ML17265A623
| ML17265A623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1999 |
| From: | Barber G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| References | |
| AL-98-07, AL-98-7, NUDOCS 9904200124 | |
| Download: ML17265A623 (42) | |
Text
CATEGORY 2 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9904200124 DOC.DATE: 99/04/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G
05000244 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BARBER,G.S.
Region 1 (Post 820201)
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.
SUBJECT:
Discusses results of plant performance review for Ginna NPP completed on 990223.Historical listing of plant issues considered during PPR encl.
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April 9, 1999 Dr. Robert C. Mecredy Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Operations Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Dear Dr. Mecredy:
On February 23, 1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.
PPRs examine information since the last, assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long.term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance'.
The PPR for Ginna involved the participation of all technical divisions in detailed evaluation of inspection results and safety performance information for the period April 1998 to January 15, 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of April 9, 1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on April22, 1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC willdecide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
The Ginna Nuclear Power Plant has had an excellent operational run. As of mid-January 1999, the unit had operated at near full rated reactor power for 421 days, with only two downpower evolutions to correct minor emergent equipment problems.
Overall performance at Ginna was acceptable.
Day-to-day operations of the unit were characterized by a safety-conscious and conservative approach to the execution of plant activities to minimize operational and personnel risk. Material condition remained good. A few lapses in inter-departmental coordination and communication contributed to some plant problems.
Plant modifications were generally well developed and implemented and plant support activities were effective.
There were no reactor trips or significant plant transients that challenged the operations staff and operators responded well to the few equipment problems that did occur.
Plant management maintained a strong emphasis on operational safety and exhibited conservative 9904200i24 990409'DR ADQCK 05000244 8
PDR I E01
Robert C. Mecredy decision making to minimize operational risk. Oversight committees were generally effective in evaluating plant operations and in identifying areas for improvement.
However, poor communications and coordination between the operations and maintenance organizations contributed to two reactivity management events.
Root cause evaluations for these events were not sufficiently thorough or self-critical in addressing human performance issues and trends.
Based on current performance, the normal NRC core inspection program is planned with increased emphasis will be placed in the area of root cause and human performance evaluations.
In addition, a May 1999 team inspection will review the effectiveness of corrective action programs.
Overall, plant equipment was well maintained and plant material condition was good.
Maintenance personnel adhered to procedures and used good safety practices.
Routine maintenance was effective. The Maintenance Rule program was well implemented, as were surveillance activities. Nonetheless, work control and spare parts deficiencies hindered timely resolution of some equipment problems.
The normal NRC core inspection program is planned with additional emphasis on work control and spare parts availability.
Engineering performance improved as demonstrated by better day-to-day support of plant operations, such as in the troubleshooting and problem identification of the emergency diesel generator output breaker failure, the identification and resolution of a containment recirculation fan cooler issue and primary coolant average temperature variations.
Also, improvements were noted in implementation of some specific aspects of engineering programs, such as calculation controls and the motor-operated valve program. The 10 CFR 50.59 review process and the inservice inspection program were strong.
However, engineering staff efforts to resolve longstanding service water system operational performance problems have met with limited success due to some remaining design issues related to high erosion rates.
The normal NRC core inspection program is planned with additional emphasis on service water system problems.
Plant support programs including the areas of radiation protection, radwaste management transportation, environmental effluent monitoring, emergency preparedness, and security were effectively implemented.
Management oversight tools including Quality Assurance audits and surveillances, department self assessments, and the corrective action system provided effective mechanisms for identifying and correcting adverse performance trends in this area.
The NRC plans to perform the normal core inspection program.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of Ginna performance trends.
Please note that the PIM was in two different formats due to a program change effective on October 1, 1998. The PIM included items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Rochester Gas and Electric.
The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
In addition, the PPR may also have considered some pre-decisional a'nd draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.
This material willbe placed in the Public Document Room as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
t k
4
Robert C. Mecredy This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Ginna PPR.
It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for personnel availability and scheduling conflicts to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
details our inspection plan for the next six months.
The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
Because of the anticipated changes to the inspection program and other initiatives, this inspection schedule is subject to revision. Any changes to the schedule willbe discussed promptly with your staff.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 610-337-5232.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY'ocket Nos. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 G. Scott Barber, Acting Chief Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan cc w/encls:
P. Wilkens, Senior Vice President, Generation Central Records (7 copies)
P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York C. Donaldson, Esquire, State of New York, Department of Law N. Reynolds, Esquire F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
Robert C. Mecredy Distribution w/encls:
H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA (1)
W. Travers, EDO S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR B. Boger, NRR J. Lieberman, OE (OEMAIL)
A. Blough, DRP W. Lanning, DRS R. Crlenjak, DRP W. Ruland, DRS D. Screnci, PAO W. Dean, Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB G. Tracy, Chief, OEDO/ROPMS T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB S. Barber, DRP DRS Branch Chiefs W. Cook, DRP S. Chaudhary, DRS T. Moslak, DRS P. Frechette, DRS D. Silk, DRS M. Oprendek, DRP R. Junod, DRP Region I Docket Room (w/concurrences)
PUBLIC Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
Distribution w/encl (VIAE-MAIL):
M. Tschiltz, Rl EDO Coordinator S. Bajwa, NRR G. Vissing, NRR M. Campion, ORA Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK Distribution w/encls: (VIAE-MAIL)
Region I Staff (Refer to the RAPPR Drive)
DOCUMENT NAME: GAPPR3-99<GINL4-1.WPD To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Co with attachment/enclosure "N" = No co OFFICE Rl/DRP Rl/DRP r.
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w'.
04/,. /90 ABlou h SBarbev
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04/
/99 04/.',/99 OFFICIALRECORD COPY HMiller 04/ /99
Page:
22of10l INCLUDES DRAFT ITEMS Region I
OIHI/A United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE IIATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/02/1999 Time: 13:57:03 Date Source Functional Area Template lp Type Codes Item Title Item Description 11/29/1998 1998012 Prl: OPS Sec:
NRC POS Prt:1A Sec:
Ter.
Operator performance during requal was good.
The requalificatlon written examination for licensed operators was adequate.
Job performance measures reviewed had been recently enhanced and were ofgood quality. Simulator scenarios were particularly effective In evaluating operator performance In that they exercised both the Functional Restoration and Emergency Contingency Action Procedures.
Operator performance durfng the requaiiiication was good.
11/29/1998 1998012 Prl: OPS Sec:
NRC POS Prl:1B Sec:
Ter.
Operator response to partial loss of offslte power.
Operations personnel performed well In response to an unexpected partial loss of offsite power. The licensee ef/actively Identitied the cause ofthe loss, and restored power from the olfsite circuit in a timely manner.
11/29/1998 199801241 Prl: OPS NRC IF)
Prl: 1A Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter.
Inadvertant dilution event human performance evaluation results Operations personnel responded well to an Inadvertent dilution of the reactor coolant system when a mixed bed demlneralizer viith new resin was prematurely placed in service. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the licensee was investigating the cause(s) ofthis event..
10/30/I 998 1998301 Prl: OPS NRC POS Sec Prf: 1C Sec:
Ter.
3 ROs and a SRO upgrade passed all portions of exam.
Three Reactor Operators (RO) and a'Senior Reactor Operator Upgrade (SROU) passed all portions of the initial license examination.
The applicants performed satisfactory on the written and simulator portions ofthe examination.
The applicants were well prepared for the examlnatlon, Indicating that the facilityevaluated the knowledge and abilyy of each candidate In an effort to determine their readiness to stt for an initial NRC, RO and SROU examination.
Crew communications, control board awareness, and craw briefings were good.
10/18/1998 1998011 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:
Sec:3A Ter.
Hunlan performance eval for8/17 lnadvertant rod insertion was effective.
The human perfonnance evaluation conducted In response to the August 17 Inadvertent automatic Insertion of control rods was effec0ve ln Identifying procedural detictendes and recommending appropriate interdepartmental communications enhancements.
However, the licensee's overall corrective action response to this evenl to date. was weak, in that similar recent operational events were not assessed for broader human performance issues and trends.
10/18/1998 1998011 Prl: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter.
NSARB professionally conducted.
The quaderly meeting ofthe Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Board was professionally conducted with good indepth discussions.
The outsMe board members were active In the discussions and had a positive impact on the board's deliberations, and alimembers displayed a good questlonlng attitude. The independent safety oversight function of the board was successfully accomplished.
11/29/1998 1998012 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2B Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter.
f/iaintenance performance waa good.
Controlledmaintenance procedures were used at Job sites. The procedures were up to date and were propedy usedby technicians involved In maintenance and surveillance work. The inspectors observed good personnel and plant safety practices.
Equipment tested met the acceptance criteria specilied for operability. The test acceptance criteria bases reviewed were adequate, with only minor discrepancies noted.
item Type (Compliance Followup Other), From 10/01/1998 To 01/15/1999
Page:
23 of 104 INCLUDES DRAFT ITEMS Region I
GINNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date 03/02/1999 Time: 13:57:03 Date Source Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Descrfption 11/29/1998 199801242 Prl: MAINT NRC NCV Sec:
Prfi 2B Missed surveillance ofth CV hydrogen recomblners.
Sec: 3A The licensee's discovery of an Improperly performed ITS surveiflance reflected a good and detailed review of a previous outage work packaqe.
Atthough both hydrogen recombiners were determined to be operable, the missed survefliance represented a condhlon prohibited by the ITS. This license identified and corrected violation of ITS surveillance requirements was ofmlnlmal safety consequence and is being treated as a Nonunited Violation (NCV). consistent with Section VII.B.1 ofthe NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV50-244/98-1242).
11/29/1998 1998012 Prf: MAINT NRC NEG Prl: 2B Troubleshooting ofCR red monitors.
Sec: ENG Sec: 3A The licensee's efforts to troubleshoot and repair control room radiation monitors were initiallyunsuccessful and hindere~
by the lack of consMeratlon of a previously discovered equipment nonconformance item and with diAicukies in Ter.
procuring spare parts.
10/18/1998 1998011 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Good maintenance performance observed.
Controlled procedures were used at maintenance Iob sites, were up to date, and were properly used by technicians Invohred In maintenance and surveillance work. The Inspectors observed good personnel an'dplant safety practices.
Equipment tested met the acceptance criteria specified for operability. The acceptance criteria bases reviewed were adequate, with only minor discrepancies noted.
10/18/1998 1998011 Prf: MAINT NRC POS Prf: 3A Effective preventive measures used during BAST level Instrument work.
Sec:
Sec: 1C The preventive measures util@ed to avoid Inadvertent grounding of lifled leads were ineffective during the installation of a bistabie for the boric acid s!orage tank level Instrument.
Ter.
'I 10/18/1998 1998011 Pri:.MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 3A Maintenance tech effective problem Identlllcatlon on Awervtce water pump breaker.
Sec: 5A Maintenance technldans effectively Identifled problems with the A-service water pump cIrcuit breaker following refu*ishment by Westinghouse.
The licensee also displayed a good effort in working with Westinghouse to correct the Ter.
noted defldendes.
11/29/1998 1998012 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl: 2B 1997 selfassessment of SW system good.
~ Sec:
Sec: 5A Technical items from a 1997 self-assessment of the service water systein were appropriately prioritized and addressed In the licensee's corrective action program.
Ter:
11/29/1998 1998012 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4B GL 89-13 program ls closed.
Sec:
The licensee estabflshed appropriate tests and maintenance tasks for service water system components consistent with the requested actions of NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Ter.
Equipment.
item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), Froni )P/01/1998 To 0ft15/1999
Page:
24 of 104 INCLUDES DRAFT ITEMS Region I
GINNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTfSSVE MATRIX By Primary Functions'I Area Jate: i.i02/1999 Time: 13:57:03 Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 11/29/1998 199801243 Prl: ENG Sec: MAINT NRC IFI i Prf:2B Sec:
Ter.
RGSE to review p~ondltioning ofvalves before IST testing.
The Inservice Test {IST)Program was well designed and Implemented.
Program documents and implementing procedures were easy to use, technically correct, and updated to reflect industry developments.
Valves ln the seIected systems were tested In accordance with ASME Code requIrements and NRC-approved relief requests.
P~nditioning of selected service water containment Isolation valves prior to leakage testing may be inconsistent with Industry guidance and Is under revIew by the RG8E staff (IFI 50-244/98-1243).
IST Program personnel were knowledgeable, and the condition monitorfng program was effective. Discre pandas regarding program scope and testing of relief valves were ofminor Importance and were appropriately addressed by RG8E.
10/18/1998
'1998011 Prt: ENG NRC POS Prt: 4B Sec:
Sec:4C Tel".
improvement noted In the 60.69 process documentation.
The licensee had a strong 10 CFR 50.59 determination process ln place. There had been a noticeable knprovement in~
the quality of the documentation ofthe bases for evaluating the three cnterla for an unreviewed safety question.
'l1/29/1998 1998012 Pff: PLTSUP NRC POS Prf: 2B Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
RP controls and RP management oversight good.
Radiological controls and postlngs In the auxiliary building were adequate.
Radiation Protection management tours were effective In the Identification and resolution ofradlologicat defiaendes.
10/1N1998
'1998011 Prt: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
Adequate Implementation of radiation monitoring system and Instrument calibration programs.
The licensee established, implemented, andmalntained an adequate radiation monitoring system program for radiological Instrument calibrations and reliability, and performance tracking and trending. The ventilation system surveillance program was adequate with respect to charcoal adsorption surveillance tests, HEPA mechanical eiliciency tests, and air flowrate tests.
~10/18/1998,1998011 Prl: PLTSUP NRC
- POS, Prl: 2B Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
The quality control program to vaikfate measurement results for radioactive eNuent samples was effective. The licensee a'iso established and Implemented an effective quality assurance audit of the radioactive eNuent control pfogfaln.
10/18/1998-1998011' Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 2B Sec: 3A Ter.
Effective Implementation of radwaste management and transportation programs.
The licensee effectively implemented radIoactive waste management and transportation programs with an experienced sta/f who systematically adhered to dearly written and detailed procedures.
Radioadive waste and olher radioactive materials shipped during the period ofJanuary through September 1998 were properly classiiied and packaged.
Areas containing radioadive wastes and contaminated materials were properly surveyed, posted, and controlled.
ttem Tvoe (Comp1iince,Foiiowup,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 01/15/1999
, 0 l
GINNAPLY)PENT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Descr/ption 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 OPS
'1A 3A OPS 5A 5C 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
OPS 1A 3A 3C 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
OPS 1A 3A 3C 7/20/98 Negative IR 98-07 N
OPS 5A 2B 3C 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
Operations personnel adequately documented plant status in the operating logs, but two exceptions were noted. The administrative guidance placed in the control room plan-of-the-day on logging equipment out of service appeared adequate to properly'document control room activities and plant status.
The licensee effectively evaluated recent equipment deficiencies as potential operator workarounds. The revisions made to formally track the evaluation, addition, and removal of workarounds from the program were good program enhancements.
=The licensee made good enhancements to their corrective action process.
The training conducted for managers on corrective action program revisions was generally effective. One deficiency existed in communicating management expectations to plant personnel when an ACTION Report was delayed, and new requirements tor formally documenting the operability status ot equipment prior to troubleshooting anomalies had to be re-emphasized by station management.
Operators entered the appropriate procedures and limitingconditions for operation (LCOs) tor improved technical specification (ITS)-related equipment out-of-sewice during the report period. Allapplicable LCO entries were made promptly, and the required actions were accomplished well within the required time periods.
Entries into LCOs were generally ot short duration, and ITS-related equipment out-of-service was restored to operable status in a relatively short period. Operator performance during the period was good.
The licensee's corrective action process was weak in that it did not maintain a formal tracking system to assure operability assessment tollow-up activities are taken to completion.
However, the number of incomplete actions planned for follow-up to operability assessments was low, and the licensee intended to implement a follow-up tracking system as part of a planned revision to their corrective action program.
7/20/98 Negative IR 98-07 N
OPS 3A The locked valve program was not well defined, was not effectively implemented, and operator 2B training was lacking in this area, as evidented by a broad variation of responses from operators 3C intewiewed about how valves should be locked. No locked valves were found out of their required positions, and no safety consequences resulted from discrepancies obsewed in the implementation of the program.
5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
OPS 1C 5A 5B The Quality Awareness/Quality Control (QA/QC) subcommittee meeting was effective in identifying areas for improvement in the corrective action and quality assurance programs.
Good participation by all attendees was also noted.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 1 of 16 April 9, 1999
GINNAPumr xSSUES Marlx Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Descr/ptlon 5/17/98 Negative IR 98-04 5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 4/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 3/12/98 Negative IR 98-02 3/12/98 VIO IR 98-02 VIO 98-02-01 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
OPS 1A 2B 5C N
OPS 1C 5A N
OPS 5A 5C 1C N
OPS 1C 3C 2B N
OPS 5A 5B N
OPS 1B 3C 5A N
OPS 1C 3A 5C The infrequently performed evolution to replace the pressurizer pressure defeat switch was well conducted.
Control room operators maintained good control of primary plant pressure, and Interfaced. well with the instrumentation and Control (18 C) technicians performing the work.
Good management oversight was also noted throughout the evolution.
The administrative procedure.governing the implementation of emergency and abnormal operating procedures contained a weakness in that it potentially allowed the authority of a licensed SRO to be overruled by two licensed ROs during the performance of anticipatory actions or when performing actions where procedural guidance is not available. The licensee's actions to resolve this issue through the emergency procedure committee were considered appropriate.
The licensee successfully resolved a discrepancy in the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) emergency operating procedure (EOP). The administrative procedure governing the emergency procedures committee provided adequate guidance to ensure changes to EOPs could be property implemented.
The inspectors noted additional discrepancies in the emergency contingency action (ECA) procedures which indicated the licensee's procedural review process could be strengthened.
Poor coordination between the operations and maintenance departments resulted in an unplanned power reduction and unnecessary adjustments to power range nuclear instruments.
There were no adverse consequences associated with theMarch 3 event. The safety importance of the transient was that itwas an unnecessary challenge to the PORV, which could have resulted in a small break loss of coolant accident had the PORV and its associated block valve failed to close. RG&E management response was quick to address the plant equipment technical aspects of the pressurizer pressure transient, but apparently slow to address the inadequate human performance aspects of this event.
There was ample time and indications of the pressure increase to allow operators to correct the problem before the pressure increased to the point of the PORV opening. The event was caused by the failure of the operators to adequately monitor panels and respond to alarms.
The failure to notice and respond to the alarms and indications is a violation of NRC requirements.
The licensee effectively identified applicable industry events, and appropriately incorporated those events into the corrective action program. Operating experience inputs to the daily management meeting routinely provided worthwhile information to the plant staff.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 2of 16 April9, 1999
GINNAPLINY ISSUES 1VIATRIX Date Type Source
/D SFA Code Item Description 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 2/21/98 Postive IR 98-01 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
OPS 1C 3B 5C N
OPS 1C 3A 5C N
OPS 1A 5A 5B N
OPS 1A 3B 3A N
OPS 5A 5C Peer-assisted self-assessments were good and included strong independent perspectives.
Numerous findings for improvement were identified and evaluated, and valuable corrective actions and program enhancements resulted from.the assessments.
However, the overall quality and value of the assessments would have been greater had the operations and maintenance organizations more fullyparticipated in the process.
The licensee's corrective action program was generally effective in identifying and correcting conditions adverse to quality, and in preventing recurrences.
However, some program weaknesses were identified which could affect the overall usefulness of the system; most notably was the practice of closing ACTION Reports before the corrective actions were completed.
Root cause evaluations were thorough, technically well-based, and aided in the identification of the appropriate corrective actions.
In addition, housekeeping and material condition of the station was generally good, but several deficiencies were identified by the inspectors.
The Ginna plant was operated well and sustained safe operational performance for an extended period. Plant operators responded quickly and effectively to equipment deficiencies, and those deficiencies did not significanlly impact safe plant operation.
The licensee has made progress in identifying and resolving plant and equipment configuration control problems. Although plant configuration control problems were ongoing, the licensee's generation of an encompassing ACTION Report, their performance of system line-up verifications, and their planned case study training were positive initiatives toward resolving a The plant operations review committee, and the nuclear safety audit and review board meetings were effective and conducted in accordance with Improved Technical Specification requirements.
The quality assurance/quality control subcommittee effectively analyzed audits to identify areas for improvement in the corrective action program. The quality assurance staff ~
was effective in identifying deficiencies.
However, the inspectors were concerned that some quality assurance auditors had difficultyassessing human performance issues.
1/4/98 LER IR 97-12 IR 98-01 LER 97-07 L
OPS 4B 1C 3B Tthe licensee discovered that there was no requirement in l8C procedures to place the neutron
. flux low range trip circuitry in the tripped condition for a power range channel removed for physics testing in MODE 2 as required by the ITS.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 3of16 April9, 1999
next pLan >SSUSS MATMX Date 7ype Source ID SFA Code Item Description 1/4/98 LER IR 97-12 IR 98-01 LER 97-06 L
OPS 1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 N
OPS 1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 L
OPS 1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 N
OPS 1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 N
OPS 11/16/97 Negative LER IR 97-11 IR 97-12 LER 97-05 S
OPS 11/16/97 Negative IR 97-11 IR 97-12 LER 97-04 S
OPS 11/16/97 Negative IR 97-11 N
OPS 1C 3B 5C 1C 3B 4B 3B 5A 5B 1B 3B 5B 1C 5C 2A 3A 1C 2A 1C 3B 5A 1A 1C 3A The licensee identified that operators may not have performed a required ITS surveillance for boron concentration within the time limitafter the source range audible count monitor was inoperable. The licensee apparently did not declare the audible monitor inoperable at the-appropriate time {upon discovery) and willissue a revision to the LER. The ITS requirements for boron concentration were satisfied after discovery of the inoperable audible monitor.
The licensee effectively evaluated plant modifications for training needs.
The assigned training methods for educating operations personnel appeared appropriate.
Operators observed during a training scenario displayed a knowledge deficiency regarding plant conditions that should have automaticaily tripped an RCP. However, the instructor identified the deficiency and conducted good on the spot remediation training for correction.
Operator performance in response to the trip of both feedwater heater drain pumps was good.
The ITS requirements were properly interpreted and actions were taken in a timely manner.
C The licensee's efforts to reduce the number of operator workarounds during the 1997 refueling outage was successful.
The operator workaround program has been appropriately implemented to identify plant deficiences as workarounds or challenges.
An inadvertent automatic Sl actuation signal was generated on low Pzr pressure while performing a plant safeguards logic test. No actual injection occurred since the Sl system was out of seNice during the 1997 refueling outage.
The signal was generated due to a failed Pzr pressure bistable in combination with a pressure transmitter test injection switch being in the test position.
An automatic isloalion of containment ventilation occurred during removal of a steam generator manhole insert. Airborne radiation levels were higher than anticipated due to failed fuel during the previous operating cycle. The radiation instrumentation setpoint had been set very low due to historically low RCS activity levels.
Apparent human performance problems led to several system configuration control issues.
None of the instances noted resulted in significant safety consequences; however, these problems adversely affected outage work controls. The issues were being addressed by operations and other interfacing groups through the licensee's corrective aclion process.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 4of16 April9, 1999
GWXAIX.~T'SSUES IvmrMX Date ape Source ID SFA Code item Descript/on 10/13/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
OPS 1A 3A 3B 10/13/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
OPS 3B 10/13/97 Negative IR 97-10 N
OPS 3B Operator performance observed throughout the inspection period was generally good; however two examples of weak configuration controls were observed when reactor makeup water was'nadvertently drained into the waste holdup tank. Control room operators performed well while troubleshooting the inadvertent discharge; however, it was apparent that personnel errors and potentially inadequate maintenance contributed to these events.
The licensee's intention to conduct training on configuration control deficiencies and maintenance practices were appropriate.
The licensed operator requalification program, examination materials, and the licensee's conduct of examinations were satisfactory. The operating crew and all individuals passed their requaiification examinations under both the NRC and the licensee's grading. Conflicting cautions in the emergency operating procedure for transfer to cold leg recirculation had not been appropriately addressed.
Although the cautions were incorporated from generic industry-wide procedures, the licensee's approach to the conflict was atypical and depended upon situation-specific evaluations.
The licensee was training operators to evaluate the degree to which they should comply with one caution, and excessive use of evaluator judgement in grading procedure tasks in Job Performance Measures (JPMs).
The classroom training for system engineers on the new veridor technical manual (VTM) program was very good. The topics covered adequately addressed the new program requirements.
The instructor was effective in relaying VTMprogram information and encouraging audience participation.
10/13/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
OPS 1B 5B The licensee took appropriate corrective actions to address the inadvertent actuation of the fire deluge system for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Additionally, the security department's investigation which determined that the actuation was unintentional was prompt and thorough.
8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
MAINT 7/20/98 Positive IR 98-07 N
MAINT 2B 3A 2A 2B 5A Controlled procedures were used at job sites. The procedures were up to date and were properly used by technicians involved in maintenance and surveillance work. The inspectors-observed good personnel and plant safety practices.
Equipment tested met the acceptance criteria specified for operability.
The licensee successfully replaced the 9-A reactor trip relay within the time constraints of the ITS LCO. However, the inability to identify that an incorrect replacement part had been requisitioned until just prior to installation indicated deficiencies in the licensee's work planning and requisitioning of spare parts.
In addition, potential inventory control deficiencies may have existed in the plant stockroom.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 5 of 16 April9, 1999
Date Type Source 7/20/98 Positive IR 98-07 5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 5/17/98 Positive IR 98-04 ID SFA Code N
MAINT 1A 2A N
MAINT GA GC N
MAINT 2A 28 GC N
MAINT 1A 3A 28 N
MAINT 1C 28 N
MAINT 1C 4C N
MAINT 5A 5C N
MAINT 2A 28 N
MAINT 1C 3A Item Description Plant equipment received adequate post-maintenance testing prior to its return to service.
Good personnel and plant safety practices were observed during the maintenance work.
Careful and deliberate actions were observed to have been taken by the l&Ctechnicians which contributed to the successful replacement of the pressurizer pressure defeat switch. The switch replacement appeared to correct previously observed intermittent swings in primary system pressure, and the licensee's intention to perform further'laboratory analysis on the replaced switch was considered appropriate.
The licensee employed good troubleshooting techniques and effectively utilized new test equipment to identify a failure mechanism in the 8-CCW pump power supply breaker. The licensee was taking appropriate action in response to the failure of the 8-SW pump breaker to close on May 12, 1998.
Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed in accordance with procedural requirements.
Plant equipment received adequate post-maintenance testing prior to its return to service. The licensee practiced good personnel and plant safety practices.
The as-found and as-left test data met the expected performance values and the acceptance criteria stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Allstructures, systems and components (SSCs) were appropriately identified and included within the scope of the maintenance rule. Performance criteria for (a)(2) systems were acceptable, and goals and monitoring for (a)(1) systems were appropriate.
System classification in accordance with the requirements of the maintenance rule was appropriate, with the possible exception of the 8 emergency diesel generator output breaker problem.
The quality of the probabilistic risk assessment was appropriate to risk rank systems for the maintenance rule. The expert panel had maintained a level of consistent, conservative decision making.
Facility initiated audits and self assessments of the maintenance rule program requirements were broad based and effective. Significant improvements in the implementation of the program were noted.
Material condition of the plant was good, with the exception of the residual heat removal pump room and selected portions of component cooling water piping.
The facility's assessment of plant risk during on-line maintenance was good. The decision to reduce power two per cent for reactor protection rack calibrations was considered conservative and appropriate.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 6 of 16 April9, 1999
GINNAPLY >SSUaS MArlx Date TYpe Source 4/5/98 VIO IR 98-03 VIO 98-03-02 3/12/98 Positive IR 98-02 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 3/27/98 Positive IR 98-05 ID SFA Code N
MAINT 3B 3C N
MAINT 5A 5B 5C N
MAINT 1A 5A 5C N
MAINT 1A 3A 3C N
MAINT 3A 3C 2B Item Descr/pt/on Licensed reactor and senior reactor operators understood the use of risk matrix guidelines and were generally well informed of the maintenance rule program. Operators and system engineers were able to fulfilltheir responsibilities under the maintenance rule during normal operations and emergent work situations.
System engineer knowledge of system status and operation was good, as well as, their knowledgeable of the requirements of the rule. However, they displayed an uneasiness in making maintenance preventable functional failure determinations.
Industry operating experience (IOE) had been incorporated into the maintenance program, and system managers displayed familiaritywith the review and usage ~
of IOE events.
The output circuit breaker from the B-emergency diesel generator (B-EDG) to safeguards bus 16 experienced five failures during periodic surveillance tests in the period from January 1995 to March 1998. The March 1998 failure was attributed to a defective condition that resulted from a missing internal component which had not been installed since 1985.
In addition, the power supply circuit breaker for the B-service water pump (B-SWP) experienced three failures following simulated over-current conditions during post-maintenance testing conducted in June 1993, May 1995, and March 1998. The high number of repetitive failures experienced in these circuit breakers followed problem identification and root cause analyses that were not sufficient to identify and correct significant conditions adverse to quality until March 1998. These failures were two examples of a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,"Corrective Action'he instrument and control (ILC) calibration activities being performed before the event were found to have been well coordinated with the operating crew. Operator response to the event was good after they became aware of the pressurizer pressure increase.
Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed in accordance with procedural requirements.
Plant equipment received adequate post-maintenance testing prior to its return to service. The licensee practiced good personnel and plant safety practices.
The as-found and as-left test data met the expected performance values and the acceptance criteria stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
The replacement of the recirculation line air operated valve (AOV)controllers in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system should effectively resolve previously noted problems with AFW recirculation line reliability. Instrumentation and control technicians displayed a good working knowledge of component operation and installation. However, the procedure used to replace the controller was somewhat vague in that some specific instructions needed to perform the replacement were not included.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 7 of 16 April 9, 1999
l
G>NXWPLY ~SSUxS MATRIX Date 1/4/98 7ype VIO Source IR 97-12 VIO 97-1 2-01 ID SFA Code N
MAINT 3A 5C 4B Item Descr/ptlon Mechanical maintenance personnel improperly entered out-of-specification test data into two preventive maintenance procedures for the B-'emergency diesel generator, and certified the data as satisfactory without consulting with maintenance management.
The failure to comply with the administrative requirements of nuclear directive ND-MAI,administrative procedure A-1603.5, and maintenance procedure M-15.1M is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 11/1 6/97 Negative IR 97-11 11/1 6/97 Negative IR 97-11 11/16/97 Negative IR 97-11 11/16/97 Positive IR 97-11 11/16/97 Positive IR 97-11 N
MAINT 5B 5C 4B N
MAINT 1C 3A 3B N
MAINT 3A 3B 1C N
MAINT 1C 3B L
MAINT 2B 3B 4C N
MAINT 1C 2B 3B The licensee effectively identified and resolved problems with the main turbine hydrogen side seal oil cooler. The addition of a service water isolation valve for the cooler was an appropriate modification.
The guidelines for hanging test tags did not provide sufficient guidance to ensure that the tags were installed and used consistently by plant personnel.
However, the licensee was quickly resolved the problem once it was brought to their attention, and the changes made to the test tag procedure were adequate to clarifyprogrammatic requirements.
Better communications and attention to detail could have prevented several outage work control issues.
Work control problems were partially responsible for degraded configuration controls.
The procedure for overspeed testing the TDAFW pump was inadequate in that it did not provide specific guidance on the operation of the trip throttle valve to ensure that the turbine would not Inadvertently trip on overspeed.
The licensee's intention to revise the procedure to provide more specific instructions was appropriate.
The completion status of the licensee's first refuel outage inspection in the third period of the third ten year inspection interval was consistent with the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section XI, IWB/C/D-2400 and the rules of 10 CFR 50.55 a.
The licensee examination of selected components, and a safety injection (Sl) Class 2 pipe line-to-elbow weld, was consistent with ASME Section XI Rules for Inservice Inspection.
The licensee supported a comprehensive chemistry program that monitored all significant elements and combinations whose control is necessary for extended SG operability.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 8 of 16 April9, 1999
Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Descrlptton 11/16/97 Positive IR 97-11 N
MAINT 10/13/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
MAINT 1C RG&E's procedures for acquisition, analysis, and evaluation of SG tube eddy current 58 examinations were commensurate with the state-of-the-art.
The data acquisition, analysis, and 38 Interpretation was well-organized and efficiently implemented.
The examination program was comprehensive and exceeded the requirements of 10 CFR 50 for SG tube inspection.
Examination results showed no reportable degradation.
However, there were fabrication concerns of tube over-expansion, manufacturing buff marks, and tubes in close proximity that the licensee was monitoring closely.
1A LimitingCondition for Operation (LCO) maintenance was successfully performed on the 28 8-residual heat removal (8-RHR) pump. A good post-maintenance test critique identified 5A areas for improvement, which included the addition of an LCO work coordinator. The licensee's decision to maintain increased monitoring of the 8-RHR pump to evaluate escalated vibration was appropriate.
8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
ENG 18 The licensee effectively compensated for average temperature variations caused by primary 5A coolant streaming, which allowed the rod control system to be returned to the automatic mode 5C of operation.
7/20/98 Negative IR 98-07 IFI 98-07-02 N
ENG 5/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
ENG 4/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 N
ENG 7/20/98 Positive IR 98-07 N
ENG 48 Although actual test results indicated that the CS system has not operated outside its design 4C basis, the lack of specific flowcalculations for the CS system chemical eductor flow requirements represented a weakness in the plant's design basis records.
4A The licensee's containment recirculation fan cooler tests and subsequent performance analysis 48 represented good progress toward completion of the GL 89-13 program. The performance 4C analysis appeared to support the licensee's conclusion that a 54 month preventive maintenance cleaning cycle for each cooler would maintain their heat removal capacity within design limits foraccident heat loads.
28 The licensee's Motor-Operated Valve periodic verification program was acceptable for GL 89-4C 10 program closure.
48 Engineering provided effective support in the troubleshooting and problem identification for the 4C 8-EDG breaker failure.
3A FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 9of16 April 9, 1999
GINNAP&WT ISSUES MATMX Date ape Source
/D SFA-Code Item Descript/on 4/5/98 Licensin g
IR 98-03 N
ENG 4/5/98 Positive IR 98-03 L
ENG 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
ENG 11/7/97 VIO IR 97-13 VIO 97-13-03 N
ENG 11/7/97 Positive IR 97-13 N
ENG 11/7/97 VIO IR 97-13 VIO 97-13-02 N
ENG 2/21/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
ENG 1C 4B 4B 1B 3B 5A 5B 4C 4B 3B 1A 2B 5C 4C 4B 3A Some License Amendment Requests (LARs) submitted by RG&E over the past year have had a reduction in the quality and quantity of, information needed by NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to fullyprocess the LARs. The licensee was involved with industry groups addressing these issues, and considering self-assessments through the QA organization and an outside consultant. These actions appeared adequate to address this concern.
The licensee took prudent actions to eliminate an unjustified analytical assumption for containment recirculation fan cooler (CRFC) motor cooler thermal performance.
The CRFC and motor cooler performance tests appeared to justifytheir operability up to the maximum design service water temperature of 80 degrees fahrenheit ('F).
The inspectors concluded that the Maintenance Rule training for system engineers was effective with good student participation on the subject matter. The written training material contained good information that should effectively aid the systems engineers in their assessments of system performance.
The licensee's discovery that Boraflex degradation had occurred in the spent fuel pool (SFP) was timely and should permit corrective actions prior to the 1998 SFP rerack. The licensee's immediate corrective actions to ensure subcriticality and their intention to perform analysis to determine longer term corrective actions were appropriate.
Input assumptions were used in several instances without adequate validation, resulting in incorrect design calculations, which under-estimated the thrust requirements for three MOVs.
The failure to adequately validate MOVdesign inputs was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control'.
Substantial improvements in the MOVprogram were evident. Self assessments and independent reviews were utilized to develop significant enhancements in MOVdesign and testing. Program documents and procedures were rewritten, test data reexamined, revised assumptions developed and new diagnostic test equipment procured.
The quality of design calculations was generally good, and degraded voltage and weak link analyses were redone.
Calculations (performed by a vendor) had not been finalized and accepted under the Ginna Station Quality Assurance (QA) program and had not received formal RG&E review and approval. The failure to approve the vendor's calculations is a poor engineering practice wilh resp'ect to configuration control and was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion Vll, "Control of Purchased Material Equipment and Services".
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 10 of 16 April 9, 1999
GINNAPLAINTISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 1/4/98 Positive IR 97-12 11/1 6/97 Negative IR 97-11 10/13/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
ENG L
ENG L
ENG 48 4C 3A 28 3A 38 48 4A 5C System engineering provided adequate technical support to resolve problems in the AFW system.
The licensee's analysis determined that foreign material in the reactor core was the root cause of damage found in the cladding of three failed fuel pins. The foreign material was a machined stainless steel remnant, and was probably produced during reactor coolant system piping weld preparation when the steam generators were replaced in the 1996 refueling outage.
The failed fuel assembly could not be reconstituted or reused in the core, and the licensee revised the core reload pattern for cycle ¹27 to accommodate four spent assemblies.
The licensee adequately evaluated the potential for a loss of RHR injection capability for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in MODE 4 operations.
The safety evaluation written to support modification of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) configuration adequately evaluated the capability of the safety injection (Sl) hot leg flow paths to provide sufficient cooling flow during the injection phase of a MODE 4 LOCA.
8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
PS 8/21/98 Negative IR 98-08 N
PS 8/21/98 Negative IR 98-08 N
PS 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
PS 8/21/98 Positive IR 98-08 N
PS 7/20/98 Positive IR 98-07 N
PS 5A 3A 5C 3A 3C 5A 58 5C 3A 3C 28 3A 18 3C 28 The ACTION Reporting system was readily and effectively used to identify, evaluate, and resolve radiological deficiencies.
Detailed analyses were performed to evaluate trends, significance reviews were performed, and adequate corrective actions were taken.
Changes in personnel assignments and responsibilities resulted in some loss of continuity with regard to oversight of issues related to potential spent fuel pool leakage.
An exception to good housekeeping was identified in the residual heat removal (RHR) pump room in that several gallons of water were present on the floor adjacent to the A-RHR pump, and licensee staff had not identified the source of the standing water.
Plans and preparations for scheduled fuel pool diving and procedural guidance for support of radiography activities were well developed and included sufficient measures to prevent unplanned exposures.
Efforts to reduce radiation exposure were successful as evidenced by declining radiation exposures.
The projected radiation exposure total for 1998 was the lowest in the station's history.
The licensee made procedure and programmatic changes to assure that maintenance team debriefings were properly conducted, and to improve the accuracy of field information conveyed to EP managers during exercises.
Debriefings conducted during the recent plume exposure exercise were effective and significantly improved.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 11 of 16 April 9, 1999
GINNAPLen rSSUaS M>TIUx Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Descr/ptlon 4/5/98 Negative IR 98-03 L
2/21/98
. Positive IR 98-01 N
1/4/98 Positive IR 97-1 2 N
11/16/97 NCV IR 97-11 L
Negative NCV 97-11-05 11/16/97 Positive IR 97-11 N
11/16/97 Negative IR 97-11 N
PS 3A 5B 3B PS 1C 3A 3B PS 1C 3A 3B PS 3B 1C 5A PS 1C 3B 5C PS 2A 2B 3A Overall operator actions in the plant simulator adequately demonstrated their ability to respond to simulated plant events during a radiological emergency exercise.
Some difficulties were noted in communications with other response groups, and not all notifications were made as expected.
The licensee's self-identified concerns reflected a critical evaluation of the poor performance.
The fire protection program has been effective in maintaining the integrity of fire barrier penetration seats, arid good controls of combustible materials were developed and Implemented.
The licensee maintained an adequate security and safeguards program. The conduct of security activities met licensee commitments and NRC requirements.
Security facilities and equipment were well maintained and reliable. Security. procedures were being properly implemented, security staff knowledge, performance and training were acceptable.
Security organization and administration, and quality assurance programs were adequate to ensure effective implementation of the program. The lock and key program was reviewed and determined to be implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Security Plan.
As a result of the licensee's failure to post a high radiation area around the gas decay tank (GDT), corrective actions were proposed to develop a procedural requirement for the operations group to communicate/coordinate with the health physics organization prior to degassing of the volume control tank to the GDT. Other operational evolutions that have the potential for changing radiological conditions willalso be evaluated.
This licensee identified and corrected violation was not cited.
The quality and content of a special training session on radiological boundary controls provided to station and contractor health physics technicians were excellent. The training incorporated details of a recent industry event.
Housekeeping was generally good in the primary auxiliary and intermediate buildings, and generally poor in the containment building. In addition, the material condition of the refuel cavity wall was somewhat degraded in that water leaked from the refuel cavity to the containment floor.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 12 of 16 April9, 1999
GONNAPLan rSsUES MArMX Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Description 11/1 6/97 Positive IR 97-11 N
-PS 10/13/97 Strength IR 97-10 N
PS 1C The licensee continued to maintain an etfective radiological controls program.
Radiological 3A controls for outage work were effective in minimizing radiation dose and controlling 3B contamination levels. The threshold for entering radiological control deficiencies into the 3C ACTION Reporting system had decreased, and the system was eftectively used to identify and resolve radiological control deficiencies. A weakness in vadiological control briefings was
'dentified, and although significant efforts were made, management has not been fully successful in fmproving human performance with regard to work in and around radiological boundaries.
0 1C 'he licensee continued to maintain a very good emergency preparedness (EP) program. The 3B emergency response facilities, personnel, procedures, instrumentation and supplies were maintained ln a high state of readiness.
The licensee's 1997 EP audit did not address or evaluate drills and exercises as stated in 10 CFR 50.54(t). Despite not specifically evaluating
- drills and exercises during the 1997 audit, the audit was of sufficient scope and depth to eftectively assess the EP program, and the audit contained numerous recommendations to enhance the program. The audit was thorough and the report was useful to licensee management in assessing the eftectiveness of the EP program.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 13 of 16 April9, 1999
ABBREVIATIONSUSED IN PIM TABLE cd'E IIS LER AOV 4CO Power Opautcd'~gldm ImroanfYahnicalSpecifua tions Dccnsec'Euent @port Ii'abactor Coolant Pump
~tor Coo/ant 5ytan gob Pcrfonnancc9lkasurc
'Vau&r QcdinicaManual'afety, Sytans and Components Ind'ustn/Opau ting 'Estpakncc Service'Jdatcr Pump Instnument andControl'usti/'ary yccdwatcr Pump Airman ted'Valve Qurbinc SrivenAtqi/asy Jud'water
~n Society ofRcctusnicalzryinecrs Dmitin//ConditionforOpaution vidual'Kyat~oval License Amendment ~nest Kotorapesuted'Na&e Spent gueIPool'pality
~uranrc Austilarygca(water FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 14 of 16 April9, 1999
~,
Loss ofCoo/ant~cnt Kmnpcncy &@pared'ness Containsncnt ~'rcn/ation Jan Cookr Knmpency Msc/gcncrator FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 15 of 16 April9, 1999
n
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLECOLUMNS Date Type Source ID SFA Code Item Descr/ptton The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspection period (for IRs).
The categorization of the item or finding - see the Type/ Findings Type Code table, below.
The document that describes the findings: LER for Ucensee Event Reports, EALfor Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspection Reports.
Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Ucensee; or S for Selt Identifying (events).
SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engfneering; and PS for Plant Support.
Template Code - see table below.
Details of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in IRs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying information contained in EALs.
TYPEI FINDINGS CODES TEMPLATECODES ED Strength Weakness EEI ~
VIO NCV DEV Positive Negative LER URI" Llcenslng MISC Enforcement Discretion-No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, II, III,or IV Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc. The type of all MISC findings are to be put in the Item Description column.
Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and AbilitiesI Training; C - Work Environment Engineering/Design: A-Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C-Resolution NOTES:
EEls are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 10/1/98 16 of 16 April9, 1999
ENCLOSURE 2 GINNAINSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION TI 2515-Y2K TITLE/PROGRAM AREA Review of Year 2000 Readiness for Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants PLANNED DATE 05/10/99 INSPECTION TYPE Safety Issue Review IP40500 IP 81110 IP 37550 IP 86750 IP 82302 IP71001 IP 82301 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Operational Safeguards Response'valuation ORSE Engineering Solid Rad. Waste Management and Trans ortation of Radioactive Material Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario for Power Reactors Licensed Operator Requalification Pro ram Evaluation Evaluation of Exercises for Power Re'actors 05/1 0/99 06/21/99 07/1 9/99 08/09/99 09/13/99 10/04/99 11/15/99 Core Team Inspection Regional Initiative Core Team Ins ection Core Ins ection In-Office Review Core lns ection Core Inspection