ML20138C304
| ML20138C304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1986 |
| From: | Butcher R, Caldwell J, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138C283 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-86-04, 50-416-86-4, NUDOCS 8604020450 | |
| Download: ML20138C304 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1986004
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLIEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-416/86-04
Licensee: Mississippi Power And Light Company
Jackson, MS 39205
Docket No.:
50-416
License-No.:
Facility Name: Grand Gulf Unit 1
Inspection Conduc ed : February 25 - March 17,1986
Inspectors:
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R.'C.(Butcher Senior R
dent inspector
'Cate Signed
abh
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J. L.
ldwell Residerft Inspector
/0 te'Si ned
Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief
/Date/ Signed
Division of Reactor Proje:ts
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection entailed 163 resident inspector-hours at the
site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation,
Surveillance Observation, Reportable Occurrences, Operating Reactor Events,
Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items, and Design Changes and Modifications.
Results:
Two violations - 1.) Failure to properly' implement a surveillance
procedure and ~ perform independent verification and 2.) failure to promptly
correct the installation of a non-seismic qualified relay.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
- J.
E. Cross, Site Director
- C. R. Hutchinson, General Manager
- R. F.. Rogers, Technical Assistant
- J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
- D. G. Cupstid, Technical Support Superintendent
R. H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent
R. V. Moomaw, Manager, Plant Maintenance
W. P. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent
L. G. Temple, I & C Superintendent
J. H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted ircluded technicians, operators, security
force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March- 14, 1986 with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify
,
as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
on the
inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment
following inspsction findings:
a.
416/86-04-01,
Violation.
Failure of electricians to properly
follow / implement a surveillance procedure, and failure to properly
perform independent verification. (Paragraph 6 and Paragraph 10)
b.
416/86-04-02, Inspector Followup Item.
Potential 10 CFR 21 report
regarding B&B Promatech fire seals.
(Paragraph 7)
c.
416/86-04-03, Violation.
Failure to promptly correct the installation
of a non - seismic qualified relay. (Paragraph 8.a)
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 416/85-45-11, Failure to follow procedures when
performing diesel generator maintenance.
The inspector reviewed
procedures 07-S-24-P75-E001AB-4,
Rev. 2,
Model
EGB-35-C Woodward
Governor Drive Element Replacement; 07-S-24-P75-E001AB-5, Rev. 1,
Periodic 011 Change of the Standby Emer. Diesel Woodward Governor
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Model
- EGB-35'C;
07-S-01-205,
Rev. 2,
Conduct
of Maintenance
Activities; and 04-1-01-P75-1, Standby Diesel Generator System.
The
procedures clarified the method to be used for Woodward Governor oil
replacement to prevent diesel engine overspeed. The diesel maintenance
personnel were given training on this incident. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 416/85-45-07,. Failure to adequately train personnel
performing activities affecting quality. The -licensee revised General
Maintenance Instruction 07-S-12-12, Calibration Checks of G.E. IAC Time
Overcurrent Relays, to add a caution note stating not to store the
relay paddle back in the relay case as a bus trip could result. Also,
electrical maintenance journeyman were instructed in the relationship
of protective relay circuits to other feeder breakers.
This item is
closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation 416/85-39-01, Failure to. follow administrative
procedures when making changes to technical section instructions.
Plant Administrative Procedure 01-S-06-12, GGNS Surveillance ~ Program,
paragraph 6.5.5, was revised to recognize the need to occasionally
deviate from the standard local leak rate test (LLRT) valve lineups.
The LLRT coordinator or responsible engineer may make pen and ink
changes on a copy of the appropriate valve lineup sheet and initial thu
changes and sign and date the sheet. All changes are to be ' reviewed by
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a qualified technical reviewer and the marked _ up sheets attached to the
LLRT data package.
Technical Section Instruction 09-S-08-2 was also
revised as noted above. This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation 416/85-45-06, Failure to close LLRT valves by normal
means.
The- licensee revised procedures 06-ME-1M61-V-001, Local Leak
Rate Test and 06-ME-1M10-0-0002, Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
to add a- precaution on the closure of containment isolation valves by-
normal operation only. This item is closed.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and.any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included
instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems;
tags and clear ~ances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;
adherence to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in
effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and
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access controls.
This inspection activity included numerous informal
discussions with operators and their supervisors.
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~ Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable.
The
confirmation is made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow path
alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage,
lubrication, cooling and general condition, and instrumentation.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside
areas were
visited.
.0bservations
included
safety
related
tagout
verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general
plant conditions, fire protection equipment- control of activities in
,
progress,
radiation protection controls, physical
security, problem
identification systems, and containment isolation.
No violations or deviations were' identified.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspector -observed telected maintenance
activities: The observations included a review of the work doc' ments for
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adequacy,. adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all 'or. part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, speciited retest requirements, and
adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing Observation (61726)
The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances.
The
observation included a review of the procedure- for technical adequacy,
conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal
from~ service and return to service of the system or components affected, and
review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
On February 20, 1986, with the plant operating at approximately 61% power,
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system B was inadvertently initiated. At the
time of the event electrical technicians were performing Surveillance
Procedure (SP) 06-EL-1E12-M-0002, Containment Spray Time Delay Relay
Calibration and Functional Test. While performing step 5.4.5 of this SP the
technicians incorrectly connected a jumper, with a test switch, between
terminals T2 and M2 on the K98 relay instead of T1 and M as required by the
procedure.
This jumper. was installed by one technician and independently
verified as installed properly by another technician.
Because of this
incorrect jumper installation the B RHR system inadvertently initiated.when,
during the performance of step 5.4.6, the test switch was closed. The B RHR
system was subsequently secured and placed back in the standby LPCI mode.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires written procedures be established,
implemented and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of
safety related equipment. The failure of electrical technicians to properly
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follow / implement SP CS-EL-1E12-M-0002 resulting in the iniuation of
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) RHR B will be identified as the first
example of Violation 416/86-04-01.
See also paragraph 10.
7.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
The below listed Event Reports were reviewed to determine if the information
provided met the NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included
adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned,
existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance
of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant
personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an
asterisk. The Event Reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general
policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions.
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On February 21, 1986, the residents were notified of a potential 10 CFR 21
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regarding B&B Promatech fire seals.
B&B Promatech and Louisiana Power &
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Light (LP&L)' conducted fire tests on two existing seal configurations and
both seals failed to perform properly causing the seal configuration to
become suspect.
The licensee initia!.ed a Material Nonconformance Report
(MNCR) requiring furt:*r engineering evaluation to determine if Grand . Gulf
was affected.
This wili ne an Inspector Followup Item (416/86-04-02).
By letter dated March 19, 1985, BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. notified the NRC of a
10 CFR 21 report regarding a potential deficiency with some of th.eir K line
circuit breakers.
The condition reported was that the control wire
insulation on the eight pole K-1600 or K-2000 auxiliary switch may be cut by
the top edge of the dust shield when the circuit breaker is racked out to
the full disconnect position with the compartment door closed. This same
condition could occur on other size circuit breakers.
The licensee
initiated Maintenance Work Order (MWO) E53414 to preform an inspection of
affected breaker auxiliary switch wiring and no discrepancies were found.
Also, MWO E53414 required that each control wire terminal be bent down to
ensure the wires were dressed as close as possible to the auxiliary switch.
This action completed the recommendations in the BBC Brown Boveri,.Inc.
report.
This item (P2185-09) is closed.
The following License Event Reports (LERs) are closed.
LER No
Event Date
Event
- 82-072
September 24, 1982
ADS Valve Air Booster
Compressor Not Operating.83-115
August 3, 1983
Incorrect Voltage Applied To
Division 1 Control Circuits.83-123
September 6, 1983
Deficiency In Drywell Air
Cooler Condensate Monitoring
System.
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(continued)
LER No
Event Date
Event
- 83-141
Saptember 19, 1983
Containment Spray Timer
Operation Less Conservative
than TS.83-171
October. 28, 1983
Diesel Generator 11 Fuel Oil
Leak.83-178
November 8, 1983
Diesel Generator 12 Air Start
Valve Failure.84-049
October 31, 1984
. Failure To Implement TS Fire
Protection Requirement.85-001
December 13, 1984
Identification Of An Unsealed
July 24, 1985
Discovery Of' Unsealed Fire
Barriers.84-043
October 2,~1984
Inadvertent Suppression Pool
Makeup Actuation.83-182
November 29, 1983
Failure of HPCS Diesel
Generator To Start.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operating Reactor Events (93702)
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor
events.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance,
performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors
examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations. journal
entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and
engineerin? support personnel as appropriate.
a.
On March 3,1986, the licensee entered a shutdown Limiting Condition
for Operation (LCO) based on Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3
provisions .when it was found that the control room outside air intake
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duct damper control system contained ~ relays that were not seismically
qualified. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), paragraph 9.4.1,
states that the control room' fresh air inlet will isolate based on
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signals from the following:
(1) High radiation in the outside air intake duct.
(2) Manual isolation.
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(3) High chlorine concentration in the outside air intake duct.
(4) Loss of coolant accident in either unit.
FSAR paragraph 9.4.1.1.1.d states that, except for noted exceptions,
the control room heating, ventilating, are air conditioning system is
designed to seismic Category I requirements. The licensee performed a
10 CFR 50.59 review and determined that the outside air intake duct
damper could be placed in the closed (isolated) position and the power
removed for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The outside air intake duct damper could
still be manually operated if required. The licensee then cancelled the
shutdown LCO.
Seismic qualified relays were installed in the A train
of the'outside air intake duct damper controls on March 5, 1986, and on
the B train on March 7,
1986.
A modification change notice MTCN
JS-1-588 was written on April 19, 1982, to replace the installed
non qualified relays with fully qualified relays (Agastat type ETR and
EGPD). The licensee received the low power license on June 16, 1982.
The licensee became aware on February 22, 1986 that the ETR and EGPD
relays were not installed and determined that the installed relays
(Agastat type 7014) had not been seismic qualified.
Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures be established to
assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and
corrected.
The failure te promptly correct the installation of a
non qualified relay as identified on April 19, 1982 is a Violation
(416/86-04-03). Subsequently, the licensee conducted seismic testing
of one of the-Agastat 7014 relays.
The one relay tested appears to
have passed the seismic test.
b.
Scram No. 37
On January 22, 1986, the plant was operating at 60% thermal power when
at 7:42 a.m. the reactor scrammed as a result of a main generator load
reject signal.
Earlier, alarms in the control room had actuated and
operators investigated and found that GGNS breakers 5240 and 5248
connecting the Franklin 500 kV transmission 1ine to the plant switch-
yard 500 kV buses were open. No automatic actuations of plant systems
occurred.
Operators contacted the dispatcher and verified the
technical specification required offsite power sources were available.
The reactor scrammed shortly thereafter.
It was determined that a
Franklin substation breaker 2420 had tripped earlier and had been
reclosed about one minute prior to the closing of GGNS breaker 5248.
However, breaker 2420 tripped again before plant breaker 5248 was
completely reclosed.
After breaker 5248 was closed, breaker 5520
automatically reclosed. The north part of the electrical power grid,
including GGNS, was out of phase with the south part of the grid due to
separation distance. Although the grid was connected through other 500
kV lines, these lines were very long and due to power being transferred
from the north to the south part of the grid, it was calculated to have
been about 30 degrees phase differential with the northern grid
leading. The GGNS generator responded in an oscillating manner which
actuated the load reject relay. The load relay then initiated a main
turbine control valve fast closure which produced a reactor scram. The
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turbine and generator tripped on reverse power.
The operators
recovered the plant to stable conditions without the use of emergency
core cooling ' systems. Tne load reject relay is set to actuate at a
load drop of at least 35 percent provided the load drop rate is greater
than 10 percent per second and the residual load is less than or equal
to 70 percent.
When the Franklin substation ' breaker tripped and
reclosed, causing the phase differential, generator megawatts (MW)
. spiked from 750 MW to 1250 MW in less than 100 milliseconds and fell to-
250 MW over the next 300 milliseconds, which is much greater than the
load reject relay trip point.
The relay actuates to vent Electro-
hydraulic Control (EHC) pressure which causes a fast closure of the
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turbine control valves. The licensee is reviewing the circumstances of
this event to determine if an acceptable design alternative exist to
prevent this condition in the future.
LER 86-003 reported this event
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and will be tracked for any supplemental actions.
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9.
Inspector Followup And Unresolved Items. (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/83-10-06. The FSAR P&ID does not
address the' required-po:ition for valve E22F001. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/83-14-02. There is no regulatory
requirement fo* every motor operated valve to have local position
indication and the licensee does not use the local indicators on all
valves. This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Inspc: tor Followup Item 416/83-30-02. The inspector verified
that breaker 72-11C18 in the HPCS local panel was reidentified. This
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item is closed.
d.
(C1'osed) Unresolved Item 416/85-45-01, Significance of plugging of ESF
room coolers. The licensee performed an evaluation to determine the
maximum temperatures in the Division 1 switchgear rooms with the room
coolers impaired as described' in MNCR 765-85.
Since the temperature
would be less than 140
F, the safety related equipment would have been
able to perform its safety function.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/85-46-03. The licensee issued a
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Technical Specification Position Statement referencing IN 85-94 stating
that if the minimum flow valve on any ECCS will not perform its
intended function then the associated ECCS function is inoperable.
This item is closed.
10. Design Changes and Modifications (37700)
Design Change Package (DCP) 82/5020, Standby Service Water (SSW) Loop B
System' Modifications, was reviewed to determine if the design change was
controlled by established procedures and if it had been reviewed and
approved in accordance with technical specification and established QA/QC
controls.
During the review the inspector determined that this DCP was
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implemented in the plant by eight Maintenance Work Orders (MWO). The review
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of MWO F56470, Electrical Support for SSW B Motor Replacement, revealed a
problem with a Troubleshooting Log Sheet which documented the lifting and
relanding of eight electrical leads. The documentation for the relanding of'
the eight leads was completed in the verified block but the restored block,
which must be signed prior to the verified block, was left blank for all
eight leads. The licensee was notified of this discrepancy and has verified
that the leads had been relanded properly.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires written procedures be established,
- implemented and maintained covering recommended procedures in Appendix A of
Revision 2,
February 1978 for performing
maintenance activities. Administrative Procedure 01-S-07-1, Control of Work
on Plant Equipment and Facilities, requires that all changes related to
troubleshooting will be documented on a Troubleshooting Log Sheet ensuring
that the changes are restored and verified using independent verification
requirements prior to the MWO being released for retest. The failure of the
licensee to properly document the restoration of lifted leads will be
identified as the second example of Violation (416/86-04-01).
See also
paragraph 6.
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