ML20138C079
| ML20138C079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1984 |
| From: | Andognini G, Andogniti G, Kaplan B, Marguiles N, Rice C, Stratton W EG&G IDAHO, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136F578 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-6429-4, FOIA-84-751 NUDOCS 8510220178 | |
| Download: ML20138C079 (45) | |
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AN INVESTIGATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK CLIMATE AT THE CDMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 4
Bruce L. Kaplan--Team Leader-l Newton Marguiles Ph.D.
j Charles M. Rice j
G. Carl Andognini William E. Stratton Ph.D.
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Published August 1984 EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Responsible NRC Individual and Division Tom Ippolito i
j Docket No.
TAC No.
l Prepared for the i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory' Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 4
FIN No. A6429-4 l
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ABSTRACT T
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NRC contracted with EG&G, Idaho, Inc., to investigate the work climate at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), and to develop an expert epinion as to whether or not a climate of intimidation was created by CPSES Management. To do this task, a study team of individuals with broad experience in the nuclear industry and specific knowledge and skill in management and organization was formed. An additional independent expert in surveying organization climates and the analysis of survey questionnaires was selected to perform an independent survey analyses.
Experts on the study team agreed upon a working definition for a climate of intimidation and then proceeded independently to assess report, depositions, and survey data available in order to reach separate c;nclusions.
Findings were that the extent of intimidation alligations were very limited and that CPSES Management style and approach is to be criticized. The study team and the independent survey research expert unanimously concluded that a climate of intimidation did not exist at CPSES.
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CONTENTS c-J... ' -
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- ASSTRACT..............
11 1.
IN'IR000CTION......
I 1.1 Overall Task..........................................
I 1.2 Team Assembly 2
1.3 Problem Focus.............................................
3 1.3.1 Specific Problem Focus......................
3 1.3.2 Definition of Terms......................
4 1.4 Procedures Followed 5
2.
DATA SOURCES....
6 2.1 Survey Data 6
2.2 Depositions 6
2.3 Reports 6
3.
ANALYSIS.....-
8 3.1 Work Climate 8
3.1.1 Extent of Allegations of Intimidation........
8 3.1.2 Emotional State of Work Force 9
3.1.3 Management Response to Intimidation Allegations 10 3.1.4 Protection of Allegers...................
14 3.2 White Paper Analysis..........
15 3.3 Perceived Intimidation.....................................
20 3.4 Management Style..........................................
22 4.
CONCLUSIONS....................................................
24 APPENDIX A--RESUMES'................................................. A-1 APPENDIX B--BCWERS SURVEY REPORT..................................... B-1 1
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i AN INVESTIGATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK CLIMATE
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AT'THE COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 1.
INTRODUCTION This section of the report describes the overall task undertaken in thikstudyandtheteamassembledtoconductit. The specific problem focus, definition of key terms, and the procedures followed are also l
presented.
1.1 Overall Task The NRC contracted with EG&G Idaho, Inc. to investigate'and develop an expert opinion as to whether or not a climate of intimidation was created by the management at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CpSES).
Allegations have been put forward by a number of individuals involved in the Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) area that management created a climate of intimidation during construction of the plant which inhibited Quality Control (QC) inspectors in the performance of their duties according to written standards and regulations, to the extent that the safety of the plant might be compromised.
In the context of issuing an operating license to this plant the (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) NRC has taken depositions from those individuals alleging irregularities and from the applicant utility in anticipation of a formal Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing.
These depositions, plus several NRC Office of Investigations reports, a Co;1anche Peak Special Review Team Report, a number of internal reports and reviews conducted by tha applicant utility, including a survey of QC inspectors, and other reports and data seen as potentially relevant to making a judgement concerning charges of management intimidation ' constitute the data reviewed by the Study Team. A comprehensive listing of the data reviewed is presented in Section 2 of this report.
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l The Study Team reviewed available material in order to advise the NRC l
as to whether or not, in their expert and independent opinion there t
appeared to be a climate of intimidation created by management among the t
QA/QC personnel at CPSES.
i 1.2 Team Assembly 1
W i
The task team leader in charge of overall coordination of the study was Mr. Bruce Kaolan. Mr. Kaplan has a masters degree in Organization Development and h'as been involved with issues of general management, as well as organizational climate and effectiveness, as an internal consultant i
for EG&G Idaho for a period of five years.
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To serve as an interim coordinator during a portion of the review 1
process, and as a contributor to integrating the. separate parts of the study into a final report, Dr. William E. Stratton was contacted. He is an l
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Associate Professor of Management at Idaho State University and has worked
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l previously with EG&G. Idaho as a consultant.
f The project coordinators, in consultation with NRC personnel, j
concluded that individuals selected to review data to determine whether or
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not a climate of intimidation existed at CPSES should possess expertise in organization behavior and the functioning of large and complex
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organizations and also have expertise in the particular milieu of the nuclear power industry.
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j The organization scientist chosen for the project was l
Dr. Newton Marguiles, Dean of the Graduate School of Management at the 4
l University of California at Irvine. He is especially well qualified for l
the study in terms of his past research and consulting experience.
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To obtain management experts with broad experience in the nuclear l
industry, LRS Consultants, Inc (LRS) of Idaho Falls, Idaho was contacted.
l LRS assigned Mr. Charles Rice and Mr. Carl Andognini.
Each has had extensive experience and a long career in the nuclear power industry, and currently works as a consultant in that incustry.
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The Study Team chose to analyze results from a survey conducted by the
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applicant utility among their QA/QC personnel regarding the climate within 4
which they worked. Therefore, an additional outside expert was sought to j
render an independent analysis of the survey response. Dr. David Bowers of the' Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan was
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selected to-perform this analysis. He is a nationally recognized expert in l
both the surveying of organizational climates and the analysis of survey questionnaires.
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Resumes' of.all team members are appended to this report.
i 1.3 problem Focus 4
The basic issue with which this study is concerned is whether or not'
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4 management created a climate of' intimidation among QA/QC personnel at CpSES.
In order to make such a judgement, a number of terms must be defined it.6 the charge to the study. team must be elaborated.
j 1.3.1 Specific Problem Focus
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The basic question the Study Team must attempt to answer is: Did l
management by its actions create a climate of intimidation for the QA/QC I
personnel such that they performed their duties in a way result ng in some likelihood of adverse irtpact on the safety and quality of the plant. The l
intent is to establish if a pattern of intimidation by management existed.
Several clarifications are pertinent here.
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1.3.1.1 Climate of Intimidation Versus Individual Intimidation. The intent is to establish if a pattern of intimidation existed. This is distinct from whether or not certain individuals were intimidated. The team is concerned with an overall climate of intimidation indicating a systemic problem.
i 1.3.1.2 Intimidation by Management Versus Other Sources. The concern is whether or not management actions created the climate of l
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intimidation, if it existed. This'is distinct from any intimidation that l
inspectors may have felt from actions on the part of crafts personnel.
I 1.3.1.3 Climate of Intimidation Versus Management Style. A j
j distinction is also made between what is called a climate of intimidation and what might be described as an autocratic and' rigid management style in f
the plant. Such a style does not necessarily indicate an intimidating climate with respect to safety concerns.
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1.3.1.4 Intimidating Climate Versus Actual Safety Problems. This I
report deals only with the work climate in the plant which may have some l
potential to adversely affect the safety of the plant.
It is beyond the scope of this Study Team's task to attempt to evaluate if safety problems exist, or to make any judgement about the resulting condition of the plant with respect to its safety.
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j 1.3.2 Definition of Terms l,
In order to proceed, the team agreed upon definitions of the terms j
" intimidation" and " climate of intimidation." A discussion of these l
definitions follows.
I 1-1.3.2.1 Definition of Intimidation.
Intimidation is an incident, action, or statement that causes an employee not to comply with written procedures or act in a manner that good judgement would prescribe.
1.3.2.2 Definition of Climate of Intimidation. A climate of intimidation occurs when a preponderance of the following exists:
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Wide spread allegations of intimidation including numbers of cases, areas other than QA/QC, and over an extended period of
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time. This would include many different individuals alleging i
intimidation and would involve many different intimidators.
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A pervasive atmosphere of fear on the part of the allegers related to testifying or deposing, to answering questions that j
might be traceable to the individual, or to naming specific individuals as intimidators.
o Failure of top management to take prompt and effective action to investigate allegations of intimidation and/or to take prompt measures to redirect individuals demonstrated to be intimidators.
o Failure of management to protect the job security of individuals who allege intimidation while employed at CPSES.
These definitions were used as guides by the Study Team as they reviewed data and reached conclusions.
1.4 procedures Followed l
The Study Team individually reviewed the available data and reached l
independent conclusions regarding the basic task assigned. Team merrbers also visited CpSES to familiarize themselves with the environment in which j
the work in question was taking place.
Section 2 of this report details the data that were available and were reviewed. Generally, these data consisted of a large number of depositions i
taken by intervenors and the applicant utility, several NRC Office of i
Investigations reports, survey data collected from QA/QC personnel by the applicant and independently analyzed by a team expert, various other reports, and internal memoranda, interoffice correspondence, and reports from the applicant utility.
The data were reviewed, keeping in mind the definitions of intimidation and/or climate of intimidation agreed upon and outlined above. The goal was to determine if sufficient direct or indirect evidence I
exists to conclude whether or not a pattern of intimidation of QA/QC j
personnel by management at CPSES existed. The Study Team agreed that the data reviewed were sufficient to allow reaching a conclusion despite the fact that some data, such as additional depositions, were not reviewed.
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2.
DATA SOURCES 1
2.1 Survey Data Two surveys were analyzed. The first was the 1983 White paper Report. A second was the 1979 Quality Assurance Management Review Board Questionnaires.
2.2 Depositions.
Depositions taken over a period of several weeks in July 1984, which in some cases also including by reference earlier depositions related to l
the same allegations, were reviewed independently by several of the team members. The depositions of more than fifty individual deponents were included in these reviews with some deponents having made multiple depositions. Some of the deponents were allegers of intimidation, harassment or other actions contrary to obtaining quality workmanship.
Deponents also included Texas Utilities executive management personnel, AW/QC management and supervisory individuals, alleged intimidators and other present and former employees at CPSES.
A total of approximately 8,000 pages of depositions were reviewed and utilized by the team in its assessment to determine whether a climate of l
intimidation existed at CPSES.
2.3 Reports t
In addition to the survey data and the depositions, the Study Team reviewed in detail several NRC Reports of Investigation, a Comanche Peak Special Review Team Report, a number of internal reports and reviews prepared by the utility several NRC items of correspondence and a set of 27 interview reports dated in April 1984.
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A comprehensive listing follows:
NRC Report of Investigation November 3, 1983 6
NRC Report of Investigation August 24, 1983 NRC Report of Investigation March 7,1984 NRC Memorandum for ASLTS Comanche Peak May 22, 1984 NRC Comanche Peak Special Review Team Report April 1984 Set of 27 QA/QC Interviews Document No. 38EX3841 April 1984.
Report on Allegation of Cover-up and intimidation by TUGCO, Dallas Quality Assurance August 19, 1983.
Interim Report on Protective Coatings--BNL April 25, 1984.
Status Report--Hot Line Program December 19, 1983.
Status Report--yet Line Program June 25, 1984.
Report on Allegation QAI0016 June 15, 1984.
TUGC0 Management Review Board Report of Interviews dated October 2,1979; October 9,1979; October 10, 1979; October 15, 1979; October 17, 1979; October 18,1979; (several); October 19, 1979; (two).
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3.
ANALYSIS The analysis of this report is organized ir.to three parts. The first attempts to establish the difference between instances of real and perceived intimidation. The second part discusses climate of intimidation.
3.1 Work Climate An evaluation of the work climate was performed in order to assess whether or not a climate of intimidation existed at the CPSES. This evaluation utilized the various data sources described in Section 2 and the
' definition set forth in Section 1, ie., widespread allegations, pervasive atmosphere of fear, management failure to take prompt and effective investigative action, and failure to protect allegers. Keeping in mind this definition, an analysis of the work climate was performed. Each section in tne following discussion is proceeded by the element of this definition to which it relates.
3.1.1 Extent of Allagations of Intimidation Wide spread allegations of intimidation including numbers of cases, areas other than QA/QC, and over an extended period of time. This would include many different individuals alleging intimidation and would involve many different intimidators.
By the very nature of inspecting other people's work, an innate adversari.21 relationship would be expected between craft and QC personnel at CPSES.
As individuals move up in any corporate QA/QC hierarchy, a better understanding is obtained of the relationship of the inspection function to the smooth flow of the construction and system turnover to start-up effort. This can cause friction and/or confrontation between individual inspectors with a narrow organizational focus and their supervisors with a broader view of the organization.
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As any construction effort begins to phase out and operation of the i
new facility begins, there is a demotivating factor for both crafts and j
inspection personnel; they see their jobs being completed and themselves as
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being out of work soon. To counteract this, unconscious or intentional ~
slow down on the part of journeymen and inspec, tors often requires increased 1
pressure from supervision.
The potential result of this situation is increased conflict between inspectors and their supervision which can result in accusations of harassment or intimidation, i
As an overall result of the above factors and the pervasive management style discussed earlier, it would be expected that soma instances of I
intinidation would occur on any large nuclear construction project with the quality programs required by regulation to be utilized at the site. These instances of claimed or actual intimidation would be expected to increase l
as the project approaches completion.
At CPSES, the extent of allegations as to the number of different allegers and the numt;er of claimed intimidators is very limited.
l Considering the many thousands of workers and the hundreds of QC inspectors j
that have been involved in the construction of CPSES, the extent of intimidation allegations is extremely small and does not support a conclusion that a climate of intimidation existed at CPSES.
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3.1.2 Emotional State of Work Force 4
A pervasive atmosphere of fear on the part of the allegers related to testifying or deposing, to I
answering questions that might be traceable to the individual, or to naming specific individuals as intimidators.
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A climate of intimidation on a work site would be reflected by a large l
percentage of the work force being afraid to jeopardize their jobs or other 1
benefits because of personal association with charges of intimidation. As i
such, they would be afraid to depose on behalf of the intervenor, they 1
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would wish to retain their anonymity, they would be extremely cautious in their response to questions, and they would be very reluctant to name specific individuals as intimid.a.t. ore
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The NRC Report of Investigation dated August 24, 1983 appears to support a climate of fear on-site. This is due to the deletion of many portions of individual interview records and indications by a large number of those interviewed that confidentiality had been requested. However, in theinterviewofthedirectsupervisorof'theIndividualaccusedof
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intimidation, it becomes cler* that the coating (paint, rust proofing, etc.) inspectors had previcasly brought the same accusations of intimidation to him personally, Consequently, it appears that I
confidentiality or fear was not a factor in the investigation. This is further supported by the investigation reports dated November 3, 1933 and March 7, 1984 in which requests for confidentiality were extremely limited (4 of 55 in the former and 2 of 22 in the latter).
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j No indication was noted in the depositions, the inspector survey l
(Appendix A), the 1979 inspector questionnaire, or the Office of Investigation reports that the employees were afraid to answer any of the questions asked or to name individuals they felt were intimidators or were attempting to intimidate them. No pervasive atmosphere of fear has been a
demonstrated.
1 3.1.3 Manacement Response to Intimidation Allegations l
Failure of top management to take prompt and effective action to investigate allegations of intimidation and/or to take prompt measures to redirect individuals j
demonstrated to be intimidators.
Several aspects to management's response to intimidation allegations i
are pertinent to this assessment:
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Promptness of reaction to allegations in terms of conduct of the investigation I
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o Independence of investigators o
Visibility of management dedication to quality and to having conditions adferse to quality reported o
Evidence of appropriate relationships between safety (i.e.,
quality) and schedule o
Promptness and appropriateness of management action taken in response to proof of intimidation allegations.
Each element of management response to allegations of intimidation is examined below.
3.1.3.1 Reaction to Allegations. Based on the various data reviewed, it is clear that Texas Utilities has been prompt in its response to allegations of intimidation. An example of this responsiveness was the establishment of an investigation committee on August 4,1983 to investiga*e claimed intimidation of a QA auditor.
In other instances, it was clear that QA supervision interacted promptly and directly with construction mu agement in response to alleged intimidation of inspectors.
Several terminttions of craftspeople resulted from these actions.
The Texas Utilities Generating Company initiated a Quality Assurance Management Review Board, October 1979, by which QC inspectors from a variety of areas were interviewed in order that problems in the relationship between QC and supervisory personnel may be identified. The existing conflicts between production and quality personnel were noted in the results of this effort.
In addition, inspectors noted feelings about losing credibility, and difficulties in their relationship with QA I
supervisory personnel.
Interviews were extensive, documented, and indicated a strong interest and concern on the part of management to deter any such intimidating behavior and to try to resolve these issues.
i 3.1.3.2 Independence of Investigators.
The independence of l
investigators is demonstrated through the use of QA personnel from Texas i
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't Utilities headquarters in Dallas, to investigate allegations of QA management cover-up at the site by QA auditors.
This particular investigation led to an accusation of intimidation. Both the cover-up and intimidation investigations were conducted expeditiously and resulted in a report dated August 19, 1983 which concluded that there was no evidence to 4
support allegations of cover-up or intimidation.
Additional evidence of Texas Utilities' assignme'nt of independent investigators includes the use of a " hot line" to the corporate security l
offices and the availability of an ombudsman, both established between October and November 1983. As of June 25, 1984, corporate security had l
received 17 phone calls related to various allegations. Of these, six investigations were in progress, one had been partially completed, and the rest had been completed or referred to other officials as not being within j
the purview of the hot line program and corporate security.
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An individual contract employee (not a Texas Utilities employee) was j
hired in November 1983 to serve as an independent ombudsman for employees to utilize for CPSES investigation concerns.
The ombudsman also interviews all terminating employees and has been involved in several management and l
organizational concerns which involve employees.
3.1.3.3 Management Oedication to Quality. As described earlier, the August 19, 1983 report by Keeley, Spangler, and Kahler documented an investigation of intimidation and cover-up by QA management.
It is important to note that this investigation was initiated by Mr. B. R. Clements, Vice President Nuclear at TUGCO. A thorough investigation was performed to ensure that QA was performing properly l
according to the high performance standards expected by the company.
The significance of this report is not so much the outcome of the investigation, but the process. For example, safeguards were taken to ensure the accuracy of information obtained in interviews. The investigation reviewed several incidents and noted their conclusions in l
l this document.
The process represents a management attempt to thoroughly l
investigate allegations, protect providers of information, and ensure 6
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accuracy and completeness of information obtained.
It appears that the report is thorough and detailed, indicating the serious attempt on the part of the management to deal with the issues at hand.
In a follow-up memo dated September 9, 1983 to 0. N. Chapman by Mr. Clements, it is perfectly clear that " intimidation...will not be tolerated." In this memo, follow-up questions and queries were identified and Mr. Chapman was charged with providing the additional information.
Once again, this is a clear indication on the part of the management of their seriousness to pursue complaints and allegations in as much detail as possible, to thoroughly try to understand the basis of those complaints and to provide an analysis for taking action.
In other documents, including minutes of a September 12, 1983 meeting between Mr. Clements and QA personnel, the management position identified above is again reiterated.
3.1.3.4 Relationship Between Safety and Schedule.
In a December 20, 1983 memo to all personnel, Michael Spence, President of Texas Utilities Generating Company, explicitly notes quality and safety as the highest priority of the company. He also states that compromises in safety and cuality will not and could not be tolerated by the company, and indeed he notes tne consequences for any employee for not reporting any such conditions that affect safety and quality at CPSES.
There is also a very clear corporate policy and attitude with respect to the relationship between building a top quality safe plant as compared to the monetary impact of delay that was expounded by Mr. L. F. Fikar in his deposition of July 11, 1984.
Examples were given of cost and schedule tradeoffs that had been made to assure building a safe, quality plant.
It was stated explicitly that the company would not jeopardize its 3.9 billion dollar investment for a delay of a day or two, a week, or even a month or two.
3.1.3.5 Prompt and Appropriate Management Action.
In cases involving claimed or demonstrated intimidation of QC inspectors by craft 13 e
journeymen, prompt action, including terminations, appears to have been taken on several occasions. No evidence was uncovered that would indicate similar prompt action taken with regard to intimidators that were either craft or QA/QC supervisory personnel.
In several cases, it appears that QA/QC supervisors were belatedly counseled and subsequently removed from their positions.
Examination, then, of management's response to intimidation allegations indicates that management tended to respond promptly to the specific alligations and provide independent investigators. They repeatedly stated their dedication to qualify and followed with prompt co rective action at least in the case of inspectors.
The same promptness and follow-through was not seen, however, where alleged intimidators were-craftspeople or QA/QC managers.
3.1.4 Protection of Allegers l
The final elements in the study teams definition of climate of intimidation deals with the protection of those who made allegations of intimidation:
Failure of management to protect the job security of individuals who allege intimidation while employed at CPSES.
Insufficient evidence was'available on this point to reach a substantial conclusion.
In several depositions and the records of a number of interviews it was clear that the company has urged individuals to take concerns to management or the NRC. A number of individuals, including both deponents and those interviewed in April 1984, expressed the feeling that one's job was more secure after becoming an alleger because of " whistle blowing" regulations. On the other hand there were deponents who believed they had been terminated because they had alleged intimidation, harassment or other potential quality problems.
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3.2 White paper Analysis The information provided for this project included an employee survey administered to 160 QA/QC inspectors in 1983. The questionnaires returned as usable numbered 139; these were grouped into 5 subgroups of QC inspectors. The use of survey data is a very common method for understanding and identifying employee attitudes and opinions with regard to their job, supervision, work environment, and perceived attitudes and philosophy of management of their organization.
In this instance, the survey was constructed specifically for use in the QA/QC organization and was also specifically constructed around items focusing on the following categories:
o Supervision: A number of items asked for opinion and perceptions with regard to the technical capabili;*es of immediate supervisors, the' perceived confidence in ? apervisory decision making, the amount of specific direction provided by supervisors, and the relative effectiveness of supervisory i
communication.
o Attitudes of Top Management: A second group of items asked for opinions about the attitudes and receptiveness of top management in the QA/QC organization and the receptiveness of those managerial personnel in dealing with problems icentified in the QC area.
4 o
Relationship between QC and Craft: Other items asked for 4
opinions about the relationship of QC inspectors to craft 4
personnel. These items focus on the degree of receptivity of craft personnel to input, suggestions, and guidelines provided by QC inspectors.
o Attitudes of Craft personnel: Questionnaire items asked for perceived attitudes of QC personnel with regard to the quality of work and the degree of perceived skill of craft personnel.
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A total of 19 closed-end questions requiring a checked response were included. There was also one open-ended question (Question 20) requiring a written response on any aspect of the QC job which could be and should be changed in the service of improvement.
The survey is an important source of data; it provided wide coverage in eliciting responses which could be identified as attitudes and opinions of QC nersonnel on various aspects of their overall job environment.
The following paragraphs briefly describe and summarize the analysis of the 1983 questionnaire survey. The analysis proceeded on two levels:
Level 1: The questionnaire permits specific identification of the attitudes and concerns of people in the QC organization.
For example, the questions focus on feelings and perceptions of various work related factors (supervision, environment, etc.).
Level 2: An analysis of item responses was performed specifically to ascertain whether or not a climate of intimidation existed at CPSES at the time of the survey. The counting of favora:le and unfavorable responses, or counting the number of threatening questions unanswered are examples of this analysis.
The focus and purpose of this investigation requires the second level of analysis to be performed as an independent perspective to the question under study. While the substance of peoples' attitudes and concerns may be of interest, it was nevertheless, secondary to our interest. The analysis of responses was designed to meet the specific needs of this study.
The detailed analysis of survey item responses, while not conclusive, may in fact allow us to provide some important and concrete inferences about the feelings and attitudes toward the issue of intimidation on the part of QC inspectors; this approach allows us to look at the relative 16
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i distortion of responses, to examine deviations from " normal," and to 1
provide some indication of the implications of this pattern with regard to i
the problem focus in this report.
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In this sense then, the analysis of the survey data examines and uses t
as criteria for this judgement the following. dimensions:
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Examination is made to ascertain whether or not there is an i
overwhelming or unrealistic positive response to items on the survey questionnaire. Another way of viewing this is to see f'
whether or not there is "an abnormal" absence of negative 2
responses.
o An examination is made to see whether or not there seems to be a distorted positive response to more " threatening items" on the questionnaire compared to less threatening items. That-is, an examination is performed to determine whether or not respondents i
overcompensate positively on items they feel will be examined.
" Threatening. cems" were defined as'those questions which, if a critical response was given and the respondent identified, could j
potentially lead to punitive action taken against the respondent, j
o The analysis explores whether or not the responses are highly negative and reflect a-highly negative opinion and perception of I
the QC organization.
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An analysis of written comments from Question 20 (What aspect of your job would you like to see changed the most and how?) is f
performed to see whether or not such written comments indeed reflect an attitude and feeling of intimidation.
A detailed report of this analysis is presented in the Appendix B of i
this report; it was performed by Dr. David Bowers of the University of I
Michigan, a nationally known expert in Survey Research and Survey l
Analysis. The following summary analysis is derived from his report.
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Response rates on all items in-the questionnaire would be judged as relatively high. That is, on almost all items, the response rate varies from 96 to 99%, indicating that people were clearly not reluctant or reticent to respond to any of the items.
Further, one might infer that there is relatively little doubt concerning the protection and confidentiality of respondents.
Dr. Bowers categorized items by degree of perceived " threat"; he is able to discern and analyze which items could be differentiated from other items based on relative degree of threat perceived by the respondent (see definition above). He has categorized high-threat intermediate-threat, and low-threat items.
On all items, regardless of relative degree of perceived threat, the response rate was high (approximately 96%).
Therefore, one might infer that people were able and willing to respond to perceived high-threat items, much as they would to perceived intermediate-and low-threat items.
A more detailed descr.iption and analysis of these item by item categories is presented in this report (see Appendix B).
The analysis indicated that, in general, across all 5 subgroups, negative (or unfavorable) responses were common in about the same proportion. This means that negative attitudes could not be identified as predominant in any one sub group, but indeed were scattered among most respondents. Moreover, the unfavnrable profile is deemed to be " normal."
With regard to the open-ended question (the write-in Question 20),
responses were categorized by Dr. Bowers in five areas:
1.
Complaints about working environment including wages, hours, benefits, working conditions, etc.
2.
Complaints about organization bureaucracy including red tape, minor annoyances, interpersonal relations problems, etc.
3.
More serious complaints about work procedure and safety.
18
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.....__._m j
4.
Suggestions of intimidation.
1 i
, 5.
No response (respondents left this question blank).
Dr. Bowers. concludes that in a content analysis of these responses, one might ascertain a relatively moderate tone, primarily focused on
" normal" work issues, problems, and complaints.
Indeed, only three of 139*4 j
respondents made comments which fall into the intimidation category (Category 4).
e H
l The overall conclusion of Dr. Bowers' analysis is that people felt i
free to respond and did express their opinion on issues; additionally they i
j were not reluctant to present a negative attitude when such an attitude was i
felt.
I i
i Two important aspects of this survey item analysis support this 1
i conclusion. First, the response on items in the "most-threatening" l*
category was not appr:ectably different from responses on the intermediate-l and low-threatening' categories; that is, that negative responses-were j
broadly scattered across these categories and, moreover, were broadly l
scattered across participants in the survey. Second, in the write-in j
question, there is no documented pattern in responses to indicate concern with intimidation. Three quarters (75*.) of the participants in the survey
(
did respond to this open-ended question, and yet only three responses l
suggested anything akin to intimidation or an atmosphere of intimidation.
~
i I
i The above conclusion was arrived at independently and without benefit of other sources of data. Dr. Bowers interpretation of his analysis is as j-follows: "The findings... disconfirm the existence of intimidation as a major factor in the survey results. The overall pattern is one of i
i favorability, with normal and ' considered variation by question or issue.
)
Insofar as the questionnaire survey results reflect real conditions, there
)
is little or no evidence of intimidation as anything but a relatively rare, coincidental occurrence."
F 19
. m....
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I 3.3 perceived Intimidation i
j j
From an organizational behavior point of view, a climate of intimidation has many. intervening elements that influence interpretation.
)
Several questions identified below demonstrate the complexity.
4 j
o What specifically is the unit of behavior that can be characterized as intimidating? What does the initiator sai or oo?
i J
i o
What triggering behaviors have precipitated that unit of intimidating behavior? That is, what conditions or situations l
initiate such behavior?
I o
To what extent is intimidation a product of the receiver's
]
perception? It is possible that variations in perceptions and individual styles would lead one person to interpret the specific l
behavior quite differently from another.
o What is the outcome of intimidating behavior? If a person feels threatened, but continues to perform his or her function, harassment may exist; however, by definition, intimidation may not have occurred. On the other hand, in the event a climate of intimidation exists, a full range of responses from ignoring i
potentially intimidating actions to being intimidated can occur on the part of different employees, j
During the extensive and in-depth review of information outlined in Section 2, the Study Team noted that several individuals who stated they were intimidated may-have perceived intimidation because of misunderstandings and/or miscommunication. Several situations were I
identified in which management actions could have been perceived as intimidation.
l One such situation was that in which individuals were not adequately.
l trained to understand or perform assigned position functions. Some
}
20
- = - -
inspectors had only minimal training for the duties and responsibilities expected of them. Several individuals were hired as clerks and apparently became inspectors without any formal training.
Management's miscommunication, poor instructions or inadequate feedback constitute a second situation that could have been misconstrued to be managements attempt to intimidate employees.
k A third situation that could have been read as intimidation occurred with feelings by inspectors that they should understand and/or concur with the disposition of the condition reported.on the nonconformance report (NCR). Some inspectors felt their responsibilities included understanding and approving NCR dispositioned on items that engineering had approved to use "as-is."
They felt intimidated when told by their supervisor that engineering had made the decision and that the inspectors do not need to knew why.
Another indication of the extent of perceptions of intimidation is derived from the Quality Assurance Review Board Qustionnaire of 1979. A canagement decision was made to conduct. interviews of the OA/QC department persennel utilizing a developed questionnaire of forty questions in an 4
j attempt to determine what types of difficulties confronted the individuals I
in toe department.
l As part of the Study Team's task, copies of the 1979 interviews were obtained and analyzed utilizing the methodology outlined as follows:
o The questions were reviewed in detail and those pertaining to a climate of intimidation were identified. This amounted to seven of the forty questions.
l t
o Three classifications were created:
I
. intimidating potentially intimidating not intimidating 21
f J
)
The responses to the seven questions from each of the 121 total o
I interviews were reviewed in detail and categorized in the I
f classification outlined above.
9 I
i
.Upon completion of this process it appears that nine individual i
respondents (7% of the population) indicated some perception of j
I intimidation.
l Although the task of the Study Team did not include the evaluation of i
whether or not actual intimidation did occur at CPSES, the Study Team has concluded that many of the alleged cases of intimidation clearly were cases of perceived intimidation. This problem of perceived ' intimidation is also i
related to the management style prevalent at CPSES and will be discussed in detail in section that follows.
l l!
3.4 Manacement Style I
1 One factor that must be considered when discussing work climate is
}
management style. Over the past 20 to 25 years, there has been an 1
l increasing interest in the subject of Management Style in the literature of i
organizational behavior. Some organizational research has already shown that in relatively stable, routine, and repetitive organizational functions, a certain degree of " Autocratic / Bureaucratic" behavioral style l
seems appropriate. Moreover, such a management style is often associated with the most efficient and* effective organizations. To some receivers, l
however, this management style may be perceived as intimidating, i
\\
l Research also shows that in a more complicated technical environment, i
(that is, one in which functions are non-repetitive, where various 1
l disciplines and technologies are required to interface,.and where the f
environment is relatively unstable) a more participative and j
interpersonally oriented management style seems more effective and j
appropriate.
(This information was initially developed by Woodward in a series of studies in the 1960s and 1970s.)
i 22 1
1 l
L.
The specific environment at CPSES resulted-from a management style that might be described as autocratic. This produced organizational tension and conflict and was viewed by various employees as aggressive, forceful, confronting, insensitive, and even intimidating.
Management response to problem situations is another aspect of management style. Where there is a discrepancy between the existing management style and the requirements of the technology, task, and mission of the organization, there seems to be one of two general responses in most organizations:
1.
Fix tne System:
In some instances, the management of an organization may elect to modify and change its own management style and organizational processes such that their methods conform more appropriately with the organization's task and mission.
2.
Fix the Problem: For the most part, management in large organizations is rigid and static. Thus proble:.is are not addressed as a set of systamic and cultural issues, but are treated in a more narrow perspective, a more thort term orientation in which the approach is to solve the immediate symptom.
It is not surprising in the case of CPSES that management tends to fix the problem. They consider each complaint, or each set of allegations as a single and self-contained issue to be addressed and resolved.
Indeed, they do not appear to see the relationship of recurring patterns of complaints and the inherent difficulties which reside in the management and organizational system in which they function. Criticism should be directed r
~
at the rather narrow set of responses provided to resolve inherent conflicts. This management must deal with the general pattern rather than isolated symptoms in order to improve the relationship between superiors and subordinates, and to build a good strong working relationship between QA, QC, and the crafts.
23 t
i.
i 4.
CONCLUSIONS The findings of the Study Team disconfirm ttle existence of a climate of intimidation. Upon completion of the extensive and in-depth review of j
the information outlined in Section 2, the Study Team unanimously concluded that a climate of intimidation did not exist at CPSES. Although isolated cases of intimidation appeared to have occurred at CPSES, the stereotypical autocratic management style discussed in detail in paragraph 3.2.2 did prevail and may have been perceived as intimidation. This does not, however, constitute a climate of intimidation.
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APPENDIX A RESUMES'
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A-1
i APPENDIX A RESUMES' William E. Stratton, Ph.D.
i Dr. Stratton is an Associate Professor of Management in the College of
-Business at Idaho St, ate University. In this capacity he has studied and lectured about organization behavior and issues of organization development i
and effectiveness for the past 10 years.
I j
Dr. Stratton received his Ph.D. degree in organization behavior from ll Case Western Reserve Univers.ity in 1974. His prior education consisted of 1
i a BS degree in mechanical engineering and a MS degree in Industrial Administration in 1963 and 1965, respectively, from Carnegie-Mellon University. He is affiliated with a number of professional organizations including membership in the Academy of Management and the American Sociological Association.
Since joining the faculty at Idaho State University, Dr. Stratton has been involved in a consultant capacity with numerous organizations including hospitals, food processing companies, public agencies, small
. t businesses, a power company, and the prime contractor at the Idaho National
^
Engineering Laboratory.
Issues dealt with in these involvements have j
included management training and development, organization structuring, organizational climate, team building and effectiveness, and productivity 4
improvement.
Dr. Stratton has been active in research in various areas related to 4
the field of management; this has resulted in-frequent presentations at j
professional conferences, and in numerous publications, j
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A-2 t
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i G. Carl Andognini Mr. Andognini is a registered professional engineer with 25 years of experience in the nuclear utility field.
His most recent position was Vice
. President of Arizona Public Service Company with responsibilities for electric operations. He had responsibility for operations of all of the Company's generating facilities, including the staffing, training, establishment of management control systems, and startup of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, the transmission system and substations, including load and generation scheduling and control.
i From 1975 to 1980, Mr. Andognini was Manager of Nuclear Operations for Boston Edison Company, with responsibility for plant operation and j
licensing, nuclear fuel procurement and management, and technical support
{
for Pilgrim Unit I, plus operational design review of Pilgrim Unit II.
l
~From 1958 to 1975, Ar.dognini was a member of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company organization, whose duties included positions from Reactor Engineer at Yankee Rowe (Licensed Reactor Operator by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), startup responsibility at Connecticut Yankee, startup.and operational support for Vermont Yankee and Maine Yankee, to his last position of Assistant to the Vice President.
Andognini was a member of the utility group that, immediately after l
the Three Mile Island incident, developed the organizational concepts that became known as the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and served on the first Board of Directors for INP0. He was a member and later l
Chairman of the American Nuclear Society ANS-3, the subcommittee responsible for the development of ANSI Standards pertaining to staffing, training, organizational support, and security for nuclear power plants.
In addition, he served as a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Performance Test Development Group.
A member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American Nuclear _ Society and the Edison Electric Institute's Nuclear Power Executive l
Advisory Committee.
l A-3
. =
- -..=-
Charles M. Rice Mr. Charles M. Rice, President of LRS Consultants, Inc., has had thirty-three years nuclear experience, initially in technical areas of shielding, criticality, radiation damage, and reactor design.
Since 1957,.
he has worked in project engineering, program management, and then general.
management where he had the following specific responsibilities:
1.
President of LRS Consultants, Inc. since its founding in 1981.
This company and Mr. Rice provide consulting services to a number of nuclear utilities, state agencies, industrial firms and federal contractors in areas of reactor safety, quality I
assurance, radioactive waste management, radiation protection, energy alternatives, and both program and general management.
2.
Principal founder in 1972, President for six years and then Chairman of the Board until early 1981 of Energy Incorporated, a consulting. firm specializing in safety analysis, quality assurance and nuclear plant startu'p.
3.
Served for three and one half years as President and General Manager of Idaho Nuclear Corporation and Aerojet Nuclear Company with responsibility for management of the National Reactor 4
Testing Station (now the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory),
i the USAEC's principal site for water reactor safety research and test reactor operation.
I 4.
Program Manager for the AEC/ NASA NERVA nuclear rocket development program. Also served as Project Manager for the first successful nuclear rocket engine NRX/EST..and the flight prototype XE-1.
5.
Program Manager for the Army Gas Cooled Reactor System Program including design and fabrication of the ML-1, (the first complete system prototype), the Gas Cooled Reactor Experiment, the closed cycle gas turbine power plant and all related research and development.
i
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A-4 n
.y
6.
Reactor Engineering Department Manager responsible for development and installation of several university training reactors, consulting contract support to the AEC for central station power plants, maritime applications of nuclear power, metallurgical research and food irradiation applications.
Patented a Variable Moderator Controlled Boiling Water Reactor.
7.
Head of the Atomic Power Engineering Group for an architect engineering firm responsible for the design of the first boiling water nuclear power plant.
8.
For four years served as a Physicist with the Oak Ridge
~
Operations Office of the U.S. Ato.nic Energy Commission.
AB Physics MS Physics Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology Fellow and Charter Member, American Nuclear Society i
l i
4 A-5
l Newton Marquiles, Ph.D l
l Newton Marguiles, Ph.D. is currently Dean and Professor of Management in the Graduate School of Management, University of California, Irvine. He l
received a B.S. in engineering from Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, a M.S. in f
Industrial Management from M.I.T., and a Ph.D. in Behavioral Science from U.C.L.A.
He has been on tho faculty of the Division of Organizational i
Sciences, Case Institute of Technology, and in tha Department of Management, l
University of Miami.
Dr. Marguiles has had an opportunity to consult in the area of organizational development and team building with a variety of j
organizations including TRW Systems Group, Department of Water l
Resources--State of California, Northrop Corp., and the National Emergency i
Medical System. He has written and lectured extensively in the field of e
l organizaticnal behavior and is co-author of Organizational Development:
Values, Process, and Technology (1972), Organizational Change: Techniques and Aeplications (1973), Conceptual Foundations of Organizational Development (1978), Organizational Development for Health Care l
Organizations (1982, and Human System Development (1985).
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Bruce L. Kaplan Mr. Kaplan is an Organization Development Specialist for EG&G, Idaho.
His work involves consulting, counseling, coaching and training. He deals with issues of management and organization effectiveness in areas which include organization design and transition management, human resources and management development, interpersonal and intergroup conflict, team building, survey feedback, and business research.
In his five years with EG&G Idaho, who's mission is providing research and development services for the government, Kaplan has consulted to scientific, technical, administrative and service organizations on such issues as problem solving and decision making, team-building, work climate assessment and improvement, productivity and quality of working life.
Kaplan holds a Master's Degree in Organization Development from Pepperdine University, where he studied the relationsh'ip between organizational climate and task accomplishment.
His courses included Consultation skills,. Organizational Systems Diagnosis and Action Strategies in including Management Development and Human Resources Planning.
His prior education included graduate studies at Case-Western Reserve University in Organizational Behavior, and a Bachelor of Arts in Chemistry from the University of Cincinnati.
His previous work experience was in adult and secondary education, where he held teaching, consulting, and administrative positions.
9 A-7
Report to EG&G Idaho, Inc.
bY David G. Bowers, Ph.D.
Research Scientist August 2, 1984 l
1
l 4
l INTRODUCTION l
This report contains an analysis of the responses of 139 persons to a questionnaire entitled White Paper Report.
The focus of the analysis was whether there is evidence, in either the substance or the response pattern of responses, of the respondents having been intimidated.
At the outset, some remarks about the issue of intimidation j
may be appropriate.
The term refers to rendering someone l
timid, thereby inducing them to do something or to deter them i
from doing something, because of fear or apprehension.
As such',
it has two principal components:-
(a) the act or words which produce the effect, and (b) the feeling or emotion that is j
induced in the recipient.
1 The survey results analyzed in this report can contain no direct reading upon possible acts of intimidation.
They also can contain no direct reading upon the feeling or emotion of i
the respondents.
What they can contain is evidence that the responses were distorted, in ways congruent with intimidation j
having been felt.
It is this hypothesis that the present i
analysis considered.
The possible patterns for which the data were examined were i
the following:
i l
- A pattern of " false positiveness," that is, an over-whelmingly positive response pattern in combination with one or more of the following:
l
- An almost total absence of negative. opinion
- A high non-response rate
- More positive responses to more threatening items I
. _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _,. _ _ -
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i REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.
2.
- Skipping of items, especially more threatening i
items l
- Uniform, intra-respondent positiveness
- A pattern of prevalent negative opinion j
- A clastering of negative opinion within a significant i
minority of persons f
- Written comments suggesting intimidation
- An almost complete absence of written comments, suggesting fear of identification by test or handwriting i
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS j
]
The 139 questionnaires, clustered into five sub-groups, were collectively examined to test for the existence of these patterns.
The following paragraphs describe what was done and the results:
i
- -The 19 closed-end items were examined for response rate, i
to determine whether ncn-response rates would suggest intimidation on certain questions.
There was no such f
effect.
For all items but one, response rates ran t
between 96 and 99%.
On that one item (Q. 5) the response rate was 89%.
(See Table 1)
- Threat was defined as a situation in which, if a critical response.were given and known, it could conceivably lead to punitive, negative, or disadvantaging action being taken against the respondent.
- Next, threat was judged in terms of whether, in my opinion, they were high, medium, or low potentially personally threatening in their content.
The categories j
were:
i f
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[
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.m.,.
. C
_m
REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.
J.
i HIGH THREAT MEDIUM THREAT LOW THREAT v
~
Items 2 Items 1 Items 3 4
13 5
l 9
16 6
[
10 18 7
11 19 8
12 15 l
r 14 17
- It was noticed that the high threat items were all f
worded in the negative; that is, a response of "Mostly No" would be considered favorable.
The low threat items, on the other hand, were all worded in the positive; a J
response of "Mostly Yes" would be considered favorable.
i The medium threat items were of mixed wording, two in l
the positive, one in the negative.
Any acquiescience response tendency would therefore tend to bias in favor
[
of the two opposite ends of the threat dimension, that is, f
a tendency on the one hand to agree with the negatively f
worded high threat items, and with the positively worded low threat items.
The results were:
f r
Percent Favorable (i.e.,
"Mostly No") to 79.5 j
negatively worded high threat items Percent Favorable to (mixed) medium 66.7 7
threat items
?
Percent Favorable (i.e.,
"Mostly Yes") to 83.3 positively worded low threat items In fact, therefore, despite any acquiescence response set, an overwhelming majority of respondents tended.
f t
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REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.-
4.
l to disagree with the negatively worded high threat items.
Any acquiescence response set that is present d
l probably causes the observed percentage to understate the true percentage disagreeing with these items.
t 1
- An informal check indicated no systematic referent differences among items in the high, medium, and low
' threat categories.
Items in all three categories referred to management, supervision, Craft, policies, and the like.
1 There was also no concentration of non-responses in any of the three threat categories:
l CATEGORY MEAN RESPONSE PERCENT High threat 97.4 Medium threat 97.0 Low threat 96.3
- Using a binomial, with a 5% confidence interval, the estimated true favorability percentages for the three i
threat categories would be:
1 High threat 70 - 88%
Medium threat 57 - 77%
i Low threat 73 - 89%
- The.overall favorable response percentage was 77.5.
The 1
five subgroupings had favorability percentages as follows:
Foote 75.8%
l JB 77.1%
Lawrence 88.3%
4 Randall 76.4%
i Williams 57.3%
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REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.
5.
Since the confidence band for the overall favorable
. response percentage would be approximately 68 - 88%,
all groups except Williams fall within that band.
' Looking at the Williams group separately, the following was found:
4 CATEGORY PERCENT FAVORABLE RESPONSE r
j High threat 60.5 i
Medium threat 50.0 Low threat 65.8 1
Because this was the smallest group (N = 12), the dif-
]
ference between these percentages and those for the overall percentages amounts to at most two persons.
I I
- Although there was not time to do a complete item analysis, a casual check in two of the largest groups was undertaken to see whether unfavorable response tended to be consistent for particular respondents.
The results suggested that this tended not to be true:
~
Q. 4 "Yes" = ll Q. 2 "Yes" Q. 4 "No" = 9 f
(N = 21)
N Q. 4 " Don't Know" = 1 I
-- Q. 11 "Yes" = 8 i
Q. 2,Yes,_
Q. 11 "No" = 13 I
l In other words, unfavorable responses seem to have been scattered generally among most respondents, not con-centrated among a few.
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REPORT TO EG&G IDEAHO, INC.
6.
- The' responses to Q. 20, the open-ended or write-in question, were content-analyzed into five possible categories.
Where more than one category was mentioned, the category discussed most was coded.
Where equal l
space was given to more than one category, the first mentioned was coded.
However, any mention in categories 4 or 5 was coded there.
PERCENT NO.
MENTION
- 1. Complaints about wages, hours, benefits, working conditions, advancement opportunities 36 25.9
~
- 2. Complaints about bureaucracy, red 4
tape, minor annoyances, interpersonal j
relations problems 58 41.7
- 3. More serious complaints about procedures, safety, etc.
2 1.4
- 4. Suggestions of intimidation 3
2.2
- 5. None,'or blank 40 28.8 It is apparent that much of the written material in response to Q. 20 was relatively moderate in tone and was concerned for the most part with what might be termed
'r
" normal" work situation complaints., only two respondents made comments related to category 4 (More serious complaints).
They were:
"There has been a dramatic increase in ' hurry up' inspection.
Most inspectors feel they ha'ce to rush j
through an inspection in order to satisfy somebody or committee for schedule reasons.
The end result is mistakes and oversights.
I think this is a very serious problem."
i I
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Typographical error:
should read " category 3".
t
,i REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.
7.
"This plant is definitely production run.
Without the quality aspect this place won't get an operator's license.
The QC's need to do their jobs and to do this they need the supervisor capable of letting them do the job right."
Three persons made comments coded in category 5 (Sugges-tions of intimidation) :
. On a personal level,.I would like to see a less antagonistic, threatening, and insecure attitude from management; i e.,
I'm tired of being told to ' hit the gate' if I don't like it here.
That type of comment is usually a response to some inquiry as to prospects of a weekend off or getting paid on time."
. Many of us have worked.at several additiona; nuclear plants, and we are appalled with the shoddy program here which largely consists of cover ups,,
smokescreens, intimidation, and harassment."
. How can there be any Quality Control when there is pressure from management to get turnovers completed.
Would the NRC approve?!?"
CCNCLUSIONS
- Although the pattern is positive or favorable overall, it is not overwhelmingly so.
Approximately one respondent, then, in four was negative.
- There was not, therefore, an absence of negative opinion.
l l
i Typographical errors should read " category 4".
O
. - ~ -. -. ~ ~
. ~
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REPORT TO EGEG IDAHO, INC.
8.
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- The response rate was extremely high.
l
- The most positive response was to the least, not the most, threatening items; the most threatening items were intermediate in positive response.
4
- There was no prevalent pattern of skipping items, 1
even more threatening ones.
f 1
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- Negative responses seemed to be rather broadly l
)
scattered across respondents.
i i
- There was not a prevalent pattern of negative opinion.
I 1
- There was no discernible clustering of negative opinion jl within a significant minority of persons.
i 6
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- Only three responses to the open-end question (Q. 20) l suggested intbnidation of any form.
i
- Almost three-fourths of the respondents responded in some
[
i way to Q. 20.
j i
The findings to the pattern points listed at the outset, there-t fore, disconfirm the existence of intbnidation as a major factor l
{
in the survey results.
The overall pattern is one of favorability, l
i with normal and considered variation by question or issue.
Inso-
}
t far as the questionnaire survey results reflect real conditions, j
(
there is little or no evidence of intimidation as anything but a relatively rare, coincidental occurrence.
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t' REPORT TO EG&G IDAHO, INC.
1 Table 1 RESPONSE RATES TO CLOSED-END ITEMS Questio'n No. Responding Percent (of 139) 1 135 97 2
138 99 3
137 98 i
1 4
134 96 5
124 89 1
6 137 98 7
135 97 8
134 96 4
9 136 98
\\
j 10 135 97
~
11 137 98
~
I 12 134 96 1
98 13 136 l
14 136 98 i
15 137 98 16 136 98 l
17 137 98 i
18 133 96
(
19 134 96 i
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