ML20052A826

Forwards Documents Re Operations at Vallecitos Nuclear Ctr Previously Withheld from Public Disclosure for Placement in PDR

ML20052A826
Person / Time
Site:	07000754
Issue date:	03/31/1978
From:	Kratzke R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Fisher B NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML20052A734	List: IR 05000070/1977001 IR 05000070/1978002 ML20052A733 ML20052A741 ML20052A743 ML20052A746 ML20052A748 ML20052A756 ML20052A758 ML20052A764 ML20052A768 ML20052A771 ML20052A773 ML20052A781 ML20052A784 ML20052A786 ML20052A792 ML20052A796 ML20052A800 ML20052A804 ML20052A806 ML20052A810 ML20052A816 ML20052A820 ML20052A823 ML20052A826 ML20052A828 ML20052A834 ML20052A836 ML20052A838 ML20052A841 ML20052A846 ML20052A848 ML20052A853 ML20052A857 ML20052A860 ML20052A862
References
FOIA-81-483 NUDOCS 8204290233
Download: ML20052A826 (55)

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MAR 311978 Docket No.70-754 SNM-960 MEMORANDUM FOR: Betty Fisher Ac' ting Fileroom Supervisor Radioisotopes Licensing Branch FROM:

Robert T. Kratzke Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch

SUBJECT:

RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING OPERATIONS AT VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER PREVIOUSLY WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Please distribute the documents listed in Attachment A for placement in the appropriate files for public inspection. This information was submitted under Docket No.70-754 and previously withheld from public disclosure.

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-9 Robt t T. Kratzke Fuel Reprocessing & Recycle Branch Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety

Enclosure:

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ATTACHMENT A DOCUMENTS TO BE PLACED IN THE APPROPRIATE DOCKET NO.70-754 FILES FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION 1.

Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the revised Section 6.0 as contained in the June 27, 1977 submittal of supportive information for the renewal of License SNM-960, 2.

Figure 9.1 of the revised Section 9.0 '5nd Figures 15.1 and 15.2 of the revised Section 15.0 as contained in the July 19, 1977 submittal of supportive information for the renewal of License SNM-960, 3.

Sections I, IV, and.VI of Attachme.it A as contained in the November 12, 1977 submittal of the summary of the oral presentation 9f ven to the NRC staff on October 28 and 29, 1977.

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>h This Section Contains 10CFR 2.790 Information EFK 11-10-77 I-1 o

ADVANCED FUELS LABORATORY PRE 3ENTATION TO NRC AT BETHESDA, #10, OCT. 28,1977 AND ADDITIONAL __INFORMATION SUPPLIED T0 fg NRC, OCT. 28 AND 29,1977 AND NOV. 2, 1977_

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This information covers the Advanced Fuels Laboratory, oreviously known as the Plutonium Laboratory.

Information consists of six carts, as follows:

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I.

Facilities & Activities (E. F. Kurtz)

,7 II. Summary - Seismic & Pu Release Analyses (E. F. Kurtz) i III.

Structural Analysis (K. Dovydattis - Consultant for G.E.)

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Plutonium Release and,@seque'nie Ana6 sis.

b V.

Programs & Shutdown Imoact (E. F. Kurtz)

VI. Additional Information Provided to NRC Staff on October 28 and 29 and November 2,1977 l

h I.

Facilities and Activities l

The Advanced Fuels Laboratory (AFL) is located in the southern e

,y portion of the Vallecitos Nuclear Center. All these facilities are within Protected Area il as indicated on Slide #EFK-3. All h

facilities which normally contain nuclear material are indicated as shaded areas in Slide #EFK-4.

n Slide #EFK-5 indicates the primary operations cerformed in the f

different laboratories, and also the present approximate lw quantities of plutonium and uranium-235 (as contained in uranium enriched to greater than natural) are indicated on Slide #EFK-5 l m 1 L (indicated as kilograms of plutonium and uranium-235 in carenthesis).

All of the nuclear material is DOE exceot for:

(a) plutonium f

containing material stored awaiting shioment to ENEL and (b) stored GE oranium.

Present DOE programs require substantially ll higher quantities of plutonium (e.g., 8 Kg of plutonium awaiting shipment from Hanford).

(The normal maximum ooerating limits for

!1 specific process facilities are indicated in Section VI.)

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b A.

The following facilities are listed in " Area 102" on Slide iEFK-5:

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1.

The Uranium Handling Facility, Building 102H.

This facility is used for only natural and depleted urania

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and at present there is no nuclear material within the facility.

2.

The SNM Shipping and Receiving Building (No.102J) is 7

used for short-term storage of sealed barrels of

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waste and shipping containers after receipt from offsite and prior to shipping offsite.

The present nuclear material

.s e6 content is indicated as zero kilograms; however, there is approximately 36 gm of plutonium in sealed barrels awaiting h

offsite shipment as waste.

l[

These two buildings were not evaluated in our seismic analysis because tnere appeared to be no need for seismic evaluation due to the type of i7 material and/or containment provided.

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B.

There are three facilities listed on Slide fEFK-5 under " Building 105 -

b Ground Floor - Cladding Lab":

1.

The fuel inspection area is utilized for inspection of welded fuel pins. These fuel pins are in the laboratory only during actual inspection operations and there is presently no material

,s in this area.

T

'E 2.

The second area is a vault-type storage room which is utilized for storage of sealed fuel pins and other sealed storage containers, plutonia and urania and mixed oxide powders and pellet's as well as scrap materials are stored in the storage

(

containers. There are no liquids stored in this facility.

J The present contents include 2 kilograms of plutonium and c

8 kilograms of U-235. This is all DOE material as well as U

all other nuclear material indicated on Slide #EFK-5, p

with the exception of 2 kilograms of plutonium which is owned b

' by the' Italian firm ENEL, and 7 kilograms of U-235 which is owned by General Electric Company. This ENEL material consists of some

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.h plutonia and mixed oxide scrap remaining from a fuel fabri-cation campaign in 1966-1967. We have been attempting to T

return this material to the owner but have not been able to

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obtain an export license. We would appreciate any p

assistance in obtaining an ' export license so that we may return 1

this material.

3.

The third area is the fuel bundle assembly area. The only AFL material in this area is sealed fuel pins and as indicated

[

there is no material there at this time. Sealed fuel pins are taken to this room for x-ray of welds or assembly of fuel E

pins into bundles. This same area is used for storage of unirradiated fuel for the General Electric Test Reactor. The

p stated quantities of nuclear material does not include this GETR fuel.

p These areas in Building 105 were included in our seismic analysis.

C.

There are three facilities listed on Slide !EFK-5 as " Building 102":

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,a g

1.

The Fuels Laboratory is probably the prime area of concern y

for this review. This Fuels Laboratory is described in Slide #EFX-6. The laboratory was evaluated in our seismic analysis. As indicated, this laboratory is in the basement of Building 102 and the ceiling of the fuels laboratory is

, J' approximately two feet above ground icvel. The Fuels Laboratory floor is 8" thick reinforced concrete and the ceiling is 12" (minimum) reinforced concrete. The walls are either 12" I

reinforced concrete or 8" concrete block filled with concrete and reinforced with rebar.

As shown on Slide #EFK-4, the l

Fuels Laboratory walls are actually surrounded by other

~

basement areas and walls or earth with the exception of the east wall which is surrounded by earth or additional metal structure in all but one small area. The inlet air supply is 4

provided through conditioning equipment and inlet air dampers J

close automatically when the pressure differential is reduced.

This laboratory is operated as are most plutonium facilities, h

with a stepwise reduction of pressure from the outside of the building to the change rcoms and into the laboratory. The

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Q air from the laboratory is exhausted through absolute filters.

There are no explosive gases in the basement area. We use a mixture of hydmgen and inert gas for various operations in the laboratory; however, th,is is 61,1/2% hydrogen in inert

{

gas (normally argon or nitrogen) and this gas is stpplied by a vendor with a certified analysis. We also analyze the gas before use. This hydrogen-inert mixture is not explosive U

and is not flamable at room temperatures. We also use a small quantity of p-10 gas for monitoring equipment. This s

.j gas is not explosive and is 10% methane in inert.

?,'.

The Fuels Laboratory was included in our seismic analysis. The. total

• T 1 present content of the Fuels Laboratory is,8 kilograms plutonium and 7

6 kilograms U-235.,The primary operations in this area are:

(a)

U process development and demonstration for the conversion of nitrate

.m so7utions to oxide powders in the east end of the laboratory, (b)

~

the fuel pin fabrication line in the west end which is utilized for the fabrication of small quantities of test fuel pins, (c) material and h

property studies and (e) storage of nuclear material in a vault-type storage room.

p 2.

The Analytical Laboratory is located on the ground floor of Building 102 imediately over the northeast portion of the Fuels Laboratory. This laboratory was evaluated in the seismic analysis. The laboratory is limited to 200 gm E-fissile (plutonium plus uranium).

I h

3.

The barrel scanning area is located on the ground floor as shown in Slide fEFK-6. Nuclear material in this area is in sealed barrels and sealed standards. Material is normally in this area dnly during periods of measurement.

J

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l-IV-1 E

This Section Contains 10CFR 2.790 Material n

i.g IV.

PLUTONIUM RELEASE AND CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

.' T The following sumarizes evaluations of the plutonium release and corres-i ponding offsite doses attributable to the NRC_oostulated seismic "evcnt at " '

~

the Vallecitos site. The material contained in the viewgraphs was presented i

to NRC on October 28, 1977.

Copies of the viewgraphs and copies of the 1

brief report which sumarizes the radiological analysis model were provided E

to NRC personnel following the verbal presentation.

[

The on-site locations of plutonium are summarized in viewgraph No.l. The

.F0e1[Labora, tory, is' locat5d in the Building 102 ' basement. Wi th~in ' "

[

the laboratory, plutonium in either nitrate solution or oxide form is found within glove boxes in the ceramic fabrication line, the conversion line, the scrap recovery line and in a storage vault. The second location considered is the Analytical Chemistry Laboratory on the main floor of Building 102, and 7

thirdly plutonium in the fonn of mixed oxide powder is stored in a vault in

't the Cladding Laboratory in Building 105.

h The second viewgraph sumarizes major conclusions regarding the structural condition of each of these locations bas'ed on the previously described

{

structural analysis. The Fuels Laboratory is predicted to remain structurally intact. That is the integrity of walls, floor and ceiling is maintained.

~

Those components of the ventilation and filtration system located within the laboratory are expected to remain intact. This includes specifically the

~

air ducts and the high efficiency filters located inside the laboratory space.

4 Therefore, the available leakage path to the environment is through filters

,9 and through nonnal leakage paths of the building itself such as cracks E

around doors, etc. The Analytical Chemistry Laboratory is predicted to collapse, thereby offering no cc,ntainment. The two vaults (one within the y

basement laboratory of Building 102 and the other one in the Cladding Labora-tory of Building"105) are expected to remain fully intact.

Even with full or partial failure of the various containment barriers, a driving force g

would be necessary to cause initial suspension of plutonium oxide particles such that they could be carried by prevailing winds to off-site locations.

g g

M

g M

Iv-2

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-L

?

PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT LOCATIONS OF PLUTONIUM c

,E

'.E e

fuels LABORATORY l

BLDG. 102 BASEMENT -

l:

CERAMIC FABRICATION LINE.

CONVERSION LINE SCRAP RECOVERY LINE.

7 E

STORAGE VAULT.

~

e ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY LAB BLDG, 102 MAIN FLOOR e

STORAGE VAULT

~

y BtDG. 105 (CLADDING LAB).

=

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IV-3 7

i E-PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT i

-5 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FROM STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 3

FUELS LABORATORY REMAINS INTACT.

E FILTRATION SYSTEM WITHIN BUILDING REMAINS INTACT (OUTLET g-FILTERS, DUCTS).

iQ LEAKAGE PATH IS THROUGH FILTERS AND NORMAL BUILDING LEAKAGE

=

e ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY LAB COLLAPSES.

U u

0 VAULTS REMAIN INTACT.

Et

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IV-4

-2 l

The three possible categories of release mechanisms are summarized in Viewgraph #3.

The first of these is fires, which could by virtue of local updrafts cause plutonium oxide particles to be suspended and picked up by local winds. The second category, mechanical suspension, would 4

include any mechanical forces which might directly impart momentum to plutonium oxide particles.

The sort of thing which comes to mind in this category is the possibility that material spilled from containers bounces off of tables or off the floor to become initially suspended in

-[

the room atmosphere.

Criticalit.v the third category, could in principle generate energy to suspend particulates in the air.

Evaluation of the F

potential for criticality in either of the two vaults caused us to rule Go this situation out as being incredible because within each of these spaces

{

the plutonium is contained within cylinders which are in turn contained within racks specially designed to prevent criticality. With the racks 7

tied to walls and/or ceilings and openings covered to prevent cylinders from falling out there is no credible mechanism for bringing the cylinders or their contents into sufficiently close proximity to create a critical E

configuration.

Within the laboratory itself, operational limits on each glove box preclude criticality. No credible mechanism could be postulated

, r l r to combine sufficient material from two or more glove boxes in the properly confined configuration to achieve criticality.

t."

It is therefore concluded that the plutonium sources for release to the

~

eniironmen't 'af a result of the,,NRC postulated, event'wo'uld be the p,1utoniujm ",

containe.1 in the Analytical Chemistry Laboratory and that contained in the s

e Fuels Laboratory. We now proceed to evaluate the quantity of release and b

the off-site dose attributable to that release for each of these sources in Viewgraph #4 sumarizes the scenario associated with the failure of turn.

[..

the Analytical Laboratory roof and walls.

The Analytical Chemistry Laboratory is assumed to. col' lapse:. 6ffeFiii'g'no'baFriir~t6

~

plutonium release. The current operating practices limit the amounts of l

plutonium in the laboratory at any one time to 70 - 100 grams of plutonium in nitrate,and as much as 6 grams of mixed oxide powder containing 257.

O plutonium.

e ed

i,t Iv-s O

k PLUT0NIUM RELEASE ilAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVE!!T I

POTENTIAL RELEASE MECHANISMS k.'

lE e

FIRES L

e MECHANICAL SUSPENSION OF POWDER e

CRITICALITY :

b RULED OUT IN VAULTS BECAUSE RACKS AND CONTAINERS CANNOT BE 7{

DISLODGED.

l RULED OUT IN FUELS LABORATORY.

CRITICALITY CONTROLS LIMIT AMOUNT IN EACH AREA.

NO CREDIBLE ttECHANISM FOR COMBINING

~

CONTENTS OF DIFFERENT AREAS INTO A CRITICAL CONFIGURATION.

2 8

g.

4 eed I w g<

s 1

MIT-3

B IV-6

=.

PLUTONIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT l 'l DOSE DUE TO REIEASE FROM ANALYTICAL _ LABORATORY e

t_

M l

c SCENARI0i BASED ON STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, LABORATORY IS ASSUMED TO COLLAPSE SOURCES:

e NORMAL MAXIMUM LIMIT IS70-100 GM OF PU IN

' ~

Pu-NITRATE lg e

6 GM OF MIXED OXIDE POWDER (25% Pu).

e 64 eM 4

M MIT a

r-'

hj G

IV-7

-3 r

f Turning to Viewgraph #5 we consider the mechanisms leading to release

[

of the material in the lab.

First it is postulated that the burning of

~

combustible materials in the laboratory results in heating and boiling p

of all of the plutonium nitrate solution present.

Based on the data of Hishima (laboratory experiments in which plutonium nitrate solution was heated by petroleum fueled fires) it is assumed that.18% of the plutonium in the nitrate is initially suspended as plutonium oxide of Sum mean particle size.

It is further assumed that mechanical suspension of the mixed' oxide powder occurs with 10% efficiency.

This is believed to be extremely conservative. The powder is located within a container which in

}

turn is located within a glove box and it is expected that these barriers will effectively confine a very large fraction of the powder even in event f

of catastrophic failure of the laboratory structures. Additionally, the

~

high density of plutonium oxide particles makes suspension of this material for more than a very short time difficult.

f_

~

. _ =. : : :._- _ _. - *.

. - - - =.

. -. =..

. :. :: - ~. :_.:. -

=

: _.._ =.. :- - -_::_ _-

-~

~

l Based on the judgemental estimate of 10% release fraction, we get.15 grams of plutonium suspended as a result of mechanical action on the powder.

~

l Adding this to the.18 grams of plutonium released as a result of boiling l

of the nitrate solution there would be a total release from the Analytical

~~

Laboratory of.33 grams of plutonium.

i+

The calculated doses at Site Boundary are summarized in the sixth viewgraph.

We calculated the 50-year dose comitment resulting from two hours' exposure eo L

at the site boun,dary which is 500 meters from the building. These doses include both the effects of acute inhalation of the passing cloud and inhalation due to resuspension of ground deposited particulate materials. The latter, it turns out, is a very small fraction of the total dose, although this was not known to be the case when we started the analysis.

The X/Q values were taken from Reg. Guide 1.4 for 0-8 hour, Pasquill Type F Wind-E speed 1 meter /sec., unifom direction.

Further details of the model used ed

-c.. -..- --

p c1

.t.

PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT

~

DOSE DUE TO REIEASE FROM ANALYTICAL LABORATORY

^

E

's F

u RELEASES:

4 BOILING OF NITRATE SOLUTION (HEATED BY FIRE)'

LEA S TO SUSPENSION AND RELEASE OF 0.18% OF THE

~

r Pu.C )

^

f e

0.18 GM Pu, 5 u w.MEAN PARTICLE SIZE.

~

• e d l

0 MECHANICAL SUSPENSION OF POWDER WITH 10% RELEASE i

EFFICIENCY.

[

e 0.15 GM Pu, 5 uM MEAN PART.ICLE S.IZE.

i i

e TOTAL RELEASE:

0.33 GM Pu.

o (1) R$FERENCE - J. MISHIMA, l.G. SCHWENDIMAN AND C. A. RADA'SCH,

" PLUTONIUM RELEASE STUDIES (IV) FRACTIONAL RELEASE FROM HEATING PLUTONIUM HITRATE SOLUTIONS IN A FLOWING AIR STREAM",

BNWL-931, NOVEMBER 1968 MIT-5 t

o0 Iy_g

=

E i

[

__PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT T

DOSE DUE TO RELEASE FROM ANALYTICAL LABORATORY Ct b

5 DOSES AT SITE BOUNDARY':

.[{

BONE 8.5 REM LUNG 2.2 REM rrL LIVER 5.1 REM KIDNEY

.73 REM

~

L T

E I

D FIFTY YEAR DOSE COMMITMENT DUE TO 2 HR. EXPOSURE.

.,)

l {}

INCLUDES ACUTE INHALATION 0,F PASSING CLOUD AND IN-l HALATION DUE TO RESUSPENSION OF GROUND DEPOSITION (SMALL).

1 MIT-6

O IV-10 3

for transport of the materials, and dose conversion factors were not included ln the verbal presentation to NRC but are summarized in a brief repo.-t.

Copies of this were provided following the presentation.

Specifically calculated were bone, lung, liver, and k,idney doses.

I T

^

The next three viewgraphs, #7 through #10, deal with the scenario for release, the release ' amounts, and the consequent doses attributable to the Fuels 1.aboratory.

Starting with the scenario for release in the 7th viewgraph, it was concluded from the structural analysis that the laboratory walls, ceiling and floor remain intact. However, due to sever-ing of ducts outside of the building the forced ventilation system and 7

[

thus the negative room pressure is lost.

The glove boxes within the labora-tory are expected to remain upright as a result of their being securely

,f fastened to the building floor, walls and ceiling. However, the possibility of breaching the containment of these glove boxes cannot be totally ruled

[

out. Possible failure mechanisms include such things as puncturing of gloves by falling objects or, as discussed further in the next viewgraph,

[

fire in combustible materials contained within glove boxes.

l r The quantities of plutonium within each of the three process lines of the laboratory are tabulated in the viewgraph.

The Table gi-ves laboratory l_

inventories per glove box in terms of both the criticality limits and the normal maximum quantities used in current practice. The nitrate conversion line includes glove box #51, the scrap recovery line includes glove box l

1. 50 and the ceramic line includes glove box #37 which contains mixed oxide powder, and glove box #38 which may contain mixed oxide material in slugged y

or granulated form.

Hence, for all practical purposes the laboratory

~

fnventories per glove box also represent the liquid and undensified powder r

inventories for each of the separate lines.

For the evaluation of release amount (considered.in the next viewgraph) the relevant quantities from this s

l table are those of olutonium in the form of oxide powder which total 5.5 Kg.

l It should be noted that subsequent to the analysis sumarized here and its presentation to NRC on October 28 these quantities were re-evaluated by laboratory personnel. A rmre detailed summary of the quantities in each l5 glove box as well as the form and containment of the materials within each'

=

W

Li*

IV-11 m

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n 7

4 I

P_LUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT l-DOSE DUE TO REIFASE FROM FUELS LAB E

L SCENARIO:

O e

FUELS LABORATORY REMAINS INTACT r

e NEGATIVE ROOM PRESSURE LOST e

GLOVE BOXES REMAIN UPRIGHT, BUT COULD BE BREACHED (E.G., PUNCTURE

'I 0F GLOVES) o E

SOURCES:

?

e LABORATORY INVENTORIES PER GLOVE BOX S

NORMAL MAXIMUM (Pu)

LIMIT NITRATE OXIDE l

AREA (Pu)

SOLUTICN OR POWDER 7

E CONVERSION LINE (NONE) 5 Kg 3 Kg

{

3 CRAP RECOVERY 15 Kg 2 Kg 1.0 Kg CERAMIC LINE 2.5 Kg 1.5 Kg m

h MIT-7

l i

b

-5 IV-12 e

[

glove box was transmitted to NRC on October 29, 1977.

The new figures provided (discussed in Sectior. VI of this report) result in a slightly

].

higher total inventory of plutonium oxide in powder form and thus, given the same analysis of release fraction, would lead to slightly higher off-

,E site doses. Since the off-site doses attributable to release from the Fuels Laboratory following the NRf. postulated seismic event represent only a

{

small percentage (approximatelylf4 of the total off-site dosejiewgraph fl0),the cc

~

clusions of our analysis are not significantly affected by these revisions of the original quantities.

s Viewgraph #8 sumarizes the evaluations of release to the laboratory space h

and subsequent release to the atmosphere. The release to the laboratory space comprises two sources, one of them being the mechanical suspension h

of material originally in oxide powder form, and the second one the release of material originally contained within a resin bed in the scrap recovery line.

Turning to the first case, it is postulated that 1% of the total inventory of oxide powder is released from glove boxes. This is a judgement r

estimate rather than the result of mechanistic analysis. We believe it to b

be highly conservative in view of the facts that the powd'er is stored in n

sealed cans inside of glove boxes, the structural integrity of the glove h

boxes is retained, and the glove boxes remain in an upright position.

Given the release of 1% of the total inventory of powder outside of the glove boxes it is then postulated that 10% of this material becomes initially suspended and uniformly distributed in the room.

This again on the basis of available theoretical models and laboratory experiments seems to be a very conservative u

assumption. The net result of this scenario is then 5.5 grams of plutonium released to and uniformly distributed in the laboratory room.

It is noted that this is not uncontrolled release to the environment.

• O.

U Now considering fire, the other possible mechanism which can suspend plutonium, the only significant amount of combustible material in one location of the laboratory is a resin bed within the scrap recovery line. This can contain up to 200 grams of plutonium.

It is unlikely that burning of the resin bed j

would occur, since the material must be dry and under some pressure to sustain combustion.

It is nevertheless postulated that the bed does burn and in the h

process melts the plexiglass Mdow of the glove box.

Burning of the res'in material containing plutonium would create plutonium nitrate, and applying n

d

!]

IV-13 5"

PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT

?

L DOSE DUE TO RELEASE FROM FUELS LAB RELEASE TO THE LAB:

e MECHANICAL SUSPENSION OF OXIDE POWDER -

e 1% OF THE TOTAL INVENTORY IS RELEASED FROM BOXES AS POWDER (MEAN DIAMETER sum lb e

MEOiANICAL SUSPENSION EFFICIENCY =.10%

lE e

5.5 64 PU RA CASED IN LAB

'u l :.]

4 FIRE IN RESIN BED l

)

e BED CAN CONTAIN 200 GM Pu lw e

FIRE BURNS PLEXIGLASS II l&

.e BOILING OF PU NITRATE (.18% SUSPENSION EFFICIENCY)

RELEASES.36 Gi TO R0oM RELEASE TO ATFOSPHERE:

g e

l W DAY LEAXAGE FRCM ELoG.

I e

MDAY WRCUGH 99.9% FILTERS S

NDAY N0fPFILN m

[N

. AEROSOL SETTLING TIfE = 0.1 PRS.

4 e

2 HR. RELEASE IS.036 64 Pu 5 9 ft MEAN RARTICLE SIZE

-1 l-E 5

i3' MIT-8 i

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'd

-6 IV-14 4

.?

again the Mishima data for plutonium nitrate boiling it is found that

.18% (0.36g) of the plutonium originally contained in the bed is released to the r'oom.

5 Since the basement laboratory structure and ventilation system filters are expected to remain fully intact, the room can then be assumed to offer substantial confinement of particulate material which does' become suspended within it.

We calculated a release to the atmosphere based on an assumed 1000% per 1

day leakage rate from the room.

Although it is not based on mechanistic g

{

analysis this leak rate is believed to be conservative. The conceivable mechanisms to create a driving pressure for outward air flod are internal h

fires and possible local low pressure areas on the outer surface of the building as a result of the normal wind patterns. Although we have not had sufficient time to specifically calculate the magnitudes of these effects they are unlikely to be very large.

Some of this air flow would pass through

'C the high efficiency filters while the rest would pass unfiltered through openings in the buildings. We dealt with each of these two flow paths separately and made further assumptions as to the partition cf " low between irw2 them.

Specifically, it was assumed that 900% per day would pass through the l,

filters and 100% per day would exit unfiltered. The basis for this judgement was simply that the filters represent a substantially larger flow area than the small openings and minute cracks in the building.

It turned out that the

.y result of the analysis was rather insensitive to this assumption. The dominant factor limiting the release was instead the aerosol settling which h

takes place over the two-hour release period.

lC The aerosol settling time was calculated with the HAA-3 code and accounts for i

the effects of gravity and particle agglomeration but not for plate-out of a

particles on walls and the surfaces of cracks and openings through which air l) must pass.

The 0.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> represents the half time for settling (that is the l

time that it takes for the particle density in the room to reduce by a factor

..)2 of 2). With the conditions described the amount of plutonium released in a 2-hour period is.036 grams.

Tuming now to the 9th viewgraph we see the

[

site boundary doses attributable to re, lease from the fuel's [aboEtory'.

E'

g sa IV-15 I}

a p

,e 3

PLUT0NIUM RELEASE HAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT

[,'

DOSE DUE TO REIFASE FROM FUELS LAB

'c3

' '1 DOSES AT SITE BOUNDARY':

c BONE

.94 REM F

LUNG

.25 REM y'

LIVER

.56 REM

[w KIDNEY

.081 REM

'*\\

w b

11.

E' T

_\\

f 'l

.}l FIFTY YEAR DOSE COMMITMENT DUE TO 2 HR. EXPOSURE.

[NCLUDES ACUTE INHALATION OF PASSING CLOUD AND IN-y TION 70 FIALATION OF PASSING CLOUD AND INHA SMALL)DUE TO d

RESUSPENSION OF GROUND DEPOSITION I

w MIT-9

D f.3

..s.

ly-16

~

The 10th viewgraph sums the contributions of release from both locations;

?

the Analytical Chemistry Laboratory and the Fuels Laboratory.

These are compared with appropriate single organ dose limits as have been applied in p

Clinch River Breeder Reactor licensing".

x Based on the evaluation, which we believe to be highly conservative in tenns j

of the amount of particulate material made airborne, we can see that the consequences of plutonium release due to the NRC po'stula'ted seisiniclevejit'_ _

are substantially within 10CFR100 limits.

The following section provides details of the radiological transport analysis and consequence evaluation which calculates these doses. The sample evaluation

[J shown here is for a release of.126 grams of plutonium in the form of Sum (mean size) particles.

The site boundary doses shown tabulated in the Q

viewgraphs were obtained by direct proportioning to the release quantities.

D The consequence extends further than evaluation of site boundary dose, estimating the expected cancer incidence within a radius of 21s miles from s

the building.

This is based on local population density and meterology.

This aspect of the analysis is not yet complete, since it includes so far only the dose due to inhalation of resuspended material.

ed 9

lC e

I '

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-,i D

a PLUT0NIUM RELEASE RAZARD FROM.75G SEISMIC EVENT TOTAL DOSE

SUMMARY

(

L50 YR. DOSE COMMITMENT j

{

RESULTING FROM 2 HR. EX-

,POSURE AT SITE BOUNDARY,

6 l

CALCULATED LIMIT

• s 6

B0f1E g,4 150 REM k

Luf1G 2.5 75 REM

'E LIVER 5.7 75 REM CJ 7

KIDNEY

.31 75 REM e

IL h)

T' cv O

j

• 10CFR100 LIMITS AS APPLIED TO CRP..P MIT-10

0 IV-10 e,

d INHALATION DOSES FROM PLUT0NIUM IN 2

PASSING CLOUDS AND IN RESUSPENDED AEROSOLS

&)

.g V

INTRODUCTION

]

Calculations were made of the doses to bone, lungs, liver and kidneys due to the inhalation of plutonium in a passing cloud and in a resuspended aerosol.

7 Expected bone and lung cancer deaths from inhalation of resuspended plutonium were also calculated. The calculations were based on the following assumptions:

1.

0.126 gm Pu are released from 70 gms of, plutonium in plutonium nitrate solution due to rolling boil caused by fire.

(Based on a 0.18 wt. " release according to Mishima et al')

2.

Particles of plutonium aerosol formed have a mr.ss median diameter of 5 um.

i ?

3.

The plutonium isotopes mixture has the following composition:

G Mt. %

.g Pu 238 0.053 Pu 239 86.5 Pu 240 11.8 Pu 241-1.4

~

4 v

Pu 242 0.2 4.

The inhal.. ion dose conversion factors (F-factors) in Rem /Ci inhaled are assumed to be as follows:

l Pu 238 Pu 239 Pu 240 Pu 241 Pu 242 l$

2 F

7.6x10s 8.7x10s 8.7x10s 1,7x107 8x10s WASH 1400 bone F

3.1x10s 2.9x10e 2.9x10s 5.9x105 5.2x10s WASH 1400 lung F

4.4x10s 5.2x108 5.2x10s 1,1x107 5.0x10s

{egs liver 4144 F

6.3x107 7.3x107 7.3x107 1.6x106 7.1x107 Teresi kidney Ia i

ig

t.'4 IV-19 3

5.

Cancer death incidences which were taken from the BEIR report are as follows:

y g

Incidence 7

Bone Cancer Deaths 0.2/106/yr/ Rem E

Lung Cancer Deaths 1.3/106/yr/ Rem Il

$1 RESULTS

(,

Table 1 shows the 50 year dose commitment from inhalation for one year of resuspended aerosol in segments 1 (0-500 meters) and segment 2 (500-100 0

,{

meters) for bone, lung, liver and kidney.

9 V

TABLE 1 rs Resuspension Analysis Results 50 Yr. Dose (REM) (1 Yr. Inhalation)

.T!

.:-W Segment (1) (0-500 meters) t'

e Bone Lung Liver Kidney

. w Pu 238

.597

.243

.35

.05

!?

Pu 239 4.05 1.35 2.4

.34 l

Pu 240 2.05

.68 1.23

.17

,(.

Pu 241 2.4

.08 1.6

.23 TOTAL 9.1 2.4 5.6

.8 6

l U}

E)

Segment (2)(500-1000 meters)

'f Bone Lung Liver Kidney

'4 0'.06 0.03

.03

.005 Pu 238 Pu 239 0.42 0.14

.25

.04 Pu 240 0.21 0.07

.13

.02 l-Pu 241 0.25 0.008

.16

.02 TOTAL 0.94 0.25

.57

.09 1l>

g-

-,~

., -, ~

D N'

IV-20

.3 n.

Table 2 shows the 50 year dose comitment from inhalation of resuspended 7

aerosol as a function of inhalation period.

.?

~

1 TABLE 2 7

Inhalation Doses Due to Resuspension as a Function of Time of Exposure Segment (1) (0-500 meters)

(REM) h Time (days) of Expsoure p

1 10 100 200 365 1825(5 yrs)

'd Bone 0.03 0.36 3.19 5.8 9.1 17.3 Lung 0.007 0.096 0.84 1.53 2.4 4.56 l~',

Liver 0.002 0.22 1.96 3.57 5.6 10.64 Kidney 0.002 0.03 0.28 0.51 0.8 1.52 l

q b

l

~

.* lb

,.y 4

3, 1

11

_.__,______m__..-

Dm N'

g y,,;,

D b

Table 3 shows the 50 year dose comitment to the bone,1dng, liver and kidney from inhalation of plutonium in the passing cloud at 500 meters and 1000 N

meters from the release point.

Tl

s.,

TABLE 3 3

Acute Inhalation of Plutonium in the Passing Cloud 50 Year Dose Comitment (REM)

L At 500 Meters P

i Bone Lung Liver Kidney Pu 238 0.21 0.086 0.12 0.02 Pu 239 1,44 0.48 0.86 0.12 Pu 240 0.73 0.24 0.44 0.06 Pu 241 0.85 0.029_

0.55 0.08 TOTAL 3.25 0.85 1.97 0.28

.F

.:'w c

E lY At 1000 Meters n

Bcne Lung Liver Kidney E

Pu 238 0.025 0.01 0.01 0.002 Pu 239 0.17 0.06 0.10.

0.014 e

Pu 240 0.01 0.03 0.006 0.001

[,

Pu 241 0.1 0.003 0.06 0.009 TOTAL 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.03 E

L, Table 4 presents the expected bone and lung cancer deaths due to inhalation for 1 year of th~e resuspended plutonium from the original release of 0.126 gms of plutonium mixture.

l r.",

F l

.e

,)

1

L,-c.?

ifx3 Q

R CO BIS A

w CE G.3 M

IT.2E f.d M

M W

C.J C7 (EU i

4 TABLE 4 Total Cancer Deaths /Yr Due to Inhalation For One Year of Resuspended Aerosol 7

Direction Frequency of Segment (1)

Segment (2)

Segment (3)

Segment (4)

I Wind Occurrence j

' From Bone Lung Bone Lung Bone Lung Bone Lung H

2.7 1.3E-8 2.3E-8 4.4E-9 7.4 E-9 1.5E-9 1.8E-9

1. l E-9 2.0E-9 j

NNE 3.7 1.9E-8 3.2E-8 6.0E-9 1.0E-8 2.0E-9 2.4 E-9 1.6E-9 2.7E-9 NE 2.9 7.6E-8 1.4 E-8 2.4E-8 4.8E-9 5.7E-9

' 3.6E-9 6.3E-9 4.4 E-8 ENE 3.0 3.5 E-8 6.lE-8 1.l E-8 1.9E-8 3.8E-9 4.6E-9 2.9E-9 5.lE-9 E

4.5 5.3E-8 9.1E-8 1.7E-8 2.9E-8 5.7E-9 6.9E-9 4.4E-9 7.6E-9 ESE 1.5 1.5E-8 2.7E-8 4.8E-9 8.2E-9 1.6 E-9 2.0E-9

1. 3E-9 2.2E-9 SE 1.2 7.7E-9 1.3E-8 2.6E-9 4.4E-9 8.7E-10 1.0E-9 6.7E-10 1.2E-9 SSE 1.8 8.8E-9 1.5E-8 2.9 E-9 5.0E-9 9.8E-10 1.2E-9 7.5E-10 1.3E-9 y

S 4.9 2.4 E-8 4.2E-8 7.9E-9 1.3E-8 2.7E-9 3.2E-9 2.lE-9 3.6E-9 U

SSW 7.8 3.9E-8 6.7E-8 1.26E-8 2.1E-8 4.3E-9 5.1E-9 3.3E-9 5.6E-9 i

SW 22.4 1.lE-7 1.9E-7 3.6E-8

6. l E-8 1.2E-8

1. 5E-8 9.4 E-9 1.6E-8 f

WSW 15.5 1.3E-7 2.3E-7 4.2E-8 7.0E-8 1.4 E-8 1.7E-8 1.lE-8 1.9E-8 l

W 8.4 4.2E-8 7.2E-8 1.4E-8 2.3E-8 4.6E-9 5.5E-9 3.5E-9 6.lE-9 l

WNW 3.7 1.9E-8 3.2E-8 6.0E-9 1.0E-8 2.0E-9 2.4E-9 1.6E-9 2.7E-9 NW 3.1 1.5 E-8 2.7E-8 5.0E-9 8.4 E-9 1.7E-9 2.0E-9 1.3E-9 2.2E-9 NNW 2.1 1.lE-8 1.9E-8 3.4 E-9 5.7E-9 1.2E-9 1.4E-9 8.8E-10 1.5E-9 TOTAL 5.9E-7 1.0E-6 1.9E-7 3.2E-7 8.iE-8 9.7E-8 4.9E-8 8.5E-8 Estimate of Total Cancer Deaths Per Year For All Areas Bone Lung 9.lE-7 1.5E-7 Total Bone and Lung Cancer Deaths 9.1x10-7 + 1.5x10-s = 2.4x10-6

L--

Dd G

6 M

D

• M G3 6.dj c10 GB EC C

d O'.) W Q

(E".J TABLE 5 Plume Depletion Factors Over Agricultural Land (F Stability) 5 (From Gudiksen et a1 )

Particle Release Distance, km Diameter.

Height, um '~

m 0.5 1

2 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 0.3 0

,0.96 0.93 0.87 0.77 0.66 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.48 1

0 0.94 0.90 0.83 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.41 3

0 0.73 0.58 0.38 0.20 0.10 0.060 0.030 0.010 0

0 5

0 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.005 0

0 0

0 0

0 8

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 20 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

3 O!

i G

e

n 13 IV-24 v

9.

)

tiETH000 LOGY

,'j}

Segmentation,:

Figure 1 shows the method of segmenting the area around the release point.

. [,

The area was divided into 16 equal sectors of 22.5' and into annuli to form segments numbered 1, 2, etc. to a distance at which no more deposition occurs (in the case of the 5 um mean diameter particle this war taken as 5 kilometers l

as shown in Table 5.)

Equations Used in Calculations

.ntj The General Equation of Cancer Deaths, which is given below, includes the

' dose term which is defined and is used for the dose calculations which p

appeared in the tabulated resuits above.

43 p

General Equation 16 10 Excess n organ Cancer Deaths /yr. = I" { { D) x P th t =1 j-1 IL D

population exposed in j segment in the i section

+

P

=

is the wind Direction Freq. of Occurrence in o[P3g ; o P

=

g g

th 0

d the I sector, P is the population in the j segment for jg th

?

the i sector.

E 22.5* sector C

t

=

b D

I" incidence of cancer deaths for the n organ

=

1 Bone g

= 0.2x10-6/ person /yr./ rem Lung = 1.3x10-6/ person /yr./ rem g

'i' h.

U

i

'P IV-25 G

ij Population Distribution P f persons / m2 ) in jth segment and P

=

yg th th t

sector x Area of j segment within a 22.5' sector A

t-j P,,

IA population density (obtained from Figure 2).

P

=

l',,

< ~

l:/

Derivation of D" for Resuspension W

1. L C(t)=

K G, Ak concentration t

K = resuspension factor Ci/m3/Ci/m2 t

G, = deposition C1/m2 2

t in days (From WASH 1400 )

Kt" o'

e lc g = 10-s -1 m

c o

w.

=.002 d-l = fixation constant A

[C x B x F dt

[

D

=

t N

o l

lu, l

[

(K e At + Ke)

B x FG dt D

=

o o

~

~

('

o t

f (G,BFK,e-At + G,BFKe)dt D

=

O E

1J

D6 IV-26

.~I CFK I

o (1 - e-At)+G,BFK,t D

G, y

=

th D"

dose to n organ in the j segment

=

j 6

D"

=[D"9 j

3

,\\

Ci n

(1-e-At),(glBF"K,)t C

7 D",

31 i 0

=

j.

j A

r,

{.

where iIJ i = isotope of Pu (238, 239, 240, 241 or 242)

, L)

B = Breathing rate = 20 m / day, t is in days, k

k, = 10 ; k, = 10~9; A = fixation constant (day-l) =.002

-5 F" = dose conversion factor for the nth th organ and the i g,

E isotope (~ REM /Ci inhaled) th th y

G f = ground concentration of the i isotope in the j j

2 L

segment in Curies /m,

1 D"$ =

(1 - e.it) + GC x 20 x F" x 10-9)t 3

j j

1-y

.002 5

'm

.b

.=.1 Gfj F" (1 - e-At), (gjj x p x 2 x 10-0) t n

5

\\>

l>

j j

l p

4

\\

.)

1

k.

I TV-27

u

g w

U9 2

G xS (Ci/m)

G

=

jj j3 j

th S$ = specific activity of i lutoniumisotope(Ci/gm) m 0

Pu 238 16.8

=

0.061 Pu 239

=

p Pu 240 0.227

=

rn Pu 241

= 114.0 Pu 242 0.0039

=

Fd G"9 th Ground concentration in j segment with 22.5' sector of i

=

i

r p,1utonium isotope (gms/m ),

2 0

• f 0

[

i i

fraction of isotope in plutonium mixture f

=

p.

4 k

w th plutonium mixture concentration in j G

=

y 2

E (22.5* sector) (gms/m )

g JR r

Aj

-s

!E jp " jp t.

th d), is deposition in j segment (gms) for p particle size

'J f

D ii, is deposition fraction in j segment for p particle j

size

1. 7 W is weight of original Pu mixture (gms)

._)

R = fraction of W released into air

{9 J

t_

~

i

~

g.

"J.

IV-28

-~

1 2

J, s

Area Km2 e

.?.

f; A

0.0491 t

A 0.147 2

A

.589 3

s Ag 4.12'

.T As 14.73

~

As 24.54 Q

A 34.36 7

uO As 44.18 A,

54.0 E

Aio 53.8 O

h to convert to M2 multiply by 10.

8 p

,s Iw f

L Values of d 9 (Derived from Table 5)

Segment (j)

~

e P

Mean Particle Size (um) 1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 h

0.3 0.04 0.03

.06 0.10 0.06

.04.03

.03.03

.03 1

0.06 0.04.07 0.07

.05

.05.03.03.03

.03

'E 3

0.27 ~ 0.15

.20.0.18 0.10

.04.03

.02.01 0

5 0.66 0.21

.07 0.055

.005 0

0 0

0 0

s eu.mW e

9 3

y l

J

n fj

• IV-29 Cloud Inhalation Dose = h x B x Release (Ci) x.Dep1. Factor x F-factor, e

-u 8 = 3.48 x 10-6 m3/sec

.h for mediun diamter = 5 pm m

q Distance km

.w

}' L 0.5 1.0 2.

5.

ei Depletion Factor 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.005 r

C x/Q 2.1x10-3 6.5x10-4 2.2x10-4 6x10-5

.s

.500 Km x5 x F-factors 2.1x10-3 x.34 x 3.48x10-4 x Release (gm) x fg 9

ij D

=

2.1 x 10-3 x.34 x 3.48 x 10 - x 0.126 x f x5 xF" 4

=

g 9

9 3.131x10-s x f{ x 5{ x p{n

(

=

l l

1Xm 6.5x10-4 x.13 x 3.48x10-4 x.126 x f S xF" D

=

jj 9

t 3.71x10 9 x f x5 x F" 1

=

y j

9 j

E E(,

2Km 9 x F" 2.2x10-4 x 0.06 x 3.48x10-4 x.126 x f x5 D

=

4 x F"

= 5.78x10 10 f4x5j

-y P'

l (,

l 6'

• From Reg Guide 1.4 J

.P *

• IV-30 J

~

~.i L

A l

I i

.V>

'l )

W f

I w

l 22.5 " '

5 Ee' I 5L S EG. r^S,fr 2.

s q

.=>

Ai El V

W M

rY N

.D 4 'g

.J F

FIGURE 1 5

W 6

d

s.-as P**

FfGURE 2

'd VALLiiCIT0.: - FA!60s e 0-10 elli..

c i r..

' l; tl d

"l f.1' e

E 1

50 N

50 1440

$*D jt,

'g

/

s

's,

/

\\

[

74 50 l

100

.t

\\ x.,/

,. \\,,

70

,g/

i

\\.

203 50 l

N 3960 )

4i g

S.*0

\\

(h

\\

\\

263

' 1220 \\

i 68 g

j

,..'?/

400 25 y.,

p *'p**

5' 16 70 50 m

3I 170 170 U1 N

35' *'/ l\\\\ N 15 1

\\ \\15\\

16 I

3 l

i lp 1

290

, 45. j 5 1515'-

's

,"'T.

x 50 c,

I 633

\\/

\\ 16 135,'

/

50 I.*

i _,

'.'\\

3440

\\

\\

/

/

\\.

N.'./

31 1 27

,e 41 \\

l l

50

.. -' N, l

• %--=="",.'-

633

• l s.

8 3440

/-

603 50

/

100

\\

/

5 s.M..

y

/

o 1

/

/

f. l 1145 t

50 I*

170

\\.,

I lw T

SECTOR 2 SECTOR 1

< gl Segment 1. 0-500 meters E,

Segment 2 - 500-1000 meters Segment 3 1000-2000 meters Segment 4 2000-5000 meters J

.,.,_.,__._..,,__,..__L*_,*__*

. ~ ~..

'G -

IV-32

ll T

References:

• h 1.

J. Mishima, L. G. Schwendiman and C. A. Radasch, " Plutonium Release Studies (IV) Fractional Release from Heating Plutonium flitrate Solutions in a Flowing

?.

Air Stream," B!NL-931, flav.1968.

[

2.

" Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences," Appendix VI of Reactor Safety Study, UStiRC Report WASH-1400 (fiUREG-75/014), 1975.

v T'

3.

J. D. Terest and F. G. Boudreau " Inhalation Dose Conversion Factors for

'a Various Radionuclides Associated with Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors,"

GEAP 14144 Sept. 1976.

4.

BEIR Report,1972, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, Division of Medical Sciences, fiational Acaderny 0;

of Sciences - f(ational Research Council, Washington, D.C.

L 5.

Paul H. Gudiksen, Kendall R. Peterson, Rolf Lange and Joseph B. Knox, " Plume Depletion Following Postulated Plutonium Dioxide Releases from Mixed-Oxide d

Fuel Fabrication Plants, UCRL-51781, March 1975.

.,m 6.

USAEC Regulatory Guide 1.4 " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water

+

Reactors", June 1973

.=

.+

l

'?

e e

l.,

= end u

r l _,

3

,7l[

t l

l.J

?.

• ~

7

....7-_

b,_

VI.

INFORIV. TION PROVIDED TO NRC

[

NRC QUESTIONS - 10/28/77 7

0 WHAT FLAMMABLE / EXPLOSIVE GASES IN FUELS LAB?

e P-10 GAS FOR MONITORING E,QUIPMENT - NOT EXPLOSIVE, A

SMALL QUANTITIES, 10% METHANE IN INERT.

L e

REDUCTION GAS - 6% H2 IN INERT, NOT EXPLOSIVE, 7

NOT FLAMMABLE AT ROOM TEMPERATURES.

WHAT HAPPENS IF COOLING WATER LOSS TO SINTERING FURNACE?

Y e

(

LOSS OF GLOVE BOX PANELS?

L' e

LOSS OF COOLING WATER MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF FURNACE OPERABILITY.

e TWO RECYCLE COOLING SYSTEMS WITH PRIMARY WATER BACKUP.

e NO DAMAGE TO GLOVE BOX PANELS.

! Eb CAN INVENTORY BE REDUCED AND STILL DO THE JOB?

e e

fuels LAB INVENTORY COULD NOT BE REDUCED WITHOUT lg IMPACT ON CUSTOMER PROGRAMS.

ANY CHANGE WOULD BE GREATLY DEPENDENT ON CUSTOMER.

~'

ENEL SCRAP AWAITING EXPORT LICENSE.

e L

CAN FUELS LAB BE FLOODED BY RUPTURE OF LAKE LEE?

e

+

L-e PREVIOUS STUDIES INDICATED SOME CONCERN) THEREFORE, LAKE LEE DISCHARGE WAS LOWERED AND DRAIN CHANNEL

[

MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE FLOODING POTENTIAL.

e 66 g

.1 e

8 e

i e

hZi 1

b US-6 g

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REOUESTED & ANSWERS PROVIDE 0 SATURDAY 10/20/77 I.

BLOG. 102 BASEMENT " PIT" DIMENSIONS.

Length Width Depth Dia.

Volume g

a.

Elevator Pit 13'4" 8'5" 5'4" 594 ft.3 b.

51A Pit 8'6" 2'6" 4'

85 ft.3

• c.

50A Pit 6'

l'6" 2'10 "

26 ft.3 d.

Box 39 Pit (outsidewall) 5' l'

l' 5 ft.3 1.5 ft.3 6.5 ft.3 Box 39 Pit (inside wall) s 3' l'

S 0.5' e.

Box 24 Pit (rcunded ends with sloped section on one end) 11" 5'6" 14' 5'6" 756+10=766 ft.3

,i

• • f.

" Sump" well at west end

~#

of basement 29" 32" 13 ft.3 p

• • • g.

(1) Cell door recess r

i

-(4 ea. )

s 10'9" s 6'6"

• 2' 140 ft.2 ea.

~

(2) Cell door recess sumps (4 ea.)

S 16" S 12" i ft.3 ea.

?

II.

BASEMENT DIMENSIONS

[

a.

Fuels Lab. approximately 4000 ft.2; approximately 44,000 ft.3 b.

Total Basement approximately 8160 ft.2; approximately 90,000 ft.3

~

7 III. WATER DATA c

a.

Lake Lee - no problem

~

b.

Water Tank (above GETR)- 500,000 gal; 200,000 gal reserve for emergencies;

~

drain to Lake les or by-pass

,l Bldg. 102; c.

Fire line - 8" from tank; 4" to Fuels Lab.

Valve at tank and at NE corner f

of Bldg. 102; also valve in E.

basement outside Fuels Lab.

d.

Water line to basement - 4"; valve So. of 102 and So. of Bldg.1028 E

e.

Water lines to, Fuels Lab. - two 1" lines (one ea. end of lab)

.o "Could be fillec

• • Indicated to NRC that these could be filled; however, following further evaluation it is not considered feasible to fill this " pit".

1

• • • Not provided to NRC.

a x

5 l

end l-

..r.. m.,.

.....+...s.

1

l,,

};

u

.C VI-3 Basement fill rate {/ min. = 664 min /60 min /hr = 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.

• Fill ra fire Ifne and water line severed - 1000 gal / min);

f.

90,000 ft.3/135 ft.

l' / hour.

g.

RP&S Pool - 1686 ft.3 (If all water in this pool entered the Fuels Lab. and

,[

filled the pits, the water level would not exceed 2 " ht. on the floor of the lab.

L IV. POWDER CAN DIMENSIONS

(

Type, Ofa.

Length Imperial Gal.

7.9" 9.4" Gal. Slip Lid 7.5" 7.5" 1

Ga. Paint can 6.5" 7.5" tI V.

CRITICALITY AND POWDER DISPERSION CONSIDERATIONS * - Glovebox Contents Dumped E

To Floor a.

Cans and other vessels such as a reduction vessel remain intact and

'8 suberitical.

b.

If cans were ruptured or unsealed the contents would spill in a " conical slab" r

configuration which would be subcritical.

c.

If water enters the cans, subcriticality would be maintained unless the cans were " shaken" to produce suspension, unifona distribution, and intimate

{

mixture with powder.

(1) Actual test data in ref. XIa. indicates Pu02 settles'out rapidly and is prevented from resuspension with " water cover.

It is b.

concluded in this reference that water sprinklers will not produce criticality if the original spacing was properly analyzed.

d.

A safe slab exists if all conversion tanks art dumped to the floor. Also, the conversion line tanks are considered to be subcritical in the event of water ficoding.

VI. DISTANCES TO RESIDENCES NEAR SITE a.

SW corner of B1dg.102 to residence near west boundary is 2200 ft.;

,y distance to nearest west boundary is 1760 ft.

b b.

SE corner of Bldg.102 to residence near south boundary is 1867 ft; distance to south boundary (middle of highway) is 1635 ft.

10/31/77 NOTE: Corrected dhtance to nearest s.te (So.) boundary n 1430 ft.

(440 meters); corrected dhiance to nearest resi.dence k 1940 ft.

• AFL criticality analyses are basad on 45% of a critical mass. geometrical control for wet chemistry operations.

!l1

.k

{

VI l!

n VII. GLOVEBOX PLUTONIUM CONTENT AND CONDITIONS Box Form Container Pu Fissile Process Conditions

[

37 Pu02 Pan 2500 gms

• Equilibration 3-4 days 37 M02 Cans or 2500 gms

• Blending 1 operation at a k

Blender time. Materials in f

l cans with taped lids '

{

when not in process.

(37 1102 Cans or 2500 gms

• Hamermilling j

- Ceramicsf Hamermill 1 Line p

• 0nly one qu'antity in the box at a time.

Worst case is Pu0.

This could be performed 2

in a closed container if nec'essary il 38 M02 Cans or 2500 gms Prepress &

Dense 1" dia. slugs prepress or granulation or granules granulator

'5 f50 M02 Can 1200 gms Prepara for On charging shelf dissolution in can i

50 M02 Dissolver 1200 gms Dissolution In HNO3-metal

!T o ery N container e..

50 MN Concentrator 1200 gms Concentration Glass Tank I

( 50 MN Product load-1200 gms For transfer Glass Tank i

out f51 MN Holding tank 2400 gms Holding shelf Glass Tank 51 MN Blend tank 2400 gms Blending Glass Tank j

Nitrate 4 51 M02 Storage cans 1200 gms Shelf In sealed cans

'"**'5I "

51 M02 Storage cans 1200 sms Transfer area In sealed cans (51 M02 Reduction 1200 gms Reduction Metal container ly vessel VIII. P10 GAS lf a.

P10 gas is 10% methane / inert gas.

~

b.

Labeled as "non-flamable".

c.

Lower explosive limit of methale in air is 5.3%.

l d.

A 6-pack with s1200 ft.3 max. is attached to a 3/8" line which provides gas to laboratory instruments.

Supply lines in the lab are k" and each instrument line is 1/8" NOTE: NRC was incorrectly informed the line to the lJ 1ab was k" Manifol,d pressure is 30 psig e.

g f.

Typical usage is <10 CFM.

l;-

~

g...

~

VI-5 IX. GAS FLOW TO THE FUELS LAB It was estimated that gas (and compressed air) flow, particularly the two p

gas trailers containing 6% H / inert gas and N2 would be interrupted in the 2

{

event of a significant seismic event.

X.

ACIO LEAXAGE TO THE FUELS LAB CREATING SIGNIFICANT H2

~

This is not considered credible due to obstructions, low quantities of acid and small quantities of available mild steel, etc.

L XI. REF. MATERIAL.

a.

W. A. Blyckert, R. D. Carter, and K. R. Ridgway, Redefined Criticality

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Risk Categories for Fire Safety, ARH 2468 ARHCO, 2/10/72 p. 6&7 b.

J. Vincent Panesko, Mobility of Plutonium Compounds in Simulated Fire Sprinkler Spray, ARH-2401, Oct.1972 ARHC0 l

c.

S. R. Bierman & E. D. Clayton, PNL, Critical Experiments with Unmoderated l-Plutonium Oxide, Nuclear Technology Vol.11, June 1971 Table III.

I T' d.

Wick, Plutonium Handbook Vol.1,1967, pp. 436/438 5

XII. PLUTONIUM TRANSPORT MECHANISMS c

Transportation of plutonium oxide and nitrate via water flooding, follow. n ash f.l separate mechanisms. Plutonium oxide powder subjected to turbulent spray U

(similar to fire sprinkler system) fonns a " mud like" layer after which water builds up faster than it is sorbed into the oxide.

After the water depth exceeds % inch in depth the underlying o.xide is essentially un-dis turbed. One mechanism which tends to limit the tranport of plutonium is the formation of lumps or aggregates of oxide which assist in holding dcwn the oxide, allcwing only a small amount of fines to be suspended.

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Plutonium nitrate when spilled into water is rapidly dispersed throughout the container. This rapid dispersion would be accompanied by M

a polymerization reactionM which occurs in weakly acidic solutions.

In E

this reaction the plutonium fonns a colloidal polymer which tends to plate-out on adjacent surfaces.

Such polymerization occurs rapidly thus tending to limit p

transport. Transport of the plut mium polymer through soil is impeded by its slightly positive charge, which causes it to be attracted to clay-type minerals o

in the soil. Tests conducted at Hanford (I.N. Taylor experience - no reference) wherein columns of soil were subjected to percolation of various plutonium solutions, showed that the natural fon exchange properties of the soil would quickly trap the plutonium within a few inches of the addition point. The Hanford Z-9 crib was designed to make use of this mechanism for disposal of large quantities of plutonium process solutions. After a period of many years the crib plutonium distribution was checked and plutonium was found within

a. few feet of the. solution entry points.

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VI-6 NRC Ouestions Asked and Responded To 11/2/77 s

1) Q. Where are L-10 containers stored When they contain Pu nitrate?

A.

Basement Fuels Lab vault.

2) Q. Where is Pu nitrate transferred to when removed from the L-10 for processing?

A.

Tank (s) in conversion glove box.

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NATURAL PHENOMENA REVIEW TEAM U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James E. Ayer

. Source Term W. E. Vesely Risk Assessment G. B. Staley Hydrology Battelle Northwest Laboratories Jofu Mishima Source Term L. C. Schwendican Source Term E. C. Watson Dose Assessment J. Soldat Dose Assessment Argonne National Laboratory Jim Carson Meteorology Norman A. Frigerio Demography /?athways R. S. Stowe Demography / Pathways Texas Tech University James R. Mcdonald Structural Kishor C. Mehta Structural University of Illinois William J. Hall Structural N. M. Newmark Structural Savannah River Laboratory Darrell W. Pepper Dispersion Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Frank J. Tokarz Seisnic/ Structural Teknekron Energy Resource Analysts Corporation L. H. Wight Seismic Engineering Decision Analysis Company Robert P. Kennedy Structural

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