ML20064L247
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AE0D/E217 og 8
WASHINGTON,0.C.205ss o
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This is an internal, pre-decisional document not (o
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MAR 311982 necessarily representing a position of AE00 or NRC.
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Carlyle Michelson, Director l
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Of fice for. Analysis and Evaluation of 0perational Data Matthew Chiramal FROM:
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data SCRAM PILOT SOLEN 0ID VALVE FAILURES DUE TO L
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF 1 The enclosed deficiency report is from Mississippi Power and Light Company, reported under 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21, regarding fail of scram pilot solenoid valves due to low voltage during preoperational The report states that testing of the Control Rod Drive (CRD). system.
during CRD testing the scram pilot valves were found stuck in theThis prevented energized position with the solenoids de-energized. actuati prevented the control rods from scranning.the valves were da being supplied to the solenoid coils.
by use of cables of insufficient capacity to supply pow damage and subsequent sticking.
Communication with Region II personnel elicited the follow'ing additional The cable runs from the RPS bus to the valves were betw details.
During preoperational testing the worst case voltage 400 to 800 feet.
seen at the Tailed solenoid was 101 volt (with the bus at a no being 120 V +10%).
Thus, in this The low voltage trip setpoint at the bus is 117 V ac.
case the undervoltage protection did not provide adequate protection to ac).
The problem has been corrected at Grand Gulf by replacing all damaged solenoids and using cables of adequate capacity.
the solenoid valves.
(Region 11 personnel has conducted a quick survey at other BWRs under construction and has concluded that this problem was confined to Grand Gulf.)
We did a quick evaluation of the problem as it applies to operating (reactors.
RPS)
We found that the ongoing NRR review of Reactor Protection Systems power monitoring system design modification and associated technical specification changes for operating reactors, does add
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Carlyle Michelson requirements of RPS components. The technical reviewers.have been looking into voltage drop. considerations of cables and terminal voltages at equipment, to assure adequacy of the design modification and technical specification values. Based on the above we can assume that the problems associated with the voltage of the RPS power supplies are being adequately addressed for operating reactors.
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Matthew Chiramal Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
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M" December 1.1981 9
l offtee of Isopecttes & Enforcement
- 5. E. Nuclear negolatory Cemeteetes testem 11 101 Nortetta Street, & &.
Seite 3100 4ttanta, Geeesta 30303
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Atteetten Mr. 5. P. 0*S 1117, Regiment Mustetettster l-amor Mr. 0*astity:
SWWect: Greed entf meeleer Statten s
Smite I med 2 Dachet Bes. 90-414/417 Ftte 0260/ISS2$/ISS24 F3>81/31. Fleet asport.
Failure of CW Sydrosite Systee Scree Files Selves ancm-es/476 tAerweee:
- 1) anos-al/srs, sett/s1 utesteelppi Poser 6' Light Ceepeay estified Mr. Yttstl' Se ancest 26, 1981 trosoles. of peer of flee, of a Peteettally Beyertable Def teteery (FEB) et the Greed Golf Sueleer Scattee (4G55) toesteetties site. The defieleecy conceres the fellese et the Centret med artes (Cap) W-Ite Systee Scree Pttet velves.
Seeed on the reesite of est tesestiasties we hees determined that thte 411 detette are def teteocy is reportette ender 40CFESS.SS(e) eed.loCFt21.
preetend to ser estached Fleet 4eport.
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Atra*h= t ts AEQ6-81/476 Page 1 ef 2 FINAL ERP0tT FOR PRD-St/35
'1.
- Maas and address of the individual... taforming the commission:
J. F. McCaeghy, Jr.
Assistant Tice-President, Meelear Predeetion F.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 l
Notification of Part 21 applicability unde to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, NRC, Region j
. Qu,d..,;N fi4,
II by letter AECN=81/476, December 1,1981.
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~14e'acification of the facility... d ich... contains a deficiency:
fp Grand Gulf Neelear Station (CCNS) Unit 1 l
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 J
3.
Identification of the firm... supplying the basic component which..~.
contains a deficiemey:
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Understsed cables which caused damage to the valves were supplied by Bechtel 7
Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland.
4.
Nature of the deficiemey... and the safety hasard which... could be created by such a deficiency...:
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A.
Description of the Defietency l
During Control Rod Drive (CRD) testing, fourteen (14) scraa pilot valves were found stuck in the energised state when both of the solenoids were de-energized. This prevents the actuation of the scrae inlet and outlet valves and thus prevents the control rods from scramaias. The deficiency affects only the Control Rod Drive (CRD) Rydraulic System (System C11) in Unit 1.
B.
Analysis of Safety Implications This situation could lead to the fatture of the Control Rods to scram and jeopardiac the reactor pressure boundary and nuclear fuel integrity.
This could adversely affeet the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and would be a substantial safety hazard.
5.
The date on which the information of such dettetency... was obtained.
Mississippi Power and 1.1ght received kaformation of the def tetency on August 25, 1981. We reported the def telency to Mr. V. Brownlee, of your of f tre an a Potentially Report 4ble Def tetency on Augugt 26, 19811.
Since that date MP%1.
has filed one (1) interim report to infors the Commission of the p r. n: re *
- a n.1 status of this~defte.tency.
An evaluat ton for Part 21 has been en9pleted.
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~ Attachment to AECN-41/476 Page 2 cf 2 4.
la the case of the basic compement... the ammber and locattee of all seeh compeaants.
bre are fourteen (14) danesed Centrel Red Drive (Can) Scram Pilot valves located la Unit 1 at OGRE.
He do set have knowledge of the locatica et defective egeipannt located other than at GGES.
t-7.
The corrective aettee which hoe been takaa... the same of the individeal... "
repensible for the actions and the length of. time that has been... takes to complete the acties."
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The valves that. failed did met ~ eestata a' defect'.. They were demaged by.
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k being operated'wich tasafficient.. voltage betag supplied to the solenoid k
eetta by the Beatter Protecties Systen des to tasefficient cable eise.
L h 'les voltage ceased "chattertag" of the solenoid core internals, resulting is demage and sehsequent sticking of the internals'. preventing proper operaties.
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N deficiemey uns caused by cables of' insufficient capacity betag used to supply power' to the.oolenoid valves, resulting in.less then aint==
voltage being 'espplied. Misstsetypt Poser & Light feels that'oer Ceestracter should have more thoroughly evaluated the design in light :of.
the physical'ceafiguraties and valve ~ power requirements. Se.affected.
Reacter protectica System Sepply Cables are.being replaced with Cables of sufficient capacity. A11. scram pilot velves are being rebuilt to' replace all damaged parts.
5.
Respoesible Individual 1
{
G. 3. Rogers, Jr.
Site Manager Wiesissippi Poser and Light Company C.
Ianath of Time to Complete Actions Misstesippi power & Light received information of the def tetency or.
- August 26, 1941.. All work e111 he completed prior to Unit I fuel load.
Our Constructor is tracking this repair on Startup. Field Report (STR)-lF.-
1959.
4.
Any advice related to the def tciency... that has been, is being, or will he given to purchasers or 1trenseen:
8Le the def telency did not ortstnat. with MP61., we have nn advt., to of f er.
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M.II AllSSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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Secesher 1, 1981
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Siften of Isopeatses & Safereneses
- s. s. noenaar Enestaeory comesesses testes 11 I
101 Nortetta Savest 3.5.
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Sette 3100 4ttanta, Georgte. 19303 attegeless ler. J. p. e*astily, testenen Adagegetteser meer Mr. e'astily W h 2CT: Greed entf macleer StatSee Seite I and 2 Seetst ass. 90 4 86/417 File cate/81521/19524 Ml/15, Pleal toport.
Attlere ed C M Eydremisc Sposee _
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74 g Stree Pilot entsee A32h48/476 teferenees. 1) amub43/379,le/t/48 es emeest 26, 1981 m essestopt 9eser 6 @ Caspear maattted nr. Virgil tremenee, of peer affles, et e paesettally topoetable Sofieleary (FW) at the Greed entf Burleer Stestem (GM) esestverstee etts. The def teleesy conseems the fattese et stur Gameset God Brise M M Systee $ stas Pilot velses.
Seese es the seesnte of ear tammettesttec we base estoestmed anet thie 411 detetts are def tetener is reportable emeer leCFESS.SS(e) and 14Cpt31.
peeeteos to est satarted enest espect.
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ter. J. F. O'Reilly AB06-81/ 476 BC Pese 2
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6 esa ler. A L. Staapley thr. R. S. 18stehoe IIr. T. E enumer M
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w Sooth IItse. 58eettle pesar Assostee6ee P. A Bus IWD h iesters. W Steet 9
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Astachenet ta AE06 41/476 h0s I of 2 Finah asraer som FM> st/35 1.
Emes and address of the tedivident... tafenstag the coesiseles:
J. F. MeGae@y,'Jr.
j Assistaat Time-freefdent. Wesleer Fredoettee F.O. Ben 1640 Jackeen Missiselppi 39205 Estificattee of het Il applisebility ende to Mr. J. F. O'Reilly, ERC, Region 11 by letter ABCW 41/476, December 1,1981.
2.
Identificaties of faa111t... skich... eestates a deftetency:
Greed Self Amelaar Station (01M5) Dett 1 Port ettese, Miestostypt 39150 3.
Identificattee of the fits... sepplytes the haste componest which...
eestates a deftetamey A-Bedersised embles shtek emmeed damage to the valves were supplied by techtel Peeer Corporettee, Gaithersberg Ihryland.
4.
Nature of the def tetaaey... med the safety hasard etich... comid be created l
by each a deficioecy...:
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A.
Beecription of the Def teteery
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Dortes Control Red Drive (CID) testing, fourteen (14) scram ptiot valves j
were found stock to the energised state uhem both of the solenoids were j
de-energised. This prevents t'ne acteattom of the scene inlet and outlet valves and thus proveets the control rods from scramming. The deficiency I
affects sely tt:e Control Red Drive (CRD) Bydraulie System (System C11) in Unit 1.
B.
Analysts of Safety lapitestions This situation could lead to the fatture of the Control Rods to scrae and jeoperdise the reactor pressure boundary and nuclear f uel integrity.
J This could adversely af fact the safety of operattons of the nuclear power plant and would be a substantial safety hasard.
5.
The date on which the information of such det tciency... was obt eined.
- ttestestppt Power and t.tsht received information of the def tetency on %go.'.
25, 1981. We reported the deftetency to $1r. V. Brownlee, of your office 4*
i Potent 1411y Report.4ble Def tetency on %gingt 26, 198l l.
Stoca that d it e $1 P % ',
has filed one (1) interte report to inform the Co nti t m of tSe i r..: r-% 4 i tt status of this deftelency.
An ev41isstton f.or Part 21 Si* horn co,M.:
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e Astecheest to ARO H 1/476 Page 2 cf 2 4.
le the case of the hasic tempeneet... the eenhor med leenttem of all each esapeeeets.
hre are feartese (14) deneged Centrol and Drive (CM) Scree Pilot Yelves leested to Bett 1 et S M S.
We de est have hometedge of the leastise of defeettve egetpenet located other then et eens.
7 The eorteettee settee which has been tekee... the esse of the individuel...
repensible for the setteeg and'the leegth of ties that has been... tekee to templete the settee.
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A.
Corrective Aetteen 'tekee h selves that failed did est eestate e defect. They were damaged by hates operated utth tesefficient gettage betag supplied to the solemoto sette by the toester Preteetten System des to tesefficient cable else.
The low voltage seemed "chetteries" of the solmeeld eere 1stermale, resulttag te doenge end seheequest sticking of the intereste, prevoettag m operettee.
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N defleteney see esmeed by enkles of' tesefficient cepecity being seed to supply power to the solenoid selves, resulttog te less than stateue weltage betag supplied. Miseinetypt Power & Light feels that our constructor abould hose aere thereaghly evalented the des 13e in itsht of the phreteel eseftgeretten med valve power regelremente. h effected Roseter Proteetlee System Supply Cohtee are holes replaced with Cables of esffieleet especity. All serem pilot volves e o betag rebutit to replace all deneged parts.
5.
geopensible tedividual C. 5. Bogers, Jr.
Stte Mneagee Misetestypt Power and Light Compsey C.
Lenath of Tlee to complete Acttone Misstestppt power & Light receivet 'aformation of the defletency on August 26, 1991. All work will k.. completed prior to Unit I fuel load.
Our Constructor is tracking this repair on Startup Field Report ( S FR )- I F.-
1959.
4.
Any advice related to the def tetency... that has been, i s be ing, o r w i l l he steen to pierchasers or ticensees:
8La the de f t e t ency did not ortgin4t* dith $4Pht., w have n o..t v t.
t., o f * - r.
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