ML20212L991
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{{#Wiki_filter:_. .i. g a aerugr n UNITE 3 STATES / 4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y WASHINGTON. D. C. 20066 gg %,...../ t OCT 31 B77 Docket Nos.: 50-275 50-323 NOTE TO: FILE (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2) APPLICANT: Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG & E)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON OCTOBER 20-21, 1977, TO DISCUSS DIABLO CANYON SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION A meeting was held on October 20 and 21, 19'77 in Bethesda, Maryland to advise the NRC staff of the current status of the PG & E and Westinghouse effort on seismic re-evaluation of mechanical and electrical systems and components including piping. A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1. The highl'ights of discussions are as follows:
- 1. "' Tha applicant responded to some of the staff questions which had previously been provided' informally to PG & E regarding the material contained in Chapters 7, 8 and 10 of Amendment 50 to the subject FSAR.
The applicant's responses to these questions are provided in Enclosure 2. ) 2. PG & E advised the NRC staff that Ln response to the staff's concern ) on the seismic qualification of the main steam safety valves (Dresser ) type), a typical main steam safety valve has been removed from the plant and qualified for the Hosgri earthquake by a laboratory test. PG,& E has agreed to submit a report of test results for staff review. 3. The areas of concern raised by the Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT) were discussed. The concern is whether the components and equipment qualified previously with single frequency and single direction at a time can adequately withstand the possible simultaneous multi-frequency and multi-directional effects of the earthquake exci-tation. Currently PG & E is conducting a seismic test program for the seismic re-evaluation of Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2, including certain in-situ tests. The staff believes that the SQRT's concern can be addressed in the applicant's requalification program. 4. The applicant has agreed to provide a list of electrical equipment used in Diablo. canyon Units 1 & 2, supplied by Westinghouse but not 860E290326 860001 PDR FOIA HOUCH86-391 PDR For& es.s91 py A 94 l
i ' 6. 1 ( t 4 MEETING
SUMMARY
Docket File 4 5 ^ NRC PDR Local PDR TIC NRR Reading LWR 1 Pile E. G. Case s R. S. Boyd R. C. DeYoung J. Stolz t .K. Kniel 3 ;_
- 0. Parr S. Varga T
L. Crocker 4 D. Crutchfield F. Williams R. Mattson H. Denton D. Muller Project Manager D. Allison Attorney, ELD E. Hylton IE (3) ACRS (16) L. Dreher g NRC Participants E. Case R. DeYoung D. Vassallo J. Stolz t. D. Allison J. Knfght R. Bosnak-P. Chen T. Sullivan I. Sihweil D. Jeng P. Kuo I J. O'Brien W. Gammill M. Grossman J. Tourtellottee L. Davis \\, 1
.g. .h ( i [ UNITE 3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y' WASHINGTON, D. C. 20066
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e %...../ l OCT 31 B77 Docket Nos.: 50-275 50-323 FILE (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2) NOTE TO: Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG & E) APPLICANT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON OCTOBER 20-21, 1977, TO DISCUSS
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION in Bethsda, Maryland to LA meeting was held on October 20 and 21, 1977
- advise the NRC staff of the current status of the PG & E and Westinghouse d
etfort on seismic re-evaluation of mechanical and electrical systems an A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure ccsponents including piping. 1. ' The highlights of discussions are as follows: The applicant responded to some of the staff questions which had previously been provided informally to PG & E regarding the material 1. contained in Chapters 7, 8 and 10 of Amendment 50 to the subject FSAR. .The applicant's responses to these questions are provided in Enclosure 2. PG & E advised the NRC staff that in response to the staff's concern 2. on the seismic qualification of the main steam safety valves (Dresser type),ta typical main steam safety valve has been removed from the plant and qualified for the Hosgri earthquake by a laboratory test. PG & E has agreed to submit a report of test results for staff review. The areas of concern raised by the Seismic Qualification Review Team The concern is whether the components and 3. (SQRT) were discussed. equipment qualifie'd previously with single frequency and single ,i direction at a time can adequately withstand the possible sinultaneous multi-frequency and multi-directional effects of the earthquake exci-Currently PG & E is conducting a seismic test program for tation. the seismic re-evaluation of Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2, including i The staff believes that the SQRT's concern certain in-situ tests. can be addressed in the applicant's requalification program. The applicant has agreed to provide a list of electrical equipment 4. used in Diablo, Canyon Units 1 & 2, supplied by Westinghouse but not + 1 FerA %-spl ~ A c)4
z -2_ OCT 31197/ included in the Westinghouse's generic demonstration program. The applicant has also agreed to verify that this equipment has been qualified for the Hosgri earthquake. 5. The applicant advised the staff of the revision of Tables 7-5 and 7-6 of Amendment 50 to the subject FSAR. Table 7-5 will have 19 items and Table 7-6 will have 53 items, as listed in Enclosure 3, instead of the original 7 items and 19 items respectively. The revision will be documented in the forthcoming amendment to Amendment 50. 6. The staff was informed by the applicant that some in-situ tests by Westinghouse have been completed at the D'iablo Canyon site, for the components noted below, to verify seismic analysis methods and results. There components are representative of typical designs of auxiliary tanks, heat exchangers and demineralizers in Westinghouse scope. These components are: a. Safety Injection System Accumulator b. Evaporator Feed Ion Exchanger Demineralizer c. Seal Water Heat Exchanger. 7. A preliminary seismic audit on PG & E piping was conducted during the meeting. General areas of discusston and concern, and the preliminary findings are summarized in Enclosure 4. {w 8. As a result of their seismic re-evaluation, the ppplicant has proposed I to perform requalification for certain equipment and some in-situ tests to supplement the seismic qualification by analysis. The equipment proposed to be tested are provided in Enclosure 5. 9. In preparation for the scheduled seismic audit, PG & E was requested to fill out a Seismic Qualification Summary sheet for each equipment. It was agreed that PG & E will start with those items listed in the revised Tables 7-5, 7-7 and 10-1 plus the following items: o Reactor Coolant Pump o Reactor Coolant Pump Support o Steam Generator o Steam Generator Support o Pressurizer I o Pressurizer Support However, the staff may request more items if the need arises. \\ 4$ # ei-Ying Che ( Mechanical Engineering Branch / Division of Systems Safety ) / gw- ...I y
. s. ,) )
Enclosures:
1. Attendance List 2. Applicant's Responses 3. Equipment List Required for Safe Shutdown 4. Minutes of Discussions on Piping 5. Equipment List for Requalification Program cc: (Fee Next Page) l l A
~ 1
Enclosures:
1. Attendance List 2. Applicant's Responses 3. Equipment List Required for Safe Shutdown 4. Minutes of Discussions on Piping 5. Equipment List for Requalification Program cc: (See Next Page) 3 4 I I l t j .I e
) 1 Pacific Gas & Electric Company cc: Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq. Mr. John Forster Pacific Gas and Electric Company 985 Palm Street 77 Beale Street San Luis Obispo, California 93401 San Francisco, California 94106 Mr. William P. Cornwell Andrew J. Skaff, Esq. P. O. Box 453 California Public Utilities Commission Morro Bay, California 93442 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, California 94102 Mr. James O. Schuyler, Nuclear Project Engineer Mr. Frederick Eissler, President Pacific Gas & Electric Company Scenic Shoreline Preservation 77 Beale Street Conference, Inc. San Francisco, California 94106 4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105 Mrs. Thelma Hirdler 811 Fair Oaks Avenue Ms. Sandra A. Silver Arroyo Grande, California 94420 5055 Radford Avenue North Hollywood, California 91607 Mr. W. C. Gangloff Westinghouse Electric Corporation Mr. Gordon A. Silver P. O. Box 355 5055 Radford Avenue Pittsburgh,' Pennsylvania 15230 North Hollywood, California 91607 Yale I. Jones, Esq. Paul C. Valentine, Esq. 100 Van Ness Avenue 400 Channing Avenue 19th Floor Palto Alto, California 94301 San Francisco, California 94102 ds. Raye Fleming David F. Fleischaker, Esq. 1746 Charro Street 1025 15th Street, N. W. San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Washington, D. C. 20005 Nell Goldberg, Esq. Ms. Elizabeth E. Apfelberg Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering 1415 Cazadero 1666 K Street, N. W. San Luis Obispo, California 93401 Washington, D. C. 20006 N. M. Newmark Consulting Engineering Services 1211 Civil Engineering Building University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois 61801 l l 5 m m a ,me,w
') Attendance List Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG & E) Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 October 20, 21, 1977 Pei-Ying Chen NRC/MEB P. T. Kuo (part-time) NRC/SEB Panos Antiochos PGE Dwain W. Alexander Westinghouse Richard E. Bacher PG & E H. J. Gormly PG & E E. J. Sullivan, Jr. NRC/MEB M. A. Torcaso Westinghouse R. A. Young PG & E R. J. Bosnak (part-time) NRC/MEB J. Stolz (part-time) NRC/DPM Fe sr. -s,/ M4
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{,* l2.3 ) The definition of " rigid piping" defined.in Section 2.2.3.3 4,O is n'ot consistent with that defined in Section 2.2.3.5. Clarify the definition used and provide the basis. Tr.c wa: 2 "rl p.i u.:i.3 1.~. pra ;raph 2.2.3.3 was used in Lt:e general sense and may be applied to equipment in the plant. The word " rigid" used in tQ section 2.2.3.5 was used in a particular sense by the piping analyshots as a ,-O brief way to identify that piping qualified seismically by the use of restraint spacing criteria. Paragraph 2.2.3.5 ha2 to do only with this particular method and was not meant to be applied to equipment or to other piping. Paragraph 2.2.3.5 will be amended to clarify this situation. e' f O m. m
4 ) ~ 110 3 The definition of " Rigid Equipment" as given in Sectio 344, 1971 or 1975. Provide a listing of mechanical and electrical equipment having any natural frequencies in either the vertical 1. direction or either of the two horizontal directions less Note than 33 Hz which were considered to be rigid. d here that the mechanical and electrical equipment state ) should not be limited to only those presented in Chapters 7 and 10. List the natural frequencies of the equipment in 1 and their corresponding directions. listed meets the qualifi-Deconstrate that the equipnent cation requirements of the IEEE Standard-344, 1975. 3. P. G & Ou7~Ge~,e.), i Tables 7-5, 7-6, and 7-7 as amended list all theiClass I mechanicai equipment in the plant. Each of these tables lists natural frequencies and i.o We %'e a<c methods of qualification. The frequenciesdisted - - frequency for the various items ::;n$tt C' k __rrr r_ direction, '- --ti' = .N jr w. Qualification method (1), the equivalent static load method, .g } assunes that the item qualified was considered tio be rigid. For any Class I w. mechanical equipment which has any natural frequency below 33 hz and which has [n been qualified by method (1), that method will be justified or is being supported Q g. by additional work. / I I I D L l 4 f* s' ( m.
} o ., )' no.4 ~ In Settio it was mentioned that scismic capability k of some of the equipment was determined by ic: pact testing 2 (drop hacmer), centrifugal test, ::nd engineering judgement. 3 e.n Q Identify all such equip =ent and d._nonstrate that the qual-ification tethod is adequate icr the l'osgri earthquake. Section 2.3.4 referred to in the question concerns the original design qualification of el'ectrical equip =ent. No mechanical equipment has l' } g ~ been claimed to be qualified on the basis of drop hac=er or centrifugal 4 g testing or engineering judgement.. Methods used to qualify mechanical ,4 g equipment are described in section 2.3.3 and Chapter 7 of Amendment 50.
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] .3 e [. ' ".. .b^ u " '; b^~y \\~k v. ' + " "~' m '\\ .a. 7-C .u. s ~._. i.~~ m , Q ^'.\\ ' e y G s, e I n e O
N0 In rolnti:n to tha attrici prachnely c nteined 141mendment
- 50/ provide su'pplementary information to demonstrate that k %'
all scismic Design C,las,s I Systems and components and those y Design Class II and III components, which are either necessary [f 5 for cold shutdown or'5re safotv 'related, are qualified for the k7 !!oscri carthqu G.e. ~ The Seismic Evaluation for Postulated 7-SM Hosgri Earthquake, Amendment 50, is being supplemented by subsequent amendment so as to demon-strate the seismic qualification of all Class I systems and components. Design Class II and III components are neither necessary for safe shutdown nor safety related, as is evident from the definition of Class I, II, and III given in Section 3.2.1 of the FSAR. Amendment 50 Section 5.1 describes the use of the steam generator los atmospheric steam dump valves following the postulated Hosgri carthquake and loss of offsite power. These Ud T/, valves are not Class I. They have been qualified, as is described in Section t,
- 7 (b
} 7.4.5 and Table 7-7, and we would expect to use them. However, they are I ' C11. neither necessary nor safety related, this function being performed by the steam generator safety valves, which are Class I. As a part of the Hosgri evaluation, we are reviewing Class II and III systens to assure that seismically-induced failures will not preclude safe shutdown. 6 s } 'l I b ---=.,-..----,v.-m-- ---,,--.,e-,e.- --._e e,%- ,e _y
In T;bla 5 2 ef-ths.bendment 50 to tha FSAR, 3.6 was 7 used for faulted condition stress limits frr Cicca #A piping. Q.Q Provide the rationale and justification 1 for 'the use of .4 ,g, 3.6 S. n 3.6 S 1: in:luded in the Diablo Canyon FSAR as the faulted condition h criterion for Class A piping. Paulted conditions, as defined in"the FSAR, include evaluation of the postulated simultaneous occurrance of the Double Design Earthquake (DDE) and the Ioss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) for which this criteria was intended. However, for all evaluations of Class A piping for the, Hosgri event, 2.4 Sh was used as the criterion. This stress criterion is consistant with that presently accepted by the ASME code for piping analyzed to rules comparable to the ANSI B31.1 rules used for the Hosgri evaluations. In most cases, piping analysis for the Hosgri event resulted in maximum stresses lower than 1.8 S *h u, ) The 3.6 Sh criterion is reasonable for its intended purpose, ,b 5
- identified above.
The Sh allowables as provided in the B31.1 code were selected so that they do not exceed twenty-five percent of minimum ultimate tensile g strength (.25 Su) evaluated at ambient or operating t,emperature, which ever is lower. At the time of preparation of the Diablo Canyon FSAR there were no generally accepted criteria for faulted condition evaluations. It was determined that increasing the then existing emergency condition criteria of 1.8 Sh by a factor of two for 6 highly improbable simultaneous occurrance of DDE and IDCA was justified. 'This insures that maximum primary stresses in the piping will be less than.9 Su. Considering the improbability of simultaneous occurrance of th'e DDE and LOCA, the use of conservative (elastic) piping analysis, and the use of ASTil minimum ultimate tensile properties, 3.6 S h is acceptable and provides an an adequate safety margin in the piping. L-e
') 11 0, 7 / In view of the steam generater problems. (c.g., denting of . 'o tubes and cracking of tube supp:rts) recently occurring in the Westin; house supplied nu:le:r power plants, what 'C M) measures have PG & E a.d Wc. stint ouse taken to minimize the h g pescibi,lity of these r:ble:s c.:crrin; in the stean gener- ,(t -s aters used in Disblo Canyon Uni:s 1 & 2. .. ~... The denting and cracking referred to in this question result after corresion of the support plates at tube holes. The feedwater chemical treat-menthasbeenchanged,atWestinghousregg*.engation,ffrom phosphate control 's-p g p w't - p,,.:, W thu. . e. to all volatile treat::ent? The condensors h ve been re-tundd with titanium 9 tubes, which will reduce or eliminate the introduction of imourities from N. k.9 + tw h.o d s w k. dJe6 k a-.v's--- r.J e-Experience at other plants indicates,that both the circulating sea water. W k these changes should reduce the liklihood of denting. Furthermore, oxygen, ,g J, known to aggrevate this type of corrosion, is being controlled at the minimum 4 g practicable level in the feedwater, ev.en during the pre-scrvice and lay-up periods. We are folicwing the Westinghouse and the EPRI investiga{.l.ons of stear. generator problems and intend to take whatever further meacai'as may be reco:c. ended as a result of that work. g t 0 m I i /
) .x f M,f ~3 Section 7.4.2 states that the ficxibic supports under the j d diesels we're re:aoved to satisfy seis=ic requirements. Detron-strate that the curre:.t design has adequataly considered vibre:.icn r i.:n, f:. diesci ;pcrc.ti:n. Af ter the removal of the flexible supports, each diesel-generator was tested for 5 days under load (120 hours continuous run at about 2 MW). 1 ). No vibration or functional problem whatsoever was noticed in the diesels d or related accessories and equipment. e-5 5 e e-O
.s ) lNd0 ) In $cccion 7.4.4, it was stated in page 714 that, as part. [ Y of the Hosgri evaluation', a vibration test was conducted to determine the lowest natural-frequency of the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers. Present the test, test results and
- t nnnlysis recults in a core cerplete fashion.
v The test referred to in the question was inconclusive because of the i D ) low level of excitation employed (flow induced vibration). Another test with Y' an appropriate external vibrator is being conducted to investigate further the 6 s , '{ -} response of the component cooling water heat exchangers. The results of this ~ s g, test will be made available for audit by the staff. o e d e I l v
J-y ? ,i H;- t lno ol .g Desonstrate that the =2in stes= rafety valves are seismically 'S t] qualified for the Hosgri earth uske. The main steam safety valves have been qualified for the Hosgri 3, y earthquake by a laboratory test. A report of this test is being prepared ? and will be available for audit by the staff. e e I l
'C . Amendment' 50. to tha F b indicet:s that cart:in type)f pip'ing have been supported by the use of seismic restraint ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ spacing criteria. (1) Provide verification of the adequacy of the piping and cuppcrts designci using tb crir,inal spacing ) .criterit by sub-ittin; the resuhs of sc=ple co:puter analyses of actusi plant piping; with cultiple supports Q y' between physical pipe an: hors, subjected to the Hosgri earthquake excitatien. ~nese sa:ple analyses should .g include cibow and tees for which the spacing criteria .f ,. p.. on page 2-11,of A=end:ent 50 was applied. \\ ') (2) Provide si ilar calculations as in (1) but using the actual stiffncss of the supports which have a first mode natural, frequency of about,20 Hz. The adequacy of the solstnic restraint spacing criteria method has been reviewed for qualification to Hosgri acceleration levels in two ways. and supgLef loadswe cer(etit First, the spacing tables 3have been reviewed using the simplified dynamic analysis method by which they were constructed originally, but using the llosgri spectra. Second, a representa'tive piping system has been analyzed by computer to confirm that the simplified dynamic analysis method gives dependable results. The result of the first review is that for all Clas s I systems qualified by the spacing criteria method, combined dead load, pressure, and gd Hosgri seismic struses remain below the allowable stress (2.4 S ). Wang SOM h support loads have increased. The calculated llosgri support loads are being / -f h.4. <,( -{ used to re-evaluate the stresses in all components of supports in Class 1 3 piping, and nodifications are being nade if indicated. vi# al yd wov ad c isc w del A '.> A ~
- 1n The second review showed that for aAroprosentative piping system (including elbows and tees) both pipi stress and support loads were lower when calculated by the detailed compiter method than when calculate 1 by the simplified dynanic c'ethe 1, confirttin i the conservatism of the latter mothed and the adequacy of the spacing criteria.
The representative piping system referred to in the preceding paragraph was analyrad uring the cor:: uter method also to determine the ef fect of support stiffness on tae analysir. It was found that if all supports were assumed to have a fittt r:ie nate: cal f requency of 20 f.z, no pipe strussos en tha we ra ae, surport led .1 - e t - r an'
- 5 evceeded allet*'-
e~ ilnis, of course, is more c. e - b increase over 6 t
- et*
,nr. the une of actual support stif*:... is the actual tur i in analysis would nat h,v - apprec.o te efruct on the outcome. I
~ s. a - --- - Jcc otottd 3 st Unit r'scIcgur 'll$ l% Ia S :c, ira 10.3.21., irelay panelbe rd v;s'tcqtcd by Wy13 Labtrottr ca cn i d ait f 2 panelboard was tested at the. vendor's plant. It was inputs used for Unit 2 panelboard were h's] noted that the test Explain the differences quite different from those for Unit 1. in structural characteristics of these two panelboards, if x 3 ,4 Demonstrate any, and the reason for using the different inputs. "?([)- th:t the Unit 1 panelboard is qualificd for the Hosgri carthquake. The Unit 2 panelboard was manufactured by,a different fabricator than the Unit 1 panelboard. The Unit 2 panelboard was tested at the vendor's facilities. g Since his testing eqtipnent was considerably different than Wyle's, a different w \\b approach was taken which resulted in the use of different inputs. y l / 'g(4 A review of this equipment is being conducted to determine qualification to the Hosgri seismic requirements. Qualification will be demonstrated and reported in an amend.,ent. 5 h 6 Al e g 9 L r i
) ) jtit.It k.9 tion of the Rotary Relay for use in the Trojan and Diablo The topical report (WCAP 8941, Feb. 1977), " Seismic Qualifica-h d .i Canyon Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets", has not been reviewed W ,i by the ! TAC Staff. Sub.it the report in ti.c for review before D* the scheduled scir: ic muJit. f ~.. -~ WCAP 8941 " Seismic Qualification of the Rotary Relay for use in the Trojan and Diablo Canyon Auxiliary Safeguards Cabinets" has been completed and is presently in printing. This report is scheduled to be submitted to the Staff Il 24 l by October k6, 1977. Since the rotary relay test results have been presented e, .g } to the Staff during the various meetings conducted under the Westinghouse Electrical Equipment Demonstration Program, it is anticipated that this will k provide sufficient time for review prior to the scheduled seismic audit. b e S 9 + i 1 ~ 4
[I.N V:rify th:t the fc1* fing W:Ctinghounc tcpital r;pr-go c3 r:fcc:nc dl.in Amendme:t 50 cro cppliccblo f:r usa.i..Di:blo Canyon Units 1 & 2, under the Eosgri earthquake excitation ~ (final spectra): t ] ~ During the office audit several cases will be reviewed for (1) judicious location of restraints on the class Il side of the anchor and (2) validity i
- di
, :. /- of assumptions used in the calculation of forces and moments on these , if 'h ' restraints and the anchor. 5. Review the results of several actual plant piping computer analyses for the Hosgri event.modeled with actual support stiffnesses. The piping ik g in the problems reviewed should cover the range of nominal pipe sizes used in the plant. Review the resulting stresses and support loads from ( 'these analyses as compared with those obtained assuming rigid supports. [ Review the hanger analyses for the new loads. \\ Freliminary results of six problems were reviewed. The problems included ( piping from 3 to 20 inches NFS, carbon and austenitic stainless steel, and a variety of locations in the plant. P'G. & E was requested to show that all restraints, where the load " ncr' ease was 50% or more, are not overstressed, since this was not included i (in the preliminary results. The 50% level was chosen on the basis of the large margin of safety tv ' characteristic of hanger design. J g
- i The preliminary results reviewed showed little increase in pipe j
b;L stress and no stresses exceeding allowables. The highest stress {' has 88% of the allowable stress. The largest increase in maximum stress for the six analyses was 27%. This stress was 30% of the allowable stress. 6. Review the methods used to analyze branch lines from main runs of piping. Review several piping computer models, covering a range of sizes of
r ) 4-branch lines, for inclusion of a portion of each branch line. Review the acceptability of analyses where branch lines were not modeled with the main piping run. Branch lines are modeled in three ways: 1. If the seismic movements of the run pipe at the branch connection are large, the branch line is modeled directly with the header; thus creating an integral piping system. 2. If the seismic movements are small, the branch line is modeled with a portion of the header to the next pinned, or anchored, point in both directions of piping from the branch connections. Auxiliary Feedwater connections to the Main Feedwater headers for legs 3 and 4 at Diablo Canyon were reviewed. They use types 2 and 1 modeling techniques respectively. Auxiliary Steam to the Steam Turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from Main Steam lead 3 was reviewed. Modeling technique . number 2 was used. 3. If the seismic movements are very small at a small pipe branch connection, the branch line was nodeled with the branch connection as an anchor. This is done only when there is negligible participation from the run pipe. 8. Review the procedures used by P.C. & E to insure that contractors who performed analyses for Diablo Canyon used analysis methods consistent with those of P.G. & E. The analysi.s methods referred to include such items as those designated for review in 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 above. F-
) . The piping analysis for the Hosgri reevaluation is being performed by P.G. & E and their contractors using the same program, namely, PIPESD. All piping models were either prepared by P.G. & E engineers or checked by P.G. & E. engineers and therefore consistency is assured. Pipe restraint and anchors being reevaluated by contractors are analyzed using " Guidelines for Pipe Supports and Restraints" which was prepared by P.G. & E. The terms of these contracts required that the work be performed according to these guidelines. These guidelines will be reviewed during the seismic office audit for their adequacy. U e M
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) DIABLO CANYON Items to be tested in place by forced-vibration method to determine dynamic parameters (natural f requencies, damping, modal shapes) 1. Diesel-Generators 2. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 3. Component Cooling Water Surge Tank 4. Boric Acid Tanks 5. Liquid Hold-Up Tanks 6. CO Storage Tank 2 7. One (or two) large valve (s) with motor operators (in line) 8. One large valve with air operator (in line) 9. Five representative pipe runs 10. About twenty pipe hangers & supports
- Testing will be done by:
Applied Nucleonics Co. (A!!CO) Testing is scheduled to start by 1 Nov. 1977. In addition we will do shaker-table tests of three large size valves (motor and air operated) to prove clielr operability under severe forced vibration, and conditions resembling those of the environment they will operate (except flow). 1 S ~*
TABLE 1 OUTLlHE OF QUALIFICATION OPTIONS Options 1 2 3 4 5 Remarks Equipment A Test TL123 Hot Shutdown Panel Local Starters A B A Test Components if Necessary Local Instrument Panels A B Ventilation Sys. Relay Panel l A Ventilation Sys. Logic Panel 6 Diesei Gen. Auxil. Cabinet A B A Fire iump Controller A B Test Turbine Lube Oil Starter 125-2,0 v DC MCC e f A B B B DC Sw:tchgear 8 Battery Charger A A Use Spares for Test Main Annunciator A yy ) Diesel Gen. Control Cabinet $ E, I' Diesel Gen. Excitation Cubicle A B o 'Y [ Vital Relay Board A we Vital Load Center (480 v) A A mE I i Vital Switchgear (4160 v) A A I e o,. Lu e e}}