ML20045B417

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Submits 10CFR50.59 Rept for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2
ML20045B417
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1993
From: Woodward J
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9306170327
Download: ML20045B417 (67)


Text

7 8

4

(

Southem NMear Operamg Compry Pont C+fce Bcx )?95 Birmingham. /dabsma 35201 1295 Teiep+one 205 DGB 5003 Ka Southern Nudear Operating Company the southem elecmc sys:em 10 CFR 50.59 June 11, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 10 CFR 50.59 Report Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) hereby submits the 10 CFR 50.59 report for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2.

This report summarizes changes to the plant performed in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant as described below.

  • : Unit 1
  • : Unit 2
  • : Shared (Applicable to Units 1 and 2)

List of Abbreviations In accordance with trie rule change for 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2) that allows 10 CFR

.50.59 reports ta be submitted with FSAR updates, SNC plans to file 10 CFR 50.59 reports with its FSAR updates.

Therefore, the next SNC 10 CFR 50.59 report will be filed with Revision 12 to the FSAR Update, which will be six months following completion of the next Unit I refueling outage presently scheduled for the spring of 1994.

If you have any questions, please advisa.

Respectfully submitted, J.

. 'oodard ive Vice President DRC:clt-10CFRPT.DRC Attachments

\\

j 5 0.1

  • d

~

o cc:

Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. T. A. Reed MI Mr. G. F. Maxwell I

9306170327 930611 1

9 PDR ADOCK 05000348 N

P PDR 1

4 l

t i

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT REPORT REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50.59 Section 59 of Title 10, Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization facilities," of the Code of Federal Regulations, states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization j

facility may (1) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) make changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior commission approval, unless the proposed change, test, or experiment involves a change in the technical i

specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10 CFR 50.59).

The licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or experiments, and those records are required to include written safety evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

Brief descriptions and a summary of the safety evaluations for the changes, tests, or experiments as described above, for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant which are included in Revision 11 to the FSAR update (provided to the NRC via a separate letter), are provided in the following.

Y I

E a

P 1

4

)

f'[l l .

i ATTACHMENT 1-10 CFR 50.59 REPORT UNIT 1

'5 W

h 5

i 1

4 4

l

)

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-80-1-0695, " Pressure Vessel Head Closure System" DESCRIITION:

This PCN provides design for reactor stud quick-connect adapters to be installed to reduce the time required to tension and detension the studs.

SE

SUMMARY

This PCN is being voided and is not going to be implemented; however, the FSAR was updated to reflect the installation of the quick-connect adapters. The FSAR is to be updated to delete the quick-connect adapter information. The circuit and raceway documentation is changed i

to maintain accurate circuit and raceway schedules. These changes to the FSAR reflect the existing condition of the plant.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-87-1-4052, " Replacement Of SW Piping" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to replace existing SW carbon steel piping and valves for various coolers with stainless steel.

SE

SUMMARY

Replacement of carbon steel material with stainless steel material for piping and valves does not adversely impact the SW system's reliability or performance. System flow rates specified in the FSAR will be maintained. The replacement piping and valves are qualified for the intended service in terms of pressure and temperature ratings. Pipmg i

to safety related coolers is seismically qualified.

r P

1 A1: Page 1 of 21 i

i u

i 4

1 ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 1

SUBJECT:

PCN B-87-1-4133, " Installation Of Modified Seal Housing On HHSI/

Charging INmps" DESCRIPTION: This PCN provides mechanical seal modifications on the HHSI/ charging pumps which eliminates the need for CCW for seal cooling.

SE

SUMMARY

Eliminating the CCW to the charging pumps allows 15 gpm to be diverted and distributed throughout the CCW system. No adverse effect on the CCW system occurs because the extra flow is insignificant when t

compared to the total flow (approximately 0.2%). Equipment served by the CCW system will experience neither a decrease nor an increase in performance as a result of the increased flow.

Removal of the associated piping will result in breached penetrations in non-fire rated walls. To ensure compliance with the exemption granted by the NRC, the breached penetration will be resealed per existing FNP proce.dures.

The changes to the charging pump mechanical seals will not result in a situation which could affect the integrity or the safe operation of the charging pumps, but will provide improved pump reliability and availability.

j i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-87-1-4230, " Replacement Of Obsolete RCP Vibration Monitoring System" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for replacing the currently installed B-N 7000 series vibration monitoring system, which is obsolete and difficult to maintain. The replacement vibration monitoring system is a B-N 3300 series system which is considered state-of-the-art, and will be F

maintainable for many years.

SE

SUMMARY

The B-N 3300 series vibration monitoring system performs the same functions as the replaced 7000 series system. The vibration monitoring system does not perform any function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. It also does not interface with any safety related equipment, nor will it affect the operation of any such equipment.

A1: Page.2 of 21 j

i E

E

a p

i j

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

............................................................a....................

SUBJECT:

PCN S-88-1-4RM, "1A And IB Turbine Building Chiller Control i

Package And Purge Unit Upgrades" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for installing a microprocessor control panel and a new refrigerant purge system for the turbine building HVAC system centrifugal chillers.

r SE

SUMMARY

The turbine building chillers are not safety related, and 'no credit is 1

taken for the chillers for accident analysis. This upgrade to the chillers will provide more efficient means of controlling the chillers and purging air and other contaminants from their refrigerant system.

j I

SUBJECT:

PCN B-88-1-5582,

  • Removal Of AFW Pump Recirculation Valves" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN documents the replacement of four AFW pump recirculation valves with straight pipe spool pieces. The closure signal associated with these valves has been removed, and the valves remain open at all times.

Therefore, the valves are being removed to eliminate maintenance required to keep the valves in service.

{

i SE

SUMMARY

Since the valves are maintained open at all times, their contribution to the pressure drop in the recirculation header is less than 1% Also, the evaluation of the piping associated with the subject valves from the standpoint of pipe stresses and support loads indicates that the pipe stresses will remain below code allowables, and no support '

modifications are required due to the removal of the valves. Therefore, removal of the recirculation valves does not have an adverse effect on the AFW system flow distribution, operation, or structural adequacy.

i A1: Page 3 of 21 f

4

.i l

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 l

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-1-5677, " BOP Instruments Replacement" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to replace the BOP LAN control system with-a Westinghouse digital distributed processing system.

l SE

SUMMARY

System functions remain the same as before the change except for i

removal of the low pressure heater bypass valve, which has been locked closed and serving no function, and removal of auto control capability l

and installation of a handwheel for the condensate dump valve.

Removal of selected auxiliary steam generator instruments from the MCB and from field locations has no effect on plant functions since the auxiliary steam system is no longer utilized. Adding the BOP controls as a drop on the digital electrohydraulic control system has no adverse l

effect for the functioning of either system since they are capable of independent operation. The changes to the main control room panels i

have been seismically evaluated and found acceptable.

The replacement control system will have the same effect on the plant pre esses as the previous control system. There are no interfaces of this system with safe-shutdown equipment or NSSS protection systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-1-6226, " Type 410 Stainless Steel Check Valve Internal Preloaded Bolting" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN identifies valves that fall within the scope of NRC Bulletin 89-02, and prepares requisitions for procurement of replacement parts.

SE

SUMMARY

Two installed valves are of a different manufacturer and model number than indicated on the P&lD by the Westinghouse valve model identification number. Therefore, this identification number will be omitted from the P&ID.

These Westinghouse valve model identification numbers are not critical to plant operations, and the TPNS numbers and Westinghouse plant valve identification numbers are still available for identification.

t l

A1: Page 4 of 21 I

I C

i

I I

?

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 l

?

l

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-1-6397, "TDAFW And MDAFW Pumps" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN documents the review and approval of vendor recommended i

physical and material changes to the AFW pump rotating assemblies.

SE

SUMMARY

The pump vendor has provided a justification for the part and material changes and has indicated that they are in accordance with those originally proposed. The vendor also stated that none of the changes to the rotating assembly impact the mechanical or structural form, fit, and function of the AFW pumps. The operation of the pump as described in the FSAR is unchanged.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-1-6425, " Securing The CVCS Demineralizer Valve Room And Waste Gas Decay Tank Area To Prevent An Inadvertent Or Unauthorized Entry Into An Exclusion Area" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN is issued to provide the following: (1) design for installing a lockable wire mesh (hinged) door to replace the existing removable panel door in the CVCS demineralizer valve room, and (2) design for installing additional steel barriers for securing existing penetrations large enough for a person to fit through.

SE

SUMMARY

This PCN will prevent inadvertent or unauthorized entry into the exclusion area. This change has no adverse impact on plant safety or the safe shutdown of the plant, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

t V

l A1: Page 5 of 21

-4 t

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-90-1-6959, "CW Chemical Feed System" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN adds mechanical and electrical interfaces for a CW chemical feed facility.

SE

SUMMARY

The CW system treatment program is not changed. The CW system is not required to be operable during any accident. Plant safety will not be affected by this change to the plant.

SUBJECT:

PCN B90-1-7143, " Add A DC Load Profile Reference To 125 VDC Single Line Drawings" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN adds a note to alert design personnel to review load profile calculations and update load profile drawings when DC loads are added.

SE

SUMMARY

This change to figures in the FSAR does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7171," Update Of HFA Relay Model Numbers On Various Drawings" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises applicable documents to show the new Century l

Series HFA relay model number.

i SE

SUMMARY

The new relay is an equal exchange seismically, thus maintaining the i

seismic qualification of the affected systems. The installation of the new j

relays will have no adverse effect on the operation of any existing equipment or systems. There will be no change to plant equipment or i

installation of new plant equipment.

l l

1

?

A1: Page 6 of 21 l

a h

7 i

t

-t ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7212, " Replacement Of Steam Generator Feed Pump Mini-Flow Piping With Erosion Resistant Materials" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to replace portions of steam generator feed pumps 'A' and 'B' minimum flow piping with erosion resistant piping.

SE

SUMMARY

The sections of piping to be replaced are non-safety and non-seismic.

These changes have been evaluated, and will not adversely affect the original design function of the condensate and feedwater system.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7252, "SW Dilution Bypass Valve Flow Limit Modification" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN increases the setpoint for the dilution bypass valves to open from 100 psig to 110 psig, and mechanically limits the disc travel in the open direction to 30 degrees to prevent the valve from failing in the full I

open position.

SE

SUMMARY

Raising the opening setpoint will prevent unnecessary loss of SW during normal operating conditions, and will ensure that no SW system components will have a steady state pressure in excess of its design rating. The amount of disc travel allowed has been calculated to ensure that the over pressurization protection function will not be impaired, while at the same time limiting the amount of water volume which can pass through the valve.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7306, "1B DG Air Start System Drawings Update" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises documentation to show the as-built condition which is the vendor's approved design and has existed sface initial DG installation.

SE

SUMMARY

There is no physical change to the DG or its support systems, and there is no impact on the safety related function of the DG.

A1: Page 7 of 21 i

I 4-i ATFACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

.i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7324, "DG Building Roof Vent Capacity"

-)

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN corrects the design flow rate shown on an FSAR figure.

SE

SUMMARY

This error correction does not affect the HVAC design.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7325, "SWIS Ventilation Thermostat Ixcations" 3

i DESCRWTION:

This DCO PCN corrects thermostat locations on a plant P&ID.

SE

SUMMARY

Showing the actual location of the thermostats on the drawing will not affect their operation.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7360, " Fire Barrier Penetrations" f

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises the fire barrier penetration seal drawing to show three penetrations that exist in the wall between rooms 202 (communications room) and 245 (roof of battery 1A room).

SE

SUMMARY

The drawing will be revised to show the as-built location and seal material (grout) of the three penetrations. The fire area hazard analysis for fire area 1-15 in the FSAR will be revised to change the design l

features of penetrations from " sealed with silicone foam or Nelson j

fittings" to an all inclusive statement that reads " sealed to a 3-hour l

minimum fire rating."

l l

l 1

i

?

i c

i A1: Page 8 of 21 i

i 4

-r

d 1

-4 i

KITACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 i

SUBJECT:

PCN P-91-1-7482, "NSSS Retrofit Filter Replacement" DESCRIITION:

This PCN authorizes the option of using Ultipor GF Plus filter elements.

with particulate retention size down to 0.2 micron absolute in several NSSS filters.

SE

SUMMARY

The Ultipor GF Plus filters are designed as direct replacements for the currently used Cuno brand filters. Therefore, no modifications in plant systems are required. There are no unreviewed safety questions.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7530, "C-117118 Drawing Error" DESCRIITION:

This DCO PCN deletes a revision summary note from C-177118, FSAR figure 8.3-21.

SE

SUMMARY

The removed note stated the drawing was revised to reflect changes to be made to the plant. The changes have been implemented, making the l

note obsolete. Since no equipment changes are required as a result of this drawing change, plant safety is not affected.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7551, " Pressurizer Manual Spray Bypass Valves" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises the FSAR to show pressurizer spray valves Q1B13V055 & 01B13V059 closed and pressurizer spray valves PCV-444C & PCV-444D open to reflect the as-built condition.

SE

SUMMARY

This change is acceptable assuming the continuous spray flow functions are maintained consistent with the design basis requirement through the pressurizer spray valves in lieu of the manual spray bypass valves.

Neither the pressurizer spray valves nor the manual bypass valves are adversely affected by the new operational scheme, and the continuous l

spray flow function is not safety related.

A1: Page 9 of 21

4 ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7566, "SW Drawing Update" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN adds SW pumps small bore discharge piping and associated instrumentation to several plant documents.

SE

SUMMARY

These modifications will not impact the original design, seismic requirements, or safety function of the SW system. The operability of the SW pumps will not be compromised since no piping or instrumentation has been physically altered.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7572, "RMW Pump Recirculating Controller Sensing Line" DESCRIITION:

This DCO PCN incorporates the as-built condition for RMW pump recirculating pressure controller 01P12PC510.

SE

SUMMARY

The actual sensing line connection at the pressure controller is documented. No physical changes to the plant are required.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7576, "1B DG Air Start Pilot System Filtration" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN reviews and approves an air filter to be installed upstream of the air start solenoid valve and main air start valve pilot valve on each train of DG 1B.

SE

SUMMARY

Based on Coltec's approval of the filter installation; their conclusion of the seismic acceptability of the filter; the comparison of characteristics of the proposed filter and the existing air distributor filters (which have similar service conditions); the periodic inspection, cleaning, and replacement of the filter elements; and surveillance testing of the DG, these filters will not adversely affect the performance of the air start system and its ability to start the DG. Thus, the DG will not be adversely impacted by the addition of these filters.

A1: Page 10 of 21

I i

ATFACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 3

{

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7577, "Agastat Replacement Program" l

DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN documents the replacement of Agastat time delay relays which were replaced per PCN B-87-0-4384.

SE

SUMMARY

There are no physical changes to the plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.

~

l 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-1-7776, "SW MOV Drawing Update" l

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN adds TPNS numbers to SW supply to the auxiliary

[

building MOVs.

SE

SUMMARY

This PCN does not perform any modifications to existing plant equipment. The change will not impact the operation or relif ility of the MOVs to perform their intended function.

SUBJECF:

PCN S-91-1-7829, "1-2A DG Air Start Pilot System Filtration" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN reviews and approves an air filter to be installed upstream of

}

the air start solenoid valve and main air start valve pilot valve on each train of DG 1-2A.

SE

SUMMARY

Based on Coltec's approval of the filter installation; their conclusion of the seismic acceptability of the filter; the comparison of characteristics i

of the proposed filter and the existing air distributor filters (which have similar service conditions); the periodic inspection, cleaning, and i

replacement of the filter elements; and surveillance testing of the DG, these filters will not adversely affect the performance of the air start system and its ability to start the DG. Thus, the DG will not be adversely impacted by the addition of these filters.

f r

6 A1: Page 11 of 21

[

l V

F

i ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 f

s

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7835, "SBO - Containment Cooler Sequencing" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN adds selector switches on the MCB (one per train) that will allow the selection of one containment cooler per train that is to be sequenced onto the DGs when offsite power is not available (LOSP events). In the event of a SI when offsite power is available, this handswitch is bypassed and both containment coolers in each train receive start signals from the ESS loading sequencers. This design change is a required portion of the SBO effort. The reduction of some loads during LOSP events is necessanf to allow DG 2C to become the designated AAC source for FNP during SBO events.

SE

SUMMARY

The changes contained in this PCN will not degrade the required containment cooler availability. Also, these changes will decrease the loads on DGs 1-2A,1B, and IC in some of the design basis events. DG loads are tracked by DG loading calculation 42.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7837, "SBO - Load Shedding Of 600 V Imad Center 1J" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for load shedding breaker DJ01 during LOSP events. This design change is a required portion of the SBO effort.

The reduction of some loads during LOSP events is necessary to allow DG 2C to become the designated AAC source for FNP during SBO events.

SE

SUMMARY

The loads that are powered through DJ01 are the river water screen wash pump and MCC 1Y (river water pump auxiliaries). These two loads have no safety function during LOSP events since the river water system is no longer a safety system. These changes will constitute a i

change in the DG loading, which is tracked by the DG loading calculation 42.

j l

A1: Page 12 of 21 t

i i

1 1

1 ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

)

i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7841, "SBO - Motor Driven Fire Pump Auto Start Interlock" i

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to modify the motor driven fire pump control circuitry to prevent automatic starting of the pump when offsite power is not available.

SE

SUMMARY

The capability of the fire suppression systems for all events not involving an LOSP is unaffected by this PCN. For LOSP events, removing power from the motor driven fire pump via the LOSP sequencer will still leave both diesel fire pumps available for fire suppression. The diesel fire pumps are each 100% capacity pumps.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7843, "SBO - Imad Shedding Of Fire Pump House' DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides an automatic tripping signal to 600 V breaker ESO4 from the 4 KV bus 13 load shedding sequencer. This will prevent the fire pump house loads from being powered by DG 2C,1B, or 2B during LOSP events. This design change is a required portion of the SBO t

effort. The reduction of some loads during LOSP events is necessary to allow DG 2C to become the designated AAC source for FNP during SBO events.

SE

SUMMARY

The loads that are powered through breaker ESO4 are not required for safe shutdown. There is adequate fire suppression capability still available even with the shedding of the fire pump house loads during LOSP events.

i i

i A1: Page 13 of 21

4' ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-1-7867, "RCP IC Motor Lower Oil Level System Upgrade" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides an e-ngineering requisition to procure the RCP 1C motor upgrade package to eliminate aberrant lower oil level alarms, and provides the necessary interface design to implement the motor upgrade i

package.

SE

SUMMARY

Modification of the lower bearing oil pot will not detract from the ability of the oil pot to supply oil to the lower bearing during all plant conditions. The modified oil pot will retain structural integrity during all plant conditions. The aluminum inventory in the containment is reduced as a result of this change; therefore, the post-LOCA hydrogen generation is not increased. The modification will not affect any safety related equipment. The conclusions of the original seismic evaluation of the pump will not be altered.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-1-7927, " Restriction Of SW Flow To The Turbine Building" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN modifies the SW to the turbine building excess flow isolation system so the isolation valves go to a throttled position instead of remaining open upon indication of an LOSP.

SE

SUMMARY

On an LOSP signal, the isolation valves will go to a throttled position to provide adequate flow to the turbine building to support a c<mtrolled shutdown /cooldown while ensuring that sufficient backpressure exists in the main SW supply header to supply the DGs with cooling water. The isolation valves will perform the same safety related function as prior to the modification, i.e., the isolation valves will isolate on either a safety injection phase 'A' containment isolation signal or a turbine building excess flow signal. The additional throttled position logic is designed to the same safety-related criteria as the existing logic.

A1: Page 14 of 21

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

)

f 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-1-7976, " Circuit Schedule Revision"

)

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises plant documents to make them agree with the as-built condition by correcting a cable callout on panel 1G of the 1251 VDC distribution system.

SE

SUMMARY

This change will have not alter the function of the 125 VDC distribution system nor have an adverse impact on the overall original design of the 125 VDC distribution system. The revision does not affect the function of any safety related equipment.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-1-8128, " Containment Penetration Design That Facilitates Outage Activities" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN modifies two spare containment penetrations to accept a refueling module designed and fabricated by Westinghouse.

SE

SUMMARY

The double blind flange configuration for the penetration assemblies ensures there will be two barriers against radiation release when containment integrity is required. The modified penetration assemblies will be leak-rate tested to verify the leak-rate limits specified in technical specifications will continue to be met. The seismic integrity of the containment is not adversely affected by this modification.

I

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-1-8163, " Drawing Update For Containment Mini-Purge System" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN updates plant documents to show the as-built backdraft damper upstream of the containment mini-purge system supply fan.

SE

SUMMARY

This PCN does not represent a physical change to the plant.

A1: Page 15 of 21

4 ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-1-8235, "SW Return Line From DG 2B" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides the design to replace a portion of the 8 inch carbon l

steel SW return piping from DG 2B.with stainless steel piping to eliminate a reduced flow area. A vent and drain valve will be added in the stainless steel piping to facilitate the installation and the return to l

service.

SE

SUMMARY

The piping system will continue to meet ASME section III, Class 3 and FNP seismic requirements. The SW system, the existing piping and j

supports, and the related systems (i.e., DG) are not adversely effected.

i There is no impact on plant safety.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-1-8341, " Fuel Transfer System Shock Absorber Removal" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to remove the two shock absorbers on the fuel transfer system upender frame in containment.

SE

SUMMARY

The removal of the shock absorbers does not affect.the design or function of the fuel transfer system, or any other component important to safety. Any potential consequence due to the removal of the shock absorbers would be bounded by the existing fuel handling accident analyses.

A1: Page 16 of 21

,=

o ATTACIIMENT 1 - UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

ES 92-2364 (AP-20237), " Temporary Power To Load Centers 1A And i

IC During Refueling Outage 11" DESCRII'FION:

This change temporarily defeated the interlocks between breakers EA08

)

and EA09 to allow these breakers to be closed at the same time, thus providing temporary power to both the normal and emergency sections of load center 1A from load center ID for the duration of scheduled maintenance of 4.16 KV switchgear ID during the eleventh refueling outage, Modes 5 and 6.

In addition, this change also defeated the interlock between breakers EC08 and EC10 to allow these breakers to be closed at the same time, thus providing temporary power to both normal and emergency sections of load center IC from load center 1E for the duration of the scheduled maintenance of 4.16 KV switchgear IE during the eleventh refueling outage, Modes 5 and 6.

i SE

SUMMARY

Calculations show that the station service transformers 1D and IE are capable of handling the combined outage loads of load centers ID and i

1A, and 1E and 1C, respectively, and that short circuit and voltage drop values are within acceptable limits, with the exception of undervoltage at several non-safety related 208 V loads. Additionally, the relay settings for the supply breakers for load centers 1A and 1C (ED02, ED08, EE02, and EE07) provided sufficient margin to prevent the supply breakers from tripping under the anticipated loads during this temporary configuration.

l

?

i A1: Page 17 of 21 i

~

\\

A'ITACIIMENT 1 - UNIT 1

)

1 o'

SUBJECT:

ES 92-2422, 'Containn < Soler ID Reduction In Cooling Capacity" DESCRIPTION:

This change allows tb <,olation of a leaking coil section of the containment coolers fro.a the SW piping or the plugging of individual leaking tubes within the coils for one refueling cycle, after which the i

coil will be replaced.

SE

SUMMARY

There are four (4) containment coolers. Two of these coolers a.e

[

aligned to one train of SW and electric power and twc coolers aligned to the other train of SW and electric power. Given the attainable flow rates, the isolation of up to one containment cooler coil will not reduce the SW flow rate to the group of containment coolers below the 1600 gpm required by technical specifications. Additionally, the containment air temperature will be maintained within the limits during normal l

operation and adequate heat removal capacity will be available in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

9

SUBJECT:

FNP-1-AOP-9.0, Revision 7 DESCRIPTION:

This change provided a contingency plan to restore RCP seal cooling in c(mjunction with loss of both trains of SW and loss of both trains of CCW.

SE

SUMMARY

As part of the individual plant evaluation, the effects of a loss of RCP seal cooling were evaluated. This procedure revision addresses operator actions for accident conditions outside he scope of those analyzed by the FSAR (i.e., beyond design basis eve:as).

l i

i i

A1: Page 18 of 21

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 i

I t

SUBJEQ FNP-1-ETP-1042, Revision 0 DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this test was to verify that the mechanical stops in the actuators for the residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet valve still l

provide the required flow limitation. It also established a baseline so that future maintenance on the valves can be performed and the l

mechanical stops can be verified to be performing their function without j

requiring future flow tests.

l SE

SUMMARY

This test was conducted in a manner that ensured that both trains of shutdown cooling remained available to provide core cooling, and test-l termination criteria would result in shutdown of the charging pump t

being tested before damage to the pump occurred in the event that the criteria was reached.

i r

I SUBJEQ FNP-1-ETP-1043, Revision 0 (AP-18775) i DESCRIPTION:

Surveillance testing of DG IC is only performed on a single unit basis.

l As a result, DG IC is not tested with its worst case loading sequence in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.108. (DG IC is.

tested in accordance with the surveillance requirements in the technical l

specifications.) His change will ensure that DG 1C is tested in a r

configuration that demonstrates the ability to supply loads under the worst case situation.

i l

SE

SUMMARY

The proposed DG alignment during the subject test and temporary alterations does not affect the capability of the DG system to provide power to the emergency loads within the design time interval for any i

design basis event.

i j

i l

I A1: Page 19 of 21 l

i ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1

{

i

SUBJECT:

FNP-1-SOP-1.1, Temporary Change Notice 26B DESCRIPTION:

This change lowered the allowable pressure range for starting and stopping the RCPs from 400-450 psig to 325-375 psig. This reduction in pressure will increase the margin to the residual heat removal suction relief setpoint, as well as lessen the pressure stress imposed on components connected to the RCS.

SE

SUMMARY

This change is consistent with the NSSS vendor's recommendation provided in Westinghouse letter ALA-92-820. The change will reduce the operating pressure and thus decrease flow from a postulated LOCA and increase makeup flow availability. A 200 psi differential pressure l

will be maintained to ensure proper RCP seal operation.

I

SUBJECT:

FNP-1-SOP-4.0, Temporary Change Notice 17A DESCRIPTION:

This change provided a cross-connection between the unit 1 and unit 2 RMW systems to supply the unit 2 auxiliary building sump pumps during maintenance on the unit 2 RMWST.

I SE

SUMMARY

The RMW system is not taken credit for to mitigate the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Therefore, the potential loss of the RMW system would not impact the accident analysis for the plant.

i A1: Page 20 of 21 I

j i

ATTACHMENT 1 - UNIT 1 a

j

SUBJECT:

MD 92-2398, " Operate Main Purge Exhaust Fan With Dampers Open And With Main Purge supply Fan Off"

]

i DESCRIPTION:

This minor departure from design allowed the containment purge exhaust fan to be operated without also operating the containment main purge supply fan during reactor vessel head movement with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool and the equipment and personnel hatches open.

i SE

SUMMARY

There is no technical specification requirement for containment integrity during refueling with the reactor core unloaded. Additionally, the minor departure eliminated the potential for activity release from containment in the event of an activity increase during vessel head movement by creating a slightly negative pressure inside containment.

l

SUBJECT:

SNC SE, " Vantage-5 Fuel" 1

DESCRIPTION:

This change introduced the first region of Westinghouse Vantage-5 fuel and two new double encapsulated secondary sources.

SE

SUMMARY

The reload design was based on the Vantage-5 reanalysis of affected FSAR safety analyses and associated changes to the technical specifications. A list of key safety parameters was derived regarding the change and an analysis performed for those key safety parameters which exceeded their limiting value to ensure that the results and conclusions of the applicable safety analyses remained bounding. Addition of the

+

new double encapsulated secondary sources will provide additional i

margin against source material leakage and will not affect the safe operation of the plant.

l i

I A1: Page 21 of 21 i

f 5

i 1

t ATTACHMENT 2

?

10 CFR 50.59 REPORT'

~

UNIT 2 f

t 9

i l.

y t

+

t i

I I

h t

t

e ATI'ACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 1

i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-82-2-2326, " Pressure Vessel Head Closure System" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for reactor stud quick-connect adapters to be installed to reduce the time required to tension and detension the studs.

i SE

SUMMARY

This PCN is being voided and is not going to be implemented; however, the FSAR was updated to reflect the installation of the quick-connect adapters. The FSAR is to be updated to delete the quick-connect adapter information. The circuit and raceway documentation is changed to maintain accurate circuit and raceway schedules. These changes to the FSAR reflect the existing condition of the plant.

j f

SUBJECT:

PCN S-86-2-3501, " Carbon Monoxide Monitor Replacement" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to remove the existing carbon monoxide monitor in the auxiliary building and install a new analyzer at the common discharge header for the service air compressors in the turbine building.

j SE

SUMMARY

The function of the compressed air system, breathing air system, and I

carbon monoxide monitor will not be altered. Seismic II/I concerns have been evaluated and no effects exist.

t i

i l

A2: Page 1 of 2.0

~

3

)

i ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B-86-2-3679,'CRDM And DRPI Connector And Cable Upgrade"

?

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to upgrade existing equipment with new I

equipment that is less susceptible to wear during normal use, and to a

reduce the potential for plant trips due to loose connectors, j

SE

SUMMARY

Although the CRDM and DRPI systems are not safety related, technical specification limits to DRPI rod insertion must be maintained to validate accident analyses. Since the aluminum connectors will be r

replaced with stainless steel connectors, the resultant aluminum' inventory in containment will be reduced. There will be_no significant effect on the rate or total volume of hydrogen produced due to the j

corrosion of alummum.

l

?

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-86-2-3921, "SW Supply And Return To The Control Room i

Ventilation System" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for a unit 2 SW supply and return of the control room air conditioner condensers.

Currently SW for these condensers is only provided by unit 1. These modifications will establish j

a redundancy between unit 1 and unit 2.

1 i

SE

SUMMARY

The supply and return lines will be designed to meet ASME section III and seismic category 1 requirements. Manually operated valves are to i

be provided in all of the condenser SW lines in order to prevent cross-connection of the unit I and unit 2 auxiliary building SW loops if i

desired. All penetrations along the route of the new piping will be sealed to meet appropriate fire protection, pressure, watertight, and radiological requirements. Implementation of this PCN will enhance the control room HVAC system operational availability, and will not l

adversely impact its operation or the operation of any other system.

j i

1

)

i 1

A2: Page 2 of 20 4

)

.l

4 I

l ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 I

i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-87-2-4106, " Replacement'Of SW Piping" DESCRIPTION: This PCN provides design to replace existing SW carbon steel piping and valves for various coolers with stainless steel.

l SE

SUMMARY

- Replacement of carbon steel material with stainless steel material for i

piping and valves does not adversely impact the SW system's reliability or performance. System flow rates specified in the FSAR will be' maintained. The replacement piping and valves are qualified for the i

intended service in terms of pressure and temperature ratings. Piping to safety related coolers is seismically qualified.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-87-2-4132, " Charging Pump 2A Seal Modifications" l

t DESCRIPTION: This PCN provides design to eliminate the need for CCW cooling water to the seals as well as the mechanical seal heat exchanger and the external piping associated with the seals.

l i

SE

SUMMARY

These modifications are an enhancement to the charging pump. The simplified design improves pump reliability and availability. Thus, these modifications do not degrade the operation or safety performance of the charging pump.

i 1

i j

4 i

i i

I i

1 A2: Page 3 of 20

)

j ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT'2 l

SUBJECT:

PCN E-87-2-4504, *2B CCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Solenoid" a

DESCRIPTION:

A discrepancy in the solenoid operation mode shown on plant drawmgs led to an inaccurate exemption request against the requirements of Appendix R.

This PCN provides the revised documents which accurately reflect the function of solenoids that control CCW heat i

exchanger SW discharge valves, and deletes the inaccurate exemption.

i SE

SUMMARY

His PCN reflects as-built plant conditions and corrects an inaccurate exemption. This PCN will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire l

protection program at FNP.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-88-2-5246, " Removal Of Excess Flow Check Valves"

(

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for removing two excess flow check valves -

from the CVCS letdown line.

SE

SUMMARY

The removal of the excess flow check valves will have minimalimpact on letdown flowrates. The decrease in piping resistance is negligible compared to the total letdown line resistance. The letdown orifices provide the primary controlling pressure drop in the system. With the l

excess flow check valve removal, letdown flow will only increase by approximately 1 gpm. An evaluation for compartment pressurization, i

flooding, and environmental effects shows removal of the excess flow

)

check valves will not adversely impact any of the areas or safety related 1

equipment in those areas.

[

i 1

t r

i e

i.

A2: Page 4 of 20 i

ATI'ACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B-88-2-5260, "RTD Bypass Elimination In Containment" DESCRIPTION: This PCN provides design for the replacement of the RTD bypass manifolds with loop mounted RTDs.

j SE

SUMMARY

Implementation of the RTD bypass elimination during the eight refueling outage will have no adverse effect on the plant since it will be conducted during modes 5 and 6 when the RTD bypass system is not required. Since NRC approval of the project is required prior to entering mode 4, an item will be added to the return to service checklist I

which will preclude entering mode 4 without the required NRC approval.

NOTE: NRC approval of this modification was granted in Amendment l

85.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-2-5945, " Fire Protection For Low Voltage Transformers" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to rearrange the fire water supply lines for the low voltage switchyard deluge spray systems so that each of the unit auxiliary and start-up transformers are supplied by one dedicated deluge clapper valve instead of having a deluge clapper valve for the set of transformers. The new arrangement of piping also provides for one l

l deluge clapper valve to supply two phase transformers and one valve to supply both the third phase and spare main transformers.

l SE

SUMMARY

Allowing each unit auxiliary transformer and each start-up transformer j

a dedicated deluge clapper valve reduces the potential for the loss of all offsite power. The main power transformer four deluge spray systems are consolidate.d into two deluge spray systems, but this does not compromise the level of fire protection that previously existed.

i l

1 A2: Page 5 of 20 i

i

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-2-6194, " Control Room CO System Trouble Annunciation" 2

DESCRIITION:

This PCN provides design to install control room alarms to indicate-trouble conditions with the CO fire protection systems in the auxiliary 2

building and SW structures. The conditions monitored are control power available, thermostat circuit continuity, and certain relay or solenoid valve continuity.

SE

SUMMARY

There will be no adverse affects on seismic II/I criteria with the addition of the monitors. The addition of the trouble alarms for these CO systems will enhance the fire protection system and conform to 2

NFPA-72D,1975.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-2-6196, " Electrical Supervision Of Halon Systems" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides the design for installing a halon control panel capable of electrical supervision of the system actuation circuits, and will provide the control room annunciation of the fire suppression system'.

SE

SUMMARY

Implementation of the proposed modifications will bring the system into compliance with applicable codes, regulatory requirements, and licensing commitments. The modifications will not adversely impact any other FNP system or structure, nor degrade the capability of the FNP fire protection program to perform its intended function.

A2: Page 6 of 20

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B-89-2-6206," Room 2405 Detection And Suppression" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for a pre-action fire protection sprinkler system to be installed in the auxiliary building.

SE

SUMMARY

The system is to be designed per the requirements of NFPA 13, Ordinary Hazard Group 3, and will meet the criteria of seismic category I. A new system will be created from portions of existing detection systems, and will receive its water via an interface with the existing seismic category I fire protection water distribution system.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-89-2-6313, " Correction Of Duplicate TPNS Number" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises documentation to correct duplicate TPNS numbers and to denote normally closed vent and drain valves in the condensate and feedwater system located in the turbine building.

SE

SUMMARY

This PCN will not affect any equipment or operation of any equipment, so no adverse effects are possible This PCN does not affect the function of any safety related equipment.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-89-2-6333, ' Containment Cooling HVAC Duct Reroute" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to relocate HVAC duct inside containment to provide increased personnel access clearance.

SE

SUMMARY

The duct pressure drop calculation has shown that the duct modification does not affect the existing system design air flow. Combustible loading has been reduced; therefore, there is no adverse impact on the fire protection program.

A2: Page 7 of 20

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-2-6398, "TDAFW And MDAFW Pumps" DESCRIFFION:

This PCN documents the review and approval of vendor recommended physical and material changes to the AFW pump rotating assemblies.

SE

SUMMARY

The pump vendor has provided a justification for the part and material changes and has indicated that they are in accordance with those originally proposed. The vendor also stated that none of the changes to the rotating assembly impact the mechanical or structural form, fit, and function of the AFW pumps. The operation of the pump as described in the FSAR is unchanged.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-2-6634, " Regenerative Heat Exchanger Personnel Barrier" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for the installation of a permanent personnel wire mesh barrier around the regenerative heat exchanger area with lockable wire mesh doors.

SE

SUMMARY

This permanent barrier will allow for positive administrative control of the exclusion area. The barrier will not impact the operation of any plant system or structure.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-90-2-6960, "CW Chemical Feed System" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises related documents to show the CW chemical feed system completed by PCN P-90-2-6960.

SE

SUMMARY

The CW chemical feed system was designed and installed for the enhancement of the established CW corrosion and deposit control program. Based on the CW system being a non-safety related system and the PCN P-90-2-6960 safety evaluation, it is concluded that plant safety will not be affected by this change to the plant.

i A2: Page 8 of 20 t

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B90-2-7144, " Add A DC Load Profile Reference To 125 VDC Single Line Drawings" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN adds a note to alert design personnel to review load profile calculations and update load profile drawings when DC loads are added.

SE

SUMMARY

This change to figures in the FSAR does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7213, " Replacement Of SGFP Mini-Flow Piping With Erosion Resistant Materials" DESCRIPTION: This PCN provides design to replace portions of SGFPs 'A' and 'B' minimum flow piping with erosion resistant piping.

SE

SUMMARY

The sections of piping to be replaced are non-safety and non-seismic.

These changes have been evaluated, and will not adversely affect the original design function of the condensate and feedwater system.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7215, " Main Steam Drip Leg Drains" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to replace the existing carbon steel main steam drip leg drain piping and associated valves with stainless steel.

SE

SUMMARY

This change is being made to the non-safety related portion of the main steam system, and does not affect the safety related portions. Pipe size, routing, and design methods are unchanged. The piping will continue to meet the FNP stress requirements. The piping replacement will have no adverse effect on the system's function nor plant safety.

A2: Page 9 of 20

)

?

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 I

j i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7238, " Turbine Building Fire Protection Features" f

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises the fire rating for the walls and doors of the stairwells in the turbine building.

l SE

SUMMARY

These drawing changes show passive fire protection features. Existmg

-l acceptable conditions will be maintained with no adverse impact anticipated.

l j

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7253, "SW Dilution Bypass Valve Flow Limit Modification" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN increases the setpoint for the dilution bypass valves to open j

from 100 psig to 110 psig, and mechanically limits the disc travel in the open dire-ction to 30 degrees to prevent the valve from failing in the full open position.

t SE

SUMMARY

Raising the opening setpoint will prevent unnecessary loss of SW during normal operating conditions, and will ensure that no SW system components will have a steady state pressure in excess of its design l

rating. The amount of disc travel allowed has been calculated to ensure that the over pressurization protection function will not be impaired, while at the same time limiting the amount of water volume which can j

pass through the valve.

i i

I

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-2-7294, " Annunciators" i

1 DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN documents the as-built condition of the MCB and BOP annunciator panel windows to conform to CRDR requirements.

l SE

SUMMARY

This modification affects annunciator window labeling only.

l f

A2: Page 10 of 20 1

l

l i

i KITACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 i

i r

t SUflJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7405, "D-205003 Drawing Errors" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN revises the P&lD to reflect as-built instrumentation conditions.

r SE

SUMMARY

This PCN provides accurate design configuration to improve overall l

system reliability to reduce the possibility for error and confusion, t

enhancing planning and maintenance activities. No physical changes will occur to change the original design and purpose of the equipment configurations for normal system operation. These changes have no impact on the CCW or SW system bases.

j I

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7407, "D-200013 Drawing Errors" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN adds TPNS numbers to flow orifices and revises the interlock signals from DG SW isolation supply and return valves.

l SE

SUMMARY

These documentation changes will not impact the original design or seismic qualification of the SW system. The operability of the SW system will not be compromised. The operating conditions are not affected. These changes do not impact the function of any safety related equipment, and existing conditions are not altered. These -

l changes will eliminate discrepancies of the SW system drawings with as-i installed conditions.

j j

i i

A2: Page 11 of 20

y

(

i' ATFACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 i

t i

l 1

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7410, "SW Supply Header Temperature Indication" l

-t DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN updates plant documents to reflect as-built information.

Temperature loop power supply units and vendor documents associated with the power units are updated.

SE

SUMMARY

This update will increase document reliability and equipment traceability.

The function of the SW supply header temperature monitoring loops has not been modified. No physical modifications have been made to the plant.

j SUBJECF:

PCN S-91-2-7463, " Door Numbers On Drawings" i

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises related documents to properly identify and number the door between auxiliary building rooms 2601 and 2602.

i SE

SUMMARY

A non-fire rated door is installed in the non-fire rated wall which separates auxiliary building rooms 2601 and 2602. These rooms are in l

the same fire area, and the wall and door separating them are not required to be fire rated to meet Appendix R separation requirements.

i p

l

SUBJECT:

PCN P-91-2-7483, "NSSS Retrofit Filter Replacement" i

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN authorizes the option of using Ultipor GF Plus filter elements with particulate retention size down to 0.2 micron absolute in several l

NSSS filters.

t SE

SUMMARY

The Ultipor GF Plus filters are designed as direct replacements for the currently used Cuno brand filters. Therefore, no modifications in pla~nt systems are required. There are no unreviewed safety questions.

l i

i A2: Page 12 of 20

O A'ITACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-2-7552, " Pressurizer Manual Spray Bypass Valves" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises the FSAR to show pressurizer spray valves 02B13V055 & O2B13059 closed and pressurizer sprayvalves PCV-444C

& PCV-444D open to reflect the as-built condition.

SE

SUMMARY

This change is acceptable assuming the continuous spray flow functions are maintained consistent with the design basis requirement through the pressurizer spray valves in lieu of the manual spray bypass valves.

.l Neither the pressurizer spray valves nor the manual bypass valves are adversely affected by the new operational scheme, and the continuous spray flow function is not safety related.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-2-7574, "Modificati To Pressurizer Cavity Temperature l

Alarm Input" 1

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for new pressurizer compartment ambient j

temperature monitor sensors and channels.

It also adds the new channels to the temperature multipoint recorder and the plant computer.

SE

SUMMARY

The raceway design meets the voltage level classification criteria and demonstrates adherence to the raceway separation group classification i

criteria contained in the FSAR. The cable routing design meets the routing criteria and the requirements for Class 1E associated circuits included in the FSAR. Equipment and cable identification meets the I

criteria established in the FSAR. The support for the thermocouple meets seismic II/I support criteria; therefore, the support design complies with Regulatory Guide 1.29 criteria.

l I

A2: Page 13 of 20 l

l

i i

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 s

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-2-7688, ' Control Room Annunciators - Black Board Concept" l

1 DESCRIIrrION:

This PCN provides design for modifying the logic of several control room annunciator windows so the windows are clear during at-power l

operation.

I SE

SUMMARY

The raceway design meets the voltage level classification criteria and j

i demonstrates adherence to the raceway separation group classification criteria contained in the FSAR. The. cable routing design meets the routing criteria, and the requirements for Class 1E associated' circuits included in the FSAR. The raceway and cable design does not violate FSAR cable tray fill limits.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-2-7830, "2B DG Air Start Pilot System Filtration" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN reviews and approves an air filter to be installed upstream of the air start solenoid valve and main air start valve pilot valve on each train of DG 2B.

SE

SUMMARY

To ensure acceptable performance of these filters, they will be-inspected, cleaned, and replaced on a periodic basis. The filters are recommended by and provided by Coltec. Since this portion of the air start system is on-skid equipment, the design has been approved by Coltec. Coltec has also evaluated the mounting of the filters and determined that it is acceptable for the applicable seismic loads.

I l

A2: Page 14 of 20

b

)

ATI'ACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 h

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-2-7895, " Containment Penetration Design That Facilitates l

Outage Activities" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN modifies two spare containment penetrations to accept a refueling module designed and fabricated by Westinghouse.

i SE

SUMMARY

The double blind flange configuration for the penetration assembhes ensures there will be two barriers against radiation release when r

containment integrity is required. The modified penetration assemblies l

will be leak-rate tested to verify the leak-rate. limits specified in l

technical specifications will continue to be met. The seismic integrity of the containment is not adversely affected by this modification.

L

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-2-8112, " Removal Of Unit Auxiliary Transformer 2A From Service" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to allow unit auxiliary transformer 2A and associated relays to be removed from service during normal plant operation, and allow the transformer to be placed in service during maintenance of the startup transformers.

SE

SUMMARY

Unit auxiliary transformer 2A is connected to the generator bus and 7

remains energized during non-outage plant operation with no load.

t Removing it from service during normal plant operation will reduce the 1

possibility of unnecessary plant trips. This modification will not degrade l

the performance of the electric power system in providing power to systems required for safe operation of the plant.

i i

i 1

A2: Page 15 of 20

. 1 d

l

...a*.

a

l i

9 i

A'ITACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 i

i SUBJEU:

PCN S-92-2-8123, "RMWST Diaphragm Removal And Replacement" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN provides instructions to remove the existing RMWST diaphragm, specifications for a replacement diaphragm, and design for

{

installation of the replacement diaphragm.

SE

SUMMARY

The existing RMWST diaphragm cannot be replaced during the eighth refueling outage as planned because a replacement diaphragm cannot

~,

be procured in time. However, the existing diaphragm is in such poor condition that it should not remain in the RMWST. Therefore, the existing diaphragm is to be removed to ensure safe operation of the l

plant, and the replacement diaphragm will be installed when procured.

The diaphragm's purpose is to exclude oxygen from the make-up water.

Since FNP has the capability to refill the RMWST with demineralized l

water deoxygenated to less the 100 ppb, operation of unit 2 without the RMWST diaphragm installed for startup and power operation will not significantly affect the RCS water chemistry or the integrity of NSSS components. The potential for release of tritium to the environment as l

a result of the temporary removal of the diaphragm is insignificant and i

not considered a hazard to the safety and health of the public. Removal i

of the diaphragm will have no adverse impact on the seismic category f

I classification of the tank due to the insignificance of the mass of the diaphragm relative to the mass of the tank and the stored water.

l i

l

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-2-8160, " Obsolete Instrument Replacement" l

~

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises applicable plant documents to reflect the i

replacement of an obsolete, non-safety related pressure transmitter that

)

provides information for extraction steam to feedwater heater 6B.

j

)

SE

SUMMARY

The replacement transmitter exceeds the accuracy of the originally installed transmitter. This replacement will not adversely impact the function of the feedwater heater, and will have no adverse impact on any safety related systems or other components which could negatively impact plant safety.

A2: Page 16 of 20 l

v

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

PCN P-92-2-8340, " Disposable Demineralizer System: Addition Of Supplemental Pressurized Demineralizer System" l

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN is to install a vendor supplied supplemental pressurized.

demineralizer system in parallel with the existing atmospheric demineralizer system to provide greater flexibility in processing radwaste water generated during refueling outages and normal operations.-

SE

SUMMARY

No equipment important to safety is affected by this PCN. Some combustibles introduced in the auxiliary building are in containers that j

should provide adequate protection against an ignition source. The other combustibles do not pose a credible fire hazard, and their contribution to the area's maximum fire severity is insignificant. The i

use of rubber and plastic materials contrary to the FSAR commitment to meet Regulatory Guide 1.143 is acceptable because this commitment is considered to apply to permanent systems. Therefore, the use of rubber and plastic materials is acceptable based on Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-3, which is attached to Standard Review Plan 11.4.

I

SUBJECT:

MD 92-2375, " Disposable Demineralizer System Micro Filtration Addition" DESCRIPTION:

This change installed a filter skid to provide micro filtration of effluent

-i from the demineralizer beds of the disposable demineralizer system, and moved the discharge valve to provide positive isolation from the balance of the radwaste processing system.

SE SUMM ARY: This change to the ndwaste processing system does not impact the operation of any safety related equipment.

Compliance with the effluent release specifications is maintained.

t l'

l A2: Page 17 of 20 i-l'.

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 4

l J

SUBJECT:

MD 92-2378,

  • Disposable Demineralizer System addition Of Pressurized Vessel For Micro filtration" i

I DESCRIPTION:

This change added a pressurized demineralizer vessel to the existing disposable demineralizer system to provide micro filtration capability.

The vessel is similarly bounded by leak protection, shielding, etc., as is provided for the existing vessels.

i SE

SUMMARY

The addition of the pressurized demineralizer vessel is consistent with the design of the disposable demineralizer system and does not impact the accident analysis for the plant. Compliance with the effluent release specifications is maintained.

i

SUBJECT:

ES 91-2177 (AP-19694)

DESCRIPTION: This change temporarily defeated the interlocks between breakers EA08 and EA09 to allow these breakers to be closed at the same time, thus providing temporary power to both the normal and emergency sections of load center 2A from load center 2D for the duration of scheduled maintenance of 4.16 KV switchgear 2D during the eighth refueling outage, Modes 5 and 6. In addition, this change also defeated the interlock between breakers ECOS and EC10 to allow these breakers to be closed at the same time, thus providing temporary power to both normal and emergency sections of load center 2C from load center 2E for the duration of the scheduled maintenance of 4.16 KV switchgear 2E during the eighth refueling outage, Modes 5 and 6.

j SE

SUMMARY

Calculations show that the station service transformers 2D and 2E are capable of handling the combined outage loads of load centers 2D and 2A, and 2E and 2C, respectively, and that short circuit and voltage drop values are within acceptable limits, with the exception of undervoltage at several non-safety related 208 V loads. Additionally, the relay settings for the supply breakers for load centers 2A and 2C (ED02, ED08, EE02, and EE07) provided sufficient margin to prevent the supply breakers from tripping under the anticipated loads during this temporary configuration.

i A2: Page 18 of 20 I

ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

FNP-2-AOP-9.0, Revision 6 DESCRIPTION:

This change provided a contingency plan to restore RCP seal cooling in conjunction with loss of both trains of SW and loss of both trains of CCW.

SE

SUMMARY

As part of the individual plant evaluation, the effects of a loss of RCP seal cooling were evaluated. This procedure revision addresses operator actions for accident conditions outside the scope of those analyzed by the FSAR (i.e., beyond design basis events).

SUBJECT:

FNP-2-ETP-1042, Revision 0 DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this test was to verify that the mechanical stops in the actuators for the residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet valve still provide the required flow limitation. It also established a baseline so that future maintenance on the valves can be performed and the mechanical stops can be verified to be performing their function without requiring future flow tests.

SE

SUMMARY

This test was conducted in a manner that ensured that both trains of shutdown cooling remained available to provide core cooling, and test tenaination criteria would result in shutdown of the charging pump being tested before damage to the pump occurred in the event that the criteria was reached.

A2: Page 19 of 20

ATI'ACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2

SUBJECT:

FNP-2-SOP-54.0, Temporary Change Notice 12B DESCRIPTION:

This temporary change was required to allow silica removal from the RWST during refueling with the reactor defueled.

In order to accomplish the silica removal, a hose was routed to temporary demineralizer, filtration, and reverse osmosis equipment located in the solidification and dewatering facility.

i T

SE

SUMMARY

In the defueled condition, the technical specifications for the RWST are not applicable.

During the silica cleanup process, all effected equipment was isolated from the spent fuel pool cooling system, thus ensuring there was no impact on the spent fuel equipment. A hose within a hose arrangement was used to ensure adequate protection against a spill of radioactive material to the environment. Prior to entering a mode of operation for which RWST operability was required, the boron concentration was verified to be within the limits specified in technical specifications.

SUBJECT:

SNC SE, " Vantage-5 Fuel" DESCRIPTION:

This change introduced the first region of Westinghouse Vantage-5 fuel.

SE

SUMMARY

The reload design was based on the Vantage-5 reanalysis of affected FSAR safety analyses and associated changes to technical specifications.

A list of key safety parameters was derived regarding the change and an analysis performed for those key safety parameters which exceeded their limiting value to ensure that the results and conclusions of the applicable safety analyses remained bounding.

t A2: Page 20 of 20

__________-____-__--__________--__j

e A

4

_1 1

L 6

h i

- 6 ATTACHMENT 3 i

10 CFR 50.59 REPORT a

SHARED I

i

- 1 l

. j

-i l

_ 1 l

i l

i 4

. i o

I I

=

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

PCN S-83-0-2361, " Turbine Building Law Pressure CO System" 2

DESCRWTION:

This PCN provides isolation valves in the 13 ton low pressure CO 2

system so portions of the system may be isolated.

SE

SUMMARY

The FSAR will be changed to show that low pressure CO system 2A-2 50, which protects 600 V load center 2M, does not comply with the CO2 concentration requirements of NFPA 12 (i.e.,2A-50 reached 30% vice the required 50%). The system does not have to exist in order to meet i

the requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 or Appendix R. Leaving system 2A-50 in service will benefit the FNP fire protection program because the - heat detectors will actuate the suppression agent and provide local and remote (control room) warning of a fire within the load center. Also, the CO concentration provided j

2 hy system 2A-50 will serve to retard a fire's progress even though it may

)

not extinguish it, thus providing additional time for fire brigade response.

5..........................................................

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-90-0-6467, " Valve Manual / Packing Improvement Program" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN introduces a comprehensive valve stem packing program that provides for the evaluation, documentation, and control i

of alternate valve packing configurations. A valve packing manual was developed that provides the engineering data required to initiate configuration changes for specific valves as requested by the plant staff.

A valve index is maintained to cross reference each valve TPNS to' an appropriate data sheet. The new packing design allows for replacement of existing packing, where required, with packing of graphite composition, and will reduce the packing height with a carbon spacer.

SE

SUMMARY

The alternate packing process uses graphite or graphitic material as endorsed by EPRI, and that has been previously evaluated an approved for use at FNP under three ESs. Any packing materials used will meet or exceed the minimum chemical / mechanical properties as given in the ESs.

A3: Page 1 of 16

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-0-6485, "SW For Control Room Air Conditioners Air Operated Valves" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design for compressed nitrogen systems which will be used as back-up for instrument air required for SW flow control valves in control room air conditioner units.

SE

SUMMARY

After a loss of instrument air, the instrument air system is isolated and the nitrogen gas cylinders are manually placed in operation by opening isolation valves. They normally operate independently, but may be cross connected to change cylinders without shutting down air conditioning.

In any configuration, the air conditioner SW flow control valves will operate without instrument air.

SUBJECT:

PCN 3-90-0-6486, " Computerized RCA ACS" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides the design necessary to install the ACS equipment and the associated raceways and cables to allow automatic entry of data when entering and exiting the RCA, thereby eliminating the manual processing of paperwork.

SE

SUMMARY

The ACS will require the addition of combustible materials (exposed cables) to the FNP fire protection program. Although the cables have not been certified to the requirements of the IEEE 383 flame test required in FSAR section 9B.4.1.3.1, combustible load calculation E-91 shows that the addition of the cables does not increase the fire severity for the applicable fire areas.

A3: Page 2 of 16

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

)

i I

SUBJECT:

PCN S-90-0-6767, " Wind Speed Instrumentation Upgrade" f

t i

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides design to replace the wind speed instrumentation at l

the 150 foot level of the plant meteorological tower.

l SE

SUMMARY

The existing wind speed instrumentation can measure speeds up to 100 j

mph. The plant is designed for wind speeds greater than 100 mph. The new instrumentation will have the same function as the old, and will monitor wind speed from 0 mph to 150 mph.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-90-0-7068," Relocation Of Unit 1 Imads From Shared MCC IP" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides the design for relocating unit 1 train B loads from l

MCC IP to MCC 1T. This modification will maintain the separation of unit 1 loads from unit 2.

Also included is the design for sparing l

breakers on 600 V distribution panel 1Z and 120/208 V distribution par.el 1 AA.

i SE

SUMMARY

The load added to diesel generator IB will not cause diesel loadmg to q

exceed its continuous rating. Most of the equipment powered by panels 1

1Z and 1AA is no longer used by chemistry, and the operating equipment is no longer needed. Therefore, several breakers on 1Z and j

1AA are being spared.

t j

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-0-7292, "Well Water Storage And Supply System -

Discrepancies Noted On The P&ID" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN revises the P&ID to reflect as-built conditions.

l l

SE

SUMMARY

The as-built conditions have been reviewed, and are acceptable.

Reflecting as-built conditions on the P&ID will enhance operation of the well water storage and supply system.

l l

i

)

A3: Page 3 of 16

{

i

1 i

e V

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED j

l i

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-0-7522, " Buried Pipe Missile Protection" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN revises FSAR references to minimum soil coverage for missile protection of safety related piping from 8 feet to 3 feet 10 inches.

SE

SUMMARY

Methodology based on the modified Petry formula is presented in FSAR Section 3.5.4 to determine the parameters of a barrier to resist l

missile penetration. Using this methodology and FSAR Section 3.3.2, l

which defines the credible missiles for outside components, a depth of 3 feet 10 inches is sufficient to provide the degree of protection required. Research of earlier design shows that the 8 feet of soil was based on a non-credible missile for buried piping.

l

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-0-7603, "DG Air Start P&ID Update" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN shows an air filter installed between the main starting air valve and the distributor, and shows the correct orientation of the symbol for the air start system strainers for DGs 1-2A,1B, and 2B.

l SE

SUMMARY

The filter and strainer are shown in the vendor's manual.

The

~

installation of the filter and strainer has been verified by field walkdown. This change only reflects the as-built, vendor approved l

configuration. There is no physical change to the DGs or their support l

systems. Therefore, there is no impact on the safetv related function of the DGs.

i i

a f

I l

d l

A3: Page 4 of 16 T

l

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED j

i i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-0-7614, 'FSAR Update On Calculation E-42, Revision 4" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN updates FSAR tables on DG loading due to the addition of transformer losses and consolidation of miscellaneous loads.

SE

SUMMARY

These changes are within the maximum DG loading values as committed in the FSAR. The calculated load changes do not affect the alignment of DGs nor their capability to provide power to the emergency loads within the design time interval for any design basis event.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-0-7626," Revised Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN updates the FSAR to reflect the revised ultimate heat l

sink evaluation.

SE

SUMMARY

This updated ultimate heat sink analysis is consistent with the l

requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink For Nuclear Power Plants," and addresses the concerns identified during the l

SW SSSA with respect to their combined effect on the calculated peak pond temperature and availability of cooling water.

E f

5 i

i 1

i A3: Page 5 of 16 4

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

PCN S-91-0-7659, " Diesel Generator Air Start System Dryer Removal And Spool Piece Installation" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN provides approval to remove the corroded and leaking "B" air dryers /aftercoolers on diesel generators 1-2A and IC, and replace the air drjers/aftercoolers with a length of % inch stainless steel piping on a temporary basis until replacement air dryers /aftercoolers are received i

and installed.

SE

SUMMARY

Administrative controls will be established on how long the diesel generator 1-2A and 1C "B" air compressors can be used to recharge a receiver without an air dryer /aftercooler. This time period is based on engineering judgement that operation will not result in the production of a significant amount of additional corrosion products, and therefore will not degrade the performance of the air start system. The stainless steel spool piece will meet the design requirements of existing air start system piping.

E

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-0-7824, " Battery Load Profile In The FSAR" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN accomplishes the following: (1) Revises the FSAR to include the latest load profile for safety related auxiliary building batteries 1A,1B,2A, and 2B; (2) revises inquiry specification SS-1102-58 to include the new battery capability load profile, the maximum battery room temperature, and the minimum battery electrolyte temperature; and (3) revises the safety evaluation provided in Bechtel letter AP-18767 to clarify the values used for the existing load profiles.

SE

SUMMARY

Bechtel electrical calculation E-95, revision 3, determined the as-built de load on auxiliary building safety related station batteries 1A,1B,2A, and 2B, and determined the maximum load profile capabilities of the existing batteries based on the sizing methodology of IEEE 485-1983.

A review of the capability of the auxiliary building batteries to the existing as-built load for each battery provided assurance that the battery capability exceeds the as-built load profile.

A3: Page 6 of 16

?

e

?

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED I

SUBJECT:

PCN B-91-0-7859, 'Part Number Change For Charging Pump Breaker Imckout Relay" t

DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN approves ABB relay 1961640 as a replacement relay for Westinghouse relay 289B473A22 in applications where the equipment is to be supplied to comply with SS-1101-38 (4 KV switchgear).

SE

SUMMARY

The replacement relays will perform the same functions and have the same operating characteristics, operating mode, and voltage, as the original relays. All replacement relays are seismically approved for the installed location at FNP.

t

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-7900, "Replu ment Foxboro Flow Totalizer" DESCRIPTICN:

This PCN provides design for the replacement of the obsolete waste f

monitor tank discharge flow integrator.

i SE

SUMMARY

The flow loop remains functionally unchanged by this modification. The replacement integrator / counter is functionally equal to the equipment which it is replacing. Based on the vendors's recommendation, the replacement equipment will provide reliability at least equal to that of the existing equipment.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-0-7963, ' Replacement Instrument Air Dryer Drain Valve" DESCRIPTION:

This PCN evaluates and approves replacement automatic drain valves for the instrument air system.

SE

SUMMARY

The instrument air system is not safety related. The valve being replaced is non-safety and non-seismic. Replacing the original valve with Pneumatic Products Corporation model numbers PDV-100 or i

PDV-400 will not adversely affect the design function of the original l

valve or the system.

A3: Page 7 of 16-

i ATFACHMENT 3 - SHARED o

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-7964, "Agastat Relay Coating Material And Part Number i

Changes" i

DESCRIPTION:

This PCN gives approval to use E7000 series Agastat relays with configuration code 004 in addition to E7000 series with configuration codes 001,002, and 003 (previously approved by a PCN).

SE

SUMMARY

Configuration codes 001, 002, 003, and 004 Agastat relays are interchangeable and have the same functional and operational characteristics.

These configuration codes have been seismically l

qualified for Class 1E applications. These configuration codes do not 7

change the functions, logic, or failure modes of any control or actuation l

circuit.

t

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-0-8061, "SWIS Penetrations" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN provides a fire protection evaluation of the walls between the SWIS East and West Stairwells and their adjacent switchgear rooms. The floor areas and combustible loadings of the SWIS stairwells are incorporated into the fire hazard analyses of their adjacent fire zones.

SE

SUMMARY

The SWIS stairwells do not contain equipment important to safety, nor do their contents pose any danger to material or equipment in adjacent rooms. Because of the very low combustible loading of the stairwells along with the additional floor area, the combustible loading and fire severity of the enlarged adjacent fire zones will be less than the original zones. The revision of the two adjacent fire zones will not adversely impact any FNP system or structure, Appendix R safe shutdown capability, or the plant's fire protection program.

P t

i A3: Page 8 of 16 i

t t

l ATI'ACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-8099, "FSAR Update For 125 VDC Batteries" t

DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN revises the FSAR to accurately reflect the design basis I

for the auxiliary building battery sizing based on the battery voltage during the first minute after initiation of a postulated LOSP+LOCA event.

SE

SUMMARY

The updated calculations confirm that adequate voltage is available to all safety related components under design basis accident conditions i

until AC power is restored. Calculations demonstrate that unit 1 l

batteries are capable of supplying accident loads for two hours without l

charger support and unit 2 batteries are capable of supplying accident i

loads for one hour without charger support. Also, a calculation was performed to document that the batteries are capable of supplying 3

normal operating loads for a period of two hours without charger support. This revision does not involve a change to any operational mode of equipment required for safe shutdown.

i i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-8107, "MSVR Herculite Covering" DESCRIPTION:

This DCO PCN provides a combustible load review and justification for l

a herculite cover placed on the exterior of the MSVR during winter for i

freeze protection of critical instrumentation.

SE

SUMMARY

FSAR, Appendix 9B, Attachment A, for fire areas (rooms) 1-6 (241) and 2-6 (2241) is being revised to include the addition of the plastic i

cover and the wood wedges as additional combustible loading for the MSVRs. The plastic cover will be specified to be a flame retardant polyethylene or similar material in both Appendix 3K and Appendix 9B.

l Due to hazardous combustible by-products of polyvinyl chloride, the option of using a polyvinyl chloride covering will be deleted from l

Appendix 3K.

i A3: Page 9 of 16 t

e

e i

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED I

j i

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-8134, *RMW Cross-Connect" DESCRIFFION: This PCN provides design details for installation of a 3-inch Class HCC pipe cross-connection between units 1 and 2 RMW systems. The cross-connection will enable the unit 1 RMW system to supply unit 2 RMW systems when the unit 2 RMWST or pumps are inoperable (e.g., during the RMWST diaphragm replacement), and vice versa.

SE

SUMMARY

This cross-connection piping syster designed per ASME Section III, Class 3 (pipe Class HCC) requirements and is seismically qualified.

1 t

The stresses in the new piping and pipe supports and in the existing piping and pipe supports affected by the cross-connection addition are within code allovrable. The new fire barrier penetration created by this i

PCN is sealed with foam in accordance with the requirements of specification SS-1102-132 and the FNP fire protection program.

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-0-8209, "FSAR Section 8.2.1.2 (Page 8.2-2) Clarification" DESCRIPTION: This DCO PCN revises the FSAR to clarify the 230 KV oil-static cable ampacity and temperature.

SE

SUMMARY

Okonite (cable supplier) used a computer program based on an industry recognized paper published by AIEE to recalculate the capacity of the existing cable. This ree!culation was based on as-built data and reasonable assumptions for soil resistivity and temperature.

+

i A3: Page 10 of 16 j

1 i

4

]

l l

t ATTACHMENT.; - SHARED l

SUBJECT:

PCN S-92-0-8307, " Diesel Generator Air Start P&ID Update" DESCRWFION:

This DCO PCN revises diesel generators 1C and 2C air start P& ids and corresponding ISI boundary diagrams to reflect the correct position (closedi of the air header cross-connect valves ard system vent and drain valves.

SE

SUMMARY

The as-designed and correct position for these valves is normally closed, as specified by the system operating procedure. The valves are normally closed to assure isolation between the two independent air start headers.

Although this design parameter has remained unchanged since original design of the system, the P& ids have not reflected the correct valve position. These drawing changes do not involve any physical changes to the diesel air start systems, are consistent with the as-designed condition, and will have no adverse effect on system function or plant safety.

SUBJECT:

PCN B-92-0-8419, *RHR/LHSI Pumps Available NPSH During Recirculation" DESCRIPTION:

RHR system tests have shown that pump run-out conditions are different than those in the FSAR. This DCO PCN provides the Westinghouse evaluation of the change in the RHR system NPSH and run-out conditions for units 1 and 2, and determine if the change in NPSH and run-out condition involves an unreviewed safety question.

SE

SUMMARY

The evaluation of the change in RHR/LHSI pump operating conditions concludes that the pumps will have adequate NPSH available for acceptable operation at flow rates less than or equal to 4300 gpm.

Based on this finding, the modification of the NPSH and run-out conditions will not result in a potential unreviewed safety question.

A3: Page 11 of 16

4 j

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

ES 91-2167, Revision 2 DESCRIPTION:

This change allows the temporary installation of a Tri-Nuclear Model UF-600 or UFV-250 filter in the SFP to assist in maintaining optical clarity.

SE

SUMMARY

The addition of a temporary filter to the SFP has been evaluated and determined to be bounded by the fuel handling accident analysis presented in chapter 15 of the FSAR. In addition, precautions have been taken to ensure that the presence of the filter unit in the SFP will i

not interfere with the SFP cooling system and the ability to remove i

decay heat.

t

...................................n c

SUBJECT:

ES 92-2252, Revision 0 DESCRIPTION:

This change allows the use of the HIS methodology for AFW pump testing. This standard allows the use of pump affinity laws to adjust test data obtained at speeds below the rated speed as opposed to the plus l

or minus 3% of rated speed specified by ASME PTC 8.2 and referenced in FSAR paragraph 6.5.

r SE

SUMMARY

An industry pump expert provided confirmation that testing of the AFW pumps at a reduced speed and application of the pump affinity laws to

~

convert the results to the rated speed can be used with accurate results.

l Therefore, verification of the pump performance based on flow and head test data obtained (and corrected) from a reduced speed test is considered valid.

l t

A3: Page 12 of 16 I

NITACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-CCP-24, Revision 9 DESCRIPTION:

This evaluation is the result of a procedure change associated with the testing of liquid tritium samples. Before this change all liquid tritium -

samples had to be purified prior to analysis. Due to improvements to analysis equipment, impurities in samples can be detected prior to l

tritium analysis; thus making purification of the samples unnecessary except for those ider*ified as containing impurities.

SE

SUMMARY

An investigation performed by FNP and Beckman Instruments i

Corporation, documented in CIR # 0-89-028, determined that differences in sample results between straight, filtered, and distilled i

samples are not significant. This investigation included each 'of the

-j standard effluent types at FNP.

T I

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-ETP-2095, Revision 0 (ES 91-2088, Revision 6)

DESCRIPTION:

This evaluation was performed for the inspection and testing of the l

lightning protection and plant ground system. The test was performed by applying approximately 35 volts and a test current of up to 300 amps across the test points of the ground grid for a short duration and determining the magnitude and paths of the injected current.

SE

SUMMARY

The lightning protection system and the plant ground grid are non-safety related systems that are designed for a significantly higher current than l'

used for the test. Precautions were taken to ensure that the test would not impact operation of the plant or any equipment required for safety.

i k

l i

A3: Page 13 of 16 l

l i

i l

A'ITACHMENT 3 - SHARED i

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-ETP-3024, Revision 0 q

DESCRII'FION:

This change installed a temporary RWST SRS. Design conservatism I

included double wall protection and local isolation valves to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment via this system.

SE

SUMMARY

The addition of the SRS has been evaluated and determined to provide adequate protection against a radiological release due to postulated line break.

In addition, the system will not impact the RWST safety function. The RWST level and baron concentration will be maintained within the limits specified in the technical specifications.

i

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-PMP-506, Revision 16

[

DESCRIPTION:

This change deletes PGS responsibility for providing quality control inspections.

SE

SUMMARY

This change is administrative in nature. Quality control inspections will 3

be performed under the direction of the PMD Manager in the future as opposed to PGS. Accordingly, this change will not negatively impact the design or operation of the plant.

i

SUBJECT:

FSARC 91-24 j

DESCRIPTION:

This change revised FSAR Figure 9.4-7, a preliminary drawing of D175031 and D205031, to reflect the current revision of D175031 and D205031.

SE

SUMMARY

Figure 9.4-7 of the FSAR is a P&ID of the turbine building chilled and

]

hot water systems. These systems are not relied on by any safety related i

system, structure, or component, and do not perform a safety related j

function.

1 A3: Page 14 of 16 l

j

r NITACHMENT 3 - SHARED f

SUBJECT:

FSARC 92-06 DESCRIPTION:

This change deleted references to FNP Procedures GO.NG-03, " Master t

Bid List Input," and GO-NG-09, " Administrative Control of Plant Services Approved Suppliers List," from Section 17.2 of the FSAR.

SE

SUMMARY

The Master Bid List and Plant Services Approved Suppliers List are being managed and controlled by other areas within Southern Nuclear.

Qualified suppliers and approved bidders must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B as appropriate, and these requirements i

remain unchanged.

i

SUBJECT:

SNC SE, " Unescorted Access Authorization" DESCRIPTION:

This change deletes procedure GO-NG-28 associated with unescorted l

access authorization and removes the reference to GO-NG-28 from Section 17.2.19.2 of the FNP FSAR.

j SE

SUMMARY

The responsibility for this function has been reassigned to Southern Nuclear Corporate Security and is no longer performed by the plant.'

l Although a change to the OOAPM is required to incorporate the proper reference, the change does not reduce the commitments in the program description previously accepted by the NRC. In addition, this change does not adversely impact the safeguards effectiveness or integrity of the FNP Security Program.

l 1

i i

e i

I i

A3: Page 15 of 16 t

i i

i l

'1 1

ATTACHMENT 3 - SHARED

SUBJECT:

Westinghouse SE 91-289, Revision 1 DESCRIPTION:

This change to the Westinghouse ECCS evaluation model was required in order to meet the Westinghouse commitment to the NRC to maintain consistency between future LOCA fuel rod computer models and the i

fuel rod design computer models used to predict fuel rod normal operation performance.

SE

SUMMARY

The effects of this change have been documented in Attachment 3 to letter ALA-91-704. A PCT assessment of 10 F has been applied to both FNP units 1 and 2.

The resulting licensing basis large break j

LOCA PCT plus margin allocation for units 1 and 2 remain below the l

2200 F regulatory limit. Therefore, it can be concluded that margin i

allocation to account for this issue does not cause a violation of the PCT acceptance criteria.

l i

l

SUBJECT:

Westinghouse SE 93-036, Revision 1 DESCRIPTION:

Permanent assessment of PCT margin has resulted from an investigation of one issue affecting the large break LOCA analysis (structural metal i

heat modelling) and one issue affecting the small break LOCA (bessel j

function error).

SE

SUMMARY

The margin assessments to account for these issues do not cause the predicted PCF to exceed the 2200 F regulatory limit, and therefore, the assessment does not create an unreviewed safety question.

i A3: Page 16 of 16

Q$

i

?

s t

l i

i

~!

ATTACHMENT 4

^

10 CFR 50.59 REPORT L

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS j

3 i

h e

.i i

i l

)

?

'I l

l 1

4 l

cr ~

, 4. -

  • ATTACHMENT 4 - ABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATION-MEANING AAC Alternate Alternating Current' ACS Access Control System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AIEE American Institute of Electrical Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers B-Prefix for a Bechtel Production Change Notice B-N Bentley-Nevada BOP Balance of Plant CCP Chemical Control Procedure CCW Component Cooling Water CIR Chemistry Incident Report CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CRDR Control Room Design Review CVCS Chemical and volume Control System CW Circulating Water DC0 Drawing Change Only DG Diesel Generator DRPI Digital Rod Position Indicator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ES Engineering Study ETP Engineering Test Procedure FNP Farley Nuclear Plant A4: Page 1 of 4

y'

_q ATTACHMENT 4 - ABBREVIATIONS i

ABBREVIATION MEANING i

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FSARC Final Safety Analysis Report Change l

GO-NG General Office - Nuclear Generation j

GPM Gallons Per Minute j

HHSI High Head Safety Injection HIS Hydraulic Institute Standards t

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISI Inservice Inspection LHSI Low Head Safety Injection LOCA Loss of Cooling Accident LOSP.

Loss of Off Site Power j

MCB Main Control Board r

MCC Motor Control Center i

MD Minor Departure MDAFW Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater MOV Motor Operated Valve MSVR Main Steam Valve Room NFPA National Fire Protection Association i

i NPSH Net Positive Suction Head t

NRC

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission f

i NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System P-Prefix for a Farley Nuclear Plant Production Change Notice A4: Page 2 of 4 i

l

p

=

a o..

j i

l ATTACHMENT 4 - ABBREVIATIONS 1

ABBREVIATION MEANING P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing i

PCN Production Change Notice PCT Peak Cladding Temperature i

PCV Piessure Control Valve PGS Power Generation Services PMD Plant Modifications Department I

PMP Preventative Maintenance Procedure PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PPB Parts Per Billion PTC Performance Test Code i

RCA Radiation Control Area RCS Reactor Coolant System RCP Reactor Coolant Pump

~

RHR Residual Heat Removal RMW' Reactor Makeup Water RMWST Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank RTD Resistance Temperature Detection j

RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank S-Prefix for a Southern Company Production Change Notice l

SB0 Station Blackout SE Safety Evaluation i

SFP Spent Fuel Pool SG Steam Generator l

A4: Page 3 of 4 I

I

r~

i L,'

ATTACHMENT 4 - ABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATION MEANING 1

SGFP Steam Generator Feed Pump SI Safety Injection SNC Southern Nuclear Operating Company SRS Silica Removal System SSSA Self-Initiated Safety System Assessment SW Service Water SWIS Service Water Intake Structure TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TPNS Total Plant Numbering System i

A4: Page 4 of 4

)