ML20237D155
| ML20237D155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/16/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1630, NUDOCS 8712230082 | |
| Download: ML20237D155 (199) | |
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WASHINGTON DC PAGES: 1 - 139 gECEMBER16, 1987 DAT
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1 PUBLIC NOTICE BY TifE 2
r UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMMISSION'S h
3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
5 6
7
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The contents of this stenographic transcript of 8
the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9
Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Sufeguards (ACRS),
10 as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the 11 discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
12 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at 13 this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or 14 inaccuracies of statement or data contained in thic 15 transcript.
16 17 18 19 20 21 s
22 23 24 25 Acme Reporting Company
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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l'_v) 2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS RELIABILITY ASSURANCE SUBCOMMITTEE 3
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In the Matter of:
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5 EQ - RISK SCOPING STUDY
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6 7
Wednesday, December 16, 1987 8
Room 1046 9
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20555 10 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, 11 pursuant to notice, at 8:00 a.m.
12
/~5 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
33 MR. CHARLES J.
WYLIE 14 Chairman Retired Chief Engineer 15 Electrical Division Duke Power Company 16 Charlotte, North Carolina 17 MR. JESSE C.
EBERSOLE Retired Head Nuclear Engineer gg Division of Engineering Design Tennessee Valley Authority 39 Knoxville, Tennessee 20 MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON Retired Principal Nuclear Engineer 21 Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, Tennessee, and, 2 '~
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Retired Director, Office for Analysis'& Evaluation f Operational Data 23 U.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
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PRQCEEpINGS dc 2
MR. WYLIE:
The meeting will now come to order.
3 This is a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on
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4 Reliability Assurance.
I am Charlie Wylie, Chairman of the 5
subcommittee.
The other ACRS members in attendance are 6
Jesse Ebersole and Carl Michelson.
Dr. Siess couldn't make 7
it because of the snow in Chicago.
8 The purpose of this meeting is to explore the cur-9 rent status of the Equipment Qualification Risk Scoping Study.
10 Richard Major is the cognizant ACRS staff member for today's i
11 meeting.
12 The rules for participating in today's meeting have rh 13
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been announced as part of the notice of this meeting that 14 was published in the Federal Register on Monday, November 15 30, 1987.
The meeting is being conducted in accordance with 16 the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the 17 Government in the Sunshine Act.
18 We have received no written statements or request 19 to make oral statements from members of the public regarding 20 today's session.
21 l
It is requested that each speaker first identify 22 (g
himself or herself and speak with sufficient clarity and
.Q 23 volume so that he or she can be heard readily.
1 24 As a matter of background, the NRC has funded for V).
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25 over many years an extensive Equipment Qualification Program.
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Because of budget restraints over the last past recent years, 2
the program in Equipment Qualification was left unfunded for 3
'87 and
'88.
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It was recognized that additional research may be 5
needed in Equipment Qualification and the.ACRS expressed its 6
concerns in letters over the last several~ years in that re-7 gard.
8 The NRC decided to' fund a study to determine what 9
additional research may be needed in Equipment Qualification 10 area, and the staff has subcontracted that to Sandia to pre-11 pare the Equipment Qualification Scoping Study.
Sandia has 12 prepared a status report defining the proposed Scoping Study
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13 which we'll be discussing today.
14 And the purpose for today's meetings is for the 15 subcommittee to review the current status of Equipment Qua-16 lification research and the proposed plans for the Equipment 17 Qualification Scoping Study.
18 I believe the NRC staff would like to hear the 19 subcommittee's impressions on the course being pursued in 20 this work.
21 I have read the material that's been sent to us.
22 I find that a unique interesting approach taking the'proba-g3 V
23 bilistic risk approach to the value of Equipment Qualifica-24 tion and the Risk Study as being an interesting approach.
1 25 And I am sure the subcommittee members will have comments on l
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I that approach.
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2 MR. MICHELSON:
I wanted to ask--the Equipment 1
3
-Qualification Report that we got from Sandia--you know, the
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4 one that's about two inches thick I think.
5 MR. WYLIE:
Here it is.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
Yeah, that one right there.
I 7
wasn't strong enough to carry mine to Washington.
I read it I
8 at home.
Are-we going to discuss that today or some other 9
meeting?
10 MR. WYLIE:
No.
I 11 MR. MICHELSON:
Because it's pretty--there's quite 12 a few questions, it's pretty voluminous, and we really
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13 wouldn't want to see the Sandia people--
A 14 MR. WYLIE:
We weren't prepared I don't think to 15 go through that--
16 MR. MICHELSON:
So what is the plan for discussing 17 this document?
18 MR. DEY:
We can meet again at a future subcommit-19 tie meeting, a full day--
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, there's no great urgency.
21 MR. DEY:
--to discuss that and its connection to 22 this--
7gU 23 MR. MICHELSON:
I was also going to ask.
Is today 24 the only discussion before we write a letter or is there go-0 25 ing to be another meeting before we write a letter or not?
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'l MR. WYLIE:
That's my impression, that there will
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2 be another meeting further along.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, maybe at that time, since it U,,
4 probably doesn't take a whole day to discuss the final Scop-5 ing document, maybe at that time we can discuss the Sandia l-6 material.
7 MR. DEY: Sure.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Charlie, without being cynical, I L
9 have long felt that we are now--you know, PRAs simply aren't.
10 right.
And I was certainly pleased to see there was a co-11 rective effort underway to put the statistics as they ought 12 to be in the PRAs from actual experimental results.
As a (s) 13 notable case, in the matter of valves, you know, we've always yNJ I4 known that valves under duress don't perform like they sta-15 tistically swing back and forth and open everyday, and accrue 16 the statistical base for the PRAs, and the PRA boys don't 17 account for valves operating under duress, under one-time 18 loads, or under one-time experiences.
So this is, I think, 19 maybe the focal point of why PRAs are suspicious calculations 20 They try to cover it with uncertainty bands.
But I'm afraid 21 they are loaded in the wrong direction, when they picked 22 the uncertainty bands.
Here it seems to me there's a chance 23 to sharpen up in the direction of somewhat better statistics 24 although they'll be very poor because you don't have enough O,_
25 bad accidents to prove the case.
You know, like a pipe Heritage Reporting Corporation nona....
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breaking and a valve having to close the flow.
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the same duty on a valve that's running back and forth every-3 day with just stopping a pump flow.
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MR. MICHELSON:
One other question I had.
When 5
are we going to discuss the research budget as it relates 6
to Equipment Qualification?
7 MR. WYLIE:
'I thought we could ask the question 8
today of how things stood on that.
9-MR. MICHELSON:
I don't know whether these gentle-10 men are prepared to discuss the budget situation or not.
11 MR. DEY:
Well, the purpose--
12 MR. MICHELSON:
We'can close the meeting for that
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13 purpose if we have to.
14 MR. WYLIE:
I really don't think we've got time 15 today.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
But we may not have time today.
17 MR. WYLIE:
Because the--
18 MR. MICHELSON:
Maybe again the next meeting--
19 MR. WYLIE:
In February?
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
If it's done sometime in 21 February there would still be time.
r3 22 MR. WYLIE:
That would be better--
5 23 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm kind of interested in whether 24 we are going to go--how we are planning on going from here 25 and what kind of money are we going to have available if any i
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MR. WYLIE:
Well, we have a very tight agenda, be-3 cause we've got to quit at 11:15.
We have another meeting k-4 at twelve, all of us.
So of the' subcommittee.
So we'll have 1
5 to move right along, so why don't we get started and call 6
on Moni.
7 My name is Moni Dey with the Office of Nuclear 8
Regulatory Research.
I'm the Project Manager for the Equip-9 ment Qualifications Scoping Study.
And I'm here today to 10 present to you a progress report, essentially to bring you up 11 to speed on the objective of the study and the approaches we 12 are taking to accomplish those objectives.
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13 I've a brief presentation.
Essentially going 14 through, to put the project in perspective, going through some 15 of the history of how the study was initiated, the objective--
16 a brief overview of the study.
17 Our contractor, Sandia Labs, Larry Bustard, will 18 go over in detail of the task structure and the approach 19 taken to accomplish the objectives, the schedule and the 20 proposed meeting on interaction with the subcommittee and 21 the ACRS in the future.
22 As was mentioned earlier, the Equipment Qualifica-(w 23 tion Research Project continued for about ten years and was 24 terminated in about 1986.
At that time, the ACRS in June of 25
'86 recommended that funding of EQ research to assess the j
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' viability of electrical equipment when subject to hostile 7,
2 conditions, including severe accidents.
It went on to state 3
that research is vital to preventing accidents as well as (m.
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4 mitigating the consequences should they occur.
5 And in this study we've attempted to take a broad 6
approach in addressing prevention of' accident which is tra-7 ditional emphasis for Equipment Qualification, but also miti-8 gating accidents with current staff efforts in severe acci-9 dent to react in policy implemention.
I think this approach 10 is consistent.
11 As a result of this and other concerns and deter-12 mination of the research, the Equipment Qualification Scoping (nT-13 Study, which is the subject for today, was initiated to de-
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14 termine the risk importance and priority for NRC-funded 15 research in terms of given the limitation of funds, what is 16 the risk significance of Equipment Qualification and the 17 research that is needed.
It's a difficult task but that's 18 essentially the objective for this particular study to de-19 termine that impact.
20 To summarize, the objective is to determine the 21 risk significance and prioritize, one, electrical equipment (m.
that are essential to preventing accidents as well as miti-22
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23 gating the consequences of accidents.
And then, two, to de-24 termine the risk significance and prioritize again the EQ
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MR. WYLIE:
Let me just comment.
Of course, we 3
say electrical equipment, but really we were talking about
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the performance of mechanical equipment that's electrically 5
driven.
6 MR. DEY:
Yes.
7 MR. WYLIE:
So this is broader really than just 8
the narrow scope of electrical equipment.
And I think your 9
report says that.
10 MR. DEY:
So the results of this study will be 11 used to determine if a need exists for further EQ research, 12 for NRC-funded EQ research.
-(s 13 Three, to develop or revise regulations--
14 MR. EBERSOLE: That language kind of bothers me.
The 15 matter of both preventing as well as mitigating accidents.
l 16 I think it might say it's to handle small accidents in a way 17 that they don't become large ones.
So that you get the cas-18 cade notation, you know.
A small pipe break out in a equip-19 ment building ought not to ruin equipment and result in a 20 core meltdown eventually.
You follow me?
21 MR. DEY:
Yeah, I agree that--
22 MR. EBERSOLE:So it's really a rising consequential fg G
23 level of accidents.
24 MR. DEY:
That's a preferred way to prevent acci-25 dents in the first place.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
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2 MR. WYLIE:
Well, isn't it all those things though, 1
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3 Jessie?
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4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
But what bothers me is that 3
people tend to jump.in on.the big LOCA and say, now, make it i
6 work for that, and then you've got it made, and that's not 7
so.
You know, thereLare accidents out in the service areas a
like steam releases and whatever that don't amount to much 9
unless it ruins equipment, go MR. DEY:
Well, I think PRA through the approach of i
33 identifying initiating events, particularly the ones that 12 initiated it.
('N 33 MR. EBERSOLE:
The old classic one that embodies y
all these things and has never been worked out yet is the 15 hypothetical loss of the EPSI tinnage main steam line.
And 16 then the theorizing that the valves will close and close off 17 that continuing discharge of steam into the equipment area.
18 But the valve reliabilities are not established for doing
~that.
And the consequences are terminal because you ruin all g9 20 the force conviction equipment, and that's been with us for 21 twenty years.
And it hasn't been settled.
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22 MR. DEY:
Let me just go over the project manage-23 ment overview and give you the technical details later.
l 24 So the results of the study will be determined--
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25 let's say to determine the need for the EQ research to I
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develop or revise regulations or support a revision of NRC k_
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Those are the regulatory applications that come out 3
of this study.
4 The study will prioritize the research for the 5
equipment and pertaining EQ= issues so if a decision is made i
6 that EQ research is needed, the need of the research for the 7
equipment will be prioritized as a result of this study.
8 And three, it will determine the need for identify-l 9
ing new generic' issues either for current operating plants 10 and then it would go into the generic issues system along 11 with recommendations from Research.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
One of the problems you've got, fm
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14 questions being raised by the consideration of A-17, the 15 systems interaction considerations because many of these 16 interesting system interactions that are initiated by lack 17 of adequate environmental qualification of equipment, and 18 if you are going to do this study and I will make this com-19 ment only once, because otherwise we'd be talking here all 20 day about it, but much of this study just seems to ignore 21 the question of system interaction and in determining the rw 22 safety significance of the equipment, I find no mention of Y
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23 how you are going to handle system interaction effects, and 24 to what extent you are going to handle them, and so forth.
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don't have a resolution of A-17 even, but somewhere it must s
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2 be recognized and address that A-17 is an integral part of 3
this question of how far to go in Equipment Qualification
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4 and how safety significant Equipment Qualification may be.
5 And I just fail to find that talked about in the Scoping i
6 document even.
Although maybe it's inferred, I certainly 7
don't see it jump out at me at all.
Maybe other members wish 8
to comment on it, but I think it's important to say once so 9
we don't delay the' rest of the day, but I believe this Scop-10 ing document falls far short until it fits in with A-17 some-11 how.
12 MR. WYLIE:
Well, I had the same thoughts, Carl.
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13 I knew you were going to bring this up.
But I agree with you s_-
14 The interactions of things like failures of support equip-15 ment such as air conditioning or the interactions, as you 16 quite often mention, on fires and floods and failures of 17 equipment somewhere in the plant that the contents of a tank 18 go someplace else where you didn't expect it to go, and 19 whether or not the trains are that well separated to prevent 20 the interactions.
That that kind of consideration should be 21 given.
And I'm not sure--
22 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm not sure how to do it right
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l 24 MR. WYLIE:
Well, it didn't jump out at you that O
25 that kind of thing was being considered, for example, the l
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loss of cooling in the control area and if it's not properly 0,
2 separated and not designed properly, there's not much you 3
can do about'it unless you go back and fix it.
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4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Eventually it boils down to an en-5 vironmental qualification, but for circumstances you didn't L
6 foresee.
7 MR..MICHELSON:
Well, no, it's hard to ever qualify 8
l for something you didn't foresee.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
-- it would be prudent to make 10 everything watertight by four.
Just on the grounds I don't 11 know what might hit it.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
But somehow in this business we f%
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are going to have to address the issue of what environment 13 14 we are dealing with that we are going to qualify the equip-15 ment for, and it's a given, I guess--I guess it's a given 16 that we know the environment and now we just have to decide 17 how safety significant that environment would be on the equip-18 ment and then whether or not it has to be qualified.
But 19 the environment itself, the definition of the environment is 20 a very important consideration.
I find it not addressed 21 here unless somebody else is working on how to define
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hazardous environment that this equipment will be qualified 22 V
23 for.
If somebody else is working on it, I'd like to talk to 24 them.
25 MR. DEY:
I think that's part of the scope of the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 6 sassa
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study, is to define that environment and start at least on
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3 MR. MICHELSON:
If it's part of the scope of the 4
study it sure didn't come across.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's going to be plant specific 6
and I don't think Sandia is prepared to take on plant speci-7 fic studies that define an environment for one plant for a 8
piece of equipment different from another.
9 MR. WYLIE:.Well, they may want to comment on that 10 as they make their presentation.
But I think it was inferred 11 that they were going to get a lot of input at the plant's 12 level.
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13 MR. BUSTARD:
Our goal is to use. input that's 14-available.
For example, if accident environments have been 15 generated --
in a core melt scenario, we would use that.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
But you'd better take a hard look 17 at what the utilities are coming up with as their definition 18 of the accident environment.
Inside a containment they are i
19 Pretty good.
Outside of containment, they are far short.
20 Far short.
So we have to decide whether that environment is 21 good enough.
If it is then you can look at the equipment in 22 terms of the effect of that environment on go on through your t
23-ritual and everything I think would work out fine.
i 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I argue--
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It's the head in process that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 426-das
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bothers me.
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I argue whether it's good inside 3
containment.
As a case in point, TVA told me, and we're
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4 having'a fight with them, that they find it permissible to 5
use leaded terminal boards and take surface condensation 6
and the consequential electrical' leakage.
And they made a 7
statement to me and I guess the staff may support it.
That's 8
a universal practice.
.If it is, I deplore it and I don't 9
know whether it is or not.
10 MR. BUSTARD:
I can address that in more detail, 11 but--
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, I think that's a part of r~x 13 this book here, when we gec to talking about this book, g
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15 MR. DEY:
Well, let me give you an overview of 16 the study, the task, and the schedule we are kollowing.
17 This is an overview.
Larry Bustard will go over some of l
thedetailsandtaskstructureandtheapprokchtheya,re 18 19 using to achieve these ends.
20 One, we are trying to obtain a prioritized list 21 of equipment, of risk significant equipment, operations for 22 BWR and PWR plants, and make it as generic as possible.
And 23 most of this study is being done through out subcontractor 24 SAI.
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25 MR. MICHELSON:
Can you tell me real briefly,how Heritage Reporting Corporation m.u-o
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3; you are folding in now the fire study as a part of this as7 a._
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February and I'd like to know how these;cwo weave together
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ment.
6 MRI DEY:
.I think when Larry goes through his task 7
structure-, h+'ll mention how Sandia is merging the 'two to-i 8
gether.
9 After 0e obtain the prioritized list of equipment, 10 for those important pieces of equipment we determine the risk 11 significance of EQ issues, that big buck.
Which are the 12 !! 1mportant YQ iscues that pertain to the performance of thisc 1-(s}
list, first list, that we determined here, and this work is 33
^I4 ceing done by our contractor, Sandia Lab.
15 Aft'er we get that r3 search, I plan to take those 16 recommendation and results to a peer review process, an 17 internal peer review group corrhisting of three members, 18 cra from EPRI, one from industry, the IDCOR Program.
IDCOR 19 did a task on equipment survivability during severe condi-i l
20 tions, so they would be able to--
21 MR. MICHELSON:
IDCOR focuses only on severe acci-s 22
(~g dents as-I understand it.
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Severe accidents.
24 MR. MIC11ELSON:
And, of course, that's beyond the,
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It isn't'now.
It isn't now.
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MR. MICHELSON:
And ao 1 wonder why you are using 6
IDCOR when that's'not the focus of'our immediate--most of 11 7 T the immediate questions on qualification I thought had to e
D do with, can we really handle dnsign basis accidents as well I'
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And how safety significant are design basis i
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And if we've got weak spots, we patch them.
But' 11 I didn't snink this thing was pitche6 toward beyond the de-12 sign basis, i
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13 MR., 3USTARD:
I'11 talk about.- that later.
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14 "MR. MICHELSON:
- Okay, because I can open up ano-u therwhoJespecthumofthingsyououghttobethinkaboutif 15 16 you itre really going beyond the design basis,
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I fihink we're ta! ting a broad approach--
13 MR. MICHELSON:
Oxay.
Then we'll throw out plenty 19
'of--
20 MR. DEf:
In determining which is more important.
1 21 My. MICHELSON:
Okay.
I didn't realize you were
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<e hitven't handled the problen of design basis accidents 24 too.well yet from the Equipment Qualification viewpoint,
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1 MR. DEY:
And the third member I plan on v tting e
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2 from the Aging research since the Aging is doing research 3
along similar lines, but with a particular objective on N-4 studying the aging mechanism, and INEL is involved in that.
5 After I take the studies from our contractor and 6
through the peer view process, I plan to write a progress 7
report and the end result of the study will be a research, 8
Office of Research'information letter which will recommend 9
. regulatory' accidents and need for further research.
10 And the schedule will be, for the first task it's 11 12/15 and that will be discussed today, presented to you 12
- today, fV 13 The second task is also being completed for one
'd 14 example and the rest of the study will be completed by March 15 15th.
16 I plan two meetings, peer review group meetings, 17 one in January of 1988 and a final one in March '88 after 18 the March 15th completion of the study.
19 And after this meeting and the first peer review 20 group meeting, I plan to write a progress report.
And a 21-Research Information letter will be written at the termina-(.. j-22 tion of the project on April 30th.
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23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask you a question.
There's 24 a current flap on board here about venting.
And I notice a 25 part of that is a thesis that we may vent into the secondary Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) a2s.4sas C___________._______.______
20 1
containment which'is t'e equipment house, and I have a feel-2 ing if you do that you may compound your problem rather than 3
reduce it.
And you develop new environmental considerations.
i' 4
I don't think this matter of even considering venting into 5
the so-called equipment building or reactor building on a 6
boiler, for instance, is a practical thing to consider.
Yet 7
it's coming up to the surface.
And I don't know what would 8
result in an environmental context.
But it sounds to me like 9
pretty risky-business, You may have a new set.
This is an 10 attempt to avoid a severe accident.
Once you get into a l
11 severe accident, I think most of your problems are inside 12 the containment and it's attempting to make a containment r
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13 survive, that's about all, l
14 So you pretty well localize where all the equipment 15 is that's inside.
Except the stuff that's running outside, i
16 you try to keep it cool.
17 This current move to vent including the aspect of 18 venting into secondary equipment areas is I think risky l
19 business.
20 MR. DEY:
I agree with you.
It's a difficult 21 problem and to determine the needs of the equipment requires 73 other studies and those are continually being conducted by 22 V
1 23 the staff, the accident management and the accident research.
24 But this is taking with often the knowledge presently avail-l (O) 25
- able, our best shot at it, to come up with the Heritage Reporting Corporation
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recommendations.
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2 Finally, I propose to fit in with the schedule I 3
just showed you, I propose a subcommittee meeting sometime-A.
4 in March and then request a letter from the committee in 5
April.
I would like to take your comments of that letter'in 6
the final Research Information letter that we formulate for 7
further study.
8 So that's all I had.
Let me pass it over to Larry 9
Bustard from Sandic' Labs, who'll present the task structure.
10 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me just give you the background 11 slides which will help put into perspective what we're trying 12 to do.
[~'\\
13 First of all, the objectives that define to us Y) 14 and in our agreement with the NRC is that the EQ - Risk 15 Scoping Study will assess the impact of electrical equipment 16 environmental qualifications or lack thereof on reactor risk 17 and its uncertainties.
And right now we are limiting this 18 study to internal-event type accidents and we are also con-19 cerned mainly with electrical equipment to electrical equip-20 ment that controls things like mechanical equipment, such as 21 motor-operated valves.
22 We have not included within the scope of this 23 study things like check valves, but we do have motor-operated 3
l i
24 valves in the study.
I 25 The second objective of the study is to identify Heritage Reporting Corporation a____-__-_-_-_-_____
22 1
any analysis or testing that may be necessary to reduce the O
2 risk or its uncertainties extending from lack of qualifica-3 tion of important equipment.
4 And in response to the question that was asked of 5
Moni regarding, are we limiting ourselves to design basis 6
versus other type of accident scenarios?
We are not limiting 7
ourself just to design basis.
We are considering the pos-8 sibility of some severe accident scenarios.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does environmental qualification 10 include the matter of process loads that are one-time heavy 11 loads as part of the accident process and have little to do 12 with the actual ambient environment, but just with the physi-13 cal duty that the equipment has to perform. Like a valve un-14 der handling run-out loads?
15 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
In the sense that if you go to 16 like a limitored motor operator, a concern about the quali-17 fication status of limitored motor operators is has the 18 qualification testing that's been done demonstrated opera-19 bility under degraded electrical conditions and under the 20 types of loads that are typical during a scenario where 21 there's--
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
You took a broad definition of en-23 vironmental qualifications.
It's not just ambient conditions 24 on the equipment.
It includes the proceso loads.
(:)
l 25 MR. BUSTARD:
It could include the process or Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 625 4888
l 23 L
(
I electrical loads that are on the equipment.
I U
l 2
MR. MICHELSON: So how are you going to define 3
severe accidents since you are going beyond the design basis?
[~)
4 You had better envelope it a little bit or limit it rather a 5
little bit.
There's almost an unlimited set of severe acci-6 dents that one can postulate.
I 7
MR. BUSTARD:
Why don't'you wait and see what we've 8
done?
9 MR..MICHELSON: Okay.
10 MR. BUSTARD:
And that will explain--
11 MR. MICHELSON: Internal events, you say you are 12 doing--I guess you mean you are only looking at the hardware
["\\
13 interconnecting effects?
In other words, how are you address-L) 14 ing system interaction under internal events?
15 MR. BUSTARD:
When I say internal events, what I 16 mean is we're looking at steam, radiation-type conditions, 17 loss of coolant accidents, transients, the typical type of 18 initiating events that would be considered in an internal I
19 event PRA.
I 20 MR. MICHELSON: But not pipe break--
21 MR. BUSTARD:
Pipe break--
l 22 MR. MICHELSON:
Pipe break is not an internal event 23 necessarily, that's what I want to find out.
Are you putting i
P Pe breaks outside of containment as internal events?
14 O
25 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
We've considered it.
What we're Heritage Reporting Corporation (20t} sts 4:ss
24 l
l 1
talking about is we're not talking about looking at the ef-
,_/3 v
2 fects of tornadoes, seismic events, flood due to an external 3
source--
n 4
MR. MICHELSON:
Wait a minute.
But a pipe break--
5 internal flooding from a pipe break is included, okay.
What 6
about fire?
7 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
A fire?
8 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
9 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I guess as far as what you 10 gentlemen are calling events that would be occurring, let's 11 say, local pump rooms or something or out in a diesel genera-1 1
12 tor building or whatever--
[\\
13 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
\\_
l 14 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Has been at least addressed but 15 I would say in a very superficial fashion at this point.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
But you are including fire then as 1
17 an internal event?
18 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
20 MR. BUSTARD:
Well, fire is under the auspices of 21 our Fire Risk Scoping Study.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, I know we're getting depart-N ]s 23 mentalized and people don't want to talk about it, but you 24 are going to have to and this is where it's going to have es 25 be done.
Heritage Reporting Corporation m.a.
25 3
MR. BOHN:
Well, wait a minute.
are not
,f'T y/
2 qualified in any sense to a fire.
In the EQ process they 3
have temperature of limits.
/'
4 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, there are general limits in 5
temperature.
6 MR. BOHN:
Well, certainly.
But I mean the EQ 7
process in terms of setting the design basis accidents, to 8
my understanding does not include the assumption that you have l
9 a fire in the room.
l l
MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, that's my assumption too, and go 11 I'm just trying to find out just what do you--I mean, I hear 12 these statements, but I don't think it's that--
(~T g3 MR. BOHN:
In this study we have not had a fire in
\\
the room and tried to assess the impact on that so that it 14 15 doesn't relate to EQ.
However--
16 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, it does relate to EQ.
The 17 smoke from the heat that goes out to the hall to the next 18 room certainly--
39 MR. BOHN:
You are exactly right.
It's in the l
20 Fire Scoping Study that we are addressing those issues.
2j MR. MICHELSON: But you are not going to consider i
22 fire right now at all?
fs 2
\\_/
l 23 MR. BOHN:
That is correct.
l MR. MICHELSON:
Someday you are going to bring the 24 O
25 two together?
You can't separate them.
Heritage Reporting Corporation
<=>na..
26 I
MR. BOHN:
Well, we see them as complimentary 2
efforts that hopefully will fill the gap between them.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
O 4
MR. BOHN:
Because we have the same group of people 5
in effect in the same division doing the same study, so we 6
are trying to make sure we cover the gap.
7 MR. MICHELSON:
But you are including pipe break' 8
outside of containment?
\\
9 MR. BOHN:
The possibility of a pipe break occur-10 ring and giving rise to a steam environment in various com-11 partments is included in the-PRA process.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
The propagation out of the compart-(
13 ment is also included?
14 MR. BOHN:
Right.
15 MR. MICHELSON:
In a PRA you have a probability 16 that valves don't close, for instance.
Now, and if you are 17 using the loadings of the valves beyond their design basis, 18 which they are in the case of reactor water cleanup, no 19 design basis for those valves that says it can handle ten 20 times normal flow unclosed.
Or eight times.
Whatever your 21 sonic limitation finally becomes.
There's no requirement 22 for that, so how does a PRA person put in a probability for 23 the valve being able to close under conditions for which it 24 was designed?
O 25 MR. BOHN:
Well, that's an issue, of course, we Heritage Reporting Corporation nui u..
l 27 1
are trying to address in this study.
O 2
MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
3 MR. WYLIE:
Would you state your name for the O
4 record?
5 MR. BOHN:
I'm sorry.
Mike Bohn.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me add just a little bit to 7
that.
I think it's true that the plants are loaded with 8
these fusable links in the air conditioning systems.
The 9
fusable temperature is probably well above the survival 10 temperature of the apparatus on the other side of the damper 11 that's going to close.
So there is an environmental fire 12 impact that it has to suffer while the damned link is trying 13 to melt.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, they do talk to each other 15 down the hall at Sandia, I know.
I'm just trying to figure 16 out how it's going to be brought together.
I worry a little 17 bit yet and I wonder how A-17 will get roped in and how fire 18 will get roped in and this will all come together in one 19 place somewhere.
I don't know if this is the program where 20 it comes together other program.
21 MR. BOHN:
I think there is sort of a fundamental 22 difference between MP-17 and what we are doing here.
What 23 we are doing here is we're using the PRA structure as the 24 means of identifying those equipment whose environment either O
25 in a normal or off normal situation could be beyond the Heritage Reporting Corporation
<m m.4.
L 28 I
l 1
equipment qualification limits.
And we are trying to use I
(. l 2
.the probabilistic structure to identify those ones that could i
3 be important.
Whereas an A-17 I think there is less emphasis t}-.
N 4
on the relative likelihood of events happening but trying to 5
consider the whole scope of events which could happen re-6 gardless of--
7 MR. MICHELSON:
How do you handle the common cause 8
now such as heating an entire room of equipment?
How do you 9
handle that from the PRA viewpoint?
10 MR. BOHN:
Well, in the PRAs the critical equipment 11 if there is a breakdown in the room cooling, the critical sets in the PRAs, they 12 equipment that occurs in the
'\\
13 make guesses in how long that equipment can function in de-(Q 14 graded environment.
15 MR. MICHELSON:
But how about the failure mode of 16 the equipment, for instance, which may be quite important 17 and which is unpredictable, say, in the case of solid state 18 devices.
How do you put in a PRA the failure modes?
Sup-19 pose you can analyze the consequence and therefore determine 20 the risk.
21 MR. BOHN:
That's teri incognito really.
We don't i
gs 22 know that much about solid state equipment--
O 23 MR. MICHELSON:
But that's what you've got to know 24 when you start talking about taking an entire area and chang-
{
25 ing its environment such that it goes beyond the equipment's Heritage Reporting Corporation l
l J
29 I
capability.
O 2
MR. BOHN:
A similar question arises in fires where 3
you are concerned about whether or not you get a hot short in O
4 a spurious actuation of equipment, a loss of isolation to 5
your valves or what have you.
In general, the way the PRAs 6
in the past have tried to treat that is two considerations.
7 First of all they try to hypothesize the worst situation that 8
could occur.
And secondly, they say, well, we might get a 9
hot short, but what little experimental data we have shows l
10 that hot shorts don't last very long.
So there's a time l
11 window.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
But there's also a combination of 13 events problem.
How many of these events are going on con-14 currently?
15 MR. BOHN:
That's true.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
And because the challenge is common 17 to all the equipment.
And nothing to saying it's only going l
18 to fail on a random basis now.
It's going to fail but from 19 a common cause and it may be quite coincident.
20 MR. BOHN:
Well, generally what they do in the 21 common cause is to hypothesize that all the equipment fails 22 but at some frequency determined by c e of the various mathe-23 matical models, data models.
24 MR. MICHELSON:
But the problem is with failure is O
i 25 you keep defining failure as loss of function.
And not as Heritage Reporting Corporation (to21624 4ssa
30 s
I producing adverse effects.
Losing a function may be nice.
f5
\\' )
2 That may be a non-problem.
Getting an adverse effect from 3
it is where you get your difficulty.
's MR. BOHN:
That is difficult, yes.
4 5
MR. MICHELSON:
And it's very hard to analyze what 6
kind of adverse effects, particularly when a lot of things 7
are happening at once.
And you don't know which order they a
come in to the chain.
And there.are many possibilities.
Or 9
whether they all come in coincidentally or what.
It's not go simple, I know,.but I hope.we don't allude ourselves into 11 believing that we don't have a common cause problem from 12 environment simply because our analysis doesn't show it.
It
(~]T 13 is a shortcoming of the analysis.
N 14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Charlie, let me ask you a question.
15 At what temperature does a holding case or even any kind of 16 circuit breaker misinterpret the multi-current and trip its 17 overload system?
18 MR. WYLIE:
It depends on whether or not it's got a thermal device in there.
39 20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I'm assuming that we will 21 have lots of those.
And we'll have--say, it reads ambient f-22 temperature and it operates on some level above that with a 23 heating system.
24 MR. WYLIE:
Well, I don't know exactly.
O~
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
You know, you don't need to go l
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) s26 4sse U____--_.-
31 i
1
.to solid state equipment before the overload system de-
.h,,
2 tects the hinte -synthetically and erroneously detect--
3 MR.
VLIE:
I think most of them are calibrated
[)'
' ~ -
4 at 30 degrees O I believe.
l 5
MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, that's well below the tempera-6 ture you get at a fusable link temperature.
7 MR. WYLIE:
Yes.
(
8 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me go'on and mention--now that 9
we've had a long discussion about internal events.
Let me I
10 just quickly summarize the types of EQ issues that we've i
11 trying to deal"with in'this study.
12 And I'm going to do'that by mentioning questions n(
j 13 that helps define some EQ issues.
The first question is does
\\_)
14 the current EQ process adequately demonstrate Equipment Quali-e 15 fication for.the design basis?
And there are two aspects to 16 that question.
One aspect is the risk significance of his-17 torical technical concerns regarding the current EQ process.
18 And what I mean by a technical concern might be something 19 like should Equipment Qualification if you use simultaneous 20 test techniques for radiation and steam rather than sequen-21 tial test techniques.
That thick report that's been men-L f-,
22 tioned discussing many of the technical concerns that have l
N-23 been raised over the years regarding the current EQ process.
I l
24 In addition--and these technical concerns can have l
25 an impact either on NRC regulations or industry practice.
Heritage Reporting Corporation 1
ani m4=
1
l 32 1
An example of that is terminal blocks.
You brought up the t
i
(_/
I 2
issue of terminal blocks.
Several years ago, terminal 3
blocks were being qualified by loading them at 20 amps high
/^TJ 4
voltage and seeing if they continued to function, and then i
5 that qualification was being applied to instrumentation cir-6 cuits.
That was an industry practice in which the NRC Re-7 search Program had an impact, and we can discuss the risk f
8 significance of that impact as part of this program.
9 A second aspect of this question, does the current 10 EQ process adequately demonstrate Equipment Qualification 11 for the design basis is~to ask what is the risk significance 12 of historical EQ problems that have been noted during NRC (L) x 13 audits of utilities?
So this question basically addresses 14 the current regulations and the current design basis.
15 However, when you start saying that you want to 16 answer these questions using probabilistic risk techniques 17 you run into a second major question that you have to deal 18 with in a study such as this one.
And that question is, does j
i 19 the current EQ process demonstrate equipment operability j
20 cognizant with the PRA assumptions, 21 And there are several different aspects of that 22 that are of relevance when we start doing our study here.
g-)
i
~
23 For example, many of the sequences that are important to the
)
24 PRA analysts are not part of the design basis for the EQ
'~'
25 process.
And so you have to ask yourself what is the risk Heritage Reporting Corporation n=> u..
33 1
significance of important PRA accident scenarios not being 7_
(,)
2 included in EQ design' basis.
3 A second issue that comes up which has been alluded
!n'~)
4 to here today is that in PRA space the component' accident in 5
normal operation reliabilities are rarely decoupled and nor-6 mally normal operation reliabilities are used in many cases 7
to describe responsive equipment during accident environments, 8
So we have to ask ourself what is the risk significance of 9
component accident in normal operation reliabilities being 10 different, and that's the way we can get back at the EQ is-11 isues, because basically the EQ issues'are going to be what 12 is driving the accident reliabilities to be different than (m
13 the normal operation reliabilities.
l 14 MR. EBERSOLE:
You make a statement in the report 15
'here that the EQ engineer and the PRA analyst have different 16 perspections regarding equipment operability.
I don't see i
17 how we can tolerate that.
18 MR. BUSTARD:
Well, let me give you an example.
19 That's the third one I have here, which is another issue l
l 20 that comes out of this, the current EQ process demonstrating 21 equipment operability cognizant with PRA assumptions.
Is the g) risk significance of PRA short-time equipment operability 22
%J 23 perspective compared to EQ's long-time equipment operability 24 perspective?
And let me give you some examples. If I go to 7(
25 a utility and look at at Equipment Qualification file for Heritage Reporting Corporation m m.a..
34 I
cables or some other components, typically those components 7
()
2 will be followed by for time periods of an hour to 180 days.
3 There are a number of components like cables and electrical A
4 penetration that will have 180-day operability requirements.
5 Typically in EQ space, testing will occur for thirty days.
6 Fifteen to thirty days.
7 Now, if you go talk to a PRA analyst what they tell 8
you is that PRA's typically model accident is out to twenty-9 four to forty-eight hours. 'And so you have a divergence 10 there between the PRA perspective on time and the EQ perspec-11 tive on time.
But that divergence actually becomes impor-12 tant when you start talking about some of these traditional o[ \\
13 EQ issues or technical concerns.that we've been doing re-
' n.)
14 search on for the last ten years.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, on the old single-failure 16 criterion, for instance.
There's no time sense in it.
And 17 there should be.
Six pumps is better than two pumps, be-18 cause one of them might last over a longer interval.
i 19 MR. BUSTARD:
That's right.
That's right.
I l
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, but a single failure over one 21 hundred days doesn't make any sense but that's all we have 22 to assume.
gs
\\
23 MR. BUSTARD:
Right.
i 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, for instance, the old boiler
<~b 25 with four pumps was better off than a new one with two, i
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 62s.4sas
-35 1
because it had a better time depth of defense.
O 2
MR. BUSTARD:
Right.
3 Well, let me give you an example of a technical g(-
4 concern that's been raised in that thick report that you 5
have and it's been addressed in that big report.
That has 6
definitely impacted our ability to determine'its risk signi-7 ficance as impacted by this difference in time perspective.
8 An issue like simultaneous versus sequential accident simula-9 tion or an issue like.the importance of oxygen during LOCA go-stimulations or an issue like beta gamma equivalents.
Those 11 issues are going to have their main impact on equipment 12 operability several days into an accident.
And if an PRA
'\\s 13 doesn't model several days into an accident, it becomes dif-(V 34 ficult to give the risk significance of those issues unless 15 you simply say what is the overall risk impact of the equip-16 ment function.
17 So what I'm trying to get to is that there are 18 some differences in approach between the PRA assumption and q
19 the EQ probability, and these differences definitely impact 20 our ability to answer this EQ Risk Scoping Study.
l 21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, shouldn't the PRA boys be l
22 required to say let's have a new look at that set of calcu-l 23 lations thirty days hence?
l 24 MR. BUSTARD:
One of the things we're doing in this b
25 study is to pick out important issues like that and to scope Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628 4880
___.__________-____-__-_w
36 1
out how we can redefine the PRA sequences to see how important 7_
2 that redefinition is.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
A simple example where a PRA O
4 doesn't do too well on that is the case'of loss of off-site j
5 power.
It goes through the scenario and determines what the
-f 6
risk and what the consequences might be.
But I have never 7
found in there yet an addressing of what happens when you 8
lose all the normal building ventilation in terms of heat 9
up of rooms, in terms of responsive equipment to heat up a 10 room, and so it's assumed that equipment goes on as if the 11 room had never heated.
And we. simply know that's not true, 12 and have plenty of experience' reported in LERs to show that
/~%N.
13 rooms even inadequately cooled start to have the equipment (d
14 respond in rather strange fashion.
That happens during a 15 blackout.
16 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is changing, as part of the i
17 evolutionary process--
18 MR. MICHELSON:
I don't find it yet though in PRAs I
19 in terms of--because only after--you first of all have to 20 do a temperature profile throughout the building before you 21 can do your PRA.
Because you don't know what the equipment 22 environment even is.
p
'u 23 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
For example, the present ongoing 24 NUREG-1150 that NRC is working on is trying in a simplistic 25 way to handle such things as venting into the reactor Heritage Reporting Corporation
<mna.
37 l
I I
building and hence you have steam now in the reactor build-A' 2
ing--
3 MR. MICHELSON:
I wouldn't want it to get that 3
4 sophisticated.
I just want to keep real simpleminded like 5
what-happens when I lose my normal power system and shut off 6
most of my normal ventilation and have only a few emergency 7
areas.
The rest of the rooms just start heating up.
What 8
happens to the equipment?
How does it respond?
Well, you 9
can't say what it.does until you know how hot it gets, and to I can't even get my hands on numbers as to how hot these 11 rooms get and I don't know how you can do a PRA if you don't 12 know how hot the room is getting.
(
N 13 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That information is becoming g,
14' available.
15 MR. MICHELSON:
I would hope to see it in a normal 16 PRA where you lose normal AC power, for instance.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, at least you don't have AC 18 heat inside.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
No, but you've got plenty of rooms 20 that don't have DC powered equipment with plenty of kilowatts 21 going back on.
22 MR. WYLIE:
Okay, let's move on.
- t 23 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me now define what our approach 24 is.
The first step in our approach of this study is to 25 identify candidate equipment operations that must be l
Heritage Reporting Corporation
{302) 638-4838
J 38 l
I accomplished in a harsh environment.
By definition, EQ is l
(1) i 2
a harsh environment process.
And so we are limiting our-
)
3 selves to a harsh environment type situation.
l O
4 MR. MICHELSON:
What's a harsh environment?
5 MR. BUSTARD:
Something above normal.
Somewhere 6
where normal operability statistics might not apply.
k 7
MR. MICHELSON:
Does it have a time sense?
8 MR. BUSTARD:
From a historical EQ requirement, 9
it does not.
I mean, if you have a room in the reactor 10 building of a BWR.that seesLa five-minute temperature.excur-11 sion in response to an accident that's occuring inside con-12-tainment, typicallyLthere will be a qualification file de-
/'(\\-
13 scribing equipment response to that five-minute accident i
14 excursion.
So in that sense it does not have a time aspect j
15~
to it.
t 16 So the first thing that this study is trying to do 17 is to identify candidate equipment operations that must be 18 accomplished in harsh environment.
We are taking two per-19 spectives on that identification process.
First, we are 20 taking a PRA perspective on the risk significant equipment 21 operation that occurs on harsh environment.
And Allen is 22 rg going to be talking more about that in a little while with
- (.).
23 respect to what some of our results our.
24 secondly, we're taking an EQ perspective on equip-(_)
l 25 ment whose harsh environment reliability may be different Heritage Reporting Corporation l-onnu...
39 g
than' typical PRA assumptions because of the EQ issues.
On b
\\~'
2 the whole, this usually means different than reliabilities 3
around--I mean failure probabilities around 10-3 and mostly
/~T l
4 in PRA space reliabilities are normal operational reliabili-I
( /'
5 ties.
However, there are few examples such as containment j
6 fan operation where they don't assume that throughout the 7
duration of the accident that reliabilities stay down in the 10-3 failure probability range.
8 9
MR. MICHELSON:
Do you define failure as being an i
10 unwanted accident from the piece of equipment?
gg MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
12 14R. MICHELSON:
Okay.
['\\
13 MR. BUSTARD:
And I will be talking a little bit L,)
more about Item B further on into this discussion.
14 15 Then the second portion of the project approach is 16 to prioritize the candidate equipment operations based on a 17 written perspective or an EQ Risk Scoping objectives per-18 spective.
We have some limited funding in this program.
We 39 can't examine everything in our follow-up activities.
20 Third, for selected equipment operations identify 21 in more detail the risk impact, important sequences, typical 22 harsh environment subcomponent locations, fragility, et r~)
I
(/
23 cetera.
And then using that information, identify the impact i
24 of the EQ issues on equipment function.
Identify if there I) 1
\\~
are data sources available to help you do this, or identify
)
25 Heritage Reporting Corporation von m.m.
IL __-_-_ ______._ ___.
40 I
that you are missing data because there is data shortcomings.
I
,_s i
)
LJ
~
2 And using this information, assess the risk significance of i
/
3 the various EQ issues.
(')
'/
4 MR. MICHELSON:
When doing this, in the past when 5
a pipe breaks outside a containment, we've just totally ig-6 nored one inch down.
Partly because of code tradition.
7 For this purpose though in terms of local environ-8 ment a one-inch pressure sensing line might be an extremely 9
important break.
Are you looking at small component breahs 10 like that?
11 MR. BUSTARD:
Again, it's been in part addressed 12 and I guess what I'd like to do is come back to your points n
13 about a harsh environment in other rooms far away from the f
x
%. ]
l 14 containment and'show you at least that we've thought about 15 it.
There's a lot of difficulty in trying to handle that, i
l 16 I'd like to touch on that.
I 17 MR. MICHELSON:
Particularly from a PRA viewpoint 18 as well as difficulty because on-inch sensing lines don't 19 follow your normal PRA kinds of approaches.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
They do have excess low checks, but 1
21 I don't know whether--
22 MR. MICHELSON:
Not necessarily, Jesse.
PRAs rs,s t,)
23 don't necessarily and not all boilers do either.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
We talk about them--
r')
25 MR. MICHELSON:
Not all lines have those.
Heritage Reporting Corporation on> u.au.
41 I
MR. DEY:
Let me make a point though.
Talking about
!,..D
'</
2 PRAs.
As you'll see later, and it might be well to point out 3
now, that there are limitations to PRA approach.
/~T
~
4 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm glad--
5 MR. DEY:
Yeah.
And they have attempted to handle 6
those--
7 MR. MICHELSON: I think it would be easier to say 8
it the other way around.
PRA is still a rather crude ap-l 9
proach to a very difficult problem.
It's the best we've got.
10 And we have to use it as best we can but we have to recog-11 nize very carefully how limiting it is and how much of the 12 problem it can really handle.
r
(
13 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me just summarize giving a more b
14 visual impression of what we're trying to do.
We are trying 15 to decide how the risk is impacted by an EQ issue by looking 16 at which component functions have high risk impact and which 17 of those function also are impacted by the EQ issue.
18 And we're coming at this approach two ways.
First 19 we are asking the PRA analysts to identify the risk signi-20 ficant equipment operations.
Secondly, from an EQ standpoint 21 we are asking which equipment functions are significantly e-22 impacted by the EQ issues.
And when we merge these two L)J 23 perspectives together and we look at these two perspectives l
24 across several candidate equipment operations, we can get a
%.s 25 feel for what is the impact on risk of a certain equipment I
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 62sasse
42 1
qualification issue.
That's the basic approach to this
-!)
V 2
study.
3 And I think since my time is about up, maybe it's
[
4 time to let--
5 MR. MICHELSON:
How does that approach handle 6
common cause?
7.
MR. BUSTARD:
Well, let me give you an example.
8 From an EQ perspective, if I believe that there is an equip-9 ment function such as motor operation is down, it could have 10 a high probability of common cause failure across systems.
Il Then we go back~in this study and'we look in more detal 12 how that common cause failure is going to impact cut sets n
13 (g%
and things like that.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
What' bothers me is you are trying 15 to do it on a piece of equipment at a time.
Really common 16 cause is a concept, is a challenge, to a large amount of 17 equipment simultaneously, and the equipment has to be viewed 18 not as an individual risk contributor in the normal sense 19 but rather as a very small contributor but in combination 20 with all the other things that are going along, becomes a I
21 major risk contributor.
But none of the individual pieces l
1 22 are major risk contributors.
It's the set that's getting you 23 in trouble--
1 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I don't know about that.
Let o
l 25 me pick one--
1 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 625 4568
43
)
l I
MR. MICHELSON:
I'm just saying that's one way
.O 2
of viewing this.
Now, there are other situations.
l 3
MR. EBERSOLE: I just picked one that bugged me and f
/
4 that is the solenoid operated ADVs on boilers.
They have to 5-be environmentally qualified to hold potential under severe f
6 circumstances while they hold the boiler open and permit-7 low pressure in order to cool the core.
And the original 8
attempt to. design these things--I remember Betel had a hell 9
of a lot of trouble developing the recipes with which they 10 made the coils.
And, you know, they are type tested de-11 vices.
I have long held and still hold a view that those.
12 solenoid-operated ADV pilot devices are inadequate in the I
(3%
13 context of severe environment prformance to serve as the p) 14 only means whereby a boiler can open a vessel and release i
35 pressure so you can get water in it.
They should be hand 16 cranked as 'far as I'm concerned to do that, which'are en-17 vironmentally independent.
Except for the operator.
18 MR. BUSTARD:
We have that issue in this study.
1 19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you?
j i
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20 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
How do you define the case wherein 22 the internal environment in which the equipment is working--
p'w/
l l
23 in other words, the internal fluid, not the external environ-24 ment, but the internal environment of equipment.
When it's 25 severely changed--for instance, air systems in which you get Heritage Reporting Corporation m u.
\\
44 I
a large amount of water into the air syetem, it fingers it-V' 2
self right out into a large number of components, almost 3:
concurrently, how do you handle that in these kinds of ana-r^3 O
4 lyses.
S MR. BUSTARD:
You'll see in a minute.
We have 6
identified a few of those kinds as well.,
7 MR. MICHELSON:
And you can handle them under PRA?
8 MR. BUSTARD:
No.
We had to go beyond the normal--
9 well, again,-Pan provides some insight in that direction.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
Yeah, but you are thinking about it?
11 MR. BUSTARD:
We thinking beyond that.
We have 12 to think about those things.
(^x i
T 13 MR. MICHELSON:
Thank you.
'O 14 MR. BOHN:
This is Mike Bohn.
The difficulty here 15 is that the kind of' events that you are talking about have 16 occurred, have shown on the LERs and have affected the multi-17 ple pieces of equipment.
We have a program the NRC sponsors 18 in common causes.
Also INEL has a program to try to see if 19 they can identify frequencies of the various common causes 1
20 like water in the air line or excess oil.
That sort of thing l
21 And they have shown up.
The difficulty from a PRA is there rs 22 is almost no data on the frequency of these types of root
(
23 causes and they are very, very infrequent.
And so if one 24 just looks at those as a separate type of event or initiator, O
O 25 they show up to be risk insignifi(ant.
They jsut don't Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) s2s-4ssa
l 45 '
l t
l 7-q h'appen that frequently cpKpt: red with other things.
So the U
2 way they are included is in thh" data base on common cause 3
failures--
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MR.MICHELSON:
But the reason they show up to be risk 5
, insignificant is you haven't adequately evalua*ed the conse-tN.
quence when this occurs in common to a largd\\ptohat of equip-6 5
7
~ ' ment.
It could be a core meltdown, but I divop ' t seen it
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6
~ predicted--wattir in the air line hasn't been predidted as &
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,e 9
- high conseqt.ence event. 1But'it w il be.
Depending on what v
10 all get into at the time.
And you are only going to get 11 one of these events to think. about probably.' We hl be,.out 12 of business after the firrn one.
/'
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T 13 MR. BOHN:
It's ptr:Lctly analyst dependent if.,the y
14 sense that they look et a group of pieces of equipment and 15 they say, "Could these ' be af fected by a comdn cause?"'
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16 Typically the curren" state of the ard is'thdr worA primarilyl
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17 withiW systems.
That is, all the valves in one par icular t
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We1J don't they fail to develop i
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20 thpugh, when they look at that, the ultimate consequence of i
0.
those rare eventt?
They don't: fill out the cascage? 'And 21 p
22 therefore recognize that--
l t
23 MR. BOHN:
Not if your faltery structure is cor-I s
24-rect.
If it's done in sufficieAt 6.etail, the failure of this h
25 icined group of equipment will cascade on you.
]
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Heritoge Reporting Corporation i
i-7
46 I
MR. EBERSOLE:
It shouldn't show up.
O MR. BOHN:
For example, the problem with the boric 2
3 acid building up in the DCCS unit in a valve.
That was one 4
that showed up and its effects, of course, cascaded down.
It 5
could go as far as core damage.
That's a logic problem 6
rather than a data problem.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you think they handle the insu-8 lation--the inf requency component. by the severity--
9 MR. BOHN:
I think we imve responded more to things 10
-t we have become aware of.
It's not a predicted--
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Well,, one of the problems is we've 12 had a large numhar of'small event.s involving water getting 13 into air linea'.
They are inconsequential because they 14 caught it in tirac ' going ' against the other.
We won't see but e
If one of the big. events wherein the water gets into a large 16 number of air lirar, all at once.
You'll only see one of
.u
+
17 those.
But'we've got a high probability of getting water 18 into the air' lines.
Tne question is the PRA analyst pro-19 bably still views these as very limiting events because the i
l water didn't get vddy far in the experienced cases.
I don't 20 21 know how you treat'that at PRA.
"i 22 In 3,ther words, if you get water in the air line i
does the PRA say it goes throughout the system and here's 1
23
.i
!1 2& }
the"consequdnc.e7 j
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MF. DOHN:
- Fignt,
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a Heritage Report!ag Corporation I
(202) E,548A8
,9
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w 47
)
=1' MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
If I can comment on that right ip 2
now.
'As far as some of the re-analysis that's' going on on 2:/i o
3 Those four plants that are being studied, there is a sensi-
- }'
4-tivity; analysis being done making the assumption what if all
's
- the air valves did not operate and'go to their fail-safe-6.
p'osition- -
7:
MR ' MICHELSON:
What-if'they can't go'to their 8
fail-safe' position'in-many cases?.You'd better watch that 9
'close too.
Once the' water is in: the air line, they will not--
10 1 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:- That's-what I'm saying..What 11 if their fail-safe-position because'of, for. instance, water
'12-intrusion in the" airsyst'em.
Basically common causing.a 1
13 bunch of' air valves,.let's-say; all'at one time,.to see 14 whether that $ould comeLout'as' risk significant in the r
~
15 final results.
16' So again, I think as PRA evolves we are picking up 17 on'these things and we're beginning to handle them as best 18 we can.
In a lot of cases, we don't have the data for the 19 numbers or whatever, but I think, as you pointed out, PRA
'l 20.
is still very much in its infancy stages--
21 MR.EBERSOLE: Be very careful to also look at the 22 air-operated instruments and controls.
23 Until the Salem case, NRC literally forced the notion that zero potential would lead equipment to the safe 24 25 stage, you know, and then they found out the little matter of Heritage Reporting Corporation (mnu OY
48 I
having the margin of force on the breakers on being enough
-/3
\\/
2 and the grease and so forth stuck them up.
3 In your consideration, do you--I hope you don't (n')
4 blanket the notion that if you kill electrical power on i
5 spring-activated equipment it will always work right.
Or 6
do you?
Do you know what I mean?
When you deenergize equip-7 ment, that's the thesis that it will always work correctly.
8 It's not necessarily so.
And it took a long time for the 9
Salem breakers not to open.
10 MR. BUSTARD:
Our goal is to take a few of these 11 equipment operability issues and look at them in depth with 12 respect to their fragility and their failure modes, the en-ym the EQ issues that could impact them,
}
13 vironments they see, t
v 14 and it's at that stage in our process that that type of in-15 sight would come into play.
16 MR. KOLACZKOW5KI:
My name is Allen Kolaczkowski.
17 I go by Allen K.
for obvious reasons.
I work for Science 18 Applications International Corporation and we're basically 19 subcontracted by Sandia to provide really what's under the 20 first task that ?!oni talked about.
Some of the PRA and 21 related type of perspectives on this particular problem.
22
-)
For fear of having tomatoes thrown at me I guess
</
23 this morning, let me say that I'm one of those who does PRA.
24 And I have the same problems that basically the subcommittee OV 25 is having as well.
We in PRA-land recognize that we are not Heritage Reporting Corporation (mna...
49 1
handling EQ issues and severe environments, et cetera, very
/_ 'i J
2 well.
And so I'm very, very interested in this particular 3
study and that's why we have taken an active role in it.
,3 4
Because we recognize a lot of the shortcomings of the PRA 5
analysts right now and this is certainly one area where per-6 haps you can pull out some very valuable insights that can 1
7 help the PRA analysts do a better job at looking at the po-l l
I 8
tential consequences of accidents, et cetera.
So I fully i
9 support a lot of the discussions and the arguments that have 10 been brought out this morning already by the subcommittee.
11 Okay.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Before we go on, could I get one l
13 clarification.
The question of the seismic environment.
14 How are you treating that in terms of all these studies or--
15 MR. WYLIE:
It's in effective.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
Any seismic effects on equipment 17 as a common challenge is in the seismic resolution business 18 but I don't see all this nice thinking going on in the seis-19 mic area.
In fact, it's quite the opposite on a resolution 20 of what was an A-46. Is that the right one?
21 MR. WYLIE:
Yes.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
It's extremely rudimentary con-7,,
k/'
l 23 siderations of what happene when equipment, non-qualified f
24 equipment, fails and falls on the floor and so forth.
They
- n 25 won't even recognize the potential for water to cause a Heritage Reporting Corporation m usam
50 I
challenge to equipment and things of this sort.
At least
\\
2 you're addressing them all in words, although we'll see how l
3 well you do in practice, but I just wondered if you thought
l 4
.you were getting the seismic.
If you were, then I was--
5 MR. BUSTARD:
No, we're not.
If you go to like 6
10 CFR 5049, they have very clearly decoupled seismic qua-7 lifications.
8 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, how can the Agency, and you 9
can't address that, but the Agency can.
How can the Agency Ki ignore these kinds of questions in the case of A-46 and be I
11 focusing on them on carefully in this case?
You simply are 12 ignoring these phenonmenon A-46.
l 13 MR. SULLIVAN:
My name is Don Sullivan with the 14 Office of Research.
5049 was written to focus on electrical 15 because that was a particular problem.
We considered seis-16 mic to be a somewhat distinct problem which is covered under 17 other rules--well, let's say other guides such as Regulatory 18 Guide 1.100, so that covers--
19 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you happy in terms of our 20 seismic resolutions to allow water to fall on the floor and 21 not worry about where it runs to and what it does to equip-w 22 ment?.
(
)
w-23 MR. SULLIVAN:
I'm not happy--
l 24 MR. MICHELSON:
That's the way it would in 846.
t'h
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)
25 MR. SULLIVAN:
Well, I'm not happy with anything Heritage Reporting Corporation noo uun.
- _ - _ - - _ - ~
51 I
like that.
,_s
(
)
2 MR. MICHELSON:
I wasn't either, but that's what 3
is being done.
That was the resolution.
7'Y 4
MR. SULLIVAN:
Yes, but the two are somewhat separ-5 ate.
One is it's perfectly okay I believe to concentrate on 6
the electrical portion--I beg your pardon.
For the EQ por-7 tion.
That is one thing that we addressed.
Seismic is 8
something else.
Then where the coupling can come--I'm not 9
sure what NRR is enforcing or the specifics of the rules on 10 this, but it's the old question of do you type test two de-11 vices, two identical ~ devices--in other words, sharing the 12 loads.
That is put one in an autoclave.
Take one just like l
13 it.
Put it in the seismic in some laboratory and shake it 14 thereby sharing the type test load--before you take the one 15 and shake it first and then put it in the LOCA test--
16 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, you are getting away from my 17 question both ways.
18 MR. SULLIVAN:
I'm really trying to bring out the 19 union of the two of them, sir.
20 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm just trying to figure out--
21 the equipment--the environmental qualifications or seismic 22 considerations--pardon me.
Seismic is just another environ-73 L.,]
23 ment.
l l
l 24 MR. SULLIVAN:
That's correct.
l
/%i)
25 MR. MICHELSON:
And the same thought process that 1
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628 4888 m________.._
52 1
leads you through this pathway ought to be used for the
'J seismic case as well.
It's the same logical thought process 2
3 and the same considerations of system interactions or what-
's_ ')
4 ever.
And the effects of water during the seismic event 5
ought to be one of the considerations, but it's not.
6 MR. SULLIVAN:
Ideally what I hope would be--I 7
can't state for NRR, would be a single prototype, whatevcr 4
8 it is.
In terms of actual qualification.
Not in terms of--
9 well, in terms of actual qualification would be subjected 10 to all of the events, seismic and EQ in sequence.
11 Now, I'm just not certain right now the nuances of 12 the rules of what is required.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
When you say water during the seis-l 14 mic, do you mean--what do you mean?
It's water that might 15 Possibly be caused to appear by a seismic event.
16 MR. SULLIVAN:
Whatever is postulated in the de-17 sign basis.
The single prototype in my personal opinion 18 should be sabjected to all those environments in sequence 19 even though there may be two sets of standards.
One takes l
20 its prototype in a standard.
Take the same prototype, the 21 came piece of equipment.
But the other standard does it 22 in sequence.
fs L.))
23 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
Well, we're together.
It's l
24 just not the way it was done.
f3 25 MR. WYLIE:
You know, we've brought this up a
'~
Heritage Reporting Corporation om u..
53 l
1 number of times--
/,_ 1
~
2 MR. MICHELSON:
Oh, yeah, yeah.
3 MR. WYLIE:
And I'm not sure where we stand either.
k-4 Certainly elements of the staff that say we're going back and 5
take a look at that.
We need to find out where that is.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
That's just the pacifier to throw 7
you--
l 8
MR. WYLIE:
I don't think we can really pursue it l
9 here.
1 10 MR. MICHELSON:
No.
No, I just wondered--I just l
11 wanted to make sure that seismic wasn't a part of our dis-12 cussion today.
l 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let's see.
You are from SAI?
14 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
I have somewhat an understanding 16 of the resources at Sandia but nothing at all about SAI.
I 17 don't now whether it's got ten employees or 10,000.
What 18 are your resources besides yourself?
19 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Science Applications Inter-20 national Corporation is a primary consulting firm--primarily 21 actually defense-related work although about 30 percent of 22 the revenues of the company is Department of Energy, nuclear cs
\\~N 23 safety related, and about approaching now 7,000 employees, 24 multi offices across the United States.
/>
)
25 MR. MICHELSON:
Which one are you from?
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 42s.4ase
54 l
1 1
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Albuquerque,New Mexico.
Close
,,' \\
C/
2 to Sandia.
l 3
MR. EBERSOLE:
Close to Sandia.
Great.
7~\\
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4 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Okay. What I'm going to talk 5
about in this first task, which again is really looking at 6
this issue from the PRA perspective in terms of what does 7
PRA say?
It might be important.
But as you can see, or 8
will see in a moment, we're going to go beyond that, okay, 9
in this first task.
10 I'm going to briefly sort of outline the overview 11 of what the task is basically trying to accomplish.
We'll 12 go into some deal about the methodology and some of the re-l 13 sults that have come out.this far in terms of where the pro-14 gram is right now.
And then just briefly summarize that 15 information.
16 But first I'll talk about the task overview.
Again 17 basically what we're trying to do in this first part of the l
18 program is from somewhat of a PRA perspective result, al-19 though again, I'll point out--we'll go beyond that as you'll 20 see in a moment.
21 What equipment operations may be important which 22 could be impacted by a harsh environment?
That's basically r')
uj 23 what we're trying to determine.
And we are going to use 24 really a two-step process.
First what we're going to do is 7
'~
25 we are going to basically do a literature review and look at Heritage Reporting Corporation om.
_j
55
)
I I
1 what do the PRAs themselves as presently configured with
)
'~'
2 their current assumptions, et cetera, which we all recognize 3
have limitations.
What do they cay are equipment that is i
4 important or risk significant that we need to certainly fo-5 cus on.
But we recognized early in this study for the very 6
reasons that have been discussed here this morning that PRA 7
has a lot of limitations.
And has not handled very well 8
harsh environment effects on equipment reliability, et cetera, 9
So what equipment is coming out is important in the PRA may
'l 10 not in fact be a true picture.
And so we've gone further i
11 than that and taken another step which we're calling a for-12 malized process in which we basically go through a thinking j
13 process and you'll see how we do that a little later on in 14 the presentation--in which we're going to look at equipment 15 throughout the plant and we're going to assess in a generic 16 way under what kind of condition might that equipment need 17 to function, okay.
And is the equipment located in such a 18 place where it might see a harsh environment, and if so, 19 are those potential environments severe enough that it may 20 be in fact that equipment function may in fact be impacted.
21 But forgetting the PRA, doing it more from a top 22 down looking at the plant, its configuration, all the possi-br-23 ble accidents, et cetera, and we're going to show you how 24 we've done that.
,r 3 I' 'J 25 So we've done something beyond just what the PRAs Heritage Reporting Corporation m u.....
56 i
said. We're going to couple this altogether in order to get
._\\
i
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'~
2 this PRA and related perspective as to what might be impor-3 tant equipment which could be impacted by harsh environments.
4 With the ultimate goal being where might the PRA results be 5
affected by considering now EQ issues.
6 Now, I'm going to go basically into how we've done 7
that.
First let me talk about the literature review process.
8 And primarily what we did in the literature review was we 9
selected a representative set of PRA and related studies and 10 basically went through them to determine what are the in-11 sights that we can pull out of the existing PRA information.
12 Review those for the insights on what is the risk significant l
13 equipment, but some of the equipment that is important in a 14 PRA may not necessarily be impacted by harsh environments.
15 That is, it wouldn't be in an area where you would expect a 16 harsh environment to exist, okay.
l'1 And so as a result we've done some screening of 18 that equipment list and came up with a final list of things 19 that PRAs basically say are important and in fact a harsh 20 environment could exist for that equipment and hence the 21 reliability for that equipment as assumed in the PRA may not
-m 22 be correct.
)
,v 23 MR. EBERSOLE:
How are you going to pick up the 24 matter--you know, sometimes it's hard to forecast in the
/~N i
)
25 old industry if you are handling coal or dirt or filth or 1
Heritage Reporting Corporation
i 57 l
1 I
1 whatever you might go to inclosures on equipment which are J
i)
i 2
neoclassical or water tight and say, " Gee, I'm happy even if j
i 3
the fireman comes in to put out a fire and he dumps my equip-4 ment."
But then you may not put that in a PRA.
You might 5
have an old open contractor there.
Are you going to sponsor 6
that?
7 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Well, again, in the formalized 8
process we're trying to do some of the things that you are 9
talking about, Mr. Ebersole.
But if you consider things 10 such as dust, such as spraying down and, let's say, putting 11 out a fire in a room, et cetera, what you are going to find 12 is that basically every room, every piece of equipment, has 1
l 13 the potential of being in some sort of an adverse environment 14 and what ends up happening is the scope of this problem just 15 multiplies considerably.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, it would seem then, you know, n
that as a bottom line consideration we would say all equip-18 ment is going to have to be enclosed in something.
Like 19 dust tight or waterproof or something.
20 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Perhaps.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
And have a bottom line.
22 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
What we've done, as you'll see 7-)
(-
23 in a moment, we've tried to basically say, well, we recognize l
24 that that is a problem and it sounds certainly from the com-n 25 ments that have been made by the subcommittee this morning Heritage Reporting Corporation
<m3 uma
58 I
that that's a problem that the subcommittee definitely has
_.s
(
\\
2 a very strong interest in and it is one that we need to spend
)
'~'
3 more attention on.
We have addressed that as an area in
,m]
4 terms of all this other equipment that can be outside, far 5
away from the containment and still under certain conditions 6
see common cause adverse environments, be it dust, be it 7
smoke, so what have you?
A loss of HBAC, et cetera.
8 We have chosen, because of the size of that problem 9
to basically put it aside for the moment, saying, well, with 10 the limited resources we have we're going to focus on this I
11 aspect and I'll show you what that is.
But it sounds as 12 though maybe the subcommittee is making come strong sug-lg 13 gestions that perhaps we need to look harder at some of 14 these external types of things.
And maybe that's one of 15 the comments that will come out of this meeting.
1 don't 16 know.
17 Let me first talk about these set of studies that 18 we looked at and for sake of time, I will not go into these 19 in any detail, but let me just make a point that the studies 20 that we looked at are fairly recent and basically run the 21 gamut of NRC-related type programs such as the NUREG-ll50 22 effort, PRAs that are being done there, but also include such f~s
(-)
23 studies that are coming out of the industry side as this 24 particular one which was done by INSAT (?) that looked at p_
('~)
25 what equipment might be important and it turned out that it Heritcge Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4848
59 l
1 was an old boiler at Big Rock Point.
Also there's an EPRI I _ I v
2 study down here so again it sort of runs the gamut of both l
3 NRC and industry-related studies and some are actually PRAs p
'l 4
and others are studies on some of those PRAs to determine 5
what might be the important pieces of equipment in the power 6
plant.
7 So basically went through those and went through 8
the process of pulling out insights from those studies in 9
terms of what is important equipment in the plant and as I 10 mentioned we screened those for which ones might in fact have 11 a possible EQ significance.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Determining the risk significance l
13 you had to plug in some kind of reliability numbers and so 14 forth because what you are worried about is low reliability 15 equipment leading to a large consequence event.
16 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
But how could you plug in relia-18 bility numbers because--or how do you get the environment 19 now into it to see how the environment shifts in numbers?
20 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I'm going to get to that.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
Thank you, rs 22 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Basically when we were doing L) 23 this review, what we were doing was really two things.
We 24 were qualitatively considering the equipment location in
%-)
25 terms of the potential for seeing the harsh environment.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 624 4848
1-60 l.
That'is,. thinking about the. type of accidents that could u
2; occur, where the LOCA type breaks might be, et cetera.
We 3.
thought'about, well, where is this equipment typically lo-L
- 4-cated relative to'where these potential harsh environments 5
would.be.
And-recognize that some equipment,~yes, in cer-6:
tain~ accident situations would be required to function during 7
the accident in a harsh environment and others would be lo-8 cated'in,,let's say, auxiliary. buildings far away from the-9
' reactor. building'.and certainly the likelihood of a harsh
'10 environment.was-far less.
11 We considered that and we'also in terms of looking 12 atLthe.' actual potential'importance of-the equipment, we 13-evaluated it'on the basis.of really two importance measures._
14 Risk reduction importance'. measure land the risk' increase.
.15 '
And I'm sure most of you are' familiar with those, but.in-16
- summary,. basically what'you are dbin !when you are looking at 17 risk reduction is you are looking-at what if I were to assume 18
'that the equipment was tdtally reliable.
That is, the study
-19 of probability was zero.
If I could harden it, et cetera, 20
- such that it would always work, what sort of an impact woul6 21 that have on reducing the risk.
If that impact is large, 22:
it makes a strong suggestion for saying that equipment should 23 be hardened for these EQ types of environment because if-I 24 can really improve its reliability I can have a significant
-O' 25 impact on the overall core damage frequency or risk or Heritage Reporting Corporation mm-
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l-Al u -
1-
.whatever from.the power plant.
2-
.MR.:MICHELSON:
You took one piece of equipment 3
at: a. time L though to do this analysis.
4 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: ' Relative'to this'part and'the-5 literature review what we did was whatever was calculated
~
6 in the PRA or the study and most of the time.you are;right,
~
7 sir.
Most of the' time what they do is they look at one 8
piece of-equipment at a time.
That's one perspective'.. We-9 recognize'the shortcomings of that' perspective.
That what
~
10
-you need.to-do is take a whole bunch of MOBS all at once
'11 that are going to'see the same environment and do that same 12 calculation.
And.that's perhaps'more meaningful to,this 13 study.
14 But all we've.done~at this point relative to this 15 task,was whatever was done iri the' PRA or in the study which 16 for the most.part,is afsingle-component at-a time.
~
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me.ask.you a question.
Are 18 you looking at the PRAs in the context that they don't nor-19 mally look at the regressive effects of their failing and I
. 20 -
then compounding the problem by producing an environment-21 which is not predicted until the PRA on'it failed.
So the-22 case in point, if a valve didn't shut on a PRA study, 23 that's a new environmental problem, but the PRA doesn't know 24 that.
Do you follow me?
.O 25 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes, I understand.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 62s.4ess
62 I
I I
MR. EBERSOLE:
And so the PRA--you might even do
(' ')
2 a PI!A in the context of developing that environment.
"~
1 3
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is true.
)
,/ m i
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
And it might be a good thing to do.
5 And notably, you know, valves open if you have to stop liquid 6
flows.
That produces a new set of circumstances.
7 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's right.
And it could 8
very well--
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Some of the designs accommodate that.
10 I think Limerick, for instance, has deliberately designed 11 into its general features a capacity to relieve and vent 12 hypothetical valve failures.
It's a good way to go.
l 13 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Again, as PRA is evolving, some 14 of that is beginning to be handled, such as your venting con-15 cern where we talked about venting interacting, and in fact i
16 I'll address that when we get to one of the--
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, putting steam-powered equip-18 ment in its own slots which have an opening to atmosphere so 19 if it doesn't close out, it just doesn't destroy the electri-20 cal complement anyway.
21 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
We also looked at things with l
1 l
22
,3 a risk increase measure and that's just the opposite.
That
%.)
23 is, what if you make the assumption the equipment is 100 24 percent unreliable.
That is, it will always fail.
What is i
/'T 25 the impact on risk?
How much is it increased?
Or how much l
)
Heritage Reporting Corporation cm,mam
63 i
l l
1 is the core damage frequency perhaps increase?
j 2
MR. EBERSOLE:
In that case, did you fail every l
3 piece of equipment in the building that was unreliable?
l
'D
\\
4 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Again, whatever was reported in i
1 5
the PRA.
At this point, we're just doing a literature l
J 6
search.
We're not doing any of our calculations of our own l
1 7
yet at this phase.
Whatever was done in the PRA or in one 8
of those reports that I just put up on the screen.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
That's generally done one element 10 at a time.
i 11 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Quite often that is done one 12 element at a time and that is part of the problem of what 13 PRA is normally calculated.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you notice a long daisy chain of i,
15 functional adequacy that has to be maintained to get a single 16 result to be performed?
17 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Do you want to ask that again?
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do you notice how many things have 19 to be in series to accomplish a terminal action?
l 20 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Oh, yes.
{
(
l 21 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a hell of a lot.
)
22 MR. KOLACZKCWSKI:
1 understand.
Okay.
But even l
f-)
i O
23 with thone limitations that we all recognize, we did find 1
f.
24 some things that were rather risk significant even though it
,,_a 25 was a single item or a single collected set of items.
And Heritage Reporting Corporation
< m> u....
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l we can identify a related harsh environment with this parti-I
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2 cular failure.
For example, out of the NUREG-ll50 where one
{
l 3
of the analyses being done in that 1150 work is a PRA analy-l t'
i i
/
4 sis on Grand Gulf which is a BWR-6 Mark III design, and they 5
have a High Pressure Core Spray Pump which is located really 1
1 6
in its own cubicle in a building outside the containment 7
boundary.
And yet there are certain accident conditions in 8
which the water that the pump would be pumping, which would i
9 be coming from the suppression pool, a station blackout where 10 you are not cooling the containment and you are not cooling 11 the suppression pool, that water heats up, and this pump is 12 cooled by the very water that it's pumping, and ultimately l
13 you get in a situation where you are looking at, is this pump 14 going to continue to survive and keep cooling the core under 15 this condition of pulling this hot suppression full of water 16 out of the pool, and do you get seal breakdown?
Do you get 17 problems with the bearings, et cetera.
And PRAs are begin-18 ning to recognize that there is a limit to that.
19 Now, currently the way PRA handles it is they'll 20 assume that when it gets to some temperature and I think 21 lately that temperature is believed to be around 300 degree 22 F.
the pump is assumed basically to have its normal relia-gJ3 L
23 bility rate up to that point and then the PRA analyst fails 24 it after that point.
Just a step change.
(~)h k'
25 The PRA analyst recognizes that that's a very crude Heritage Reporting Corporation non u.4.=
w.
65' y
o.
l' approximation.
O:
.2' The point I-want to make is--or actually there are 3.
-twoipoints I want to make.
This is'an: example of where, as 4
Mr. Ebersole pointed out, it's not'so much the environment-5 that the pump.is in.
It's not the. ambient t'emperature.
Al-6 though', ? granted, that is going.up in this case too, because 7
. We' don't have room. cooling the station blackout..But it's 8
-this'particular failure mount'is more driven by the' internal.
9 offwhat: fluid is passing by the pump seals.
And the fact 10 -
.that that. water'is very hot.
Much hotter.than the pump is l
l 11 really normally expec'ted to handle.
But you then get, failure 12 of the seals. 'Now you:get water flashing the' steam.incthe 13-room,.et cetera, and the pump is then' assumed'to fail.
14 If.you look at that particular event--
15 MR. MICHELSON: LThat's'a; diesel-driven pump, isn't-16 it?
o 17 MR.. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's' correct.
18 MR. MICHELSON:.What is the jacket cooling water, i
19 -
do you know?~
20
'MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
It has its own service water 21 system.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
River Bend depended on the ' --
23 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is correct too.
That is 24 correct.
At Grand Gulf it is not.
It is independent.
It's 25 -
off the same diesel--
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 62sases
y,____----
66 i
MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, I think they picked River
,m 2
Bend too.
1 3
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
If you were to assume that this
/~
tV 4
thing was totally reliable, that is, we could harden this 5
pump so that that failure load would not occur, it would make 6
a significant reduction in the core damage frequency at Grand 7
Gulf as the current numbers exist in the 1150 analysis.
It j
8 would take the point estimate core damage frequency which is 1
9 about 3E-5 in the current version and it would reduce it by to that much.
In other words, about, what?
80 percent of it 11 or so.
Or 9 percent of it would go away.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
But that pump doesn't take away f'5 13 containment heat.
All it does is dump heat into the con-
~%-)
14 tainment and there's no containment. heat removal, and even-15 tually things are going to pile up in the containment.
And 16 you can't vent the containment because you'll use MPSH, so 17 you are going to a deadend.
18 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
If you take it all the way out 19 and the containment does fail, let's say, then there's some 20 new failure modes you need to consider, but you need to 21 address will this pump still survive that particular scenario 22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Doesn't it lose MPSH when you do es k) m 23 that?
24 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's been looked at.
I be-
-s k_#
25 lieve at Grand Gulf they believe that that is not a problem.
Heritage Reporting Corporation m u.<..s
67 1
MR. MICHELSON:
What's the vapor pressure of water
' ~ ' '
2 at 300 degree F.
3 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Well, granted you're going to get
\\'
4 a lot of boiling in the pool until the pool goes--the con-l 5
tainment goes to atmosphere and the pool goes to 212.
)
l 6
MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't know how you are sucking 7
water into that pump, but, boy--
8 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, the containment is at a very 9
high pressure.
Whatever vapor pressure of water at 300 10 degrees is, I don't recall offhand, but it's a pretty high 11 number.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
As long as it's closed it will j
13 pump, because--
)
14 MR. MICHELSON:
No, no.
It will blow the contain-15 ment before you ever get to the 300 perhaps.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, I don't know about that.
17 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I don't want to get into speci-18 fics of this particular failure mode.
19 The point I want to make--
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Oh, go ahead.
21 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
The point I want to make is 1
22 that it was recognized--well, with the amount of the litera-l
- 3
\\
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l s-23 ture review, as an example, was the fact that here was an EQ 24 related type of problem that in fact if we could show that l
fT I
'~'i 1
25 if we could do something to make this problem not exist, it Heritoge Reporting Corporation l
l (202) 62s 4ssa I
L _ _ _-_-__
68 I
could have potentially a very big impact on the risk.
\\
/
'~'
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you looking at the radiation 3
capability of those seals?
I recall at TMI 2 they were 4
afraid to pump on the pumps and they used a condenser 5
because in fact they had not designed the rubber seals on the 6
pumps to cope with radiation mode.
l 7
MR. BUSTARD:
When we get to that level of analysis 8
in this program, we're going to be looking at the fragility 9
levels for the various components.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Including radiation hardening?
11 MR. BUSTARD:
Right.
At this stage in the pro-12 gram we're simply trying to determine what is the list of l
13 significant PRA issues.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
You are in the severe accident en-15 vironment or approaching it there, aren't you?
16 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: Yes, in this case they are still 17 cooling the core and this is the pump that's doing it.
- Now, 18 what you are asking is, will it be able to keep cooling the 19 Core?
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, right.
With the containment 21 heating up.
22 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
With the containment heating up,
~
,3 b) 23 in the particular scenario that's of most interest.
24 Similarly for Peach Bottom there was an event q
25 called miscalibration of the low reactor pressure permissive Heritage Reporting Corporation i
om us m.
69 I
sensors.
These are sensors that basically allow or tell the
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s L.)
2 low-pressure injection valves that the pressure in the ves-3 sel is now low enough that you can now put in low pressure I :
4 cooling.
They are common to basically--there are four sen-5 sors I believe that are common to all the low-pressure in-6 jection valves.
7 Now, although the event in the particular PRA was 8
called miscalibration, you can argue, well, suppose that if 9
those pressure sensors failed because of some common EQ pro-10 blem in the reactor building, okay, that you would basically 11 see the same thing.
The sensors would fail.
12 If you assume that they fail with a probability of
(
13 1,
in certain environments, as opposed to their normal 14 failure probability, over all the sequences that are analyzed 15 in the Peach Bottom analysis currently, it would take the 16 existing point estimate core melt frequency of 80-6 and 17 increase it by that much, so a rather significant increase 18 in the core damage frequency.
19 If you were to take a failure probability in these 20 pressure sensors and make it go to 1.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
What happens is you open up the 22
,e y low pressure systems into high pressure conditions?
LJ 23 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
No.
What would happen is it 24 would not allow the low--
h '}
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, it wouldn't have a LOCA at all?
Horitage Reporting Corporation (202) 62s 4sse
70 l
1 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
And it's a rather subtle type 4
2 failure that would not be necessarily easily discovered by 3
the operator.
And it's also very hard to bypass, because
(,
'/
4 obviously you don't want to make it very easy to bypass this 5
signal of allowing low pressure systems to go into a high 6
pressure--
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
There's the other side of the coin.
8 It can fail and then admit high pressure to the low pressure 9
system and they will carry away, which is then compounded by l
10 equipment failures everywhere.
11 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is correct.
12 (Go to next page)
I 14 15 16 17 18 19 l
20 21 l )
l x-l 23 24
,~
25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 62s.4sse
1 I am only going to show one of these slides but there are s
2 multiples of that in your handout.
3 What we have done is summarize for you, in each of (l
4 the studies that was reviewed--basically the major insides that 5
were gained.
6 What I really want to pay attention to for just a 7
minute or two is the " Comment" column and, again, just really 8
re-address some of the things that have been being said already 9
said this morning.
10 And that is that in every one of these studies, which 11 are either a PRA, per se, or some sort of PPA related type 12 study.
What you often find is that the work is not complete 13 for purnoses of what we need to be looking at in the EO PRA l
14 Scoping Study.
15 For example, in in Numeric 1150 work, a lot of the 16 specific instrumentation, really down to the specific sensor, 17 specific circuit breakers, et cetera, are not being modeled, I
tg okay.
And, therefore, you can't pull out, just by looking 19 at that particular piece of work, EO related type of insides 20 on the instrumentation because it's not even in the model.
21 In some cases, things are only considered through an 22 element of core damage frecuency and not necessarily a]l the
,~
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23 way to risk and, as we have already pointed out as well, PRA l
f does not very well handle this bit about equipment, either 24 l
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potentially operating or not operating in harsh environment.
25 Acme Reporting Company l
l
- _.7 6.
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Another thing that has been pointed out by Dr.
k ~l Michelson is the fact that a lot of the PPAs when they have 2
3 calculated these risk reductions or risk increase measures M
x.J 4
have only calculated on a single component basis, for the most 5
part and not on multiple systems or mult5ple components across.
(;
the board and so the insights you can pull out of just the PPA' 4
is limited because of the limited amount of calculations 7
8 that have been done.
9 That's why we went on further and did the second part 10 of our process and let me describe basically how we did that, Oh, just before I do, let summarize some of the major ji issues which just came out of the 3iterature review.
In other 12 words, we're not doing any calculations yet, we're just taking 13 information that is out there and available and basically 34 15 saying, is there a list of eauipment, which seems to be risk significant and yet could be impacted by harsh environments.
1(i And some of the major things that did come put is 37 basically this list here.
You will notice that a lot of; it gg is inside containment, but not necessarily so.
Some of this jg stuff is not necessarily inside containment, but the PRBs 20 nd the black valves, I mean you need it for potentially feed 21 and bleed situation in PWRs and if you're in a small LOCA l
22 N._)
envir nment or something like that, where you've got steam 23 I
f entering the containment, the operator recognizes, cosh I've
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l operatiod, the q\\uestion becomes:
ill he he able to potentially 4 'i
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2 open the'PORVs, for instance, would be an exaLple?
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31 Doctor VN.'rsole, here's your BWR SRVs, okay.
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.Mn. EBENSOLE:
Great.
Now, let me ask you this.
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EBERSOLE:
The failure thereof.
15 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Pight.
gg MR. EBERSOLE:
But nevertheless, it resulted, I think 37 lowered environmental problem in that desich.
in a 18
! tWereupon, on the ether hand, the big track containments, gg all that junk is piled inside the containment and then you como 20 someboey made a grqs distake here as to.
21 t, 'ip o an argument,
" \\ thich side of the steel wall he decht bobeonanddowehave j_3 u Y t in front of our f ace and, :?n' '. see it, malpractice, in ths 23 t ought not to be.
f rm of putting equipment v{dev #
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MR. KOLACZKOWSKI, When we get to our final list, you O
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Okay.
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Well anyway again, this is an 3
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MR. MICHELSQ.V:
Most of that seems to be focused on L
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That's what I was going to say, tr
,39 and that is phyeithat's one of the reasons why we recognized
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If we could identify
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jwherh darsbj envir:er. ment s would occur, under conditions where
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t 17 tiime and time again, already this morning, with a lot of the i
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- 1 18 limitations, MPRA, et ceterd for handling ED problems, we r
.at we needed to.go beyond just the literature 19 recognize 20 review T:f tha~ PPA work and so ve went through a process to focus
,i
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21 onidentiihingrisksignificantequipmentwithEOpotential, s
22 FNtlookintbeyondjustwhat'siatheliteraturerightnow, l'
23 tiwt exists in the PPA world and that's with the second phase i
24 of Wis first task and let me jpst go through that.
s 25 MP. MICHELSON: When you deal with eauipment outside
/
l Acme Reporting Company
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~~.-3------_____----.__-_______-_______________,________
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75 1
of containment, in some cases you have to even dea' with 2
so called non qualified ecuipment.
3 When you start putting in reliability numbers for the
-.)
4 probabilities--or putting probability numbers for pipe breaks, 5
for instance.
How do you differentiate between a qualified 6
and a non qualified pipe in terms of probability of failure?
7 Do you give any credit at all for the fact or do you take a g
deficit for the fact that it's not cualified?
9 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
In the existing PPA world, in terms 10 of probability of a pipe breaking, I would say there is no distinction made.
33 12 MP. MICHELSON:
That's my understanding.
I have 13 yet to find a distinction made, as a matter of fact.
l MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I think, in part, that's because, 14 15 I don't think there's enough data out there to suggest what the difference would be.
16 17 3 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, because they don't break big Ig pipes very often.
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's right.
39 This is really a complicated diagram.
I'm not going 20 21 to go through it all right now, but I think when I take it in 22 pieces, you'll see kind of how this other formalization
'l process,what we went through.
23 Let me first talk about--the first thing we did was 24
}
we took 5 accidents, we took some very general categories and s'
25 Acme Reporting C o n,) a n y
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)
76 1
as we pointed out also this morning, the types of accidents 2
that can occur are many from just the normal transient and 3
responding to that to the design basis LOCA, to severe acci-4 dents, et cetera and we recognize we had this great big problen 5
to deal with and was there some way that we could categorize 1
6 those into groups to kind of get a handle on the types of accidents that could occur, 7
MR. MICHF,LSON:
Now wait a minute, you're going to g
9 flip that real quick.
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: Okay.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
When you define accident categories,
);
are you including non design basis kinds of things as well as 12 so called design basis?
l 13 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
So yours is a complete thought 15 16 process, all possibilities.
MP. KOLACZKOWSKI: Up to and including the design 17 basis and actually going beyond into the severe accident jg world.
l 39 l
I MR. BUSTAFD:
For example, venting of the VWR con-20 tainment into the reactor room is included in this thought pro.-
21 cess and as you will see in a few moments--
22 t
/
MR. MICHELSON:
But you're not coing to go and include 23 f
the seismic, the fire as part of what you're try i.ng to do?
f 24 t
t8
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25 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's correct.
Acme Reporting Company a
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5 77 1
MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
(' ')
2 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Let me show you how we did 3
categorize accidents.
k) 4 As Dr. Ebersole also pointed out this morning, he 5
said, you know, this equipment has to work so that things don't G
get worse and that was sort of our thought procers as well.
7 What we did was we put all those types of accidents 8
and we lumped them into these and actually there was a fifth 9
and I'm going to come back to what that fifth was in just a 10 moment.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
When I saw that, I got a lot of 12 questions.
I think you mean " vessel and core".
l 13 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes, really, that is true, that is 14 correct.
15 We would like to look at these 4 categories and 16 first of all we said there are sets of accidents in which--
17 what we want to do is we want certain equipment to operate, 18 to make su e that the accident does not go beyond having the 19 containment cooled and having the core, the vessel et cetera i
1 20 cool.
21 In other words, a successful response to whatever
~
22 initiator might occur, he it simply a turbine trip and what
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have occurred inside the containment and we need certain
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3 containment is cooled and its integrity is maintained and also that the reactor core and the vessel is properly cooled and 4
5 so there is no damage to fuel.
MR. MICHELSON:
Well, in doing this kind of an analysi s, 6
say a question of containment and whether it failed, do you go 7
back and look at the containment ventilation valves to see if 8
the operators are operating them normally open or not and 9
then to put in the probability of closure under the accident 10 conditions for which no tests have ever been done and all that, 13 do you do that?
12 I
MR. BUSTARD:
At this stage in the scoping studies, 13 no.
14 MR. MICHELSON: So how do you decide whether contain-15 ment has failed or not?
You don't even know if the contain-16 ment is already open at the time of the accident.
37 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Okay.
We're not saying whether 18 or not it is, we're saying, for instance, in the very case H) where if the containment was already open for some reason, and 20 it would not work and did not close, that would come under the 21 next category.
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I just wondered though when you 23 l
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PRA people do.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
I have yet to find them doing it, but 3
I assume they do and they know the probability that the valve 4
5 will be open which, in some cases, is unity, because some utilities still operate with those valves partially open, at 6
least all the time on PWRs.
7 Do they go back and understand that containment isn't g
9 always buttoned up.
MR. BUSTARD: I think what you have to remember is 10 that we're trying to identify a broad list of issues here 33 and then we're going ot go into each--
12 MR. MICHELSON:
But what you do is you draw some broad l
13 14 conclusions at the beginning though based on these rather 15 broad scoping views and you forget there's a whole set of 16 issues that weren't exposed by this kind of an analysis such 17 as the proverbial closing ventilation valves that are open.
18 It doesn't even show up because you never failed a containment 19 for many of your scenarios.
20 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
No, no.
We recognize that in 21 order to keep the containment cool and to maintain its integri ty, 22 one of the things that will come out of this is the fact that
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They 24 were already open, and that will come out in our thinking 7
25 process for that cateogry of accidents.
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O MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
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2 MR. EBERSOLE:
This is really the consequence list, l
3 isn't it?
You've had some kind of an accident in which--
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MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
We've had at least some kind of an 4
initiator--
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Maybe it's a fire.
6 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes, or whatever, and the plant 7
8 is responding to that.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
And really in the long run, it was a non accident.
10 q
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
In this case, it ended up beina a 33 n n accident.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
But nevertheless, it was a severe l
13 event?
34 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: That is correct. And what we're 15 16 g ing to do, as you will see as we go through this process, we're going to identify what equipment maybe had to be called 37 upon to make sure the accident didn't get any worse than this 18 first stage.
39 MR. EBERSOLE: That might have been--
20 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Where was that equipment?
It could 21 have been in a harsh environment, therefore the reliability 22
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MR. EBERSOLE:
As a case in point, that could be a 25 f
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7
,j MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: Yes.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
And you caught it before--the thermal l
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storage capacity saved the day.
4 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's correct.
5 g
MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
7 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
There's another set of accidents though in whi'h the containment is either failed and I use c
8 9
that in the broad term or it's ended.
Okay.
MP. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
10 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
In which now, in that accident, 3g 12 you know the reactor vessel and the core is being cooled.
We l
13 may be introducing steam outside the containment boundary, as a for instance, and therefore now some of that equipment 14 15 that we're calling upon to keep the vessel cool and perhaps 16 try to save the containment in terms of washing out potential 17 fission products or dropping out the steam or whatever, taking gg care of the problem.
i MR. EBERSOLE:
Would that be a successful--
39 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Now that steam is going into areas 20 21 where that equipment actually exists.
MR. EBERSOLE:
Could that he a successful LorA 22 mitigation?
23 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes, it could.
24 r3 j
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MR. EBERSOLE:
And now you have to deal with a 25 Acme Reporting Company 1204) f> 2 tl d e fl H
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reguletic discharge through a LOCA containment with modest s
i 2
core damage.
That can be a severe--
3 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's possible.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: It can be severe in source terms--
l 5
MR. KOLALZKOWSKI:
That's possible.
6 MR. FBERSOLE:
That can be severe source term in 7
both the reactability as well as the operating environment.
8 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Thnt's possible.
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Although you don't have to severe 10 core damage.
ji MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes, that's true.
I mean you are 12 going to get--you could potentially get gas releases and that l
13 kind of stuff--
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
15 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
--depending on how much fuel has 16 failed.
17 So now we're looking at somethina a little beyond this first case and recognizing that now the environment 18 can spread to other locations outside the containment.
We're 19 20 going to look at that equipment now and recognize that there 21 is some other equipment, not just within the containment 22 boundary, but now can see a harsh environment potential.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
So that could be a post LOCA?
33 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes or it could be he successful 24
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response to a transient whereby we had lost containment cooling
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25 Acme Reporting Company
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and we had to vent in order to save the containment.
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2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
3 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
And now we're asking survivability 3
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4 of that core cooling equipment that is out there in the reactor x
5 building.
Is it still going to be able to operate and cool the 6
core.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
You may have a chance now to open the 8
difficult question of how much radiation release can you 9
deliberately release witnin a worse release.
10 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I don't want to address that.
11 MR. MICIIELSON : That equation cannot be worked out.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
It has to be worked out.
13 MR. WYLIE:
Ilow much time does it take to go through 14 this if we keep quiet?
15 MR. KOLAC Z K'.0FS K I :
15 minutes.
16 MR. WYLIE: Okay, let's go.
17 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Okay.
Two other classes of acci-18 dents. The containment is cool but the vessel has failed.
I 19 Now you're introducing a lot of radiation potentially, let's j
20 say at least, in the realms of where the equipment is in the
)
21 containment, it's now going to potentially have to operate in 22 a high radiation atmosphere as well as all the other problems i
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v 23 associated with losing the core in terms of steam and hydrogen 24 production and hydrogen burns and what have you.
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I 25 Then you have this case, a very severe accident where l
Acme Reporting Company an un.u.
8
84 1
we lose both the containment and the reactor vessel.
Now the 2
equipment that we're really asking to still work is sort of 3
mitigative in nature.
Can we wash out the fission products, 4
can we make the sprays work even though the containment has 5
failed to at least somewhat knock down the potential source o
term.
7 Let me just point out, we did have another category 8
here and that was accidents that happened sort of external in 9
all these rooms, that is a flood happens out in the service 10 water building or there's a fire or whatever and that's when we started to begin to look at some of these other types of--
33 let's call them external events, that are external really to l
12 the containment boundary et cetera and that class, as I pointed l
13 out earlier, was so large in terms of basically what we said 34 15 was equipment anywhere could potentially have to operate in a high temperature environemtn because of a fire in the room or 16 high smoke or a flood or a steam break in the HPSI pump room 17 or something like that and that became such a large category 18 of equipment that we felt it, well we'll go ahead and focus on 39 this set first and then if there is time and resources, if 20 felt there was an important need, we'll look at this fifth we 21 category of things that are far from' the containment boundary but, 22 in fact, may still have to operate just because of loss of 23 ATH--HVAC eauipment, for instance, et cetera, 24 rm
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So we did recognize that fifth category that a lot of 25 Acme Reporting Company Dr b d b 4 f1 H H E________
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you gentlemen have been bringing up this morning, but it t
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represented such a large set of problems that we thought, well, 2
we'll focus on this set first.
3
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MR. FBERSOLE:
Well that's it, it only led to these 4
eventually or didn't amount to anything.
5 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is true, that is true.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
So it's really a difference of the 7
i source of the accident.
8 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: Okay, we have this broad classi-g fication of accidents.
What we're going to do is--now also broadly break up the plant into specific environmental boundaries and that was done using this set.
as cally broke up the plant into 4 major 13 environmental boundaries, okay.
That is one would be the environment inside the primary boundary and is there equipment g
inside the primary boundary or which pulls, let's say, water g
from the inside of that boundary, which would have an affect 37 ig potentially on the operability of the equipment, such as in core thermal couples, for example.
39 20 Inside the primary containment, inside the reactor 21 building and inside other auxiliary buildings, so we have broken up the plant now into sort of 4 major environmental 22 I I w/
23 areas, okay and we're going to look at the equipment in each one of those areas felative to those four accident categories 2-1
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I discussed previously.
25 Acme Reporting Company 1202 6/H 4h08
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Okay, we have a definition for accident categories; i
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we have a definition of sort of how we're goina to break up th e 2
3 plant for looking at this equipment, Now, it's listed r~,,
tj quipment that's important to safety for each one of those 4
5 accident categories and I am only going to show an example 6
this morning--let me just say, when we did this, we based it on a number of factors in order to find what equipment are we 7
g going to call upon to keep each one of those accident categories 9
w.ithin that particular category.
10 It was based on looking at the Emergency Procedure 11 Guidelines in terms of what is the operator basically told 12 he needs to basically bring on line in response to a situation 13 He needs to have this system working.
He's looked--when he l
sees this indication, he is supposed to take action a, b or 34 15 c or it obviously means he needs the indicator to be working 16 properly and then he also needs that particular piece of equip.-
ment to be working properly in order to carry through that 17 33 particular operation.
So we went through the Emergency Procedure Guidelines 39 nd pulled out what equipment is the plant going to call upon 20 to respond to these various accident cateogries.
21 We coupled that with just our, you know, general nn
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pl nt knowledge from a PRA perspective and, well again, really 23 pr vided a PRA perspective on what equipment is likely to be 24 r'i called upon in certain accident situations 25 Acme Reporting Company m.,
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l 87 MR. MICHELSON:
EPGs don't generally tell you much 7
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beyond the design basis.
They're tailored to respond to 2
design basis accidents, not the severe accidents.
3
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MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's true and that's why we--
4 MR. MICHELSON:
It's very vague on severe accidents.
5 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
We had to use more than that and 6
go into some other knowledae.
7 MR. MICHELSON:
In fact, they're going to get very 8'
little from that, in terms of looking at containment failure g
and so forth, which is the listing of things you wanted to 10 do.
11 12 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Let me just give an example.
13 For the category of, basically a successful mitiga-l tion of a normal initiating event or perhaps all the way up 34 15 to and including a design basis LOCA, where we successfully cooled the containment, maintain its integrity and also gg 17 successfully cool the reactor core.
There is still a variety of systems, this happens to 18 be a list for a boiler, there's a variety of systems and/or 39 indications that may he called upon to mitigate the event 20 so that the accident does not become worse than this.
21 For instance, you're going to call on some sort of 22 s \\
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standing function.
The operator may want to be looking at 23 24 rod position indication as a means to tell him that, yes, in I
25 fact, the reactor has SCRAM.
Acme Reporting Company l a' O l t f> 2 6 4 R H B
ll, 88 There are a whole lot of other plant indications y
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which I won't get into.
There's a whole list of those.
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call upon Stand by Liquid Control System to operate,to make sure 4
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this BORON system to be working, et cetera, g
I won't go through this entire list, but basically out g
of the process, what was done for each category, is lifted the g
potential equipment that might be called upon, it might have g
to function in this situation in order to maintain the accident 12 at this category and not let it get any worse.
g MR. EBERSOLE:
That represents one plant, one boiler, 14 in fact, doesn't it?
15 The list came, of course, pri-MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
16 marily, it was based on one boiler, but we tried to look at typical boiler design.9 include that as representative o#
jg what this list nicht, in fact, be.
39 I guess, if you ' re speakinn about, iusr for instance, 20 that we don't have like isolation condensor on there, and in the 21 22 old boilers, that would be on the slit.
fn.,
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, for instance, there's no 23 PRVs on there, so it's not a PWR.
24 U
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
No, this is a boiler.
25 Acme Reporting Company
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MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a boiler, s/
MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: This is a boiler, but there is 2
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
4 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
And then you got a whole variety 5
G f high pressure cooling systems that are going to have to 7
potentially work low pressure cooling systems, potentially compensating feed water if you're trying to get that back to 8
save the accident.
9 There are a number of dry well systems, coolers and 10 fans, there's containment isolation valves.
33 MR. EBERSOLE:
There are several water systems that 12 are not on there.
l 13 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Well emergency service water is here.
34 RHR service wa ter for RHR heat exchangers is here.
Potentially 15 fire w ter even, this is service water, normal plant service 16 water could be a potential.
37 MR. EBERSOLE:
An item that may be up there any may 3g 19 not and I think it's open to a little investigation.
The 20 staff has told us that all boilers, they think, have provisions 21 for venting in place, bu t they don ' t kr.-
> whether they'll work 22 or not and whether the operators will, in fact, use one, but
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23 the picture we get is that all boilers, they think, ought 24 to have a capacity to vent the dry well.
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t 25 While, in fact, I think we have got to go to the Acme Reporting Company 6202b 6th 4H88
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individual regions and plants to find out what, in fact, exists.
2 So, I don't see anything up there, in this context, that would
_/
3 make you believe you can vent.
L MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Well actually, as part of this 4
isolation valve, not only is it--not only would they potentially 5
6 be called upon to isolate the containment, but they might be called upon to then be reopened irl order to vent the contain-s 7
ment.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well the fact of life is, I don't 9
think you're going to get any solid information as to what, in
]
10 a general context, is there.
You got to go almost to the 3g pl nt to find out.
12 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is true, that is true.
33 MR. M I C IIE L S O N :
Only a suggestion, but there is a g
very definite definition of important to safety and a lot of 15 these items are not important to safety, 16 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That is correct.
g MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
You ought to be careful in 3g labeling because some people up and wonder if you're expanding g
20 the scope of "important to safety," beyond the realm of its 21 meaning.
~3 23 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Well, we're certainly not trying
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23 to do that, but what we are trying to do is recognize that the 24 plant, in reality is going to call uron ecuipment more than that.
2T, MR. MICHELSON:
I know what you're doing.
I just want Acme Reporting Company
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91 to caution you that you ought to chose other words.
"Important 1
b,m to safety," is a word you never chose unless you mean it and 2
there is a regulatory definition for it.
3 MR. KOLACZKONSKI:
Okay. If we now have the accident 4
5 categories broadly defined in these 4 categories and we have 6
broken up the plant into 4 major environmental areas and we 7
have a feeling for each one of those accident categories 8
as to the equipment that might be called upon to mitigate the event and maintain the event within that category, we now need 9
to look at what kinds of environment would potentially occur 10 11 where might they occur for each one of these accident cate-12 gories.
13 And, we have done that, again in a very qualitative 14 sense for purposes of the Scoping Study.
It is based on 15 existing thermal hydraulic code predictions.
Previous studies 16 we did alert research, operational experience et cetera and le 17 me try to just take you through one of these.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
Apparently, you're making some kind i
19 of assumption about the effectiveness of boundaries, so you're drawing boundaries at the auxilliary building and so forth.
20 is your assumption about the effective of a boundary when
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you talk about the environment in one area versus the other 22 G
23 areas of the building.
whatever, you 21 There may doorways between the areas,
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25 don't know.
Acme Reporting Company
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MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
There is no real assumption becuasc 7
2 if the boundaries work--the boundaries as we defined them, if 3
they were to be breached, you would just go from one accident kj' 4
category to the next one.
5 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, but how do you know the boundary 6
won't be breached, particularly when you get out into the 7
auxilliary building and we know those are not necessarily 8
hardened boundaries.
There are doorways and all the other 9
things.
They're not intended to be environmental boundaries.
10 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
No, but in the category where--
31 okay, you're talking about the auxilliary building.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Particularly if you're talking about l
13 elevating the pressure at all, you open doors, so it takes a 14 fraction of a pound pressure to open doors, swinging doors 15 particularly, so yaa can' t draw a boundary in one place.
If 16 you release steam in one area, how far does the steam go in 17 other words?
I think you're assuming that it goes out to the 18 perimeter of the boundary you defined.
19 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Within each category, yes--within 20 each category.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
And it really may well go beyond the 22 perineter of that boundary depending on what the release is y3J 23 unless you're assured that these boundaries are all hardened 24 against elevated pressure, temperature and whatever.
)
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
That particular case at Browns Ferry,
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the steam release, I think it might invade all three units.
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MR. MICHELSON:
That's right.
In some cases it will 2
3 go beyond the boundary of the particular plant unit even.
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4 MR. EBERSOLE:
What are those Roman Numerals, what 5
do they mean?
6 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Okay, let me just take you through 7
this very quickly.
This may be one example.
Let's take, for 8
instance, the design basis LOCA scenario and suppose we have 9
a design basis LOCA inside the containment and yet we're 10 1 oking at accident category in which the containment is okay, gi that is we properly cooled the containment, we maintain its 12 integrity and we successfully mitigate the LOCA and reflood the core and therefore cool the core and cool the vessel and l
13 we don't get any significant fuel damage.
Okay.
34 15 Which is our Accident Category Number 1, as we defined in an earlier slide.
Okay.
16 These Roman Numerals, each one is for those environ-37 l
mental boundaries that we talked about.
Roman Numeral I is j
18 l
within the primary system itself.
Foman Numeral II is inside
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ig containment, et cetera.
20 j
MR. EBERSOLE:
You define it on a later slide.
21 22 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
III is reactor building and IV l
73 V
23 is the aux buildings.
Okay.
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24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, it's on the next slide.
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25 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
And what we did was, we said, okay,
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1 in a typical accident of that type, of this accident category, I
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where would we expect the harsh environments to most likely 3
occur and if you look at Category I, which is inside the pri-J 4
mary system, now remember, we're successfully cooling the core and the containment in this case and these are--down at the 5
o bottom of the slide, you see the types of enviivaments that we 7
considered.
8 In the case of within the primary system, we did 9
recognize that during the initial blow down, let's say in this 10 design basis LOCA event, we might get some sort of mechanical shocks of equipment inside the vessel interms of the thermal 11 12 couples that are in there, et cetera.
Okay.
So we recognize there was potential for vibration or mechanical shock problems 13 of any equipment that we might be calling upon to mitigate thi s 14 15 accident and that equipment was one of the previous lists that I have just showed.
16 That equipment might see a mechanical or shock type 37 18 problem.
Now, within the containment for this event, we're 19 certainly going to expect to see elevated temperatures, 20 elevated pressures, potentially mechanical shock problems 21 on some equipment, depending on where the steam is, in fact, 22 impinging and actually we made impingment as a separate cate-
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23 gory.
24 We're certainly goina to see high humidity.
Okay.
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25 But for this class where the containment is maintained and the Acme Reporting Company n s., n
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1 MR. EBERSOLE:
Isn't there some designs called the q
2 reactor building as encompassing the auxilliary building equip-I l
3 ment, do they not?
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4 MR, KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
Sometimes the terms are a 5
little bit misleading.
The reactor building, in this case, 6
is more typical of the boiler reactor building that surrounds 7
the dry well and in the PWR, usually the equipment is over 8
in these auxilliary buildings.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
What did you do about the intake 10 building?
11 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That was out--that would be one of 12 these, that would be considered as out in Region IV.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
I know they're auxilliary buildings, l
14 right.
15 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That would be considered out in 16 Region IV.
17 MR. DEY:
Alan, why don't you try and highlight 18 the slides and wrap it up soon.
19 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
All right.
Let me just say that 20 we then had to understand where the equipment relative to thos e
21 4 locations, that is the primary system are within the contain-22 ment, et cetera, and what we did, for each one of those, that 23 list of equipment that you saw back on this slide--let me just 24 point it out.
In each accident category where we had listed the 25 Acme Reporting Company (2021 626 48H6
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Primary vessel is cooled, we would not normally expect to see I
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any sort of harsh environment out in the reactor building or
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2 out in the auxilliary buildings.
3 Now that's not to say they can't occur and I think
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4 5
this brings in some of the systems interaction problem that 6
you discussed and I think if we tried to consider those, we 7
might identify that maybr at the same time, we could get some i
harsh environments out here as well, but if we look at the nor--
8 mal sort of transient situation or in this case, design basis 9
LOCA situation, we would expect the harsh environments to 10 ij preferentially occur in these two areas and not so much in these two areas.
Okay.
12 13 Whereas, if we lock at the next category of contain-l ment breach, but the primary vessel okay, such as venting the 14 15 containment, okay, in order to basically save it or perhaps the 16 containment has, in fact, failed.
Not only will we expect the harsh environments in these first two regions, that is within bhe 17 we're now also going 18 primary system or within the containment, to get elevated conditions out in the reactor building which 19 is environmental area Number 3 and so the equipment--on our 20 21 Equipment List that is out in this location is now going to start seeing these kinds of environments that it needs to func-cw 22 t
tion in in order to maintain that primary vessel as okay.
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23 And, we did that for all the accident categories--the 34 i
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4 accident categories that we looked at.
25 Acme Reporting Company
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potential equipment with which we may have to mitigate that g
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equipment was typically located and here's an example of the q
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4 emergency service water that Dr. Ebersole was asking about 5
where a lot of the cquipment is going to be located more out 6
in these outer regions rather than in the inner regions and 7
this is just the nomenclature, tanks, sensors, et cetera, et 8
cetera.
9 We went through that process and now we know where 10 the equipment is.
- Okay, f
11 If you put that altogether, you say if I look at each 12 of the accident categories, what equipment has to respond, 13 where that equipment is located and have an idea on where the l
harsh environments might exist.
14 15 I can then look at, is the equipment going to have to 16 function, to respond to this particular accident.
IIere 's an 17 example of one that we, for instance, threw away and said it ig wasn't important, elr:trical, mechanical SCRAM functions and associated with it, perhaps rod position indications.
19
.Most of the stuff that really does disfunction is 20 21 located out in Regions I and II, I mean the rods are out there the rods have to go inside the primary system, et cetera.
22 g-v)
Basically the functions that place the reactor in 23 sub critical safe condition, we said no EO issues are evident, 24
('h
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7/
98 1
significant EQ environment.
That is, one of the first things l
10 2
that happens in most of these situations is the reactor trips.
3 That is happening so early in the accident we couldn't see I)
(>
4 where the environment would get so bad as to affect the equip-5 ment reliability as a result of that accident before the time 6
'the function had actually occurred.
7 Whereas, if you look at this second case, that is the 8
level in pressure detector piping.
9 Doctor Ebersole talked about the piping in the 10 boilers that comes out of the primary system, eventually pene-11 trates the containment wall and the sensors are outside the 12 dry well.
[N 13 What we reocgnized was that in certain situations,
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14 particularly when the vessel is depressurized and yet the 15 containment is heating up, you can get flashing of the referenc e 16 lags, et cetera, in that vessel instrumentation piping.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me give you a particular case in 18 point:
There are some boilers which I am shocked to find still 19 have loop isolation systems, so you don't dump the water on the 20 floor, but rather dump it into the reactors.
Those things are 21 piloted by sophisticated and delicate transient pressure in-dicators with a whole host of impulse lines that are wrapped 22 uj around the very pipes that are going to break.
23 So the accident kills the function of the mitiaating 24 I
25 equipment, it's degenerated.
They're still in operation and I Acme Reporting Company (2U/ 3 6/H 4BHH
99 1
ask you therefore to look at the dynamic effects on impulse 2
lines inside the boiler, at dry wells and you're going to find 3
you're going to have them all over in certain accidents.
,/-1#
4 They're going to be blown away and you may have thought you 5
had to operate in the first one second, but they won't be 6
there.
7 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Okay.
That latter example I showed 8
was a case where it's really more a mechanical problem or D
thermal hydraulic problem, but because they're going to 7et 10 flashing of those reference legs, you could make the instru-11 ments read wrong, so there's another case of it's not so much 12 the ambient that the sensor is actually in, but it's the fact 13 that the liquid that it is using, the process that it is l
14 using is in fact the problem.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well then you will look at the genera-16 tion of all signals rather than loss of signals as well.
17 You'll look at generation of all signals.
If you lose an 18 impulse line, it may say I got a high level and I'm safe when, 19 in fact, I've got a small LOCA and I don't know it.
20 MR. MICIIELSON :
Well, I thought when you assured me 21 carlier you were looking at such things, I was going back to 22 your Example A on the previous slide where you said there's a es s C/
23 non problem of environment on the SCRAM valves.
24 There is a problem of environment, but it's a different 25 kind.
It's either the voltage environment in which it operates,
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Acme Reporting Company
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how the over voltage affects or water getting into the air
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2 lines which will also affect the ability to SCRAM.
3 MR. KOLACZKOWSFI:
That's right.
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4 MR. MICHELSON:
Now, are those kinds of tidngs a part h
5 of your study or aren't they. If they are, then why aren't 6
they highlighted here when you say there's no EO problems 7
with SCRAM valves.
8 MR. DEY:
Well it's not part of this part of the 9
study, but I think Larry may--
10 MR. MICHELSON:
Will you pick it up later in some other 11 study?
12 MR. BUSTARD:
We can pick it up--let me put it this t
(' ')N 13 way.
There's two ways to look at it.
First of all if'what
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y 14 you're talking about, let's say water in the air line, is 15 something that occurs during normal operation and would snow 16 up in the normal operation reliability and data base.
j l
17 MR. MICHELSON:
Why won't it?
l 18 MR. BUSTARD:
Well, what Alan is saying is that what 19 we're comparing against.
Do we have an environment that can 20 change our normal--a harsh environment that can create 21 reliability--
g-22 MR. MICHELSON:
Is over voltage considered a change N 3-I
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in environment or is that something else, for instance?
23 24 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
I think--I would like to suggest
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MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
But air--water in the air
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valves.
5 MR. BUSTARD:
Right.
6 MR. MICllELSON:
Somebody else is g]ing to handle the
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Right.
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9 MR. MICHFsLSON : l'kay.
s 10 MR. KOLMZKOWSKI:
This will be my last slide.
It 11 really do'es summarize.
12 Ilaving gone through this process now of basically la just trying to think about accidents in general, breaking up 14 the plant into some general boundaries, try to say typically 15 where is the equipment located, might the eqdpment have to
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What comes out of thinking a!.out this problem in using that 18 l l
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i 20 out of the RA studies, let's put that list together and whmt i' 21 do we come up with.
22 And this is the current list of issues that we have n
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so if you 1 o'i at tha, PWR list, you do start seeing a lot of p.
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.histrumentation, feed generator level detectors, j.
9 temperature vising of the primary RTD, et cetera.
A lot of 10 instrumentation where the sensors are physically inside the 11 containment, you're going to have to continue to function in 12 order to give the operator an indication of the status of the l
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13 accident, et cetera.
k_ Tv) 14 MR. EBERSOLE: Unfortunately they are also inside for 15 the new boilers, but not the old one.
16 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
The boilers, again, there are some 17 instrumentation, but you also see things like, we talked about 18 the reference leg piping problems.
Here it is again, the SRVs 19 and the AVS valvues--
j 1
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Where you say SRV manual, it ought to 21 be mautal pneumatic electric because it's not truly manuai.
22 MP. KOLACZKOWSKI:
That's true, and we recognize
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23 that.
24 Again, containment isolation valves do occur in both 25 lists and--
Acme Reporting Company s 2t:2 n 6264988
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MR. MICHELSON: Yoa're thinking of Mark III's as well 7
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as Mark I's and II's, aren't you?
3 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI:
Yes.
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MR. MICHELSON: They put a lot of instrumentation back 4
5 inside the containment on Mark II's.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think that was a regressive act on 7
their part.
g MR. MICHELSON:
Well whatever, it is in the scope.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
MR. KOLACAKOWSKI:
We don't what to say, at this point 10 that this list is by any means complete, but we think that 11 12 having gone through this literature search and formal pro-13 cess, and thinking about accidents in general, as a process thet l
14 I have tried to illustrate here, we have come up with what we 15 think is a reasonable broad list of equipment items that are 16 on there that relate to operations.
17 I can be potentially very significant and, in fact, 18 we can identify accident scenarios in which this equipment is 19 going to continue to operate in some sort of a harsh environ-20 ment.
21 That concludes my remarks unless there are other 22 questions.
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Well, let's take a 10 minute break.
f 1
24 (A short recess was taken)
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\\~l MR. WYLIE:
Let's get started again then.
Who is 25 Acme Reporting Company 920d6 f>25 48B8 L__
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next?
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MR. BUSTARD:
I am.
3 The handouts that you have does not include the
(~)/
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4 first vu-graph I have put up because I have already shown 5
this to you in a previous handout.
I thought that I would 6
mention it once more.
1 7
As I said in my practical approach introduction, 8
this project is taking the approach that from a probabilistic 9
risk assessment standpoint, we tried to define what is the 10 risk significance of certain equipment functions.
11 From an equipment operability standpoint, we tried to 12 define what is the impact on various equipment qualification
(~ N 13 issues on equipment function.
g We also tried to got a feel for whether the PRA people 14 15 are missing issues or not by using other techniques.
What I want to focus on right now is an example of 16 17 trying to put this stuff together, that we're mid way through 18 doing for containment fans.
So a couple of things to keep in mind, as we go throuah 39 20 this is, first of all, we're still in the process of doing it and secondly since this is an EQ Risk Scoping Study that has l
21 to look at numerous issues, we can't necessarily, unless there 's f-22 i
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23 deeply in all its detail.
24
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And so what of the things that I am going to talk abou 25 Acme Reporting Company
<PO2f 6th dHhe L ___
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with containment fans.
Well, for the selected equipment opera-k/
2 tion, PWR containment fans, I am going to identify in more 3
detail the risk impact, some of the important sequences, A
(_)
4 typical harsh environments, sub component locations, fragility, 5
et cetera.
6 I am going to look at what is the potential impact of 7
some EQ issues on that equipment function.
Identify where is the data sources and where is this datas short comings and a
9 then assess the risk significance of the various EQ issues with an understanding that not all the time am I going to be 10 able to get an answer to this latter question because of the 11 data short comings that I have in the data base.
12 T
MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me come in about something that I (V
N 13 noticed and that has always bothered me.
If I can mention 34 this HPSI line failure again.
15 You'll find the staff analysis and the vender 16 analysis only considers radiation release as the objection of 37 defining the consequences and they invoke the fact that that the 18 valve closes at the prescribed time and so much volume has been 39 released and they run out then and figure out the dose on the 20 man 10 miles away and that's the consequence.
21 They don't even touch the environmental aspect of wha 1 22 k
happens when that steam went into that room and certainly neve c 23 24 touched the aspect of what happens when it never does shut off i
25 at all.
So that is going to be your job.
Acme Reporting Company L2023 621$ A S E O
106 1
MR. BUSTARD: That would be our job, to redefine 2
sequences to bring in that type of attribute to the program and i
3 as I mentioned a few minutes ago, since this is a Scoping
.y
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4 Study, we are not attempting to reinvent PRAs.
We're not going 5
to full blown PRA for a plant. We're trying to do some scoping G
calculations to get a feel for what is the risk impact of 7
various equipment operability issues.
8 So, with that in mind, let's look at some things about 9
PWR containment fans and I understand that you want me to 10 stop around 11:00 o' clock, right or what is my time frame?
11 MR. WYLIE:
That's it.
l 12 MR. BUSTARD:
11:00 o' clock?
l 13 MR. WYLIE:
Yes, if we can squeeze it in then.
l 14 MR. BUSTARD:
Okay.
15 What I am going to be doing, with the PWR containment 16 fans is mentioning several topics.
One topic is what is the 17 current PRA operability assumptions.
When we talk about risk, 18 of an EQ issue and we try to define the risk of an EO issue,
]
we have to do it in terms of the fact that risk is being de-19 20 fined in a PRA based on current assumptions.
21 So I am going to be talking about what their current
]
22 assumptions are for which we can do risk achievement, risk
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23 reduction type analysis, j
The second thing I am going to be talking about is 24 rm I
25 the risk importance in PWR containment fans as it is shown up J
1 I
Acme Reporting Company 52026 f,28 4HB8
T 107 in some of the current PRAs that are out on the street.
3
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I am going to be identifying some of the EQ issues 2
that could impact fan operability.
I am going to be looking 3
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(_)
4 at how the various different environments impact those EO 5
issues and subsequently the fan operability and then I am 1
6 going to be making some interim conclusions and as I have 7
mentioned, this particular issue is in current--its status is 8
that we're currently looking at it and so this is just some 9
preliminary conclusions and some' preliminary results.
10 PWR containment fans--the current PPA operability 11 assumptions depend on whether one assumes the vessel breach 12 is occurring or not during your important sequences.
13 Prior to vessel breach, PWRs assume the containment l
14 fans typically operate with normal operation failure probabil-15 ities and prior to vessel breach, you can have steam, radiation 16 and other conditions occurring where the fans are located.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you including in the other condi-18 tions such a thing as the fact that the containment is under a 1
\\
violent wind storm of steam, so to speak, for a period of time i
19 20 due to wherever the break is, is that a part of your environ-21 mental thoughts?
22 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
Well, let me--
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MR. MICHELSON:
I haven't seen any testing of that 23 f
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25 MR. BUSTARD:
You're talking about things like jet I
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Acme Reporting Company 42021 62H 4BbEs
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impingement and things like that?
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MR. MICHELSON:
Well, I'm not even saying they're i
3 necessarily impinging directly on the fans but rather keep j
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4 in mind, you know, steam load on fans is an order of magnitude 5
heavier than an air load.
When you start blowing steam, j
i 6
then they're running all that steam through it, tests have 7
not been done that way.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is that really so?
9 MR. MICHELSON:
Sure, oh yeah, it's the mass of the 10 steam, it's much denser.
11 MR. WYLIE:
There have been tests though on contain-12 ment fans.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
You mean running steam through them?
l 14 MR. WYLIE:
Yes, sure.
It was done at--
15 MR. MICHELSON:
With them running?
16 MR. WYLIE:
Yep.
The accident nvironment testing 17 of the--
18 MR. MICHELSON: I think those were with them not 19 running.
20 MR. WYLIE: Oh no, I seen the tests, I was there.
21 MR. MICHELSON: I wasn't aware that they didn't run 22 steam through the fans when they did it.
23 MR. WYLIE:
Joy fans--Joy Manufacturing ran the first 24 test.
rm
(
)
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MR. MICHELSON:
They ran pressurized--
25 Acme Reporting Company 6202h 6/ 8 d B Bil
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109 1
MR. WYLIE:
Oh sure, they had it set up and they hit
)
2 it with full pressure.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
Even high humidity is an overload on a 4
fan--can be, depending on--
5 MR. WYLIE:
I won't say all fans have been run that 6
way, but I know theirs was.
7 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me partially answer your question 8
by saying that, for example, Point Beach which is a plant 9
that is a plant that was analyzed as part of the TAP-45 10 analysis.
Each one of their fan coolers actually has two fans 11 12 and two associated motors.
One fan is designed for normal operation type of air conditions and the second fan is desione?
l 13 for the denser steam environment that occurs during a large 14 15 break LOCA type enviornments.
MR. MICHELSON: I was thinking of the transient situa-16 17 tion, not after it's settled down to a nice quiesent steam jg bath.
I'm thinking of as the break occurs, there's a de-pressurization wave propagating right through the containment 19 and that hits the fan which is already running and perhaps even 20 21 hits it even in the reverse direction from the running of the 99 fan.
The air is going back up in the case of some of these lk 23 fans, depending on where the break is.
MR. WYLIE:
That's exactly the test that Joy ran.
24 O
MR. MICHELSON:
That could be.
I had never heard of 25 Acme Reporting Company
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- ?-T 110 1
that one.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
You're not considering the ice con-3 tainment type things.
4 MR. BUSTARD:
At this stage, this example is for a 5
large dry PWR containment fans.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
I know, you probably ought to specify 7
it because those other fans are 20 cycs.
g MR. MICHELSON:
They don't run until after the acci-9 dent.
MR. BUSTARD:
I think what you'll see as I go thorugh 10 this, that I am not touching base on all of these issues and ji we can continue our investigation to get into that, but it is a 12 time consuming process that requires a lot of inner action 13 with manufacturers to get that type of detail, that the 14 utilities to find out exactly what type of f ans they have.
15 For the first stage of the Scoping Study, we haven't 16 done that.
Now, if we need to get into that level of detail, 37 we plan on finding out exactly what's in use at a particular 18 plant and look at its qualification data, if we can get a 39 hold of it and things like that.
20 Let's get back to the PWR operability assumptions.
21 Prior to vessel breach, as I said, PRA typically assumes the
~2 9
O containment fans operate with normal operation failure 23 pr bability.
21 The one question we need to ask ourselves is in harsh 25 Acme Reporting Company j
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environments, should the failure probabilities be assumed to bc
,rs.
2 higher.
I After vessel breach, PWR treatment of fan operability 3
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For. example, TAP 45 assumes that the fans fail with vessel breach.
One reason historically mentioned is aerosol 5
behavior and the loading on the fans and the clogging of the 6
fans with aerosols.
7 NEWREG 11--
g MR. EBERSOLE:
Pardon me.
When you say, " vessel 9
breach," are you talking about a LOCA?
10 MR. BUSTARD:
Vessel breach, I'm talking about it failure of the bottom head.
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
That's a severe accident breach.
( 's 13 s_J MR. BUSTARD:
That's right.
g4 MR. EBERSOLE:
A LOCA is a breach and I think the 15 failure probability of a fan is unquestionably higher as a 16 LOCA because it's been sitting there dry for x years and it 17 has incurred oxidation damage and other things.
It's operat-33 ing in rather a dry environment which an electrical system 19 likes.
20 MR. BUSTARD:
Right and then suddenly you have a stea m 21 environment.
MR. EnERSOLE:
Right.
t's the sudden assault.
23 MR. BUSTARD:
I understand.
One of the things that 24 O
25 I am going to be doing here is tyring to give you a feel for Acme Reporting Company
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what the impact of this environmental change might be on the 2
electrical cabeling, for example.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Even on the LOCA environment, that's
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5 good to bad and it has been somewhat obscured, that but you're I
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sitting in air which is a fine insulator and now you're got 7
moisture intrusion in the lining or whatever it takes to fail 8
it.
9 MR. WYLIE:
But it's supposed to have been qualified
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1 10 for that.
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11 MR. MICHELSON:
These are not ice containment kinds i
12 of fans you're talking about.
j f 'T 13 MR. WYLIE:
I'm not talking about ice, I'm talking V
14 large dry--
15 MR. MICHELSON:
They're supposed to be dry fans or 16 ice condensor fans.
17 MR. WYLIE:
Nope, no, they were not.
These were 18 tested for the Occone Nuclear Station.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
They were supposed to be cooked and 20 aged and all that stuff.
21 MR. WYLIE:
Right.
22 MR. BUSTARD:
One of the assumptions that is made 23 by the PRA analysts is that if you don't exceed qualification 24 parameters, typically you maintain normal operation reliabil-25 ities.
What they assume is that the reliability function is a Acme Reporting Company 120/1 628 dhBB
'lL' 113 i
step function.
I have normal operational reliability up until t")
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I hit some harsh environment condition that usually is some-2 3
thing like failure of the bottom head of a reactor vessel and k-4 then suddenly my failure probability goes to one.
Now what I am saying here is that TAP 45 assumes 5
6 normal operation failure probabilities up until the time I 7
get the bottom head falling out of the vessel.
The NUREG 1150 review of Zion assumes normal opera-8 9
tion failure probabilities even after vessel breach.
Now let's look at some risk numbers associated with 10 those assumptions and first let's look at prior to vessel 33 breach because when we look at what is the impact of hydrogen 12 burns, let's say on fan operation.
We have to put it in a risk
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context for this study.
g The TAP 45 analysis of Point Beach and I'm talking 15 about prior to vessel breach type probabilities.
The chance of 16 early death with fan operation is 6-E to the -9 per year.
The 37 i
chance of early death without fan operation is 1.5 to 2 E-8/yr.
gg So what I have is is I have an increase in my early 19 20 death probabilities by a factor of about 2 to 3.
Given the 21 TAP 45, assume fan failure at vessel breach.
This factor is 22 2 to 3 applies to fan operation occurring either being normal s_/
operation versus complete failure prior to vessel breach.
23 If I do a separate analysis and look at the actual 24
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25 cut set and things like that, I see that the frequency of Acme Reporting Company 420Z6 628 an8B
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small break LOCA type plants damage states for Point Beach e i
-J were characterized by failure of both fans and sprays doubled 2
3 if I lose fan operation prior to vessel breach.
(-(_)
4 So a back of the envelope type argument could be 5
that doubling the plant damage state characterized by failure l
6 of both fans and sprays, given that I have separate risk
{
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achievement numbers up here, approximately triples the risk
)
8 of early death for Point Beach.
9 If I go to some of the other TAP 45 plants,
..are I i
10 don't have separate risk analysis like this, I see that j
11 similar to Point Beach, failure of the fans will double the 12 frequency of the plant damage state that has both fanc and 13 spray in operability.
l 14 So roughly, a first cut scoping analysis of fan 15 operation, prior to vessel breach, is that I would double or 16 triple the risk if I lose fan operation for these TAP 45 PWR 17 plants.
I If I go to the NUREG 1150 Zion analysis, the informa-l Ig I
I tion I currently have available is that the conditional 19 containment failure probabilities increase by 3--I'm sorry, 20 I'm thinking about small break LOCA type plant damage states J
21 l
i 22 and increase by 1.5 if I talk about large break type LOCAs.
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So this puts some perspective on the risk.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, but on the other hand it sort of 24 i
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obsures it because doubling a small risk may not be very 25 Acme Reporting Company
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important.
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2 MR. BUSTARD:
Doubling a--
3 MR. EBERSOLE: Doubling a small risk doesn't cut much f3
!s/
4 ice, does it?
5 MR. BUSTARD:
Okay, you're talking about doubling a 6
small risk--
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm talking about the absolute sense 8
of the problem.
9 MR. BUSTARD: In the context that the total--
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
11 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes, I understand what you're saying.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Not a significant contributor.
(m 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
At some point it fades into Ns}
i 14 nothing--
15 MR. BUSTARD:
That's right, i
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
--the doubling
- 1. actor and where that--
17 it looks like you could have sort of a preamble that says 18 where you begin to recognize it as absolute reality.
19 MR. BUSTARD: That's right.
You want to say anything 20 else?
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
No.
22 MR. BUSTARD:
Let's look at the risk importance of 23 fan operations after vessel breach.
That's currently difficul t j
24 to quantify.
We had trouble coming up with numbers for that, O
V 25 and some of the important parameters that are involved, Number Acme Reporting Company
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1, does the core debris remain coolable.
If the core debris 8
2 is coolable, you don't get as much aerosol generation in your 3
containment building that could clog the fans.
K/
4 And a second issue is when large amounts of non 5
condensible gases are present, can fan cooler operation re-6 duce the containment failure probabilities.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Isn't the answer to that automatically 8
is yes because it avoids hydrogen concentration?
9 MR. BUSTARD:
The answer to this one is that richt 10 now, fcr example, the NUREG 1150 analysis is looking in'o this 11 issue and we're not sure yet what their answer is going to be.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
How do you treat the elevated l
13 temperature and pressure conditions that were perhaps the 14 cause for the containment failure?
15 It must certainly--beyond the environmental qualifi-l 16 cations of the fans now and what affect, if any, does that have j
l 17 on probability of failure of the fan?
18 MR. BUSTARD: I'll get to that.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
20 MR. BUSTARD:
I'll get to that.
I 21 What I am saying here is that we're looking for 22 magnitudes on risk impact for fan failure or fan operations.
s.J l
23 The next question is, what type of EQ issues in l
24 environments could impact fan operations and there are several
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i and I motivate my EQ issues by asking two questions based on t
25 Acme Reporting Company IPO21 026 4686
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I l
1 the assumptions that have been made by the PRAs.
I
(~% -
l 2
First, is it appropriate to assume normal operation 3
failure probabilities prior to vessel breach and second, is it 4
appropriate to assume failure or a successful operation of the 5
containment fans after vessel breach?
6 What type of EQ issues do we get into when we start 7
looking at those questions?
8 First, the survivorability of safety related 9
equipment during hydrogen burn environments is one issue that 10 arises because we have the potential for a hydrogen burn en-11 vironment, both before and after vessel breach.
What will 12 those environments do to the reliability of rhe containment
(
13 fan systems?
14 Secondly, the appropriateness of the current EO 15 radiation source term and what happens if we change that source term because of consideration of things like vessel 16 17 breach, severe accident type scenarios and move beyond the 18 design basis.
So this EQ issue comes up.
19 Third, which won't be immediately obvious until I go 20 into more depth in a few minutes, is the damage equivalence from beta and gamma radiation, which is an EQ issue that is 21 discussed in your thick summary report there and has been the
,~
22 subject of EQ research both here and ahorad.
This one comes to 23 24 play.
/')
Fourth, appropriate techniques to simulate accident 25 Acme Reporting Company 120 0 628 4R88
N7 118 1
conditions, issues such as simultaneous versus sequential; the
(~h,i K/
2 importance of oxygen during LOCA simulations; techniques for 3
accelerating post accident environments.
These all could im-
,/3 pact our answer or we could postulate that they could possibly
(,)
4 5
impact our answer.
Can we give more definitive answers to what.
that impact will be and tie it to equipment operability and g
therefore to risk.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: How important is 3?
Isn't that a very g
subtle business?
9 MR. BUSTARD:
Which one?
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
Number 3.
11 MR. BUSTARD:
Number 3 is rather subtle and let me 12
(~NT 13 get into that later, if I don't run out of time.
Ky MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
14 MR. BUSTARD:
And finally, a fifth issue that is 15 partially encompassed by some of these other issues is 16 equipment operability during severe accident environment, 37 and in particular, we have the aerosol issue.
We have the 18 more severe--potentially more severe radiation environments, jg Potentially more severe steam in pressure environments in the 20 typical design basis, 21 So what we can do is we can take these EO issues and 22 e
t 1
we can say how do they impact our answers to these questions J
23 and by understanding u *'ey impact our answer to these 24 n
k_.)
questions, we can tie it to risk and try to get a risk impact 25 Acme Reporting Company 42021 628 4800
LK 113 1
for these particular issues.
o\\"}
2 What we're going to find is that in some cases we 3
have sufficient data sources and in others we don't and in 7_
?
b ks' 4
some cases, we're not far enough along in our analysis of 5
the system.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
One item not listed on your list, 7
of course, which can be very important and that was the how is 8
the plant maintained during the 30 years before the accident 9
and is the equipment still environmentally qualified as you 10 thought it was because they may have opened and changed seals 11 and so forth or left seals off or whatever, even though the 12 equipment was originally qualified and may longer be.
l 13 But it's an unknown factor.
I don't know how you put 14 it in.
Clearly it's a factor, as we find out during, you know, 15 various small events, that equipment that we thought was water 16 tight, for instance, gets water in it. We thought it was all 17 sealed up, but it turns out they had gone in and did something 18 and left a seal off.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Are you looking at aging effects, includ-20 ing this one?
21 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes, we will be looking at aging s
22 effects.
For example, dose rate effects could create an l
RJ 23 environment where many of the cables that give power or con-24 trol to the fan coolers could suffer common cause failure l
(~)
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25 mechanism.
Acme Reporting Company m o,,.
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I haven't included that in the list because we are
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running out of time and I knew I only had a short time to talk.
2 3
Let me talk about hydrogen hurn first.
So if we go
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4 back again, what we're trying to do is to look at what is our 5
current knowledge regarding hydrogen burn, answer these two 6
questions here and therefore tie the hydrogen burn issue to 7
risk through containment fans.
And let me mention what some of the research has 8
9 told us about hydrogen burns. First of all, we have done some studies at Sandia and Don King led that effort so I refer to it 10 11 as King, et al because there were a number of people involved.
And the basic conclusion is that single global hydro-12 fC 13 gen burns will not create a common cause vulnerability for V
14 typical safety related equipment and he did not look at all 15 components that are involved in containment fans, he looked 16 at cables and pressure transmitters, but this happens to be 17 an assumption that also is somewhat endorsed by the PRA people 18 and what that says is that if I ever have a single burn environment inside containment here, those containment fans, j
19 20 at least initially, it may be inappropriate to assume failure 21 due to the hydrogen burn events.
We haven't yet answered the question about what is 22 f-the reliability after the hydrogen burn, but it possibly is 23 24 inappropriate, at least. For that issue, too soon failure.
)
Now let's look at molable burns.
King also did an q
25 i
Acme Reporting Company
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121 analysis of 3 Mile Island--a 3 Mile Island Zion hybrid contain-1 (y
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ments of core situations.
2 Basically what he did in his analysis, he assumed the 3
73 3 Mile and containment structure and he put a Zion core in tha t
(_)
4 structure and analyzed what type of pipe breaks would create 5
what type of LOCA and hydrogen burn environments inside that i
6 containment.
7 The reason for using a hybrid analysis was simply to 8
9 save money.
He already had a code that was developed for Zion to look at Hydrogen generation out of the core, hanging 10 out a code that was developed for the 3 Mile Island contain-yg ment building so that he could look at the progression of 12 hydrogen movement through the core, and potential different lg 13 scenarios.
g4 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm looking at the affect of hydrogen 15 burn.
Was he also looking at the pressure effects that you 16 see with it?
17 MR. BUSTARD:
Well, no.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
Just the terhmal?
39 MR. BUSTARD:
Just the thermal basically.
20 MR. MICHELSON:
But you see some very peaked pressure s 33
/
m mentarily from it.
Not all containment dividing enclo-e' 22 V
sures are necessarily designed for it.
23 MR. BUSTARD:
I understand.
24 r^i
'.i Now what vere his conclusions?
By the way, 3 Mile 25 Acme Reporting Cornpany n m -.
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Island has fan coolers.
They're on the second floor of 3 Mile 1/
2 Island.
3 And what he concluded was that if you assume a 4 inch
(_)
4 pipe break and you have ignition of the hydrogen due to some 5
ignition source so that everytime it gets above 7 percent, 6
mo fraction hydrogen, you get a hydrogen burn, that he can 7
have a molable burn environment, for example, 18 burns in 8
the basements of TMI's containments.
9 Now the basement of TMI's containment does not include 10 fan coolers.
The fan coolers are located on the second floor 11 But what he saw was that between these 18 burns, what 12 I am assuming here is that the 4 inch pipe break is occurring 13 in a location in the basement and that there is piping in the j
14 basement that could create a 4 inch pipe break.
15 Enough hydrogen would be transported to the second 16 floor, which is the location of the fan coolers, to allow 5 17 burns to occur and the gas temperatures during the multiple 18 burns, at the second floor, would exceep 400 degrees 19 Fahrenheit in 10 minutes, which is above typical qualification s 20 temperatures for many safety related components in 5 large 21 dry TWRs.
22 He did some experimentation, he didn't focus on this m
i ;
il 23 particular issue, but he did do some experimentation for more severe multiple burn environments where he exposed transmitter s 24
,q
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2 123 1
of the components to function.
O N/
So, let me skip a few vu graphs here.
What we have 2
3 is the following situation.
In the basement of TMI contain-4 ment structure, we could have a multiple burn environments 5
that gives temperature pulses like this that could propogate 6
environmentally from the second floor, that includes the fan coolers and create an environment like this.
7 8
The temperatures achieved during these multiple burns 9
exceeds the qualification temperatures for a number of typical equipment that one would see in an environment like Three Mile 10 Island and therefore, I have a potential EQ issue that could ii have a potential-impact on my fan cooler operability, 12 The upper valves of the risk significance to be a t( }
13 factor of 3 increase in risk, when I assume no vessel breach 34 15 and in particular, Don King's analysis does not assume vessel 16 breach in the sense of loss of the head and things like that 17 and potential risk reduction activities that I could do so that 18 I can better characterize the impact of this, is characterized 19 which risk significant sequences would include the potential 20 for multiple burns in containment compartments with fan cooler l
1 21 components and find out what their maximum risk input is.
J 22 For example, you brought up before that some sequence s L<gg 23 don't contribute much to the overall risk.
One way of dealing 24 with this issue would be to look at which sequences have l
25 Potential for multiple burn and possibly deciding they're not i
Acme Reporting Company s202 6?H 408H Li
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very risk significant themselves.
And the second thing to O
2 do would be to better characterize steam cooler component 3
response to credible multiple burn environments because the 4
situation we have is if I do experimentation for the 5
environments that I see in the basement, I am led to believe G
that equipment will not survive that type of environments.
7 and I lack that type of information right now for equipment 8
that is on the second floor.
9 For example, I have included a vu graph in your 10 presentation that shows--it's actually for another containment 11 but it's a multiple burn enclosure of a Barton Transmitter.
12 What I have is a rather severe multiole burn environ-l 13 ment, much more severe than what I showed you as postulated l l 14 for the fan cooler location and you can see that the trans-15 mitter ceases operation midway through the multiple burn 16 environments.
17 MR. BOHN:
Larry, you need to make the point that 18 that was though the environment for a compartment for a 19 RAC or Model 111, not just a hypothetical situation.
20 MR. BUSTARD:
That's right, that's right.
21 And just to bound it on the other side, here is a single burn test that was done also on a Barton Transmitter 22 23 and as ou can see, compared to a reference trasmitter that was 24 outside the environmental chamber, it basically functions very O
25 well throughout the single burn environment.
Acme Reporting Company (2021 628 4689
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So what I can say, from an EQ standpoint, is that I p
- ~
2 have a traditional EO issue, hydrogen burns.
It does not ap-3 pear they're going to be that they're going to be that k_)
significant for single burn scenario.
For multiple burn 4
5 scenarios, I need to do a little bit more work.
I need to loch 6
at the components in more detail, what do they have, what don' t 7
they have.
8 MR. MICHELSON:
But the assumption is, I guess, that 9
you picked what was the most sensitive component to the burn 10 and concluded from that that multiple burns weren't all that 11 important.
12 MR. BUSTARD:
You mean the Barton Transmitter.
' ["*3 13 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, I mean--that's why I wonder
\\/
14 why you picked it.
There are a number of things that you have 15 to worry about when you start fires in the--flash fires in-10 side the containment.
17 For instance, the containment isolation valves 18 themselves are generally butterfly valves with rubber seats 39 and they may not take these kinds of flash fires without 20 even ignting, for instance, I don't know--I don't know what 21 happens.
If the rubber seats go on the first fire or two, 22 and then you get more of them later, by now you're talking k-23 about hydrogen going on out into the ventilation system attach 3d to those valves for potentially igniting out there the next 24
(
time.
j 25 A,c m e Reporting Company j
6702l 628 4868
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If you have lost the ventilation valve, you're i
f k>
2 talking about high pressure, plenty of driving force that 3
pushed whatever is in containment out the ventilate valves
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4 if they're not tight.
I don't know what the weak point is, 5
but you picked a couple of things and you got to be careful.
6 That's fine to do, but don't leave me the conclusion that 7
flash fires aren't important because I don't know if you even 8
picked the right things to look at.
I just don't know.
9 MR. BUSTARD:
Okay.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
I just don't know.
11 MR. BOHN:
Wait a minute.
The two things that were 12 tested were cables, a couple of different kinds of cables j
13 and one type of pressure transfusion.
14 Now those were tested because, in a previous program, 15 the appratus was broke.
We had to simulate hydrogen burn 16 and then a very limited amount of testing on only these two 17 kinds of components was performed before the program funding 18 was cut off.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
But you can't conclude anything 20 about fire burns on the basis of those two components.
I 21 don't know how you even picked the right component.
22 MR. BOHN:
The point I am trying to make is that we f-(
23 didn't pick.
We're giving you the results of the only two 21 component tests--
t' 25 MR. MICHELSON:
Don't lead the reader to believe Acme Reporting Company 120/r 628 4PBB
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that fire burns aren't important because of this work.
('i U
MR.
BOHN: That's a very valid point.
2 3
MR. MICHELSON:
And I got a different feeling in (7
(./
4 reading it.
5 MR. BOHN:
I didn't want you to think though that 6
we picked pressure transitions being the weak linh--
7 MR. MICHELSON:
I know.
8 MR. BOHN:
--in this particular item.
i 9
MR. MICHELSON:
I know.
That's why I asked.
Did you puposely think that that was the weak link or the fan 10 I
coolers or whatever.
11 MR. BOHN:
In a hydrogen burn situation, the only 12 data we have was on a couple of different kinds of of cable,
('j s
13 s
different manufacturers and on this.one type of pressure 14 15 transfusion.
Other than that we have no idea of how 16 equipment was tested.
MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask you this.
These implements 17 18 come with pigtails hanging out of them.
MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
19 k
MR. EBERSOLE: The wires are normally inside the 20 f
instrument, but these things stick out.
]
21 i
MR. BUSTARD:
That's right.
f-22 MR. EBERSOLE:
The builder has got the problem of 23 The connecting that to cable run from the plant at large.
24 O
transition point, preferably, I guess, is heat strength for 25 tubings, environmentally qualified for splices.
Acme Reporting Company l
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MR. BUSTARD:
That's right.
\\
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
And not these damn open terminal boxes.
3 Those have very little thermal mass and if you're looking at
()
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4 just the operations of the guts of the transducer and not 1
5 looking at the little splice out there, you may be picking the 6
item which is least responsive to thermal shocks and you may 7
ignite the pigtail long before the transducer is gone.
8 MR. WYLIE:
Well, they're inside a junction box, 9
aren't they?
I 10 MR. EDERSOLE:
I don't know whether they are or not, i
11 Charlie.
12 MR. WYLIE:
Well generally they are.
f '}
13 MR. BUSTARD:
Inside containment applications tend to s.
14 be better protected than outside containment applications.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes, I should think so.
16 MR. BUSTARD:
Let me mention, just to give you another 17 example, we did look at cabling also in hydrogen burn--in these 18 hydrogen burn environments.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Did you look at the fine structure of 20 the cabling, like the splice points where the instrument wires 21 are tied to the--
22 MR. BUSTARD: No.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
Or the penetration?
24 MR. BUSTARD:
The only two pieces of equipment that we 25 looked at, from a hydrogen burn standpoint, in this particular l
l Acme Reporting Company 1202) 629 488H
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equipment was cabling and the BartAn Transmitter atd we 2
saw the same conclusions for both.
During the si gle burn i
3 environment, they continued to function during tp t extreme
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4 multiple burn environment that I utei act, 1
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they both failed.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
You had better look at the interspace 7
where they come together.
8 MR. BUSTARD:
I understand.
(,
9 Let me just nuntion one other thing, radiation.
10 Fan coolers are going to include cabling and we have S/.;me 11 data on radiation impact on cabling and again, if you go--
12 there are two possible scenarios to the cabling that is in-13 side containment.
It It could be inconduit or it could be not inFtaIled 15 conduit.
i 16 MR. WYLIE:
Or it could be an armored cable.
17 MR. BUSTARD:
Or it could be an armored cable if 18 you're Duke Power.
Duke Power was very good about making 19 armor cable.
20 But if you go to cabling conduit, scoping calculation i
3
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21 based on some severe accident sequences would initially sugges t 22 no common cause vulnerability for cables.
Now this is very 1
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us 23 rough scoping calculations.
24 And the reason I say that is because if you look at
' ']
25 the traditional design basis event that people have td qualif y
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Acme Reporting Company
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equipment for.
It is dominated by beta radiation.
The gamma
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2 radiation contribution is about one-fifth to one-tenth of what
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3 the beta radiation contribution is and so when people say
.(~
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4 they're qualifying cable at 200 megarads, they're qualifying i
5 it to a design basis event that includes both beta end rate and 6
gamma radiation and if I put that cabling in conduit where I 7
no longer have the beta radiation contribution, I have a large 8
margin in my cable operability in a radiation environment.
I 9
could have a factor of 5 to 10 margin in my ability for the 10 cables b3 survive radiation, if it's in conduits.
11 MR. WYLIE:
Wouldn't you make the same conclusions 12 for galvanized steel end wire?
- (T 13 MR. MICHELSON:
Beta don't go very deep in metal.
t 14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Can you give a lay down of the rate 15 of the beta on the cable?
16 MR. BUSTARD:
The beta?
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
1g MR. BUSTARD: What happens is your beta radiation has a limited--beta radiation is not going to penetrate 19 20 through the conduit or the armor, so you're protecting the 21 underlying insulation from the beta radiation.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Right.
,.~/3 V
MR. BUSTARD:
And if you go to too big of an 23 equipment qualification spec right now, on a design basis, yot 24
(~}
may have a 20 megareg contribution from gammas from the k'
25 Acme Reporting Company t
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accident.
Like I.said, a 100 - 150 megareg contribution from e
k-betas and the cable manufacturers have pretty much uniformly 2
3 qualified equipment at 200 megarads, they cables at 200 mega-Il k-4 rads.
They have done a one to one correspondence beta to 5
gamma.
6 So what that does is that gives me a lot of margin if 7
my cables installed in conduit.
If it is not ins-alled in con.
8 duit, I don't have that. margin and when I say scoping calcula-9 tions suggest no common cause for vulnerability, I'm meaning 10 a vulnerability that converts everything to one, the failure 11 probability is one.
12 MR. MICilELSON:
Cable and conduit doesn't mean it's in
(~)
13 conduit all the way, of course?
MR. BUSTARD:
That would be something that you would 14 15 have to look at in detail for each plant and each fan cooler 16 system.
]
17 MR. MICHELSON:
Very likely it's not in conduit 1g right up to the fan motor itself although it can be. It depends on how much flexibility is needed.
19 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Are we talking about short term 21 failure or long term failure?
e 22 MR. BUSTARD:
That's an interesting question that
- (
i 23 we're going to have to look at when we start trying to merge 24 PRA perspectives witn equipment operability perspectives.
(^
And what I am saying nere is from a radiation stand-25 i
l Acme Reporting Company na,,n na
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1 point, I haven't brought in the steam, the temperature and fr~) -
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other standpau tc.
The cabling that is controlling the fan 3
coolers look like it would not suffer common cause failure, (3
(_/
4 you know, across all the cables, where all of them are failing 5
due to radiation if it's in conduit.
6 And that is true, both short term and long term 7
and the reason for that is because the equipment qualifications 8
source term for radiation is similar to a severe accident source j
9 term.
10 I mean I have instantaneous release of 50 percent of q
the iodine and a 100 percent of the modal gas is in one persent 11 12 of the remaining fission product inventory in.the core, f~'5 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you using the old--what was it, d
14 you know, the' ancient release factors--release--what am I 15 trying to--WASH 740.
16 MR. BUSTARD:
You mean in doing my quick scoping 17 calculations?
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
l 19 MR. BUSTARD:
No. It turns out--Patell has done some
)
l calculations on what type of releases I would get to the con-f 20 21 tainment for various different sequences.
l And this happens to be a small break sequence with r-22 23 subsequent failure of the fan and the sprays during the se-
)
)
24 quence, not initially, j
I
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~
25 1
Acme Reporting Company
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ment because of that sequence that ultimately leads to failure
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2 of.the reactor vessel bottom head, et cetera and what you see 3
is that my eyes on contribution that I get to the containment f3(>
4 is approximately.27 of the total core inventory of iodine 5
and the source term for equipment qualification assumes an 6
instantaneous release of 50 percent, so I have less iodine 7
that I have to deal with here.
8 Now I also don't have containment sprays washing it 9
out.
So what needs to be done is more detailed calculations 10 that relate to these types of numbers to actual dose rates 1
inside containment for various inferred pieces of equipment 11 and their locations and that has not yet been done, but if I 12
's 13 go back to my risk impact and what type of r.O issues I'm
(~d,
since I'm dealing with the vessel break situa-k 14 talking about, 15 tion here, right now I don't have an upper bound for the risk significance, we still need to determine that based some of 16 17 those things in NUREG 1150.
Risk reduction activities, what can we do try to 18
{
reduce this risk impact, if there is one.
We could try to put 19 20 fan coolers in conduit or, I'm not saying it's necessary to do this, we can hetter characterize the severe accident source 21 I
22 term, reevaluate the qualification status in terms of that
!,-)
%d severe accident source term, reevaluate the qualification 23 status in terms of that severe accident source term and see 24
(~)
25 whether I have a r tential for a dramatic failure of all of my
~'
Acme Reporting Company t/D2) 6?HAMHH
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- cables, p
k/
2 I could also characterize the reliability during 3
these severe accident radiation conditions.
('3 (j
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Under normal conditions, these cables 5
don't get much radiation.
Whatever you're going to get has 6
to accrue in a short time, doesn't it?
7 MR. BUSTARD:
That's correct.
g MR. EBERSOLE:
And then the effecrs of that has to 9
materialize while the challenge--environmental challenge 10 is still there.
Can't the effects be argued to be delayed 11 until the environmental challenge is over and gone?
12 MR. BUSTARD:
Sometimes.
(~'N 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm trying to put this in sequence, y)
MR. BUSTARD:
That's right.
Let me give you an 14 15 example and I don't have time to go through it in detail.
16 Steam and pressure conditions during the assessed 17 2-CR-1 sequence.
Okay.
Initially, for the first 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 18 their comparable to LOCA type simulations the people have done and we can put an upper limit on the reliability of 39 cables during LOCAs based on the fact that many people have 20 done equipment qualification tests and we can look at how many 21 failures they saw and when they sew them.
22 LJ MR. EBERSOLE:
Now you're not yet radiation damage?
23 MR. BUSTARD:
For a LOCA test, they have already 24
\\s' done the 200 megarads worth of radiation prior to steam, so 25 Acme Reporting Company 4242e t, t b 4 R H is
SU 135 1
I can use those numbers in a sense and what I would--a rough Y-2 estimate would be that late in a LOCA type environment, I'm 3
talking LOCA and not severe accident, I may have a maximum
\\_)
4 cable failure rate of about 10 percent.
Okay, that's a very 5
rough estimate and so that can be factored into this type of 6
analysis and what you have to do is go to the PRA people and 7
say, are you interested in early LOCA performance or late LOCA 8
performance.
9 I see I am already 10 minutes over, so let me just 10 Put up the conclusions we addressed here.
11 PRAs characterized equipment performance during 12 accident conditions.
By using a semi normal operation 13 failure probabilities, they sometimes, in a few circumstances l
14 like fan coolers, since debt function changes in those failure 15 probabilities.
16 EQ insights are useful for it's definition of 17 accident failure probabilities in the sense that they can 18 help define where the PRA analysis might assume the step 19 function change occurs or secondly if we wanted to go into 20 more detail, what are the upper - lower bounds in the accident 21 environment failure probabilities are 10 percent on cables in 22 a LOCA environment or when, during accident exposures, do 7_.
L 23 f ilure probabilities significantly diverge from normal 24 operation values.
,/~
If we wanted to, if it were desirable, we could do 25 Acme Reporting Company l
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more than that and some of the vu graphs that I haven't had 2
a chance to show you, I'll give examples.
3 For example, if you have an electrical penetration, r
iL 4
you got many modules passing through that penetration, maybe 5
50 if it's an instrumentation penetration.
6 So if you want to know the probability of failure 1
7 during a severe accident condition, you can take that electri-8 cal penetration, expose it to severe accident conditions and 9
monitor the performance of those 50 feed throughs the course 10 of your accident and pick up the failure probability curve 11 for the duration of that sphere accident type condition.
12 So we can do more, but we can do some of _nis based f.
(
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13 on these few insights.
x; 14 Once we use these insights, we can take the risk i
15 changes that are associated with the modified f ailure probabil-16 ities to try to characterize the risk significance of the 17 EO issues.
But we have to understand that a lot of data is 18 missing, so sometimes we can up or down the risk impact and 19 point out that an issue exists.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
When you mention penetrations, yo;t 21 know all penetrations, whether they're whinney or not, have 22 some potential for opening up the containment, if they face a
,3 LJ 23 short and the short is not cleared before the penetration is 24 damaged.
The biggest ones are the fans, I mean the pumps, O'
'~
25 Acme Reporting Company
~s-L_________
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1 the 10,000 horsepower pumps and it was late in time that 2
multiple and qualified 1-E over crack advices were put on 3
those big penetrations, but I don't think any plant today 4
disconnects the electrical circuitry that goes into the ccntainmnt 5
in an effort to prevent short circuit loads on on those pene-6 trations.
They're all dependent on clearing short circuits 7
which you almost have to invoke will occur on non 1-E equipmen u l
i 8
inside of containment and so the focus then gets on the 9
penetration viability and their protective features that you 10 don't overload them and they become fuzes and blow up and 11 produce holes in the containment.
You follow me?
12 MR. BUSTARD:
I think so.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: I have often thought it might be smart 14 to disconnect the bulk of those non required circuits on the 15 occasion of environmental intrusion into containment because 16 you just don't like to have to face overload conditions and short circuits in c6ntainment from the host and the circuits 17 18 that go in there, which are not qualified, but we don't.
We 39 leave them all connected, so we can say we must face short 20 circuit failures which must be cleared for every containment 21 penetration by fuzes fo whatever.
22 MR. BUSTARD: Okay.
We can talk more about that later.
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
All right.
24 MR. WYLIE:
Okay.
25 Acme Reporting Company 12O28 6 2 f5 4868
l
(\\
138 l
1 MR. BUSTARD:
Yes.
O 2
MR. DEY:
I think that we're done.
l 3
MR. WYLIE:
Well, I think that at this time we were f
4 supposed to--as a subcommittee to--I think you received the subcommittee's comments and so forth this morning and I think--
5 o
my impression is that this is a very good approach and I think 7
the scoping study as outlined is very good.
You have heare the comments from our members as to 8
9 things that possibly should be considered, such as interactions and other things that have been mentioned.
10 ji Carl, do you have any comments?
MR. MICIIELSON :
No.
I think you might say it's 12 bringing reality to the PRA world, which is shedding a little 13 bit of light on it.
14 15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Which, I think, is generally thought to be more real than it really is.
16 MR. WYLIE:
Now, in the meeting that you proposed 17 for March, what status will we have at that time?
18 MR. DEY:
That would be the final conclusion of the--
gg MR. WYLIE:
Scoping study.
20 MR. DEY:
--of the study.
21 22 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think the committee at large, that 23 is the full committee, would regard all of you as they regard 24 myself, as a complicator because you're picking up the bulk O
25 of the questions in the PRA world and that's a complicated Acme Reporting Company
- a, n. n,,,
bb) 139 1
compliment and you know our academic types don't like that.
t' -
2 They like to live in broad cosmic issues, an awful lot of 3
junk.
./^
4 MR. WYLIE:
I would like to thank the staff and the 5
Sandia people for a very interesting and worthwhile presenta-6 tion.
7 MR. MICHELSON:
Did we want to talk about what we're 8
going to give to the full committee?
D MR. WYLIE:
Well, I would give a--I plan to give a 10 subcommittee chairman's report.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
They don't need to hear much until
.I 12 they hear the full report.
j 13 MR. WYLIE:
We'll save that for April.
(~\\
-s)
I g4 MR. EBERSOLE:
It can do a lot, I think, to bring PRAs 15 more closely in line.
16 MR. WYLIE: Okay.
With that, we'll adjourn the 17 meeting.
18 (Whereupon at 11:50 a.m.,
the subcomritted was i
ig adjourned.)
20 21 22 g
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23 l
24 C)
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25 Acme Reporting Company (J Oli 626 4800
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
- /3 O
2 Q
3 DOCKET NUMBER:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Subcommittee-on Reactor Safeguards 4
CASE TITLE:
Reliability Assurance Subcommittee.
RISK SCOPING STUDY 5
HEARING DATE:
Wednesday, December 16, 1987 6
LOCATION:
Washington, D.
C.-
m 7
N O
8-I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence ci y
9 herein are contained and accurately on the tapes and notes O!
10 reported by.me at the hearing in the above case'before the 11 Reliability Assurance Subcommittee - RISK SCOPING STUDY.
3.
and that this is a true and correct transcript of.the case.
2 12 J
13 5
Date:
g g4 sw3
^
n5-
.for 15 Official Reporter 16 ACME REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 1220.L Street, N. W.
17 g
Washington, D. C.
20005 y
18 19 20 21 3
22 l-23 l
- O.
Acme Reporting Company
.aos,sa.....
l L7 9
1 i
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION SCOPING STUDY (NRC RESEARCH PROJECT - FIN: A 1823)
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELIABILITY ASSURANCE DECEMBER 16, 1987
- Am/
PRESENTED BY MONI DEY, PROJECT MANAGER OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH 1
'1OL PRESENTATION OUTLINE I
- PROJEC1 INITIATION
- OBJECTIVE
- OVERVIEW OF STUDY
- SCHEDULE
- PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH ACRS
)
PROJECT INITIATION ACRS. LETTER (6/11/86) RECOMMENDED FUNDING OF EQ RESEARCH TO ASSESS SURVIVABILITY OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WHEN SUBJECTED TO HOSTILE CONDITIONS INCLUDING SEVERE ACCIDENTS. STATED
".......RESEARCH ARE VITAL TO PREVENTING ACCIDENTS AS WELL AS MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS, SHDULD THEY OCCUR."
l EQ SCOPING STUDY WAS INITIATED TO DETERMINE THE RISK IMPORTANCE/ PRIORITY FOR NRC FUNDED EQ RESEARCH
'l b
o
p JO OBJECTIVE TO DETERMINE RISK SIGNIFICANCE AND PRIORITIZE 1.
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO PREVENTING ACCIDENTS AS WELL AS MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS; 2.
EQ ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT.
THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY WILL BE USED TO DETERMINE:
1.
IF A NEED EXISTS FOR FURTHER EQ RESEARCH TO:
/~} -
A.
DEVELOP / REVISE REGULATIONS (50.49) AND/OR
(
B.
SUPPORT REVISION OF NRC GUIDES (e.g.
R.G.
1.89) 2.
PRIORI 112ATION GF THE RESEARCH FOR THE EQUIPMENT AND PERTAINING EQ ISSUES; 3.
THE NEED FOR IDENTIFYING NEW GENERIC ISSUES I
I O
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1 k-
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l OVERVIEW OF STUDY /GCHEDULE TASK SCHEDULE s
PRIORITIZED LIST OF RISK 12/15/87 SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT /0PERATIONS F0f BWR AND PWR PLANTS (Subcontractor SAIC) l RISK SIGNIFICANCE OF EQ ISSUES One Example 12/15/88 PERTAINING TO ABOVE PRIORITIZED Complete 3/15/88 EQUIPMENT LIST (Contractor SNL)
O PEER REVIEW GROUP MEETINGS Progress Review 1/88
[EPRI, Industry (IDCOR),
Final Review 3/88 Aging Research (INEL))
NRC/RES REPORTS:
1.
PROGRESS REPORT (M. DEY) 1/31/88 2.
RESEARCH INFORMATION LETTER 4/30/88 i
l L
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l 1
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PROPOSED MEETINGS WIlH THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE 3/88 FULL COMMITTEE 4/88 O
I O
4 l
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EQ-RISK SCOPING STUDY-OBJECTIVES
- 1. Assess the impact of electrical equipment environmental qualification or lack thereof on reactor risk and its uncertainties.
- 2. Identify any analyses or testing that may be necessary to reduce the risk or its uncertainties stemming from lack
.of qualification of equipment important to safety.
O
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. ~
- O EQ ISSUES:
l
- 1. Does the current EQ process adequately demonstrate equipment qualification for the design basis?
]
1
- a. Risk significance of historical technical concerns regarding the current EQ process (NRC regulations /
{
industry practice).
l
- b. Risk significance of historical EQ problems noted during NRC audits.
)
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1 i
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EQ ISSUES:
- 2. Does the current EQ process demonstrate equipment l
operability consonant with current PRA assumptions?
- b. Risk significance of component accident and normal l
operation reliabilities being different.
1 l
L
- c. Risk significance of PRA's short-time equipment
' O operability perspective compared to EQ's long-time equipment operability perspective?
L h
v i
j
EQ-RISK SCOPING STUDY - PROJECT APPROACH 4
- 1. Identify " candidate" equipment operations that must be accomplished in harsh environments.
- a. PRA perspectives on risk significant equipment I
operations that occur during harsh environments.
- b. EQ perspectives on equipment whose harsh environment reliability may be different than typical PRA assumptions (because of EQ issues).
O 2. Prioritize " candidate" equipment operations.
- a. Risk Perspective (Scoping Effort).
- b. EQ-Risk Scoping Study Objectives.
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EQ-RISK SCOPING STUDY-PROJECT APPROACH
- 3. For selected equipment operations, identify in more detail their risk impact, important sequences, typical harsh environments, subcomponent locations, fragilities, etc.
- 4. For selected equipment operations, identify impact of EQ l
issues on equipment function. Identify data sources, data base shortcomings.
- 5. Assess risk significance of various EQ issues.
O 6. Report Conclusions.
l I
l O
RA Perspectives on Risk Significant Equipment Operations that Occur during Harsh Environments.
- 1. Examine historical PRA risk reduction and risk achievement results.
- 2. Consult with PRA analysts.
- 3. Employ " formal" process to map likely risk significant equipment with harsh environment locations.
o i
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, n
I OEQ Perspectives on Equipment whose Harsh Environment Reliability may be Different than, Typical PRA Assumptions.
- 1. Summarize equipment historically important to the EQ specialist.
- 2. Identify equipment operability issues raised by NRC and industry EQ research programs.
- 3. Identify equipment operability issues raised by NRC Information Notices.
O
. Identify equipment per bility issues that have been 4
raised during NRC audits of utility, NSSS, A/E, and manufacturer EQ practices.
i t
O i
O PWR Containment Fans - An Example
- 1. Identify in more detail their risk impact, important sequences, typical harsh environments, subcomponent locations, fragilities, etc.
- 2. Identify impact of EQ issues on equipment function.
Identify data sources, data base shortcomings.
- 3. Assess risk significance of various EQ issues.
O i
l0 l
l l
O EQ-Risk Scoping Study
- 1. Project Approach.
- 2. PRA perspectives on risk significant equipment operations that occur during harsh environments.
- 3. EQ perspectives on equipment whose harsh environment reliability may be different than typical PRA assumptions.
- 4. PWR Containment Fans-An Example O
i l
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EQ-Risk Scoping Study Task Structure t
Task 1: For a generic BWR and PWR and based on a PRA analysts perspective list those important equipment operability issues and operator actions that are needed to mitigate various accident states and which potentially could be impacted by aging or accident environments. (October,87)
Task 2: From an EQ specialists perspective list historical equipment operability concerns (November,87)
O Task 3: Use results from Tasks 1 and 2 to assess the potential for common-cause failure within a system or across systems of similar components that are needed to mitigate accident states. (initial Screen: November,87; Final Effort: January,88)
Task 4: Examine historical PRAs to determine traditional " risk achievement" and " risk reduction" ratios for those operability issues identified in Task 1 and if available, those operability l
issues identified in Task 2. (November,87)
O
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Task 5; Choose several equipment operability / operator action lasues for further study. (November,87)
Inakj; For each selected equipment operability / operator action i
issue, define those plants and accident sequences that most contribute to risk. (December,87)
Task 7: For selected equipment operability issues, plants and sequences of interest, identify important subcomponent locations, environments, system accuracy requirements, and component fragility levels. (January,88)
Task 8: List EQ lasues to be examined by the study. Identify important attributes for each issue. (January,88)
Task 9: Assess impact of EQ issues on equipment functionality.
Identify data sources; identify data shortcomings. (February,88)
(
Task 10: Assess impact of "EQ insights" on PRA modelling techniques. (March,88)
Task 111 Determine risk significance of EQ issues and summarize.
(March,88)
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