ML20154R111
| ML20154R111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1986 |
| From: | Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Mchard S KATZ, MCANDREWS, BALCH, LEFSTEIN & FIEWEGER (FORMERLY |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-79 NUDOCS 8603280060 | |
| Download: ML20154R111 (3) | |
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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ggg g Samuel S. McHard, Esquire-Katz, McAndrews, Durkee, Balch & Lefstein, P.C.
200 Plaza Office Building 1705 Second Avenue P.O. Box 66 IN RESPONSE REFER Rock Island, IL 61204-0066 TO FOIA-86-79
Dear Mr. McHard:
This is in regard to your request, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, to which the NRC assigned the above number.
This is a partial response to your request. We will notify you upon completion of search for and review of any additional records subject to your request.
The staff has completed the search for and review of records subject to your request, and this is the final response to your request.
The NRC has no records subject to your request.
X Records subject to your request are available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public' Document Room (PDR),
1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, as noted on the enclosure (s). The PDR accession number is identified beside each record description.
X Records subject to your request are being made available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, in the POR file folder under. the above number and your name. These records are listed on the enclosure (s).
X We are enclosing a notice that proviEes information about charges and procedures for obtaining records from the PDR.
y Sincerely,
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H Donnk H. Grimsley, Direct Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration Enclosure (s): As stated 8603280060 860221 PDR FOIA MCHARD86-79 PDR
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FOIA-86 APPENDIX A
. Records tseing Placed in the Public Document Room 1.
l05/08/85 Daily Report RIII 2.
05/08/85 Preliminary Notification of-Event or Unusual Occurrence --
PNO-III-85-39
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05/03/85 ~ CECO to NRC - LER No. 85-11 U
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F0lA-86-79 APPENDIX B r,ecords Available in the Public Document Room 1.
.06/12/85 IE Inspection Reports No. 50-254/85012; No. 50-265/85013 -
Accession No. 8506260303 - ADOCK/50-254Q 2.
08/21/85 IE Inspection Reports No.' 50-254/85017; No. 50-265/85019 -
Accession No. 8509040360 POR/AD0CK/50-2549
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-III-85-39 Data May 8, 1985.ff0 This pral'itinary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.
The information is as initially received without veri-fication or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the staff on this date.
Fr 7 ty: Comonwealth Edison Co.
Licensee Emergency Classification:
Quad Cities N?S XX Notification of an Unusual Event Cordova, IL 61242 Alert Site Area Emergency Docket Nos: 50-254, 50-265 General Emergency
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Not Applicable Subj:ct: TWO INJURED IN ACCIDENT CAUSING PARTIAL LOSS OF 0FF-SITE POWER Two contractor employees were injured May 7,1985, when an electrical cable they were using came into contact with a 345 kilowatt power line, which was providing off-site power to the plant. Unit I was operating at 100 per cent power, and Unit 2 was shut down for refueling.
Tha workers were on the roof of the diesel generator building when the accident occurred about 3:15 p.m.
They received burns on their hands and were taken by off-site ambulance to a R:ck Island, Illinois, hospital for treatment.
Wh:n the cable touched the 345 kv line, the Unit 2 auxiliary transformer tripped, causing a 1:ss of off-site power to Unit 2.
Power for Unit 2, which is in a refueling outage, was supplied by the shared diesel generator and by a cross-tie to the Unit I auxiliary trans former.
The electrical short on the 345 kilovolt line triggered a voltage drop in the plant 01:ctrical supply, which, in turn, led to a trip of the Unit I reactor.
(Feedwater temperature dropped, and the feedwater regulator valves were locked into position, which caused a reactor. trip on high water level as the reactor operator reduced power output.)
icensee declared an unusual event under its emergency plan at 3:17 p.m., and the unusual event classification was terminated at 5 p.m. when Unit 1 power was connected to Unit 2.
The Unit 2 auxiliary transformer was placed back onto service at 6:35 a.m.,
May 8, 1985. Unit I will remain shutdown for a previously seneduled maintenance outage.
Th2 State of Illinois will be notified.
Th ra was local news media interest in the injuries to the two workers.
The H:adquarters Duty Officer was notified of this event at 3:42 p.m., May 7,1985.
This infcrmation is cur ent as of 9 a.m., May 8,1985.
CONTACT:
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hrissotimos a fer FTS 388-5716 FTS 388-5656 DISTRIBUTION:
H. St. 4 56 MNBBN Tt Phillips A J' E/W g 30 WillsteMid3 Chairman Palladino EDO NRR IE NMSS Comm. Roberts PA OIA RES Comm. Asselstire MPA AE00 Comm. Bernthal ELD Air Rights /Jfl ADM:DMB MAIL:
Comm. Zech SP INP0M. V SECY NSAC a r]
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Regions I Ae6, IIN /'J, IV au, V ).g Licensee (CorporateOffice)f0f L
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UATEt 05/08/85 I
FCCILITf/ LICENSEE NOTIFICATION ITEM OR EVENT HEo!ONAL ACTION
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DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS CLINTON PER 10 CFR S0.SS(El ON 05/0T/85, ILLIN0IS POWER FOLLOWUP PER MC 2512 NOTIFILO RIII THAT THE HEATING, WENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING (NWACI CONTRACT 0H. THE ZACK COMPANye DID NOT ADDRESS THE IM8ACT OF DESIGN CHANGES ON ITEMS PREVIOUSLY INSPECTED. THE 1
EATENT, IF ANfe OF COMPLETED INSTALLATIONS uMERE DESIGN CHANGES HAVE NOT BEEN INCORPORATED 15 dEING DETERMINED SV ILLINDIS PowCR. A 30-DAY REPORT WILL FOLLOW THEIR INVESTIGATION.
I udAD CITIES HQ 00 WHILE WORKING ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR ROOF, RI w!LL FOLLOW CONTHACTONS INA0VERTENTLY CauSE3 A TRIP 0F SEuuENCE OF EVENTS UNIT 2 MAIN TRANSFORMER.
THIS TRIP CAUSED CLOSELY ~AND MONITOR l
AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL TO OCCUR FON 80TH UNITS.
LICENSEE ACTIONS.
THE UNIT I AND Su!NG O!ESEL AUTO STARTED. THE Sw!NG DIESEL PROVIDED power TO JNIT 2 wHICH HAS A PN IS BEING ISSUE 0 BEEN IN COLD SMuTDOWN FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS
$1NCE MARCH IV85.
UNIT I EXPERIENCE 0 A REACTOR SCRAM FROM HIGN WATER LEVEL DUE TO 4 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILING IN AN OPEN POSITION BECAUSE OF UNDERVOLTAGE. UNIT I WAS TAKEN TO COLD SHUT 00WN TO WEGIN A PLANNED MAINTENANCE OUTAGE.
THE w0RKERS INVOLVED IN THE EVENT RECEIVED BURNS AND WERE TRANSPORTED TO A LOCAL 1
N0 SPITAL Of AM8ULANCE.
i OIVISION OF REACTOR SAFETY AND SAFEGUAROS bENLMAL DR. C. J. PAPENIELLO w!LL BE GIVING A INFORMATION J
PRESENTATION ON
- DESIGN OF ENVIRONMENTAL 1
MONITORING PROGRAMSw AT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY mEING MELO IN DECATURe ILLINDIS.
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Commomrealth Edison Oued Cites Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Corcova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 300/064-2241 NJK-85-151 May 30, 1985 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two Enclor.ed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-11, Revision 00, for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.
This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulttions, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 50.73(a)(2)(vii), which requires the reporting of any event that resulted in an automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, and the reporting of an event where a single cause resulted in at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems.
Respectfully, COM110NWEALTH EDISON C0!! PAIN QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION ff W
N. J. Kalivianakis Station Manager NJK:BRS/bb Enclosure cc B. Rybak A. !!adison M J 0 gy INPO Records Cent.er NRC Region III 4fd$77hTdY
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n et on May 7,1985, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at approximately 90 percent of rated core thermal powar. Unit 2 was in COLD SHUTDOWN. At 1517 hours0.0176 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.772185e-4 months <br />, contractor personnel working on roof repairs were attempting to connect a pouer cord for a drill to an AC outlet located near the ground below.
While lowering the cord from the roof, a sudden 'A' phase to ground fault occurred. This fault opened oil circuit breakers (OCB) 8-9 and 9-10, which caused a loss of normal auxiliary power to Unit 2.
Diesel Generator 1/2 auto-started and closed-in to Bus 23-1 on a Bus 23-1 undervoltage signal.
Unit 2 remained stable.
The electrical transient in the 345 KV switchyard caused a transient on the Unit 1 electrical systen. The transient caused a loss of 'A' Reactor Protection System Bus and a lock-up of a Feedwater Regulating Valve. The locked-up Feedwater Regulating Valve resulted in a high Reactor water level condition which resulted in a Turbine trip, and Reactor scram. This occurred six minutes af ter the electrical transient, at 1523 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.795015e-4 months <br />. Sub-sequently, a normal scram recovery was performed and all electrical systems were returned to normal. All systems and equipment functioned as designed.
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.as c a -, an..nm Event Description On May 7,1985, Unit 1 was in the RUN mode at approximately 90 percent of rated core thermal power. Unit 2 was in COLD SHUTDOWN for its End of Cycle 7 Refueling and Maintenance Outage. At 1517 hours0.0176 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.772185e-4 months <br />, contractor personnel, working on roof repairs, were attempting to connect a power cord for a drill to an AC outlet located near the ground below in the vicinity of Unit 2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (T-22).
In the process of lowering the cord from the roof, a sudden 'A' phase to ground fault occurred, apparently from the cord getting too close to T-22
'A' 345 KV phase line. Two contractor personnel received burn injuries. They were given first aid treatment by Radiation Chemistry Technician personnel, and transported by ambulances to Franciscan Hospital, Rock Island, Illinois.
No personnel were contaminated.
Both injured contractors are recovering and there will be no disabling inj uries.
At the instant of the fault, Transformer T-22_ tripped when oil circuit breake rs (OCB) 8-9 and 9-10 (FK) opened due to
'A' phase undervoltage.
This caused a loss of normal auxiliary power to Unit 2.
Diesel Generator 1/2 auto-started due to an undervoltage signal on Bus 23-1 and closed-in to that Bus. There was no ircediate safety concern over the status of Unit 2 since the unit was shutdown for refueling and the Reactor water level was elevated in preparation for Reactor vessel head installation. The unit remained stable.
At the time of the loss of T-22, several events took place on Unit 1:
A.
Loss of the
'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus.
B.
!!omentary voltage degradation of the instrument Bus.
C.
One-half of the Group II and III Primary Cc,ntainment Isolation Valves went closed.
D.
Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) Suction Valve closure.
E.
Feedwater Regulating Valve, H0 1-642B, lock-up.
F.
Diversion of the Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Drains to the main Condenser.
The diversion of the Feedwater Heater Drains to the main Condenser, thereby not cascading from heater to heater, resulted in a slow decrease of Feedwater temperature. This caused a slow reactivity addition. Station procedures direct the Nuclear Station Operators to drop 20 percent speed on M
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.mc a.- m w im Event Description (continued) the Recirculation Pumps and then to begin inserting control rods in sequence.
'Ihis power reduction, with a locked-up regulating valve, resulted in a high Reactor water level condition. The mai: Turbine trip at +48 inches and the resulting Reactor scram from Turbine Stop Valve closure occurred at 1523 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.795015e-4 months <br />. After the scram, a normal scram recovery was initiated.
A Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) Unusual Event was declared at-1540 hours due to Emergency Action Level (EAL) #10, loss of all off-site pouer to a unit. Appropriate NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone notifications were made for both the Unit 1 scram and the Unit 2 loss of power.
At approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, af ter Unit I was stabilized, it was decided to energize Bus 24-1 on Unit 2 utilizing the Bus 14-1 to Bus 24-1 crosstie breakers. Bus 29 was subsequently energized, as were the RPS buses.
The GSEP Unusual Event was terminated at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />.
Cause These events occurred from a transient that took place in the 345 KV switchyard. A fault occurred on the high voltage side of the Unit 2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer. This fault was a high voltage transmission system fault.
The fault was of five cycle (0.083 sec) duration and was at ground potential for the five cycles. The oscillograph recordings were analyzed by System Operational Analysis Department (SOAD). 'Ihese recordings showed
'A' phase to be at zero volts for five cycles, while 'B' and 'C' phase voltages dropped by 10 percent from normal voltage for five cycles.
The duration was the result of equipment response time to isolate the fault.
The fault was detected by two independent sets of 345 KV protective relays.
Both sets of relays operated and initiated the proper breaker trips. All protective devices functioned correctly and cleared the fault within design limits.
The electric grid has been analyzed for the simultaneous loss of both nuclear units at Quad-Cities Station.
The analysis involved a 3 phase fault and loss of both units. The electric grid can withstand such a situation.
An event of this type is documented in RO 50-265/77-37/03L.
The depressed voltages on the 345 KV system during the fault resulted in abnormal voltages in both Unit 1 electrical divisions. One electrical division is supplied by the Unit 1 main Generator via the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the other division is supplied by of f-site power via the mneu r~p J
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Reserve Auxiliary Transformer. To determine the extent to which the 345 KV fault affected'the auxiliary power system, System Planning conducted a computer study. The results of the study show that the phase voltage on the auxiliary power system were as follows:
Livision Supplied By Division Supplied By Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Unit Auxiliary Transfomer 4 KV System Vab - 2400 V Vab - 2670 V Vac - 2400 V Vac - 2670 V Vbc - 4400 V Vbc - 4290 V 480 Volt System Vab - 132 V Vab - 218 V Vac - 455 V Vac - 455 V Vbc - 455 V Vbe - 455 V The most significant difference between the voltages in the two divisions occurred on the A to B voltage on the 480 Volt systems. The A to B voltage on the 480 Volt buses powered from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer dropped to 132 Volts (27 percent of nomal) as compared to 218 Volts (45 percent of nomal) on the buses powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transfomer. The depressed voltage of 132 Volts for five cycles caused the contactor feeding the 1-A RPS liotor Generator (?!G) Set drive motor to drop out.
The control circuit for the 480 Volt drive motor of the RPS !!G Set does not allow an automatic restart of the motor. When the contactor dropped out, tripping the liG Set, the flywheel had no effect on the resulting !!G Set operation.
The flywheel would be effective for transients when the !!G Set drive motor does not trip. The abnomal voltages did not affect the operation of equipment on the 4 KV System. The loss of voltage and the degraded voltage protective circuits designed for the Class lE, 4160 Volt buses require two seconds or more to operate. They should not operate for transient voltage dips.
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SJAE suction valve closure is a normal consequence on the loss of ' A' RPS Bus, as is the closure of one-half of the Group 11 and III Primary Containment Isolation Valves. The momentary voltage degradation on the Instrument Bus caused the Feedwater Heater Level Control Valves to trip.
The air operated, normal drain valves, on the Feedwater Heaters, close automatically upon sensing Feedwater Heater high water level by the operation of nomally energized electrical solenoid valves. These solenoid valves are installed in each Level Control Valve's control air line and are electrically energized from the Instrument Bus. A momentary voltage degradation of the Unit 1 Instrument Bus caused these solenoid valves to close. After these valves close, they can only be reset manually at the local rack. The heater. drains were, therefore, diverted to the Feedwater Heater emergency damp valves that drain directly to the main Condenser.
The Feedwater Regulating Valve lock-up was a result of the tripping of the hydraulic pump for the valve operator. This pump tripped because its contactor dropped out in a similar fashion as the RPS MG Set drive motor contactor.
Corrective Action Transformer 22 was examined and damaged insulators were found on the
' A' phase lines feeding the transfomer. The insulators were replaced and the transformer was returned to service at 0645 hours0.00747 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.454225e-4 months <br /> on May 8, 1985. All systems and equipment functioned as designed and no changes are necessary.
Houever, the Station is considering a modification which may prevent losing the feed to the RPS MG Set drive motor for similar faults on the 345 KV system. The modification involves a time delay relay which allows the flywheel to be more effective in performing its intended function.
In November, 1977, a fault in the 345 KV switchyard involving Transformer 82, resulted in the loss of both units. This event is documented in RO 50-265/77-37/03L.
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