ML20213A324
| ML20213A324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1987 |
| From: | Harrell P, Hunter D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213A296 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-86-34, NUDOCS 8702030218 | |
| Download: ML20213A324 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1986034
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
' NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/86-34
License:
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Docket: 50-285
Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
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Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station
Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted:
December 1-31, 1986-
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Inspector:
WAA
I 'd-N
P.\\Hj 'MarM 1," Senior Resident Reactor
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IWspector
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Approved:
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D. R. Hunter, Chief, Project Section B,
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Reactor Projects Branch
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8702030218 870129
ADOCK 05000285
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-34)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety
verifications, maintenance, surveillance, plant tours, safety-related system
walkdowns, security observations, inoffice review of periodic and special
reports, followup on previously identified items, cold weather preparations,
and followup on an allegation related to dismissal of an individual for
incompetence.
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Results: Within the ten areas inspected, three violations (failure to identify
the auxiliary building as a radioactive materials area, paragraph 4; failure to
install a fire barrier / security door in accordance with documented installation
instructions, paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedure for operation of the
waste gas sampling system, paragraph 6) were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Andrews, Division Manager - Nuclear Production
- W. Gates, Plant Manager
C. Brunnert, Supervisor - Operations Quality Assurance
M. Core, Supervisor - Maintenance
- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor - Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs
- J. Fleuhr, Supervisor - Station Training
J. Foley, Supervisor - I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance
S. Gambhir, Section Manager - Generating Station Engineering (GSE)
- J. Gasper, Manager - Administrative Services
L. Gundrum, Manager - GSE Nuclear
M. Kallman, Supervisor - Security
L. Kusek, Supervisor - Operations
- D. Munderloh, Licensing Engineer
T. McIvor, Supervisor - Technical
R. Mueller, Plant Engineer
- A. Richard, Manager - Quality Assurance
G. Roach, Supervisor - Chemical and Radiation Protection
- F. Smith, Plant Chemist
J. Tesarek, Reactor Engineer
S. Willrett, Supervisor - Administration Services and Security
Others Attending Exits
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- J. Pellet, Operator Licensing Examiner, Region IV, NRC
- R. Hall, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects,
Region IV, NRC
- Denotes attendance at the monthly exit interview held on January 2,
1987.
- Denotes attendance at the senior reactor operator walkthru examination
exit held on December 17, 1986.
The inspector also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items
(Closed) Open Item 285/8602-06: Replacement of RTV seals during
maintenance or modification activities.
To establish equipment environmental qualification for terminal
blocks installed in the plant, the licensee applied RTV to the
blocks to form a vapor seal. However, the licensee had not
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established a method to ensure the seal was maintained during
subsequent maintenance or modification activities.
The licensee issued maintenance procedure HP-RTV-1, " Application
of RTV Silicon. Sealant on Terminal Blocks," Revision 0, dated
November 6, 1986, to establish the requirements for replacement
of RTV if the vapor seals are broken. The NRC resident
inspector reviewed.the procedure and it appeared to establish
the necessary controls and provide the appropriate instructions
for reapplication of RTV.
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(Closed) Open Item 285/8614-03: Section 5.9.5 of the updated safety
analysis report (USAR) requires licensee review to verify-
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information was correct.
The licensee performed a review of USAR Section 5.9.5,
Table 5.9-1, and figure 5.9-19 and verified that the information
provided in the USAR was correct. The NRC inspector performed a
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review of selected information and noted no problems.
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Subsequent to the review performed by the licensee, Table 5.9-1
and Figure 5.9-19 were replaced in the USAR by Figure 5.9-13,
Sheets 1 thru 64 during the annual update to the USAR. The NRC
inspector reviewed selected sheets for accuracy of the
information provided and noted minor errors of an editorial
nature. The licensee stated that the errors would be corrected
in the next scheduled USAR update.
(Closed) Deviation 285/8618-01: The safety parameter display system
(SPDS) does not monitor all parameters as stated in the safety
evaluation report (SER).
On September 29, 1986, the licensee submitted a letter to the
NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) requesting
changes to the approved SPDS parameter monitoring list. The
letter submitted by the licensee included justification as to
why the list should not include containment temperature, primary
system boron concentration, and primary system average
temperature.
NRR reviewed the licensee's submittal and on November 28, 1986,
issued a revised SER for the SPDS. The SER stated that NRR
concluded that monitoring of the three parameters listed above
was not required.
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(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8621-01:
Storage of boric acid
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to prevent damage or deterioration.
The licensee has stored the boric acid in a permanent critical
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quality equipment (CQE) area inside the auxiliary building. The
CQE area consisted of an enclosed wire cage to prevent stacking
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of extraneous material on the bags of boric acid.
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The NRC inspector verified that the boric acid had been placed
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in a permanent CQE storage area. The NRC inspector also toured
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other selected areas of the plant to verify that other CQE
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material was properly stored to prevent damage or deterioration.
No additional problems were noted.
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(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8621-02: A report was not
submitted for a nonfunctional fire barrier.
The licensee revised and reissued Procedure 50-58. " Fire Barrier
Penetrations," on September 19, 1986. The revision to S0-58
included a new requirement for any person working in the plant
to report to the plant engineer, any fire barrier that is not
functional for greater than seven days.
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The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure change issued by the
licensee.
It appeared that the procedure change adequately
addressed the requirements for reporting nonfunctional fire
barriers to the NRC.
(Closed) 11nresalved Item 285/8623-04: Organizational changes made prior
to updating the Technical Specifications (TS) and quality
assurance manual (QAM).
NRR issued Amendment 101 to the TS to incorporate the
organizational changes made by the licensee into Section 5 of
the TS.
The NRC staff concluded that the organizational changes
made by the licensee were acceptable.
The licensee changed the organizational charts and issued the
charts as a revision to the QAM. Prior to the change, an
evaluation was performed by the licensee. The results of the
evaluation indicated that the organizational changes made by the
licensee did not reduce the level of commitments stated in the
current NRC-approved quality assurance program.
(Closed) Open Item 8624-05:
Operator assigned to shift after failing NRC
annual requalification examination.
The NRC inspector interviewed the operator that failed to pass
the requalification examination to determine what duties the
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operator performed while assigned to an operating onshift crew
after the examination failure. The operator stated that he did
not perform any licensed duties and that he had been instructed
by licensee supervision not to perform license duties. The NRC
inspecter also interviewed other personnel onshift with the
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operator during the time period.
No individual could recall
whether or not the operator performed licensed duties. The NRC
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inspector interviewed licensee management and management
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confirmed that the operator was instructed not to perform
licensed duties.
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The NRC inspector reviewed documentation generated in the
control room during the time the operator was onshift after
failing the requalification examination. The documentation
review did not indicate that the operator had performed licensed
duties. The NRC inspector also reviewed the security computer
printout for the control room access during the time the
individual was assigned to the operating crew. The printout
indicated that there was at least one other licensed individual
in the control room at all times during this refueling period (a
licensed individual other than the operator who failed the
examination).
3.
Operational Safety Verifications
The NRC inspector conducted reviews and observations of selected
activities to verify that facility operations were performed in
conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative
procedures, and the TS. The NRC inspector made several control room
observations to verify:
Proper shift staffing
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Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requirements
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Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards
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equipment
Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and
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switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements
Proper return to rervice of components
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Maintenanceorders(MO)initfatedforequipmentinneedof
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maintenance
Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators
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No violations or deviations were noted.
4.
Plant Tours
The NRC inspector conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant
and equipment conditions. The following items were observed during the
tours:
General plant conditions
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Equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibration
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices including fire hazards
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and control of combustible material
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Adherence to the requirements of radiation work permits
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Work activities performance in accordance with approved procedures
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During tours of the plant,)the NRC inspector noted that all entrances to
the auxiliary building (AB were not properly posted to indicate that the
AB was a radioactive materials area. The doors identified by the NRC
inspector as not being properly posted were the emergency exit from the AB
and the door from the AB to the AB roof.
Both doors provide access from
the clean area outside the AB to the radioactive materials area inside the
AB.
Section 20.203(e) of 10 CFR Part 20 requires that each area or room in
which licensed material is used or stored be conspicuously posted with a
sign bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words
" Caution-Radioactive Materials Area." Paragraph 3.1.9 of Section 3.0 to
the licensee's radiation protection manual defined a radioactive materials
area as an area where licensed material is used or stored. The AB has
been designated by the licensee as a radioactive materials area. This
paragraph also stated that each radioactive materials area will be posted
with a sign bearing the radiation colors and symbol with the words
" Caution-Radioactive Materials Area". The licensee failed to post all
entrances to the AB with the appropriate sign. This is an apparent
violation.
(285/8634-01)
Upon notification by the NRC resident inspector, the licensee promptly
posted the doors identified by the inspector with the appropriate sign.
In addition, the licensee reviewed other possible entrances to the AB and
posted signs where appropriate. The licensee also reviewed other
locations inside the AB to verify signs had been appropriately posted. No
other problems were noted.
The NRC inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in response
to notification of the apparent violation.
It appeared the licensee had
adequately addressed the criteria for response to the apparent violation.
Based on the actions taken by the licensee and the review performed by the
NRC inspector no further information is required regarding Violation
285/8634-01, and the violation is considered closed.
During a plant tour, the NRC resident inspector noted that a fire
barrier / security door (1025-4) for the cable spreading room had been
recently installed with an excessive gap between the bottom of the door
and the threshold plate. The gap was approximately one-eighth of an inch
at one end and approximately five-eighths of an inch at the other end.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) specification states that
the gap for a door with a threshold should not be greater than
three-eighths of an inch. Upon notification by the NRC inspector, the
licensee reviewed the situation and determined that an hourly roving fire
watch had been in effect since installation of door 1025-4 as required by
the TS for a nonfunctional fire barrier. The establishment of the hourly
fire patrol was not due to the door being a nonfunctional fire barrier,
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but was established for.the cable spreading room in general. The licensee
-had not submitted a 30-day special report for this nonfunctional fire-
barrier as required by the TS. The licensee is reviewing the
reportability requirements for this fire barrier.-
The NRC resident inspector reviewed the instruction package
(MR-FC-85-38A/B) for installation of door.1025-4.
In addition to door
- 1025-4, this installation package also installed two additional doors
(1036-2 and 1011-28). Door 1011-28 was not a fire door but was installed
as a security door. Door 1036-2 was installed as a fire barrier / security
door. During review of this package, the NRC inspector noted a number of
anomalies associated with the completion of the documentation used for
installation activities. The anomalies are listed below.
For installation of doors 1025-4 and 1036-2, the procedural step
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requiring the engineer to verify the doors had been installed in
accordance with Underwriter Laboratory (UL) and manufacturer
standards was signed off. However, the doors.did not meet these and
NFPA standards in that the gap at the bottom of door 1025-4 was
excessive and door 1036-2 had six holes in it that exposed the core
of the door. The holes in door 1036-2 were ? eft unplugged when the
door closing mechanism was relocated. These conditions were noted
after the verification of installation step was signed on December
10, 1986.
No specific information was provided in the installation
instructions as to the acceptance criteria (e.g., maximum
door-to-threshold plate gap, exposure of door core not allowed, etc.)
required to meet the referenced standards.
In addition, the engineer
had signed the step verifying door 1025-4 had been painted blue when,
in fact, the door had not yet been painted. During review of the
installation package and actual door installation, the NRC inspector
noted, as stated above, that door 1036-2 was also a nonfunctional
fire barrier. The licensee has established that an hourly roving
fire patrol was in effect for this door since installation. The-
licensee is reviewing, in conjunction with door 1025-4,.whether a
special 30-day report required by the TS is also appropriate for door
1036-2.
For installation of doors 1036-2 and 1011-28, quality control (QC)
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hold points were included for verification of acceptable
installation, yet the QC hold points were not signed prior to
completing additional work beyond the hold points.
The " work completed" signature for installation of all three doors
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had been signed even though all steps in the installation procedure
were not completed.
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that activities
affecting quality be described in documented instructions, installed in
accordance with the instructions, and appropriate quantitative and
qualitative acceptance criteria be provided. Section A.6 of the
licensee's quality assurance plan amplifies this requirement and states
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that quality-related activities for plant operations, fabrication,
processing, assembly, inspection, and test be accomplished in accordance
with instructions and that such documentation adequately reflect all
applicable quality requirements and contain the appropriate quaatitative
acceptance criteria (such as dimensions, tolerances, and samples) for
determining that important activities have been satisfactorily
accomplished. The failure to install fire barrier / security doors 1036-2,
1011-28, and 1025-4, in accordance with documented instructions, to
provide the appropriate acceptance criteria in the instructions and the
failure to honor the specified QC hold points is an apparent violation.
(285/8634-02)
During plant tours, the NRC resident inspector also noted the following.
Dry, unused ion exchange resin was stored in an area that was not
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protected by an automatic detector / sprinkler installation. Upon
notification by the NRC resident inspector, the resin was moved to an
area with an automatic detector / sprinkler installation.
On four separate occasions during this inspection period, the NRC
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resident inspector noted that gas cylinders located in the AB were
not properly stored.
In each case, cylinders were stored in an
upright position without being properly secured to a structure.
Without proper securing, the cylinders could be overturned and
damaged, causing the cylinder to become a missile hazard and
endangering personnel and/or safety-related equipment. Upon
notification after each of the four occasions by the NRC resident
inspector, the licensee secured the cylinders.
The NRC inspector noted that two fire doors (1007-36 and 1011-1) were
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not functioning properly in that the doors would not always latch
thus making the fire barrier. nonfunctional. The licensee stated that
an hourly fire patrol had been established in accordance with the TS.
The licensee issued a maintenance order for repair of the door
closers. The closers were adjusted and the door returned to a
functional status within the seven-day period allowed by the TS;
therefore, a special report is not required to be submitted.
The licensee has been in the process of replacing old fire doors with
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new fire doors. After replacement of the fire doors, the licensee
has not reinstalled the signs that were installed on the original
fire doors. The signs included information such as no smoking; halon
system installed, evacuate if alarm sounds; and no two-way radio
transmission allowed. The licensee stated that the signs would be
replaced. The signs were not replaced by the end of this inspection
period.
A container of lubricating oil was stored adjacent to low pressure
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safety-injection pump (SI-2B). The flammable oil was stored in a
plastic bottle rather than an NFPA-approved container. The amount of
oil did not present a fire load for the affected fire area greater
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than what had been analyzed for that area. The NRC inspector
notified the licensee; however, the oil had not been placed in a
proper container or stored in a flammable storage cabinet prior to
the end of this inspection period.
Room 81 was found to be messy and needed additional licensee
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housekeeping attention. The NRC inspector notified the licensee;
however, additional housekeeping attention was not provided prior to
the end of the inspection period.
5.
Security Observations
The NRC inspector verified the physical security plan was being
implemented by selected observation of the following items:
The security organization is properly manned.
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Personnel within the protected area (PA) display their identification
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badges.
Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or
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controlled within the PA.
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Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry
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into the PA is permitted.
The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when security
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equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory measures to be
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Safety-Related System Walkdowns
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The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the following
safety-related systems to verify system operability. Operability was
determined by verification of selected valve and switch positions. The
systems were walked down using the' procedures noted:
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Reactor startup locked valves (Procedure OI-RC-28, Revision 45)
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Waste gas sampling system (Procedure 01-WDG-3, Revision 3)
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During the walkdowns, the NRC inspector noted minor discrepancies of an
editorial nature between the procedures and plant as-built conditions for
selected areas checked in the waste gas sampling systen. No problems were
noted during walkdown of the reactor startup locked valves procedure.
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None of the conditions noted during walkdown of the waste gas sampling
system appeared to affect the safe operation of the system. Licensee
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On December 4, 1986, the NRC resident inspector walked down portions of
the waste gas sampling system in preparation for closecut of licensee
event report (LER)86-003. LER 86-003 reported the release of radioactive
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gas to the auxiliary building due to misoperation of the waste gas system.
During the walkdown, it was noted that two valves in the system were not
aligned as required by Procedure 01-WDG-3. This procedure contained
specific instructions that required the sampling system to be placed in
the standby mode upon completion of sampling activities.
In discussion
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with licensee personnel, it was determined that the-chemistry technician
using the sampling system failed to return the system to the standby mode
upon completion of sampling activities. The licensee stated that the
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system valves would be realigned to the required positions.
-During a plant tour on December 29, 1986, it was again noted that the
waste gas sampling system had not been left in the standby mode as
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required by Procedure OI-WDG-3. Two valves were'found to be in a position
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other than required by the procedure. This was the second example during
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this inspection period where a chemistry technician failed to follow
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instructions for operation of the system as stated in the operating
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procedure. Licensee personnel- stated that the valves would be realigned
to the position required by the procedure.
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On December 31, 1986, the NRC inspector checked the waste gas sampling
system for co. rect alignment. During this check, the NRC inspector noted
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that five valves were left in a position other than required by Procedure
01-WDG-3. This is the third example of a failure to follow the procedure
-for operation of the waste gas sampling system identified during this
inspection period. All three examples discussed above involve the failure
of chemistry technicians to operate the waste gas sampling system in
accordance with an approved, documented operating procedure.
TS 5.8.1 requires that written procedures be established and implemented
that meet or exceed the procedures listed in Appendix A to Regulatory
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Guide 1.33.
Section 7.c of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires
that procedures be established-and implemented for sampling and monitoring
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the gaseous effluent system. Fracedure 01-WDG-3 has been established for
operation of the waste gas sampling system.
Procedure OI-WDG-3 was not
properly implemented in that on three occasions during this inspection
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period, the system was not operated as required by the operating
instructions. This is an apparent violation.
(285/8634-03)
Towards the end of this inspection period, the licensee began actions to
correct this identified problem. The actions included review of the
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procedure for possible revision and discussions with the individuals
involved and appropriate management personnel. None of the actions had
been completed at the end of this inspection period.
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Monthly Maintenance Observations
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The NRC inspector reviewed and/or observed selected station maintenance
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activities on safety-related systems and components to verify the
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maintenance was conducted ir. accordance with approved procedures,
regulatory requirements, and the TS. The following items were considered
during the reviews and/or observations:
The TS limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or
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components were removed from service.
Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work.
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Activities were accomplished using approved M0s and were inspected,
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as applicable.
Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
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returning components or systems to service.
Quality control records were maintained.
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Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
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Parts and materials used were properly certified.
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Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
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The NRC inspector reviewed and/or oiserved the following maintenance
activities:
Replacement of a fire door (M0 853383)
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Repair of containment isolation valve, PCV-7420 (M0 864493)
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Repair of the flow controller for the hydrogen analyzer (M0 864422)
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Repair of the emergency diesel generator brush holders (M0 864539)
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No violations or deviations were noted.
8.
Monthly Surveillance Observations
The NRC inspector observed selected portions of the performance of and/or
reviewed completed documentation for the TS required surveillance testing
on safety-related systems and components. The NRC inspector verified the
following items during the testing:
Testing was performed by qualified personnel using approved
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procedures.
Test instrumentation was calibrated.
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The TS limiting conditions for operation were met.
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Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were
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accomplished.
Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements.
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Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
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directing the test.
Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
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resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The NRC inspector observed and/or reviewed the documentation for the
following surveillance test activities. The procedures used for the test
activities are noted in parenthesis.
Testing of the electric-driven fire water pump (01-FP-6)
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Measurement of the moderator temperature coefficient using center
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control element assently (ST-MTC-1-F.2)
Measurement of a containment isolation valve leakrate
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(ST-CONT-3-F.4)
Monthly test of emergency diesel generator, D-1 (ST-ESF-6-F.3)
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Calibration of component cooling) water flow indication for the
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containmentcoolingunit(CP-416
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Cold Weather Preparations
During plant tours, the NRC inspector observed plant systems susceptible
to extreme col! weather to verify the systems were operating properly.
The observations were performed to verify the following:
Heat tracing for the appropriate systems was energized and operating
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properly.
Cold weather protective measures had been reinstalled for systems
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where maintenance and/or modification had been performed during the
past year.
The NRC inspector did not identify any problems from the effects of the
cold weather on any safety-related systems.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Inoffice Review of Periodic and Special Reports
Inoffice review of periodic and special reports was performed by the NRC
resident inspector and/or the Fort Calhoun project inspector to verify the
following, as appropriate.
Reports included the information required by appropriate NRC
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requirements.
Test results and supporting information were consistent with design
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predictions and specifications.
Determination that planneo corrective actions were adequate for
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resolution of identified problems.
Detennination as to whether any information contained in the report
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should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
During review of special reports, it was noted that a 10 CFR Part 21
report was submitted by the Validyne Corporation to the NRC on
September 17, 1986. The review indicated that the subject discussed in
the report may be applicable to the licensee's equipment. The NRC
resident inspector provided the report to the plant licensing engineer on
December 9,1986, for review of applicability by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Followup on An Alleoation (Reference 4-86-A-062)
An allegation was received by the NRC related to the discharge of an
individual working as a nuclear engineer in the licensee's generating
station engineering (GSE) department. The individcal making the
allegation stated that the nuclear engineer was fired for incompetence and
that the work performed by the engineer should be checked to verify that
the work was performed correctly.
The NRC inspector met with the Section Manager - GSE and the Manager - GSE
Nuclear to determine the circumstances associated with the dismissal of
the engineer. These two managers were in direct supervision cf the
safety-related activities performed by the engineer.
During the discussion, the two managers stated that the dismissal was
based on continuing problems management had with the engineer during the
months preceding his dismissal on March 28, 1986. The managers also
stated that the dismissal was in no way related to the tech '. ul competence
of the engineer.
The NRC inspector reviewed documentation contained in the engineer's
personnel file. The documentation confirmed that the engineer had
previously exhibited actions that had been a concern to his supervisors.
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The actions consisted of doing personal business on the telephone during
working hours, not getting along well with his coworkers and management,
consistent tardiness, and not meeting established deadlines for work
completion. These concerns were documented in a performance improvement
program written expressly for the individual in November 1985.
Management supervision stated that all safety-related work performed by
the engineer was independently reviewed and approved.
In many cases, an
independent third-party review was performed by a licensee contractor,
Stone and Webster. The reviews performed on the work generated by the
engineer seldom noted any technical errors.
Based on discussions with licensee management and the documentation
reviewed, it appears that the engineer was not discharged due to technical
incompetence, but was discharged due to personnel reasons. Therefore, no
evidence was found that substantiated this allegation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspector met with you and other members of the OPPD staff at the
end of this inspection. At this meeting, the NRC inspector sumarized the
scope of the inspection and the findings.
On December 17, 1986, an exit meeting was held to provide the licensee
with the results of the walkthru examinations given to a selected group of
senior reactor operators (SRO) by an NRC operator licensing examiner. The
results of the examinations indicated that all the SR0s examined
satisfactorily passed the walkthru examinations.
Those in attendance at
the exit are shown in paragraph 1 of this inspection report.
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