ML20096H018

Rev 1 to Seismic Evaluation Rept

ML20096H018
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	01/16/1996
From:	Dykstra T WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20096H014	List: ML20096H011 ML20096H018 ML20096H022
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, NUDOCS 9601260226
Download: ML20096H018 (53)

Text

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1 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 USNRC GENERIC LETTER 87-02 UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE A-46 RESOLUTION r

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT s

1 Original Issue June 1995 Revision 1 January 1996 Prepared By:

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nzlz,l9s T. J. Dykstla /

Date Reviewed By:

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Wisconsin Eleciric Po'wer Co.

Date Approved By:

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/[/6/9[o Wisconsin Electric Power Co.

D' ate '

9601260226 960119 PDR ADOCK 05000266 i

P PDR I

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Forwerd POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 i

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS I

1.

INTRODUCTION AND SElSMIC VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY 1-1 Rev.0

[

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 1

1.2 SEISMIC VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY 1-1 1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION 1-2 2.

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH 2-1 Rev.0 2.1 GENERIC SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS FROM THE GIP 2-1 2.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS SELECTED FOR PBNP 2-4

}]

2.3 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST 2-16 2.4 OPERATING PROCEDURES REVIEW 2-16 1

3.

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS 3-1 Rev.0 l

3.1 DESCRIPTION

OF INPUT MOTIONS 3-1

3.2 DESCRIPTION

OF DYNAMIC MODELING AND B ASES FOR THE SELECTION OF KEY MODELING PARAMETERS 3-1

3.3 DESCRIPTION

OF SOIL-STRUCTURE INTERACTION STUDIES 3-2 3.4 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA 3-2 4.

RESULTS OF SCREENING VERIFICATION AND WALKDOWN 4

- EQUlPMENT CLASSES 0 THROUGH 20 4-1 Rev.0 4.1 SEISMIC EVALUATION GUIDELINES 4-1 4.1.1 SEISMIC CAPACITY VS. DEMAND 4-2 j

4.1.2 CAVEAT COMPLIANCE 4-2 4.1.3 ANCHORAGE ADEQUACY 4-3 4.1.4 SEISMIC INTERACTION CHECKS 4-7 4.2 OUTLIER RESOLUTION 4-7 4.3 SEISMIC CAPABILITY ENGINEERS AND PEER REVIEWER 4-7 t

4.4 OTHER TYPES OF SEISMIC EVALUATIONS AND INTERFACES 4-8 4.5 DOCUMENTATION 4-9 4.6 EVALUATION RESULTS - EQUIPMENT CLASSES 0 THROUGH 20 4-9 5.

GIP DEVIATIONS AND COMMENTARY ON MEETING THE INTENT OF CAVEATS 5-1 Rev.0 4

I 6.

RESULTS OF THE TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW 6-1 Rev.1 6.1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 6-1 6.2

SUMMARY

OF EVALUATION RESULTS 6-3 i

i WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Forwerd POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS j

7.

RESULTS OF THE CABLE TRAY AND CONDUlT RACEWAY REVIEW 7-1 Rev.1

7.1 INTRODUCTION

AND PURPOSE 7-1 7.2 SCOPE OF ELECTRICAL RACEWAYS ASSESSED 7-1 7.2.1 GENERAL AREAS COVERED 7-1 4

7.2.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF POINT BEACH RACEWAYS 7-2 7.3 SPECIFIC RACEWAY SYSTEMS EVALUATED 7-3 7.3.1 GENERAL APPROACH 7-3 l

7.3.2 CABLE ROUT!NG 7-3 7

7.3.3 CABLE DATA AND WEIGHTDETERMINATION 7-6 7.3.4 CARDS DATA VERIFICATION 7-6 7.4 RACEWAY SEISMIC EVALUATION CRITERIA AND WALKDOWN RESULTS 7-7 7.4.1 GIP INCLUSION RULES RESULTS 7-7 1

7.4.2 GIP OTHER SEISMIC PERFORMANCE CONCERNS l

& SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW 7-8 7.5 LIMITED ANALYTICAL REVIEW (LAR) RESULTS 7-9 1

7.5.1

SUMMARY

OF RERJf TS 7-9 7.5.2 LOGIC DIAGRAMS rQR CABLE TRAY AND CONDUIT SUPPORT EVALUATIONS 7-11 1

7.6 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 7-14 f

8.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS 8-1 Rev.1 8.1 OUTLIERS RESOLVED PRIOR TO FINAL USI A46 WALKDOWNS:

8-1 8.2 GENERIC OUTLIER lSSUES 8-1 8.3 EQUlPMENT SPECIFIC OUTLIERS lDENTIFIED DURING THE FINAL SElSMIC VERIFICATION WALKDOWNS 8-2 2

9.

RESOLUTION OF OUTLIERS 9-1 Rev.1 9.1 OUTLIER RESOLUTION - EQUIPMENT CLASSES 1 THROUGH 21 9-1 4

9.2 CABLE TRAY AND CONDUlT RACEWAY SYSTEMS OUTLIER I

RESOLUTION 9-15

10. REFERENCES 10-1 Rev.1 i

i 1

i ForwIrd O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 l

USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

11. APPENDIX A: SEISMIC WALKDOWN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (S-SSEL)

Rev.0

12. APPENDIX B: SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS SPECTRA Rev.0-

13. APPENDlX C: WALKDOWN PERSONNEL RESUMES Rev.0

14. APPENDIX D: SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEETS (SVDS)

Rev.0

15. APPENDlX E: PEER REVIEW ASSESSMENT Rev.0

16. APPENDIX F: COMPOSITE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)

Rev.O i

l

'i l

i iii

I WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY For&td POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 0 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION June 1995 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT ACRONYMS List of Acronyms CARDS Cable And Raceway Data System CB Control Building CEA Concrete Expansion Anchor EPRI Electric Power Research Institute GERS Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra GIP Generic Implementation Procedure for the Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment GL Generic Letter GRS Ground Response Spectrum lAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events ISRS In-structure Response Spectra PBNP Point Beach Nuclear Plant LAR Limited Analytical Review MCC Motor Control Center OSVS Outlier Seismic Verification Sheet PAB Primary Auxiliary Building PASS Plant Area Summary Sheet PSD Power Spectral Density RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank S&A -

~

' Stevenson & Associates SCE Seismic Capability Engineer SEWS Screening Evaluation Work Sheet SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Group SRT Seismic Review Team SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List SSER Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report

'SVDS Screening Verification Data Sheet USl Unresolved Safety issue NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission WE Wisconsin Electric Power Company ZPA Zero Period Acceleration iv

S:ction 6 O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW

6. Results of the Tanks and Heat Exchanger Review Tanks and heat exchangers were evaluated in accordance with the rules and procedures given in Section 7 of the GIP [2]. If the vertical tanks did not meet the 4

caveats, they were generally evaluated using the procedures of Appendix H - Flat Bottom Verticalfluid Storage i~anks of EPRI Report NP-6041, Rev.1 [17).

This section gives the results of the tank and heat exchanger reviews performed.

In total, fifty-two (52) tanks and heat exchangers were evaluated. Six (6) tanks and heat exchangers were declared outliers generally due to exceeding anchorage allowables.

6.1 Evaluation Methodology The screening evaluations described in this section for verifying the seismic adequacy of tanks and heat exchangers cover those features of tanks and heat exchangers which experience has shown can be vulnerable to seismic loadings.

These evaluations include the following features:

Check that the shell of large, flat-bottom, vertical tanks will not buckle.

Loadings on these types of tanks include the effects of hydrodynamic loadings and tank wall flexibility.

+ Check that the anchor bolts and their embedments have adequate strength against breakage and pullout.

Check that the anchorage connection between the anchor bolts and the tank shell (e.g., saddles, legs, chairs, etc.) have adequate strength.

Check that the attached piping has adequate flexibility to accommodate the motion of large, flat-bottom, vertical tanks.

The Seismic Capability Engineers reviewed these evaluations to verify that they meet the intent of these guidelines. This review included a field inspection of the tank, the anchorage connections, and the anchor bolt installation against the 4

guidelines described in this Section 7, Section 4.4, and Appendix C of the GIP [2].

The derivation and technical justification for the guidelines utilired were developed specifically for: (1) large, flat-bottom, cylindrical, vertical, storage tanks; and (2) horizontal cylindrical tanks and heat exchangers with support saddles made of plates. The types of loadings and analysis methods described in this section are considered to be appropriate for these types of tanks and heat exchangers; however, a generic procedure cannot cover all the possible design variations.

Other design features such as wall mounted heat exchangers, heat exchangers 6-1

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S;ction 6 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW 4

and vertical tanks supported on legs not covered by the GIP were evaluated using the same procedures and loading conditions as given in Section 7 of the GIP.

i Other types of tanks and 1:aat exchangers (e.g., vertical tanks supported on skirts and structural legs) which were not specifically covered by the guidelines in Section 7 of the GIP were evaluated by the Seismic Capability Engineers using an approach similar to that described in Section 7 of the GIP.

For ven'ical tanks, Reference 17 provides guidelines for evaluating flat bottom vertical tanks using the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) analysis approach. The same design basis input spectra are used as for the GIP (Section i

7) analysis. The results, expressed as High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF), are known to be less conservative than the GlP evaluation results. This r

i is due, predominantly, to the use of more sophisticated evaluation techniques such as accounting for water hold-down forces. The screening guidelines described in Section 7 of the GIP were developed to simplify the complex dynamic fluid-3 j

structure interaction analyses for large vertical tanks and to further simplify the equivalent static analysis procedure for smaller horizontal tanks. To accomplish this, it was necessary to make certain simplifying assumptions and to limit the range of applicability of the guidelines. As such, the HCLPF result should normally exhibit a higher capacity margin over the design basis demand than the GIP approach. The CDFM approach was used for the Refueling Water Storage Tank i

(RWST) (1&2T-13) at Point Beach.

The other types of tanks covered by the screening guidelines in Section 7 of the GIP are cylindrical steel tanks and heat exchangers whose axes of symmetry are horizontal and are supported on their curved bottom by steel saddle plates. The screening guidelines are based on the assumption that the horizontal tanks are anchored to a stiff foundation, which;has adequate strength to resist the seismic loads applied to the tank.

All the base plates under the saddles are assumed to have slotted anchor bolt holes in the longitudinal direction to permit thermal growth ~of the tank, except for the saddle at i

one end of the tank which is fixed. The saddles are assumed to be uniformly spaced a j

distance S apart, with the two ends of the tank overhanging the end saddles a 4

maximum distance of S/2.

r l

A simple, equivalent static method is used to determine the seismic demand on and capacity of the anchorages and the supports for horizontal tanks. The screening guidelines contained in Section 7 of the GIP specifically addressed only the seismic loads due to the inertial response of horizontal tanks, if, during the Screening Verification and Walkdown of a tank, the Seismic Capability Engineers determined that the imposed nozzle loads due to the seismic response of attached piping may be significant, then these loads were included in the seismic demand applied to the anchorage and supports of the tank. The nozzle loads were obtained from existing WE piping analysis.

6-2

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 6 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW

+

6.2 Summary of Evaluation Results i

The results of the A-46 evaluations are summarized below:

j Table 6-1: Tank & Heat Exchanger Evaluation Results NO.

ID DESCRIPTION TYPE RESULTS 1

1HX-12A CCW Heat Horizontal Heat OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with angws angs

@ Sdon 7 Nes 2HX-12D HX-12B&C i

2 1(2)HX-2 Regenerative Wall Mounted OK - M. ;ts Design Basis in Accordance with Heat Exchanger Heat Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules 3

1(2)HX-3 A&B Non-Regenerative Vertical Heat OK-Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Heat Exchanger Exchanger GlP Section 7 Rules (on legs) 4 HX-8 A&B Boric Acid Elevated Heat OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Evaporators Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules (on legs) 5 1(2)HX-4 Excess Letdown Horizontal Heat OK-Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Heat Exchangers Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules 6

1(2)HX-14 A-C Pzt and RCS Wall Mounted OK-Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Sample Heat Heat Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules Exchangers 7

1(2)HX-59 A&B Steam Generator Wall Mounted OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Blowdown Heat Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules Sample Heat Exchangers 8

HX-9 A&B Distillate Cooler Honzontal OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Storage Tank GIP Section 7 Rules 9

T-31 A&B Diesel Fuel Oil Horizontal OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Day Tanks Storage Tank GIP Section 7 Rules 10 T-60 A-F Diesel Air Start Vertical Tanks OK-Meets Design Basis in Accordance with I "I'9'I T-61 A-E 11 T-61F Diesel Air Start Vertical Tanks OUTLIER - Supporting concrete (grout) pier Tank (on legs) is cracked and is in need of repair.

12 1HX-11 A RHR Heat Vertical Heat OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with x angws xchange

@ Sedon 7 Rules.

l 1(2)HX 11B (on legs) 13 2HX-11 A RHR Heat Vertical Heat OUTLIER - The anchorage on two of the Exchanger Exchanger legs of 2HX-11 A have gaps between the nut (on legs) and the top of the base plate.

4 6-3 1

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 6 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGER REVIEW No.

ID DESCRIPTION TYPE RESULTS 14 HX-13 A&B Spent Fuel Pit Horizontal Heat OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Heat Exchangers Exchanger GIP Section 7 Rules 15 1(2)HX-5 Seal Water Heat Vertical Heat OK - Meets Design Basis in Accordance with Exchangers Exchangers GIP Section 7 Rules (on legs) 16 1(2)T-13 Refueling Water Vertical Flat OUTLIER - HCLPF capacity (PGA) using Storage Tanks Bottom Tank App. H rules of Ref. 7 is 0.13g > 0.12g design basis PGA [23). Therefore, the outlier is resolved.

j 17 1(2)T-12 CCW Surge Horizontal OUTLIER - Both saddles have slotted bolt Tanks Storage Tank holes, so modification is required to secure one saddle in longitudinal direction.

P i

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4 1

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a 6-4

Ssction 7 0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND f

RACEWAY REVIEW

7. Results of the Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review 7.1 Introduction andPurpose The seismic adequacy of electrical raceway systems has been identified as an open issue (Unresolved Safety issue A-46) by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for older nuclear power plant facilities.

This section gives the results of the USI A-46 evaluation for the electrical raceways at Point Beach. The evaluations were conducted following Section 8 of the GIP.

4 The seismic evaluation involves conducting a thorough plant walkdown to identify representative, " worst case" examples of raceway systems and evaluate their adequacy.

The scope of raceways reviewed is reported in Section 7.2 followed by a discussion of the specific raceway hangers (and systems) chosen for the limited analytical review in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 provides the raceway assessment criteria (caveats) and the walkdown results. Section 7.5 presents the limited analytical review results.

7.2 Scope of ElectricalRaceways Assessed This section describes the areas of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant that were assessed and the specific raceway systems chosen for evaluation. Electrical raceways are cable tray and conduit systems that are wall-mounted, floor supported and suspended :;ystems.

7.2.1 General Areas Covered All power block buildings anc elevations were surveyed. The station walkdown was conducted from September 28-29 and October 18-28,1993; April 5-8, July 26-28, October 26-20, and November 22,1994. Essentially all electrical raceway systems were walked down by the Seismic Capability Engineers conducting the Class of Twenty walkdowns. A list of the buildings in which the walkdowns were ccnducted is shown below:

1. Containment Structure and Intemals (both Units 1 and 2)

2. Auxiliary Building, Central Part

3. Auxiliary Building, North and South Wings

4. Control Building 7-1 i

l WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW

5. Pipeway #1 i

6. Pipeways #2 & #3

7. Pipeway #4

8. Fuel Oil Pump House

9. Circulating Water Pump House i

10. Spent Fuel Pool All rooms and areas, stated above, were visited without exception at Point Beach.

l All areas were evaluated against the GIP Inclusions Rules and the Caveats (also I

known as "Other Seismic Concerns" and " Seismic Interaction"). Section 7.5 discusses the evaluation criteria at greater length.

The surveys are documented on Plant Area Summary Sheets (PASS).

7.2.2 General Description of Point Beach Raceways I

The Point Beach raceway systems are primarily light steel strut frame construction.

The strut hangers vary from the very simple single cantilever strut supporting one or a few conduits to multi-tier, three-dimensional strut frames supporting cable trays and conduiis. The predominant strut hanger type at Point Beach is the cantilever strut with brackets supporting cable trays or conduits. The largest number of tray tiers at Point Beach were seven tier systems found in the cable spreading room of the Control building.

The trays varied in size from 6" width to 24" width, primarily of 12" to 24" ladder and trough type construction. Conduits vary in size from 1/2" to 4" nominal diameter and are of rigid steel material (standard schedule pipe). Trays were sometimes sprayed with fire retardant or covered.

i The trays and conduits were secured to hangers using standard tray clamps (clips), pipe clamps, or bolting. No missing or damaged hardware was noted during the walkdowns.

The hangers are generally constructed of double channel members interconnected with 4-bolt nir:ety degree fittings. The hangers are anchored to overhead channels which are embedded into (cast-in) concrete or connected to concrete slabs by expansion anchors. Hangers are also sometimes bolted through connection fittings directly to the reinforced concrete slab or wall. Anchorage designs such as welding fittings direct;y to steel and clamping to structural steel using clamps are infrequently seen, although more so in Containment.

Lateral (transverse) and longitudinal bracing is used in various systems.

s 7-2 l

1

S:ction 7 O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 1

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND j

RACEWAY REVIEW i

A considerable percentage of the raceway systems are rigidly mour.ted on walls using strut frames, brackets or single strut members mounted directly on the wall.

Post-TMI plant construction raceway hangers are observed using rolled (structural tube) shapes.

Photographs of the various types of Point Beach raceways are included on the PASS forms.

I 7.3 Specific Raceway Systems Evaluated 7.3.1 General Approach The goal of the evaluation process is to determine overall plant raceway systems acceptability based on a detailed examination of a focused review scope. The GIP evaluation procedure requires that each plant evaluates 10 - 20 raceway supports selected for Limited Analytical Reviews (LAR) to envelop the most heavily loaded of the major different support configurations in use at that plant. Following GlP, all of the raceway systems and their supports were first checked against the inclusion Rules and Caveats. Then the Seismic Review team (SRT) selected representative, worst-case (bounding) samples of the raceway supports on which LARs were performed. This process allows for the establishment of the adequacy of the plant's raceway systems. The actual supports used for LAR were selected following GIP recommendations and at the discretion of the SRT relying on experience and technicaljudgment.

A limited number of large junction boxes were observed. The conduit / tray feeding into the junction boxes are well supported in allinstances. In addition, the junction boxes are also well supported. No unusual conditions were observed.

Raceways spanning seismically separate buildings were also observed. The raceway trays and supports, including cable and conduit, possess adequate flexibility to absorb relative movement between the buildings. It is also noted that relative scismic movement between seismically separate buildings at Point Beach is very small.

7.3.2 Cable Routing The power supplies and control stations for the majority of safety related equipment are centrally located in the PBNP Control Building (CB) or Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) central part. The safety related power supplies are the 4160 VAC medium voltage switchgear cabinets 1 A-05,1 A-06,2A-05, and 2A-06, the 480 VAC low voltage switchgear,1B-03,1B-04,28-03, and 2B-04; and the 480 VAC motor control centers,18-32,2B-32,1B-42 and 2B-42. The 4160 VAC medium voltage switchgear is located in the CB 8' elevation, the 480 VAC low voltage switchgear is located in the CB 26' elevation, and the 480 VAC MCCs are located in the PAB 8' and 26' elevations. The control for the safety related 7-3

l WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 4

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW equipment is in the control room, located in the CB 44' elevation, dire.ctly above the cable spreading room.

As a result, the majority of the control cabling for the safety related components at I

PBNP is routed through the cable spreading room, either to equipment in the CB or through the cable spreading room west wall penetrations to the PAB central part at the 26' elevation. The power cabling is routed in the overhead of the CB 8' elevation either to loads in the CB or through the CB wall penetrations just below the 26' elevation to the PAB central part.

j in the PAB, the majority of the SSEL equipment is located in the central part on the i

8' and 26' elevation. From the PAB central part 26' east wall, the majority of the cabling runs directly west either in the 8' or 26' overheads. For the safety related equipment in containment, the power and control cables are routed through the l

pipeways 1 and 2 for Unit 1 and pipeways 3 and 4 for Unit 2 to the containment electrical penetrations located on the 26' or 35' elevations Based on the equipment layout and cable routing, the majority of the cable trays are located in the cable spreading room, CB 26' elevation; exiting the vital switchgear room, CB 8' elevation; and at the east wall of the PAB at and just below the 26' elevation directly west of the control building.

l As required by the GIP, the entire plant was inspected, however, the inspection focused on the cable tray and conduit systems located in the CB and PAB central part and Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments. The most heavily loaded cable tray l

supports were identified in the cable spreading room. Ten (10) cable hanger supports, listed below in Table 7-1, were chosen for limited analytical review.

Drawings or sketches of the LAR supports are provided in the respective PASS l

Forms.

Table 7-1: Locations of Hangers Chosen for Limited Analytical Reviews LAR NUMBER DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1

6 tier system - all cable trays; one P1001 floor Unit 2 Containment, to ceiling support with a P1001 lateral brace 46' elevation 2

3 tier system - 1 tier conduits,2 tiers of cable Unit 2 Containment, trays; P1001 trapeze hanger 46' elevation 3

5 tier system - all cable trays; P1001 Cable Spreading 1

cantilever with P1000 knee brace; attached Room, CB 26' conduit elevation 7-4

0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S::ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW LAR NUMBER DESCRIPTION LOCATION 1

4 7 tier system - all cable trays; P1001 cantilever Cable Spreading with P1000 trapeze; attached conduit Room, CB 26' elevation 5

3 tier system - all cable trays, multiple trays on Cable Spreading same tier; P1001 trapeze; attached conduit Room, CB 26' elevation 6

5 tier system - all cable trays; P1001 cantilever Just west of vital with 5 trays on one side and 2 trays on the switchgear room, CB other side; attached conduit 8' elevation 7

8 tier system - 1 conduit,7 cable trays; P1001 PAB central part,46' vertical member top and bottom supported; elevation attached conduit 8

4 tier system - all cable trays; single P1001 PAB south wing,8' vertical member, top and bottom supported elevation 9

5 tier system - all cable trays; P1001 cantilever, PAB central part,8' S trays on one side,1 tray on the other; elevation attached conduit 4

10 4 tier system - all cable trays; P1001 cantilever, Cable Spreading P1000 knee brace,4 trays on one side,1 tray Room, CB 26' on the other side; attached conduit elevation 1

i h

75 l

0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7

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POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RE' SOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND t

RACEWAY REVIEW 7.3.3 Cable Data and Weight Determination WE maintains the cable routing for cable at PBNP in the Cable And Raceway Data System (CARDS). With few exceptions, the cable trays at PBNP are identified by a unique number which is maintained in CARDS. For a given cable, an association is established with the cable tray through which it is routed. Within CARDS each cable type is given a cable designator for which the cable's physical and electrical characteristics are listed. Included with the data is the cable's weight per foot.

For the 10 LARs, with the exception of 1 cable tray on LAR 9, all of the cable trays supported by hangers were identified in CARDS. For each tray the following data was obtained from CARDS:

- the cable tray empty weight in pounds per foot

- the cable tray actual weight in pounds per foot l

- the number of cables in a cable tray

- the cable tray actual percent fill l

The cable tray actual percent fill and actual weight are calculated values based on the number of cables and types of cables in the cable tray.

7.3.4 Cards Data Verification i

1 The CARDS cable tray data was verified by visualinspection under PBNP Work i

Order 00630 for the cable trays associated with LAR 3 and LAR 4 cable tray supports located in the cable spreading room. The cables in each tray at the location of the LAR hanger of interest were counted and the number compared to the number of cables provided from CARDS. With the exception of 2 of the 12 j

cable trays inspected, CARDS indicated more cables than were actually counted.

For the 2 cable trays,1 AJ14 and ZMO2, the number of cables counted exceeded the number of cables provided by CARDS by 7 and 13 respectively. This corresponds to a deviation from CARDS of 5% and 6%, respectively.

in CARDS, a cable is counted as being in the cable tray whenever its routing goes through any portion of the cable tray. The cable may enter and exit the cable tray 4

and not be routed through the cable tray at the location of the cable tray hanger of interest. As a result, the CARDS weight per foot information for a given cable tray will usually be conservatively high as demonstrated by the verification inspection conducted. The use of CARDS data for the cable tray weight information is considered an acceptable attemative to the linear adjustment of the cable tray weight, based on percent fill, allowed by Section 8.3.9 of the GlP.

7-6

0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW

]

7.4 Raceway Seismic Evaluation Criteria and Walkdown Results i

This section discusses the raceway seismic evaluations for the Point Beach station.

1 7.4.1 GIP Inclusion Rules Results b

As previously stated, the vast majority of raceway systems in the power block 4

buildings were included in the walkdown. It is important to note that a very thorough review of most raceways, raceway supports and supporting concrete was accomplished, j

Without exception, no anomalies in design or construction were found. All inspected raceways meet the requirements of Section 8.2.2 of the GIP as follows:

i Cable tray spans did not exceed the 10' limit between adjacent supports and the 5' limit for cantilevers; j

s Conduit spans were within the limits required by Rule 2 of Section 8.2.2 [2];

On all cantilever bracket-supported systems cable trays and conduit were found secured to their supports so no tray or conduit sliding can occur; Channel nuts used with light metal framing systems were nuts with teeth (ridges) stamped into the nuts ( Fig.8-1, Ref. 2);

No " rigid boot" type connection or similar (Fig.8-2, Ref. 2) was observed during the walkdown inspection; i

None of the beam clamps inspected had friction resistance in the direction of gravity; Cast-iron anchor embedment rule implementation was resolved as follows. To check for cast iron anchorage embedments in a walkdown is not clearly feasible; however, Wisconsin Electric undertook an exhaustive effort to identify and document its concrete anchorages for the IE 79-02 Bulletin issue in 1981 and reported the use of various commonly used and well documented ductile steel anchor types, but no usage of cast iron embedments was found. Therefore, this j

issuo v'as judged to have no impact on Point Beach.

Point Beach meets the Cable Raceway inclusion Rules of the GIP in their entirety.

7-7

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 I

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW 7.4.2 GIP Other Selsmic Performance Concerns & Selsmic Interaction Review in addition to the inclusion Rules the SRT inspected the raceway systems for the Caveats known as "Other Seismic Performance Concems" and " Seismic Interaction Review". The assessment results are as follows:

i Other Seismic Performance Concems All raceway anchorages were reviewed for adequacy in accordance with Section 8.2.3 [2]. No concerns were found; No concems were found regarding visible cracks, significantly spalled concrete, a

serious honeycombs or other gross defects in the concrete to which the raceway supports are attached; No significant corrosion of cable trays, conduit supports or anchorage was noted by the SRT; No noticeable sag of any conduit or cable tray as defined in Concem 4 of Section 8.2.3 [2] was observed; J

l No broken or missing cable tray and conduit components were found by the 2

SRT, with the exception of one loose base clip angle on one side of a floor to I

ceiling hanger in Unit 1 containment building, elevation 21';

Most cables inspected were restrained so they will be kept in the tray during an earthquake. The SRT found a few cable bundles which were not tied to their respective trays (horizontal and vertical tray type), therefore they are hanging out of trays or free to swing. These anomalies were observed in the Unit 1 containment building, elevation 46';

A sampling of plastic ties were pull-tested, and no brittle ties of plastic materials were found by the SRT; The SRT evaluated the raceways for stiff /short supports and found no instances of this design flaw. Point Beach's hangers are of uniform height in long flexible runs of cable trays or conduit.

l i

7-8

- _ - ~

I i

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:;ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 31 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW Seismic Interaction The raceway systems were reviewed for seismic proximity interaction in accordance with Appendix D (2) No concerns were found by the SRT.

The raceway systems were reviewed for falling hazards in accordance with Appendix D (2)

Conduit and cables were reviewed for sufficient flexibility to accommodate differential displacement between safe shutdown equipment and adjacent equipment and structure. No concerns were found by the SRT; As for Isolated Outliers (other findings), there is an isolated vertical cable tray which has no plastic ties in the Unit 2 containment building, elevation 46'. The cables appear to be hanging out of this tray.

1 7.5 Limited Analytical Review (LAR) Results This Limited Analytical Review (LAR), performed within the scope of Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46, evaluates the structural integrity of cable tray and conduit supports, which have been chosen as representative, worst case examples of the raceway support configurations within the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

The hangers (members, connections and fittings) were first evaluated for static, dead load stresses. They were then evaluated for lateralload ductility to ensure that there were no brittle failure loads. Finally, the vertical capacity was checked I

by comparing the support anchorage capacity to 3 times the support deadweight.

if any of these evaluations fail. the support is declared an " outlier" and additional i

evaluations of lateral load capacity are performed. This section describes the criteria and overall results for the 10 LARs.

in all,10 raceway systems (supports) were chosen for LAR evaluation as shown in 4

Table 7-1. Three (3) out of the 10 supports chosen for assessment did not meet the LAR requirements - specifically the requirement that anchorage capacity be st.fficient to meet the vertical dead load capacity (1.0 x DL) and vertical capacity checks (3.0 x DL) and were, therefore, considered outliers. Outlier Seismic l

Venfication Sheets (OSVS) were completed for the 3 analytical outliers.

I 7-9 4

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 I

USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 I

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW l

7.5.1 Summary of Results 1

The critical interaction value and related comments for each of the raceway

]

support evaluations in this LAR are summarized in Table 7-2 below. Refer to

~

Reference 11 for details of each of the evaluations.

i Table 7-2: CriticalInteraction Values I

1 LAR No.

Interaction Value i

j 6

Members Fittings /

Anchorage

• Maximum Connections 001 0.58~

DL 0.59 DL 0.29 3DL 0.68 002 0.36 3DL 0.16 3DL 0.08 3DL 0.36

, g, s003h as),03l 43DW set 061 gegg d45.? Mg3tXB id$4453 >

[

% *$!g1004) sg4

% 513

,43DL5 (0.49; g3DL) 8f;3;30/

g3Dit! gg 3.30g I'

005 0.57 DL 0.26 3DL 0.51 3DL 0.57 l

006 0.52 DL 0.77 DL 0.92 3DL 0.92

)

l 007 0.93 3DL 0.39 3DL 0.95 3DL 0.95 5

008 0.86 DL 0.71 3DL 1.00 LL 1.00 M 6009p g : 11.26j 9 00)

,s2.021 nDL);

$1.01)

. 6D03 1 g2.021 1

010 0.13 DL 0.18 3DL 0.54 3DL 0.54 1

i DL -

Dead Load j

3DL-3x Dead Load (Vertical Load Check) i LL Lateral Load Check 1

RF -

Rod Fatigue Check Fm

,4 Outlier g

• Support connection to building structure.

i 1

)

1 4

7 10

i l

4 0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Ssetion 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 i

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW 7.5.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations

)

Logic diagrams indicating the evaluation path taken to demonstrate the i

acceptance of each of the raceway supports are shown below. Note that the particular evaluation path taken for the support in question is defined in heavy outline. As previously noted, the hand calculations are given in Reference 11.

LAR Nos.001,002,005,006,007 and 010

[

START i

i

% /

Iwd 8.3.1 i

Yes*

Does the Support Have No s

Vertical Dead Load Capacity With Eccentricities > 1.0 x DL ?

i Yes s /

I 8.3.2 Does the Support Have

?

)

Vertical Capacity ( 3.0 x DL ?

Yes

% /

8.3.4 8.3.3 No No )

Does the Support Have i

Does the Support Have Ductile Response to Lateral Loading ?

Adequate Lateral Load Strength?

l Yes Yes s

i s s 8.3.5 8.3.5 Yes No s

s 1

is the Support a Fixed - End

/ Does the Fixed - End Rod Hanger

/

Rod Hanger ?

Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

i Yes No j

I v

% /

r OUTLIER PASS GO TO SECTION l

) ANALYTICAL REVIEW 8.4 i

• (Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall) j l

7-11 i

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Srction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW 1

)

7.5.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations (Cont.)

~

LAR Nos.

003,004, and 009 Note: Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

j START v

8.3.1 l

Yes*

Does the Support Have No Vertical Dead Load Capacity With Eccentricities)1.0 x DL 7

~

f 4

Yes v

8.3.2 1

Does the Support Have Vertical Capacity > 3.0 x DL 1 Yes 8.b.3 1

No 8.3.4 i

No s s

Does the Support Have Ductile i

Does the Support Have Response to Lateral Loading ? l Adequate Lateral Load Strengtf?

Yes Yes (

v 8.3.5 8.3.5 Yes No s

s Does the Fixed - End Rod Hang ler is the Support a Fixed - End i

Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

Rod Hanger ?

Yes No s

N /

P S

TLIER

{ GO TO SECTION

) ANALYTICAL REVIEW 8.4

• (Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall) i 7-12

~ _ _ ___ _..

W'ISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Section 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW 7.5.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Condult Support Evaluations (Cont.)

i LAR No.

008 Note: Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

START

\\/

8.3.1 Yes*

Does the Support Have No Vertical Dead Load Cepeoity With Eccentricities g 1.0 x DL 7 Yes

%/

8.3.2 Does the Support Have N'

Vertical Cepeoity > 3.0 x DL ?

Yes s/

8.3.3 8.3.4 Does the Support Have Ductile Does the support Have Response to Lateral Loading ?

Adequate Lateral Load Strength ?

I Yes f

Yes s

rs 8.3.5 8.3.5 y,

No s

le the Support a Fized - End Does the Fixed End Rod Henger Rod Henger ?

Pese Fatique Evolustion ?

Yes No

%/

OUTLIER PASS

)t ANALYTICAL REVIEW O TO SECTION 8.4

• (Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall).

7-13

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 7 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT CABLE TRAY AND RACEWAY REVIEW 7.6 Results and Conclusions l

The electrical raceways were walked down as part of the USl A-46 effort. All areas of the plant were surveyed and inspected against inclusion rules and caveats for raceways such as maximum spans, missing or broken hardware, and good design practices as presented in the GlP, Section 8. The results were documented in Plant Area Summary Sheets. In addition, bounding and representative supports were selected for structural and seismic evaluations called Limited Analytical Reviews (LAR). The LAR evaluations checked dead load stresses, ductility, and vertical capacity.

The PASS concluded that all raceways, with no exceptions, meet the GIP inclusion rules and have no seismic interaction concerns. Two deficiencies found by the walkdown teams were classified as "Other Seismic Performance Concems" and are as follows; There is a loose base clip angle on one side of a floor to uiling type hanger in the Unit 1 containment building, elevation 21'.

There are vertical and horizontal trays with cable bundles which are I

hanging out of the trays in the Unit 1 containment building, elevation 46'.

One deficiency found by the walkdown teams was classified as an " isolated l

Outlier" under the Seismic Interaction Review section of the PASS form and is as follows; There is an isolated vertical cable tray with cables which are hanging out of the tray in the Unit 2 containment building, elevation 46'.

l The raceways outside of the cable spreading room met all of the GIP criteria with the exception of LAR#9 which has been declared an outlier. That LAR was also determined to be unique in that no other hanger of its particular design was found elsewhere in the plant. All other hangers outside the cable spreading room satisfactorily meet the GIP guidance for design basis loads.

Two of the hanger types chosen (LARs #3 and #4) within the cable spreading room (Control building) do not meet the GIP criteria.

7 14

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 8 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Fevision i USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS

8. Description of the Equipment Outliers This section discusses the outliers identified during the USl A-46 walkdowns conducted at Point Beach. The outliers are identified from the Twenty Classes of Equipment discussed in Section 4, the Tanks & Heat Exchangers Review l

discussed in Section 6, and the Cable Tray & Conduit Raceway Review given in Section 7 Relay outliers are discussed in the Point Beach Relay Evaluation l

Report [25].

l l

An outlier is an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guidelines provided in the GIP. The GIP screening guidelines are intended to be used as a generic basis for evaluating the seismic adequacy of equipment. If an item of equipment fails to pass these generic screens, it may still be shown to be adequate by additional evaluations.

Section 9 provides a discussion of the disposition or corrective action, as appropriate, for each outlier discussed below.

8.1 Outliers Resolved Prior to Final USI A46 Walkdowns:

Pre-walkdowns of a sampling of USl A46 equipment were conducted in October, 1992 and April,1993 to collect data for the official walkdowns conducted in the latter half of 1993 and during 1994. During the pre-walkdowns, several potential outliers were noted and some were subsequently resolved prior to the start of the official walkdowns and others were removed from the SSEL, thus given no further consideration. The potential outlier (s) listed below are not considered official outliers and OSVS sheets were not completed since the final walkdown teams inspected the equipment in their upgraded condition.

• Control room electrical pane;s 1C105-133 were re-anchored in 1992 when it was discovered that they were marginally anchored during the SQUG pre-walkdowns. They were re-anchored per modification work request #MR 92-l' 122 dated 8/20/92.

8.2 Generic OutlierIssues Only one generic issue was identified during the final walkdowns that affected A46 equipment items in several plant areas. This generic issue is discussed below.

4

. Unrestrained portable equipment, such as tool carts, reference tables, supply cabinets and copiers were found throughout the main control room.

These items present potentialimpact hazards to nearby equipment. This is a common problem in crowded areas such as a control room and can be adequately addressed by invoking a reasonable seismic housekeeping procedure.

8-1

....__.-_____...___.._.-_.___-_A

i O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Scction 8 l

l POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 l

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS 8.3 Equipment Specific Outilers identified During the Final Seismic Verification Walkdowns:

A total of ninety-nine (99) components were determined to be outliers during the seismic verification walkdowns. The outlier discussions below group the equipment with a common typo of outlier. The proposed resolution of these

]

l outliers is discussed in Section 9. The list of equipment that was walked down included equipment for the IPEEE Seismic PSA project and two WE intemal action items. As a result, the list of outliers includes equipment that is outside of the scope of USl A-46, which would not have been evaluated if the seismic verification walkdowns were done solely for USI A-46. Seventy eight (78) of the ninety nine (99) outliers are part of the USI A-46 project. Section 9 identifies which outliers are not within the scope of the USI A-46 project.

A1.

Transformers 1(2) X-13 and 1(2) X-14 were found anchored by friction clips, an unacceptable form of anchorage according to the GlP. The existing anchorage was evaluated and the seismic review team did not consider the condition to be an operability concem, but did recommend the anchorage be upgraded.

A2.

Reactor trip breaker cabinet 2C-41 was found unanchored. The existing condition was evaluated and the seismic review team did not consider the condition to be an operability concem, but did recommend t.

the anchoraae be upgraded.

(

A3.

Inverters, DY-0A, DY-0B, adjacent to relay cabinets 1C-158/166/167 and 2C-156-158 respectively, and battery chargers, D-07, D-08 adjacent to 4160 VAC switchgear 1 A-06 and 2A-06 were found not bolted together. Applicable caveats for cabinets and panels housing essential relays require adjacent cabinets to be interconnected. The concern is impact vibration effects on sensitive relays. D-07 was alco found to be missing one of four anchors. The existing anchorage was evaluated and the seismic review team did not consider the condition to be an operability concem, but did recommend the anchorage be upgraded. The formal anchorage calculation showed that the D-07 andorage was adequate with 3 of the 4 concrete expansion anchors.

A4.

Motor control center 2B-42 had one missing fastener nut on the top braces supporting the MCC to the rear reinforced concrete wall. This was an isolated instance in a highly redundant system that was adjudged to be of little safety significance, although the SRT did recommend its repair.

AS.

The doors on control room vertbal panels 1(2)C-75 and 1C-105 were found unlatched and could not be closed. This condition poses a possible impact hazard to vibration sensitive equipment in the panel.

8-2

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 8 j

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS A6.

The control room furniture as discussed under generic concerns is a potential interaction hazard to control room cabinets back panels 1(2)C-105-114, and 1C-115-133; and main control cabinets (console)

C-01-1(2)C-04.

A7.

A potential interaction hazard was identified next to a control cabinet 2

C-178-179 due to an unanchored computer printer denoted as "LP300" which could slide into the cabinet (s) and pose an impact hazard. The concern is impact vibration effects on sensitive relays.

A8.

Several buses and control panels in the cable spreading room of the Control building have undocumented anchorage details. The anchorage arrangements are such that proper reinforcing of support pedestals and proper anchorage of the cabinets cannot be assured.

Although they are positively anchored, a reliable capacity cannot be established. The panels (buses) are 1(2)B-03,1(2)B-04,1(2)C151-4 155,1C156-157,1(2)C161-165, and 2C166-167. Buses 1(2)B-03 and 1(2)B-04 also have an overhead trolley on the top of the bus that runs 1

on a rail and poses an impact hazard.

A9.

Several pumps have cast-in-place (or grouted-in-place) anchorages, specifically, j-bolts, that are less than minimum required embedment, l

16D, (D denotes " diameters") and/or with edge distance spacings less than 4D. The pumps are 1P-10 A&B,1P-11 A&B, and 1(2)P-14 A&B.

~

A10. The vertical deep well, service water pumps, P-32 A through F, have an extended shaft which is greater than 20' long and therefore requires a specific evaluation. The shaft length of 20' represents the upper i

bound length of cantilever shafts for vertical pumps in the earthquake experience equipment class.

1 j

A11. A possible interaction hazard was identified for air-operated valve 1SI-844A. The adjacent reinforced concrete wall is in close proximity (about 1/2") to the valve.

A12. The valve operator support anchorage for air operated valve 1SI-844B was cracked or cut. This was determined to be seismically inadequate based on inspection and engineering judgment.

A13.

Valves 1(2)SI-839 A-D are on a 3/4"line which is less than the 1" minimum diameter line size covered in the GIP and, therefore, need evaluation. The valve groupings in both units are supported by a steel frame. In Unit 1, the valve operators are supported and the supoorting fr.ame is anchored by powered-actuated anchors which are not covered by the GlP. In Unit 2 the valve operators are not supported by the frame; however, the frame is properly anchored by concrete 4

8-3

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 8 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS expansion anchors. The SRT recommended the support of the operators in Unit 2.

A14. Air operated valves,1(2)CS-466,1(2)CS-476,1(2)CS-480, and 1(2)CS-481 are adjacent to an unanalyzed block wall which poses an interaction hazard to the valves and their sub-components.

A15. Several air operated valves air mounted on 1" diameter carbon steel pipe that is not well supported. Because of the pipe support configuration, the potential for pipe overstress exists due to the valve's horizontal response during an earthquake. The valve operator offset is within the allowed limits for equipment class 7. Had the pipe been better supported, the valves would be seismically adequate. The valves are 1(2)SI-846,1(2)WG-1786, and 1(2)WG-1787.

A16. Air operated valve,2SI-957, was missing the U-bolt which holds the valve operator to the valve support stanchion. The valve operator offset was within the allowed limits for valves on a 1" diameter pipe.

However, since the operator support was not installed per design, the valve was declared an outlier.

A17. Air operated valves,1(2) RM-3200 A&B are mounted inside a climate control hut inside the facade structure that encloses the containment structure. The valves are adequately supported, however, there is no visible anchorage at the base of the hut to the facade platform. If the hut is not anchored, it poses an interaction hazard to the valve.

A18. Air operated valve,1SC-959, is mounted on a 1/2" tubing line. The valve body is supported on a shelf and held in place by 2 U-bolts in friction around the valve body. The valve is an outlier because it is not positively restrained.

A19. Motor operated valves,1(2) SI-878 A through D were supported by the valve operator but not the valve body, in addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed. The proposed resolution is to check the applicable piping analysis for the pipe and yoke stresses at the valve.

A20. Air cortpressor K-4B has a loose hand crank resting against it which may po se an interaction hazard.

A21. Air handling units HX-66 and HX-98 are mounted on rubber vibration i

isolators. The isolators have insufficient capacity to transfer the full seismic tension and shear loads to the concrete expansion anchors.

HX-66A is mounted on spring vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation shows that the base plate of the spring vibration isolator will 8-4

r j

WISCONSid ELECTRIC. OWER COMPANY Section 8 P

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A 46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS yield. Air handling units 1W-4 A&B were found not anchored. The fan and motor assembly was welded to the interior of the pienum housing.

However, the housing was not anchored the supporting structural platform.

A22. Chiller units HX-38 A1/A2/A3 and HX-38 B1/B2/B3/84 are not anchored, the compressor motors are mounted on steel springs. In addition, the seismic demand ISRS exceeds 1.5 x Bounding Spectrum at the low frequency peak, for the Imation where the chiller units are installed.

A23. Three temperature elements have potential interaction problems.1TE-622 and 2TE-450 B&D are in close proximity or contact with adjacent piping or pipe support. Also 2TE-450 B&D have piping insulation impinging on the elements which may cause them to bend.

l A24. One leg on air receiver tank T-61F has cracked grout underneath the foot.

A25. The nuts for the caste in place anchor bolts for RHR hest exchanger 2HX-11 A and RCP Seal Water Supply Filter,2F-39A, are not fully seated. There are 1/4" to 3/8" gaps between the nuts and the base plate of the legs.

A26. The RWST,1(2)T-13, does not meet the Section 7 evaluation rules of the GIP and was subsequently analyzed according to Appendix H of EPRI Report NP-6041, Rev.1 [17].

A27. The CCW Surge Tank,1(2)T-12, have slotted mounting holes in the saddle supports on both ends of the tank. This results in an uneven distribution of the anchorage longitudinal shear loads between the eight (8) caste in place bolts, potentially overloading a single bolt if it is required to resist the entire anchorage load in the longitudinal direction.

A28. Cable tray hangers represented by LARs #3 and #4 in the cable spreading room and LAR #9 immediately adjacent to the spreading room do not pass the dead load, vertical capacity, or lateral load LAR evaluations and will require further investigation.

A29. In the Unit 1 Containment building, on elevation 21', there is a floor to ceiling cable tray support hanger with a loose based clip angle on one side.

3-5

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 8 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS A30. In both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment buildings, on elevation 46', there are cables hanging out of their trays. In Unit 1, there are cable bundles hanging out of vertical and horizontal cable trays and in Unit 2, there is an isolated vertical cable tray whose cables are hanging out of the tray.

I i

i f

8-6

O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY SGetion 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION

9. Resolution of Outliers 9.1 Outiler Resolution - Equipment Classes 1 through 21 l

All of the outliers, for Equipment Classes 1 through 21, discussed in Section 8 are shown in Table 9-1. The resolution block provides a summary of the seismic operability determination that is recorded on the OSVS form along with the completed, in-progress or proposed resolutions. All of the outliers are proposed to be resolved by February of 1998, following the second available refueling outage for PBNP Unit 2.

Table 9-1: Outlier Resolution Summary CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION l

1 0

CV 2F-39A The nuts for the cast in place This is not an operability concern because anchors are not fully seated.

the attached pipe has sufficient flexibility to accommodate the displacement of the filter. The nuts will be seated or washers installed to close up the gaps. The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only.

Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.

2 1

480V 28-42 The connecting bolt that The MCC is considered seismically I

connects the double P1000 to operable because the other top supports the strut that is anchored to the are sufficient to resist overturning. The wall has either loose or bolts will be check tight and any missing missing fastening nuts.

hardware replaced.

3 2

480V 18-03 The anchorage weld spacing is There is sufficient anchorage capacity in to large, every 3rd cabinet in the existing welds to carry the seismic some cases. The trolley hoist anchorage loads. However, the switchgear that rides along the top of the was declared an outlier because it is not switchgear poses an good engineering practice to transfer the interaction hazard.

seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage.

The trolley hoist will be evaluated.

1 9-1 4

O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION 1

l CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION l

4 4

2 480V 28-03 The anchorage weld spacing is There is sufficient anchorage capacity in to large, every 3rd cabinet in the existing welds to carry the seismic 1

some cases. The trolley hoist anchorage loads. However, the switchgear J

that rides along the top of the was declared an outlier because it is not switchgear poses an good engineering practice to transfer the interaction hazard.

seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage.

The trolley hoist will be evaluated.

5 2

480V 18-04 The anchorage weld spacing is There is sufficient anchorage capacity in to targe, every 3rd cabinet in the exisling welds to carry the sei#c some cases. The trolley hoist anchoruge loads. However, the switcogear I

that rides along the top of the was declared an outlier because it is not switchgear poses an good engineering practice to transfer the i

interaction hazard.

seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-l 005 is initiated to install new anchorage.

l The trolley hoist will be evaluated.

6 2

480V 2B-04 The anchorage weld spacing is There is sufficient anchorage capacity in to large, every 3rd cabinet in the existing welds to carry the seismic some cases.1 he trolley hoist anchorage loads. However, the switchgear that rides along the top of the was declared an outlier because it is not 4

switchgear poses an good engineering practice to transfer the interaction hazard, seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage.

The trolley hoist will be evaluated.

7 3

RP 2C-41 The cabinet is not anchored.

The relay review showed that there were no essential Reactor Protection System relays located in the cabinet. Any failure of 2C-41 a

is expected to cause the reactor trip breakers to open, therefore in the safe

+

direction. Modification request MR 94-045 will install new anchorage.

8 4

4.16KV 1X-13 The transformer anchorage The friction clips provide adequate capacity uses friction clips which is not to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the covered by the GlP.

friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.

i 9-2

i I

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 9

4 4.16KV 2X-13 The transformer anchorage The friction clips provide adequate capacity uses friction clips which is not to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the 1

covered by the GIP, friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.

4 10 4

4.16KV 1X-14 The transformer anchorage The friction clips provide adequate capacity uses friction clips which is not to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the covered by the GlP.

friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.

11 4

4.16KV 2X-14 The transformer anchorage The friction clips provide adequate capacity uses friction clips which is not to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the covered by the GIP.

friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.

i 12 5

RH 1P-10A The pump anchorage has less The pump anchorage was analyzed in than GIP minimum required accordance with ACI 349-80 Appendix B edge distance, resulting in and shown to have sufficient capacity.

i anchorage failure when evaluated in accordance with the GIP.

I 13 5

RH 1P-108 The pump anchorage has less The pump anchorage was analyzed in than GIP minimum required accoratnce with ACI 349-80 Appendix B edge distance, resulting in and shown to have sufficient capacity.

anchorage failure when evaluated in accordance with the GlP.

14 5

CC 1P-11 A The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-2 embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP.

anchorage has sufficient capacity.

15 5

CC 1P-11B The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP.

anchorage has sufficient capacity.

i 16 5

Si 1P-14A The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP.

anchorage has sufficient capacity 17 5

SI 2P-14A The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP.

anchorage has sufficient capacity.

3 i

1 9-3

i O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 18 5

Sl iP-14B The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP.

anchorage has sufficient capacity.

19 5

Si 2P-14B The anchor J-bolts have an A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349 embedment < 16D as required 80 Appendix B shows that the pump by the GIP, anchorage has sufficient capacity, i

20 6

SW P-32A The pump extending casing is The pump is considered operable based on 34' long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the interaction hazard.

pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be evaluated and restrained if required, l

21 6

SW P-32B The pump extending casing is The pump is considered operable based on 34'long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the interaction hazard.

pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be evaluated and restrained if required.

22 6

SW P-32C The pump extending casing is The pump is considered operable based on 34'long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the interaction hazard.

pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be evaluated and restrained if required.

23 6

SW P-32D The pump extending casing is The pump is considered operable based on j

34'long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the interaction hazard.

pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be :, valuated and restrained if required.

24 6

SW P-32E The pump extending casing is The pump is considered operable based on 34' long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A 4

The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the I

interaction hazard pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be evaluated and i

restrained if required.

25 6

SW P-32F The pump extending easing is The pump is considered operable based on 34' long > the 20' allowable.

original design calculations. S&A The overhead crane poses an calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the interaction hazard.

pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.

l The overhead crane will be evaluated and restrained if required.

9-4

0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 26 7

CS 1CS-466 The valves are adjacent to a The function of the valve is to close to large unanalyzed block wall.

isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not The block wall poses an required to shut during the 30 second interaction hazard for the valve period of strong motion. However, it is and it sub-components.

desired to have it shut during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> recovery period. As a back up to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps.

4 27 7

CS 2CS-466 The valves are adjacent to a The function of the valve is to close to large unanalyzed block wall.

isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not The block wall poses an required to shut during the 30 second interaction hazard for the valve period of strong motion. However, it is and it sub-components.

desired to have it shut during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> recovery period. As a back up to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps 28 7

CS 1CS-476 The valves are adjacent to a The function of the valve is to close to large unanalyzed block wall.

isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not a

The block wall poses an required to shut during the 30 second interaction hazard for the valve period of strong motion. However, it is and it sub-components.

desired to have it shut during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> recovery period. As a back up to the valve 4

failing to close, the operators can turn of a

the feed pumps and condensate pumps 4

29 7

CS 2CS-476 The valves are adjacent to a The function of the valve is to close to large unanalyzed block wall.

isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not The block wall poses an required to shut during the 30 second interaction hazard for the valve period of strong motion. However, it is and it sub-components.

desired to have it shut during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i

recovery period. As a back up to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps 30 7

CS 1CS-480 The valves are adjacent to a The valve is normally close and must j

large unanalyzed block wall.

remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs.

j The block wall poses an Therefore, during the 30 second period of interaction hazard for the valve strong motion, the valve is not required to and it sub-components.

change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps.

l 95

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION l

CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 31 7

CS 2CS-480 The valves are adjacent to a The valve is normally close and must large unanalyzed block wall.

remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs.

The block wall poses an Therefore, during the 30 second period of interaction hazard for the valve strong motion, the valve is not required to and it sub-components.

change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps.

32 7

CS 1CS481 The valves are adjacent to a The valve is normally close and must large unanalyzed block wall, remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs.

The block wall poses an Therefore, during the 30 second period of interaction hazard for the valve strong motion, the valve is not required to and it sub-components.

change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to i

open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate l

pumps.

33 7

CS 2CS-481 The valves are adjacent to a The valve is normally close and must large unanalyzed block wall, remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs.

The block wall poses an Therefore, during the 30 second period of interaction hazard for the valve strong motion, the valve is not required to and it sub-components.

change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn of the feed pumps and condensate pumps.

34 7

RM 1RM-3200A The valve is located in a The item has been walked down for the climate contiol hut that has no IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, visible base anchorage.

It has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening enteria.

i 35 7

RM 2RM-3200A The valve is located in a The item has been walked down for the climate control hut that has no IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, visible base anchorage.

it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening cnteria.

i 36 7

RM 1RM-32008 The valve is located in a The item has been walked down for the i

climate control hut that has no IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, visible base anchorage.

it has been screened out using the Seismic 1

PSA screening criteria.

i 37 7

RM 2RM-3200B The valve is located in a The item has been walked down for the climate control hut that has no IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, visible base anchorage.

it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.

i 9-6

O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 38 7

SC 1SC-959 The AOV body is mounted to a This valve is normally closed and is support shelf by 2 U-bolts in required to stay closed in the event of an friction. The valve is mounted SSE. The U-bolt support will be analyzed on a 3./8"line. If the U-bolts and if required a valve operator support will slip, the potential exists for the be installed.

line to be overstress.

39 7

SI 1SI-839A The Shot in concrete nails The support frame anchorage was modified used for anchorage of the during the same U1R21 refueling outage valve support frame are not under MR 93-047 covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection.

40 7

Sl 2SI-839A The AOV was mounted on a The valve was determined to be seismically 3/4"line with the valve inoperable. The operator was supported operator unsupported that same refueling out under MWR 935398 41 7

SI 1S1-839B The support frame anchorage The support frame anchorage was modified was modified during the same during the same U1R21 refueling outage U1R21 refueling outage under under MR 93-047 MR 93-047 1

42 7

Si 2SI-839B The AOV was mounted on a The valve was determined to be seismically 3/4"line with the vaive inoperable. The operator was supported operator unsupported that same refueling out under MWR 935398 43 7

SI 1SI-839C The support frame anchorage The support frame anchorage w;s modified was modified during the same during the same U1R21 refueling outage U1R21 refueling outage under under MR 93-047 MR 93-047 j

44 7

Sl 2SI-839C The AOV was mounted on a The valve was determined to be seismically 3/4"line with the valve inoperable. The operator was supported l

l operator unsupported that same refueling outage under MWR 935398 45 7

SI 1SI-839D The support frame anchorage The support frame anchorage was modified was modified during the same during the same U1R21 refueling outage U1R21 refueling outage under under MR 93-047 MR 93-047 48 7

Si 2SI-839D The AOV was mounted on a The valve was determined to be seismically 3/4"line with the valve inoperable. The operator was supported l

operator unsupported that same refueling outage under MWR 935398 47 7

SI 1SI-844A The valve is within 1/2" of This item has been walked down for the concrete wall. Valve on 1"line IPEEE only. An operator support was installed during the same U1R21 refueling outage under modification MR 94-031.

l

=

9-7

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Ssction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 J

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION

)

CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION i

48 7

SI 1SI-844B The valve operator support is This item has been walked down for the not anchored to the floor.

IPEEE only. The valve support was mounted during the same U1R21 refueling outage under MR 94-031 49 7

St 1S1-846 The AOV offset of 36" < 45" The item has been walked down for the allowable offset for a 1"line.

IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, However, because of the pipe it has been screened out using the Seismic support configuration, there is PSA screening criteria. Modification a potential for pipe overstress.

request MR 94-066*B is initiated to upgrade the support of the 1"line.

4 50 7

Si 2SI-846 The AOV offset of 36" < 45" The item has been walked down for the allowable offset for a 1"line.

IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, However, because of the pipe it has been screened out using the Seismic support configuration, there is PSA screening criteria. Modification i

4 a potential for pipe overstress.

request MR 94-066*B is initiated to upgrade the support of the 1"line.

l t

51 7

SI 2SI-957 The valve operator yoke U-bolt The item has been walked down for the was missing IPEEE only. The valve was considered seismically operable based on a calculation that showed the pipe stress was < 2Sy.

The valve operator U-bolt was installed 1

s during the next refueling outage under Work Order 935298 52 7

WG 1WG-1786 Fventhough 24" offset < 45" The item has been walked down for the GIP allowable for a 1" there is IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, a potential for pipe overstress it has been screened out using the Seismic f

in hne 1"-WD-151R-1 because PSA screening criteria.

{

of how the 1"line is supported.

j i

i 53 7

WG 2WG-1786 The AOV offset of 15" < 45" The item has been walked down for the i

allowable offset for a 1"line.

IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, However, because of the pipe it has been screened out using the Seismic support configuration, there is PSA screening criteria.

a potential for pipe overstress.

54 7

WG 1WG-1787 Eventhough 24" offset < 45" The item has been walked down for the GIP allowable for a 1" there is IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, a potential for pipe overstress it has been screened out using the Seismic in line 1"-WD-151R-1 because PSA screening criteria.

of how the 1"line is supported.

9-8

O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S@ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 i

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION 3

CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 55 7

WG 2WG-1787 The AOV offset of 15" < 45" The item has been walked down for the allowable offset for a 1" line.

IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, 4

However, because of the pipe it has been screened out using the Seismic support configuration, there is PSA screening criteria.

j a potential for pipe overstress.

56 8

SI 1SI-878A The valve was supported by The pipe analysis, Accession #-WE-the valve operator but not the 100104, shows that the valve will not be valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed 57 8

Si 2SI-878A The valve was supported by The piping analysis, Accession # -WE-the valve operator but not the 200084, shows that the valve will not be valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed 58 8

SI 1SPd788 The valve was supported by The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-the valve operator but not the 100104, shows that the valve will not be 4

valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly 7

1 shimmed 59 8

SI 2SI-878E The valve was supported by The piping analysis, Accession # -WE-the valve operator but not the 200084, shows that the valve will not be valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed a

l 60 8

SI 1SI-878C The valve was supported by The pipe analysis, Accession # -WE-the valve operator but not the 100104, shows ; hat the valve will not be I

valve body. In addrtion, the overstressed.

j gap between the valve body i

and the gravity support j

stanchion is not properly shimmed a

61 8

SI 2SI-878C The valve was supported by The piping analysis, Accession # - WE-i the valve operator but not the 200084, shows that the valve will not be valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

1 gap between the valve body

)

and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed 9-9

0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Srction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 l

USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 i

i SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION i

I CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION i

i l

62 8

SI 1SI-878D The valve was supported by The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-the valve operator but not the 100104, shows that the valve will not be valve body, in addition, the overstressed.

j gap between the valve body and the gravity support t

stanchion is not properly

{

i shimmed t

63 8

SI 2SI-878D The valve was supported by The piping analysis, Accession # -WE-the valve operator but not the 200084, shows that the valve will not be 4

valve body. In addition, the overstressed.

l gap between the valve body and the gravity support i

stanchion is not properly shimmed 64 10 VNAFW HX-66 The air handling unit is HX-66 is on the SSEL to maintain SW mounted on rubber vibration system integrity. The air handling and air isolators. The ancharage cooling function is not required. The SW calculation concluded that the system engineer judged that a break in the rubber isolators had attached 2" SW line would not significantly I

insufficient capacity to transfer impact service water to other essential the anchorage loads to the loads. The function of the air handling unit concrete expansion anchors.

will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.

65 10 VNAFW HX-66A The air handling unit is HX-66A is on the SSEL to maintain SW 1

mounted on spring vibration system integrity. The air handling and air isolators. The anchorage cooling function is not required. The SW calculation determined that the system engineer judged that a break in the spong isolator base plate will attached 2" SW line would not significantly yield.

impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.

66 10 SW HX-98 The air handling unit is HX-98 is on the SSEL to maintain SW mounted on rubber vibration system integrity. The air handling and air t

a isolators. The anchorage cooling function is not required. The SW l

calculation concluded that the system engineer judged that a break in the rubber isolators had attached 21/2" SW hne would not insufficient capacity to transfer significantly impact service water to other the anchorage loads to the essential loads. The function of the air concrete expansion anchors.

handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.

j I

67 10 VNRC 1W-4A The air handling unit was The unit was anchored during that same found unanchored.

U1R21 outage under modification MR 94-032.

i i

i 9-10

l O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S:ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 68 10 VNRC 1W-48 The air handling unit was The unit was anchored during that same found unanchored.

U1R21 outage under modification MR 94-032.

69 11 VNCSR HX-The chiller unit is not The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW 038A1,A2,A anchored, the compressor integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not 3

motors are on springs, and the significantly affect SW flow to otner seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x essentialloads. The HVAC room is i

BS at the low frequency peak.

designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling function of i

l the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if I

an anchorage upgrado is required.

70 11 VNCR HX-The chiller unit is not The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW 038B1,B2,8 anchored, the compressor integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not 3,B4 motors are on springs, and the significantly affect SW flow to other seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x essentialloads. The HVAC toom is BS at the low frequency peak.

designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling functicn of l

the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.

71 12 DA K-48 A loose hand crank wis The hand crank is stored on a new bracket j

resting against the air on the wall adjacent to the air compressor.

compressor posing an interaction hazard.

72 10 125V D-07 The battery charger is not The battery charger does not contain attached to the adjacent essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear switchgear.

cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.

73 16 125V D-08 The battery charger is not The battery charger does not contain attached to the adjacent essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear I

switchgear.

cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.

9-11

4 I

~

~WfSCOSS'N ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY SGetion 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 l

SElSMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 74 16 Y

DY-0A The outlier is an interaction.

The inverter does not contain any essential DY-0A is mounted directly relays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is j

adjacent to 1C-167. The cont.idered seismically operable based on i

cabinets are not fastened there being no instances of inverter failure together.

due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.

1 75 16 Y

CY-09 The outlier is an interaction.

The inverter does not contain any essential DY-0B is mounted directly re!ays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is adjacent to 2C-157. The considered seismically operable based on cabinets are not fastened there being no instances of inverter failure together.

due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.

1 l

t 76 19 RC 2TE-450B The temperature element is An engineering evaluation showed that impinging on insulation It thermal expansion did not accommodate must be determined if thermal the expected seismic displacements.

expansion while hot Modification request MR 95-021 is initiated accommodate seismic to replace TE with a shorter one.

displacements.

77 19 RC 2TE-450D The temperature element is An engineering evaluation showed that impinging on insulation. It thermal expansion did not accommodate 4

must be determined if thermal the expected seisn ic displacements.

expansion while hot Modification request MR 95-021 is initiated accommodate seismic to replace TE with a shorter one.

displacements.

78 19 RH 1TE-622 The outlier concern is The piping analysis shows that the interaction. The TE is pinned maximum expected pipe displacement at against a pipe support. The the TE is.13", Therefore only slight support has a 2" gap so pipe bending of the TE is expected and it is could move and shear or bend considered seismically operable. The element.

temperature element will be rotated to removed the interaction concern. The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only.

l Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been

[

screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.

79 20 MMS C-01-1(2)C-An adjacent supply cabinet The supply cabinet was attached to the 04 posed a spatial interaction back of 2C-03 under modification MR 94-hazard.

021.

I 9-12

S::ction 9 0 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 80 20 IOPS 1C-75 The doors are not positively The cabinet does not contain any essential j

latched.

relays, and the doors are fairly light weight therefore, significant damage is not expected to occur.1 & C will be contacted to determine if the existing door latch can be used or whether a new handle would be preferred.

81 20 IOPS 2C-75 The doors are not positively The cabinet does not contain any essential latched.

relays, and the doors are fairly light weight therefore, significant damage is not expected to occur.1 & C will be contacted to determine if the existing door latch can be used or whether a new handle would be preferred.

82 20 MMS 1C-105-114 The door on 1C-105 was The cabinet was bolted to the back of 1C-identified as binding and not 03 under MR 94-021. The door binding being secured, allowing it to was checked by an l&C technician. The impact the cabinet. An door does bind, but the binding does not adjacent supply cabinet poses prevent the door from closing. Technicians and interaction concern.

must use an extra effort to ensure the door is shut.

83 20 MMS 2C-105-114 An adjacent supply cabinet The supply cabinet was attached to the posed a spatial interaction back of 2C-03 under modification MR 94-hazard.

021.

84 20 RP 1C-115-133 An adjacent supply cabinet The supply cabinet was attached to the posed a spatialinteraction back of 2C-03 under modification MR 94-hazard.

021.

I 85 20 RP 1C-151-155 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-007 will upgrade the anchorage.

86 20 RP 2C-151-155 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-008 will upgrade the anchorage.

87 20 ESF 1C-156-157 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-011 will upgrade the anchorage.

9-13

i i

i S:ction 9 O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 f

US lRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION e

CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 88 20 ESF 2C-156-158 The outlier is an Interaction.

No " bad setor" relays are located in the The cabinets are mounted cabinets. The relays in the cabinets have a directly adjacent to inverter seismic capacity of at least 4 g's.

I DY-OB. The cabinets are not Therefore, they are considered seismically fastened together.

operable. The cabinet will be fastened to the adjacent inverter.

!9 20 ESF 1C-The outlier is an Interaction.

No " bad actor" relays are located in the 158/166/167 The cabinets are mounted cabinets. The relays in the cabinets have a directly adjacent to inverter seismic capacity of at least 4 g's.

DY-OA. The cabinets are not Therefore, they are considered seismically fastened together.

operable. The cabinet will be fastened to the adjacent inverter.

90 20 RP 1C-161-165 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request

]

MR 95-009 will upgrade the anchorage.

91 20 RP 2C-161-165 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-010 will upgrade the anchorage.

92 20 ESF 2C-166-167 The anchor detail for the grout Since the cabinet has anchorage as pad and the perimeter channel originally designed, it is considered is unknown.

seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-012 will upgrade the anchorage.

93 20 COMP C-178-179 Line Printer, LP-300, is kept on C-178-179 are computer cabinets contain the floor adjacent to the primarily solid state and circuit board cabinet.

components. There are no essential relays i

in the cabinets. The cabinets are considered seismically operable. l&C will store the printer in a different location and have it adjacent to the cabinets only when being used.

94 21 RH 2HX-11 A The caste in place anchor bolt Not an operability concern since HX is top nuts are not fully sested.

supported in both lateral directions.

There are 1/4" to 3/8" gaps between the nut and the HX foot.

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O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Section 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION j

CLASS SYSTEM ID STATUS RESOLUTION 95 21 CC iT-12 The saddle anchorage on both There are large washers between the ends of the tank has overstzed anchorage nut and the oval holes.

anchor bolt holes (2.25" x Therefore, some load will be transferred to i

1.18") identified from WEST all of the anchor bolts. In addition, the 685J114. The anchor bolts are attached piping will help in restraining the 1" diameter. Therefore, there tank. Therefore, the tanks are considered is too much clearance to say seismically operable. The anchorage will seismic load is transferred be upgraded with a structural member evenly to enough anchor between the tank base and the anchor bolt.

bolts.

96 21 CC 2T-12 The saddle anchorage on both There are large washers between the ends of the tank has oversized anchorage nut and the oval holes.

anchor bolt holes (2.25" x Therefore, some load will be transferred to 1.18") identified from WEST all of the anchor bolts. In addition, the 685J114. The anchor bolts are attached piping will help in restraining the 1" diameter. Therefore, there tank. Therefore, the tanks are considered is too much clearance to say seismically operable. The anchorage will seismic load is transferred be upgraded with a structural member evenly to enough anchor bolts between the tank base and the anchor bolt.

l 97 21 SI 1T-13 The tank does not pass the The tank has been analyzed using a finite screening criteria of Section 7 element analysis [23].

of the GlP.

98 21 Sl 2T-13 The tank does not pass the The tank has been analyzed using a finite screening crrteria of Section 7 element analysis [23].

j of the GIP.

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99 21 DA T-61F The grout under the foot of one An inspection subsequent to the seismic l

of the air receiver tank legs is verification walkdown found a steel spacer cracked.

plate under the leg of the tank. Therefore the grout is not structural and the tank is considered seismically operable. The leg will be re-grouted.

9.2 Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Systems Outlier Resolution The Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review identified three (3) of the ten (10) l LARs as outliers (section 8,3 item A28). LAR #s 3 and 4 are cantilevered cable tray suppcrt hangers located in the cable spreading room in the Control Duilding.

LAR #9 is a cantilevered cable tray support located in the PAB central part. Based on the results of the review as discussed in Section 7, WE has established that the l

weak link cable tray supports are limited to inside the cable spreading room and i

the unique hanger outside the cable spreading room that was analyzed as LAR #9.

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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY S ction 9 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT OUTLIER RESOLUTION To resolve the cable tray deficiencies at PBNP, WE proposes to use a phased approach. The first phase will be to conduct exploratory walkdowns to determine if any possible analytical methods exist for resolving the cable tray support outliers or if cable tray support upgrades can be done to the system as a whole rather than treating the hangers individually. The first phase is proposed to be completed by September of 1996. The scope and time frame for follow on phases will depend on the results of the first phase.

Also, there is a loose base clip angle on one side of a floor to ceiling cable tray support hanger in the Unit 1 Containment building, on elevation 21' (section 8.3 item A29). A proposed resolution is to tighten the loor,e base clip angle.

In both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment bulidings, on elevation 46', there are cable bundles hanging out of their respective tray (section 8.3 item A30). A proposed resolution is to tie the cables to the trays.

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'l WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Soction 10 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USI A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 i

SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES

10. References 1.

Generic Letter 87-02, " Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46", USNRC, Washington, D.C., February 19,1987.

2.

" Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment", Revision 2, Corrected,2/14/92, Seismic Qualification Utility Group.

3.

" Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER #2) on GIP-2", USNRC, Washington, D.C., May 22,1992.

4.

USI A-40 " Seismic Design Criteria Short-Term Program", USNRC, Washington, D.C.

5.

USl A-17 " Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants" USNRC, Washington, D.C.

6.

WE Response to GL 87-02, Supplement 1 on SQUG Resolution of USI A-46 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Letter No. VPNPD-92-313, NRC '

111, Bob Link (WE) to USNRC, dated September 21,1992.

7.

USNRC Letter " Evaluation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant 120-day Response to Supplement No.1 to Generic Letter 87-02 (TAC Nos. M69472 and M69473)', A.

T. Gody (USNRC) to R. E. Link (WE), dated February 22,1993.

8.

Sargent & Lundy, " Response Spectrum Curves for Point Beach, Revision 0",

Project No. 8992-01, August 3,1992.

9.

SPECTRA Software Package, Stevenson & Associates, Version 2, November, 1992.

10. EPRI Report NP-7146, " Development of in-Cabinet Amplified Response Spectra for Electrical Panels and Benchboards " Revision 0, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by Stevenson & Associates, December,1990.

1

11. " Cable and Conduit Raceway Limited Analytical Review (LAR) for USI A-46 at Point Beach Nuclear Plant" Calc. C-018, Rev.0,5/26/95,91C2696 by Stevenson and Associates.

12. SQUG Letter from N.P. Smith, SQUG Chairman to J.G. Partlow of USNRC,

Subject:

Revision 2A to the Genen'c Implementation Procedure, dated March 26,1993.

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Srction 10 O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision 1 USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES 13, SSRAP Report,"Use of Seismic Experience Data to Show Ruggedness of Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants," Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel, Revision 4.C, /ebruary 28,1991.

14. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Point Beach Nuclear Plant - Drawings.

(Dwg. numbers are specified where referenced).

15. EPRI Report NP-5228-SL, " Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment Anchorage (Revision 1)." Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by URS/ John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, June,1991.

16. ACI 318-83, " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete", American

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Concrete Institute,1983.

17. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL,"A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1).", Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by JR Benjamin Associates et. al., August,1991.

18. WE, " Final Safety Analysis Report for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

19. ANCHOR 3.0 Software Package (with Verification and Users Manuals), Rev.0, 8/16/90 by Stevenson and Associates.

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20. "USNRC USl A-46 Resolution Seismic Evaluation Report, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2," Report 91C2696.A46, Revision 0, June 23,1995, by Stevenson and Associates.

21. " Point Beach RWST Seismic Capacity," S&A 91C2696-C003, Rev. O, June 1994, by Stevenson and Associates.

22.

• Point Beach RWST Tank Shell Local Bending Nonlinear Analysis," S&A 91C2696-C004, Rev. O, June 1994, by Stevenson and Associates.

23. " Point Beach Refueling Water Storage Tank Seismic Capacity," Final Report, S&A Project 91C2696, June 30,1995 by Stemnson and Associates.

24. WE Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, "USNRC USl A-46 Resolution, Safe Shutdown Equipment List Report," June 1995.

25. WE Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, *USNRC Generic Letter 87-02, USl A-46 Resolution, Relay Evaluation Report," Rev. O, June 1995.

26. WE - PPNP DBD-27, Reactor Protection Desian Basis Document, Revision 0, December 16,1994, t

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I O WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY Section 10 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Revision i USNRC USl A-46 RESOLUTION January 1996 SEISMIC EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES

27. WE - PBNP DBD-T-35, Accident Analysis Basis Document. Module 10. Loss of Extemal Electrical Load. Revision 0, February 1995.

28. ASME Steam Tables, Fifth Edition,1992.

29. IEEE Std 344-1975,"lEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," 1975.

30. Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Technical Specifications, " Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-24 and Facility Operating License DPR-27 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.1 and 2."

31. Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Set Point Document.

32. Westinghouse Design Specification No. 955381, " Replacement Steam Generator Lower Asan bly and Upper Internals Reactor Coolant System,"

Revision 2,9/22/83.

33. "USNRC USl A-46 Resolution Seismic Evaluation Report, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2," Report 91C2696.A46, Revision 1, July 7,1995, by Stevenson and Associates.

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VPNPD-96-003, Attachment B Revision 1 to WE Renort. "USNRC Generic Letter 87-02. USI A-46 Resolution. Relav Evaluation Reoort." Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.

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Please replace the Revision 0 sections listed below in your copy of the WE " Relay Evaluation -

Report" with the Revision I sections attached.

Section Revision Summary of Revision Cover Page 1

Changes the format to include the origir_al issue date ofJune 1995 and the revision I date of January 1996.

Title Page 1

Changes the format to include the 1

originalissue date of June 1995 and i

the revision 1 date of January 1996.

Table of Contents 1

Adds the revision number after each section heading f

l Section 2 1

Corrects number of components on the R-SSEL, the number of relays on the associated and essential relay lists and the number ofrelays screened in each category.

Section 3 1

Page 5 of 6; added a right quotation l

mark around the word " chatter."

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Page B-1

VPNPD-96-003, Attachment B Revision 1 to WE Report. "USNRC Generic Letter 87-02. USI A-46 Resolution. Relay Evaluation Report." Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.

Section Revision Summary of Revision Section 4 1

Pages 7 of 23 and 9 of 23, Section 4.4.2; clarified the circuit screening description to distinguish the difference between the screening for

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" primary" and " cascading" schematics.

Page 9 of 23, Section 4.4.3; added a sentence to state the "not vulnerable" relay devices are not included on the Associated Relay List Page 10 of 23, Section 4.4.4; corrected grammatical errors.

Page 10 of 23, Section 4.4.5.1; added reference to the associated relay list.

Pages 12 of 23 and 13 of 23, Sections 4.5 and 4.5.1; added a discussion on

" Relays Mounted on Vibrating Equipment."

Page 13 of 23, Section 4.5.2; changed the section number from 4.5.1 to 4.5.2 Page 18 of 23, Section 4.5.3; changed the section number from 4.5.2 to 4.5.3 and corrected the cross reference to the Switchgear " Rule-of-the-Box."

t Page B-2

VPNPD-96-003, Attachment B Revision 1 to WE Renort. "USNRC Generic Letter 87-02. USi A-46 Resolution. Relav l

Evaluation Report." Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units I and 2.

j Section Revision Summary of Revision Section 5 1

Page 2 of 4, Section 5.3; corrected a grammatical error, corrected the total number of relays identified from 2368 to 2370.

Page 3 of 4, Section 5.3.1, corrected the total number of relays from 2368 to 2370 and the number of chatter acceptable relays from 735 to 731.

Page 3 of 4, Section 5.3.2; corrected the numbers of relays screened in each category, corrected a grammatical error.

Page 4 of 4; corrected the numbers of relays screened in each category.

Section 6 1

Page 2 of 8; added the reference for the PBNP EDG Loading Analysis.

Pages 6 of 8 and 7 of 8; corrected the drawing numbers.

Page 8 of 8; sorted the drawing numbers in numerical sequence, added additional drawing references and deleted duplicate entries.

Appendix A 1

Page 1 of 29; added a Relay Review SSEL description.

Changes to the R-SSEL include corrections to the specified equipment systems, and the addition of the equipment ID for the breakers in motor control center 2B-42.

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Page B-3 l

1 VPNPD-96-003, Attaciunent B l

Revision 1 to WE Renort. "USNRC Generic I etter 87-02. USI A-46 Resolution. Relay l

Evaluation Report." Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.

Section Revision Summary of Revision Appendix B 1

Table B-1, Associated Relay List line #s 542 & 553 - corrected relay ID; l

line #s 1071,1076,1093 & 1098 -

l added relays to the list; i

line #s 2355,2356,2357 & 2358 -

corrected screening codes; deleted relays 4883X and 4884X, they l

were duplicate entries to line #s 2355 l

and 2357.

Table B-2 note #17 - reduced the time that the fans are not required from 60 minutes to 45 minutes.

note #21 - corrected spelling error note #24 - added new note Appendix C 1

Page 1 of 119 - added a discussion of the low ruggedness relay check, clarified reference to Table B-2 in Appendix B.

Essential Relay List resorted list by Relay ID; line #s 489,494,495,1111,1116, 1117,1319, & 1320 - added relays to the list; line #s 1391 & 1409 - corrected relay ID; i

I deleted relays 4883X and 4884X, Page B-4

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VPNPD-%-003, Attachment B

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Revision 1 to WE Reoort. "USNRC Generic Letter 87-02. USI A-46 Resolution. Relav 5

Evaluation Reoort."1 oint Beach Nuclear Plani Units 1 and 2.

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1 Section Revision Summary of Revision i

Appendix F 1

Page 1 of11; added the missing word 4

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" response."

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Page 2 of 11; corrected spelling error i

Page 3 of 11 and 4 of11; added l

component descriptive wording for clarification.

Page 5 of 11, Section F.2.1; added

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j component descriptive wording for clarification.

Page 5 of 11, Section F.2.2; added the P-35A example.

l Page 6 of 11, Section F.2.2; corrected

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grammatical error.

l Page 6 of 11, Section F.2.3; added the f

j missing reference number.

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Pages 7 of11 and 8 of 11; corrected grammatical errors for clarification.

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POINT BEAC'H NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 1

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USNRC GENERIC LETTER 87-02 USl A-46 RESOLUTION l

j RELAY EVALUATION REPORT j

Original issue June 1995 i

h Revision 1 January 1996

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