ML20005A664
| ML20005A664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Architzel R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005A657 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-81-09, 50-317-81-9, 50-318-81-09, 50-318-81-9, NUDOCS 8106300567 | |
| Download: ML20005A664 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000317/1981009
Text
Document Identification Numbers on n:xt page.
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Region I
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50-317/ 81- 09
Report No.
50-318/ 81- 09
50-317
Docket No.
50-318
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License No. OPR-69
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Comoany
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland
Inspection Conducted:
Aoril 6 .May 3 ,1981
Inspectors: [
h'
M
R. E. Architzel, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector
date signed
cate signed
date signed
Approved By:
9iMAh
G l 5d El
E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects
cate signed
Section 2B,
Inspection Summary:
Insoection on Apri16-May3,1981 (Ccmbined Recort Nos. 50-317/81- 09 and 50-318/81- 09)
Areas Inscected:
Routine, onsite regular and cacksnif t inspection by the resident
inspector (17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />, Unit 1; 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, Unit 2). Areas inspected included the control
rocm and the accessible portions of the auxiliary, turbine, service, and intake
buildings; radiation protection; physical security; fire protection; plant operating
records; surveillance testing; maintenance; licensee actian on previous inspection
findings and reports to the NRC.
Noncompliances: Two. Failure to adequately calibrate seismic monitorin
instrumentation (paragraph 8), Inadvertant release of caustic and acid (gparagraph 7).
8106300$4y
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DCS Nos.
50317-81-04-23
50318-81-04-19
50317-80-05-20
50318-81-04-12
50317-81-04-05
50318-81-03-03
50317-81-04-08
50318-81-03-19
50317-81-03-09
50318-81-03-17
50317-81-03-11
50318-81-04-14
50317-81-03-20
5031 .81-04-02
50317-81-03-24
50317-81-03-17
50317-81-04-04
50317-81-04-01
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OETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
The following technical and supervisory level personnel were contacted:
E.R.
Bauer, Modifications Supervisor
0.E.
Buffington, Fire Protection Inspector
J.T.
Carroll, General Supervisor, Operations
>
S.M.
Davis, Senior Engineer, Operations
R.E.
Denton, General Supervisor, Training / Technical Services
C.L.
Dunkerly, Shift Supervisor
W.S.
Gibson, General ' Supervisor, Electrical & Controls
J.E.
Gilbert, Shift Supervisor
R.P.
Heibel, Principal Engineer, Technical Support
J.R.
Hill, Shift Supervisor
L.S.
Hinkle, Supervisor, Instrument Maintenance
J.F.
Lohr, Shi f t Supervisor
R.0.
Mathews, Assistant General Supervisor, Nuclear Security
J.A.
Mihalick, Senior Engineer,-Fuel Management
N.L.
Milits, General Supervisor, Radiation Safety
J.E.
Rivera, Shift Supervisor
P.G.
Rizzo, Assistant General Foreman, Maintenance
L.B.
Russell, Plant Superintendent
R.P.
Sheranko, General Foreman, Production Maintenance
G.W.
Siegel, Kinemetrics Vendor Representative
J.A.
Tiernan, Manager, Nuclear Power Department:
D.
Zyriek, Shift Supervisor
Other licensee employees were also contacted.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findinos
(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (317/81-07-03); CSR Halon Flooding Test.
The licensee retested the CSR Halon system (see paragraph 8).
Although
the system will put out a fire, personal safety considerations (high
concentrations) remain. The licensee is investigating additional
modifications and testing.
-(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (317/80-22-01; 318/80-18-01); Reactor
Cavity Orain Valves.
The inspector reviewed CCCM Change 80-192, dated
December 24, 1980 t1 01-10, Reactor Coolant System Fill and Vent. This
change added a requirement (by addition to the valve checklist) to
verify the proper lineup of the reactor cavity and reactor plenum
drains prior to start up from a refueling outage.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (318/78-12-02); Evaluation and Corrective
Action on Oropped Rods.
The licensee has completed mocification FCR
78-72, Add Redundant Power Supplies to Coil Power Programmer.
In
-addition, during the recently conpleted refueling outages (both
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units) the licensee followed the vendor's recommendation to vent all
the CEDM's' prior to start up. As a result no control rod drops were
experienced during the start up test program for either unit (Unit 1
Unresolved Item previously closed).
(Closed) Noncompliance (317/80-16-03); Failure to Follow Procedures
during a Plant Emergency. The licensee responded to this item in a
letter dated February 9,1981.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
actions including discussions with'the Shift Supervisor involved, a
General Supervisor-Operations Notes and Instruction entry on October
10, 1981 bringing this' event to the attention of operations personnel
with particular emphasis on failure to sound the emergency alarm and
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make appropriate announcements.
(Closed) Noncompliance (318/80-15-02); Failure to make an ENS Report
following a Manual Plant Trip.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
actions as stated in the response letter dated February 9,1981.
The
Shift Supervisor involved was counseled by the General Supervisor-
Operations. A GSO Notes and Instructions entry (November 4, 1980)
brought this failure to comply with prompt notification requirements
to the attention of all licensed operations personnel.
CCI 118 Re-
parting Requirements specifically direct such a report following
manual RPS actuation.
(Closed) Noncompliance (317/80-06-05, 06 and 07); Inoperability of the
Auxiliary Feedwater System (APdS), Failure to Report the Inoperability,
and Failure to Log the Inoperability in the Shift Supervisor's and
Operator's Logs.
The licensee responded to these items in a letter
dated August 13, 1980. Associated Civil Penalties were not contested.
The following actions committed to by the licensee were verified
completed by the inspector.
a.
0I-32, " Auxiliary Feedwater", revised (Rev. 13, 9/25/80) to
include a checklist wnich must be used when realigning Auxiliary
Feedwater pump suctions.
This checklist requires a two-man
verification, one of whom must hold a Senior Operator License
/. SOL) .
b.
The administrative controls (CCI 300 D, Calvert Cliffs Operating
Manual) for repositioning all locked valves have been revised to
require a two-man verification that such valves are properly
returned to their locked position. At least one person making
such verifications must hold a Senior Operator License.
c.
A partial system diagram depicting the Auxiliary Feedwater suction
header valves and their relationship to the Auxiliary Feedwater
pumos and the Condensate Storage Tanks was posted in the vicinity
of each such valve.
d.
The GSO issued a memorandum to all Shift Supervisors and all
Senior Control Room Operators.
The mer.o stressed the importance
of keeping the Control Room Operator aware of evolutions affecting
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his plant being conducted outside the Control Room, emphasizing
the SCR0's responsibility to assist the Shift Supervisor in
determining reportability of events, and the necessity of proper
log keeping,
e.
The guidance provided for operating personnel by the General
Supervisor-Operations Standing Instruction 80-06 was expanded.
Specifically, the loss of Auxiliary Feedwater capability as well
as any disabling of both redundant trains of _ safety features was
addressed. This was subsequently incorporated into CCI 118 0,
Reporting Requirements.
f.
The various reporting and notification requirements which were
contained in several General Supervisor-Operations Standing
Instructions and Calvert Cliffs Instructions were consolidated
into a single document CCI 118 0 (latest change 2/23/81).
g.
The checklist for "Non-Routine Technical Specification Reports
Requiring Timely Reporting" (CCI 118 Attachment 1) has been
revised to include a ,ignoff for "10 CFR 50.72 Notification."
h.
Copies of 10 CFR 50.72, Notification of Significant Events, have
been posted at the Shift Supervisor's and Senior Control Room
Operator's desks in the vicinity of the dedicated telephones.
1.
CCI 114 B, Plant Logs, approved March 18, 1981 has been revised
to require that events such as the Auxiliary Feedwater isolation
be logged as soon as possible following their discovery, re-
cognizing that subsequent clarifying entries may be appropriate
as investigation continues.
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Attachment (3) to CCI 114 Plant Logs was further revised to
providt-guidance to the Shift Supervisors as to what typ of
events should be logged as unusual occurrences.
k.
All licensed Operations personnel have been required to read and
sign the Notice of Violation contained in Combined Inspection
Report 50-317/80-06 and 50-318/80-06, and the licensee's commit-
ments and measures to prevent. recurrence.
1.
The Shift Supervisor and Senior Control Room Operator on duty May
21,_1980 were counseled by the licensee.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (317/80-26-03; 318/80-22-02); Safety Related
Classification of Various Components.
NRC:IE Headquarters reviewed
the particular items for which the inspector had questioned the licensee's
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-safety-related designation. The NRC has identified problems with
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" Safety Related" Classifications as a generic problem to all licensees
and is pursuing resolution under Three Mile Island Action Plant Item
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (317/81-04-01; 318/81-04-05); 10 CFR 50.72
Reporting Requirements. The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
sent the licensee a letter (dated March 23,1981) detailing differences
with the licensee's reporting guidelines (CCI 118 0). This item
remains open because CCI 118 0 does not conform to the NRR position.
The licensee stated that CCI 118 0 was in the process of being revised.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (317/80-02-01; 318/80-02-05); Ensure Facility
Radiation Monitoring Devices are Repaired in a Timely Fashion.
The
licensee responded to this item, along with other NRC concerns, in a
letter dated May 9, 1980. The licensee stated that '; hey felt that
repair ef forts made at the time were reasonable.
The inspector has
continued to examine the status or repair of various facility Radiation
Monitoring Devices. The following items were noted during the current
inspection.
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Unit 2 Main Vent Gaseous and Par:iculate Detectors were made in-
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operable on April 10, 1981 about 11:00 p.m., when the sample pump
failed.
The inspector reviewed maintenance activity (MR 0-81-
1592 initiated 4/10/81) to repair the pump. Although a priority
2 had been assigned, the system was not tagged out until April
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14, 1981.
Repairs were completed on Av ril 15, 1981.
Technical
Specifications require this effluent pa h to be continuously
monitored and recorded, but allows inderinite grab sampling of
the effluent (5 out of 7 days) in the event of instrument inoperability.
The computer hourly peak log value for Unit 1 and 2 Main Vent
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Gaseous activity appear suspicious, tracking continuously at 12
counts for Unit 1 and 13 counts for Unit 2.
Investigation revealed
that improper impedence matching had been performed when a signal
take-off was rrovided for the Technical Support Center
The FCR
was still in progress and the licensee stated that correction
would be pursued with the FCR.
Unit 1 Blowdown Tank Radiation Monitor operability was questioned
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and an MR issued (MR 0-81-1371) on March 25, 1981.
The licensee
first examined the detector on April 27, 1981.
The detector was
operable but the check source and shield needed replacement.
New Fuel Storage Radiation Monitor local indication was downscale
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and meter face broken when examined on April 27, 1981 (no MR).
Remote readout and alarm were operable.
Unit 2 Condensor Off Gas Monitor continues out of service (since
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construction). Because Technical Specifications require this
effluent ; ow path to be continuously monitored and recorded, the
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licensee has been taking at least 5 grab samples every 7 days. A
recently completed modification on Unit l's system is apparently
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successful and the licensee stated that equipment has been ordered
to implement the modification (refrigeration unit to remove in
line moisture) on Unit 2.
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The licensee agreed with the inspector that more timely repair of rad-
iation monitoring devices was appropriate and stated that action would
be taken.
~ 3,
Review of Plant Ocerations
a.
, Plant Tour
At various times the inspector toured the facility, including the
Control Room, Auxiliary Building (all levels,
o High Radiation
Areas), Turbine Building, Qatside Peripharal
, Security
Buildings, Health Physics Control Points, Dei
Generator Room,
Service Building and Intake Structure.
b.
Instrumentation
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Control room process instruments were observed for correlation
between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification
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relutrements.
c.
Annunciator Alarms
The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been
received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with
shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions
required.
During plant inscections, the inspector observed the
condition of equipment associated with various alarms,
d.
Shift ,Vanning
The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the
operating- requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 6,
both to the number and type of licenses.
Control room and snift
manning was observed to be in conformance with Technical Spec-
ifications and site administrative procedures.
e.
Radiation Protection Controls
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Radiation protection control areas were inspected.
Radiation
Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those
documents, as to protective clothing and requ red monitoring in-
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struments, was inspected.
Proper posting of radiation and high
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radiation areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements
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for wearing of appropriate personal monitoring devices.
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f.
Plant Housekeecing Controls
Storage _of materials and components was observed with respect to
prevention of fire and safety ha:ards.
Plant housekeeping was
avaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and
airborne contamination.
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g.
Fire Protection / Prevention
The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire
fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled
and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations
were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays
were clear of debris.
h.
Control of Eouiement
0uring plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag
. control was examined.
Equipment condftions were consistent with
information in plant control logs.
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Instrument Channels
Instrument channel checks recorded on routine logs were reviewed.
An independent comparison was made of selected instruments.
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Equioment Lineues
The inspector examined the breaker position on switchgear and
motor control centers in accessible portions of the plant.
Equipment. conditions, including valve lineups, were reviewed for
conformance with Technical Specifications and operating requirements.
k.
Review of Ocerating Logs, Records
Logs and records were reviewed to identify significant changes
and trends, to assure required entries were being made, to verify
proper identification of abnormal conditions, and to verify can-
formance to reporting reouirements and Limiting Conditions for
Operation.
The following records were reviewed for the report
period:
Shift Supervisor's Log
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Unit 1 Control Room Operator's Log
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Unit 2 Control Room Operator's Log
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Nuclear Plant Engineer-Operations Notes and Instructions.
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Unit 1 and 2's Control Room Daily Operating Logs (sampling
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review).
The inspector also discussed all Shift Supervisor turnover notes
(very long term, long term and current) with the General Super-
visor-Operations.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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4.
Review of Events Requiring One Hour Notification of the NRC
The circumstances surrounding the following events requiring prompt
(one hour) notification on the NRC via the dedicated telephone (ENS-
line) were reviewed.
At 4:05 p.m. on April 5,1981, improper restoration of power to
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an.ESFAS cabinet (Channel 8 Logic Cabinet) caused a partial
actuation of Engineered Safety Features (Unit 1).
The unit was
in Cold Shutdown at the time. Although No. 13 HPSI pump started,
no injection occurred because the discharge valve remained closed.
Equipment was restored to normal within three minutes.
About noon, April 8.1981, a brush fire started in the upper
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laydown area of the site.
It was under control by 2:30 p.m. The
Calvert County Fire Department responded.
The protected area and
off site power lines were not affected.
Approximately 70 acres
of open field (tall grass) burned.
At 10:43 a.m. on April 19,1981 Unit 2 tripped from Mode 2 (start-
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up). The cause of the trip was a failure of No. 21 Steam Gen-
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erator Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve Controller, resulting in
a low steam generator level.
The faulty controller was replaced
and startup was resumed.
At 9:41 a.m. en April 12. 1981, power (Unit 2) was being increased
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to 100*.' after a reduction because of condenser tube leakage. All
rods were out.
Power was being leveled by baration when an
overpower alarm was received.
The operator, believing he had
secured borating, went to tend the alarm.
Beration continued for
about two minutes (direct to the charging pump suction.) and
reactor power decreased rapidly to about 60*.'.
The feedwater
system could not handle the transient, resulting in a High Steam
Generator level turbine trip followed by reactor trip.
The
inspector reviewed traces of Steam Generator Water level and
reactor power immediately prior to the trip.
Pressurizer pressure
dropped below the CNB parameter (2225 psia) to about 1900 psia.
Technical Specification 3.2.6 action statement allows two hours
to restore pressure above this limit, however, the pressure
immediately returned to normal following the reactor trip.
The
licensee counseled the operator concerning attentiveness to
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duties and will notify all licensed operators of the details of
this event.
LER 81-021 will remain open pending completion of
the licensee's actions.
5.
plant Maintenance
During the inspection, the inspector observed various maintenance and
problem investigation activities to verify:
compliance with regulatory
requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications;
compliance with the acministrative and maintenance procedures; compliance
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with' applicable codes and standards; required QA/QC involvement;
proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of
. jumpers; personnel qualifications; radiological controls for worker
protection; fire protection; retest requirements and reporting in
accordance with Technical Specifications. The following activities
were included.
IC-87-37, Seismic System. Perform PM on SMA-3 CFT, Rev. E, started
4/27/81.
Cound 0-YE-004, Vertical Accelerometer out of service due to
salt water leakage, replaced entire unit.
MR-81-893, Replace SRW Heath Exchanger SW Valve,1 CV 5212 (FCR 80-
17),observad-April 28, 1981.
MR-81-141, No. 12 SRW Heat Exhanger, Clean, Change Zinces, observed
April 28, 1981,
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MR 0-91-1693, Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Alarm
-Hanging, initiated 4/21/81; observed 4/24/81.
No unacceptable conditions were identified (timeliness of repair of
radiation monitoring devices is addressed in paragraph 2).
6.
IE Bulletin Followup
The inspector reviewed licensee actions on the following IE Bulletins
(IEBs) to determine that the written response was submitted within the
, required time period, that the response included the information
equired including adequate corrective action commitments, and that
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licensee management had forwarded copies of the response to responsible
onsite management.
The review included discussions with licansee
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personnel and observations and review of items discussed below.
IEB 81-01:
Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers.
The licensee
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responded to this bulletin in a letter dated February 19, 1981,
stating that no mechanical snubbers are used in safety-related
appitcations.
The inspector discussed the response with the
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licensee.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.
Review of- Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to
a.
verify that the details of the event were clearly reported,
including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy
.of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further
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information was required from the licensee, whether generic im-
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plications_were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite
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followup.
The following -LER's were reviewed:
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LER No.
Date of Event
Date of Report
Subject
Unit 1
81-18/3L'
03/09/81
04/08/81
OURING TEST ON #11 OIESEL
GENERATOR SM0KE BEGAN FROM
EXHAUST MANIFOLD INSULATION.
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81-19/3L
03/11/81
04/10/81
ONE OF TWO CONTAINMENT HYORCGEN
ANALYZERS INOPERASLE.
81-20/3L
03/20/81
04/16/81
OURING ROUTINE TEST CNTMT NORMAL
SUMP ORAIN EXCEEDED MAXIMUM
CLOSING TIME.
81-21/3L
03/20/81
04/16/81
OURING NORMAL POWER #12 CCP WAS
STARTED FOR MAINTENANCE TEST;
THE DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE LIFTED
AND STUCK OPEN.
81-22/3L
03/24/81
04/23/31
ESFAS CEGRADEO VOLTAGE RELAY
- 81-23/3L
03/17/81
04/16/81
CURING ACCEPTABLE TEST VENTILATION
EXHAUST DAMPER IN CA8LE SPREADING
RCCM OIO NOT SHUT (INSPECTION
REPORT 317/81-09)
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- 81'-24/3L 04/04/81
05/01/81
- 12 MSIV CLOSING TIME EXCEEDED
MAXIMUM
81-25/3L
04/04/81
05/01/81
CUTER PERSCNNEL AIR LOCK CCOR
OPERATING MECHANISM FAILEO.
'81-28/3L
04/23/81
05/04/81
INADVERTENT RELEASE OF NON-
RADIOLCGICAL WASTE INTO
CHESAPEAKE SAY.
81-29/3L
04/01/81
04/30/81
SUPPORTS IN #12 SRW SUBSYSTEM DIO
NOT MEET CRITERIA 0F ESTABLISHED
PROGRAM DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO
IE BULLETIN 79-14
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- This LER to remain ocen pending additional NRC review
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. LER No.
Date of Event
Date of Report
Subject
Unit 2
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81-09/3L
03/03/81
04/03/81
SALT WATER SYSTEM MOTOR-0PERATED
ISOLATION VALVE INOPERABLE.
81-15/3L
03/19/81'
04/17/81
BORIC ACID CCNCENTRATION GREATER
THAN ALLCWED BY T.X. AT 8.1%.
81-16/.*L
03/17/81
04/14/81
CIRCUIT BREAKER GROUND SENSOR
TRIPPED CAUSING PCWER LOSS TO
MOTOR OPERATED MAIN FEEDWATER
ISOLATION VALVE.
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81/17/3L
04/14/81
05/04/81
OURING MODIFICATION WORK 22 ECCS
PUMP RCCM COOLER EMERGENCY ORAIN
LINE WAS BROKEN.
81-19/3L
04/02/81
05/01/81
WHILE PARALLELING #12 EDG TO
FAILED TO CLOSE.
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- 81-21/3L
04/12/81
05/04/81
PRESSURE ORCPPED BELCW ONB
PARAMETER CURING RAPID PCWER
DECREASE (SEE PARAGRAPH 4)
b.
For the LER's selected for onsite eview (denoted by asterisks above),
the inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken
or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the
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facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications
and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined
in 10 CFR 50.59.
Report accuracy, compliance with current re-
porting requirements and applicability to other site systems
and components were also reviewed.
LER 81-28 (Unit 1), Unmonitored Otscharge of No. 11 Waste
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Neutrali:ing Tank (WNT) at 4: 50 p.m. on April 23 1931, the
outside ocerator discovered the drain valve for #11 WNT open.
The operator immediately shut the valve to terminate the dis-
charge.
The WNT had been placed in service at 2:20 p.m. to
receive make-up regeneration waste. At about 3:30 p.m. the
water treatment specialist started regenerating #12 make-up
train.
Between 3:45-4:45 p.m. approximately 75 gallons of 97%
H S04 (diluted to 15% with a 27 gpm dilution flow) was dis-
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charged to the WNT.
Starting at 4: 30 p.m., 50% NACH (diluted
to 5% with a 21 gpm dilution flow) was being discharged to the
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WNT when the open drain valve was discovered.
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Since the WNT drain. valve was not shut, the regenerative
waste sent to #11 WNT was discharged to the Chesapeake Bay,
after-being diluted with 1.2 million gpm circulating water
flow, without ensuaing that the. regeneration waste was in
compliance with the Environmental Technical Specification
limits.
The inspector reviewed the-licensee's procedures, the sub-
mitted reports (prompt and followup), corrective actions,
and impact analysis.
The licensee determined that the
circulating water flow rates would produce dilutions of one
in 960,000 parts and one in 480,000 parts for the acid and.
caustic, respectivley, resulting in an imperceptible change
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in pH.
Regarding procedural controls, the licensee reviewed
the circumstances and. determined that these were adequate,
however, three separate operators failed to adequately
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implement the procedures.
OI 23 0, Operation of the Waste
Neutralizing System, requires a WNT Orain Valve to be locked
shut following draining and a lineup check verified locked
shut prior to placing a ta1K on service. The midshift Outside
Operator (050) failed to shut the drain valve folicwing
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draining of #11 WNT on his shift. The day shift OSO directed
a trainee to perform the checklist lineup and place #11 WNT
on service. The trainee did not verify the WNT drain valve
0W-199 closed, although he initialed the On Service checalist
to this effect.
The licensee took disciplinary actions against the three
operators involved, including two suspensions. Although the
licensee stated that it has always been the watch standers
duty to complete all actions on his station and directly
supervise the actions of trainees, a new GSO Standing In-
struction, Plant Operators Responsibilities, was issued on
April 29, 1981.
(GSO Notes and Instruction 31-3).
This
instruction specifies that the watch standers, not trainees,
are to initial and perform or directly supervise all valve
lineups, checklists, and surveillance tests.
The licensee
also now requires that all non-licensed operators have a
procedure in hand whenever performing steps of a procedure.
The insepctor stated that the NRC was concerned with non-
licensed operator action in this release, but agreed with
the licensee's conclusion that the actual environmental im-
. pact was imperceptible.
The inspector also concluded that
the licensee had taken and completed adequate corrective
action prior to completion of the inspection period.
The
inspector stated that the unmonitored release of acid and
caustic was an item of noncompliance (317/81-09-01; 313/ 31-
09-01).
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8.
Surveillance Testing
a.
The inspector observed portions of the following testing, verified
that it was performed in accordance with approved procedures,
that limiting conditions for operation were satisfied, that test
results (of completed at time of observation) were satisfactory,
that removal and restoration of equipment were properly accomplished
and that deficiencies identifed were properly reviewed and resolved.
The following tests were included in this review.
TSP 53, Revision 0, dated 3/11/81, Cable Spreading Room
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Operational Test (Unit 1) performed 4/29/81.
Smoke Testing of Unit 1 27' elevation Switchgear Room on
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4/29/81.
STP M460-0, Seismic Accelerometer Calibration Revision 0,
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performed on 4/27/81.
The inspector also reviewed the calibration curves for Cardox
analyzers 79 and 36 used during the performance of the CSR Halon
Flooding test on April 27. Although sufficiently high halon
levels were reached in all portions of the CSR during the test,
stratification of the gas did occur, resulting in potentially
lethal (greater than 20% halon) levels near the floor.
The
licensee is investigating.
Inspector Follow Item 317/81-07-03
remains open to follow resolution of this item.
STP M460 was a semi-annual seismic monitoring system channel
functional test.
One vertical accelerometer was discovered non-functional (saltwater
had dripped through cover in the intake structure's accelerometer
0-YE-004 and damaged the unit).
The entire unit was rcplaced.
Inspector questions in Mis area resulted in a deeper review and
an item of noncompliance as described below.
b.
The inspector reviewed the most recent channel calibration performed
on the seismic monitoring system,'STP-M-560-0, Seismic Instrument
Calibration, Revision 2, approved August 19, 1975 and performed
on October 30, 1980.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the
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(vendor's) Kenemetrics Operating Instructions for the SMA-3
Strong Motion Accelerog*aph System, dated July, 1971, and the
Bechtel Purchase Specification for CCNPP, 6750-M-373, dated April
16, 1971.
The purchase specification states a requirement for
the triggers to actuate between 0.005 to 0.029 vertical and 0.005
to 0.060 inches of hori: ental motion.
The licensee's Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation consists of 5
triaxial Strong Motion Accelerographs (SMA's), 2 triaxial Seismic
Switches (starters), and a recording unit which records the SMA's
motions following initiation of a seismic event as detected by
the starters.
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The starters contain a vertical starter to detect acceleration in
the vertical plane and a horizontal starter with two degrees of
freedom to detect radial displacement caused by an earthquake.
The Triaxial SMAs each contain a vertical and two orthogonal
horizontal accesarometers.
Three outputs from each SMA are fed
to a particular recording taae in the control room.
For calibration of the starters, the licensee's procedura (Step
'II, Starter Calibration) checks the calibration by verifying that
the horizontal starter is level and then checks racial contact
gap at 0.030 inches by a knob adjustment.
No check is made of
the v'rtical starter.
For calibration of the accelerometers, the respective amplifier
electrical outputs are first checked from the steady state (0.000
+0.050 VDC).
Then a test signal (12 VOC) is applied to the
accelerometer to disolace the coil.
Following removal of the
test signal the accelerometer is observed (on the tapes) to
return to neutral at the particular accelerometers' natural
frequency.
The inspector noted that this test demonstrates that an accelerometer
is not bound and that amplification and recording circuits are
furctional. However, no relation can be made to the magnitude of
the parameter monitored (acreleration).
The test performed on
the accelerometers and horizontal starters constitute functional
tests. Channel calibrations, as defined in Technical Specifications,
require verification tha*. the channel response with the necessary
range and accuracy to knc,, values of the parameter monitored.
The inspector noted that capabilities exist to obtain known acc-
eierations (shaker tables, vibration stands, etc.).
Failure to
adequately calibrate the Seismic Monitoring System is an item of
noncomo11ance (317/81-09-02; 318/81-09-02).
9,
Observation of Physical Security
The resident insoector checked, during regular and off-shif t hours, on
whether selected aspects of security met regulatory requirements,
physical security plans and approved procedures,
a.
Physical Protection Security Organi:ation
Cbservations and personnel interviews indicated that a full
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time member of the security organization with authority to
direct physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shif ts on various days was obserfed to
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be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers
Selected barriers in the protected area (PA) and the vital areas
(VA) were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was
performed. Cbservations of truck and car searches were made.
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c.
Access Control
Observations of the following items were made:
Identification, authorization and badging
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Access control searches
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Escorting
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Communications
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Compensatory measures when required.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10. Verification of Suction path fr
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumos
Representatives from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
requested that tne inspector verify adequate procedures were in place
to insure a suction flow path to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
This
concern arose coincident with the NRC's review of the automatic in-
iation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The inspector reviewed ACP-
15, Loss of Auxiliary Feedwcter, Revision 1 approved November 12,
1980. The procedure requires a check of the suction and discharge
lineup following receipt of indications such as Low Pump Suction
Pressure Alarm or Low Pump Discharge Pressure Alarm.
The outside
operator is directed to examine the lineup in the vicinity of the 12
CST and the Turcine Building Operator in the AFP rooms.
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
11.
Review of Periodic and Soecial Recorts
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee
pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed.
This review included the following considerations:
The report incluces
the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test re-
suits and/or supporting information are consistent with design predictions
and performance specifications; planned corrective action is adequate
for resolution of identified problems; whether any information in the
report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity
of reported information. Within the scope of the above, the following
periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
March, 1981 Operations Status Reports for Calvert Cliffs No. 1
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Unit and Calvert Cliffs No. 2 Urit, dated April 14, 1981.
Revisions to the Opera *ing Status Reports for November and Cecember,
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1980, January, February and March, 1931, letter dated April 15,
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1981.
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BG&E letter dated April 15, 1981; Supplement to (1979 year)
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Report of Changes Tests and Experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
BG&E letter dated April 8, 1981, CCNPP, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-317
,
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Report of 3tartup Testing for Cycle Five.
12.
Exit Interview
Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically
during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope
and findings. A summary of inspection findings was also provided to
the licensee at the conclusion of the report period.
The inspector discussed the NRC's position regarding review of non-
safety-related changes to the facility performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC's position is that the Onsite Committee (POSRC)
must review all changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and make determinations
regarding nuclear safety significance.
The Plant Superintendent
stated that the P0RSC would follow the NRC position regarding these
reviews.
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