesmade to AmerGen's emergency plan (E-Plan) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q),

"Conditions of Licenses." AmerGen determined the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the E-Plan; and the E-Plan continued to meet the requirements of10 CFR 50.47(b), "Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities." A selected sampleof E-Plan changes were reviewed in-office by a regional emergency preparedness inspector. This review does not constitute approval of the changes and, as such, the changes and the associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews are subject to future NRC inspection.

d. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

(1 sample)The inspectors observed one licensed operator requalification training activity that wasincluded as an input into the NRC's emergency drill and exercise performance indicator. This observation was made in the simulator on March 10, 2006. The inspectors observed AmerGen's critique of the training activity to verify that weaknesses and deficiencies were adequately identified. The inspectors specifically focused on ensuring AmerGen identified operator performance problems with event classification and notification activities. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety2OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

a. Inspection Scope

(2 samples)The inspectors reviewed activities, and associated documentation, in the area of accesscontrol to radiological significant areas. The inspectors evaluated AmerGen's performance against criteria contained within 10 CFR 20 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"), applicable technical specification requirements, and AmerGen procedures.The inspectors reviewed performance indicators (PIs) for the occupational exposurecornerstone. The inspectors toured Oyster Creek, reviewed radiological controls, and performed independent radiation surveys during the tours. The inspectors reviewed housekeeping, material condition, radiological postings, barricades, and access controls to determine if radiological controls were acceptable. The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of radiological controls on work associated with installation of level instrumentation on the sludge tanks and replacement of 'B' reactor recirculationpump seal.The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's implementation of high radiation area (HRA)access controls at Oyster Creek, including administrative controls and inventory of locked HRA access keys maintained by operations and radiation protection.The inspectors reviewed self-assessments and audits performed by Amergen todetermine if problems were being entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors evaluated the database for repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies to determine if self assessment activities were identifying and addressing issues. The inspectors evaluated data associated with PI events with dose rates greater that 25 R/hr at 30 centimeters, greater than 500 R/hr at1 meter; unintended exposures greater than 100 millirem total effective dose equivalent,5 rem shallow dose equivalent, and 1.5 rem lens dose equivalent. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports to evaluate AmerGen's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems in the area of access control to radiologically significant areas. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified that AmerGen did not properly implementadministrative controls for locked HRA access keys maintained under the control of 20operations personnel. This finding was of very low safety significance (Green) anddetermined to be a non-cited violation of technical specification 6.13.2, "High RadiationArea."Description. On March 14, 2006, the inspectors conducted an inventory of locked HRAkeys maintained in the control room by operations and reviewed the results of audits performed in November and December 2005. The inspectors reviewed AmerGen procedure OP-OC-108-103-1002, "Operations Controlled Keys," to identify the process of maintaining administrative control of HRA keys. AmerGen's procedure stated that the controlled key inventory be kept up-to-date, and that the key inventory be audited. The inspectors identified that the key inventory, as depicted in Attachment 1 toprocedure OP-OC-108-103-1002, was not up-to-date as required. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the control room maintained four

(4) HRA keys for the tag 5location. However, the procedure stated that there should be five

(5) keys for thatlocation and in the event of a lost key the operations personnel should notify radiation protection personnel. The inspectors could not identify any efforts to correct the key inventory or notify radiation protection personnel associated with the apparent lost keyfollowing the audits conducted on November 4, 2005 and December 11, 2005. The inspectors also identified that at least five

(5) required weekly audits were not conducted or documented between the time period of November 4, 2005 and December 11, 2005, as required by the procedure. In addition, the inspector identified that operationspersonnel had signed off on the key audits as acceptable on these dates despite inconsistencies in the key inventory. The inspectors noted that the procedure wassubsequently revised on December 14, 2005, to change audit frequency from weekly to quarterly. Notwithstanding, when reviewed by the inspector on March 14, the inventorydepicted in Attachment 1 of the procedure, had not been updated. The inspectorsdiscussed these observations with radiation and operation personnel. AmerGen investigated this issue and determined that the procedure contained multipleadministrative errors such as incorrect key identification numbers or amount discrepancies and documented this in corrective action program condition report 466231. AmerGen's investigation did not identify missing HRA keys.Analysis. The performance deficiency involved inadequate procedure adherence. AmerGen did not maintain administrative controls for locked HRA keys in accordance with technical specification requirements and AmerGen procedures. The performance deficiency had a problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspect because it involved inadequate corrective actions to previously identified administrative control issues associated with HRA keys (O2004-0752 and IR 431915). As of the end of the inspection period, AmerGen was determining the appropriate corrective actions for this issue.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program andprocess attribute of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," because it was an exposure 21control issue. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safetysignificance (Green) because it did not involve an ALARA finding, it did not involve an overexposure, there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and the ability toassess dose was not compromised.Enforcement. Technical Specification 6.13.2, "High Radiation Area," requires, in part,that keys to areas with radiation dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem/hr (at 30centimeters), but less than 500 rads in one hour (at 1 meter), be maintained under the administrative control of operations and/or radiation protection supervision on duty toprevent unauthorized entry. Contrary to this requirement, AmerGen did not properly implement procedure OP-OC-108-103-1002, which specifies the administrative controls for locked HRA keys being maintained by operations personnel, between November 4, and December 11, 2005. However, because the finding was of very low safety significance, and has been entered into AmerGen's corrective action program in condition report 466231, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistentwith Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 (NCV05000219/2006002-05, Inadequate Administrative Control of High Radiation Area Keys).2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope

(2 samples)The inspectors reviewed activities, and associated documentation in the area of operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel occupational radiation exposure ALARA. The inspectors evaluated AmerGen's performance against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation") and applicable industry standards and AmerGen procedures.The inspectors reviewed documents associated with station collective dose history,current exposure trends, and ongoing or planned activities in order to assess current performance and exposure challenges. The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's plans in the area of source term controls. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed AmerGen's Cobalt-60 source term control efforts as described in the AmerGen business plan. The inspectors also reviewed system radiation base-point measurement results.The inspectors reviewed self-assessments, audits, and special reports performed byAmergen to determine if problems were being entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors also reviewed dose significant post-job reviews and post-outage ALARA report critiques of exposure performance to evaluate AmerGen's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

22Enclosure2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)

a. Inspection Scope

(2 samples)The inspectors reviewed activities and associated documentation in the area of radiationmonitoring instrumentation and protective equipment. The inspectors evaluated AmerGen's performance against criteria contained within 10 CFR 20 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"), applicable technical specification requirements, and AmerGen procedures.The inspectors reviewed the calibrations and operability checks for portable radiologicalcontrol instrumentation (including hand-held instrumentation and laboratoryinstrumentation): RO-20-077643, RO-2A-075840, RO-2-072356, RO-7-073525, ASP1-700118, Gillian-075932, RAS1-701861, AMS3-700030.The inspectors reviewed self-assessments and audits performed by AmerGen todetermine if problems were being entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports to evaluate AmerGen's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems.Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action ProgramTo identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues forfollow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into AmerGen's

corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, and/or accessing AmerGen's computerized database.4OA3Event Followup (71153) (2 samples)

.1 Trip of the 'B' Reactor Recirculation Pump

On January 25, 2006, operators experienced a trip of the 'B' reactor recirculation pump. Prior to the event, the plant was operating with four reactor recirculation pumps in service and the 'A' reactor recirculation pump out-of-service due to a failed seal.

Operators stabilized the plant at approximately fifty-three

(53) percent, in accordancewith procedures. The inspectors responded to the control room after hearing the site announcement thatthe 'B' reactor recirculation pump had tripped. The inspectors observed the response of 23EnclosureAmerGen personnel, including operator actions in the control room. The inspectorsverified that operators responded in accordance with procedures and equipment responded as intended. The inspectors further reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operatinglicense.AmerGen initiated an investigation and performed troubleshooting to determine thecause of the pump trip. AmerGen determined the pump tripped due to a ground in the pump motor. The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's extent of condition reviews on the other in-service reactor recirculation pumps to determine if the other pumps were susceptible to the same type of failure. AmerGen performed a plant shutdown on January 28, 2006, in order to replace the 'B' reactor recirculation pump motor.The trip of the 'B' reactor recirculation pump was described and evaluated in correctiveaction program condition report IR 452708.

.2 AOG System Hydrogen Detonation

Early in the evening on February 13, 2006, the inspectors were informed that the OysterCreek AOG system isolated due to a hydrogen detonation. Operators received offgasisolation alarms and two "loud" bangs were heard originating from the AOG building.

The detonation caused a high pressure spike in the offgas holdup line, causing offgas to isolate. Operators implemented abnormal procedure ABN-25, "Off-Gas Explosion," andwere able to reset the offgas isolation and restore offgas flow to the stack via the offgas system. Operations and engineering personnel performed plant walkdowns in themechanical vacuum pump room, steam jet air ejector room, high/low conductivity room, feedpump room, AOG building, and the base of the stack. The walkdowns did not identify visible damage to components or structures.The inspectors responded to the site to verify that the detonation and offgas flowisolation did not impact safety-related or plant support systems needed to safely operateOyster Creek.The inspectors verified the condition did not meet the entry criteria for an emergencyaction level (EAL) as described in the Oyster Creek EAL matrix. The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operatedin accordance with its operating license. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors," to determine if this condition was reportable. The inspectors also performed walkdowns of the areas inspected by operations andengineering, and did not identify damage to structures or components caused by the detonation.The detonation in the AOG system was described and evaluated in corrective actionprogram condition report IR 453495. AmerGen attributed the cause of the detonation tobe catalyst (palladium particulates) carryover from the 'B' recombiner bed to the blower.

24EnclosureAmerGen determine the catalyst bed was replaced in October 2005, and was not rinsedproperly to prevent particulate carryover.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting Summary. On April 7, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspectionresults to Mr. Swenson and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings.

The inspectors asked AmerGen whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. Artz, Chemist

M. Button, Director, Engineering

J. Derby, Radiological Engineer

K. Drieher, Security Manager

J. Dostal, Shift Operations, Superintendent

A. Judson, Radiological Engineer

J. Kandasamy, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

R. Larzo, Engineering

J. Magee, Director, Maintenance

J. Murphy, Radiological Engineering Manager

J. O'Rourke, Assistant Engineering Director

T. Powell, Engineering Programs Manager

J. Randich, Plant Manager

J. Renda, Radiation Protection Manager

C. Swenson, Site Vice President

J. Vaccaro, Director, Training

M. Wagner, CAP Coordinator

R. Zacholski, Director, Operations

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000219/2006002-01URIContainment Spray System '1' FlowInstrumentation Failure (Section 1R12)

Opened/Closed

05000219/2006002-02FINUntimely Corrective Actions Causes UnplannedPower Reduction Due to 'A' Feedwater Packing

Leakage (Section 1R12)05000219/2006002-03NCV'D' ESW Pump Start Failure (Section 1R12)05000219/2006002-04, NCVUnauthorized Unmonitored Effluent Discharge tothe Environment (1R20)05000219/2006002-05NCV Inadequate Administrative Control of HighRadiation Area Keys (2OS1)

A-2AttachmentClosed

05000219/2005005-02URI'D' ESW Pump Start Failure (Section 1R12)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report, the inspectors reviewed thefollowing documents and records:

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresOP-AA-108-111-1001, "Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines"WC-AA-107, "Seasonal Readiness"

OP-OC-108-1001, "Preparation for Severe Weather T&RN for Oyster Creek"

OP-OC-108-109-1002, "Cold Weather Freeze Inspection"

OP-OC-108-109-1003, "Winter Readiness"

ABN-31, "High Winds"

ABN-32, "Abnormal Intake Levels"Work Order (AR)

A2133596

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresOP-OC-100-1003, "Redundant System Operability Verfication Checksheet (A

IC Valve Operability IST)"309.2," Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Operation (RBCCW)"

ABN-19, "RBCCW Failure Response"

337.7," 4160 Volt Electrical System"

333, "Plant Fire Protection System"

2400-SMM-3681.03, " Addition of FPPF Diesel Additive to Emergency Fire Diesel Fuel Tanks During Winter Months"327.1, "Fuel Oil Receipt and Handling Procedure"DrawingsBR 2006, Sheets 1 thru 8, Rev.72, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System"BR 3001, "Emergency Power System - Emergency Diesel Generator" Condition Reports (IR)

463109,

454171,

465266, 46528,

467824,

458387,

463546,

460809,

467636, 446493Work Orders (AR)A2125825, A2137417, R2064710

A-3AttachmentOther DocumentsClearance Order: 05501969FSAR 8.3.1.1.1, "41.6 kV Distribution System"

FSAR 2.3, "Meteorology" Oyster Creek Monthly Fuel Oil Report, dated November 2, 2005

Oyster Creek Monthly Fuel Oil Report, dated November 30, 2005

Oyster Creek Monthly Fuel Oil Report, dated December 29, 2006

Oyster Creek Monthly Fuel Oil Report, dated January 20, 2006Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionCondition Reports (IR)

459980,

460435, 460374Other DocumentsOC Fire Risk Analysis-Compartment Fire Scenario Development Report (R0467050033.04)Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Fire Hazard Analysis Report (990-1746)

Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans (OP-OC-201-008)

Section 1R06: Flood ProtectionProceduresEMG 3200.11, "Secondary Containment Control"ER-AA-310, "Implementation of the Maintenance Rule"DrawingsGU 3E-151-02-001, "General Arrangement - Turbine Bldg Floor Plan Elevation 0 ' 0" and 3 ' 6"BR 2003, "Feedwater and Condensate System"

DWG 4093-6, " Turbine Building Floor Plans"

DWG 4096-4, "Turbine Building Floor Slab - Sections & Details"Condition Reports (IR)

450405,

461571, 450405

Other DocumentsFSAR 9.3.3.2.1, "Turbine Building Floor and Equipment DrainsTDR 779, "Evaluation of Possible Internal Flooding of OC Nuclear Generating Station PowerPlant Buildings"

Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProcedures309.2, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System" DrawingsBR 2005, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System"

A-4AttachmentCondition Reports (IR)

455799Work Orders (AR)

A2136052Other DocumentsFSAR 9.2.2.2, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System" Clearance # 06500280

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProceduresEOP Scenario #2, "Exelon Nuclear Licensed Operator Requal Training Simulator ExerciseGuide"ABN-1, "Reactor Scram"

ABN-40, "Stuck Open EMRV (Electro-Mechanical Relief Valve)"

ABN-59, "RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) Level Instrument Failures"

RAP-H6e, "Reactor Level Lo-II" Technical Specifications section 3.4.B, "Automatic Depressuriztion System" Condition Reports (IR)

457828

Other DocumentsEOP User's Guide (2000-BAS-3200.02)

Section 1R12: Maintenance ImplementationProceduresER-AA-310, "Implementation of Maintenance Rule"ER-AA-310-1005, "Maintenance Rule - Disposition Between (a)(1) and (a)(2)"

SE-315403-018, "Safety Significance of Torus Spray Nozzle Blockage"

2400-SME-3915.03, "4160 Volt Breaker Preventive Maintenance"

MA-AA-716-230-1002, "Vibration Analysis/Acceptance Guideline" Oyster Creek Prompt Investigation for "A" Feedwater Regulating Valve V-2-732 Packing LeakDrawings3C-733-11-006, "120 V Vital Power System"GE 148F912, Sheet 3, "Reactor Plant Instrumentation"

GE 112C3701, Sheet 4, 5, and 8, "Main Control Room Panels"

GE 223R0173, "Emerg SVC Water Sys Electrical Elementary Diagram - 4160 Swgr 1D Unit D6 Emer Service water Pmp 1-4 (52D)"

A-5AttachmentCondition Reports (IR)

44410,

444488,

438582,

427386,

444925,

445130,

396982,

452708,

435168,

457730,

467899,

468499,

468537,

467547,

465556,

466262,

466048,

464516,

464595,

465266,

456641,

453177,

452936,

453101,

455549, 02000-1788, 02005-2118, 2005-2118Work Orders (AR)

A2133775, A2432466, A2109095, A2013986, R0806287, A2131520,

C2011629, M2133775Other DocumentsNEI 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants"Oyster Creek Operations Narrative Logs, dated October 1 to December 20, 2005Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProceduresER-AA-600-1042, "On-line Risk Management"WC-OC-101-1001, "On-line Risk Management and Assessment"

106.13, "Operational Barriers"DrawingsBR 3001, "Emergency Power System - Emergency Diesel Generator"

Condition Reports

(IR)

441274,

444410,

455799,

439207,

464479,

456487

Work Orders

(AR)

A2133775, A2432466, A2109095, A2013986, A2133775,

Section 1R14: Operator Performance During Non-routine Evolutions and EventsProceduresOP-AA-106-101-1006, Rev. 2, "Issue Resolution Documentation Form"MA-AA-716-210-1002, "Exelon Motor Maintenance Logic Tree"

MA-AA-716-004, "Complex Troubleshooting Plan" Technical Specifications 3/4.11, "Radioactive Effluents"

301.2, "Reactor recirculation System"

309.1, "Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System"

309.1.1, " Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Routine Evolutions"

2, " Service water System"

25, Rev. 58, "Air Extraction and Off Gas"

350.1, Rev. 58, "Augmented Offgas System Operation"ABN-2, "Recirculation System Failures"

ABN-25, "Off-Gas Explosion"

ABN-32, "Abnormal Intake Level"

A-6AttachmentDrawingsBR M608, "Augmented Off-gas"BR 2008, "Air Extraction and Off-Gas System"Condition Reports (IR)

453495,

453244,

454306,

454476,

453473,

453495,

453485, 45347,

453244,

459041,

445640,

442450,

458387,

470934,

468426, 458638Work Orders (AR)A2135593, A2134041, R2026579, C2011852

Other DocumentsOyster Creek Prompt Investigation for AOG IgnitionOyster Creek Prompt Investigation for "B" Recirculation Pump Trip Oyster Creek Prompt Investigation for Loss of speed control on "D" Recirculation Pump Outage Control Center Logs Oyster Creek Active Plant Operator Narrative Logs Plant Computer Data for AOG system Plant Computer Data for Recirculation System, Reactor Power, Level, and Pressure

EPRI Report TR-106857-V10

NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10

CFR 50.72 and 10

CFR 50.73"Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsProceduresLS-AA-105, "Operability Determination"OP-OC-100-1003, "Redundant System Operability Verification Checks heet"307, "Isolation Condenser System, Figure 307-6

609.4.001, "Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and In Service Test"116, Surveillance Testing Program, Attachment 116-1Drawings3E-211-A1-001, "Emergency Condenser"GE 237E912, "Reactor Manual Control System Electrical Elementary Diagram"

BR 2011, "Reactor Building Ventilation Flow Diagram"

DWG 2171-2, "Heating & Ventilating Plan, Elevations & Sections Reactor Building"Condition Reports (IR)

439243,

450749,

470934,

470993,

471209,

464930,

465287,

463546,

463569,

458147,

458883,

456913,

456661,

450261,

450315,

450318,

449690,

449890,

450119,

450261,

451729,

447079,

445153,

459041,

459177,

459343,

460828,

445067,

445065,

442848,

467848,

455799,

470934

A-7AttachmentWork Orders (AR)A2131820, A2118989, C2010589Other DocumentsOyster Creek Prompt Investigation: Abnormal Rod Movement of Rod 38-31Operator Logs for 3/26/2006

SPDS data for Core Thermal Power, APRM Power and rod movements during rod exerciseSection 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingProceduresMA-AA-716-012, "Post Maintenance Testing"322, "Service Water System"

309.2, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System"

2400-GMM-3900.52, "Inspection and Torquing of Bolted Connections"Drawings

GE 237E756, GU 3E 822-21-1000, "Standby Gas Treatment"

JC 19479, "Fire Protection Water System"

JC 19749, "Fire Protection Water System"

GE 157B6350, "Reactor Bldg. Ventilation System

GE 3E-822-21-1000, "Standby Gas Treatment Flow Diagram"

BR 3005, "Miscellaneous Bldg. 460 V MCC"

BR 2005, "Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System"

BR 3002, "Main One Line Diagram Generators"Condition Reports (IR)

0043622, 45799,

471259,

Work Orders

(AR)

A2130255, A2108615, A2136052, A2085725, A2016727,

C2011586, C2011727Other DocumentsVendor Manual-OC-6045, "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump"Clearance # 06500021

Clearance # 06500092

Clearance #,06500280Section 1R20: Refueling & Other Outage ActivitiesProceduresStation Procedure 201, Plant StartupStation Procedure 203, Plant Shutdown Station Procedure 203.4, Plant Shutdown Following Reactor ScramStation Procedure 305, Shutdown Cooling System OperationOU-AA-1001, Shutdown Safety Management Program

OU-OC-103-1001, "Shutdown Safety Management Program"

A-8AttachmentOP-AA-108-114, "Post Transient Review"2400-SMM-3302.01, Main Condenser Cleaning, Inspection and Tube Testing"HU-AA-104-101, "Procedure Use and Adherence"Condition Reports (IR)

447822,

447801,

447484,

447577,

447996,

448260,

448283,

448355,

448531,

449346,

449613,

449627,

450160,

445752,

445949,

445640,

447436,

447235,

448196,

447436,

447467,

447495,

447301,

447532,

447580,

447597,

449690,

447710,

447234,

447301,

449874,

461691,

449393, 449393Work Orders (AR)A2134488, A2137389, C2010694

Other DocumentsStanding Order 92,Operation of Dilution Pumps, Circ Pumps, and Temporary DischargeCanal Heaters to Support Startup from 1F09Oyster Creek Prompt Investigation, "'B' Recirculation Pump Trip" (IR 445640)

Transient Response Report (IR 445640)

Specification S-2299-69, "Piping & Equipment Insulation" Engineering Standard

ES-029, "Piping and Equipment Insulation Design"

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProcedures609.4.001, "Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and In Service Test"678.4.001, "Primary Containment Valve Operability and

IST"617.4.001, "CRD Pump Operability Test"617.4.002, "CRD Exercise and Flow Test/IST Cooling Water Header Check Valve"312.9, "Primary Containment Control"DrawingsGE 157B6350, "Reactor Bldg. Ventilation SystemGE 3E-822-21-1000, "Standby Gas Treatment Flow Diagram"

BR 3005, "Miscellaneous Bldg. 460 V MCC"

GU 3E 822-21-1000, "Standby Gas Treatment"Condition Reports (IR)

451343,

460724

Work Orders

(AR)

A2108615

Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsProceduresMA-AA-716-004, "Complex Troubleshooting plan" doe loss of speed control on "D"

RCPCC-AA-501-1016, "Non-Code Welding and Anti-Rotation Tack Welding Guideline

A-9AttachmentCC-AA-102, "Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening"301.2, "Recirculation System"

201.1, "Power Operation"DrawingsGE 107C5339, "Recirculation Pumps and M/G Set"GE 223R0173, "Feedwater System"

103D5251, "Connection Diagram Metal Clad Switchgear"

GE 223R0173, "Feedwater System Electrical Elementary Diagram"Condition Reports (IR)

449662,

459041,

469717,

438731

Work Orders

(AR)

A2134877, A2135061

Other DocumentsECR#

OC 06-00110-000, "FWP (Feedwater Pump) Ground Relay 50GS Setpoint Change"ECR#

OC 06-00284-00, "Cap/Plug

'C' Feed Pump Casing Drain"Exelon Nuclear Complex Troubleshooting on P-2-2A motor ("A" FWP)Section 2OS1: Access Control to Radiologically Significant AreasProceduresOP-OC-108-103-1002, "Operations Controlled KeysCondition Report (IR)

430182,

431915,

432402,2OS2: ALARA Planning and ControlsProceduresCY-AB-120-1000, "BWR Chemistry Optimization"Condition Report (IR)

435167,

444279,

445446,

446937,

446938, 442670

Other DocumentsOyster Creek Source Term Reduction Plan2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective EquipmentProceduresRP-AA-700, "Controls for Radiation Protection Instrumentation"

RP-OC-301-1002, "Background Efficiency and Operational Check Determination and Performance of the Scaler Counting System"

A-3AttachmentCondition Report (IR)

439424,

447830,

449958,

454599, 457161Other Documents2006 Air Sample Results Log

Section 4OA3: Event FollowupProceduresABN-2, "Recirculation System Failures"Other DocumentsNUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10

CFR 50.72 and 50.73"NEI 99-02, Rev 3, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline"

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMSAgency-wide Documents Access and Management SystemALARAAs Low As Is Reasonably Achievable

AmerGenAmerGen Energy Company,

LLC [[]]

AOGAugmented Offgas

ATWSAnticipated Transient Without Scram

CFRCode of Federal Regulations

CRDControl Rod Drive

EALEmergency Action Level

EDGEmergency Diesel Generator

EMRVElectromagnetic Relief Valve

EPEmergency Preparedness

E-Plan Emergency Plan

ESWEmergency Service Water

GEG eneral Electric

HRA High Radiation Area

IMCInspection Manual Chapter

IPEEIndividual Plant Examination for External Events

IRCondition Report

ISTInservice Test

NCVNon-cited Violation

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

Oyster CreekOyster Creek Generating Station

ODCMOffsite Dose Calculation Manual

PORCPlant Onsite Review Committee

RBCCWReactor Building Closed Cooling Water

SAMSmall Article Monitor

SBGTStandby Gas Treatment

SDCShutdown Cooling

SDPS ignificance Determination Process

SLC Standby Liquid Control

TBCCWTurbine Building Closed Cooling Water

UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report

URIU nresolved Item