ML20147B187
| ML20147B187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1991 |
| From: | Donges R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Paolino R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147B009 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9701300045 | |
| Download: ML20147B187 (23) | |
Text
LNI 1n :
3 6-Ul 1:151W I E &G Lit & E c_
%l j
TO:
Ralph Paolino NRC - Region I i
FROM:
Ralph Donges
[
PSE&G - Licensing
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPENDIX R FIRE WRAP ACTIVITIES DATE:
May 8, 1991 The Appendix R fire wrap activities at the Salem Unit 1 station are part of our corrective actions for the Notice of Violation (NOV) cent to us on 6/15/87.
- l. The NOV di ncus_ses one-hqur fi re barriern ( fiJe wrapj_.
Under Violation A, the second paragraph states, "Section III.G 2 and III.G.3 specify alternatives that may be implemented outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage.
The alternatives are:
.. 3 Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated circuito by a one-hour rated fire barrior with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area."
The.first paragraph on the second page of the NOV states,
" Contrary to the above, as of January 24, 1984, fire protection features woro not provided for certain redundant trains of equipment and/or cabling located outside the primary containmont necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control stations such that one train would remain free of fire damage and none of the alternatives nrovided by Eection III.C.? or III.C.3 were innlemented."
- 2. Our Corrective Actions were keved to our exemotion reauest.
In our responne to the Nov, in the space allocated for "the date when full compliance will be achiovad", we noted that compliance with the rule is subject to NRC approval of PSE6G's exemption request.
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C 9701300045 970124 PDR FOIA i
O'NEILL96-351 PDR
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2.
The econe and type of corrective actions de_ pended on NRR acceotance of the reauest.
Our intention to use fire wrap as the alternative of choice is clearly delineated in our exemption request dated 7/15/88 (which was a resubmittal of numerous submittals and resubmittals).
NRR subsequently approved our exemption request by letter dated 7/20/89.
It is important to note that if NRR had disapproved'our request, some.other action.would have been ou'r corrective action (perhaps installation of full area detection, additional suppression, etc.
was our preferred corrective action, pen) ding NRR approval of While fire wrap our exemption, we did not know the scope of work that would be required.
Upon roccipt of NRC approval, we developed the completion j
schedule that we delivered to the Region in October of 1989.
- 4. PSE&G holds that the schedules providgd in 50.48 had elansed and we are in Appendix B reaulatory space.
The schedules allowed by 50.48 had elapsed (or else you could not have cited us against 50.48(b)in the first place).
Section 8.5 of Generic Letter 86-10 states "... Once the time porlod allowed by a schedule in 50.48 has run out, schedule cannot be reinstituted by exemption.
the situation the licensee is in violation of the regulation and In such a should notify the Region proposing compensatory measures and a schedule for gaining compliance either with the provisions of Appendix R or with the provisions of an approved technical exemption."
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..A compensatory measures (which were approved) e.ormoco and also our schedule for compliance.
S.
Previous annlics. correspondence from Recion indicates Apoendix B Region's letter in response to our NOV response, dated March 21, 1988 (W. T. Russell to S. E. Miltenberger) states, Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented in your letter.
These actions will be examined during a future inspection of your licensed program.
Because of this wording, PSE&G concluded that the NOV corrective actions would be reviewed under Criterion XVI of Appendix B similar to any other Notice of violation.
l Please call me if you have any questions about this.
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SENATOR BIDEN STAFF BRIEFING NOTES AGENDA e
STATUS
SUMMARY
Event on 4/7 AIT on 4/8 AIT exit on 4/26 PSE&G letters 4/20 and 4/29 PSE&G letter to closeout restart item due 5/5 Restart meeting with licensee 5/6 Restart decision made by Regional Administrator Commission meeting 5/9 Regional Administrator approves restart and release of CAL e
AIT FINDINGS LICENSEE SIGNIFICANT EVENT RESPONSE TEAM (SERT)
RESULTS e
DIFFERENCES LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND NRC INSPECTION ACTIVITIES I4
_~
is Would cooling towers have prevented this event?
Cooling towers could be designed to minimize the impact of grass on plant operation.
There is still some dependency on the bay for cooling water. However, grass intrusion is only one of many initiators for plant transients / trips.
l There is no regulatory requirement for cooling towers. Licensing basis does not address the non-safety intake structure.
NRC regulates radioactive effluents. Final Environmental Statements on each plant detail potential impacts resulting from routine operation.
l Since the plant was licensed w/o cooling towers, the cooling tower issue is between PSE&G and the states. Our understanding is that negotiations between PSE&G and the states are still ongoing concerning the cooling tower issue. (Clean Water Act) e o
l 1
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l
3 Should improvements in the intake structure be completed before restart?
Improvements in procedures and operator responses relative to grass intrusion will be accomplished. For example, earlier turbine trip to assure plant stability, better guidance on reactivity manipulation, MS-10 procedures, and operator guidance enhanced.
The potential for grass intrusion still exists, it may result in power reductions. It could result in another challenge to the plant and operators, which is part of licensing basis and an i
anticipab.i transient for which the unit is designed. Core protection is still assured.
e Operators can reduce power, take actions to clear grass, and shutdown pumps.
Operators have been sensitized and retrained in addressing grass intrusion.
Procedures have been revised to address several intake structure flow problems.
l l
e The safety related water system has not been adversely affected by grass. The location appears to be the big difference. In addition, the flow rate is significantly different. (2.1 million gpm vs 80,000 gpm). Also, the design for the safety related system is significantly different. Neither of the intake structures for HC have been affected by grass intrusion.
e Loss of safety-related intake structure flow is outside licensing basis. However, EOPs address this unlikely event, Licensee periodically surveys bay bottom for grass in front of safety-related system.
e Contingency plans established?
Long Term Improvements e
Increase screen speed e
Replace screens with fiberglass panels to prevent grass entanglement.
e Other modifications to address losses to aquatic life.
s 4
How do you verify command and control in the control room? What has NRC done to date and what is olanned in the future?
The errors that caused command and control to lapse during the April 7,1994, event have been identified and the licensee is taking corrective actions. These actions primarily involve procedure changes and training. Licensee has provided specific guidance on C&C. All shifts have received training on C&C expectation.
The NRC staff is inspecting (i.e., verifying actions and evaluating their effectiveness) at the site. The NRC inspection staff will brief the Regional Adrainistrator (RA) on their inspection as part of the evaluation of Salem Unit I readiness for restart.
If the NRC authorizes restart, the NRC plans augmented inspection coverage of plant heatup and startup activities. These will include extensive control room obsenations that would include evaluation of command and control.
Also, the NRC evaluates command and control in the simulator during regular "requalification program evaluations" at each site, conducted once per NRC SALP assessment cycle (typically eighteen months). The next program evaluation for Salem is projected for later this calendar quarter. NRC management is evaluating whether additional l
inspections, evaluations, or inspection schedule changes are warranted.
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l
5 Why is Salem Management capable of operating Salem safely?
Given:
Numerous events 4 AITs since 1991 Decline in performance Management weaknesses e
The NRC is concerned about the performance of PSE&G.
Aggressiveness of management oversight of plant activities e
Aggressiveness to assure adequate corrective action implementation.
e e
Root cause analysis of events e
Slow identification and evaluation of degraded plant conditions J
e Adherence to procedures i
e Several NRC/PSE&G management meetings to discuss needed improvements and l
safety-oriented program improvements particularly, root cause analyses.
l Safety Assessment j
In general, Salem has been operated safely and within its licensing basis, e
e Operators will be able to respond more effectively to grass intrusion because l
of training, procedures, and hardware changes.
Licensee acknowledges deficiencies in personnel performance and equipment e
3 maintenance. Initialimprovement programs and self-assessment that were insightful and directed towards management deficiencies. Weaknesses in management processes requires time to correct.
Operator training and requalification were satisfactory during the last NRC e
inspection.
Material conditions have improved; significant capital investment. Replaced e
SWS piping during the past 4 years.
All procedures have been upgraded as part of Procedure Upgrade Project.
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS Senior n. nagement changes to improve oversight. VP of Nuclear Operations now managing Salem.
-=
6 Improved effectiveness and accountability of supervisors and managers; replaced some supervisors. Supervisors monitoring work in the plant.
Unitization of maintenance, operations and planning organizations.
Improved Root Cause Assessment; procedures and training, broader application of techniques.
Backlog Reduction Corrective Maintenance Backlog Reduction 2,550 in 1990; 1,000 in 1993 Overdue Preventative Maintenance Item Reduction 600 in 1991; 37 in 1993 LER Reduction 84 in 1990; 34 in 1993 Reorganizing Nuclear Safety Review to be more effective and critical Forming Nuclear Review Board (senior offsite experts) to provide enhanced independent oversight.
ADDITIONAL PLANNED ACTIVITIES A special review of the performance and capabilities of the management organization e
for the purpose of diagnosing performance deficiencies is planned.
Insp' ction to verify / validate operator performance, qualifications and training.
e e
1 5
- 7 Why didn't the licensee take actions to deal with the grass intrusion prior to this event?
Given:
Trip last summer Numerous power reductions e
Dredged the bay (2/yr) e Monitored grass buildup (Bathymetry) e Operators were trained and sensitized to grass intrusion Contingency plans to clear screens of grass e
e Engineering evaluations ongoing e
1993: Occasional grass; anomally-No urgency.
e 1994: Significant grass due to severe winter-planned actions Refer to long term actions i
s TABLE 9.83 SALEM 1 4
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0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
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0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
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a Neo-AerNiing 0
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0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
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0 0
0 0
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40 32 14 16 13 10 0
20 71 12 EF0/1000 BRS 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.33 0.52 0.00 0.00 1.36 2.62 0.93 G IT. BR5 2200 2184 72 1217 2109 1904 1924 2004 25 1474 762 2142 I
BAD SO 8
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10 8
4 272 4
9 RA CADSE CXEES:
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0 I
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SALEM 1
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TABLE 9.84 SALEM 2 Y. r - C.1.nder ouart.r in. _
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CRIT. BRS 948 0 1162 1779 2209 1717 52 2208 1537 2083 2118 1826 RAD 50 122 17 4
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FIGURE 7.84b Legend Statistical Significance He undum e -
Peer Group: O! der Westinghouse 4-Loop 1
91-4 to 94-3 Trenos ono Deviations Deviations From Plant Peer Group Self-Trend Median Short Term Long Term Declined Improved Worse Better gg7g Automatic Scrame While Critical -
-0.25 o.29 Sofety System Actuations -
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o o
Sofety System Failures -
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Cause Codes (ALL LERs) s Ae--wio. c.** * -
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c.go Sofety System Failures -
o o_w Cause Codes (All LERs) r a A**=***
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SUPPLEMENT TO SALEM OE 7079 i
UPDATE During the implementation of the SSPS power supply I
modifications, 4
three engineering issues were identified I
which required resolution prior to restart.
In addition, several issues were identified with respect to power supply 4
preventative maintenance.
These are summarized below:
ENGINEERING ISSUES j
Issue 1 - SSPS General Warning Alarm a
i The SSPS general warning alarm is utilized to provide a j
local and control room alarm to annunciate several failures within the SSPS, including failure of the 15 volt and 48 l
q volt Train A and Train B power supplies.
Maintenance troubleshooting and further testing at the PSEEG Nuclear Training Center indicated that the general warning alarm will not be received if the failur* mode of the nower puooly
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This is due to the general
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general warning alarm only on a total loss of a power supply.
The design described above appeared to conflict with i
statements contained in Westinghouse WCAP-7488-1 'Erf-M :,
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which is specifically referred to in the Salem UFSAR, j
section 7.2.2.
In addition, concerns were raised about the j
conformance of this circuit design with the design basis of the SSPS.
l Issue 2 - SSPS 48 Volt Power Supply Resistor R28 i
i Another utility (Pacific Gas & Electric) identified a i
problem with the design of the circuit which uses resistor i
R28, installed in the SSPS 48 volt power supplies.
The i
_ resistor _is_dissinating more heat than it is designed for, gnd~could fail.
Investigation into the Salem station 48 volt power supply history indicated no known failures of the R2B resistors, in spite of over 15 years of operating experience with these power supplies, and noted power supply ripple.
PSE&G Nuclear Engineering Design has determined, i
with concurrence from Westinghouse that this R28 issue does not affect the operability of the power supply.
Failure of the R28 only affects the overvoltage setpoint, which could i
drift up to 10%.
Note that this only applies to the 48 volt i
power supply.
This failure cannot cause an overvoltage j
condition, it is only for overvoltage protection.
- However, at the next convenient outage, the resistor should be r{f
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l Issue 3 88PS 15 and 48 volt Power Supply Output Breaker i
Physical examination of several power supplies received from other utilities and PSEEG stores indicated a difference in the markings on the output. breakers for the 15 and 48 volt i
power. supplies.
Some power supplies' breakers had identification affixed to them which indicated that they had a time delay feature, a marking which did not appear on all of the power supplies.
Discussions with Westinghouse, and the power supply manufacturer, Basler Electric, indicate that later versions of the power supplies contained breakers which may have been provided from a different sub-supplier than was provided with the original power supplies.
A review of the sub-supplier literature for the current i
version of the power supplies indicates that these breakers are still of an instantaneous type design.
The power supply 4
assemblies still carry the same Westinghouse part number, and are considered an equivalent replacement to the original power supplies.
e Power Supply Preventative Maintenance Troubleshooting indicated high ripple on some power supplies.
This has been attributed to aced capacitors in the power supplies.
No preventative maintenance had been performed on the power supplies since the date of original installation, although voltage and periodic load capability i
checks were performed as part of surveillance and functional i
testing.
PSELO is pursuing the development of Preventative Maintenance for these power supplies.
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UNITED STATES 1}'
' E OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION I
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475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa.19406 Tel. 215337.EG30 No. I-91-77 November 9, 1991
Contact:
Karl Abraham NRC STAFF SENDS AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM TO SITE OF A TURBINE FAILURE AND ELECTRIC GENERATOR FIRE AT SALEM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NEAR SALEM, NJ.
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff tonight organized an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to be at the Salem Nuclear Power plant first thing Sunday morning to find out how and why a fire occurred in the Salem Unit 2 turbine electric generator, which was heavily damaged when blades broke from the turbine and penetrated the turbine's outer shell shortly before noon Saturday (11/9/91).
The nuclear reactor itself was undamaged.
't shut down automatically and was stable. There was no releaue of radiation from the plant, and there were no serious injuries. One guard was treated at the scene for smoke inhalation.
At 12:10 p.m. Saturday, Public Service Electric and Gas Company of New Jersey reported to the NRC from the Salem 2 control room that workers had heard a loud noise and had seen fire coming out of the Unit 2 steam-driven turbine electric generator about 11:40 a.m. The plant declared an " unusual event," the least serious of NRC's emergency classifications. When the fire, which was extinguished in about 15 minutes, a'id the smoke had cleared, the company briefly escalated the emergency to an " Alert," because workers found holes in the turbine casing, ir.dicating objects had broken through to the outside. When no significant damage was found outside from the flying pieces, the
" Alert" was almost immediately reduced by the company back to an
" unusual event."
The utility told the NRC it has begun an inquiry into what could have caused the turbine blades to fly off and do the damage it observed.
The NRC's seven-member AIT, led by a Section Chief familiar with reactor operations, includes specialists from NRC Region I and from NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD. On the team are specialists in turbine controls and turbine materials, in non-destructive testing, and in electrical engineering.
Such AIT's normally take 4 to 6 days to do the field work at the site, then review the findings and issue a report within 30 days.
(more)
1 0-4 2
Salem Unit 2 was operating at full power. The electric generators at nuclear power plants, as well as at fossil-fueled plants, are cooled by hydrogen gas, and it appears that the hydrogen gas and lubricating, oil supplied to turbine bearings was what burned. That fire was extinguished by a combination of water and carbon dioxide deluge systems, and the response of the station fire brigade, which included the guard. Lower Alloways Township fire fighting forces also responded to the plant's call for help, but the fire was extinguished quickly,before the off-site fire department entered the protected area of the plant.
The States of New Jersey and Delaware have been informed of this event.
a 4
P DCS No:
50311911109 g
Date:
November 12, 1991 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I-91-81 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.
The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region I staff on this date.
Facility:
Licensee Emergency Classification:
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
X Notification of Unusual Event Salem Nuclear Generating Station X
Alert Unit 2 Site Area Emergency Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 General Emergency Docket No. 50-311 Not Applicable
Subject:
TURBINE AND GENERATOR FAILURE AND FIRE, AIT DISPATCHED A hydrogen explosion and fire occurred in the area of the turbine generator on November 9, 1991.
The reactor automatically shutdown.
The fire was extinguished in about 15 minutes.
An Unusual Event was declared at 11:40 a.m.
There was no damage to the reactor side of the plant and there was no release of radiation.
When the smoke cleared, the licensee found holes in the turbine casing, apparently from turbine blading.
This caused the licensee to momentarily declare an Alert.
Since no damage had occurred to the containment building or to safety related equipment, the event was reduced immediately back to an Unusual Event.
Prior to the event, the unit had been at 100% power.
Turbine testing was being conducted at the time of the event; the licensee's Significant Event Response Team (SERT) is attempting to determine causes, including any relationship of the turbine testing to the event.
All emergency equipment operated as required, and no personnel were injured.
One guard was treated for smoke inhalation.
The plant was cooled down using the atmospheric dump valves; currently, the unit is in cold shutdown, with shutdown cooling provided by the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
Initial assessment shows the #22 low pressure turbine damaged, along with the generator / exciter and the //22 condenser hotwell.
Several dozen pieces of turbine blading have been found onsite outside the casing.
Special tools needed for disassembly of the turbine were expected to arrive on site yesterday, and a team of Westinghouse turbine experts is enroute to supplement the licensee's team.
Two resident inspectors responded to the site on Saturday.
A seven-member NRC Augmented Inspection Team arrived early Sunday to determine the causes of the event, evaluate the licensee's response, and determine if there are generic implications.
The States of New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania were notified.
There has been extensive media coverage.
CONTACT:
A.
Blough S.
Pindale (215) 337-5224 (609) 935 3850 f
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j (Reactor Licensees) 1 Region I Form 83
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DCS No:
50311911109 g
Date:
December 10, 1991 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I-91-81A This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.
The information is as initially received wi:hout verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region I staff on this date.
Facility:
Licensee Emergency Classification:
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Notification of Unusual Event Salem Nuclear Generating Station Alert Unit 2 Site Area Emergency Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 General Emergency Docket No. 50-311 X
Not Applicable subject:
PNO-I-91-81 UPDATE - TURBINE AND GENERATOR FAILURE AND FIRE The Augmented Inspection Team (Inspection No. 50-311/91-81) exit meeting was held on December 3, 1991 at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station; the meeting was open to the public for observation.
Preliminary inspection findings were presented as follows:
(1) the proximate cause of the turbine overspeed was the failure of the emergency trip solenoid valve and the overspeed protection control (OPC) solenoid valves.
The root cause of the failure is under investigation; (2) the proximate causes of the generator fire are extreme vibration, damage to the hydrogen seals, ignition of hydrogen gas, and ignition of seal oil.
The root cause of the fire is tne unarreste_ turbine overspeed.
The AIT discovered several additional contributing causes of the event, the most noteworthy of which is the failure of licensed operators and supervisors to effectively resolve test discrepancies involving the OPC solenoid valves prior to restart of the turbine on 10/21/91.
Other contributing causes included insufficient preventive maintenance and surveillance testing of the solenoid valves, and insufficient priority directed toward the replacement of the solenoid valves at Unit 2 following the identification of defective solenoid valves at Unit 1 during an outage on September 10, 1990.
The licensee expressed agreement with the NRC on the general findings of the AIT and identified several corrective actions intended to address deficiencies revealed by both the NRC and their own event assessment effort.
Media attendance at the meeting was significant, and the meeting was broadcast live on a local radio station.
Representatives from the NRC and PSE&G answered questions from the media and the public at the close of the meeting.
Following the meeting, PSE&G also provided the press with a tour of the f acility to observe the damage.
The AIT inspection report is expected to be issued within 30 days.
CONTACT:
Isabel Moghissi John White (FTS) 346-5143 (FTS) 346-5114
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NL Mail:
ADM:DMB Chairman Selin
.AEOD RES DOT:Trans only Comm. Rogers IRM FDR Comm. Curtiss OIG Comm 'Remick NRC Ops Ctr CA EDO Phillips INPO----
GPA NRR PA OE Regional Offices SP RI Resident Office EWW ASLAP Licensee:
(Reactor Licensees)
Region I Form 83 (Rev. July 1991)
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