ML20147B256
| ML20147B256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1994 |
| From: | Holody D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147B009 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9701300119 | |
| Download: ML20147B256 (2) | |
Text
i From:
Daniel J. Holody (DJH) j To:
OEMAIL Date Monday, November 21, 1994 4:00 pm subjects ACTION ITEM 94-302 -Forwarded Forwarded mail received from: JRW1 Region I DRP has reviewed the PSE&G response to the $500,000 civil penalty and finds the licensee's response acceptable.
OE an acknowlege the check.
Dan CC JEB2 Files:
20: MESSAGE 9701300119 970124 PDR FOIA O,'NEILL96-351 PDR
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SUMMARY
OF SALEM SRO ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE On August 2 Glenn Meyer and Dan Holody conducted an individual enforcement conference with the Salem SRO who had been the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (Senior) during the April 7 event at Salem Unit 1 and who had left the control room to " move" the mechanical switch for circulating water system vacuum to enable a circ water pump start. The conference lasted approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the Senior was forthright and open about his actions. Generally, the Senior provided a credible explanation of his actions, stated that he had attempted to maintain the condenser as a heat sink but not to keep the turbine on-line, and stated that he now realizes that he violated the operating procedure for the cire water system but was unaware of this at the time.
The Senior s'tated that subsequent to directing that the turbine be removed from service, at about 35% power he left the control room for 1:58 minutes (by security logs) to enable a circ water pump start, to attempt to maintain the condenser as a heat sink, and to provide for an orderly shutdown of the turbine. He had a detailed technical basis for believing that the pump start did not represent a technical risk or problem, and judged the benefits to be considerable and worth his leaving the control room for a few minutes. He concluded that as the task was performed very infrequently, it was far quicker (than explaining it to someone else) and more reliable for him to do it himself. Further, as circ water is a non-safety system and he believed that there was no procedural prohibition against his actions on the switch, he thought it was an acceptable action in accordance with the operational procedure guidance.
The Senior believed that it did not represent a modification of the plant or come under the controls of the jumper and lifted lead procedure as the action was physically lifting the spring action arm of the mechanical vacuum switch on the pump start permissive for approximately a second and then allowing it to return to its normal position. He did not remove any wiring or install any jumpers or leads, nor did he have to take any action to return it to its normal alignment. To him it was a special case (unlike any other in the plant) and was acceptable to plant management, because it had been done very infrequently during his 12 years on shift and management appeared to accept the practice (although he had no evidence of their specifically addressing the practice).
The Senior noted that he believed the AIT report to be inaccurate in that he had returned to the control room prior to the reactor trip.
He appeared to be contrite, and admitted his errors in retrospect of interacting with the switch, violating the circ water operating procedure, and leaving the control room to perform it.
I concluded that he had NOT willfully violated any procedures nor had he taken his actions to avoid a possible turbine or reactor trip.
Glenn Meyer 8/3/94 3