ML033140581

License Amendment Request: Increase the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Maximum Enrichment Limit with Soluble Boron and Burnup Credit, Attachments 1 Through 5

ML033140581
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/30/2003
From:	Constellation Energy Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
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Download: ML033140581 (162)

Text

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

September 30, 2003

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the spent fuel pool (SFP) is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a safe storage condition. Per 10 CFR 50.68, if no credit for soluble boron is taken, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. In addition, the maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of the fresh fuel assemblies is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

The current Technical Specifications limit the maximum enrichment for standard fuel assemblies based on an older pellet design utilizing smaller pellet diameters and stack densities to 4.52 weight percent U-235. The corresponding maximum enrichment for value added pellet (VAP) fuel assemblies utilizing larger pellet diameters and stack densities is limited to 4.30 weight percent U-235 with the present storage configuration and with no credit for soluble boron. Note that VAP fuel is more reactive than similarly enriched standard fuel, thus any analysis performed for VAP fuel conservatively bounds that for standard fuel.

The current analyses for the Unit 2 SFP assume the presence of Boraflex poison sheets with 4" staggered gaps. However, possible boraflex degradation in the Unit 2 SFP was calculated using the Racklife software package.

The Racklife results indicated that at certain highly-irradiated locations the degradation could be as high as 70%.

An evaluation was performed to determine Calvert Cliffs' compliance with Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, which states that k-effective must be less than or equal to 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water including an allowance for uncertainties and biases as described in the Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Crediting burnup in lieu of Boraflex assures that the Technical Specification k-effective limit of 0.95 is maintained. Each assembly offloaded from either reactor or from an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation dry shielded canister must be evaluated against the burnup restrictions to determine if it can be safely stored in the Unit 2 SFP.

No similar restrictions exist on the Unit I SFP.

This submittal documents the Calvert Cliffs SFP Rack Criticality Methodology that was used to ensure k-effective for the Unit 2 SFP is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 regulatory limit for VAP fuel. The soluble boron credit will be limited to 300 ppm per the restrictions of the Unit 1 criticality analysis documented in Reference (1). Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. The proposed change to Technical Specification 4.3.1 adds approximately 15 percent to this value to account for any unknown uncertainties. This increases the boron level to 350 ppm required to safely store 5.0 weight percent VAP fuel in the SFP.

Several checkerboard fuel patterns were modeled in an effort to determine if more reactive fuel can be stored in the Unit 2 SFP while meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. This will require that a fuel assembly that does not have sufficient burnup to satisfy the reactivity requirements must be surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other non-reactive materials (e.g., wall, water, etc.).

The calculation contained in Attachment (5) documents the Calvert Cliffs SFP Rack Criticality Methodology. This calculation shows that the spent fuel pool rack multiplication factor, k-effective, is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 regulatory limit with 5.0 weight percent VAP fuel and with credit for soluble boron and burnup in the Unit 2 SFP. The proposed change will add Technical Specification 3.7.17 I

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS "Spent Fuel Pool Storage" to provide the necessary configuration controls. The proposed Technical Specification conforms to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications.

An additional consideration needed to allow the credit of the soluble boron is the negative reactivity required to ensure that acceptable levels of subcriticality are maintained, assuming a design basis event occurs. For spent fuel storage, we must consider credible boron dilution events. The analysis for the boron dilution events determined what the minimum SFP boron concentration needs to be at the start of a credible event in order to ensure the boron concentration does not go below 350 ppm. The proposed changes will add Technical Specification 3.7.16, "Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration," to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications to provide sufficient negative reactivity to ensure acceptable levels of subcriticality for spent fuel storage assuming a dilution event.

Technical Specification 3.7.16 was proposed for the Unit 1 Technical Specifications as part of the proposed change described in Reference (1). A minimum SFP boron concentration of 2000 ppm supports the normal and accident boron assumptions in the required calculations (see Attachment 6). With credit being taken for soluble boron in the SFP, a Surveillance Requirement will be included in Technical Specification 3.7.16 to ensure the appropriate minimum concentration of soluble boron is maintained in the SFP for both normal and accident conditions. The proposed Surveillance Requirement to verify the SFP boron concentration is appropriate because no major replacement of pool water is expected to take place over a short period of time. This proposed Surveillance Requirement Frequency conforms to the Improved Standard Technical Specification Frequency.

SYSTEM DESIGN The SFP is a large rectangular structure that holds the spent fuel assemblies from the reactors in both units. Each half of the pool is 54 feet long, 25 feet wide, and approximately 39 feet deep (the floor elevation varies). Borated water fills the SFP and completely covers the spent fuel assemblies. The SFP is constructed of reinforced concrete 5-1/2 to 6 feet in thickness and is lined with a 3/16-inch stainless steel liner that serves as a leakage barrier. A 3-1/2 foot dividing wall separates the SFP, with the north half being associated with Unit I and the south half associated with Unit 2. A slot in the dividing wall has a removable gate that allows movement of fuel assemblies between the two halves of the pool. The SFP is located in the Auxiliary Building between the two containment structures. Each half of the SFP is equipped with vertical spent fuel racks installed on the pool bottom. The fuel rack cells are individual double-walled containers approximately 14 feet high. The inner wall of each cell is made from a 0.06-inch thick sheet of stainless steel formed into a square cross-section container, indented on the corners, with an inside dimension of 8.56 inches. The outer or external wall is also formed from a stainless steel sheet 0.06 inches thick.

Plates of borated, neutron absorbing material are inserted between the two cell walls, in each of the four spaces formed by the indentations in the inner wall. The plates are made of a composite material (Boraflex) consisting mainly of boron carbide (B4C) and are 6.5 inches wide by 0.08 inches thick. Each plate originally contained at least 0.020 grams of boron-10 per square centimeter of plate. Although Calvert Cliffs has a coupon surveillance program that confirms the integrity of the Boraflex material, possible Boraflex degradation in the Unit 2 SFP was calculated using the Racklife software package.

Therefore, Boraflex was not credited in the Unit 2 criticality analysis. The spacing between the cells is maintained at 10 3/32 inches, center-to-center, by external sheets and welded spacers. The original SFP design used boron plate inserts and assembly spacing to help maintain the SFP assemblies in a subcritical condition. The Unit 2 SFP racks are vertical cells grouped in ten OxlO modules.

The racks are designed to withstand all anticipated loadings.

Structural deformations are limited to preclude any possibility of criticality. The Seismic Category 1 racks are supported in such a manner as to 2

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS preclude a reduction in separation under either the Operating Basis or Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The racks are designed not to collapse or bow under the force of a fuel assembly dropped into an empty cavity or dropped horizontally across the top of the racks assuming no drag resistance from the water. Heavy loads in excess of 1600 lbs are prohibited from travel over spent fuel assemblies in the SFP unless such loads are handled by a single-failure proof device. The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane, which is designed in accordance with the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, is used to handle heavy loads in the SFP area. Thus, a cask or heavy object drop accident is not a credible event.

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS The fuel assemblies contain uranium dioxide (UO2 ) over the entire length of the active fuel region in each fuel rod and a uniform distribution of enrichments both radially and axially.

The fuel and 14x14 assembly parameters for Westinghouse/Combustion Engineering standard and VAP fuel designs are detailed in the Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Since the VAP fuel design is more limiting, all calculations performed in this work will model VAP assemblies.

The VAP fuel is contained in a 14x14 assembly array. The VAP fuel rods were modeled with six different clad materials (Zirlo, Optin, Zirc-4, low tin Zirlo, Alloy A, and M5) to maximize assembly reactivity. No shims were modeled in the fuel assemblies.

Burnable Absorbers NUREG/CR-6760 details the effect of Integral Burnable Absorbers (IBAs) on reactivity as a function of burnup, fuel enrichment, IBA number and loading, and cooling time. Integral Burnable Absorbers are burnable poisons that are an integral part of the fuel assembly. Two types are detailed. The first is the Westinghouse Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA), which has a coating of zirconium diboride (ZrB2) on the fuel pellets and which does not displace fuel. The second includes UO2-Gd2O3 rods, U0 2-Er2O3 rods, and A1203-B4C rods, which do displace fuel. For pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels without IBAs, reactivity decreases with burnup in a nearly linear fashion. For PWR fuel assembly designs that make significant use of IBAs, reactivity actually increases as fuel burnup increases, reaching a maximum at a burnup where the IBA is nearly depleted (approximately one third of the assembly life), and then decreases with burnup almost linearly. The presence of IBAs during depletion hardens the neutron spectrum, resulting in lower U-235 depletion and higher production of fissile plutonium isotopes.

Enhanced plutonium production and the concurrent diminished fission of U-235 can increase the reactivity of the fuel at later burnups.

However, the analyses of NUREG/CR-6760 conclusively demonstrate that with the exception of the Westinghouse IFBA rods, k-effective for an assembly without IBAs is always greater (throughout burnup) than k-effective for an assembly with IBAs, including UO2-Gd2O3 rods, UO2-Er2O3 rods, and A120 3-B4C rods. The negative reactivity effect of the BAs was found to increase with increasing poison loading (the number of poison rods and the absorber content) and with increasing initial fuel enrichment. This is due to the negative residual effect associated with the neutron-absorbing isotopes and with the reduced reactivity due to the reduction in fissile isotopes.

Therefore, for those IBAs other than IFBAs, burnup credit criticality safety analyses may conservatively neglect the presence of the IBAs by assuming non-poisoned equivalent enrichment fuel.

Two-dimensional radially-infinite calculations have demonstrated that the neutron multiplication factor is slightly greater for assembly designs with IFBA rods (maximum of 0.4%Ak). Similar reactivity behavior as a function of IBA loading is observed for Calvert Cliffs-specific VAP fuel. Since the non-poisoned equivalent enriched fuel is more reactive than the poisoned fuel, our burnup criticality safety analysis assumed non-poisoned equivalent enriched fuel to assure conservative results.

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ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Reactivity Equivalency The spent fuel inventory subsequent to the decay of the short-lived Xe-135 isotope is typically used within the storage pool geometry to determine a fresh fuel enrichment that provides the same reactivity as the spent fuel inventory. This Reactivity Equivalent Fresh Fuel Enrichment (REFFE) is then used within a criticality safety analysis code to perform the actual safety analysis. The acceptability of this practice can be demonstrated, provided the environment in which the REFFE is determined remains unchanged (e.g., an infinite array of identical storage rack cells in unborated water). However, if the REFFE is determined based on a reference configuration and employed in the analysis of another condition, erroneous estimations of reactivity may result.

The use of REFFE can be shown to produce nonconservative results when used in the presence of soluble boron. These results show increasing nonconservatism with increasing soluble boron concentration and with increasing burnup. The soluble boron in the water is an effective thermal neutron absorber. Because of its negative reactivity worth, the presence of soluble boron reduces the relative reactivity worth of the fission products and actinide absorbers.

The fission product and actinide absorbers have greater negative reactivity worth in the unborated reference condition in which the REFFE was determined, resulting in a lower prediction of the REFFE reactivity value. When a REFFE assembly is placed in a checkerboard configuration with a more reactive assembly, the REFFE approach yields nonconservative results. When comparing the reference infinite configuration to a configuration in which the reference assembly is stored with higher-reactivity fuel, the reactivity of the latter configuration is controlled by the higher-reactivity fuel. Physically, the maximum reactivity or fission density for this latter configuration occurs in the higher-reactivity fuel, with the lower-reactivity fuel acting in a supplementary manner. Therefore, the fission products and actinide absorbers have less relative negative reactivity worth in this configuration (as compared to the reference configuration), because they are not physically located where the fission density is maximum.

Because of the possible nonconservatisms referenced above, reactivity equivalence was not used in this evaluation.

Source Terms The source-term portion of this evaluation employs SAS2H, a functional module in the SCALE system, to calculate the bumup-dependent source terms for the Unit 2 SFP system. The SAS2H control module performs the depletion/decay analysis using well-established codes and data libraries provided in the SCALE system. Problem-dependent resonance processing of neutron cross-sections is performed using the Bondarenko resonance self-shielding module BONAMI-S and the Nordheim Integral Treatment resonance self-shielding module NITAWL-II. The XSDRNPM-S module is used to produce spectral weighted and collapsed cross-sections for the fuel depletion calculations. COUPLE updates the cross-section constants included in an ORIGEN-S nuclear data library with data from the cell-weighted cross-section library produced by XSDRNPM-S.

The weighting spectrum computed by XSDRNPM-S is applied to update all nuclides in the ORIGEN-S library that were not specified in the XSDRNPM-S analysis. The point-depletion ORIGEN-S module is used to compute time-dependent concentrations and source terms for isotopes simultaneously generated and depleted through neutronic transmutation, fission, and radioactive decay. The cross-section library 44GROUPNDF5 was utilized in this evaluation. The cross-section 44GROUPNDF5 is a 44-energy group library derived from the latest ENDF/B-V files with the exception of 0-16, Eu-154, and Eu-155, which were taken from the more improved ENDF/B-VI files.

Regulatory guidance dictates that a reactivity uncertainty, due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculation, should be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties. Although SAS2H is benchmarked to the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 14 environmental qualification radioactive source terms and to the measured data in ORNL/TM-12667, no reactivity biases or uncertainties were determined. In the absence of any other determination of the depletion uncertainty, an uncertainty equal to 5% of the reactivity decrement to the burnup of interest is an acceptable assumption. Thus, for 5.0 weight percent 4

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS fuel burned to 70 GWD/MTU, a worst case uncertainty value of 0.02089 was calculated and was used in all burnup related reactivity calculations. Comparisons against the radiochemical assay (RCA) data of Calvert Cliffs fuel presented in ORNLITM-12667 and PNNL 13667 were also performed. The results indicate that the isotopic compositions predicted for Calvert Cliffs fuel by SAS2H produce conservative values of k-effective [k(SAS2H) > k(RCA)].

The reactivity of a SAS2H-generated system is more conservative by 0.358% Ak than an RCA-normalized system. An independent comparison performed by Bechtel SAIC and reported at the 2002 ANS Winter Meeting, also shows a similar result. Thus, use of the 0.02089 uncertainty was extremely conservative.

The SAS2H employs multiple steps (paths) at specified burnup intervals to produce a burnup dependent cross-section library for use in the ORIGEN-S depletion. The model used in SAS2H Path A represents the fuel as an infinite lattice of fuel pins. Cell-weighted cross-sections are produced by this model and are then applied to the fuel zone of the Path B model.

The model applied to SAS2H Path B is a larger unit cell model used to represent part of an assembly within an infinite lattice. The concept of using cell-weighted data in the l-D XSDRNPM-S analysis of Path B is an appropriate method for evaluating heterogeneity effects found in fuel pin lattices. The Path B model is used by SAS2H to generate few-group, cell-weighted cross-sections for ORIGEN-S, and to calculate the neutron flux for an assembly-averaged fuel region that is used to update the ORIGEN-S spectral parameters for isotopes not explicitly included in the cell model. The essential rule in deriving the zone radii is to maintain the relative volumes in the actual assembly.

Additional conservative assumptions utilized in the SAS2H isotopics generation are as follows:

1)

A decrease in refueling downtime results in less Pu-241 decay to Am-241, which results in increased reactivity.

A 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay time at end-of-life per Technical Specifications is conservatively assumed.

2)

A significant spatial variation exists in the fuel temperature because of the low thermal conductivity of U02.

The fuel temperature is highest at the pellet centerline and lowest at the pellet outside diameter. In addition, the fuel temperature varies axially due to different linear heat generation rates at different axial positions. An increase in fuel temperature increases the resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to Doppler effect, which results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in fuel temperature. It is thus desirable to select a value for fuel temperature that estimates the highest average temperature that an assembly has experienced. The fuel temperature used is the highest axially-averaged fuel temperature, based on the rated linear power multiplied by the radial peaking factor limit. The bounding fuel temperature was calculated as a function of burnup for a Tho, value of 6011F, a core thermal power of 2970 MWt (2700 MWt times a 10% power uprate), and a radial peaking factor of 1.65. The peak fuel temperature value of 1285.420K at zero burnup was conservatively employed in all SAS2H calculations.

3)

The moderator temperature is lowest at the reactor inlet and increases monotonically as it reaches the reactor outlet. This increase in moderator temperature is greater in a hot channel where the heat generation is higher than the average. Neutron spectral hardening occurs with an increase in moderator temperature due to fewer hydrogen nuclides that thermalize fast neutrons past the resonance region. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is 5

AT17ACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS increased reactivity with an increase in moderator temperature.

The moderator temperature increases from the bottom to the top of the reactor core. Thus, the use of the average core outlet temperature conservatively bound the moderator temperature. Applying the average core outlet temperature over the entire fuel length and for the entire depletion time provides adequate assurance of bounding treatment. An average core outlet temperature of 6011F or 589.261K with a corresponding water density of 0.6905 gm/cc was conservatively employed in all SAS2H calculations.

4)

The concentration of soluble boron is adjusted to maintain core criticality. The soluble boron concentration is gradually decreased as the burnup increases and reaches a minimum value at the end-of-cycle. The soluble boron present in the moderator increases the thermal absorption cross-section, decreases the thermal flux, and results in a hardened neutron spectrum. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in soluble boron concentration. The maximum average boron concentration is to be identified and used in the SAS2H depletion analysis. The maximum beginning-of-cycle soluble boron concentration is less than 1820 ppm. Thus a bounding beginning-of-cycle soluble boron concentration of 1900 ppm was conservatively assumed with a linear letdown curve, resulting in a maximum average soluble boron concentration of 950 ppm.

5)

The reactivity results were shown to be only slightly power-dependent. The reactivity tends to increase slightly with decreasing assembly power. Thus the core-averaged assembly power of 12.442 MW (2700 MWt/217 assemblies) was utilized in this work.

6)

Per regulatory guidance, the SFP storage rack should be evaluated with spent fuel at the highest reactivity following removal from the reactor (usually after the decay of Xe-135).

Thus the SAS2H-generated Xe-135 concentration was conservatively set to zero.

The edited actinides include the important nuclides included in the benchmark comparisons.

U-234 I U-235 I U-238 l NP-237 I PU-238 IPU-239 I PU-240 l

l PU-241 I PU-242 I AM-241 I CM-242 I CM-243 I CM-244 I

The edited fission products include the important nuclides included in the benchmark comparisons.

KR-83 KR-84 KR-86 MO-95 TC-99 RU-101 RH-103 AG-109 SN-126 1-129 XE-131 XE-132 CS-133 XE-134 CS-134 CS-135 CS-137 ND-143 ND-144 ND-145 ND-146 PM-147 SM-147 ND-148 SM-148 SM-149 ND-150 SM-150 SM-151 EU-151 SM-152 EU-153 EU-154 GD-154 EU-155 GD-155 The SCALE 4.4 CSAS25 code module with the 44 group ENDF/B-V cross-section library, 44GROUPNDF5, was utilized in this work to perform the KENO criticality calculations. CSAS25 uses the SCALE Material Information Process and the associated material composition library to calculate material number densities, to prepare geometry data for resonance self-shielding, and to create data input files for the cross-section processing codes, BONAMI and NITAWL-II. The CSAS25 sequence then invokes the KENO-Va Monte Carlo criticality code.

The lattice-type is LATTICECELL 6

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS SQUAREPITCH, assuming cylindrical rods in a square pitch and using the VAP dimensions.

The number of generations per case is 1010, while the number of particles per generation and the number of skipped generations are 600 and 10, respectively. This is identical to the modeling methodology used in the validation effort.

Most of the criticality computations model a single assembly in a storage cell with reflective boundary conditions on all surfaces to simulate an array of infinite axial and radial extent. Eccentric positioning uncertainties were modeled with a ten-by-ten array of storage cells with mirror boundary conditions on all surfaces to simulate a ten-by-ten array of infinite axial and radial extent. The assembly drop accident was simulated with a model of the entire Unit 2 SFP in both the normal and reconstitution configuration.

Benchmarking Regulatory guidance dictates the analysis methods and neutron cross-section data shall be benchmarked by comparison with critical experiment data for similar configurations. The benchmarking process should establish a calculational bias and uncertainty of the mean with a one-sided tolerance factor of 95%

probability at a 95% confidence level. The maximum k-effective value for the SFP is obtained by summing the calculated value, the calculational bias, the total uncertainty (defined as a statistical combination of the calculational and mechanical uncertainties), and the burnup axial distribution bias. A bias that reduces the calculated value of k-effective should not be applied. Mechanical and material uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties. Uncertainties may be combined statistically provided that they are independent variations.

NUREG/CR-6361, "Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages" provides documentation for 180 criticality experiments with geometries, materials, and neutron interaction characteristics representative of LWR fuel in core, storage, and cask arrangements.

NUREG/CR-6361 was used as design input and as the primary reference for the validation calculation package.

Statistical evaluations included calculating the range of calculated k-effective, the mean k-effective, standard deviation of the mean, bias, 95/95 uncertainty in the bias, and the average Monte Carlo error for the whole group of experiments as well as categories within a data base. Trending of k-effective with physical parameters, i.e., fuel rod pitch, fuel enrichment, moderator-to-fuel ratio, soluble boron concentration, assembly separation, and average energy group causing fission, was evaluated by creating scatter plots of k-effective versus each physical parameter and then performing linear regression on the data. The strength of a trend was evaluated by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient from the linear regression. In addition, the validation results were organized into three groupings: reactor core-type experiments, storage rack-type experiments, and cask-type experiments.

For each of these groupings, a bias and 95/95 uncertainty is also specified for use in criticality safety evaluations.

The storage rack-type category combines the results of 123 critical experiments, including the results for the core-type, separator plate, separator plate-soluble boron, and flux trap-void experiments, but excluding the reflector wall categories. This experimental data is sufficiently diverse to establish that the method bias and uncertainty applies to the Calvert Cliffs storage rack conditions. The storage rack-type category exhibits a bias of 0.0008 and a 95/95 one sided uncertainty of 0.0076.

A histogram for the frequency of k-effective values shows a tight clustering of k-effective values near k-effective equal to I and a near normal distribution. Scatter plots were constructed of k-effective versus fuel rod pitch, k-effective versus fuel enrichment, k-effective versus water/fuel volume ratio, k-effective versus H/235U atom ratio, k-effective versus soluble boron concentration, k-effective versus assembly separation, and k-effective versus average energy group of fission, respectively. Also included in each 7

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS plot is the associated regression line and equation with correlation coefficient. Review of these plots indicates all the trend lines are nearly horizontal, with very small correlation coefficients. Thus, there are no significant trends indicated.

Uncertainty Calculations The evaluation of normal storage should be done at the temperature (water density) corresponding to the highest reactivity. In poisoned racks, the highest reactivity will usually occur at a water density of 1.0000 (i.e., at 400F or 277.150K). However, if the temperature coefficient of reactivity is positive, the evaluation should be done at the highest temperature expected during normal operation: i.e., equilibrium temperature under normal refueling conditions (including full-core offload), with one coolant train out-of-service and the pool filled with spent fuel from previous reloads. In the event that any one loop is lost, the remaining two loops [either two spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) loops or one SFPC loop and one shutdown cooling loop] can continue to maintain the pool temperature at or below 1550F (341.480K @

0.9785 gm/cc) for 1830 fuel assemblies in the SFP including a full core offload. An infinite axial and radial array of storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 weight percent fuel was modeled as a function of temperature (401F and 1550F) and as a function of fuel clad material (Zirlo, Optin, Zirc-4, Alloy A, low tin Zirlo, and M5). The Zirc-4 clad cases at 1551F were the most reactive for all conditions (unborated, borated, unburned, burned). This worst case condition was assumed in all calculations.

The mechanical design of the fuel racks is such that the average pitch between cells is maintained by structural members at 10.09375 +/- 0.03125 inches.

Thus a nominal pitch of 10.09375 inches was assumed, and an uncertainty value to +/- 0.03125 inches was included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value.

A storage cell pitch of 10.0625 inches results in the highest reactivity value (0.358% Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 0.449% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.454 %

k at 300 ppm/finite burnup), and the resulting uncertainty values were used in the uncertainty calculations.

The maximum stack height density is 10.31 gm/cc (<94.5% theoretical density). For VAP fuel, the stack height density can range between 94.0% and 96.5% of theoretical density. Thus a nominal stack height density of 94.5% of theoretical density was assumed, and an uncertainty value to 96.5% of theoretical density was included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value. The higher stack height density results in the higher reactivity values, and the resulting uncertainty values (0.090%Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 0.340% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.841% Ak at 300 ppm/finite burnup) were used in the uncertainty calculations Per 10 CFR 50.68, the maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of the fresh fuel assemblies is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

An uncertainty of 0.05 weight percent enrichment was assumed.

The higher enrichment value results in the higher reactivity values, and the resulting uncertainty values (0.155%Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 0.210% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.304% Ak at 300 ppm/finite burnup) were used in the uncertainty calculations.

The mechanical design of the fuel racks is such that the average wall thickness is 0.060+/- 0.010 inches.

Thus a nominal wall thickness of 0.060 inches was assumed, and an uncertainty value to +/- 0.010 inches was included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value.

A storage cell steel thickness of 0.1270 cm results in the highest reactivity values. The above uncertainty values (1.346% Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 0.775% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.698% Ak at 300 ppm/finite burnup) were used in the uncertainty calculations.

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS It is possible for a fuel assembly not to be positioned centrally within a storage cell, because of clearance between the assembly and the cell wall. Calculations have been performed to determine the effects of eccentrically located fuel. It was assumed that the fuel assemblies were displaced diagonally within their storage cells as far as possible towards and away from each other. This generated an uncertainty value, which was included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value. The cases modeled an infinite axial and radial array of xo storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 weight percent fuel as a function of eccentric positioning within the storage cell at the worst case temperature of 1550F for a fuel clad material composed of Zirc4. The larger of the above uncertainty values (0.961% Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 1.112% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.800% Ak at 300 ppm/finite burnup) were used in the uncertainty calculations.

The soluble boron credit is limited to a maximum value of 300 ppm per the restrictions of the Unit 1 criticality analysis. Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. The proposed change to the Technical Specification 4.3.1 adds 15 percent to this value to account for any unknown uncertainties, which increases the boron level to 350 ppm required to safely store 5.0 weight percent VAP fuel in the SFP.

Nominally, all of the cases in this evaluation assume that the pellet-to-clad gap contains void, which it normally does. However, failed fuel rods may exist and the gap may be filled with water of the same composition as that exterior to the fuel rod. The uncertainty values (0.000% Ak at zero boron/zero burnup, 0.356% Ak at 300 ppm/zero burnup, and 0.267% Ak at 300 ppm/finite burnup) were used in the uncertainty calculations.

In addition, fuel clad failure would indicate that certain fission gases and highly soluble nuclides (noble gases, halogens, cesiums, and technetiums) could escape the affected fuel pins and increase system reactivity. Pin failure occurs infrequently (much less than 1% of the rods inserted into the core fail).

When failure does occur, not all of the gases escape from the fuel matrix. Assuming that the pin is at or near centerline melting temperature and assuming that a fuel pin fails for 1 of the 3 cycles of insertion (it is the policy at Calvert Cliffs not to reinsert failed fuel back into the core without reconstitution),

approximately 9% of the noble gases, 33% of the halogens and cesiums, and 99.9% of the technetiums would remain. Conservatively assuming that 5% of all fuel pins fail and that all of the gaseous fission products from the failed fuel would be lost, the change in reactivity would only amount to 0.00084Ak.

Treating this as a component in the uncertainty analysis, the total bias and uncertainty would only increase by 0.001% Ak. In addition, part of this reactivity increase would be negated by a smaller two-dimensional to three-dimensional burnup bias. Thus, this effect is negligible and will be neglected.

Burnup Effects The dynamics of reactor operation results in non-uniform axial-burnup profiles in fuel with any significant burmup.

At the beginning-of-life in a PWR, a near-cosine axial-shaped flux will begin depleting fuel near the axial center of a fuel assembly at a greater rate than at the ends. As the reactor continues to operate, the cosine flux shape will flatten because of the fuel depletion and fission product buildup that occurs near the center. However, because of the high leakage near the ends of the fuel, burnup will drop off rapidly near the ends. The majority of PWR fuel assemblies have similar axial-burnup shapes - relatively flat in the axial mid-section (with peak burnup from 1.1 to 1.2 times the assembly average burnup) and significantly underburned fuel at the ends (with burnup of 50 to 60% of the assembly average). Note that due to a difference in the moderator density, the burnup is slightly higher at the bottom of the assembly than at the top. The cooler higher-density water at the assembly inlet results in a higher reactivity and thus, higher burnup than the warmer moderator at the assembly outlet. An assumed single average burnup incorrectly weights the calculation of k-effective by placing the flux 9

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS profile toward the center of the rod. Thus, leakage is artificially minimized, and burnup in the driving region is artificially reduced. In reality, the most reactive region of spent fuel is towards the assembly ends, where there exists a balance between reactivity due to lower burnup and increased leakage. The reactivity difference between the neutron multiplication factor (k-effective) calculated with explicit representation of the axial burnup distribution and k-effective calculated assuming a uniform axial burnup is referred to as the "end effect".

The "end effect" is dependent on the axial burnup profile, total accumulated burnup, cooling time, initial enrichment, assembly design, and the isotopics considered (i.e., actinide-only or actinide plus fission products).

A reactivity bias was included in the overall k-effective calculations, to account for differences between two-dimensional and three-dimensional modeling.

A conservative set of biases was developed that account for the reactivity difference between a fuel assembly with an explicit axial three-dimensional burnup profile and one with a uniform two-dimensional profile at the same average burnup. The biases were computed and tabulated as a function of both burnup and initial enrichment. The conservative axial bias corresponding to the highest enrichmentlburnup storage limit was employed, since among all enrichment/burnup combinations, the highest yields the largest positive axial bias. Worst-case 18-node axial profiles were extracted from ORNLITM-1999/246 and NUREG/CR-ORNL/TM-2001/33 as a function of burnup. Two-dimensional to three-dimensional comparisons were performed as a function of enrichment and soluble boron. The reactivity bias results indicate that the worst-case reactivity bias (0.03226 Ak) is for the unborated highest enrichment and highest bumup fuel. A worst-case bias of 3.25% Ak was utilized in all calculations.

Actual Calvert Cliffs end-of-cycle 26-node bumups were generated for a complete core's assemblies.

Two-dimensional to three-dimensional comparisons were performed at the highest enrichment value of 5.0 weight percent and at zero soluble boron. The reactivity bias results indicate that the worst-case reactivity bias is -0.00579 Ak. Thus, for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of 26-node axial burnup profiles is less conservative than uniform axial burmups at all values of burnup.

All three dimensional KENO executions assumed that the upper end fitting and lower end fitting of each assembly are composed of moderator. This was verified to be conservative.

Worst case values of moderator temperature, clad composition, soluble boron concentration, and fixed poison loading were assumed in all reactivity calculations. Most of the uncertainties and biases were determined at three state points: zero soluble boron and zero burnup, 300 ppm soluble boron and zero burnup, and 300 ppm soluble boron and 40 GWD/MTU average burnup. The calculational methodology and axial burnup distribution biases and uncertainties were independent of soluble boron concentration and average burnup and were bounding for all cases, while the fuel depletion uncertainty was a function of soluble boron only. The composite bias and uncertainty values as a function of state point were determined. The worst case composite bias and uncertainty value was 0.06129 Ak for zero soluble boron and zero burnup. This value was conservatively applied to all calculated reactivity values.

The uncertainty in measured burnup was extracted from the Asea Brown Boveri, IncJCombustion Engineering, Inc. Methodology Manual for Physics Biases and Uncertainties for Asea Brown Boveri, InclCombustion Engineering, Inc. Fuel Assemblies. For burnups less then 30 GWD/MTU, the burnup must be increased by 2.5%. For burnups in excess of 30 GWD/MTU, the burnup must be increased by 750 MWD/MTU.

Reactivity was determined as a function of burnup, enrichment, and soluble boron concentration. Note that at zero soluble boron, all of the reactivity values are less than 0.998, while at 300 ppm soluble boron, all of the reactivity values are much less than 0.95. This is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68, if credit is 10

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS taken for soluble boron. The above burnup values must then be increased by the measured burnup uncertainty. The burnups required to store fuel in the Unit 2 SFP crediting 350 ppm of soluble boron including all biases and uncertainties are detailed in the following table:

Enrichment (weight percent)

Burnup (GWD/MTU) 2.0 6.00 2.5 13.75 3.0 20.50 3.5 27.00 4.0 32.75 0

~~4.5 38.25 5.0 43.75 Several checkerboard patterns were modeled in an effort to store more reactive fuel (i.e., fuel with less burnup than required by the above table) in the Unit 2 SFP. To store any fuel with burnups less than those indicated in the above table, that fuel assembly must be surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other non-reactive materials (e.g., wall, water, etc.). Note that this checkerboard pattern meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68.

A finite radial and axial model of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 weight percent VAP fuel at a soluble boron concentration of 0, 300, and 2000 ppm was modeled with sequential assemblies in the row closest to the SFP wall on 20.5" spacers to simulate the reconstitution/inspection process. There is no reactivity difference between reconstituting an entire row of assemblies or normal storage of said assemblies. Since Boraflex is not credited in this analysis, placing assemblies on spacers has no reactivity effect.

Accident Conditions Regulatory guidance dictates subcriticality must be maintained under accident conditions.

Since assemblies must possess sufficient burnup to be placed in the Unit 2 SFP to counteract the loss of Boraflex, placement of an assembly with insufficient burnup in the SFP would constitute a fuel misleading accident. However, per regulatory guidance and ANSI-N16.1-1975, the double contingency principle allows the crediting of the soluble boron in the SFP during such an event. A criticality accident would require two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to occur. The Technical Specification boron concentration must be 2000 ppm or greater without biases and uncertainties. Assuming that the Unit 2 SFP is completely misloaded with fresh fuel of the indicated enrichments, k-effective is maintained below 0.95. Thus there are no adverse consequences for a worst-case fuel misloading accident in this analysis.

The top opening of the SFP racks has angled lead-in guides, which effectively block the spaces between the cavities, as well as guide the fuel assembly into the open tube. Also to avoid the possibility of inadvertently placing a fuel assembly between the outermost storage cell and the pool wall, the top rack surface is extended to cover this space. Thus the abnormal placement of a fuel assembly in the SFP racks is not a credible event.

Dropping an assembly horizontally onto the top of the SFP racks from the Spent Fuel Handling Machine is not possible at Calvert Cliffs due to the design of the Spent Fuel Handling Machine and due to the height of the SFP racks. The bottom of the outer mast assembly is at elevation 49'6", while the top of the SFP racks is at elevation 45'0". Dropping an assembly on top of the SFP racks from the Cask Handling Crane or the new fuel elevator is also not a credible accident. The Cask Handling Crane is designed in 11

ATTACIIMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS accordance with the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612 and is used to move assemblies into the new fuel elevator. Assuming a dropped assembly during normal operation and during reconstitution/inspection activities, k-effective is maintained below 0.95 in both cases. Thus, there are no adverse consequences for a worst-case horizontal assembly drop accident in this analysis.

Dropping an assembly and having it stand upright atop another assembly in the SFP racks is less limiting than the current analysis, which assumes infinite axial extent. Thus, there are no adverse consequences for a vertical assembly drop accident in this analysis.

Criticality Conservatisms The reactivity calculations include the following conservatisms that result in appreciable reactivity margin:

1)

SAS2H isotopics were modeled with conservative fuel temperature, moderator temperature, soluble boron concentration, specific power, and refueling downtime inputs. For 5.0 weight percent fuel at 50 GWD/MTU, the conservatism was in excess of 0.4% Ak for Tfue,, 0.5% Ak for Tmw, and 2.6% Ak for cooling time (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> vs 5 years).

The conservatisms were higher for lower enrichments but lower for lower burnups.

2)

Integral burnable absorbers, boraflex poison sheets, and control element assemblies were conservatively neglected in this evaluation.

3)

A reactivity uncertainty due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculation must be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties.

An uncertainty equal to 5% of the reactivity decrement to the burmup of interest is an acceptable alternative. Based on computations presented in this evaluation, a worst case uncertainty value of 2.089% was used in all burnup related reactivity calculations, even though SAS2H generated isotopic were determined to be 0.358% more reactive than those adjusted to radiochemical assay isotopics. Thus for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of SAS2H generated isotopics is more conservative than use of isotopics normalized to radiochemical assay isotopics.

4)

For conservatism, an axial bumup bias of 3.25% Ak was utilized for all burnup cases. The most conservative Calvert Cliffs specific reactivity bias was calculated to be -0.579% Ak.

Thus for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of 26-node axial bumup profiles is less conservative than uniform axial bumups.

5)

Inclusion of additional isotopes in the SAS2H and KENO executions can add significantly more margin to the reactivity results.

While no benchmarks exist for these additional isotopes, comparison of existing benchmark cases to SAS2H/KENO computations indicates that the computation results are conservative. Note that the additional margin provided by an expanded list of isotopes (101 vs 50) generally increases as a function of burnup and enrichment, exceeding 1.5% Ak for high enrichments (4-5 weight percent) and high bumup (60 GWDIMTU) fuel.

6)

The worst case composite bias and uncertainty value was 0.06129 Ak for zero soluble boron and zero bumup. This value was conservatively applied to all calculated reactivity values.

7)

The conservatism in reactivity for a two-dimensional infinite array versus a three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model increases from 1.56% Ak at 0 ppm, to 10.18% Ak at 300 ppm, to 21.87% Ak 12

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS at 2000 ppm. In addition, for the zero burnup cases, an additional reactivity conservatism of 4.185% Ak exists.

DILUTION ANALYSIS The objective of the evaluation in Attachment (6) was to confirm that design features, instrumentation, administrative procedures, and sufficient time are available to detect and mitigate boron dilution in the SFP before the boron concentration is reduced below the value assumed in the SFP criticality analyses that credit boron to remain below the design basis criticality limit of 0.95 k-effective. Attachment (6) identifies the potential boron dilution sources and dilution events, the instrumentation available for detection of dilution, and the operating and administrative procedures available for the detection and mitigation of dilution. The report also identifies the potential events that could dilute the soluble boron contained in the Units 1 and 2 SFPs and quantifies the dilution rates and response times of each event.

Flooding Spent fuel pool flooding by tsunami, hurricane, and storms are not credible events at Calvert Cliffs.

Since there has been no record of tsunamis on the northeastern United States coast, it is not believed that the site will be subjected to a significant tsunami effect. The relative frequency of hurricane occurrence for the Calvert Cliffs site is slightly more than one hurricane per year. For the Probable Maximum Hurricane it is assumed that the peak hurricane surge is coincident with normal high tide and with a 99th percentile wave height. The total predicted wave run-up is to Elevation 27.1', which is considerably less than the Elevation 69' of the top of the SFP. Thus the maximum hypothetical flood level is below the top of the SFP elevation. The Auxiliary Building is a concrete structure and qualified for high winds. Therefore, severe storms with high winds are not expected to cause sufficient damage to the roof to allow a large volume of rain to enter the building and become an unborated source of water to the pool. The 6" lip around the SFP should cause the bulk of any entering rain water to flow out of the SFP area via the 13 floor drains, 13 doors, and 2 tendon end cap shafts.

The onsite water sources that can flood the SFP and possibly cause dilution below the minimum boron concentration are the two pretreated water storage tanks of 500,000 gallons each, the two condensate storage tanks of 315,000 gallons each, the demineralized water storage tank of 350,000 gallons, and the two refueling water tanks of 420,000 gallons each. The large volume of water necessary to dilute the pool to the boron endpoint precludes many small tanks as potential dilution sources.

No tanks containing any significant amount of water are stored in the vicinity of the SFPs. The large unborated water sources, such as reactor makeup water and demineralized water, are in tanks at elevations below the SFP, so that gravity feed from these tanks to the SFP is not possible. It is very unlikely that the large volumes of water necessary to substantially dilute the SFP (i.e., to the boron endpoint) could be transferred from these tanks to the SFP without being detected by plant personnel.

The possibility of a fire in the SFP area leading to a boron dilution event is not a credible event.

Typically, combustible loadings around the pool area are minor. If the fire hose stations were used to extinguish a fire, the volume of water required to extinguish a local fire is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to dilute the pool such that a several hundred ppm reduction in the pool boron concentration would occur. Water for the Fire Protection System is supplied by two 2,500 gpm full-capacity fire pumps. The fire pumps take suction from the two 500,000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. Fire in the fuel handling building could result in unborated water entering the SFP while attempting to extinguish the fire. However, the rate of addition of unborated water from a fire would be insufficient to exceed the minimum boron level of 350 ppm, since sufficient time would exist to take compensatory measures (i.e., add additional boron to the SFP).

13

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS In addition, the discussion that follows on incomplete boron mixing indicates that the unborated water would tend to float on the surface of the pool and overflow the SFP as water continues to flow into the SFP. Thus the fuel assemblies should remain surrounded by borated water. Finally, assuming that the fire is not directly over the SFP, the 6" lip around the SFP should cause the bulk of the water used to extinguish the fire to flow out of the SFP area via the 13 floor drains, 13 doors, and 2 tendon end cap shafts. At a dilution rate of 2,500 gpm directly into the SFP, it will take 6.95 hours0.0011 days <br />0.0264 hours <br />1.570767e-4 weeks <br />3.61475e-5 months <br /> to dilute the SFP from 2000 to 350 ppm. It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the SFP high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1,043,000 gallons of pretreated water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. Assuming that a fire hose was inserted into the SFP and discharged at the maximum rate of 2500 gpm, it would exhaust the pretreated water storage tank that it was aligned to in approximately 3.45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />. Two well water pumps would automatically actuate and pump 600 gpm into the pretreated water storage tank. An additional 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> would be required for the SFP to be diluted to 350 ppm boron at this rate. Note that this dilution by flooding scenario bounds all others. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-effective not to exceed 0.998.

The unlikely probability of an inadvertent boron dilution event reducing the SFP boron concentration to less than 350 ppm is based on the assumption of complete mixing of the boron in the SFP. The complete mixing assumption may not always be valid, if the circulation flow in the SFP is insufficient to prevent stratification. Where stratification has occurred (Robinson 2 December 20, 1988 and San Onofre 1 January 23, 1989), it was observed that the diluted water floated on the higher borated water.

This suggests that if stratification does occur, the water with the higher boron concentration will tend to be in the lower level of the SFP where the fuel assemblies are located. Circulating the SFP water via the SFP cooling or purification systems can eliminate the possibility of boron stratification in the SFP.

Another type of incomplete boron mixing is a ribbon effect, where a channel of unborated water bores its way to a SFP assembly location. If the SFP cooling or purification systems are in operation, mixing will occur in the piping systems eliminating any ribbon effects. Assuming that the SFP cooling and purification systems are not in operation, an analysis using turbulent jet and diffusion theory was performed to determine the extent of any ribbon effect. For an initial SFP concentration of 2000 ppm and an unborated discharge from a 10" diameter pipe (the largest discharge pipe in the SFP is from an 8" diameter pipe, use of a 10" is conservative), the boron concentration will reach 350 ppm within 29" of the nozzle discharge. The active fuel region of the fuel assembly is more than 29" from the nozzle discharge. Thus, it is not credible that a diluted ribbon flow of less than 350 ppm could reach the fuel.

The SFP instrumentation is not powered from the emergency diesel generators, thus, a loss-of-offsite power would affect the plant's ability to respond to a dilution event. However, the loss-of-offsite power would also affect electric pumps involved in the dilution event. The large unborated water sources such as reactor makeup water and demineralized water are in tanks at elevations below the SFP, so that gravity feed from these tanks to the SFP is not possible.

Loss of SFP Inventory Structural failures, where makeup can compensate for the loss-of-coolant, can also initiate a dilution event.

The SFP is designed to preclude the loss of structural integrity. A 3/16" solid stainless steel liner plate was used on the inside face of both pools for leak tightness, and all of the field welds have leak-test channels welded to the outer side of the liner plates. The channels are grouped into ten zones, each 14

ATTACHMENT (1)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS with its own detector pipe to localize leaks in the liner seams. Even with the precautions described, small leaks may still occur in the SFP.

Early leakage detection is assured by a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.7.13.1), which requires that the minimum pool level be verified at least once every seven days. In practice, the level is checked once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by the Auxiliary Building log sheets. In addition, a level alarm keeps the Control Room Operator aware of level changes.

The likelihood of a fuel handling incident is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations. All refueling operations are conducted in accordance with prescribed procedures under direct surveillance of a qualified supervisor. Mechanical interlocks prevent inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the fuel handling machine; consequently, the possibility of dropping and damaging of a fuel assembly is remote. Even though the assembly drop is an unlikely event, the SFP concrete plus liner plate are stronger than the assembly bottom casting, fuel, and guide tubes for impact of a fresh or irradiated VAP fuel assembly with an inserted control element assembly (1350-1360 bm). The bottom casting is, in turn, stronger than the fuel and guide tubes. Essentially all impact kinetic energy absorption will take place in the fuel and guide tubes.

Interface forces between the bottom assembly and the liner plate would be limited by the buckling of the fuel and guide tubes. In addition, for impact over the collection trenches in the SFP, the interface forces between the bottom assembly and the liner plate would be limited by the buckling of the fuel and guide tubes. The interface forces, therefore, will be of insufficient magnitude to cause perforation of the liner plate. Therefore, for both full contact impact and impact over the collection trenches of a fresh or irradiated VAP fuel assembly with an inserted control element assembly (1350-1360 Ibm), the liner plate would not be perforated.

The most serious failure to the system is the loss of SFP water. This is avoided by routing all SFP piping connections and penetrations above the water level and providing them with siphon breakers to prevent gravity drainage. The SFP inlets to the SFP cooling and purification systems are above the spent fuel racks and penetrate the SFP liner at 65' 11" elevation. The SFP discharge pipes from the shutdown cooling system, purification system, refueling water tank, and demineralized water tank are also above the spent fuel racks and penetrate the SFP liner at 65' 11" elevation. The SFP does not contain any permanent drains, thereby, preventing accidental drain down.

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling The SFPC system is common to both units. The SFPC system is a closed-loop system consisting of two half-capacity 1,390 gpm pumps and two half-capacity heat exchangers in parallel, a bypass 128 gpm cartridge-type filter which removes insoluble particulates, and a bypass 128 gpm mixed bed resin demineralizer which removes soluble ions. The SFPC heat exchangers are cooled by service water. The normal configuration for the cooling system is one pump/one cooler loop in operation on each half of the SFP to cool the water. However, the purity and clarity of the water is maintained by passing a portion of the flow through the purification system. The purification system consists of a filter to remove insoluble particulates and a demineralizer (ion exchanger) which removes soluble ions.

Ten skimmers are provided in the spent fuel pools to remove accumulated dust and debris from the surface of the water. Connections are provided for tie-in to the shutdown cooling system to provide for 2,000 gpm of additional heat removal in the event that the reactor cores are off-loaded resulting in 1,830 fuel assemblies contained in the pool. A total loss-of-cooling is not part of the system's design basis for the SFPC system and pool structural components (e.g., pool liner plate, SFPC piping, and pumps). The entire SFPC system is tornado-protected and is located in a Seismic Category I structure.

Even though loss of SFP cooling is not part of the system's design basis, because the SFPC system is a Class III system, the effect of that event was analyzed. Assuming that the Units' 1 and 2 SFPs contain 15

ATTACHMENT (I)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 1,830 assemblies generating the maximum possible heat load, and assuming the worst case initial SFP temperature of 1550F, then the time to boil can be calculated as 7.34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br />. Time to uncover the fuel assemblies is 79.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. However, loss of the pool water via boiling will not result in a loss of soluble boron, since the soluble boron is not volatile. Thus, loss of SFPC system without makeup flow is not a mechanism for boron dilution. A worst-case scenario involves adding sufficient unborated water to the SFP to just keep the water from boiling and letting the excess fluid flow down the Auxiliary Building gravity drains associated with the SFP overflow level. It would take 24.88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> to dilute the SFP to 350 ppm under this scenario. It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1,043,000 gallons of demineralized water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is three times more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water tank.

CONCLUSION The proposed change would allow the maximum fresh fuel enrichment with the VAP fuel design to be increased to 5.0 weight percent, assuming credit for soluble boron, burnup, and configuration control in maintaining acceptable margins of subcriticality in the SFP. The analyses contained in Attachments (5) and (6) demonstrate that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 are met.

Allowing the maximum enrichment for fresh fuel to be increased to 5.0 weight percent, assuming partial credit for soluble boron, credit for burnup, and configuration control will allow the number of fresh fuel assemblies per cycle to be decreased. This will decrease Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation storage requirements, decrease permanent Department of Energy storage requirements and decrease fuel cycle costs.

REFERENCE

1.

Letter from Mr. P. E. Katz (CCNPP) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated May 1, 2003, License Amendment Request: Increase to the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Maximum Enrichment Limit with Soluble Boron Credit 16

ATTACHMENT (2)

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

September 30, 2003

ATTACHMENT (2)

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS The proposed change has been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and has been determined to not involve a significant hazards consideration in operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment:

1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will increase the maximum enrichment limit of the fuel assemblies that can be stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) by taking credit for soluble boron, burnup and configuration control in maintaining acceptable margins of suberiticality. The proposed change will modify Technical Specification 4.3.1 "Criticality," add Technical Specification 3.7.16, "Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration" and add Technical Specification 3.7.17 "Spent Fuel Pool Storage." The postulated accidents for the SFP are basically four types; 1) dropped fuel assembly on top of the storage rack, 2) a misloading accident, 3) an abnormal location of a fuel assembly, and 4) loss-of-normal cooling to the SFP.

There is no increase in the probability of a fuel assembly drop accident in the SFP when considering the higher enriched fuel or the presence of soluble boron in the SFP water.

Dropping a fuel assembly on top of the SFP storage racks is not credible at Calvert Cliffs due to the design of the spent fuel handling machine and the height of the SFP storage racks.

The handling of fuel assemblies has always been performed in borated water and will not change as a result of crediting soluble boron in the SFP criticality analysis. The proposed change does not change the general design or characteristics of the fuel assemblies. Therefore, the proposed change does not increase the probability of a fuel assembly drop accident.

There is no increase in the probability of the accidental misloading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the SFP storage racks when considering the higher enriched fuel or the presence of soluble boron in the SFP water for criticality control.

Fuel assembly placement will continue to be controlled pursuant to approved fuel handling procedures.

Due to the design of the SFP storage racks, an abnormal placement of a fuel assembly into the SFP storage racks is not possible. Also, the design of the SFP prevents an inadvertent placement of a fuel assembly between the outer most storage cell and the pool wall. The proposed change does not make any change to the design of SFP. Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of abnormal placement of a fuel assembly into the SFP storage racks.

The proposed change will not result in any changes to the SFP cooling system, and the fuel assembly design and characteristics are not changed by an increase in fuel enrichment. Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of a loss of SFP cooling. Also, since a high concentration of soluble boron has always been maintained in the SFP water, there is no increase in the probability of the loss of normal cooling to the SFP water considering the presence of soluble boron in the pool water for criticality control.

There is no increase in the consequences of an accidental drop, accidental misleading, or abnormal placement of a maximum enriched fuel assembly into the SFP storage racks, because the criticality analysis demonstrates that the pool will remain subcritical following either event. The Technical Specification limit for SFP boron concentration will ensure that an adequate SFP boron concentration will be maintained.

I

ATTACHMENT (2)

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS There is no increase in the consequences of a loss-of-normal SFP cooling because the Technical Specification boron concentration provides significant negative reactivity. Loss of the SFP water via boiling will not result in a loss of soluble boron, since the soluble boron is not volatile. Therefore, loss of SFP cooling system, without makeup flow, is not a mechanism for boron dilution. Even in the unlikely event that soluble boron in the SFP is completely diluted via unborated makeup flow, a pool completely filled with maximum enriched unburned assemblies will remain subcritical by a design margin that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated The proposed change will increase the maximum enrichment limit of the fuel assemblies that can be stored in the Unit 2 SFP by taking credit for soluble boron, burnup and configuration control in maintaining acceptable margins of subcriticality. Increasing the maximum enrichment limit does not create a new type of criticality accident.

Soluble boron has been maintained in the SFP water and is currently required by procedures.

Therefore, crediting soluble boron in the SFP criticality analysis will have no effect on normal pool operation and maintenance. Crediting soluble boron will only result in increased sampling to verify the boron concentration in accordance with the proposed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. This increased sampling will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

A dilution of the SFP soluble boron has always been a possibility. However, the boron dilution event previously had no consequences, since boron was not previously credited in the accident analysis. The initiating events that were considered for having the potential to cause dilution of the boron in the SFP to a level below that credited in the criticality analyses fall into three categories:

dilution by flooding, dilution by loss-of-coolant induced makeup, and dilution by loss-of-cooling system induced makeup. The SFP dilution analysis demonstrates that a dilution event that could increase k-effective in the SFP to greater than 0.95 is not a credible event. It is not credible that dilution could occur for the required length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1,043,000 gallons of unborated water must be added to the SFP to reach the minimum soluble boron concentration. This is more water volume than is contained in both pretreated water storage tanks and also more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined. Even in the unlikely event that soluble boron in the SFP is completely diluted, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68.

Burned assemblies have been stored in the SFP for many cycles. Therefore, crediting burnup in the SFP criticality analysis will have no effect on normal pool operation and maintenance.

Fuel assembly placement, although more complex, will continue to be controlled pursuant to approved fuel handling procedures and in accordance with Technical Specification spent fuel rack storage configuration limitations.

2

ATTACHMENT (2)

DETERMINATION OF SIGNIICANT HAZARDS The proposed change will not result in any other change in the plant configuration or equipment design. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The Technical Specification changes proposed by this license amendment request will provide an adequate safety margin to ensure that the stored fuel assembly array of maximum enriched fuel will always remain subcritical. Those limits are based on a plant specific criticality analysis performed for the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 SFP, that include technically supported margins.

Soluble boron is used to provide subcritical margin such that the SFP k-effective is maintained less than or equal to 0.95. Since k-effective is less than or equal to 0.95, the current margin of safety is maintained. In addition, while the criticality analysis utilized credit for soluble boron, the fuel in the SFP rack will remain subcritical with no soluble boron with a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level as required by 10 CFR 50.68. This substantial reduction in the SFP soluble boron concentration was evaluated and shown not to be credible.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

3

ATTACHMENT (3)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MARKED-UP PAGES iii 3.7.16-1 3.7.17-1 3.7.17-2 3.7.17-3 4.0-2 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

September 30, 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.5.5 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)..........................

3.5.5-1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1-1 3.6.1 Containment........................................ 3.6.1-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks.............................. 3.6.2-1 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves..........

3.6.3-1 3.6.4 Containment Pressure 3.6.4-1 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature

............... 3.6.5-1 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.............. 3.6.6-1 3.6.7 Hydrogen Recombiners 3.6.7-1 3.6.8 Iodine Removal System (IRS) 3.6.8-1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

............ 3.7.1-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)......

3.7.2-1 3.7.3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System

............ 3.7.3-1 3.7.4 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

.............. 3.7.4-1 3.7.5 Component Cooling (CC) System

.............. 3.7.5-1 3.7.6 Service Water (SRW) System 3.7.6-1 3.7.7 Saltwater (SW) System 3.7.7-1 3.7.8 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS).. 3.7.8-1 3.7.9 Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS).. 3.7.9-1 3.7.10 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Filtration System (PREFS).

.3.7.10-1 3.7.11 Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System (SFPEVS).

3.7.11-1 3.7.12 Penetration Room Exhaust Ventilation System (PREVS)........................................ 3.7.12-1 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Water Level

............ 3.7.13-1 3.7.14 Secondary Specific Activity

.............. 3.7.14-1 3.7.15 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs).

......... 3.7.15-1 3.16 uentration......... o.....................centration

......... 3

-i-ml i.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating.............

3.8.1-1 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown..............

3.8.2-1 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil 3.8.3-1 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating.............

3.8.4-1 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown..............

3.8.5-1 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.6-1 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating..............

3.8.7-1 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown..............

3.8.8-1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 iii Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 Amendment No.

SFP Boron\\oncentrat 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

(

3.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.16 Boron concentration of the SFPs shall be > 2000 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the SFPs.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent Fuel Pool boron

---

NOTE------------

concentration not LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

within limit.

A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the SFPs.

AND A.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore boron concentration to within limit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify boron concentration is greater than 7 days 2000 ppm.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.7.16-1 Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No.

Ale"-'

SF torage 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial nominal enrichment and burnup of each fuel assembly stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool shall be in accordance with the following:

(a) Irradiated fuel assemblies may be stored in any rack location in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool provided the combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment is in the acceptable range of Figure 3.7.17-1, and (b) Irradiated or unirradiated fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment that are not in the acceptable range of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool if surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other non-reactive materials.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the

_-__-_--- NOTE -

LCO not met.

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

A.1 Initiate action to Immediately move the non-complying fuel assembly to an acceptable storage location.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.7.17-1 Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No.

4

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3.7.17 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVE ILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means that the Prior to initial enrichment, burnup and storage storing the location of the fuel assembly is in fuel assembly accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1.

in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3.7.17-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

SFP Storage 3.7.17 50.00 _

45.00 40.00-0 35.00 30.00 25.00 2) 20.00 E 15.00_

c:10.00 I-~~~~~~~~

~' 5.00 I-~~~~~~~~~~~~~

0.00 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 U-235 Enrichment (w/o) 4.5 5.0 Figure 3.7.17-1 Discharge Burnup vs. Initial Enrichment for Unit 2 SFP CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 3.7.17-3 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.2.2 Control Element Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 77 control element assemblies.

4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment

b.

keff < 1.00 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and keff < 0.95 if fully flooded with water borated to 350 ppm, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.2 of the UFSAR;

> unborattSkwttr whic ifncle al owanecd e

o

< uncwtait~tsas d~xr)ea in ecto

.2rf-h A nominal 10-3/32-inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the high density fuel storage racks; 4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.0 weight percent; CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 4.0-2 Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT (4)

FINAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES iii iv V

3.7.16-1 3.7.17-1 3.7.17-2 3.7.17-3 4.0-2 4.0-3 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

September 30, 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.5.5 3.6 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP).......................

3.5.5-1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS...........

Containment......................................

Containment Air Locks..............................

Containment Isolation Valves......................

Containment Pressure..............................

Containment Air Temperature........................

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems..............

Hydrogen Recombiners..............................

Iodine Removal System (IRS)........................

3.6.1-1 3.6.1-1 3.6.2_1 3.6.3-1 3.6.4-1 3.6.5-1 3.6.6-1 3.6.7-1 3.6.8-1 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 3.7.6 3.7.7 3.7.8 3.7.9 3.7.10 3.7.11 3.7.12 3.7.13 3.7.14 3.7.15 3.7.16 3.7.17 3.8 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 3.8.5 3.8.6 3.8.7 CALVERT CALVERT PLANT SYSTEMS............

Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)...................

Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)................

Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System...................

Condensate Storage Tank (CST)......................

Component Cooling (CC) System...............

Service Water (SRW) System........................

Saltwater (SW) System......................

Control RoQm Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)..

Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS)..

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Filtration System (PREFS)

Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System (SFPEVS).........................

Penetration Room Exhaust Ventilation System (PREYS)

Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Water Level..................

Secondary Specific Activity.......................

Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)............

Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Boron Concentration..........

Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage......................

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS..............................

AC Sources-Operating.............................

AC Sources-Shutdown...............................

Diesel Fuel Oil....................................

DC Sources-Operating..............................

DC Sources-Shutdown...............................

Battery Cell Parameters...........................

Inverters-Operating...............................

3.7.1-1 3.7.1-1 3.7.2-1 3.7.3-1 3.7.4-1 3.7.5-1 3.7.6-1 3.7.7-1 3.7.8-1 3.7.9-1 3.7.10-1 3.7.11-1 3.7.12-1 3.7.13-1 3.7.14-1 3.7.15-1 3.7.16-1 3.7.17-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-1 3.8.2-1 3.8.3-1 3.8.4-1 3.8.5-1 3.8.6-1 3.8.7-1 CLIFFS - UNIT 1 CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 iii Amendment No.

Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown..........

3.8.8-1 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating..................

.. 3.8.9-1 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown......

3.8.10-1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration 3.9.1-1 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.2-1 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations 3.9.3-1 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level.

3.9.4-1 3.9.5 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level 3.9.5-1 3.9.6 Refueling Pool Water Level......................... 3.9.6-1 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES............................................ 4.0-1 4.1 Site Location..........................................

4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core...........................................

4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.0-2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1-1 5.1 Responsibility 5.1-1 5.2 Organization 5.2-1 5.2.1 Onsite and Offsite Organizations

............ 5.2-1 5.2.2 Unit Staff 5.2-2 5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications.............................. 5.3-1 5.4 Procedures 5.4-1 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5-1 5.5.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.....

5.5-1 5.5.2 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment........

5.5-2 5.5.3 Post-Accident Sampling 5.5-2 5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program.

.......... 5.5-3 5.5.5 Component Cyclic or Transient Limit.

........... 5.5-6 5.5.6 Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program

... 5.5-6 5.5.7 Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Program

... 5.5-6 5.5.8 Inservice Testing Program 5.5-6 5.5.9 Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program..........

5.5-7 5.5.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Program

............ 5.5-17 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testing Program

.5.5-17 5.5.12 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program...

5.5-20 5.5.13 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.

5.5-21 5.5.14 Technical Specifications Bases Control Program 5.5-21 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 iv Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.5.15 5.5.16 5.6 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.6.3 5.6.4 5.6.5 5.6.6 5.6.7 5.6.8 5.6.9 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).......

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program...........

Reporting Requirements.................................

Occupational Radiation Exposure Report.............

Annual Radiological Environmental Operating report.

Radioactive Effluent Release Report................

Monthly Operating Reports..........................

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)................

Not Used...........................................

Post-Accident Monitoring Report....................

Tendon Surveillance Report.........................

Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report.............

5.5-22 5.5-23 5.6-1 5.6-1 5.6-1 5.6-2 5.6-3 5.6-3 5.6-9 5.6-9 5.6-9 5.6-9 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 v

Amendment No.

Amendment No.

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.16 Boron concentration of the SFPs shall be 2000 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the SFPs.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent Fuel Pool boron --

NOTE------------

concentration not LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

within limit.

A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the SFPs.

AND A.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore boron concentration to within limit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify boron concentration is greater than 7 days 2000 ppm.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3.7.16-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

SFP Storage 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial nominal enrichment and burnup of each fuel assembly stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool shall be in accordance with the following:

(a) Irradiated fuel assemblies may be location in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel combination of burnup and initial in the acceptable range of Figure stored in any rack Pool provided the nominal enrichment is 3.7.17-1, and (b) Irradiated or unirradiated fuel assemblies with a combination of burnup and initial nominal enrichment that are not in the acceptable range of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool if surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other non-reactive materials.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the Pool.

Unit 2 Spent Fuel ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the

---

NOTE------------

LCO not met.

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

A.1 Initiate action to Immediately move the non-complying fuel assembly to an acceptable storage location.

CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3.7.17-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

SFP Storagen 3.7.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means that the Prior to initial enrichment, burnup and storage storing the location of the fuel assembly is in fuel assembly accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1.

in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 3.7.17-2 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

SFP Storage 3.7.17 50.00 45.00 0) 0.

I-c=

3 a) m 0) 0 B

E a)

M co 40.00 35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00

Acceptable

/

---

4 -----

I It I

I 5.00 0.00 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 U-235 Enrichment (w/o)

Figure 3.7.17-1 Discharge Burnup vs. Initial Enrichment for Unit 2 SFP CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 3.7.17-3 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.2.2 Control Element Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 77 control element assemblies.

4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.00 weight percent;

b.

koff < 1.00 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and kff < 0.95 if fully flooded with water borated to 350 ppm, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.2 of the UFSAR;

c. A nominal 10-3/32-inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the high density fuel storage racks; 4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.0 weight percent;

b.

keff < 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.1 of the UFSAR; CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 4.0-2 Amendment No.

CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 Amendment No.

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES

c.

keff < 0.95 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.7.1. of the UFSAR; and

d. A nominal 18-inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

4.3.2 Drainage The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below 63 ft.

be maintained elevation 4.3.3 Capacity The spent fuel with a storage more than 1830 storage pool is designed and shall be maintained capacity, for both Units 1 and 2, limited to no fuel assemblies.

CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 1 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNIT 2 4.0-3 Amendment No.

Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT (5)

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 SFP CRITICALITY ANALYSIS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

September 30, 2003 l

E*1-100 FormsAppendix Revision 2 ESP No.:

ES200iO 70l Supp No.

0 Rev. No.

0 Page 1 of 1 FORM 19, CALCULATION COVER SHEET INITIATION (Control Doc Type - DCALC)

Page 1 of 191 DCALC No.:

CA06015 Revision No.:

0 Vendor Calculation (Check one):

El Yes 3 No Responsible Group:

NEU Responsible Engineer:

Gerard E. Gryczkowski CALCULATION ENGINEERING El Civil f Instr & Controls 3 Nuc Engrg DISCIPLINE:

El Electrical El Mechanical E] Diesel Gen Project El Life Cycle Mngmt E Reliability Engrg El Nuc Fuel Mngnt El Other

Title:

UNIT 2 SPENT FUEL POOL cRITcALTY ANALYSIS WITH SOLUBLE BORON AND BURNUP CREDIT BUT WITHOUT BORAFLEX CREDIT Unit El UNIT 1 0

UNIT 2 El COMMON Proprietary or Safeguards Calculation

[l YES 3 NO Comments:

Vendor Calc No.:

REVISIONNO.:

Vendor Name:

Safety Class (Check one):

3 SR El AQ El NSR There are assumptions that require Verification during walkdown:

AIT #:

This calculation SUPERSEDES:

REVIEW AND APPROVAL:

Responsible Engineer:

Gerard E. Gryczkowski Date:

Independent Reviewer:

John R. Massari Date:

Approval:

M.T.Finley Date:

6 bo°/G3

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CA06015 Revision 0 Page -2

3. REVIEWER COMMENTS Comments on CA06015 from J. R. Massari (01) The document has no page numbers, which makes the TOC useless.

Response: Page numbers will be add after incorporation of comments.

(02) Section 5, second page. The first paragraph on this page Oust below the table) indicates that no unburned fuel may be stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. However, on the same page, the fourth paragraph provides an acceptable checkerboard pattern for storing unburned fuel in the Unit 2 pool. This inconsistency is also repeated in Section 13. If Pattern 1 is to be permitted, then the initial statement should be modified to reflect this condition.

Response: Done (03) Section 5, third page. The first paragraph indicates a 2.6% Ak for cooling time from 100 days vs. 5 years. This should be 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> vs. 5 years. This error is also repeated in Sections 9.B.3.a and 13.

Response: Done (04) Section 6.A. Change "theVAP" to "the VAP" in the last sentence.

Response: Done (05) Section 6.B. Change "thet" to "that" in the sentence before the last paragraph.

Response: Done (06) Section 6.C.4.(e). Change "kenetic" to "kinetic" in the last sentence.

Response: Done (07) Section 6.D.1. In item (2)(f fx M5 cladding acrial, thl pluase "Refs. and 22" should be changed to "Ref. 22", or the second reference should be added. Also, items (7) and (8) should probably indicate that the material info for the upper and lower endfittings comes from Refs. 25 and 26. Finally, the statement in item (12) does not appear to be true in all cases. The SAS2HED50 cases specify the fuel region as material 1, not 101.

Response: Done (08) Section 6.D.2. This section indicates that the Boraflex panel is 0.09" thick, while the Unit 2 rack design report, NES 81A0704 Rev. 0 page 8, indicates that the panels are 0.08" thick. The Unit 1 panels are 0.09" thick. Since the KENO models replace the Boraflex with water, a few cases were run to quanitfy the effect of this small discrepancy. The results indicate a very small negative uncertainty (in the noise in one case), which indicates that the existing model is conservative and no changes to the model or uncertainties are warranted.

KENO Enr Burnup "Poison Sheet" Boron Clad Unbiased Delta Uncertainty Case wlo gwd/t H20 Thickness ppm K-eff K-eff K500000B6 5

0 0.09" 0

zirc4 1.21112 0.00091 K500000BZ 5

0 0.08" 0

zirc4 1.20794 0.00093

-0.00318 K504000C6 5

40 0.09" 300 zirc4 0.89089 0.00077 K504000CZ 5

40 0.08" 300 zirc4 0.89013 0.00085

-0.00076 Response: Noted. Also note that our current design basis CE calculation assumes 0.09".

(09) Section 6.D.2.iii. Provide a reference for the height of moderator above the active fuel region. I get 22.77 feet based on the TS requirement of 21.5 feet of water above the top of the fuel assembly, and 15.293 inches from the top of the active fuel region to the top of the assembly

CA06015 Revision 0 Page (Ref. 13). This small discrepancy will have absolutely no impact on the results of the calculation.

Response: The 23.619' of water above the active fuel region and 17.871" of water below the active fuel region comes from Attachment G with appropriate references.

(10) Section 7.A. This assumption should probably also mention that the KENO model assumed that the boraflex was completely replaced by pool water and this representation is based on the fact that the silica matrix is dissolved by the water and transported away from the vicinity of the panel. Section 3.2.1 of Reference 14 provides a good description of the dissolution process.

Response: Done (11) Section 8, Reference 15. Instead of the Unit 1 rack design report, the correct reference should probably be the report for the Unit 2 racks, NES Report 81A0704 Rev. 0.

Response: Done (12) Section 8, References 36 and 37. These are both the same.

Response: Ref 37 has been changed.

(13) Section 8, Reference 38. To ensure that this reference can be obtained in the future, you should probably indicate that the paper was published in the ANS Transactions for the 2002 Winter Meeting (Vol. 87, pp. 105-107).

Response: Done (14) Section 9.B.2. This section included a brief comparison with Calvert Cliffs radiochemical assay data from Ref. 10 that was used in the SAS2H Validation (CA05780). Recently, an independent radiochemical assay of Calvert Cliffs assembly BT03, performed by the V.G.

Khlopin Radium Institute in Russia, was published in Ref 11. This radiochemical assay included isotopes that were not included in the Oak Ridge doucment. An analysis similar to that performed at the end of section 9.B.2 was performed using this data. The results provided below bhUw dial he nw data still suppurts Li csuclusiai tht the SAB2H generated isotopics produce conservative keff results for Calvert Cliffs fuel.

Case 08: Calvert Cliffs Assembly BT03 Rod NBDI07, 37.27 GWD/MTU measured Measured SAS2H SAS2H Percent Nuclide nWg U02 Ci/g U02 mg/g U02 Citg U02 Difference U234 1.270E-01 1.070E-01

-15.75 U235 2.710E+00 2.590E+00 4.43 U236 3.030E+00 3.000E+00 0.99 U238 8.438E+02 8.330E+02

-1.28 Pu238 1.947E101 1.890E-01

-2.93 Pu239 3.835E+00 3.990E+00 4.04 Pu240 2.321E400 2.280E+00

-1.77 Pu241 8.130E.01 7.840E-01

-3.57 Pu242 7.753E-01 7A50E-01

-3.91 Np237 2.260E-07 2.690E-07 19.03 Am241 1.460E-03 1.250E-03

-14.38 Cm243-Cm244 4.1 IOE-03 3.950E-03

-3.89 Se79 5.630E-08 6.500E-08 15A5 Sr90 5.180E-02 5.520E-02 6.56 CsI33 Used Average fnom CA05780 2.50 Cs134 Used Average from CA05780

-11.21 Tc99 8.960E-06 1.300E-05 45.09 Snl26 1.60E-07 6.13E-07 283.13

CA06015 Revision 0 Page Cs135 4.15E-07 4.63E-07 11.57 Cs137 8.56E-02 8.81E-02 2.92 1129 Used Average from CA05780

-10.75 RMlO3 5.98E-01 4.53E-01

-24.28 Ndl43 6.69E-01 6.39E-01

-4.49 Nd144 1.49E+00 1.38E+00

-7.63 Ndl45 6.74E-01 6.29E-01

-6.69 Ndl46 7.39E-01 6.94E-01

-6.15 Ndl48 3.91E-01 3.60E-01

-7.86 Ndl5O 1.95E-01 1.83E-01

-6.12 Sml47 2.47E-01 2.32E-01

-6.19 Sml48 l.59E41 1.51E-0I

-5.26 Ref. 11 Sml49 1.87E-03 1.77E-03

-5.20 SmlSO 2.79E-01 2.76E-01

-0.97 SmlSl 7.30E-03 9.22E-03 26.33 Sml52 1.13E-01 1.31E-01 16.41 14.9 years EulSI 1.23E-03 1.14E-03

-7.62 Eul53 t.38E-01 1.28E-01

-7.21 afler Eul54 6.58E-03 6.79E-03 3.17 Eu155 1.04E-03 6.67E-04

-36.05 discharge GdI54 1.17E-02 2.OOE-02 71.48 Gdl55 6A6E03 S.47E-03

-15.36 KENO Case SAS2 Case Enr (W%)

Burnup (gwdh)

Unbiased kdr Delta kedy Uncertainty KS06000DI S560 5.0 60 0.84339 0.00071

-0.00196 K506000RI Hand 5.0 60 0.84143 0.00074 Response: OK (15) Section 9.B.3.a - d. In the tables in these sections, the cases indicating that isotopics from SAS2H case S550 were used actually utilized those from case S550A.

Response: Done (16) Section 9.B3.c. This section addressed the effect of varying the average RCS boron concentration used during the SAS2H depletion, but did not address the manner in which the letdown was modeled during the depletion. If more than one library is requested per cycle (you used 1 long cycle with 20 libraries) SAS2H models boron letdown by varying the boron concentration linearly from 1.9 to 0.1 times the average during the time interval of the cycle.

This is appropriate for an assembly with only 20 gwd/t burnup, but is not realistic for an assembly with 50 gwd/t burnup. To examine the sensitivity to variations in boron letdown, two SAS2H depletions were run with the same assembly power and EFPD as the 50 gwd/t case, but with varying boron letdown assumptions. The resulting keff values are provided in the table below. It seems that the letdown method currently used during the depletion provides the least conservative results for high burnup fuel. Options to fix this include applying a bias on the order of 0.35% Ak (possibly making it burnup dependent), or demonstrating that there is sufficient margin in other parts of the model to off-set this effect.

KENO SAS2H Enr Burnup Avg. Boron SAS2H Depletion Unbiased Case Case w/o gwd/t ppm Boron Letdown Method K-eff delt K505000AN S550N 5.0 50 950 One 1649 EFPD Cycle (20 lihbcyc) w/ B linearly varying ftm 1.9 to 0.1 avg.

0.88363 K5050ANC3 S550C3 5.0 50 950 Three 549.7 EFPD Cycles (7 lib/cyc) w/ B linearly varying fom 1.9 to 0.1 avg. each cycle 0.88712 0.00' K5O5OANCB S550CB 5.0 50 950 Twenty 82.45 EFPD Cycles (I ib/cyc) w B constant at 950 ppmeach cycle 0.88915 0.00' Response: In this analysis, where burnups ranged from 0 to 70 gwd/mtu, a single consistent methodology was employed to model soluble boron letdown. The single depletion model with one library per 2.5 gwd/mtu step minimizes any discontinuity due to arbitrary cycle lengths.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 6 Three cases were executed to determine the effect of using three cycles per depletion instead of one:

KENO Case SAS2H Enr Burnup Avg. Boron Case w/o awdh mm SAS2H Depletion Boron Letdown Method Unbiased K-eff delt K505000DI S55ON 5.0 50 950 One 1649 EFPD Cycle (20 ib/cyc) w B linearly varying from 1.9 to 0.1 avg 0.89641 K5050ANC4 S550C4 5.0 50 950 Three 549.7 EFPD Cycles (7 ibcyc) w/B linearly vaying fion 1.9 to 0.1 avg. each cycle 0.89663 KS050ANC3 S550C3 5.0 50 950 Same as prevtlous case except with 180 down days between cycles 0.89717 The difference between the three executions are within one sigma of each other and thus statistically equivalent. Note that these cases use zirc4 as the clad material, while the above use zirlo. Modification of the calculation results to incorporate multiple cycles per depletion is not wananted and would unnecessarily complicate the calculations, since cycle length and downtime between cycles would theoreticall have to be optimized.

(17)Section 9.B. The analyses in References 4 through 8 utilized 2-D depletion codes such as CASMO-4, and Reference 9 does not specifically mention SAS2HI/ORIGEN-S (a point/quasi-1D code) as an acceptable depletion method. To allay any possible concerns, a comparison of keff values calculated from isotopics obtained from SAS2H and CASMO-4 was performed. The CASMO-4 depletion utilized identical input conditions and materials as those used in SAS2H.

This comparison used the same set of actinides, but only 20 of the 36 fission products (for both the SAS2H and CASMO4 cases). The 16 fission products not available from CASMO-4 were:

KR-84, KR-86, MO-95, TC-99, RU-101, SN-126, I-129, XE-132, XE-134, ND-144, ND-146, ND-148, SM-148, ND-150, EU-151, and GD-154. The KENO results are provided in the table below, and indicate that for the 34 isotopes considered, isotopics from SAS2H are more conservative than from CASMO-4 by average of 0.675% Ak. This conservatism is larger than the worth of the 16 isotopes that were not considered in this comparison.

0.00C 0.00c KENO Case K505000AN33 K5050ANC3-33 K5050ANCB33 K5050ANCB33cas SAS2H Case S550N S550C3 S550CB CASM04 Enr Burnup Avg. Boron w/o gwd/t ppm SAS2H Depletion Boron Letdown Method 5.0 50 950 Same as above but with 34 isotopes 5.0 50 950 Same as above but with 34 isotopes 5.0 50 950 Sarne as above but with 34 isotopes 5.0 50 950 34 isotopes from CASM04 depletion Unbiased K-eff 0.89216 0.89482 0.89175 0.88616 D

50 elta Delta vs. 34 SAS2H vs.

-0.00853 0.006

-0.00770 0.00866

-0.00260 0.00559 N/a N/a Average worth of 16 remaining fission products w/ SAS2H Average delta between SAS2H and CASM04 for 34 isotopes

-0.00628 0.00675 Response: OK (18) Section 9.C. In the first sentence, remove the first "i" from "iisotopics."

Response: Done (19) Section 9.C. The analysis credited a number of fission product absorbers that might not be present at 100% of their predicted values in failed fuel. Examples include Kr, Xe, L Cs, and Mo isotopes. Reference 1 provides the design basis release rates for these isotopes from a failed rod while at power (6.5E-8 sec' for noble gases, 2.3E-8 sec l for I and Cs, and 1.4E-9 sec'l for Mo) for use in calculating the RCS specific activity for 1% failed fuel. These release rates indicate that for a 24-month cycle, only 2% of the noble gases, 25% of the I and Cs, and 90% of the Mo would remain from BOC (see figure below) in a failed rod. In addition, any remaining noble gases and highly soluble isotopes, such as I and Cs (Ref. 3, p. 6-28), would continue to be lost while the failed rod was in the spent fuel pool. Three possible options to correct this deficiency are: 1) expand the moderator-in-gap uncertainty to be a failed fuel uncertainty that also considers reduction/loss of the above mentioned isotopes, 2) restrict failed fuel from the Unit 2 pool, in which case you could argue that it was bounded by the fresh fuel misload accident, 3) demonstrate that there is sufficient margin in other parts of the model to off-set this effect. As a side note, none of the other evaluations in References 4 through 8 addressed this.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 7 Response: See Section 9.E.2.j.

(20) Section 9.C. There appears to be a bug in the SAS2HED50 code. The SAS2H output contains moles of U-236, but the SAS2HED50 code supplied KENO input section contains a number density of IE-20 for U-236. However, the code correctly calculates the number density, as is shown at the top of the output. To determine the impact of this bug, one of the previous KENO cases was rerun with the correct U-236 number density. The results suggest a reactivitiy bias of -0.61%, which indicates that the existing method used in the calc is conservative (and compensates for some of the errors noted above).

Case K5O5OANCB without U-236 0.88915 Case K5050ANCB236 with U-236 added in 0.88305 Response: OOPS. But conservative. SAS2HED50 corrected for later use.

(21) Section 9.D. In the paragraph just below the table, the first sentence indicates that Figures 8

- 11 depict various isotopic quantities as a function of burnup. This needs to be changed to Figures 9 - 11. Figure 8 looks like a loading -curve but it could use a better title since the current one is not very descriptive.

Response: Done (22) Section 9.E.2.b. For case K50400C8, change ",89004" to "0.89004".

Response: Done (23) Sections 9.E.c & d. It would be helpful if the baseline keff cases (K500000B6, K500000C6, and K504000C6) were listed in these tables as was done in the other sections, to make it easy for the reader to see how the uncertainties were determined.

Response: The data is listed in many places including a master listing in Appendix A.

(24) Section 9.E.2.k. No problems were found with this section. However, it seems worth noting some new information that further demonstrates the conservatism of the 3.3% axial profile bias used. Reference 15 performed an even more detailed review of the PWR Axial Profile Database (YAEC-1937) than did References 33 and 34 of CA06015. Of particular interest is the plots in Ref 15 (pp. 44-49) for each of the 12 burnup groups by fuel type, which indicate that the axial bias for CE 14x14 assemblies (544 of 3169 assemblies in the database) is never greater than 1% for any of the burnup groups. The profiles which result in high axial profile biases occur only in fuel designs where control and axial power shaping rods are utilized for flux shaping (11 of the 12 bounding designs are from B&W 15x15 assemblies). Axial power shaping rods are not used at CCNPP and a review of cycles back to U1C8 and U2C7 confirmed all rods are generally fully withdrawn (any insertion that does occur is typically on the order of a few inches for a total of 3% or less of the cycle duration). In addition, another conservatism worth noting is that the axial bias is generated by comparing axial vs. average burnup profiles in an axially finite assembly model, but is applied to calculations using average burnup profiles in an axially infinite assembly model.

Response: OK. Some additional information was added from Ref.37.

(25) Section 12.C. For clarity, you may wish to add a column indicating the SAS2H case that the isotopics used in the KENO run came from.

Response: Done REFERENCES (01) "Fission Product Activity in the Reactor Coolant," CE Report SE-69-971, NORMS Doc ID

1. 77330, October 9, 1969

CA06015 Revision 0 Page (02) CCNPP Calculation CA05994, "RC Waste Processing System Incident and Waste Gas Incident Dose Analysis," October 4, 2002.

(03) "Evaluation of the Candidate High-Level Radioactive Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain Using Total System Performance Assessment," EPRI TR-1000802, November 2000.

(04) Docket 50-247, Indian Point Unit 2, "License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Storage Pit Rack Criticality Analysis with Soluble Boron Credit," Entergy Nuclear Northeast, September 20,2001.

(05) Docket 50-336, Millstone Power Station Unit 2, "Technical Specification Change Request 2-10-01, Fuel Pool Requirements," Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, November 6, 2001.

(06) Docket 50-335, St. Lucie Unit 1, "Proposed License Amendment: Spent Fuel Pool Soluble Boron Credit," Florida Power and Light Corporation, November 25, 2002.

(07) Docket 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, "License Amendment Request to Change Spent Fuel Pool Loading Restrictions," Entergy Operations, January 29, 2003.

(08) Docket 50-250 & 251, Turkey Point Units 3 & 4, "Soluble Boron Credit for Spent Fuel Pool and Fresh Fuel Rack Criticality Analyses," Florida Power and Light Corporation, November 30, 1999.

(09) "Guidance on the Regulatory Requirements for Criticality-Analysis of Fuel Storage at LWR Power Plants", NRC Memorandum L. Kopp to T. Collins, 8/19/98 (10) "Validation of the Scale System for PWR Spent Fuel Isotopic Analyses," ORNL/TM-12667, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, March 1995.

(11) "Compilation of Radiochemical Analyses of Spent Nuclear Fuel Samples," PNNL-13667, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, September 2001.

(12) "Nuclear Design Analysis Report for the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Nuclear Plant High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks," NES Report 81A0704 Rev. 0, October 28, 1980.

(13) "Fuel Bundle Assembly," CCNPP Drawing 12131-0342SH0001, Rev. 1, November 17, 1999.

(14) "The RACKLIFE Boraflex Rack Life Extension Code: Theory and Numerics," EPRI TR-107333, Electric Power Research Institute, August 1997.

(15) "Recommendation for Addressing Axial Burnup in PWR Burnup Credit Analyses,"

ORNL/TM-2001/273, November 2002.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page

4. TABLE OF CONTENTS

01. COVER SHEET..................................

I

02. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES..................................

2

03. REVIEWER COMMENTS..................................

3

04. TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................

9

05. PURPOSE.................................

1

06. INPUT DATA.................................

14 (A) Fuel and Assembly Parameters (B) Integral Burnable Absorbers (C) SAS2H Depletion Inputs (1) Isotopics (2) Cross Section Library (3) Lattice Type (4) Material Specifications (5) Fuel Temperature (6) Moderator Temperature (7) Soluble Boron Concentration (8) Specific Power (9) Refueling Downtime (10) Clad Material and Temperature (11) Path A Geometry (12) Path B Geometry (13) Additional Inputs (D) KENO Criticality Inputs (1) Materials (2) Geometry (3) Parameters (4) More Data (5) Boundary Conditions

07. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS.........................................................................................25

08. REFERENCES..................................................................................................................26

09. METHODS OF ANALYSIS.................................

29 (A) Reactivity Equivalencing (B) SAS2H Method of Analysis (1) Calculational Methodology (2) Calculation of Biases and Uncertainties (3) Calculations (C) SAS2H Edit Code (D) SAS2H Interpolation Codes (E) KENO Method of Analysis (1) Calculational Methodology (2) Calculation of Biases and Uncertainties (3) KENO Calculations (4) Accident Conditions

CA06015 Revision 0 Page IC, (F) Burnup Measurement Uncertainty

10. CALCULATIONS.................................................

63

11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES.................................................

64

12. RESULTS.................................................

66 (A) Biases and Uncertainties (B) Accident Conditions (C) Enrichment vs Burnup Loading Limits (D) Comparison of Two-Dimensional to Three-Dimensional Models (E) Configuration Control (F) Reconstitution and Inspection

13. CONCLUSIONS.................................................

70

14. ATTACHMENTS.................................................

72 (A) CALCULATION LIST (B) BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY RESULTS (C) DENSITY CALCULATIONS (D) FUEL DATA SPREADSHEET (E) SFP SINGLE RACK PLANAR GEOMETRY (F) UNIT 2 SFP PLANAR GEOMETRY (G) UNIT 2 SFP AXIAL GEOMETRY (H) KENO PLOTS (I) AXIAL BURNUP PROFILES (J) EFFECT OF INTEGRAL BURNABLE ABSORBERS (K) SAS2H FUEL TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS (L) WATER DENSITY SPREADSHEET (M) SAS2HED50 CODE (N) SAS2HED101 CODE (0) SAS2HLIN CODE (P) SAS2HLAG CODE (Q) SAS2HLIN/LAG INPUT FILES (R) ISOTOPIC BENCHMARK CASES (S) BURNUP VS ENRICHMENT REGRESSION ANALYSIS LAST PAGE OF REPORT....................................................................................................191

CA06015 Revision 0 Page It

5. PURPOSE The primary purpose of the spent fuel pool is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a safe storage condition. Per 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 62 (Ref.l), criticality in the fuel storage and handling system shall be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe configurations. Per 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2), if no credit for soluble boron is taken, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. In addition, the maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of the fresh fuel assemblies is limited to five percent by weight.

The existing analysis of record for the Unit 2 SFP (Ref.28) allows the storage of standard fresh fuel assemblies with a maximum fresh fuel enrichment of 4.52 w/o U-235, based on the older pellet design utilizing smaller pellet diameters and stack densities; a k-effective less than 0.95 including uncertainties and biases, and no soluble boron credit. Ref.29 determined the maximum fresh fuel enrichment with VAP fuel with the present storage configuration, such that, K-effective is less than 0.95 with uncertainties and biases and assuming no soluble boron credit.

VAP fuel with enrichments less than or equal to 4.30 w/o U-235 can now be safely stored in the CCNPP Spent Fuel Pools. Note that VAP fuel is more reactive than similarly enriched standard fuel, thus any analysis performed for VAP fuel conservatively bounds that for standard fuel. The analyses of record for the Unit 2 SFP assume the presence of Boraflex poison sheets with 4" staggered gaps.

Issue Reports R3-045-938, R3-045-939, and R3-052-199 documented possible boraflex degradation in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool, based on calculations using the Racklife software package. The Racklife results indicated that at certain highly-irradiated locations the degradation could be as high as 70%. Since the Unit 2 design basis areal B-10 loading is 0.020 gm/cm2 and since the initial loading was a minimum of 0.020 gm/cm2, insufficient margin exists to cover the degradation. The evaluation in Ref 42 was performed to determine CCNPP's compliance with Technical Specification 4.3.1.1, which states that K-effective must be less than or equal to 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties and biases as described in Section 9.7.2 of the UFSAR. Crediting burnup in lieu of boraflex assures that the Technical Specification K-effective limit of 0.95 is maintained.

The purpose of this report is to document the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Rack Criticality Methodology that ensures that the spent fuel rack multiplication factor, k-eff, is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2) regulatory limit with Value Added Pellet (VAP) fuel ranging in enrichment from 2.0 to 5.0 w/o with burnup credit and with partial credit for soluble boron in the Unit 2 SFP. The soluble boron credit will be limited to 300 ppm per the restrictions of the Unit 1 criticality analysis in Ref.43. Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. 15% should be added to this value to account for all uncertainties.

Thus a boron level of 350 ppm with uncertainties is required to credit soluble boron in the SFP.

The burnups required to store fuel in the Unit 2 SFP crediting 350 ppm of soluble boron including all biases and uncertainties are the following:

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 2.-

Enrichment (w/o)

Burnup (GWD/MTU) 2.0 6.00 2.5 13.75 3.0 20.50 3.5 27.00 4.0 32.75 4.5 38.25 5.0 43.75 A graphical representation of the above is presented in Figure 8, while a second-order regression analysis is listed in Attachment.S. Note that these minimum burnup values are less than those reported in Ref.42 Thus, all assemblies currently qualified to be stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool may continue to be safely stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool. In addition, each assembly offloaded from either reactor or from an ISFSI DSC must be evaluated against the above burnup restrictions to determine if it can be safely stored in the Unit 2 SFP. No similar restrictions exist on the Unit 1 SFP.

A finite radial and axial model of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o VAP fuel at a soluble boron concentration of 0, 300, and 2000 ppm was modeled with sequential assemblies in the row closest to the SFP wall on spacers to simulate the reconstitution/inspection process.

There is no reactivity difference between reconstituting an entire row of assemblies or normal storage of said assemblies. Since Boraflex is not credited in this analysis, placing assemblies on spacers has no reactivity effect.

Dropping an assembly of 5.0 w/o VAP fuel onto the SFP racks was analyzed, even though it is not a credible accident. Per Ref 4, the double contingency principle was applied. It required two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to produce a criticality accident.

The double contingency principle means that realistic conditions may be assumed. For example, if soluble boron is normally present in the SFP water, the loss of soluble boron is considered as one accident condition and a second concurrent accident need not be assumed. Therefore, total credit for the presence of soluble boron may be assumed in evaluating this accident condition. Per Technical Assumption 7.H, the normal SEP boron concentration is conservatively assumed to be 2000 ppm. A finite radial and axial configuration of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel was modeled as a function of soluble boron concentration (0, 300, 2000 ppm) for the dropped assembly accident with and without reconstitution. The dropped assembly is effectively decoupled from the assemblies stored in the SFP storage racks as was previously noted in Ref 32. Taking credit for 2000 ppm per the double contingency principle drops the k-effective value to well below the regulatory requirement for all cases.

Several checkerboard patterns were modeled in an effort to store more reactive fuel in the Unit 2 SFP. Note that only one pattern meets the requirements of 10 CPR 50.68 (Ref.2). If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. Thus to store any fuel with insufficient burnup to satisfy reactivity requirements, that fuel assembly must be surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other nonreactive materials (e.g., wall, water,...).

The above results include the following conservatisms:

(01) SAS2H isotopics were modeled with conservative fuel temperature, moderator temperature, soluble boron concentration, specific power, and refueling downtime inputs. For 5 w/o fuel at 50

CA06015 Revision 0 Page S GWD/MTU, the conservatism was in excess of 0.4% Ak for Tfuel,.5% Ak for Tmod, and 2.6%

Ak for cooling time (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> vs 5 years).

The conservatisms were higher for lower enrichments but lower for lower burnups.

(02) Integral burnable absorbers, boraflex poison sheets, and control element assemblies were conservatively neglected in this work.

(03) A reactivity uncertainty due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculation should be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties. An uncertainty equal to 5% of the reactivity decrement to the burnup of interest is an acceptable assumption.

Based on computations presented in this work, a worst case uncertainty value of 0.02089 was used in all burnup related reactivity calculations, even though SAS2H generated reactivity was determined to be 0.358% more reactive than those adjusted to radiochemical assay isotopics.

(04) For conservatism, an axial burnup bias of 3.3% Ak was utilized for all burnup cases. The most conservative Calvert Cliffs specific reactivity bias was calculated to be -0.579% Ak. Thus for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of 26-node axial burnup profiles is less conservative than uniform axial burnups (05) Inclusion of additional isotopes in the SAS2H and KENO executions can add significantly more margin to the reactivity results. While no benchmarks exist for these additional isotopes, comparison of existing benchmark cases to SAS2H/KENO computations indicates that the computation results are conservative. Note that the additional margin provided by an expanded list of isotopes (101 vs 50) generally increases as a function of bumup and enrichment, exceeding 1.5% Ak for high enrichments (4-5 w/o) and high burnup (60 gwd/mtu) fuel.

(06) The worst case composite bias and uncertainty value was 0.06129 AK for zero soluble boron and zero bumup. This value was conservatively applied to all calculated reactivity values.

(07) The conservatism in reactivity for a two-dimensional infinite array versus a three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model increases from 1.56% Ak at 0 ppm, to 10.18% Ak at 300 ppm to 21.87% Ak at 2000 ppm. In addition, for the zero burnup cases, an additional reactivity conservatism of 4.185% Ak exists. Thus for the three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model, an entire SFP of 5.0 w/o fresh fuel becomes subcritical (k-effective < 1) for soluble boron concentrations in excess of 500 ppm assuming no credit for borafiex in the Unit 2 SFP racks and no credit for burnup. For the two-dimensional infinite array model, 1600 ppm would be required to maintain suberiticality under the same conditions.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page #1

6. INPUT DATA Inputs and assumptions have been developed conservatively consistent with applicable safety analysis guidance.

(6.A) Fuel and Assembly Parameters The fuel assemblies contain uranium dioxide (UO2) over the entire length of the active fuel region in each fuel rod and a uniform distribution of enrichments both radially and axially. The fuel and 14x14 assembly parameters for standard and VAP fuel designs are detailed in Z2INP.XLS(Fuel) (Attachment D). Note that per Ref.28 the Unit 2 SFP enrichment limit is 4.52 w/o for the standard fuel design, while per Ref.29 the Unit 2 SFP enrichment limit is 4.30 w/o for the VAP fuel design.

Thus since the VAP fuel design is more limiting, all calculations performed in this work will model VAP assemblies.

(6.B) Integral Burnable Absorbers Ref35 details the effect of Integral Burnable Absorbers (IBAs) on reactivity as a function of burnup, fuel enrichment, IBA number and loading, and cooling time. BAs are burnable poisons that are an integral part of the fuel assembly.

Two types are detailed.

The first is the Westinghouse Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (FBA), which has a coating of zirconium diboride (ZrB2) on the fuel pellets and which does not displace fuel. The second includes U0 2-Gd20 3 rods, U02-Er2O3 rods, and A1203-B4C rods, which do displace fuel.

For PWR.fuels without IBAs, reactivity decreases with burnup in a nearly linear fashion. For PWR fuel assembly designs that make significant use of IBAs, reactivity actually increases as fuel bumup increases, reaching a maximum at a burnup where the IBA is nearly depleted (approximately a third into the assembly life), and then decreasing with burnup almost linearly.

The presence of IBAs during depletion hardens the neutron spectrum, resulting in lower U-235 depletion and higher production of fissile plutonium isotopes. Enhanced plutonium production and the concurrent diminished fission of U-235 can increase the reactivity of the fuel at later burnups.

The analyses of Ref.35 conclusively demonstrate that with the exception of the Westinghouse IFBA rods, k-eff for an assembly without As is always greater (throughout burnup) than k-eff for an assembly with IBAs, including U0 2-Gd2O3 rods, U0 2-Er2O3 rods, and A120 3-B4C rods.

The negative reactivity effect of the IBAs was found to increase with increasing poison loading (the number of poison rods and the B-10 content) and with increasing initial fuel enrichment.

This is due to the negative residual effect associated with the neutron-absorbing isotopes and with the reduced reactivity due to the reduction in fissile isotopes. Therefore, for those IBAs other than FBAs, burnup credit criticality safety analyses may conservatively neglect the presence of the IBAs by assuming non-poisoned equivalent enrichment fuel.

For assembly designs with IFBA rods, two-dimensional radially-infinite calculations have demonstrated that the neutron multiplication factor is slightly greater for assembly designs with IFBA rods (maximum of 0.4% Ak). Three-dimensional cask calculations showed that when the axial burnup is included, assemblies with full-axial length IFBA coatings are less reactive than corresponding assemblies without IFBA rods, because of the residual absorber in the low-burnup end regions. However, the results also indicated that the effect of the IFBA rods is dependent on the axial length of the poison loading and that for typical lFBA coating lengths, there is a small positive effect associated with the IFBA rods. For a fixed initial fuel enrichment, the positive reactivity effect was shown to increase with increasing poison loading. For a fixed poison loading, the positive reactivity effect was shown to increase with decreasing initial fuel enrichment. This increase in reactivity for assemblies with IBAs is due to a lack of residual reactivity effects associated with IFBAs and due to no reduction in fissile isotopes.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page K The Ref.35 results indicate that the calculated effects are not sensitive to cooling time.

Similar reactivity behavior as a function of IBA loading is observed for Calvert Cliffs specific VAP fuel. Ref.36 and the tables and graphs of Attachment J detail k-infinity versus burnup for 3.8 and 4.8 w/o VAP fuel for 2.0 w/o U0 2-Er203 rods of 0, 20, 44, and 68 quantity. In all cases, the non-poisoned equivalent enrichment fuel is more reactive than the poisoned fuel, and the negative reactivity effect of the BAs was found to increase with increasing poison loading Therefore, burnup credit criticality safety analyses may conservatively neglect the presence of the IBAs by assuming non-poisoned equivalent enrichment fuel.

(6.C) SAS2H Depletion Inputs (6.C.1) Isotopics (a) Per Ref.4, the SFP storage rack should be evaluated with spent fuel at the highest reactivity following removal from the reactor (usually after the decay of Xe-135). Thus the SAS2H-generated Xe-135 concentration will be set to zero.

(b) Per Ref.4, subsequent decay of longer-life nuclides, such as Pu-241 to Am-241, over the rack storage time may be accounted for to reduce the minimum bumup required to meet the reactivity requirements. In this work, the minimum of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of decay time will be assumed per Ref.45.

(6.C.2) Cross Section Library The SAS2H executions utilize the 44GROUPNDF5 cross section library as recommended in Ref.9 and validated in Ref.8. 44GROUPNDF5 is a 44-energy group library derived from the latest ENDF/B-V files with the exception of 0-16, Eu-154, and Eu-155, which were taken from the more improved ENDF/B-VI files.

(6.C.3) Lattice Type Per Ref.9, SAS2H always requires LATTICECELL.

(6.C.4) Material Specifications (a) The U0 2 weight percentages for 5.0, 4.5, 4.0, 3.5, 3.0, 2.5, and 2.0 w/o enriched fuel are derived in the EXCEL spreadsheet (Densities)z2inp.xls, which is listed in Attachment C. The methodology for calculating the weight percentages is as follows:

U5w = U235 w/o enrichment of total U (given)

U8w = (100-U5w) = U238 w/o enrichment of total U Ow = 32*(U5w/235+U8w/238)

U5x = U5w/(U5w+U8w+Ow)=U235 w/o of U0 2 U8x = U8w/(U5w+U8w+Ow) =U238 w/o of U02 Ox = Ow/(U5w+U8w+Ow) =016 w/o of U0 2 (b) Per UFSAR Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-2, the maximum stack height density is 10.31 gm/cc

(<94.5% theoretical density).

Thus a nominal stack height density of 94.5% of theoretical density (10.3572 gm/cc) will be assumed.

(c) Per Refs.9 and 40, trace elements of selected nuclides are automatically included by SAS2H to assure appropriate cross sections are available for important nuclides that accumulate in the fuel during depletion. These include Xe-135 Cs-133 U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238 Np-237 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 Am-241 Am-242m Am-243 Cm-242 Cm-243 Cm-244 1/v-absorber (d) Per Ref.9, trace elements of additional nuclides (trace density lx10-20 atoms/b-cm) may be added by the user to assure appropriate cross sections are available for important nuclides that

CA06015 Revision 0 Page C accumulate in the fuel during depletion. The additional nuclides used in this work corresponds to a set generated by ORNL in Ref.40. These isotopes represent the highest worth fission products or the precursors for the highest worth fission products and include the following:

Moderator region:

Co-59 Fuel region:

Zr-94 Mo-94 Nb-95 Mo-95 Tc-99 Rh-103 Rh-105 Ru-106 Sn-126 Xe-131 Cs-134 Cs-135 Cs-137 Pr-143 Nd-143 Ce-144 Nd-144 Nd-145 Nd-146 Nd-147 Pm-147 Sm-147 Nd-148 Pm-148 Sm-148 Pm-149 Sm-149 Nd-150 Sm-150 Sm-151 Eu-151 Sm-152 Eu-153 Eu-154 Gd-154 Eu-155 Gd-155 Gd-157 Gd-158 Gd-160 (e) Light elements are used in the calculation of the average energy per fission. Since most of the energy released per fission is in the kinetic energy of the fission products, the correction for capture energy with light element absorption is small. ORNL in Ref.40 has been in the practice of estimating the light element content of PWRs by use of a constant content. Assembly light element masses were taken from Reference 40 and are summarized below.

Assembly Light Element Masses Element Kglassy 0

119 Fe 11 Zr 195 Cr 5.2 Co 0.066 N _______

0.63 Mn 0.29 Ni 8.

Sn 3.2 (6.C.5) Fuel Temperature A significant spatial variation exists in the fuel temperature because of the low thermal conductivity of U02. The fuel temperature is highest at the pellet centerline and lowest at the pellet outside diameter. In addition, the fuel temperature varies axially due to different linear heat generation rates at different axial positions. An increase in fuel temperature increases the resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to Doppler effect, which results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in fuel temperature.

Per Ref.48, it is desirable to select a value for fuel temperature that estimates the highest average temperature that an assembly has experienced. The fuel temperature determined, based on the rated linear power multiplied by the radial peaking factor limit, is the highest axially-averaged fuel temperature.

Since the radial peaking factor limit is established on fuel pins, not on assemblies, application of the radial peaking factor throughout the entire assembly provides a layer of conservatism. It is still possible that parts of assemblies could experience higher fuel temperatures for a period of time because of axial variations; however, decreased end effects should compensate for higher mid-region effects. Thus the nominal average pellet temperature

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 17 should be calculated based on a reactor rated linear power multiplied by the radial peaking factor limit. A sufficiently conservative value can be obtained using a uniform axial power distribution and taking the average pellet temperature from the top of the fuel assembly. The burnup that results in the highest fuel temperature should be used.

Fuel temperature used in the SAS2H cases was calculated using the fuel temperature correlation from the CORD model for Unit 1 Cycle 16, as documented in file gbnszsoq.cdf of Refs,49-50.

The correlation is:

Tfe = Tm

+ (2.34607E-7*B

+

.10995E-3*B + 130.08)*L + ( -9.505119E-13*B

+

5I13836E-8*B2 - 5.11639E-4*B - 1.67177)*L2

where, e = fuel temperature in OF Tmod = moderator temperature in OF B

= burnup in MWd/MTU L

= linear power density in kW/ft.

As in the CORD model, the actual burnup is used up to 20,000 MWdIMTU, above which it is fixe-at2OOOOMNdMLL Attachment K (EXCEL Spreadsheet SAS2H-Tfuel(X2inp.xls)) details the calculation of the bounding fuel temperature as a function of burnup for a Thot value of 6010F per UFSAR Figure 4-9, a core thermal power of 2970 MWt (2700 MWt times a 10% power uprate), and a radial peaking factor of 1.65 per Refs.51-52. Note that the peak fuel temperature value of 1285.420K at zero burnup will be conservatively employed in all SAS2H calculations.

Note that the fuel, moderator, and clad temperatures are defined on the material cards; however, they may also be specified on the power cards via the TNIPFUEL, TMPCLAD, and TMPMOD inputs. If the temperatures are specified on the power cards, all must be specified or none must be specified. If none are specified, the temperatures on the material cards will be utilized. If all are specified, the temperatures on the power cards will be utilized. If only some are specified on the power cards, the remaining will be set to zero.

(6.C.6) Moderator Temperature The moderator temperature is lowest at the reactor inlet and increases monotonically as it reaches the reactor outlet. This increase in moderator temperature is greater in a hot channel where the heat generation is higher than the average. Neutron spectral hardening occurs with an increase in moderator temperature due to fewer hydrogen nuclides that thermalize fast neutrons past the resonance region. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in moderator temperature.

The moderator temperature increases from the bottom to the top of the reactor core. Thus per Ref48, the use of the average core outlet temperature appears to conservatively bound the moderator temperature. In fact, the use of the average core outlet temperature (Tjn + ATa.,e) is more conservative than the use of the peak average moderator temperature (Tin + AT.,*Pradial/2).

Applying the average core outlet temperature over the entire fuel length and for the entire depletion time provides adequate assurance of bounding treatment.

Per UFSAR Figure 4-9, an average core outlet temperature of 601°F or 589.26°K will be conservatively employed in all SAS2H calculations. The corresponding water density of 0.6905 gm/cc is derived in Attachment L (H2ODEN(x2inp.xls)) from data extracted from Ref.9.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page f (6.C.7) Soluble Boron Concentration The concentration of soluble boron is adjusted to maintain core criticality. The soluble boron concentration is gradually decreased as the burnup increases and reaches a minimum value at the end of cycle. The soluble boron present in the moderator increases the thermal absorption cross section, decreases the thermal flux, and results in a hardened neutron spectrum. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in soluble boron concentration.

The limit on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) restricts the level of soluble boron concentration in a given reactor cycle, which is the reason that many plants with long cycle lengths resort to the use of burnable absorbers in fuel assemblies. The average soluble boron concentration can be calculated from the critical boron letdown curve generated as a result of fuel reload analysis. The average boron concentration can be found by integrating the boron letdown curve with respect to time and dividing by the cycle length. Per Ref 48, the maximum average boron concentration is to be identified and used in the SAS2H depletion analysis.

PetRefs.3$54he maximum.B3OCsolublbarocentrationisesa han40 ppm, where_

Ref.55 models a cycle at the MTC Technical Specification limit. The boron letdown curves in these cycles are approximately linear with exposure. Thus a bounding BOC soluble boron concentration of 1900 ppm will be assumed with a linear letdown curve, resulting in a maximum average soluble boron concentration of 950 ppm. Note that the use of IFBAs would result in a nonlinear soluble boron letdown curve and is thus not bounded by this work.

(6.C.8) Specific Power An increase in specific power results in an increase in neutron flux and a decrease in fuel depletion time to achieve the same burnup. The decrease in fuel depletion time has a negligible effect on the majority of the actinides because of their long half-lives; however, Pu-241 has less time to 13-decay to Am-241 because of its short half-life of 14.4 years.

Therefore, the concentration of Pu-241 increases and that of Am-241 decreases as the specific power increases.

The equilibrium concentration of Xe-135 increases as the neutron flux increases, which results in neutron spectral hardening. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers.

This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in specific power.

Per Ref.48, multiplying the specific power by the radial peaking factor limit assures the highest axially averaged specific power. Since the radial peaking factor limit is established on fuel pins, not on assemblies, application of the radial peaking factor throughout the entire assembly provides a layer of conservatism. It is still possible that parts of assemblies could experience higher specific powers for a period of time because of axial variations; however, decreased end effects should compensate for higher mid-region effects.

The specific power (SP) and assembly power (AP) are calculated from the VAP fuel data detailed in Attachment D.

M=t*(0.96774/2cm)2*(347.21 8cm)*(10.96gm/cc)*(0.945)*(176)*(238/270)/(106MTU)

=0.410372MTU SP= (2700 MWt)*(l.l)*(l.65)/217/M

= 55.03 MW/MTU AP = (2700 MWt)*(l.l)*(l.65)/217

CA06015 Revision 0 Page I

= 22.583 MW which assumes a 10% power uprate and a radial peaking factor of 1.65 per Refs.51-52. The correspondence between burnup and EFPD for the above powers are listed in Attachment K (EXCEL Spreadsheet SAS2H-Tfuel(X2inp.xls)).

It was attempted to verify this behavior for the current work via the SAS2H and KENO executions of Section 9.B.3.e (also see Figure 6). Examination of the results of that section indicates that the reactivity results are only slightly power-dependent, the maximum and minimum values within 2 sigma at high burnups and within 3 sigma at low burnups. The reactivity tends to increase slightly with decreasing assembly power not with increasing assembly power as indicated in Ref.48. Since Ref.48 was applicable to actinide credit only, inclusion of fission products in the reactivity calculations tends to reverse the actinide only reactivity behavior as a function of assembly power. This is most probably due to the increased time required to attain the same burnup at a lower assembly power level, which allows more decay of the neutron parasitic fission products.

Thus the core-averaged assembly power of 12.442 MW will be utilized in this work.

SPi(2700MWt)L21M

= 30.32 MWIMTU AP = (2700 MWt)/217

= 12.442 MW Note that the fuel irradiation period BURN in days can be readily calculated as the desired burnup in MWD/MTU divided by the specific power in MW/MTU per Attachment K and EXCEL spreadsheet X2INP.XLS(SAS2H-Tfuel(2)).

(6.C.9) Refueling Downtime A decrease in refueling downtime results in less Pu-241 decay to Am-241, which results in increased reactivity.

Per Ref.48, fuel cycles modeled with no reactor downtime are a conservative approach. In this work, only a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay time at end-of-life per Ref.45 is conservatively assumed.

(6.C.10) Clad Material and Temperature The clad was assumed to be composed of zircaloy-4 (ZIRC4) as defined in the Standard Composition Library of Ref. 9. Current fuel pin clad composition includes zirlo, optin, low tin zirlo, alloy A, and M5 (Refs.5, 6, 17, 18, 22, and 30); however, -98% of these materials are composed of zirconium, thus the use of zirc4 should be representative of the clad. Also note that only fission products and actinides will be extracted from the SAS2H executions for use in the criticality calculations.

A clad temperature of 620°F or 599.82K was utilized in this work consistent with Refs.8 and 40.

(6.C.11) Path A Geometry The model used in Path A represents the fuel as an infinite lattice of fuel pins. Cell-weighted cross sections are produced by this model and are then applied to the fuel zone of the Path B model. The VAP fuel rod pitch (1.4732 cm), pellet outer diameter (0.96774 cm), clad outer diameter (1.1176 cm), and clad inner diameter (0.98552 cm) are extracted from Attachment D (Z2INP.XLS(Fuel)).

(6.C.12) Path B Geometry The model applied to Path B is a larger unit cell model used to represent part of an assembly within an infinite lattice. The concept of using cell-weighted data in the -D XSDRNPM-S analysis of Path B is an appropriate method for evaluating heterogeneity effects found in fuel pin

CA06015 Revision 0 Page O

lattices.

The Path B model is used by SAS2H to generate few-group, cell-weighted cross sections for ORIGEN-S and to calculate the neutron flux for an assembly-averaged fuel region that is used to update the ORIGEN-S spectral parameters for isotopes not explicitly included in the cell model. The essential rule in deriving the zone radii is to maintain the relative volumes in the actual assembly. The effective radii for the SAS2H Path B model for 176 pin VAP CE 14x14 assemblies were taken from Attachment D (Z2INP.XLS(Fuel)).

Zircaloy-4 Guide Tube Borated Water in Guide Tube Cell Borated Water r = 1.416 cm r3 = 1.662 cm r4= 5.204 cm rs = 5.223 cm Fuel Region Figure 1: Path B Model for SAS2H (6.C.13) Additional Inputs Definition Reference NPIN/ASSM 176 Number of fuel rods/assembly Attachment D FUELNGTH 347.218 Fuel rod active length in cm Attachment D NCYCLES 1

Number of cycles NLIB/CYC 1/2.5 gwd/mtu Number of libraries made per cycle PRlNTLEVEL 9

Print level Ref.9 S2.5.19 LIGHTEL 9

Number of light elements Section 6.C.4.e INPLEVEL 2

Input level Ref.9 S2.5.14 NUMHOLES 5

Number of guide tubes per assembly Attachment D NUMINSTR 0

Number of instrument tubes per assembly Attachment D MXTUBE 2

Mixture number of guide tubes ORTUBE 1.41605 Outside radius of guide tubes in cm Attachment D SRTUBE 1.31445 Inside radius of guide tubes in cm Attachment D ASMPLTCH 20.7772 Assembly pitch in cm Attachment D NUMZTOTAL 5

Number of zones in Path B cell Attachment D MXREPEATS 1

Mixes and radius required only once Ref.9 S2.5.5 M]XMOD 3

Mixture number of moderator FACMESH 1.0 Mesh size factor (6.D) Keno Criticality Inputs All KENO calculations are LATTICECELL calculations using the 44GROUPNDF5 libraiy. The lattice type is SQUAREPITCH, assuming cylindrical rods in a square pitch and using the VAP dimensions detailed in Attachment D.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 21 (6.D.1) Materials The following material designations are used in the KENO input decks.

(1) Material 1 is U02 at the indicated enrichment, stack height density, and temperature per Z2INP.XLS(CALCLIST) (Attachment A).

(2) Material 2 is fuel clad. Three materials are modeled:

(a) Zirlo fuel clad is detailed in Z2INP.XLS(DENSIMES) (Attachment C).

(b) Optin fuel clad is detailed in Z2INP.XLS(DENSlTlES) (Attachment C).

(c) Zirc4 fuel clad is a standard composition of Ref.21.

(d) Alloy A fuel clad is detailed in Refs. 5 and 6.

(e) Low tin zirlo fuel clad is detailed in Refs. 5 and 6.

(f) M5 fuel clad is detailed in Refs. 5 and 22.

(3) Material 3 is borated moderator as detailed in Z2INP.XLS(DENSlTlES) (Attachment C).

(4) Material 4 is SS304. a standard composition of Ref.21.

(5) Material S is borated moderator as detailed in Z21NP.XLS(DENSlTES) (Attachment C).

Note that borated moderator is used in lieu of boraflex in the rack structure.

(6) Material 6 is guide tube clad and is composed of ZIRC4, standard composition of Ref.21.

(7)

Material 7

comprises the upper end fitting or moderator as detailed in Z71NP YTS DEN TE(Attachment C

25)

(8)

Material 8 comprises the lower end fitting or moderator as detailed in Z2INP.XLS(DENSITIES) (Attachment C - Refs.25-26).

(9) Material 9 is the SS304 SFP liner, a standard composition of Ref.21.

(10) Material 10 is the SFP concrete structure, a standard composition of Ref.21.

(11) Material 11 is a second U02 enrichment for some configuration control cases.

(12) For material densities generated by SAS2HLN, and SAS2HLAG, material designations starting with material 101 are employed, similar to the nomenclature of Ref.34.

The single assembly and lOxlO assembly array of infinite axial extent calculations use material types 1-6. The 1-node, 18-node, and 26-node axial burnup bias calculations use material types 11 for fuel, 2 for clad, 3 for moderator, 4-5 for rack, 6 for guide tube, 7 for UEF and LEF, 8 for SFP SS304 liner, and 9 for SFP concrete. The whole core, reconstitution, dropped assembly, and configuration controlled models use materials 1-10 as described above.

(6.D.2) Geometry The SFP is a large rectangular structure which holds the spent fuel assemblies from the reactors of both units. Borated water fills the SFP and completely covers the spent fuel assemblies. The SFP is constructed of reinforced concrete and is lined with a stainless steel plate which serves as a leakage barrier. A dividing wall separates the SFP, with the north half being associated with Unit 1 and the south half associated with Unit 2. A slot in the dividing wall has removable gates which allow movement of fuel assemblies between the two halves of the pool. The SFP is located in the Auxiliary Building between the two containment structures.

Each half of the SFP is equipped with vertical spent fuel racks installed on the pool bottom. The fuel rack cells are individual double-walled containers approximately 14 feet long. The inner wall of each cell is made from a 0.06 inch thick sheet of stainless steel formed into a square cross-section container, indented on the corners, with an inside dimension of 8.56 inches. The outer, or external, wall is also formed from a stainless steel sheet 0.06 inches thick. Plates of borated, neutron absorbing material are inserted between the two walls, in each of the four spaces formed by the indentations in the inner wall. The plates are made of a boron carbide (B 4C) composite material (boraflex) and are 6.5 inches wide by 0.09 inches thick. Issue Reports R3-045-938, IR3-045-939, and IR3-052-199 documented possible boraflex degradation in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool, based on calculations using the Racklife software package. The Racklife results indicated that at certain highly-irradiated locations the degradation could be as high as 70%.

Since the Unit 2 design basis areal B-10 loading is 0.020 gm/cm2 and since the initial loading

CA06015 Revision 0 Page Ha-.

was a minimum of 0.020 gm/cm2, insufficient margin exists to cover the degradation.

No boraflex is credited in this work. Attachments E and G display a single SFP planar and axial storage cell geometry. The spacing between the cells is maintained at 10 3/32 inches, center to center, by external sheets and welded spacers.

(6.D.2.i) Single Assembly Model of Infinite Axial Extent Geometric regions designated as Units 1-8 in each of the KENO input decks define an assembly seated in a fuel rack cell. For the single assembly model of infinite axial extent, Units 1-8 are sufficient to completely define the problem.

Storage Cell Pitch = 10.09375" (Ref.15)

Storage Cell Inner Dimension = 8.5625" (Ref.15)

Poison Sheet = 6.5"

• 0.09" (Ref.15)

Inner Steel Wall = 0.06" (Ref15)

Outer Steel Wall = 0.06" (Ref.15)

Unit 1:

Fuel pin cell (Z2INP.XLS(FUEL))

Unit 2:

Guide tube cell (Z2INP.XLS(FUEL))

it3--

Storage-rackwalLsection

-!.Z(0 06" SS 009'B4Cfl*Q06" SS)

Unit 4:

Storage rack wall section (0.06" SS + 0.09" B4C + 0.06" SS)

• 6.5" Unit 5:

Storagerackwall section 1.15125"

• 0.12" SS Unit 6:

Storage rack wall section 0.12"

• 1.03125" SS Unit 7:

2

• 2 fuel cell Unit 8:

14

• 14 assembly in fuel rack cell (6.D.2.ii) lOx lO Assembly Array of Infinite Axial Extent In addition to the Units 1-8 geometric regions in 6.D.2.i, a Unit 9 geometric region is required to model the IOx lo assembly array of infinite axial extent.

(6.D.2.iii) Single Assembly Axial Burnup Models The 1-node, 18-node, and 26-node axial burnup bias calculations model an infinite array of assemblies in the lateral directions. In addition to the Units 1-8 geometric regions in 6.D.2.i, Unit 9 is employed to model 23.619 feet of moderator above the active fuel region and 17.871 inches of moderator below the active fuel region followed by 3/16 inch stainless steel liner and 6 feet of concrete wall.

(6.D.2.iv) Complete Unit 2 SFP, Reconstitution/Inspection, and Dropped Assembly Models During inspection/reconstitution activities in the SFP, assemblies are put on 20.5" spacers (Ref.

25) adjacent to the SFP wall. This process lifts the active fuel region of the affected assembly above the boraflex poison plates (Attachment G) and thus could affect reactivity. In this work, the boraflex plates are replaced with moderator and are not credited, thus the reactivity effect of inspection/reconstitution should be minimal. In addition to the Units 1-8 geometric regions in 6.D.2.i, Units 11-18 in the KENO input decks define an assembly seated on a rack spacer in a fuel rack cell.

Unit 11:

Fuel pin cell on spacer (Z2INP.XLS(FUEL))

Unit 12:

Guide tube cell on spacer (Z2INP.XLS(FUEL))

Unit 13:

Storage rack wall section 6.5" * (0.06" SS + 0.09" B4C + 0.06" SS)

Unit 14:

Storage rack wall section (0.06" SS + 0.09" B4C + 0.06" SS)

• 6.5" Unit 15:

Storage rack wall section 1.15125"

• 0.12" SS Unit 16:

Storage rack wall section 0.12"

• 1.03125" SS Unit 17:

2

• 2 fuel cell on spacer Unit 18:

14

• 14 assembly on spacer in fuel rack cell

CA06015 Revision 0 Page ZS For accident analysis, an assembly dropped across the top of the SFP racks must be modeled.

Units 21-24 in the KENO input decks define an assembly in the horizontal position.

Unit 21:

Horizontal fuel pin cell (Z2NP.XLS(FUEL))

Unit 22:

Horizontal guide tube cell (Z21NP.XLS(FUEL))

Unit 23:

Horizontal 2

• 2 fuel cell Unit 24:

Horizontal 14

• 14 assembly The Unit 2 SFP racks are vertical cells grouped in 10 10x1O modules. Units 30-32 in the KENO decks define these arrays.

Unit 30:

10x1 Oarray Unit 31:

I0x9 array Unit 32:

1Oxl array on spacers The SFP is located in the Auxiliary Building between the two containment structures. Designed in two identical sections separated by a 3 1/2 foot thick dividing wall, the pool is constructed of reinforced concrete and lined with 3/16 inch stainless steel. Each half of the pool is 54 feet long,

-- 25fe we id feeLdeep- (the1oor-elevation-varies)

The-SEPwal&-andL floor are 5 1/2 or 6 feet thick, depending on the location. Unit 40 is the entire Unit 2 SFP structure to the outside concrete boundary (Attachment F) and includes any reconstitution and/or dropped assembly details.

Unit 40:

Unit 2 SFP (6.D.2.v) Configuration Control Models with Empty Rack Spaces and Fresh Fuel For the some configuration control models (KU2CONA-C), Units 30-34 define a rack space filled only with moderator, while Unit 40 is a I Ox 10 array of assemblies and empty rack spaces and Unit 50 is the entire Unit 2 SFP filled with the Unit 40 0x1O arrays. Units 1-24 are as detailed in Section 6.D.2.iv.

(6.D.2.vi) Configuration Control Models with Burned and Fresh Fuel For the configuration control models (KU2COND1-3 and KU2CONEI-3), Units 1-8 define a burned assembly in a rack space, and Units 11-18 a fresh assembly in a rack space. Unit 40 is a lOxlO array of fresh and burned assemblies, while Unit 50 is the entire Unit 2 SFP filled with the Unit 40 1Ox1O arrays.

Verification that the input geometries are constructed correctly can be seen by an inspection of the KENO generated plots in Attachment H.

(6.D.3) Parameters (1) Maximum execution time is set at 500 minutes.

(2) Number of generations is 1010 (3) Number of particles per generation is 600 (4) Number of skipped generations is 10 (5) The NB8 parameter on the PARAM card and the DAB parameter on the DATA card must be set to at least 500 to accommodate the increased storage requirements of axial burnup profile isotopics.

(6.D.4) MORE DATA (1) The NB8 parameter on the PARAM card and the DAB parameter on the DATA card must be set to at least 500 to accommodate the increased storage requirements of axial burnup profile isotopics.

(2) For multiple fuel types in the same model, enter

CA06015 Revision 0 Page i

RES=Mixture Number CYL-Fuel pellet radius (0.48387 cm)

DAN(Mixture Number)=Dancoff Factor for each fuel type not specified in the SQUAREPITCH card.

From multiple KENO outputs, it was determined that the Dancoff Factor is independent of enrichment and burnup and is only a function of soluble boron concentration.

Dancoff Factor (0 ppm)

=0.24337743 Dancoff Factor (300 ppm)

=0.24314851 Dancoff Factor (2000 ppm) =0.24185666 (6.D.5) Boundary Conditions Per Ref.4, the SFP storage racks should be assumed to be infinite in the lateral dimension or to be surrounded by a water reflector and concrete or structural material as appropriate to the design.

The fuel may be assumed to be infinite in the axial dimension, or the effect of a reflector on the top and bottom of the fuel may be evaluated. Thus reflective boundary conditions are modeled on all sides and on top and bottom.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 24'7

7. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS The following technical assumptions were utilized in this work:

(7.A) No Boraflex was credited in this work. In addition, the KENO model assumes that the boraflex is completely replaced by SFP water, which is based on the fact that the silica matrix is completely dissolved by by the water.

(7.B) No CEA insertion was credited in these evaluations.

(7.C) No shims were modeled in the fuel assemblies. The analyses in Refs.35-37 demonstrate that, with the exception of Westinghouse FBA rods, the neutron multiplication factor for an assembly without Integral Burnable Absorbers (IBAs) is always greater (throughout burnup) than the k-eff for an assembly with IBAs, including U0 2-Gd2O3, UO2-Er203, and A1203-B4C rods.

(7.D) The following assumptions are consistent with the validation methodology of Ref.8 and are necessitated by the methodology biases and uncertainties used in this work.

(7.D.1) All criticality calculations were run with 1010 generations and 600 neutrons per generation to improve statistics.

(7.D.2) The first ten generations are omitted when calculating the average eigenvalue of the system.

(7.D.3) The default value was used for the start option of flat neutron distribution.

(7.D.4) No albedo boundary conditions were applied.

(7.D.5) No neutron biasing in the water reflection region was used.

(7.D.6) Structural components such as control and safety rod guides, support angles and channels, and tanks were neglected.

This is conservative, since they are parasitic neutron absorbers.

(7,D.7) Trace chemical elements were neglected.

(7.D.8) The 44 group ENDF-BN cross section library is utilized.

(7.E) This work does not address encapsulated fuel stored in assembly guide tubes, which would increase total reactivity. Thus encapsulated fuel can not be stored in the guide tubes of fuel assemblies stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool. Encapsulated fuel can be stored in empty grid cages in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool, since that would constitute a decrease in reactivity.

(7.F) The most reactive fuel type, 5.0 w/o VAP fuel, is modeled.

(7.G) U234 and U236 are conservatively not modeled in the fresh fuel pellet.

(7.H) Per Refs.53 and 54, the Technical Specification Refueling Boron Concentration is greater than 2150 ppm. 2000 ppm will be conservatively used in this work.

(7.1) Per Refs.53 and 54, the Refueling Boron Concentration uncertainty is 7.5%.

15% will conservatively assumed in this work.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page ;

8. REFERENCES (1) "Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling", 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 62 (2) "Criticality Accident Requirements", 10 CFR 50.68 (3) "Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", B.K.Grimes (NRC) to All Power Reactor Licensees, 4/14/8 (4) "Guidance on the Regulatory Requirements for Criticality Analysis of Fuel Storage at LWR Power Plants", NRC Memorandum L. Kopp to T. Collins, 8/19/98 (5) "Chemistry Review of New Fuel Cladding Materials in Westinghouse and Framatome LFAs",

RL0092 (6) "Safety Analysis Report for Use of Improved Zirconium Based Cladding in Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Batch T LFAs", WCAP-15874-P, Rev.0 (7) "SCALE 4.4 Verification and Validation for BGE's CCNPP", CA04910 (8) "SCALE 4.4 CSAS Validation Computations", CA04911 (9) "SCALE: A Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation," NUREG/CR-0200, Rev. 6 (ORNIJNUREG/CSD-2R6), Vols.,, and II September 1998.

(10) ANSIIANS-8.1, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors."

(11) ANSIIANS-8.17, "American National Standard for Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside of Reactors."

(12) NUREG/CR-6361, "Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages," J. J. Lichtenwalter, S. M. Bowman, M. D. DeHart and C. M.

Hopper, March 1997.

(13) NEA/NSC/DOC(95)03, International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments, Volume IV, Low Enriched Uranium Systems, September 1999 Edition.

(14) NTIS PB93-196-038, "Experimental Statistics Handbook 91", August 1963.

(15) "Nuclear Design Analysis Report for the CCNPP Unit 2 High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks", NES Report 81A0704 Rev.0.

(16) 1967 Steam Tables, New York St. Martin's press, 1967 (17) "impact of Zirlo on the Reactivity Bias", Westinghouse Interoffice Correspondence CA-2001-0026 (18) "Implementation of Zirlo Cladding Material in CE Nuclear Power Fuel Assembly Designs",

CENPD-404-P Rev.0 (19) "Nuclides and Isotopes, Chart of the Nuclides", GE Nuclear 14th Edition.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page Z7 (20) "Introduction to Nuclear Engineering", J.R.Lamarsh, 12/77.

(21) "Standard Composition Library", NUREG/CR-0200 Rev.6 Volume 3 Section M8 (22) "M5 Alloy Topical", Framatome (23) "Auxiliary Building SFP Liner Plan and Sections Sheet 1", BGE Drawing 61-706-E Rev.18.

(24) " Fuel Storage Rack Installation in Pool", BGE Drawing 13939-0038 Rev.2 (25) "Fuel Handling Accident during Reconstitution", CA04048 (26) "Design Input Data for CCNPP ISFSI", NEU-01-016.

(27) "Guide Tube Assembly Details", BGE Drawing E-STD-701-303 Rev.5.

(28) "Reanalysis of Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Calculations", ABB/CE Calculation A-CC2-FE-0003 Rev.2, 7/2/92.

(29) "Spent Fuel Pool Enrichment Limit with Value Added Pellets", CA04662.

(30) "Calvert Cliffs Lead Fuel Assemblies Fuel Design and Safety Analysis Report", Volume 1, EMF-2807(P) Rev.0, RL00101.

(31) "Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", WCAP-14416-NP-A.

Rev.1 (32) "Separation Distance to Neutronically Decouple Fresh Fuel Assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool", P.F.O'Donnell to P.H.Gavin, CC-FE-0130 Rev.0, 3/5/98.

(33) "Review of Axial Burnup Distribution Considerations for Burnup Credit Calculations",

ORNUIJM-1999/246 (34) "STARBUCS: A Prototype SCALE Control Module for Automated Criticality Safety Analyses Using Burnup Credit", NUREG/CR-ORNLTM-2001/33. 9/2001 (35) "Study of the Effect of Integral Burnable Absorbers for PWR Burnup Credit", NUREG/CR-6760, ORNIJTM-2000-321, March 200.

(36) "Cross Section Generation for 2.00 w/o Erbia Pins for VAP Using ENDF/B-VI Library",

CA04732.

(37) "Recommendations for Addressing Axial Burnup in PWR Burnup Credit Analyses",

NUREG/CR-ORNLIJTM-2001/273.

(38) Isotopic Bias and Uncertainty for Burnup Credit Applications", J.M.Scaglione (Bechtel SAIC), ANS Transactions for the 2002 Winter Meeting (Vol. 87, pp. 105-107)

(39) "Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 14 EQ Source Term Verification", CA05653.

(40) "Validation of the SCALE System for PWR Spent Fuel Isotopic Composition Analyses",

ORNI/TM-12667.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 2M (41) "SAS2H Validation", CA05780.

(42) "Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Boraflex Degradation Operability Evaluation", CA05883 (43) "Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Enrichment Limit with Soluble Boron Credit", CA0601 1.

(44) "A Critical Review of the Practice of Equating the Reactivity of Spent Fuel to Fresh Fuel in Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses for PWR SFP Storage", NUREG/CR-6683, 9/2000.

(45) "CCNPP Technical Requirements Manual Section 15.9.1: Refueling Operations Decay Time", Rev.8 (46) "Non-conservatisms in Axial Burnup Biases for Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", USNRC 7/27/2001 (47) "Axial Burnup Shape Reactivity Bias", NSAL-00-015, 11/2/2000.

(48) 'Depletion and Package Modeling Assumptions for Actinide-Only Burnup Credit",

DOE/RW-0495, May 1997.

(49) "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 16 CORD/ROCS Design Models and Depletions," CCNPP Calculation CA05735, Westinghouse Calculation A-CCI-FE-0128, Rev. 0.

(50) "RC Waste Processing System Incident and Waste Gas Incident - Dose Analysis", CA05994 (51) Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 16 COLR, Rev.0 (52) Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 14 COLR, Rev.2 (53) "Unit 1 Technical Data Book", NEOP-13, Rev.18 (54) "Unit 2 Technical Data Book", NEOP-23, Rev. 14 (55) "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 15 CORD and ROCS Design Models and Depletions",

ABB/CE Calculation A-CCI-FE-0090 Rev.01 (56) "Applied Numerical Methods", Brice Carnahan, H. A. Luther, and James 0. Wilkes, John Wiley & Sons, N.Y., 1969.

(57) "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 16 CORD and ROCS Asbuilt Models and Depletions",

CA05743.

(58) "CE Response to NRC Questions on Enrichment Limit Upgrade at Calvert Cliffs",

Combustion Engineering Letter J.E.Baum (CE) to J.A.Mihalcik (BGE), B-88-128,.

(59) "Specification for U02 Fuel Pellets", Specification Number 00000-PD-1 10, Rev.l 1, 4/24/97.

(60) "BGE Criticality Analysis for Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pools", CA04166 (61) "ABB/CE Methodology Manual Physics Biases and Uncertainties", CE-CES-129 Rev.8-P (62) "Fission Product Activity in the Reactor Coolant", CE Report SE-69-971, NORMS Doc. ID

1. 77330, 10/9/69.

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9. METHOD OF ANALYSIS (9.A) Reactivity Equivalencing Per Ref 44, the spent nuclear fuel inventory subsequent to the decay of the short-lived Xe-135 isotope is typically used within the storage pool geometry to determine a fresh fuel enrichment that provides the same reactivity (neutron multiplication factor kf) as the spent nuclear fuel inventory. This Reactivity Equivalent Fresh Fuel Enrichment (REFFE) is then used within a criticality safety analysis code to perform the actual safety analysis. The acceptability of this practice can be demonstrated, provided the environment in which the REFFE is determined remains unchanged (e.g., an infinite array of identical storage rack cells in unborated water).

However, if the REFFE is determined based on a reference configuration and employed in the analysis of another condition, erroneous estimations of reactivity may result.

The use of REFFE can be shown to produce nonconservative results when used in the presence of soluble boron. These results show increasing nonconservatism with increasing soluble boron concentration and with increasing burnup. The soluble boron in the water is an effective thermal neutron absorber. Because of its negative reactivity worth, the presence of soluble boron reduces the relative reactivity worth of the fission products and actinide absorbers. The fission product and actinide absorbers have greater negative reactivity worth in the unborated reference condition in which the REFFE was determined, resulting in a lower prediction of the REFFE reactivity value.

When a REFFE assembly is placed in a checkerboard configuration with a more reactive assembly, the REFFE approach yields nonconservative results. When comparing the reference infinite configuration to a configuration in which the reference assembly is stored with higher-reactivity fuel, the reactivity of the latter configuration is controlled by the higher-reactivity fuel.

Physically, the maximum reactivity or fission density for this latter configuration occurs in the higher-reactivity fuel, with the lower-reactivity (reference) fuel acting in a supplementary manner.

Therefore, the fission products and actinide absorbers have less relative negative reactivity worth in this configuration (as compared to the reference configuration), because they are not physically located where the fission density is maximum.

Because of the possible nonconservatisms referenced above, reactivity equivalencing will not be employed in this work.

(9B) SAS2H Method of Analysis (9.B.1) Calculational Methodology The source term portion of this work employs SAS2H, a functional module in the SCALE system, to calculate the burnup-dependent source terms for the CCNPP Unit 2 SFP system.

Ref.9 documents the SCALE 4.4 modular code system SAS2H for computing the isotopic content of PWR spent fuel. The SAS2H control module performs the depletion/decay analysis using the well-established codes and data libraries provided in the SCALE system. Problem-dependent resonance processing of neutron cross sections is performed using the Bondarenko resonance self-shielding module BONAMI-S and the Nordheim Integral Treatment resonance self-shielding module NITAWL-11.

The XSDRNPM-S module is used to produce spectral weighted and collapsed cross sections for the fuel depletion calculations. COUPLE updates the cross section constants included on an ORIGEN-S nuclear data library with data from the cell-weighted cross section library produced by XSDRNPM-S. The weighting spectrum computed by XSDRNPM is applied to update all nuclides in the ORIGEN-S library that were not specified in the XSDRNPM analysis. The point-depletion ORIGEN-S module is used to compute time-dependent concentrations and source terms for isotopes simultaneously generated and depleted through neutronic transmutation, fission, and radioactive decay.

The cross section library 44GROUPNDF5 was utilized in this work.

44GROUPNDF5 is a 44-energy group library

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 3(° derived from the latest ENDFIB-V files with the exception of 0-16, Eu-154, and Eu-155, which were taken from the more improved ENDF/B-VI files.

Note that the SAS2HIORIGEN-S libraries include 689 light elements, such as clad and structural materials, 129 actinides, including fuel nuclides and their decay and activation products, and 879 fission product nuclides.

(9.B.2) Calculation of Biases and Uncertainties Per Ref.4, a reactivity uncertainty due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculation should be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties.

Although SAS2H is benchmarked in Ref.41 to the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 14 EQ radioactive source terms of Ref.39 and to the measured data in ORNLITM-12667 (Ref.40), no reactivity biases or uncertainties were determined. Per Ref.4, in the absence of any other determination of the depletion uncertainty, an uncertainty equal to 5% of the reactivity decrement to the bumup of interest is an acceptable assumption.

KENO Case K200000DI K207000DI K300000D1 K307000DI K400000DI K407000DI K500000DI KS07000DI K200000D2 K207000D2 K300000D2 K307000D2 K400000D2 K407000D2 K500000D2 K507000D2 Boron ppm 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 Enr w/o 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 Burnup gwdh 0

70 0

70 0

70 0

70 0

70 0

70 0

70 0

70 Unbiased K-eff 0.97726 0.69082 1.09184 0.71073 1.15989 0.74660 1.21112 0.79503 0.89457 0.63731 1.00921 0.65791 1.08296 0.69218 1.13444 0.73910 Delta K-eff 0.00082 0.00060 0.00091 0.00063 0.00096 0.00070 0.00091 0.00072 0.00083 0.00056 0.00081 0.00058 0.00085 0.00069 0.00094 0.00068 Uncertainty 0.01439 0.01913 0.02075 0.02089 0.01293 0.01763 0.01962 0.01985 Based on the above computations, a worst case uncertainty value burnup related reactivity calculations.

of 0.02089 will be used in all Ref.38 includes additional benchmarking of SAS2H to Calvert Cliffs radiochemical assays.

Radiochemical assays (RCAs) are the destructive post-irradiation examination of nuclear fuel.

Note that there are compensating effects by the over/under-prediction of different isotopes.

Therefore, when evaluating a code's ability to accurately predict the isotopic composition of irradiated fuel, the effect on reactivity is the important result. The results for CCNPP fuel indicate that the isotopic compositions predicted by SAS2H produce conservative values of k-effective (k(SAS2H)>k(RCA)).

Additional calculations in this work verified that the reactivity of a SAS2H generated system is more conservative than an RCA based system.

KENO Case K506000DI K50600001 SAS2H Case S560 Hand Enr w/o 5.0 5.0 Burnup gwdt 60 60 Unbiased K-eff 0.84339 0.83981 Delta K-eff 0.00071 0.00071 Uncertainty

-0.00358 The isotopics for Case K506000D1 were generated via a SAS2H execution, while those for K506000G1 used the same SAS2H isotopics but were modified by the SAS2H to RCA biases

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 31 determined in Attachment R from the validation data of Ref 41. Note that the SAS2H generated reactivity is 0.358% more reactive than those adjusted to the RCA isotopics.

(9.B.3) Calculations (9.B.3.a) Reactivity vs Refueling Downtime Per Section 6.C.9, a decrease in refueling downtime results in less Pu-241 decay to Am-241, which results in increased reactivity. This was verified for the current work via the following SAS2H and KENO executions (also see Figure 2):

KENO SAS2H Enr BuTnup Cooling Time Unbiased Case Case w/o gwd/t K-eff K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay 0.70641 K205000AB S250B 2.0 50 1 year decay 0.69684 K205000AC S250C 2.0 50 2 year decay 0.69026 K205000AD S250D 2.0 50 5 year decay 0.67068 KS02000AA S520A 5.0 20 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay 1.05935 K502000AB S520B 5.0 20 1 year decay 1.05345 K502000AC S520C 5.0 20 2 year decay 1.05450 K502000AD S520D 5.0 20 5 year decay 1.05015 KS05000AA S550A 5.0 50 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay 0.88271 KS05000AB S550B 5.0 50 1 year decay 0.87514 KSO5000AC S550C 5.0 50 2 year decay 0.87105 K5S05000AD S550D 5.0 50 5 year decay 0.85665 Thus using the Technical Specification cooling time of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> is conservative in all cases.

(9.B.3.b) Reactivity vs Fuel Temperature Per Section 6.C.5, an increase in fuel temperature increases the resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to Doppler effect, which results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in fuel temperature.

This was verified for the current work via the following SAS2H and KENO executions (also see Figure 3):

KENO SA2H Enr Burnup Notes Unbiased Case Case w/o gwd/t K-eff K205000AA S250A 2.0 SO Tfuel=1285.42K 0.70641 K20SOOOAE S250E 2.0 50 Tfuel-1085.42K 0.69927 K205000AF S25OF 2.0 SO Tfiiel885.42K 0.69036 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 Tfuel=1285A2K 1.05935 K502000AE S520E 5.0 20 Tfuel=108SA2K 1.05864 K502000AF S520F 5.0 20 Tfiiel1885A2K 1.05793 K505000AA S550A 5.0 50 Tfuel=1285.42K 0.88271 KS05000AE S550E 5.0 50 Tfiiel=1085.42K 0.87832 K505000AF S550F 5.0 50 Tfuel=885.42K 0.87249

CA06015 Revision 0 Page JZ-Thus using a fuel temperature of 1285.42K should be conservative in all cases.

(9.B.3.c) Reactivity vs Soluble Boron Concentration Per Section 6.C.7, the soluble boron present in the moderator increases the thermal absorption cross section, decreases the thermal flux, and results in a hardened neutron spectrum.

An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in soluble boron concentration. This was verified for the current work via the following SAS2H and KENO executions (also see Figure 4):

KENO SAS2H Enr Burnup Boron Unbiased Case Case w/o gwd/t PPM K-eff K205000AH S250H K205000AA S250A K205000AG S25OG K502000AH S520H KS02000AA S520A K502000AG S520G KS05000AH S550H KS05000AA S550A K5O5000AG S55OG 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 50 SO 800 0.70343 950 0.70641 SO 1100 0.71116 20 20 800 1.05837 950 1.05935 20 1100 1.05882 SO 50 800 0.88274 950 0.88271 50 1100 0.88656 Per Refs.53-55, the maximum BOC soluble boron concentration is less than 1820 ppm, where Ref.55 models a cycle at the MTC Technical Specification limit. The boron letdown curves in these cycles are approximately linear with exposure. Thus a bounding BOC soluble boron concentration of 1900 ppm will be assumed with a linear letdown curve, resulting in a maximum average soluble boron concentration of 950 ppm.

(9.B.3.d) Reactivity vs Moderator Temperature Per Section 6.C.6, neutron spectral hardening occurs with an increase in moderator temperature due to fewer hydrogen nuclides that thermalize fast neutrons past the resonance region. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in turn, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in moderator temperature. This was verified for the current work via the following SAS2H and KENO executions (also see Figure 5):

KENO SAS2H Case Case Enr Bumup Density-mod wlo gwdh gmicc 2.0 50 0.6905 K205000AA S250A K205000AI S250I K20SOOOAJ S250 K502000AA S520A KS02000AI S5201 KS02000AJ S5201 KSO5000AA S550A K505000AI S5501 2.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 50 0.7177 50 0.7404 20 0.6905 20 0.7177 20 0.7404 50 0.6905 50 0.7177 Tmod Unbiased F

K-eff 601 0.70641 580 0.69791 560 0.69044 601 1.05935 580 1.05764 560 1.05770 601 0.88271 580 0.87720 K505000AJ S5501 5.0 50 0.7404 560 0.87276

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 3 Thus the HFP value of Thot (60 1°F) was conservatively utilized in this work.

(9.B.3.e) Reactivity vs Assembly Power Per Section 6.C.8, an increase in specific power results in an increase in neutron flux and a decrease in fuel depletion time to achieve the same bumup. The decrease in fuel depletion time has a negligible effect on the majority of the actinides because of their long half-lives; however, Pu-241 has less time to

-decay to Am-241 because of its short half-life of 14.4 years.

Therefore, the concentration of Pu-241 increases and that of Am-241 decreases as the specific power increases.

The equilibrium concentration of Xe-135 increases as the neutron flux increases, which results in neutron spectral hardening. An increase in resonance capture of neutrons in U-238 due to the hardened spectrum results in increased production of fissile plutonium and actinide absorbers. This, in tum, causes more fissions in fissile plutonium and leads to less depletion in U-235. The net effect is increased reactivity with an increase in specific power. It was attempted to verify this behavior for the current work via the following SAS2H and KENO executions (also see Figure 6):

KENO SAS2H Enr Bumup Assembly EFPD Unbiased Case Case w/o gwdlt Power (MW)

K-eff K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 22.583 908.590 0.70641 K20500AK S250K 2.0 50 20.000 1025.930 0.70793 K20SOOOAL S250L 2.0 50 17.500 1172.490 0.70753 K205000AM S250M 2.0 50 15.000 1367.910 0.70754 K205000AN S250N 2.0 50 12.442 1649.090 0.70774 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 22.583 363.440 1.05935 K502000AK S520K 5.0 20 20.000 410.370 1.05903 KS02000AL S520L 5.0 20 17.500 469.000 1.05801 K502000AM S520M 5.0 20 15.000 547.160 1.05983 K502000AN S520N 5.0 20 12.442 659.640 1.06091 KSOSOOOAA S550A 5.0 50 22.583 908.590 0.88271 KSO5000AK S550K 5.0 50 20.000 1025.930 0.88415 K5O5000AL S550L 5.0 50 17.500 1172.490 0.88372 KSOSOOOAM S550M 5.0 50 15.000 1367.910 0.88420 KS05000AN S550N 5.0 SO 12.442 1649.090 0.88363 Examination of the above results indicates that the reactivity results are only slightly power-dependent, the maximum and minimum values within 2 sigma at high burnups and within 3 sigma at low burnups. The reactivity tends to increase slightly with decreasing assembly power not with increasing assembly power as indicated in Ref.48. Since Ref48 was applicable to actinide credit only, inclusion of fission products in the reactivity calculations tends to reverse the actinide only reactivity behavior as a function of assembly power. This is most probably due to the increased time required to attain the same burnup at a lower assembly power level, which allows more decay of the neutron parasitic fission products. Thus the core-averaged assembly power of 12.442 MW will be utilized in this work.

(9.C) SAS2H Edit Code It was necessary to generate SAS2H isotopics as a function of enrichment, bumup, cooling time, moderator temperature, fuel temperature, and soluble boron concentration; to edit each output for the specified number of actinide and fission product values; to convert the isotopic content from moles to atoms/b-cm; and then to put the results in KENO format prior to insertion into the

CA06015 Revision 0 Page R KENO input decks. This laborious task was simplified by writing the FORTRAN programs SAS2HED50 and SAS2HED1Ol, which accomplished all of the above.

The FORTRAN code listing for SAS2HED5O.FOR is included in Attachment M, while that for SAS2HED1O1.FOR is included in Attachment N. The programs can be compiled and linked via the FORT51 and LLNK5I batch files. A copy of FORT51.BAT and LINK51.BAT are included on the accompanying CDROM.

The program executable files SAS2HED5O.EXE and SAS2HED11O.EXE are executed on DOS. The program queries the user for the SAS2H output file and prints the results to the SAS2HED.OUT output file. The fuel portion of the KENO material cards is included in SAS2HED.OUT and may be manually copied into the KENO input deck.

The SAS2HED program performs the following functions:

(1) SAS2HEDO1I edits the number of moles for the following 28 actinides at the end of the final decay period. The edited actinides include the important nuclides delineated in Section 6.C.4.

TH-232 U-232 U-233 U-234 U-235 U-236 U-237 U-238 NP-237 NP-238 PU-236 PU-237 PU-238 PU-239 PU-240 PU-241 PU-242 AM-241 AM-242 AM-242M AM-243 CM-242 CM-243 CM-244 CM-245 CM-246 CM-247 CM-248 Note that if any of the above nuclides are not included in the SAS2H output listing, SAS2HED1O1 assigns a molar value of L.E-20 to that nuclide.

SAS2HED101 also edits the number of moles for the following 73 fission products at the end of the final decay period. The edited fission products include the important nuclides delineated in Section 6.C.4.

KR-83 KR-84 KR-85 KR-86 ZR-91 ZR-92 ZR-93 ZR-94 NB-95 MO-95 ZR-96 MO-97 MO-98 TC-99 RU-100 RU-101 RU-102 RU-103 RH-103 RU-104 PD-104 RH-105 PD-105 RU-106 PD-106 PD-107 PD-108 AG-109 CD-113 SN-126 1-127 1-129 XE-131 XE-132 XE-133 CS-133 XE-134 CS-134 XE-135 CS-135 CS-137 LA-139 PR-141 PR-143 ND-143 CE-144 ND-144 ND-145 ND-146 ND-147 PM-147 SM-147 ND-148 PM-148 PM-148M SM-148 PM-149 SM-149 ND-150 SM-150 SM-151 EU-151 SM-152 EU-153 EU-154 GD-154 EU-155 GD-155 EU-156 GD-156 GD-157 GD-158 GD-160 Note that if any of the above nuclides are not included in the SAS2H output listing, SAS2HED assigns a molar value of 1.E-20 to that nuclide.

(2) SAS2HED50 edits the number of moles for the following 14 actinides at the end of the final decay period. The edited actinides include the important nuclides included in the benchmark comparisons of Refs. 38 and 41.

U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238 NP-237 PU-238 PU-239 PU-240 PU-241 PU-242 AM-241 CM-242 CM-243 CM-244 Note that if any of the above nuclides are not included in the SAS2H output listing, SAS2HED50 assigns a molar value of 1.E-20 to that nuclide.

SAS2HED50 also edits the number of moles for the following 36 fission products at the end of the final decay period. The edited fission products include the important nuclides included in the benchmark comparisons of Refs. 38 and 41.

KR-83 KR-84 KR-86 MO-95 TC-99 RU-101 RH-103 AG-109 SN-126 I-129 XE-131 XE-132 CS-133 XE-134 CS-134 CS-135 CS-137 ND-143 ND-144 ND-145 ND-146 PM-147 SM-147 ND-148 SM-148 SM-149 ND-150 SM-150

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 1<

SM-151 EU-151 SM-152 EU-153 EU-154 GD-154 EU-155 GD-155 Note that if any of the above nuclides are not included in the SAS2H output listing, SAS2HED assigns a molar value of 1.E-20 to that nuclide.

(3) The edited molar quantities are converted to atoms/b-cm via the following algorithm:

N(atoms/b-cm) = N(moles) * (6.023E+23 atoms/mole)*(l.E-24 cm2/b)/(44949.183 cc) where 44949.183 cc is the fuel volume per assembly as calculated in Attachment K.

(4) Per Ref.4, the SFP storage racks should be evaluated with spent fuel at the highest reactivity following removal from the reactor (usually after the decay of Xe-135). Thus the quantity of Xe-135 is set equal to 1.E-20 moles.

(5) The nuclide designation and the quantity of each nuclide in moles and in atoms/b-cm are printed for the actinides and fission products.

(6) Finally, the fuel portion of the KENO material cards is printed, assuming that the fuel is material 1 in the KENO input file.

Verification that the program performs its intended function properly was checked as follows:

(1) The edited molar actinide and fission product values were verified to be identical to those in the SAS2H output file.

(2) The resultant Xe-135 value was verified as correct.

(3) The conversion from moles to atoms/b-cm was verified.

(4) The KENO material input cards were verified.

(9.D) SAS2H Interpolation Codes It was necessary to generate the SAS2H isotopic data for the 14 actinides and 36 fission products as a function of axial burnup for a given enrichment value for the 3D-to-2D KENO biasing calculations and then to put the results in KENO format prior to insertion into the KENO input decks.

This process was simplified by writing two FORTRAN programs SAS2HLIN and SAS2HLAG, which interpolated on burnup to generate isotopic data and which created the fuel portion of the 3D KENO input decks..

The FORTRAN code listing for SAS2HLIN.FOR is included in Attachment 0. The program can be compiled and linked via the FORT51 and LINK51 batch files. A copy of FORT5.BAT and LlNKS I.BAT are included on the accompanying CDROM.

The program executable file SAS2HLIN.EXE is executed on DOS. The program queries the user for an enrichment-specific SAS2HED50-generated isotopic file(S2xx.ed for 2.0 w/o fuel, S3xx.ed for 3.0 w/o fuel, S4xx.ed for 4.0 w/o fuel, and SSxx.ed for 5.0 w/o fuel), the bumup profile file (SAX18.INP for 18 axial nodes and SAX26.1NP for 26 axial nodes), the profile number, and a switch for single/multiple axial nodes (1 for single and 2 for multiple). The program linearly interpolates on burnup to generate the required isotopic data and prints the results to the SAS2HLIN.XXX output file. The fuel portion of the KENO material cards may be manually copied into the KENO input deck.

The FORTRAN code listing for SAS2HLAG.FOR is included in Attachment P. The program can be compiled and linked via the FORT51 and LINK51 batch files. A copy of FORT51.BAT and LJNK51.BAT are included on the accompanying CDROM. The program executable file SAS2HLAG.EXE is executed on DOS. The program queries the user for an enrichment-specific

CA06015 Revision 0 Page O SAS2HED50-generated isotopic file(S2xx.ed for 2.0 w/o fuel, S3xx.ed for 3.0 w/o fuel, S4xx.ed for 4.0 w/o fuel, and S5xx.ed for 5.0 w/o fuel), the burnup profile file (SAX18.INP for 18 axial nodes and SAX26.NP for 26 axial nodes), the profile number, and a switch for single/multiple axial nodes (1 for single and 2 for multiple). The program interpolates on burnup via a second-order Lagrangian algorithm (Ref 56) to generate the required isotopic data and prints the results to the SAS2HLAG.XXX output file. The fuel portion of the KENO material cards may be manually copied into the KENO input deck.

The codes were verified by manual calculations and comparisons.

The isotopic data as a function of burnup and enrichment were generated from the following SAS2H and SAS2HED50 executions:

l______ 2.0 w/o 3.0 w/o 4.0 w/o 5.0 w/o Burnup SAM SAS2HEDO 5SA SAMSO SAM SAS2HMDS SAM SAS2ED50 0

s200.out s200.ed s300.out s300.ed s400.out s400.ed s5OO.out s500.ed 5

s205.out s205.ed s305.out s305.ed s405.out s405.ed s505.out s505.ed 10 s210.out s210.ed s310.out s310.ed s410.out s410.ed s5lO.out s5lO.ed 15 s215.out s215.ed s315.out s315.ed s415.out s415.ed s515.out s515.ed 20 s220.out s220.ed s320.out s320.ed s420.out s420.ed s520.out s520.ed 25 s225.out s225.ed s325.out s325.ed s425.out s425.ed s525.out s525.ed 30 s230.out s230.ed s330.out s330.ed s430.out s430.ed s530.out s530.ed 35 s235.out s235.ed s335.out s335.ed s435.out s435.ed s535.out s535.ed 40 s240.out s240.ed s340.out s340.ed s440.out s440.ed s540.out s540.ed 45 s245.out s245.ed s345.out s345.ed s445.out s445.ed s545.out s545.ed 50 s250.out s250.ed s350.out s350.ed s450.out s450.ed s550.out s550.ed 55 s255.out s255.ed s355.out s355.ed s455.out s455.ed s555.out s555.ed 60 s260.out s260.ed s360.out s360.ed s460.out s460.ed s560.out s560.ed 65 s265.out s265.ed s365.out s365.ed s465.out s465.ed s565.out s565.ed 70 s270.out s270.ed s370.out s370.ed s470.out s470.ed s570.out s570.ed input s2xx.ed s3xx.ed s4xx.ed I s5xx.ed Figures 9-11 depict various isotopic quantities as a function of burnup for 2 w/o fuel (EXCEL spreadsheet s2xx.xls). The curves are smooth and well-behaved, as expected. While a first-order interpolation would probably be of sufficient accuracy for the 5 gwd/mtu burnup intervals, a second-order Lagrangian interpolation technique was developed and implemented to assure accuracy. The isotope file S5xx.ed is listed in Attachment Q.

Worst case 18-node axial burnup profiles as a function of average burnup were imported from Refs.33-34 (Attachment 1). The Ref33 axial profiles were designated as 06AL, IOAK,..., where the first two digits indicate average burnup and the last two profile. The Ref.34 axial profiles were designated as 06BL, lOBK,..., where the first two digits indicate average burnup and the last two profile. These 24 files are stored in the input file SAX18.INP (Attachment Q). Actual 26-node axial burnup profiles as a function of average burnup were imported from Ref.57 and represent actual Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 16 end-of-cycle profiles. The Ref£57 axial profiles were designated OlSO, 02S0, 03S1,..., where the first two digits indicate the quartercore assembly number and the last two the fuel type. The 43 files are stored in the input file SAX26.INP (Attachment Q). Note that 26 nodes were utilized for the Calvert Cliffs profiles, since the data was provided in that format, while 18 nodes were utilized for the worst-case profiles, since that data was provided in that format. Also note that while a quartercore encompasses 62 assemblies, only 43 axial profiles were modeled. Credit was taken for eighthcore symmetry.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 37 Comparison of reactivities generated with isotopics generated from SAS2HLAG (K5006ALGI) and isotopics generated from SAS2H (K5006ALH1) indicates reactivity values within two-sigma of each other. Note that the interpolated isotopics were only employed to calculate biases between axial and uniform burnup profiles. Any bias in the interpolation process itself should cancel out.

(9E) KENO Method of Analysis (9.E.1) Calculational Methodology The SCALE 4.4 CSAS25 code module (Ref.9) with the 44 group ENDF/B-V cross section library was utilized in this work to perform the KENO criticality calculations. CSAS25 uses the SCALE Material Information Process (MIP) and the associated material composition library to calculate material number densities, to prepare geometry data for resonance self-shielding, and to create data input files for the cross section processing codes, BONAMI and NITAWL-ll. The CSAS25 sequence then invokes the KENO-Va Monte Carlo criticality code.

(9.E.2) Calculation of Biases and Uncertainties Per Refs.3-4, the analysis methods and neutron cross-section data shall be benchmarked by comparison with critical experiment data for similar configurations. The benchmarking process should establish a calculational bias and uncertainty of the mean with a one-sided tolerance factor of 95% probability at a 95% confidence level. The maximum k-eff value for the SFP shall be obtained by summing the calculated value, the calculational bias, the total uncertainty defined as a statistical combination of the calculational and mechanical uncertainties, and the burnup axial distribution bias. A bias that reduces the calculated value of k-eff should not be applied.

Mechanical and material uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties.

Uncertainties may be combined statistically provided that they are independent variations.

(9.E.2.a) Methodology Bias and Uncertainty The SCALE 4.4 nuclear analysis software package (Ref.9) was verified on a dedicated CCNPP computer (Ref.7). The Ref.8 calculation package documented the validation of SCALE 4.4 for Light-Water Reactor (LWR) fuel criticality analysis.

Criticality safety standards ANSI/ANS-8.1 (Ref.IO) and ANSI/ANS-8.17 (Ref 11) apply to criticality methods validation and to criticality evaluations, respectively. ANSI/ANS-8.1 requires that a validation be performed on the method used to calculate criticality safety margins. The validation shall be documented in a written report describing the method, computer program and cross section libraries used, the experimental data, the areas of applicability and the bias and margins of safety. ANSI/ANS-8.17 prescribes the criteria to establish sub-criticality safety margins.

The USNRC has issued NUREG/CR-6361, "Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light-Water-Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages" (Ref.12). This guide provides documentation for 180 criticality experiments with geometries, materials, and neutron interaction characteristics representative of LWR fuel in core, storage and cask arrangements. NUREG/CR-6361 was used as design input and as the primary reference for the validation calculation package.

The objective of the Ref.8 calculation package was to satisfy the intent of ANSI/ANS-8.1 (Ref.IO) with respect to LWR fuel criticality evaluations in reactor core, spent fuel rack, and cask enviromnents and to satisfy the intent of ANSI/ANS-8.17 (Ref.l1) with respect to a determination of the bias and uncertainty in the bias. The Ref 8 calculation package validates the SCALE 4.4 code package (Ref.9) with the 44 neutron energy group ENDF/B-V based cross section library for use in light-water-reactor (LWR) type fuel criticality evaluations. Estimates are made for the bias, uncertainty in the bias and trending with important physical parameters.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page K Criticality evaluations were performed with the CSAS25 sequence of the SCALE 4.4 code package and with the 44 neutron energy group ENDF/B-V based cross section library. CSAS25 uses the SCALE Material Information Process (MIP) and the associated material composition library to calculate material number densities, to prepare geometry data for resonance self-shielding and to create data input files for the cross section processing codes. The BONAMI and NITAWL-l codes are then used to perform problem dependent cross section processing and resonance correction.

The CSAS25 sequence then invokes the KENO-V.a Monte Carlo criticality code. KENO-Va is capable of modeling each critical experiment in three dimensions including explicit representation of the fuel rod array and any associated water or metal reflector regions.

Statistical evaluations included calculating the range of calculated k-eff, the mean k-eff, standard deviation of the mean, bias, 95/95 uncertainty in the bias, and the average Monte Carlo error for the whole group of experiments as well as categories within a data base. Trending of k-eff with physical parameters, i.e. fuel rod pitch, fuel enrichment, moderator to fuel ratio, soluble boron concentration, assembly separation, and average energy group causing fission, was evaluated by creating scatter plots k-eff versus each physical parameter and then performing linear regression on the data. The strength of a trend was evaluated by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient from the linear regression.

In addition, the validation results were organized into three groupings: reactor core type experiments, storage rack type experiments and cask type experiments.

For each of these groupings, a bias and 95/95 uncertainty is also specified for use in criticality safety evaluations.

The bias and 95/95 uncertainty statistics are determined as follows. For any group or category of k-eff results, the bias is defined as P = <k-eff > - 1 where <k-eff> is the average for the category or group of critical experiments. According to this definition of bias, the bias is negative if k < 1 and positive if k > 1. ANSI/ANS-8.17 (Ref.ll) requires that the total uncertainty in the mean k-eff or equivalently the bias should include uncertainties for the computation of <k-eff>, the statistical convergence (Monte Carlo error) in computed k-eff and experimental uncertainty.

Thus, the total uncertainty in the bias is the square root of the pooled variance of the variance in

<k-eff> (akeff2) plus the average Monte Carlo variance of the category of critical experiments (cy,,C2) plus the average variance of the experimental uncertainty (aep ), i.e.,

U = sqrt(akeff +

nc + a2

)

The average Monte Carlo variance is approximately (0.0017)2 in these criticality evaluations.

NUREG/CR-6361 (Ref.12) does not provide an estimate of experimental uncertainty, but the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments, Volume IV, Ref 13 provides extensive analysis of the experimental uncertainty associated with the benchmark experiments referenced in NUREG/CR-6361 as well as others.

Review of the experimental uncertainties associated with the LWR type critical experiments provides an average experimental uncertainty of +/-0.0024. Per Ref.8, kff is 0.0035 for the storage rack type experiments. Thus, the total uncertainty in the bias becomes:

op = sqrt( 0.00172 + 0.00242+ 0.00352)

The 95/95 uncertainty in the bias is the standard deviation, af, times one-sided 95% confidence factor from a Student "t" distribution with n-2 degrees of freeCom or:

(595/95 = tS

• Csp where n is the number of kff results in the category or group of critical experiment. For large samples, t.05 approaches 1.645 (Ref.14).

The storage rack type category combines the results for the 123 critical experiments including the results for the core-type, separator plate, separator plate-soluble boron, and flux trap-void experiments but excluding the reflector wall categories. This experimental data is sufficiently diverse to establish that the method bias and uncertainty will apply to the Calvert Cliffs storage rack conditions. The storage rack type category exhibits a bias of -0.0008 and a 95/95 one sided uncertainty of 0.0076.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 37 A histogram for the frequency of k-eff values shows a tight clustering of k-eff values near k-eff=

1 and a near normal distribution. Scatter plots were constructed of k-eff versus fuel rod pitch, k-eff versus fuel enrichment, k-eff versus H 20/fuel volume ratio, k-eff versus H1235U atom ratio, k-eff versus soluble boron concentration, k-eff versus assembly separation, and k-eff versus average group of fission, respectively. Also included in each plot is the associated regression line and equation with correlation coefficient. Review of these plots indicates all the trend lines are nearly horizontal with very small correlation coefficients. Thus, there are no significant trends indicated.

(9.E.2.b) Temperature and Clad Composition Bias Per Ref4, the evaluation of normal storage should be done at the temperature (water density) corresponding to the highest reactivity. In poisoned racks, the highest reactivity will usually occur at a water density of 1.0000 (i.e., at 40C or 400F or 277.150K).

However, if the temperature coefficient of reactivity is positive, the evaluation should be done at the highest temperature expected during normal operation: i.e., equilibrium temperature under normal refueling conditions (including full-core offload), with one coolant train out of service and the pool filled with spent fuel from previous reloads. Per UFSAR 9.4.1, in the event that any one loop is lost, the remaining two loops (either two SFPC loops or one SFPC loop and one SDC loop) can continue to maintain the pool temperature at or below 1550F (680C or 341.480K @

0.9785 gm/cc per Ref 16) for 1830 fuel assemblies in the SFP including a full core offload.

Cases K500000B1-9, K500000Cl-9, and K504000C-9 model an infinite axial and radial array of storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel as a function of temperature (400F and 1550F) and as a function of fuel clad material (zirlo, optin, zirc4, alloy a, low tin zirlo, and m5).

KENO Case K500000BI K50000OB2 K500000B3 K500000B4 K500000B5 KSOOOOOB6 K500000B7 K500000B8 K50000OB9 K500000C1 K500000C2 K500000C3 K500000C4 K500000C5 K500000C6 K500000C7 K500000C8 K500000C9 K504000CI K504000C2 Enr Burnup w/o 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 gwd/t 0

0 Tmod K

277.15 277.15 Boron ppm 0

0 Clad Unbiased zirlo optin 0

277.15 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

277.15 0

277.15 0

277.15 0

341A8 0

341A8 0

341.48 0

341.A 0

341.48 0

341 A.

40 277.15 40 277.15 0

zirc4 0

zirlo 0

optin 0

zirc4 0

alloy a 0

It zirlo 0

mS 300 zirlo 300 optin 300 zirc4 K-eff 1.19925 1.19707 1.19639 1.20803 1.20813 1.21112 1.20980 1.20870 1.20890 1.12220 1.12203 1.12104 300 zirlo 1.13323 300 optin 1.13396 300 zzrc4 1.13444 300 alloya 1.13241 300 Itzirlo 1.13259 300 nS 300 zirlo 300 optin 1.13359 0.87878 0.S7862 K504000C3 5.0 40 277.15 300 zirc4 0.87750

CA06015 Revision 0 Page a

K504000C4 5.0 40 341.48 300 zirlo 0.89027 K504000C5 5.0 40 341A8 300 optin 0.89083 K504000C6 5.0 40 341.48 300 zirc4 0.89089 K504000C7 5.0 40 341A8 300 alloy a 0.89039 K504000C8 5.0 40 341A8 300 It zirlo 0.89004 K504000C9 5.0 40 341A8 300 n1S 0.89018 The zirc4 clad cases at 1550F are the most reactive for all conditions (unborated, borated, unburned, burned). This worst case condition will be assumed in all calculations.

(9.E.2.c) Storage Cell Pitch Uncertainty Per Ref.4, mechanical and material uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties.

Per Ref 15, the mechanical design of the fuel racks is such that the average pitch between boxes is maintained by structural members at 10.09375 +/- 0.03125 inches. Thus a nominal pitch of 10.09375 inches will be assumed, and an uncertainty value to +/- 0.03125 inches will be included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value. See Attachment E.

Cases K50000OBB-C, K500000CB-C, and K504000CB-C model an infinite axial and radial array of storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel as a function of storage cell pitch (10.0625, 10.09375, and 10.125 in) at the worst case temperature of 155°F for a fuel clad material composed of zirc4.

KENO Enr Bumup Tmod Boron Pitch Unbiased Delta Uncertainty Case w/o gwd/t K

ppm inch K-eff K-eff K50000OBB 5.0 0

341.48 0

10.125 110356 0.00088

-0.00577 K50000OBC 5.0 0

341.48 0

10.0625 1.21278 0.00101 0.00358 KSOOOOOCB 5.0 0

341.48 300 10.125 1.12857 0.00091

-0.00402 K50000OCC 5.0 0

341.48 300 10.0625 1.13705 0.00094 0.00449 K504000CB 5.0 40 341.48 300 10.125 0.88473 0.00077

-0.00462 K504000CC 5.0 40 341.48 300 10.0625 0.89382 0.00084 0.00454 A storage cell pitch of 10.0625 in results in the highest reactivity value, and the resulting uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations (9.E.2.d) Stack Height Density Uncertainty Per Ref4, mechanical and material uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties.

Per UFSAR Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-2, the maximum stack height density is 10.31 gm/cc (<94.5%

theoretical density). Per Ref.58 for standard fuel pellets, the stack height density can range between 93.5% and 96.0% of theoretical density, while per Ref.59 for value added fuel pellets, the stack height density can range between 94.0% and 96.5% of theoretical density. Thus a nominal stack height density of 94.5% of theoretical density will be assumed, and an uncertainty value to 96.5% of theoretical density will be included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value.

KENO Enr Burnup Tmod Boron SHD Unbiased Delta Uncertainty Case w/o gwd/t K

ppm K-eff K-eff K500000BA 5.0 0

341.48 0

0.965 1.21021 0.00090 0.00090 K500000CA 5.0 0

341.48 300 0.965 1.13606 0.00084 0.00340 K504000CA 5.0 40 341.48 300 0.965 0.89768 0.00085 0.00841

CA06015 Revision 0 Page

/

The higher stack height density results in the higher reactivity values, and the resulting uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations (9.E.2.e) Enrichment Uncertainty Per Ref4, mechanical uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties. Per 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2),

the maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of the fresh fuel assemblies is limited to five percent by weight. Per the methodology of Ref.60, an uncertainty of 0.05 w/o enrichment was assumed.

KENO Case K500000B6 K500000BI KSOOOOOC6 KSOOOOOCI Enr Burnup w/o gwd/t 5.0 0

Tmod Boron Clad Unbiased Delta Uncertainty K

ppm 41.48 0

zirc4 K-eff K-eff 3.

1.21112 0.00091 5.05 5.0 5.05 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 40 341.48 40 341.48 0

zirc4 1.21080 0.00096 0.00155 300 zirc4 1.13444 0.00094 300 zirc4 1.13474 0.00086 300 zirc4 0.89089 0.00077 0.00210 K504000C6 5.0 KS04000CI 5.05 300 zirc4 0.89238 0.00078 0.00304 The above uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations.

(9.E.2.A) Steel Thickness Uncertainty Per Ref.4, mechanical and material uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties.

Per Ref.15, the mechanical design of the fuel racks is such that the average wall thickness is 0.060 +/-

0.010 inches. Thus a nominal wall thickness of 0.060 inches will be assumed, and an uncertainty value to +/- 0.010 inches will be included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value. See Attachment E.

KENO Case K500000B6 Enr Burnup w/o gwd/t Tmod Boron Steel Unbiased Delta Uncertainty K

ppm cm K-eff K-eff 5.0 KSOOOOOBD 5.0 KSOOOOOBE 5.0 K500000C6 5.0 KS00000CD 5.0 K500000CE 5.0 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

341.48 40 341.48 40 341A8 40 341.48 300 0.1524 1.13444 0.00094 0

0.1524 1.21112 0.00091 0

0.1270 1.22267 0.00100 0.01346 0

0.1778 1.19742 0.00109

-0.01170 300 0.1270 1.14037 0.00088 0.00775 300 0.1778 1.12599 0.00098

-0.00653 K504000C6 5.0 300 0.1524 0.89089 0.00077 KS04000CD 5.0 K504000CE 5.0 300 0.1270 0.89639 0.00071 0.00698 300 0.1778 0.88471 0.00083

-0.00458 The above cases model an infinite axial and radial array of storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel as a function of storage cell steel thickness (0.1270, 0.1524, and 0.1778 cm) at the worst case temperature of 155 0F for a fuel clad material composed of zirc4. A storage cell steel thickness of 0.1270 cm results in the highest reactivity values The above uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations.

(9.E.2.g) Poison Loading Uncertainty Per Refs.3-4, mechanical uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties.

Although the Unit 2

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 9'1-storage rack cells contain sheets of Boraflex neutron absorber, Issue Reports IR3-045-938, R3-045-939, and IR3-052-199 documented possible boraflex degradation in the Unit 2 SFP, based on calculations using the Racklife software package. Thus the worst case assumption of no Boraflex credit is assumed in this work (9.E.2.h) Eccentric Positioning Uncertainty Per Ref.4, mechanical uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties. It is possible for a fuel assembly not to be positioned centrally within a storage cell, because of clearance between the assembly and the cell wall.

Calculations will be performed to determine the effects of eccentrically located fuel.

It will be assumed that the fuel assemblies will be displaced diagonally within their storage cells as far as possible towards and away from each other. This will generate an uncertainty value, which will be included in the mechanical and material uncertainty value. See Attachment E.

KENO Enr Burnup Tmod Boron Unbiased Delta Uncertainty Case w/o gwd/t K

ppm K-eff K-eff K500000B6 5.0 0

341.48 0

Single assembly 1.21112 0.00091 K500000BF 5.0 0

341.A8 0

IOxlO 1.20934 0.00095

-0.00178 K500000BG 5.0 0

341.48 0

IOxtO eccentric in 1.21883 0.00099 0.00961 KSOOOOOBH 5.0 0

341.48 0

IOxlO eccentric out 1.21889 0.00092 0.00960 K50000OC6 5.0 0

341.48 300 Single assembly 1.13444 0.00094 KS00000CF 5.0 0

341.48 300 lOxlO 1.13528 0.00096 0.00084 KSOOOOOCG 5.0 0

341.48 300 lOx lo eccentric in 1.14187 0.00104 0.00941 K500000CH 5.0 0

341.48 300 lOxlO eccentric out 1.14386 0.00086 0.01122 K504000C6 5.0 40 341.48 300 Single assembly 0.89089 0.00077 KS04000CF 5.0 40 341.48 300 lOxlO 0.89070 0.00077

-0.00019 K504000CG 5.0 40 341.48 300 tOxlO eccentric in 0.89731 0.00081 0.00800 KS04000CH 5.0 40 341.48 300 lOxlo eccentric out 0.89682 0.00088 0.00758 Cases K500000BF, K500000CF, and K504000CF models an infinite axial and radial array of lOxl0 storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel at the worst case temperature of 1550F for a fuel clad material composed of zirc4. The purpose of these cases was to verify that the reactivity of the infinite axial and radial array of xlO storage cells is equivalent to the infinite axial and radial array of single storage cells. The resultant k-effective values are well within the two-sigma error margins of the calculations.

The remaining cases modeled an infinite axial and radial array of lOx lo storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel as a function of eccentric positioning within the storage cell at the worst case temperature of 155'F for a fuel clad material composed of zirc4. The larger of the above uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations.

(9.E.2.i) Soluble Boron Uncertainty Per Ref4, mechanical uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties. The soluble boron credit will be limited to a maximum value of 300 ppm per the restrictions of the Unit 1 criticality analysis in Ref.43. Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. 15%

should be added to this value to account for all uncertainties. Thus a boron level of 350 ppm with uncertainties is required to credit soluble boron in the SFP.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page S

(9.E.2.j) Moderator In Gap Uncertainty Per Ref.4, mechanical uncertainties may be treated by assuming worst case conditions or by performing sensitivity studies and obtaining worst case uncertainties. Nominally, all of the cases in this work assume that the pellet-to-clad gap contains void, which it normally does. However, failed fuel rods may exist and the gap may be filled with water of the same composition as that exterior to the fuel rod. This is an NRC requirement for cask criticality safety analysis (NUREG-1536, p. 6-3).

KENO Enr Burnup Trnod Boron Unbiased Delta Uncertainty Case wlo gwd/t K

ppm K-eff K-eff K50000OB6 5.0 0

341.48 0

No mod In gap 1.21112 0.00091 K50000OBJ 5.0 0

341.48 0

Mod in gap 1.20915 0.00089

-0.00017 KSOOOOOC6 5.0 0

341.48 300 No mod in gap 1.13444 0.00094 K5000OOCJ 5.0 0

341.48 300 Mod in gap 1.13618 0.00088 0.00356 K504000C6 5.0 40 341.48 300 No mod in gap 0.89089 0.00077 K504000CJ 5.0 40 341.48 300 Mod in gap 0.89204 0.00075 0.00267 The above uncertainty values will be used in the uncertainty calculations.

In addition, fuel clad failure would indicate that certain fission gases (noble gases, halogens, cesiums, and technetiums) could escape the affected fuel pins and increase system reactivity. Pin failure occurs infrequently (much less than 1% of the rods inserted into the core fail). When failure does occur, not all of the gases escape from the fuel matrix. Assuming that the pin is at or near centerline melting temperature, the fission product pellet-to-coolant escape rates can be extracted from Ref 62 (6.50E-08/sec for noble gases, 2.30E-08/sec for halogens and cesiums, and 1.40E-l1 for technetium). Assuming that a fuel pin fails for 1 of the 3 cycles of insertion (It is the policy at CCNPP not to reinsert failed fuel back into the core without reconstitution.),

approximately 9% of the noble gases, 33% of the halogens and cesiums, and 99.9% of the technetiums would remain. Conservatively assuming that 5% of all fuel pins fail and that all of the gaseous fission products from the failed fuel would be lost, the change in reactivity would only amount to 0.00084 Ak. Treating this as a component in the uncertainty analysis, the total bias and uncertainty would only increase by 0.00001 A In addition, part of this reactivity increase would be negated by a smaller two-dimensional to three-dimensional burnup bias.

Thus, this effect is negligible and will be neglected in this work.

(9.E.2.k) Axial Distribution Burnup Bias The dynamics of reactor operation results in non-uniform axial-burnup profiles in fuel with any significant burnup. At the beginning of life in a PWR, a near-cosine axial-shaped flux will begin depleting fuel near the axial center of a fuel assembly at a greater rate than at the ends. As the reactor continues to operate, the cosine flux shape will flatten because of the fuel depletion and fission product buildup that occurs near the center. However, because of the high leakage near the ends of the fuel, burnup will drop off rapidly near the ends. The majority of PWR fuel assemblies have similar axial-burnup shapes - relatively flat in the axial mid-section (with peak bumup from 1.1 to 1.2 times the assembly average burnup) and significantly underburned fuel at the ends (with burnup of 50 to 60% of the assembly average). Note that due to a difference in the moderator density, the burnup is slightly higher at the bottom of the assembly than at the top.

The cooler higher-density water at the assembly inlet results in a higher reactivity and thus higher burnup than the warmer moderator at the assembly outlet.

An assumed single average burnup incorrectly weights the calculation of k-effective by placing the flux profile toward the center of the rod. Thus, leakage is artificially minimized, and burnup at the driving region of a uniform problem (center) is artificially reduced. In reality, the most

CAO6OJS/Revision 0 Page Y reactive region of spent fuel is towards the assembly ends, where there exists a balance between reactivity due to lower burnup and increased leakage.

Depletion and criticality models cannot exactly represent the continuous bumup distribution that occurs in spent fuel. Discretization is required. Very fine axial discretization is possible, but is computationally expensive. In addition, real burnup data is generally available on a relatively coarse grid. Ref.37 ndicates that using more than 18 equally-spaced axial regions has no significant impact on the calculated end effect.

The reactivity difference between the neutron multiplication factor (k-effective) calculated with explicit representation of the axial burnup distribution and k-effective calculated assuming a uniform axial burnup is referred to as the "end effect". The "end effect" is dependent on the axial burnup profile, total accumulated burnup, cooling time, initial enrichment, assembly design, and the isotopics considered (i.e., actinide-only or actinide plus fission products).

Studies have shown that assuming a uniform axial distribution is usually conservative for low burnups, but becomes increasingly nonconservative as burnup increases. The transition between conservatism and nonconservatism depends on several factors, including the initial enrichment, the cooling time, and the nuclide composition.

Per Ref.4, a correction for the effect of the axial distribution in burnup should be determined and, if positive, added to the reactivity calculated for uniform axial burnup distribution. Per Ref46, WCAP-14416 (Ref31) can no longer be relied upon as approved methodology by the NRC staff or licensees due to larger (non-conservative) two-dimensional (2D) to three-dimensional (3D) axial burnup biases than Westinghouse had reported in WCAP-14416. For future licensing actions, licensees need to submit plant-specific criticality calculations for SFP configurations that include technically supported margins. This issue was further addressed in Ref 47.

A reactivity bias was included in the overall k-effective calculations, to account for differences between two-dimensional and three-dimensional modeling. A conservative set of biases was developed that account for the reactivity difference between a fuel assembly with an explicit axial three-dimensional burnup profile and one with a uniform two-dimensional profile at the same average burnup. The biases were computed and tabulated as a function of both burnup and initial enrichment. The conservative axial bias corresponding to the highest enrichment / bumup storage limit was employed, since among all enrichment / burnup combinations on the reactivity equivalence curve, the highest yields the largest positive axial bias.

Burnup profiles change with burnup - tending to flatten with increasing burnup. Consequently, if an axial bumup profile from a low burnup assembly is used in a calculation involving high burnup, the end-effect is over-estimated. Hence, for determination of bounding profiles, it is common to sort the profiles into burnup ranges, Worst-case axial profiles were extracted from Ref.33 as a function of burnup (he 12 burnup profiles are listed in Attachment I.). Two-dimensional to three-dimensional comparisons were performed as a function of enrichment and soluble boron.

Three-Dimensional to Two Dimensional Reactivity Bias 5.0 w/o 4.0 w/o 3.0 w/o 5.0 w/o 4.0 w/o 3.0 w/o Gwd/mtu Profile 0 ppm 0 ppm 0 ppm 300 ppm 300 ppm 300 ppm 62 AA 0.03226 0.03046 0.01704 0.03047 0.02898 0.01423 46 AB 0.01751 0.02128 0.01459 0.01656 0.02062 0.01619 42 AC 0.01060 0.01195 0.01380 0.00944 0.01367 0.01345 38 AD 0.01623 0.02367 0.02465 0.02030 0.02418 0.02391 34 AE 0.01255 0.01739 0.01684 0.01245 0.01549 0.01495

CA06015SRevision 0 Page b 30 AF 0.00918 0.01559 0.01609 0.00996 0.01475 0.01616 26 AG 0.00688 0.01089 0.01730 0.00789 0.00858 0.01544 22 AH 0.00193 0.00479 0.00914 0.00109 0.00863 0.00869 18 AI 0.01682 0.02645 0.02942 0.01528 0.02703 0.02705 14 AJ

-0.00834

-0.00135

-0.00052

-0.00236

-0.00250 0.00036 10 AK

-0.00294

-0.00241

-0.00079

-0.00409

-0.00208

-0.00224 6

AL

-0.00360

-0.00406

-0.00169

-0.00286

-0.00290

-0.00331 The above reactivity bias results indicate that the worst-case reactivity bias (0.03226 Ak) is for the unborated highest enrichment and highest burnup fuel.

Worst-case axial profiles were extracted from Ref.34 as a function of burnup (Attachment I).

Two-dimensional to three-dimensional comparisons were performed as a function of enrichment and soluble boron.

Three-Dimensional to Two Dimensional Reactivity Bias 5.0 w/o 4.0 w/o 3.0 w/o 5.0 w/o 4.0 w/o 3.0 w/o Gwd/mtu Profile 0 ppm 0 p pm ppm 300 ppm 300 ppm 300 ppm 62 BA 0.03054 0.03061 0.01470 0.02955 0.02802 0.01271 46 BB 0.01381 0.01803 0.01373 0.01598 0.01744 0.01542 42 BC 0.00643 0.01066 0.01006 0.00773 0.00791 0.01041 38 BD 0.01073 0.01842 0.01912 0.01285 0.01650 0.01842 34 BE 0.01013 0.01499 0.01453 0.00603 0.01217 0.01249 30 BF 0.00850 0.01648 0.01584 0.01083 0.01359 0.01612 26 BG 0.00741 0.00923 0.01401 0.00678 0.01002 0.01499 22 BH

-0.00008 0.00461 0.00909 0.00154 0.00430 0.00891 18 BI 0.01989 0.02704 0.02853 0.01519 0.02669 0.02753 14 BJ 0.00644 0.00963 0.01008 0.00767 0.00811 0.00814 10 BK

-0.00337

-0.00151 0.00102

-0.00235

-0.00023

-0.00244 6

BL

-0.00254

-0.00247

-0.00109

-0.00081

-0.00091 0.00010 The above reactivity bias results indicate that the worst-case reactivity bias (0.03054 Ak) is for the unborated highest enrichment and highest burnup fuel.

A statistical evaluation was performed in Ref.37 on the neutron multiplication factors resulting from the profiles contained in the database to assess the likelihood of the existence of axial profiles that have significantly higher reactivity. Comparison of the individual k-effective values to the mean and standard deviation for each burnup group reveals that the bounding profiles provide a significant increase in reactivity compared with the average. For all but one of the 12 burnup groups, the k-effective value associated with the bounding axial profile, is more than 3 standard deviations above the mean and in most cases is more than 4 standard deviations above the mean. The only exception is burnup group 12 (burnup < 6 GWd/MTU), which has relatively few profiles and is of little interest to burnup credit, since the burnup profiles in group 12 yield a negative end effect. Nevertheless, the k-effective value associated with the bounding axial profile in group 12 is 2.2 standard deviations above the mean. Thus the bounding profiles can be considered statistical outliers, as opposed to representative of typical spent nuclear fuel profiles.

Consequently, the probability that other axial profiles exist that are notably more reactive than the bounding profiles is very small.

Also note that per Ref.37 some evidence exists that some plants may have selectively submitted their most reactive profiles. This would introduce a conservative bias into the database.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 0 Actual Calvert Cliffs end-of-cycle bumups were extracted from Ref.57 (Attachment I). Two-dimensional to three-dimensional comparisons were performed at the highest enrichment value of 5.0 w/o and at zero soluble boron.

Calvert Cliffs Three-Dimensional to Two Dimensional Reactivity Bias Assm Batch gwd/mtu AK Assm Batch gwd/mtu AK 01 So 48.013

-0.01135 26 VI 27.861

-0.00680 02 So 46.688

-0.00875 27 T2 50.026

-0.01105 03 S 1 49.523

-0.00838 28 VI 27.664

-0.00847 04 VO 14.895

-0.00649 33 V2 27.782

-0.00699 05 TO 35.696

-0.01075 34 T2 49.939

-0.01008 06 VI 20.408

-0.00934 35 V2 27.639

-0.00797 07 VO 22.090

-0.00761 36 T2 49.592

-0.00679 08 S2 51.485

-0.00863 42 V2 27.667

-0.00660 09 VO 18.880

-0.00579 43 T2 49.325

-0.00952 10 TO 35.485

-0.01080 44 V2 27.779

-0.00864 11 V1 25.651

-0.00581 52 V2 27.236

-0.00780 12 TO 41.171

-0.01016 53 TO 40.843

-0.00914 13 TI 42.997

-0.01064 54 So 46A17

-0.01068 14 T2 35.350

-0.01111 55 VO 22.094

-0.00777 1 5 VO 19.296

-0.00902 56 Ti 42.987

-0.01120 16 T2 46.518

-0.00887 57 T2 48.568

-0.01021 17 V1 26.726

-0.00914 58 V1 27.667

-0.00667 18 T2 49.829

-0.01169 59 T2 49.583

-0.00905 19 V1 27.257

-0.00765 60 V2 27.735

-0.00956 20 T2 48.874

-0.00977 61 TO 43.765

-0.01120 24 V1 26.492

-0.00935 62 Jo 50.648

-0.00700 25 T2 47.452

-0.00864 The above reactivity bias results indicate that the worst-case reactivity bias is -0.00579 Ak. Thus for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of 26-node axial burnup profiles is less conservative than uniform axial burnups. Note that per Ref.37, CE fuel types tend to exhibit a smaller end effect on average.

For conservatism, an axial burnup bias of 3.25% Ak will be utilized for all burnup cases.

(9.E.2.1) Effect of UEFILEF Composition on Reactivity All three dimensional KENO executions in this work assume that the Upper End Fitting (UEF) and Lower End Fitting (LEF) of each assembly are composed of moderator. This was verified to be conservative.

KENO Case K5U2SFPA KU2SFPX Enr Bumup w/o gwd/t Tmod Boron UEF/LEF Unbiased K

ppm K-eff 5.0 5.0 0

341.48 0

341.48 0

Water 1.19548 0

Actual 1.19449 (9.E.3) KENO Calculations (9.E.3.a) The reactivity of an infinite array of fuel as a function of enrichment, burup, and soluble boron to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.68.

(9.E.3.b) The reactivity of an infinite array and of the whole Unit 2 SFP as a function of soluble boron.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page V7 (9.E.3.c) Reactivity as a function of soluble boron and burnup using checkerboard patterns in a whole Unit 2 SFP model.

(9.E.3.d) Reactivity of the whole Unit 2 SFP model with reconstitution.

(9.E.3.e) Comparison of reactivity of an infinite array of fuel as a function of burnup and enrichment for 50 and 101 isotope models.

(9.E.4) Accident Conditions Per Ref 3, for accident conditions, the following assumptions apply: (i) The double contingency principle of ANSI N 16.1-1975 shall be applied. It shall require two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to produce a criticality accident.

(ii) Realistic initial conditions (e.g., the presence of soluble boron) may be assumed. (iii) Accidents shall include dropping of a fuel assembly on top of the racks, abnormal placement of a fuel assembly in the SFP, a cask or heavy object drop onto the SFP racks, effect of tornado or earthquake on the deformation and relative position of the fuel racks, and loss of cooling systems or flow unless single failure proof.

(9.E.4.a) Fuel Misloading Accident:

Since assemblies must possess sufficient burnup to be placed in the Unit 2 SFP to counteract the loss of Boraflex, placement of an assembly with insufficient burnup in the SFP would constitute a fuel misloading accident. However, the double contingency principle allows the crediting of the soluble boron in the SFP during such an event.

Per Refs. 53 and 54, the Technical Specification Refueling Boron Concentration is greater than 2150 ppm. 2000 ppm will be conservatively used in this work.

KENO Enr Burnup Tmod Boron Unbiased Delta Biased Case w/o gwd/t K

ppm K-eff K-eff K-eff K200000D3 2.0 0

341.48 2000 0.62679 0.00066 0.68808 K300000D3 3.0 0

341.48 2000 0.74302 0.00073 0.80431 K400000D3 4.0 0

341.48 2000 0.82161 0.00096 0.88290 KSOOOOOD3 5.0 0

341.48 2000 0.87907 0.00094 0.94036 The above accident cases assume that the Unit 2 SFP is completely misloaded with fresh fuel of the indicated enrichments. K-effective is maintained below 0.95 in all cases. Thus there are no adverse consequences for a worst-case fuel misloading accident in this analysis.

(9.E.4.b) Abnormal Placement of a Fuel Assembly in the SFP Racks:

The top opening of the SFP racks has angled lead-in guides, which effectively block the spaces between the cavities, as well as guide the fuel assembly into the open tube. Also to avoid the possibility of inadvertently placing a fuel assembly between the outermost storage cell and the pool wall, the top rack surface is extended to cover this space. Thus the abnormal placement of a fuel assembly in the SFP racks is not a credible event.

(9.E.4.c) Horizontal Assembly Drop Accident:

Dropping an assembly on top of the SFP racks from the Spent Fuel Handling Machine (SFHM) is not possible at CCNPP due to the design of the SFHM and due to the height of the SFP racks.

The bottom of the outer mast assembly is at elevation 49'5", while the top of the SFP racks is at elevation 45'0". While not a credible accident, this accident will be explicitly analyzed in this work.

Dropping an assembly on top of the SFP racks from the Cask Handling Crane (CHC) or the New Fuel Elevator (NFE) is also not a credible accident. The CHC is designed in accordance with the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612 and is used to move assemblies into the new fuel elevator. The NFE is utilized to lower new fuel from the operating floor to the

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 5 bottom of the SFP, where it is then grappled by the Spent Fuel Handling Machine. The elevator is powered by a cable winch, and the assembly is contained in a simple support structure whose wheels are captured on two rails.

Dropping an assembly from the NFE would require a catastrophic failure of the NFE, which is not a credible event and which has never occurred to date.

Per Ref.4, the double contingency principle shall be applied. It shall require two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to produce a criticality accident.

The double-contingency principle means that realistic conditions may be assumed. For example, if soluble boron is normally present in the SFP water, the loss of soluble boron is considered as one accident condition and a second concurrent accident need not be assumed. Therefore, total credit for the presence of soluble boron may be assumed in evaluating this accident condition.

During inspection/reconstitution activities in the SFP, assemblies are put on 20.5" spacers (Ref

25) adjacent to the SFP wall. This process lifts the active fuel region of the affected assembly above the boraflex poison plates (Attachment G) and thus could affect reactivity. In this work, the boraflex plates are replaced with moderator and are not credited, thus the reactivity effect of inspection/reconstitution should be minimal. However, a horizontal dropped assembly in the vicinity of assemblies on rack spacers may affect reactivity.

KENO Enr Burnup Boron Unbiased Delta Biased Case w/o gwd/t ppm K-eff K-eff K-eff KU2SFPCD 5.0 0

2000 Dropped assm 0.65990 0.00085 0.72119 KU2SFPCRD 5.0 0

2000 Dropped assm during recon 0.66264 0.00068 0.72393 The above accident cases assume a dropped assembly during normal operation and a dropped assembly during reconstitution/inspection activities. K-effective is maintained below 0.95 in both cases. Thus there are no adverse consequences for a worst-case horizontal assembly drop accident in this analysis.

(9.E.4.d) Vertical Assembly Drop Accident:

Dropping an assembly vertically will not cause abnormal placement of a fuel assembly in the SFP racks since the top opening of the SFP racks has angled lead-in guides, which effectively block the spaces between the cavities, as well as guide the fuel assembly into the open tube.

Also to avoid the possibility of inadvertently dropping a fuel assembly between the outermost storage cell and the pool wall, the top rack surface is extended to cover this space. Dropping an assembly and having it stand upright atop another assembly in the SFP racks is less limiting than the current analysis, which assumes infinite axial extent.

Thus there are no adverse consequences for a vertical assembly drop accident in this analysis.

(9.E.4.e) Cask or Heavy Object Drop onto the SFP Racks:

The racks are designed to withstand all anticipated loadings. Structural deformations are limited to preclude any possibility of criticality. The Seismic Category 1 racks are supported in such a manner as to preclude a reduction in separation under either the Operating Basis or Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The racks are designed not to collapse or bow under the force of a fuel assembly dropped into an empty cavity or dropped horizontally across the top of the racks assuming no drag resistance from the water. Heavy loads in excess of 1600 lbs are prohibited from travel over spent fuel assemblies in the SFP unless such loads are handled by a single-failure proof device. The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane, which is designed in accordance with the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, is used to handle heavy loads in the SFP area. Thus the cask or heavy object drop accident is not a credible event.

(9.EA.f) Boron Dilution Accident:

CA06015 Revision 0 Page s' This proposed criticality design basis for the SFP racks assumes that the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity will not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective will remain below 0.998 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if completely flooded with unborated water. Dilution events that have the potential to dilute the SFP boron concentration to a value less than the minimum required are not credible events based on existing level alarms and the stored inventory of demineralized water in the systems interfacing with the SFP. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.998. Thus boron dilution to less than the required minimum is not a credible event; however, in the unlikely event of complete dilution, no adverse consequences would result.

(9.E.4.g) Loss of Coolant Accident:

The most serious failure to the system is the loss of SFP water. This is avoided by routing all SFP piping connections above the water level and providing them with siphon breakers to prevent gravity drainage (UFSAR 9.4.4).

The SFP is designed to preclude the loss of structural integrity. The SFP is designed in two identical sections separated by a 3 1/2 foot thick dividing wall, the pool is constructed of reinforced concrete and lined with 3/16 inch stainless steel. Each half of the pool is 54 feet long, 25 feet wide and approximately 39 feet deep (the floor elevation varies). The SFP walls and floor are 5 1/2 or 6 feet thick, depending on the location.

Even with the precautions described, small leaks may still occur in the SFP. Early detection of pool leakage and prompt replacement of water is essential. Early leakage detection is assured by a surveillance which requires that the minimum pool level be verified at least once every 7 days.

In practice, level is checked one every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by the Auxiliary Building log sheets.

In addition, a level alarm keeps the Control Room Operator aware of level changes. PEO 0-067-02-O-M (SFP Leakage Test) requires a regular check for leakage, as well.

(9.E.4.h) Loss of Cooling Accident:

The design of the SFP Cooling System and pool structural components (e.g., pool liner plate, SFPC piping and pumps) for total loss of cooling is not part of the system's design basis (UFSAR 9.4.4). The entire Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is tornado-protected and is located in a Seismic Category I structure.

(9.E.4.i) Natural Phenomena Incident:

The racks are designed to withstand all anticipated loadings. Structural deformations are limited to preclude any possibility of criticality. The Seismic Category 1 racks are supported in such a manner as to preclude a reduction in separation under either the Operating Basis or Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

Since there has been no record of tsunamis on the northeastern United States coast, it is not believed that the site will be subjected to a significant tsunami effect (UFSAR 2.6.6).

The relative frequency of hurricane occurrence for the CCNPP site is slightly more than one hurricane per year. For the Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH), it is assumed that the peak hurricane surge is coincident with normal high tide and with a 99th percentile wave height. The total predicted wave run-up is to Elevation 27.1', which is considerably less than the 69' elevation of the top of the SFP. Thus the maximum hypothetical flood level is below the top of the SFP elevation (UFSAR 2.8.3).

Missiles generated externally to the plant could be from high winds (tornadoes or hurricanes).

Missiles generated internally to the plant could be from the malfunction or structural failure of

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 50 plant equipment, such as the turbine generator.

Internal and external missile protection is provided by the 6 foot thick SFP walls. In addition, a 2 foot thick concrete missile barrier positioned at the 1 8-foot elevation protects the SFP from a high trajectory missile generated by a turbine overspeed incident.

(9.F) Burnup Measurement Uncertainty The uncertainty in measured burnup was extracted from Ref 61 for ABB/CE fuel assemblies.

For burnups less then 30 gwd/mtu, the burnup must be increased by 2.5%. For burnups in excess of 30 gwd/mtu, the burnup must be increased by 750 mwd/mtu.

Note that per Ref.37, these burnup measurement uncertainties are conservative. The uncertainty in burnup, evaluated over three cycles of operation, decreases with increasing burnup. For assemblies discharged after one cycle of operation the uncertainty was estimated to be 1.90%;

after two cycles of burnup the uncertainty was 0.98%; and after three cycles of burnup the uncertainty was 1.02%.

C c:

Figure 2: Reactivity vs Cooling Time r

1.1 0-1.05, 1.00 2w/o-50 0.75

-0.- -5w-o-20 CD

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5w/o-50, 0.65 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Cooling Time (Years)

-0 C-1

>0 >-

4m

=

rm C" C=)

- w

-Cn Figure 3: Reactivity vs Tfuel Fra rvt 1.10:

1.05 1.00 0.95

= 0.90 K 0

(U 0.85 K 4

6-h-

2wo-50

-a-5w/o-20

--- 5w/o-50 U.bu 0.75 -

0.70 -

0.65 -,

800 6

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I l

900 1000 1100 1200 1300 Tfuel(K)

II, env Figure 4: Reactivity vs Soluble Boron r"

c 1.10 0

za 1.00 0.90 0.80

-I m m~~~~~X 4.I

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~Ah

_II I

l l

I I

I I

I I

I 2wo-50 5w/o-20 t 5w/o-50 0.70 800 900 1000 1100 Soluble Boron

cZ cn Figure 5: Reactivity vs Tmod

'-W 0

0 w

1.10 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 I -

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I.I 2wo-50 5w/o-20

-- Sw/o-50 560 570 580 590 600 610 Tmod(F)

-0 C-,

m1 C, i.-)

rl Figure 6: Reactivity vs Assm Power I a 1.10 1.05

• 5 (U) 0 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80

_ ~

~

~

~ ~

~

~~

~

~

it

d.

i A.

-~~~~~~~~~

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I I

I 2wo-50 m 5w/o-20

-- 5w/o-50 0.75 0.70 10 15 20 25 Assembly Power (MW)

,0 ms C-Figure 7: U2SFP K-eff vs Boron c

1.3 1.2 C) 4m 4-ti 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8

-- SFP w BU

-'- ASSM w BU

,N SFP wo BU

-- ASSM wo BU 0.7 0.6 0

500 1000 1500 2000 Boron (ppm)

-aD',

D mn C,

3ri Figure 8: Enrichment vs Burnup 50.00 tE

£0 C

sm 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Enrichment (w/o)

1:-

C-M C-Q Figure 9: Isotopics Vs. Burnup OM, E

0 0,

u.

Q 00

,o us 8.E-05 6.E-05 4.E-05 2.E-05 0.E+OO

-- KR-83

--- KR-84

-s KR-86

-*- MO-95 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Burnup (gwd/mtu)

V m

CD C-,,

Fugure 10: Isotopics Vs Burnup M

E 0

E o

0e*n 0Co 1.4E-04 1.2E-04 1.OE-04 8.OE-05 6.OE-05 4.OE-05 2.OE-05 O.OE+00 CS-1 33

---

XE-1 34

-A-CS-1 34 m CS-1 35 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Burnup (gwd/mtu)

m0 Figure 11: Isotopics Vs Burnup mn c=

E 0

I Qen E

0-m 00.

UVW 0en 1.E-04 1.E-04 1.E-04 8.E-05 6.E-05 4.E-05 2.E-05 O.E+00 ZIA

+- PU-238

-U-- PU-239

- PU-240 x PU-241

-- PU-242 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Burnup (gwdlmtu)

Figure 12: Reactivity vs Burnup (O ppm)

p> :P-cu*

cm M

G en c

C.,

Cu a)-

z 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7

\\4

+ -\\ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

at 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

-1 2

3

.64 5

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Burnup (gwdlmtu)

-0 C-,

m Figure 13: Reactivity vs Burnup (300 ppm) 1.2 Z,

P

M

m 0

w 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 2

i-4 5

0.7 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Burnup (gwd/mtu)

CA06015 Revision 0 Page

10. CALCULATIONS A list of all of the SAS2H and KENO calculations is included in Attachment A.

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11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES The source term portion of this work employs SAS2H, a functional module in the SCALE system, to calculate the burnup-dependent source terms for the CCNPP Unit 2 SFP system.

Ref.9 documents the SCALE 4.4 modular code system SAS2H for computing the isotopic content of PWR spent fuel. The SAS2H control module performs the depletion/decay analysis using the well-established codes and data libraries provided in the SCALE system. Problem-dependent resonance processing of neutron cross sections is performed using the Bondarenko resonance self-shielding module BONAMI-S and the Nordheim Integral Treatment resonance self-shielding module NITAWL-1l.

The XSDRNPM-S module is used to produce spectral weighted and collapsed cross sections for the fuel depletion calculations. COUPLE updates the cross section constants included on an ORIGEN-S nuclear data library with data from the cell-weighted cross section library produced by XSDRNPM-S. The weighting spectrum computed by XSDRNPM is applied to update all nuclides in the ORIGEN-S library that were not specified in the XSDRNPM analysis. The point-depletion ORIGEN-S module is used to compute time-dependent concentrations and source terms for isotopes simultaneously generated and depleted through neutronic transmutation, fission, and radioactive decay.

The cross section library 44GROUPNDF5 was utilized in this work.

44GROUPNDF5 is a 44-energy group library derived from the latest ENDFIB-V files with the exception of 0-16, Eu-154, and Eu-155, which were taken from the more improved ENDF/B-VI files.

Note that the SAS2H/ORIGEN-S libraries include 689 light elements, such as clad and structural materials, 129 actinides, including fuel nuclides and their decay and activation products, and 879 fission product nuclides.

Ref. 7 constitutes a verification that the computer codes of SCALE 4.4 have been successfully installed on the NEU computer PCB386 with the Windows NT operating system and with a PENTIUM H XEON processor. SCALE 4.4 includes the codes CSAS, SASI, SAS2H, SAS3, SAS4, QADS, HTAS1, ARP, and CSAS6, which codes calculate nuclear criticality, source term, radiation shielding, heat transfer, and cross section processing.

SAS2H is benchmarked to the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 14 EQ radioactive source terms of Ref.39 and to the measured data in ORNLrTM-12667 (Ref.40). Ref.39 constitutes a safety-related source term calculation performed by Westinghouse/Combustion Engineering (W/CE).

Ref 40 documents radiological assays of PWR spent fuel conducted by the Material Characteristics Center (MCC) at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) using discharged PWR fuel from Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 and H. B. Robinson Unit 2. Additional spent fuel characteristics were conducted by four research laboratories in Europe using fuel from the Obrigheim (KWO) PWR.

Even though not exhaustive in scope, the validation included comparison of predicted and measured concentrations for 14 actinides and 37 fission and activation products.

Ref 41 validates SAS2H for general and safety related use in calculating isotopics and thermal power.

The SAS2H results with cross section file 44GROUPNDF5 agrees well with the W/CE safety-related results of Ref.39 and the ORNLITM-12667 results of Ref.40.

Per Ref.4, acceptable computer codes for criticality applications include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: NrrAWL-KENO5a.

The criticality portion of this work employs KENO.Va, a functional module in the SCALE system, and the Criticality Safety Analysis Sequence Number 25 (CSAS25) to calculate the k-effective of a three-dimensional system (Ref.9). CSAS25 uses the SCALE Material Information Process (MIP) and the associated material composition library to calculate material number densities, to prepare geometry data for resonance self-shielding, and to create data input files for the cross section processing codes, BONAMI, NlTAWL-lH, and XSDRNPM. BONAMI performs resonance self-shielding calculations for nuclides that have Bondarenko data associated with their cross sections. NTAWL-II applies a Nordheim resonance self-shielding correction to nuclides having resonance parameters.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page at XSDRNPM provides cell-weighted cross sections based on the specified unit cell and can calculate k-effective for a one-dimensional system. The CSAS25 sequence then invokes the KENO-Va Monte Carlo criticality code.

The SCALE 4.4 CSAS module with the 44 group ENDF/B-V cross section library for criticality safety evaluations of LWR fuel in spent fuel rack in-core, and cask type environments is validated in Ref.8 via comparison of the computational CSAS outputs with the 180 criticality experiments documented in Ref.12. The validation is performed in compliance with the standards of ANSI/ANS-8.1 (Ref.10) and ANSIANS-8.17 (Ref. 11). ANSVIANS-8.1 requires that a validation be performed on the method used to calculate criticality safety margins. The validation shall be documented in a written report describing the method, computer program, and cross section libraries used, the experimental data, the areas of applicability, the uncertainties and biases, and the margins of safety. ANSI/ANS-8.17 prescribes the criteria to establish sub-criticality safety margins.

Additional input calculations and result compilations were performed manually in the Excel spreadsheet X2inp.xls.

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12. RESULTS (12.A) Biases and Uncertainties Worst case values of moderator temperature, clad composition, soluble boron concentration, and fixed poison loading were assumed in all reactivity calculations.

The bias and uncertainty determinations were detailed in Section 9 and are summarized in Attachment 2. Note that most of the uncertainties and biases were determined at three state points: zero soluble boron and zero burnup, 300 ppm soluble boron and zero burnup, and 300 ppm soluble boron and 40 gwd/mtu average bumup.

The calculational methodology and axial bumup distribution biases and uncertainties were independent of soluble boron concentration and average burnup and were bounding for all cases, while the fuel depletion uncertainty was a function of soluble boron only.

The composite bias and uncertainty values as a function of state point were determined. The worst case composite bias and uncertainty value was 0.06129 aK for zero soluble boron and zero burnup. This value was conservatively applied to all calculated reactivity values.

(12.B) Accident Conditions The accident determinations were also detailed in Section 9 and pose no reactivity challenge.

(12.C) Enrichment vs Burnup Loading Limits Multiple cases were executed to determine reactivity as a function of burnup, enrichment, and soluble boron concentration.

The results are summarized in Figures 12 and 13 and in the following table:

KENO SAS2H Enr Burnup Tmod Boron Mode Biased Case Files w/o gwd/t K

ppm K-eff K200580D1 S20058 2.0 5.80 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99767 K251340D1 S25134 2.5 13.40 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99793 K302000D1 S320 3.0 20.00 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99720 K352630D1 S35263 3.5 26.30 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99648 K403200D1 S40320 4.0 32.00 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99665 K453750D1 S45375 4.5 37.50 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99750 K504300D1 S50430 5.0 43.00 341.48 0

Single Assembly 0.99728 K200580D2 S20058 2.0 5.80 341A8 300 Single Assembly 0.92157 K251340D2 S25134 2.5 13.40 341A8 300 Single Assembly 0.92623 K302000D2 S320 3.0 20.00 341.48 300 Single Assembly 0.92744 K352630D2 S35263 3.5 26.30 341A8 300 Single Assembly 0.92913 K403200D2 S40320 4.0 32.00 341A8 300 Single Assembly 0.93231 K45375OD2 S45375 4.5 37.50 341.48 300 Single Assembly 0.93384 K504300D2 S50430 5.0 43.00 341A8 300 Single Assembly 0.93516 Note that at zero soluble boron, all of the reactivity values are less than 0.998, while at 300 ppm soluble boron, all of the reactivity values are less than 0.95. This is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref£2), if credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. The above burnup values must be increased by the measured bumnup uncertainty. The uncertainty in measured burnup was extracted from Ref. 61 for ABB/CE fuel assemblies. For burnups less then 30 gwd/mtu, the bumup must be increased by 2.5%. For burnups in excess of 30 gwd/mtu, the bumup must be increased by 750 mwd/mtu. The burnups required to store fuel

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 67 in the Unit 2 SFP crediting 350 ppm of soluble boron including all biases and uncertainties are detailed in the following table and in Figure 8.

Enichment (w/o)

Burnup (GWD/MTU) 2.0 6.00 2.5 13.75 3.0 20.50 3.5 27.00 4.0 32.75 4.5 38.25 5.0 43.75 (12.D) Comparison of Two-Dimensional to Three-Dimensional Models To estimate the conservatism of utilizing an infinite two-dimensional assembly array with worst-case biases and uncertainties, the reactivity of the SFP as a function of soluble boron concentration was determined for the actual three-dimensional SFP configuration versus an infinite two-dimensional assembly array with the worst-case bias and uncertainty including burnup related biases and uncertainties and nominal bias and uncertainty excluding burnup related bias and uncertainty. The results are detailed in the following table and in Figure 7.

KENO Case K500000DI K500000D2 K500000D4 K500000D3 K500000DI K500000D2 K500000D6 KSOOOOOD3 KU2SFPA KU2SFPB KU2SFPF KU2SFPC KU2SFPA KU2SFPB KU2SFPJ KU2SFPC Enr Bumup W/o gwd/t 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 Tmod K

341 AB 341 A8 341A8 341 A8 341A8 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341A8 341A8 341.48 Boron ppm 0

300 1930 2000 0

300 1590 2000 0

300 730 2000 0

300 590 2000 Mode Single Assembly / Worst-Case Bias Single Assembly/ Worst-Case Bias Single Assembly I Worst-Case Bias Single Assembly / Worst-Case Bias Single Assembly I Nominal Bias Single Assembly / Nominal Bias Single Assembly/ Norninal Bias Single Assembly /Nominal Bias Unit 2 SFP / Worst-Case Bias Unit 2 SFP I Worst-Case Bias Unit 2 SFP /Worst-Case Bias Unit 2 SFP I Worst-Case Bias Unit 2 SFP I Nominal Bias Unit 2 SFP INorninal Bias Unit 2 SFP INoninal Bias Unit 2 SFP I Nominal Bias Biased K-eff 1.27241 1.19573 0.94694 0.94036 1.23056 1.15388 0.94353 0.89851 1.25677 1.09386 0.94672 0.72165 1.21492 1.05201 0.94597 0.67980 Note that the conservatism in reactivity for a two-dimensional infinite array versus a three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model increases from 1.56% Ak at 0 ppm, to 10.18% Ak at 300 ppm, to 21.87% Ak at 2000 ppm. In addition, for the zero burnup cases, an additional reactivity conservatism of 4.185% Ak exists. Thus for the three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model, an entire SFP of 5.0 w/o fresh fuel becomes subcritical (k-effective < 1) for soluble boron concentrations in excess of 500 ppm assuming no credit for boraflex in the Unit 2 SFP racks.

For the two-dimensional infinite array model, 1600 ppm would be required to maintain suberiticality.

(12.E) Configuration Control

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 6' Three checkerboard patterns were modeled in an effort to store more reactive fuel in the Unit 2 SFP.

Pattern 1 x

x x

x Pattern 2:

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

xx x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x xx x

x x

x x~~ XxXXXX x

x x

x x

x x x

x x x

Pattem3:

a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a The results are detailed in the following table:

Case KU2CONA KU2CONB KU2CONC KU2CONDI KU2COND2 KU2COND3 KU2CONEI KU2CONE2 KU2CONE3 w/o I

5 S

5 5

5 4

4 4

gwd/t K

0 341.48 o

341.48 0

341.48 20 341 A8 40 341A8 60 341.48 20 341.48 40 341.48 60 341.48 ppm 0

300 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

Pattern I Pattern I Pattern 2 Pattern 3: a-fresh, b=bumed Pattern 3: a-fesh, b=bumed Pattern 3: afesh, b=bumed Pattern 3: a-fesh, b-bumed Pattern 3: a=fresh, b=bumed Pattern 3: a-fresh, b=bumed K-eff 0.95666 0.84793 1.15017 1.19211 1.14593 1.10819 1.14127 1.09295 1.05891 Note that only pattern 1 meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2). If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. Thus to store any fuel with insufficient bumup to satisfy reactivity requirements, that fuel assembly must be surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other nonreactive materials (e.g., wall, water,...).

(12.F) Reconstitution and Inspection A finite radial and axial model of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o VAP fuel at a soluble boron concentration of 0, 300, and 2000 ppm was modeled with sequential assemblies in the row closest to the SFP wall on spacers to simulate the reconstitution/inspection process.

There is no reactivity difference between reconstituting an entire row of assemblies or normal storage of said assemblies. Since Boraflex is not credited in this analysis, placing assemblies on spacers has no reactivity effect.

KENO Case KU2SFPA KU2SFPB KU2SFPC KU2SFPAR KU2SFPBR KU2SFPCR Enr w/o Burnup gwd/t 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 5.0 0.00 Tmod K

341A8 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 341.48 Boron ppm 0

300 2000 0

300 2000 Mode Unit 2 SFP / No Reconstitution Unit 2 SFP I No Reconstitution Unit 2 SFP No Reconstitution Unit 2 SFP / Reconstitution Unit 2 SFP / Reconstitution Unit 2 SFP / Reconstitution Biased K-eff 1.25677 1.09386 0.72165 1.25400 1.09365 0.72347

CA06015 Revision 0 Page C1 (12.G) Additional Margin Provided by Inclusion of Additional Isotopes While only the 50 isotopes for which benchmark data existed were included in the burnup credit calculations, there is no valid reason to exclude additional fission product isotopes. Reactivity calculations were performed to include 101 isotopes, and the additional margin that would be generated by this inclusion was calculated as a fiction of enrichment and burnup.

Enrichment Boron Bumup 50 Isotopes 101 Isotopes W/o ppm gwd/mtu K-effective K-effective Delta K-effective 5

0 10 1.13638 1.12996

-0.00642 5

0 20 1.07119 1.06249

-0.00870 5

0 30 1.01281 1.00313 0.00968 S

0 40 0.95358 0.94032

-0.01326 5

0 50 0.89641 0.88183

.0.01458 5

0 60 0.84339 0.82754 0.01585 5

0 70 0.79503 0.78126 0.01377 4

0 10 1.08330 1.07849

.0.00481 4

0 20 1.01347 1.00744

.0.00603 4

0 30 0.94894 0.93814 0.01080 4

0 40 0.88840 0.87704 0.01136 4

0 50 0.83200 0.81838

.0.01362 4

0 60 0.78548 0.77035 0.01513 4

0 70 0.74660 0.73326

.0.01334 3

0 10 1.01050 1.00342

.0.00708 3

0 20 0.93591 0.92802

.0.00789 3

0 30 0.87020 0.86187

.0.00833 3

0 40 0.91338 0.80172 0.01166 3

0 50 0.76783 0.75627

-0.01156 3

0 60 0.73518 0.72120 0.01398 3

0 70 0.71073 0.69729

.0.01344 2

0 10 0.90578 0.90008

-0.00570 2

0 20 0.83855 0.83024

.0.00831 2

0 30 0.78440 0.77555

.0.00885 2

0 40 0.74665 0.73641

.0.01024 2

0 50 0.71990 0.70752

.0.01238 2

1 0

60 0.70267 0.69013

.0.01254 2

0 70 0.69082 0.67796

.0.01286 Note that the additional margin provided by the expanded list of isotopes generally increases as a function of burnup and enrichment, exceeding 1.5% Ak for high enrichments (4-5 w/o) and high burnup (60 gwdfmtu) fuel.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 70

13. CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this report is to document the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Rack Criticality Methodology that ensures that the spent fuel rack multiplication factor, k-eff, is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2) regulatory limit with Value Added Pellet (VAP) fuel ranging in enrichment from 2.0 to 5.0 w/o with burnup credit and with partial credit for soluble boron in the Unit 2 SFP. The soluble boron credit will be limited to 300 ppm per the restrictions of the Unit 1 criticality analysis in Ref.43. Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. 15% should be added to this value to account for all uncertainties.

Thus a boron level of 350 ppm with uncertainties is required to credit soluble boron in the SFP.

The bumups required to store fuel in the Unit 2 SFP crediting 350 ppm of soluble boron including all biases and uncertainties are the following:

Enrichment (w/o)

Burnup (GWD/MTU) 2.0 6.00 2.5 13.75 3.0 20.50 3.5 27.00 4.0 32.75 4.5 38.25 5.0 43.75 A graphical representation of the above is presented in Figure 8, while a second-order regression analysis is listed in Attachment S. Note that these minimum burnup values are less than those reported in Ref.42 Thus, all assemblies currently qualified to be stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool may continue to be safely stored in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool. In addition, each assembly offloaded from either reactor or from an ISFSI DSC must be evaluated against the above burnup restrictions to determine if it can be safely stored in the Unit 2 SFP. No similar restrictions exist on the Unit 1 SFP.

A finite radial and axial model of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o VAP fuel at a soluble boron concentration of 0, 300, and 2000 ppm was modeled with sequential assemblies in the row closest to the SFP wall on spacers to simulate the reconstitution/inspection process.

There is no reactivity difference between reconstituting an entire row of assemblies or normal storage of said assemblies. Since Boraflex is not credited in this analysis, placing assemblies on spacers has no reactivity effect.

Dropping an assembly of 5.0 w/o VAP fuel onto the SFP racks was analyzed, even though it is not a credible accident. Per Ref.4, the double contingency principle was applied. It required two unlikely, independent, concurrent events to produce a criticality accident.

The double contingency principle means that realistic conditions may be assumed. For example, if soluble boron is normally present in the SFP water, the loss of soluble boron is considered as one accident condition and a second concurrent accident need not be assumed. Therefore, total credit for the presence of soluble boron may be assumed in evaluating this accident condition. Per Technical Assumption 7.H, the normal SFP boron concentration is conservatively assumed to be 2000 ppm. A finite radial and axial configuration of the Unit 2 SFP of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o fuel was modeled as a function of soluble boron concentration (0, 300, 2000 ppm) for the dropped assembly accident with and without reconstitution. The dropped assembly is effectively decoupled from the assemblies stored in the SFP storage racks as was previously noted in Ref.32. Taking credit for 2000 ppm per the double

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contingency principle drops the k-effective value to well below the regulatory requirement for all cases.

Several checkerboard patterns were modeled in an effort to store more reactive fuel in the Unit 2 SFP. Note that only one pattern meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 (Ref.2). If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. Thus to store any fuel with insufficient burnup to satisfy reactivity requirements, that fuel assembly must be surrounded on all four adjacent faces by empty rack cells or other nonreactive materials (e.g., wall, water,...).

The above results include the following conservatisms:

(01) SAS2H isotopics were modeled with conservative fuel temperature, moderator temperature, soluble boron concentration, specific power, and refueling downtime inputs. For 5 w/o fuel at 50 GWD/MTU, the conservatism was in excess of 0.4% Ak for Tfuel, 0.5% Ak for Tmod, and 2.6%

Ak for cooling time (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> vs 5 years).

The conservatisms were higher for lower enrichments but lower for lower burnups.

(02) Integral burnable absorbers, boraflex poison sheets, and control element assemblies were conservatively neglected in this work.

(03) A reactivity uncertainty due to uncertainty in the fuel depletion calculation should be developed and combined with other calculational uncertainties. An uncertainty equal to 5% of the reactivity decrement to the burnup of interest is an acceptable assumption.

Based on computations presented in this work, a worst case uncertainty value of 0.02089 was used in all burnup related reactivity calculations, even though SAS2H generated reactivity was determined to be 0.358% more reactive than those adjusted to radiochemical assay isotopics.

(04) For conservatism, an axial burnup bias of 3.3% Ak was utilized for all burnup cases. The most conservative Calvert Cliffs specific reactivity bias was calculated to be -0.579% Ak. Thus for Calvert Cliffs specific fuel, use of 26-node axial burnup profiles is less conservative than uniform axial burnups (05) Inclusion of additional isotopes in the SAS2H and KENO executions can add significantly more margin to the reactivity results. While no benchmarks exist for these additional isotopes, comparison of existing benchmark cases to SAS2HIKENO computations indicates that the computation results are conservative. Note that the additional margin provided by an expanded list of isotopes (101 vs 50) generally increases as a function of burnup and enrichment, exceeding 1.5% Ak for high enrichments (4-5 w/o) and high burnup (60 gwd/mtu) fuel.

(06) The worst case composite bias and uncertainty value was 0.06129 AK for zero soluble boron and zero burnup. This value was conservatively applied to all calculated reactivity values.

(07) The conservatism in reactivity for a two-dimensional infinite array versus a three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model increases from 1.56% Ak at 0 ppm, to 10.18% Ak at 300 ppm, to 21.87% Ak at 2000 ppm. In addition, for the zero burnup cases, an additional reactivity conservatism of 4.185% Ak exists. Thus for the three-dimensional Unit 2 specific model, an entire SFP of 5.0 w/o fresh fuel becomes subcritical (k-effective < 1) for soluble boron concentrations in excess of 500 ppm assuming no credit for boraflex in the Unit 2 SFP racks and no credit for burnup. For the two-dimensional infinite array model, -1600 ppm would be required to maintain subcriticality under the same conditions.

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 7-ATTACHMENT A CALCULATION LIST

CalcList CA06015 Rev.0 Page73 KENO Reactivity Results KENO SAS2H Enr Burnup Tmod SHD Pitch Steel Clad Boron Planar Geom Axial Unbiased Delta Biased Case Case w/o gwd/t K

in cm ppm Notes K-eff K-eff K-eff SAS2H Cooling Time

=

K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 100 days decay Infinite 0.70641 0.00075 K205000AB S250B 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - I year decay Infinite 0.69684 0.00059 K205000AC S250C 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 2 year decay Infinite 0.69026 0.00068 K205000AD S250D 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 5 year decay Infinite 0.67068 0.00065 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 100 days decay Infinite 1.05935 0.00083 K502000AB S520B 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - I year decay Infinite 1.05345 0.00080 K502000AC S520C 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 2 year decay Infinite 1.05450 0.00079 K502000AD S520D 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 5 year decay Infinite 1.05015 0.00095 K505000AA S550A 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 100 days decay Infinite 0.88271 0.00077 K505000AB S550B 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - I year decay Infinite 0.87514 0.00077 K505000AC S550C 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 2 year decay Infinite 0.87105 0.00083 K505000AD S550D 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - 5 year decay Infinite 0.85665 0.00071 SAS2H Tfucl K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -Tfuc1I1285.42K Infinite 0.70641 0.00075 K205000AE S250E 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -Tfuel=1085.42K Infinite 0.69927 0.00065 K205000AF S25OF 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfuel-885.42K Infinite 0.69036 0.00064 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfucl=1285.42K Infinite 1.05935 0.00083 K502000AE S520E 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfuel=1085.42K Infinite 1.05864 0.00083 K502000AF S52OF 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfuel-885.42K Infinite 1.05793 0.00083 K505000M S550A 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfuel-1285.42K Infinite 0.88271 0.00077 K505000AE S550E 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfucl=1085.42K Infinite 0.87832 0.00081 K505000AF S55OF 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tfuel-885.42K Infinite 0.87249 0.00076 SAS2H Boron Concentration K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - PPM=950 Infinite 0.70641 0.00075 K205000AG S250G 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM-I 00 Infinite 0.71116 0.00061 K205000AH S250H 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - PPM=800 Infinite 0.70343 0.00065 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM=950 Infinite 1.05935 0.00083 K502000AG S52OG 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM-I 100 Infinite 1.05882 0.00085 K502000AH S520H 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM=800 Infinite 1.05837 0.00082 K505000AA S550A 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM-950 Infinite 0.88271 0.00077 K505000AG S55OG 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM-I 100 Infinite 0.88656 0.00087 K505000AH S550H 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -PPM=800 Infinite 0.88274 0.00072 z2inp.XLS Page 1

CaicLst CA06015 Rev0 Page_?< _

P Y

Y Y

P P

SAS2H Tmod K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -Tmod-6IF Infinite 0.70641 0.00075 K205000AA S2501 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod=60F Infinite 0.69791 0.00070 K205000AJ S250J 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod-560F Infinite 0.69044 0.00061 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod-601F Infinite 1.05935 0.00083 K502000AI SS20I 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod5801F Infinite 1.05764 0.00087 KS02000AJ S520J 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod-560F Infinite 1.05770 0.00085 K505000AA S550A 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod=60F Infinite 0.88271 0.00077 K505000AA S5501 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - Tmod801F Infinite 0.87720 0.00077 KSO5000AJ S550J 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -Tmod-560F Infinite 0.87276 0.00072 SAS2H Assembly Power K205000AA S250A 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP=22.583MW Infinite 0.70641 0.00075 K20500OAK S250K 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP-20.OMW Infinite 0.70793 0.00066 K205000AL S250L 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP=17.5MW Infinite 0.70753 0.00068 K205000AM S250M 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP15.OMW Infinite 0.70754 0.00066 K205000AN S250N 2.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP-12.442MW Infinite 0.70774 0.00063 K502000AA S520A 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP=22.583MW Infinite 1.05935 0.00083 K502000AK S520K 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP-20.OMW Infinite 1.05903 0.00091 K502000AL S520L 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP=17.5MW Infinite 1.05801 0.00093 K502000AM S520M 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP=I 5.OMW Infinite 1.05983 0.00091 K502000AN S520N 5.0 20 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP12.442MW Infinite 1.06091 0.00081 K505000AA S550A 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP-22.583MW Infinite 0.88271 0.00077 K5000AK S5SOK 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly -AP=20.OMW Infinite 0.88415 0.00073 K505000AL S550L 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP=17.5MW Infinite 0.88372 0.00076 K505000AM S550M 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP15.OMW Infinite 0.88420 0.00071 K505000AN SSSON 5.0 50 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly - AP-12.442MW Infinite 0.88363 0.00071 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Tmod and Clad Material K500000B I 5.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.19925 0.00107 K500000B2 5.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.19707 0.00099 K50000083 5.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.19639 0.00091 K500000B4 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20803 0.00084 K500000B5 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20813 0.00103 K500000B6 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21112 0.00091 K50000OB7 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 alloy a 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20980 0.00091 K500000B8 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 It zirlo 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20870 0.00095 K500000B9 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 m5 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20890 0.00090 KSOOOOOCI S.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zido 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.12220 0.00094 z2inp.XLS Page 2

CaicList CA06015 Ry.0 Page_.sZO K500000C2 5.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.12203 0.00095 K500000C3 5.0 0

277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.12104 0.00107 K500000C4 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13323 0.00091 K50000OC5 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13396 0.00083 K500000C6 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zrc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13444 0.00094 K50000OC7 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 alloy a 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13241 0.00094 KSOOOOOC8 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 It zirlo 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13259 0.00091 K50000OC9 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 m5 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13359 0.00106 K504000CI S540 5.0 40 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87878 0.00076 K504000C2 S540 5.0 40 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87862 0.00085 K504000C3 S540 5.0 40 277.15 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87750 0.00077 K504000C4 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirlo 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89027 0.00071 K504000C5 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 optin 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89083 0.00078 KC504000C6 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zrc4 300 Single ssembly Infinite 0.89089 0.00077 KS04000C7 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 alloy a 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89039 0.00076 K504000CS S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 It ziro 300 Single assembly Infinite 89004 0.00082 K504000C9 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 m5 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89018 0.00086 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Stack Height Density K500000BA 5.0 0

l 341.48 0.965 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21021 0.00090 0.00090 K500000CA 5.0 0

341.48 0.965 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13606 0.00084 0.00340 K504000CA S540SHD 5.0 40 341.48 0.965 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89768 0.00085 0.00841 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Assembly Pitch K50000OBB 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.125 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.20356 0.00088

-0.00577 KSOOOOOBC 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.0625 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21278 0.00101 0.00358 KSOOOOOCB 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.125 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.12857 0.00091

-0.00402 K50000OCC 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.0625 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13705 0.00094 0.00449 K504000CB S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.125 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.88473 0.00077

-0.00462 K504000CC S540 5.0 40 341.A8 0.945 10.0625 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89382 0.00084 0.00454 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Steel Thickness K500000BD l

5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1270 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.22267 0.00100 0.01346 KSOOOOOBE l5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1778 zirc4 0

Singleassembly Infinite 1.19742 0.00109

-0,01170 K500000CD l

5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1270 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.14037 0.00088 0.00775 K500000CE l

5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1778 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.12599 0.00098

-0.00653 K504000CD S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1270 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89639 0.00071 0.00698 K504000CE S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1778 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.88471 0.00083

-0.00458 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Assembly Eccentric Positioning K500000BF 5.0 l 0

l 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

lOxlO Infinite 1.20934 0.00095 0.00008 z2inp.XLS Page 3

CalcList CA06015 Rev.0 Page 7-6 KSOOOOOBG 5.0 cw 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

IOxIO cc in Infinite 1.21883 0.00099 0.00961 K500000BH 5.0 ecw 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

lOxlO Mt out Infinite 1.21889 0.00092 0.00960 K500000CF 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 lOxlO Infinite 1.13528 0.00096 0.00274 K500000CG 5.0 ecc 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 lOxlO ecc in Infinite 1.14187 0.00104 0.00941 K500000CH 5,0 ecc 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 I OxlO ew out Infinite 1.14386 0.00086 0.01122 K504000CF S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 IOxlO Infinite 0.89070 0.00077 0.00135 K504000CG S540 5.0 e 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 lOxlO cc in Infinite 0.89731 0.00081 0.00800 K504000CH S540 5.0 ecc 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 lOxlO ec out Infinite 0.89682 0.00088 0.00758 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Enrichment K500000BI 5.05 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21080 0.00096 0.00155 K500000CI

_5.05 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 300 Singe assemb Infinite 1.13474 0.00086 0.00210 K504000CI S540ENR 5.05 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89238 0.00078 0.00304 KENO Biases and Uncertainties as a Function of Gap Contents K500000BJ l

5.00 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 0

Single assembly-Water in gap Infinite 1.20915 0.00089

-0.00017 K500000CJ 5.00 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 300 Single assembly-Water in gap Infinite 1.13618 0.00088 0.00356 K504000CJ S540ENR 5.00 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1397 zirc4 300 Single assembly-Water in gap Infinite 0.89204 0.00075 0.00267 Enrichment vs Burnup at PPM K200000DI 2.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.97726 0.00082 1.03855 K201000DI S210 2.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.90578 0.00074 0.96707 K202000DI S220 2.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.83855 0.00071 0.89984 K203000DI S230 2.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.78440 0.00087 0.84569 K204000DI S240 2.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.74665 0.00066 0.80794 K205000DI S250 2.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.71990 0.00068 0.78119 K206000DI S260 2.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.70267 0.00059 0.76396 K207000DI S270 2.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.69082 0.00060 0.75211 0.0 1439 K300000DI 3.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.09184 0.00091 1.15313 K301000DI S310 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.01050 0.00083 1.07179 K302000DI S320 3.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93591 0.00077 0.99720 K303000DI S330 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.87020 0.00069 0.93149 K304000DI S340 3.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.81338 0.00070 0.87467 K305000DI S350 3.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.76783 0.00074 0.82912 K306000Dl S360 3.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.73518 0.00070 0.79647 K307000DI S370 3.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.71073 0.00063 0.77202

=___________

0.01913 K400000DI 4.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.15989 0.00096 1.22118 K401000DI S410 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 O

Single assembly Infinite 1.08330 0.00092 1.14459 z2inp.XLS Page 4

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page.27-K402000DI S420 4.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

O Single assembly Infinite 1.01347 0.00082 1.07476 K403000DI S430 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.94894 0.00083 1.01023 K404000DI S440 4.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.88840 0.00076 0.94969 K405000DI S450 4.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.83200 0.00071 0.89329 K406000DI S460 4.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.78548 0.00073 0.84677 K407000DI S470 4.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.74660 0.00070 0.80789

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

KS00000DI 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21112 0.00091 1.27241 K501000DI S510 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.13638 0.00085 1.19767 K502000DI S520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.07119 0.00088 1.13248 K503000DI S530 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.01281 0.00079 1.07410 K504000DI S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.95358 0.00083 1.01487 K5OSOOODI S550 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.89641 0.00079 0.95770 K506000DI S560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.84339 0.00071 0.90468 K507000DI S570 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.79503 0.00072 0.85632 0.02089 K200580DI S20058 2.0 5.80 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93638 0.00079 0.99767 K251340DI S25134 2.5 13.40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93664 0.00078 0.99793 K302000DI S320 3.0 20.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93591 0.00077 0.99720 K352630DI S35263 3.5 26.30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93519 0.00089 0.99648 K403200DI S40320 4.0 32.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93536 0.00080 0.99665 K453750DI S45375 4.5 37.50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93621 0.00075 0.99750 K504300DI S50430 5.0 43.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 0.93599 0.00075 0.99728 Enrichment vs Burnup t 300 PPM K200000D2 2.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89457 0.00083 0.95586 K201000D2 S210 2.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.83281 0.00074 0.89410 K202000D2 S220 2.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.76997 0.00079 0.83126 K203000D2 S230 2.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.72224 0.00065 0.78353 K204000D2 S240 2.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.68733 0.00059 0.74862 K205000D2 S250 2.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.66433 0.00072 0.72562 K206000D2 S260 2.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.64749 0.00064 0.70878 K207000D2 S270 2.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.63731 0.00056 0.69860 K300000D2 3 0 O 3 1 8 0 9 5 0 0 3 5

. 5 4 z c 30Si l

s e I f n

1. 0 2

. 0 81 0.01293 K30000OD2 3.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.00921 0.00081 1.07050 K301000D2 S310 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.93514 0.00077 0.99643 K302000D2 S320 3.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.86615 0.00085 0.9274 K30300OD2 5330 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Iniie 0.80550 0.00075 10.86679..

z2inp.XLS Page 5

CalcList CA0601§,Rev.0 Page 7If K304000D2 S340 3.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.75140 0.00072 0.81269 K305000D2 S350 3.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.71084 0.00069 0.77213 K306000D2 S360 3.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.67942 0.00068 0.74071 K307000D2 S370 3.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.65791 0.00058 0.71920

=

0.01763 K400000D2 4.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.08296 0.00085 1.14425 K401000D2 S410 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.00944 0.00095 1.07073 K402000D2 S420 4.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.94612 0.00079 1.00741 K403000D2 S430 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.88401 0.00078 0.94530 K404000D2 S440 4.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.82508 0.00075 0.88637 K405000D2 S450 4.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.77122 0.00070 0.83251 K406000D2 S460 4.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.72752 0.00074 0.78881 K407000D2 S470 4.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.69218 0.00069 0.75347 0.01962 K500OOD2 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13444 0.00094 1.19573 KSOIOOOD2 SSIO 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.06482 0.00093 1.12611 K502000D2 S520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.00457 0.00081 1.06586 K503000D2 S530 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.94771 0.00075 1.00900 K504000D2 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.89059 0.00077 0.95188 K5050OOD2 S550 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.83586 0.00080 0.89715 K506000D2 S560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.78435 0.00071 0.84564 K507000D2 S570 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.73910 0.00068 0.80039 0.01985 K200580D2 S20058 2.0 5.80 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.86028 0.00071 0.92157 K251340D2 S25134 2.5 13.40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.86494 0.00077 0.92623 K302000D2 S320 3.0 20.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.86615 0.00085 0.92744 K352630D2 S35263 3.5 26.30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.86784 0.00074 0.92913 K403200D2 S40320 4.0 32.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87102 0.00078 0.93231 K453750D2 S45375 4.5 37.50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87255 0.00078 0.93384 K504300D2 S50430 5.0 43.00 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assembly Infinite 0.87387 0.00083 0.93516 Enrichment vs Reactivity at 2000 PPM K200000D3 2.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.62679 0.00066 0.68808 K300000D3 3.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.74302 0.00073 0.80431 K400000D3 4.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.82161 0.00096 0.88290 K500000D3 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.87907 0.00094 0.94036 Axial Profiles at 0 PPM II III KS062AADI s62aa2.x=

5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axil nodes Water 0.86254 0.00104 0.03226 z2inp.XLS Page 6

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page t1 K5062AAEI s562aal.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Wat 0.83204 0.00072 K5046ABDI s546ab2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Wat 0.93104 0.00087 0.01751 K5046ABEI s546abl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91513 0.00073 K5042ACDI s542ac2.xxx 5.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.94813 0.00091 0.01060 K5042ACEI s542acl.xxx 5.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93931 0.00087 K5038ADDI s538ad2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.97777 0.00090 0.01623 K5038ADEI s538adl.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.96331 0.00087 K5034AEDI s534ae2.xxx 5.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.99441 0.00089 0.01255 K5034AEEI s534ael.xxx 5.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.98361 0.00086 K5030AFDI s53Oaf2.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01763 0.00096 0.00918 K5030AFEI sS30afl.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Wat 1.01030 0.00089 K5026AGDI s526ag2.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03809 0.00111 0.00688 K5026AGEI s526agl.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03312 0.00080 K5022AHDI s522ah2.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05695 0.00096 0.00193 K5022AHEI s522ahl.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.05677 0.00079 K501SAIDI s51 ai2.x=x 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-lS axil nodes Water 1.09833 0.00102 0.01682 K501S8AIEI sSI8ail.xxx 5.0 1 8 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.08348 0.00095 K5014AJDI s514aj2.xxx 5.0 14 341.4S 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.09717 0.00092

-0.00834 K5014AJEI s514aji.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.10729 0.00086 K501OAKDI s51Oak2.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1S axial nodes Water 1.12772 0.00092

-0.00294 K501OAKEI s51Oakl.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.13244 0.00086 K5006ALDI s506al2.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.15379 0.00092

-0.00360 K5006ALEI s5O6all.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.15923 0.00092 K5006ALFI s506a2.yyy 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Watr 1.15383 0.00083

-0.00343 K5006ALGI s506al.yyy 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axil node Water 1.15898 0.00089 K5006ALHI s506 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.16104 0.00104 Axial Profiles t 0 PPM K5062BADI s562ba2.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axil nodes Water 0.86091 0.00095 0.03054 K5062AAEI s562aal.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axil node Water 0.83204 0.00072 K5046BBDI s546bb2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92725 0.00096 0.01381 K5046ABEI s546abl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91513 0.00073 K5042BCDI s542bc2.xxx 5.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single usm-18 axial nodes Water 0.94408 0.00079 0.00643 K5042ACEI s542acl.xxx 5.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93931 0.00087 K5038BDDI s538bd2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-lS axial nodes Water 0.97221 0.00096 0.01073 K503SADEI sS3Sadl.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.96331 0.00087 K5034BEDI s534be2.xxx 5.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axil nodes Water 0.99202 0.00086 0.01013 K5034AEEI s534ael.xxx 5.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.98361 0.00086 z2inp.XLS Page 7

CaicList CA06015 Rev.O K503OBFDI s530bf2.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01689 0.00102 0.00850 K5030AFEI s530afl.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.01030 0.00089 K5026BGDI s526bg2.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03869 0.00104 0.00741 K5026AGEI s526agl.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03312 0.00080 K5022BHDI s522bh2.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05485 0.00105

-0.00008 K5022AHEI s522ahl.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.05677 0.00079 K01S1BID1 s518bi2.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.10153 0.00089 0.01989 K5018AEEI s518ail.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.08348 0.00095 K5014BJDI s514bj2.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-8 axial nodes Water 1.11182 0.00105 0.00644 K5014AJEI s514ajl.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assn-l axial node Water 1.10729 0.00086 K5O1OBKDI sSlObk2.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.12731 0.00090

-0.00337 K5010AKEI s510akl.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.13244 0.00086 K5006BLDI s506bl2.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.15490 0.00087

.0.00254 K5006ALEI sS06all.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.15923 0.00092 Axial Profiles at 300 PPM K5062AAD3 s562aa2.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80241 0.00087 0.03047 K5062AAE3 sS62aal.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.77352 0.00071 K5046ABD3 s546ab2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86800 0.00100 0.01656 K5046ABE3 s546abl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85319 0.00075 K5042ACD3 s542ac2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88407 0.00089 0.00944 K5042ACE3 sS42acl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.87627 0.00075 K5038ADD3 s538ad2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91655 0.00088 0.02030 K5038ADE3 s538adl.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89790 0.00077 K5034AED3 s534ae2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93206 0.00085 0.01245 K5034AEE3 s534ael.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.92130 0.00084 K5030AFD3 s530af2.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.95155 0.00098 0.00996 K5030AFE3 s530afl.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.94349 0.00092 K5026AGD3 s526ag2.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.97262 0.00096 0.00789 K5026AGE3 s526agl.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.96659 0.00090 K5022AHD3 s522ah2.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.98880 0.00104 0.00109 K5022AHE3 sS22ahl.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.98965 0.00090 K5018AID3 sSlai2.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.02935 0.00103 0.01528 K5018AIE3 sS 1Sai.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.01598 0.00088 K5014AJD3 s514aj2.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03210 0.00085

-0.00236 K5014AJE3 s5l4ajl.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03628 0.00097 KSOIOAKD3 sSlOak2.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05620 0.00090

-0.00409 K5OIOAKE3 sSlOakl.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.06210 0.00091 z2inp.XLS Page 8

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page f, KS006ALD3 s506a2.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-S axial nodes Water 1.08098 0.00096

-0.00286 KS006ALE3 sS06all.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.08583 0.00103 KS006ALF3 s506a12.yyy 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.08256 0.00088

-0.00215 K5006ALG3 sSO6all.yyy 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.08642 0.00083 KS006ALH3 s506 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.08621 0.00087 Axial Profiles at 300 PPM KS062BAD3 s562ba2.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80133 0.00103 0.02955 KS062AAE3 sS62aal.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.77352 0.00071 KS046BBD3 s546bb2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86749 0.00093 0.01598 K5046ABE3 sS46abl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85319 0.00075 K5042BCD3 s542bc2.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88241 0.00084 0.00773 K5042ACE3 s542acl.xxx 5.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.87627 0.00075 K5038BDD3 s538bd2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90892 0.00106 0.01285 KS038ADE3 s538adl.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89790 0.00077 K5034BED3 sS34be2.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92553 0.00096 0.00603 KS034AEE3 s534ael.xxx 5.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.92130 0.00084 KS03OBFD3 s530bR.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.95246 0.00094 0.01083 KS030AFE3 s530afi.xxx 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axil node Water 0.94349 0.00092 K5026BGD3 s526bg2.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.97153 0.00094 0.00678 K5026AGE3 s526agl.xxx 5.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.96659 0.00090 K5022BHD3 s522bh2.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.98935 0.00094 0.00154 K5022AHE3 s522ahl.xxx 5.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.98965 0.00090 K5018BID3 sSl8bi2.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.02929 0.00100 0.01519 K5018AIE3 sS18fail.xxx 5.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.01598 0.00088 KS014BJD3 sSl4bj2.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm 8 axial nodes Water 1.04213 0.00085 0.00767 KS014AJE3 sS14aj.xxx 5.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03628 0.00097 KSOIOBKD3 sS I Obk2.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05793 0.00091

-0.00235 K501OAKE3 s51Oakl.xxx 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.06210 0.00091 KS006BLD3 s506bl2.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.08307 0.00092

-0.00081 K5006ALE3 s506al1.xxx 5.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axil node Water 1.08583 0.00103 Axial Profiles atO rPPM K4062AADI s462aa2.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80208 0.00096 0.03046 K4062AAEI s462aal.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.77332 0.00074 K4046ABDI s446ab2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm 8 axial nodes Water 0.87055 0.00079 0.02128 K4046ABEI s446abl.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85093 0.00087 K4042ACDI s442ac2.xxx 4.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88373 0.00096 0.01195 K4042ACEI s442acl1.xxx 4.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.87350 0.00076 z2inp.XLS Page 9

CaIcList CA06015 Rev.0 Page &Z K4038ADDI s438ad2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91851 0.00094 0.02367 K4038ADEI s438ad2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89658 0.00080 K4034AEDI s434ae2.xxx 4.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93496 0.00096 0.01739 K4034AEEI s434ae2.xxx 4.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91931 0.00078 K4030AFDI s43afl.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l8 axial nodes Water 0.95822 0.00100 0.01559 K4030AFEI s430afi.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.94456 0.00093 K4026AGDI s426ag2.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.98197 0.00011 0.01089 K4026AGEI s426agl.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97207 0.00088 K4022AGDI s422ah2.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00104 0.00099 0.00479 K4022AHEI s422ah2.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.99814 0.00090 K4012AIDI s428ai2.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.04820 0.00099 0.02645 K4018AIEI s4l8ail.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial node Water 1.02363 0.00089 K4014AJDI s414aj2.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial nodes Water 1.04819 0.00097

-0.00135 K4014AJEI s4l4aj.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.05138 0.00087 K401OAKDI s41Oajl.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.07393 0.00093

-0.00241 K401OAKEI s4lOakl.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.07813 0.00086 K4006ARDI s406ak2.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l8 axial nodes Water 1.10190 0.00096

.00406 K4006ALEI s406al2.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.10783 0.00091 Axial Profiles t O PPM K4062BADI s462ba2.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80215 0.00104 0.03061 K4062AAEI s462aal.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.77332 0.00074 K4046BBDI s446bb2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86715 0.00094 0.01803 K4046ABEI s446abl.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85093 0.00087 K4042BCDI s442bc2.xxx 4.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88253 0.00087 0.01066 K4042ACEI s442ac.xxx 4.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.87350 0.00076 K4038BDDI s438bd2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91317 0.00103 0.01842 K4038ADEI s438adl.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89658 0.00080 K4034BEDI s434be2.xxx 4.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93255 0.00097 0.01499 K4034AEEI s434ael.xxx 4.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.91931 0.00078 K403OBFDI s430bf2.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.95916 0.00095 0.01648 K4030AFEI s430afl.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.94456 0.00093 K4026BGDI s426bg2.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial nodes Water 0.97947 0.00095 0.00923 K4026AGEI s426agl.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97207 0.00088 K4022BHDI s422bh2.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00094 0.00091 0.00461 K4022AHEI s422ahl.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.99814 0.00090 K4018BIDI s418bi2.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.04896 0.00082 0.02704 K4018AIEI s4l8ail.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.02363 0.00089 z2inp.XLS Page 1 0

CacList CA06015 ev.0 Page

^ D K4014BJDI s414bj2.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05918 0.00096 0.00963 K4014AJEI s4l4aj.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.05138 0.00087 K4010BKDI s4lObk2.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.07496 0.00080

-0.00151 K4010AKEI s4lOakl.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.07813 0.00086 K4006BLDI s406bl2.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.10342 0.00103

-0.00247 K4006ALEI s406a 1.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.10783 0.00091 Axial Profiles at 300 PPM K4062AAD3 s462aa2.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.74486 0.00082 0.02898 K4062AAE3 s462aal.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-axial node Water 0.71743 0.00073 K4046ABD3 s446ab2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80845 0.00085 0.02062 K4046ABE3 s446abl.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.78950 0.00082 K4042ACD3 s442ac2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.82387 0.00091 0.01367 K4042ACE3 s442acl.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.81182 0.00071 K4038ADD3 s438ad2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axil nodes Water 0.85491 0.00094 0.02418 K4038ADE3 s438adl.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.83250 0.00083 K4034AED3 s434ae2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86937 0.00095 0.01549 K4034AEE3 s434ael.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85565 0.00082 K4O30AFD3 s430af2.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.89376 0.00101 0.01475 K4O30AFE3 s430afl.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.88083 0.00081 K4026AGD3 s426ag2.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91168 0.00090 0.00858 K4026AGE3 s426agl.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.90474 0.00074 K4022AHD3 s422ah2.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93452 0.00099 0.00863 K4022AHE3 s422ahl.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.92765 0.00077 K4018AID3 s418ai2.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.97727 0.00106 0.02703 K4018AIE3 s418ail.xxx 4.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.95210 0.00080 K4014AJD3 s414aj2.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axil nodes Water 0.97598 0.00081

-0.00250 K4014AJE3 s4l4aj.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.98007 0.00078 K401OAKD3 s410ak2.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00175 0.00083

-0.00208 K40IOAKE3 s4lOakl.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axil node Water 1.00557 0.00091 K4006ALD3 s406al2.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.02825 0.00085

-0.00290 K4006ALE3 s406all.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03299 0.00099 Axial Profles at 300 PPM K4062BAD3 s462ba2.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.74379 0.00093 0.02802 K4062AAE3 s462aal.xxx 4.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.71743 0.00073 K4046BBD3 s446bb2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80520 0.00092 0.01744 K4046ABE3 s446abl.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.78950 0.00082 K4042BCD3 s442bc2.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.81795 0.00107 0.00791 z2inp.XLS Page 1 1

CaIcList CA06015 Rev.0 Page y

K4042ACE3 s442ae1.xxx 4.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.81182 0.00071 K4038BDD3 s438bd2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.84721 0.00096 0.01650 K4038ADE3 s438adl.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.83250 0.00083 K4034BED3 s434be2.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86626 0.00074 0.01217 K4034AEE3 s434ael.xxx 4.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85565 0.00082 K4030BFD3 s430bf2.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zir4 300 Single assm-S axial nodes Water 0.89257 0.00104 0.01359 K4030AFE3 s430afl.xxx 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zir4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.88083 0.00081 K4026BGD3 s426bg2.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial nodes Water 0.91314 0.00088 0.01002 K4026AGE3 s426agl.xxx 4.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.90474 0.00074 K4022BHD3 s422bh2.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-IS axial nodes Water 0.93016 0.00102 0.00430 K4022AHE3 s422ahl.xxx 4.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.92765 0.00077 K401 BID3 s41Sbi2.xxx 4.0 IS 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assm-lS axial nodes Water 0.97695 0.00104 0.02669 K4018AIE3 s4lSail.xxx 4.0 IS 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.95210 0.00080 K4014BJD3 s414bj2.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zir4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.98657 0.00083 0.00811 K4014AJE3 s4l4ajl.xxx 4.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.98007 0.00078 K401OBKD3 s4lObk2.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00358 0.00085

-0.00023 K401OAKE3 s4lOakl.xxx 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.00557 0.00091 K4006BLD3 s406bl2.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03200 0.00091 0.00091 K4006ALE3 s406al1.xxx 4.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03299 0.00099 Axial Profiles at O PPM K3062AADI s362aa2.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zire4 0

Single assm-S axial nodes Water 0.74309 0.00090 0.01704 K3062AAEI s362aal.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 O

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.72764 0.00069 K3046ABDI s346ab2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-S axial nodes Water 0.79727 0.00083 0.01459 K3046ABEI s346abl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.78431 0.00080 K3042ACDI s342ac2.xxx 3.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.81294 0.00083 0.01380 K3042ACEI s342ael.xxx 3.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.80075 0.00078 K3038ADDI s338ad2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.84467 0.00096 0.02465 K303ADEI s33adl.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.82169 0.00071 K3034AEDI s334ae2.xxx 3.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.86022 0.00086 0.01684 K3034AEEI s334ael.xxx 3.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-I axial node Water 0.84505 0.00081 K3030AFDI s330af2.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88332 0.00090 0.01609 K3030AFEI s330afl.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-axial node Water 0.86888 0.00075 K3026AGDI s326ag2.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 AM 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes water 0.90835 0.00086 0.01730 K3026AGEI s326ag.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89268 0.00077 K3022AHDI s322al.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92670 0.00080 0.00914 K3022AHEI s322ah.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zir4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91917 0.00081 0.00914 K301AIDI s318ai2.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-S axial nodes Water 0.97541 0.00107 0.02942 z2inp.XLS Page 12

CaIcList CA0601_y.O Page Y

K301SAIEI s318ail.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.94783 0.00077 K3014AJDI s314aj2.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l8 axial nodes Water 0.97395 0.00087

-0.00052 K3014AJEI s3l4aj.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97620 0.00086 K301OAKDI s310ak2.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00359 0.00079

-0.00079 K301OAKEI s3l0akl.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.00603 0.00086 K3006ALDI s306al2.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03277 0.00100

-0.00169 K3006ALEI s306al.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03625 0.00079 Axial Profiles atO PPM K3062BADI s362ba2.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.74092 0.00073 0.01470 K3062AAEI s362aal.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.72764 0.00069 K3046BBDI s346bb2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.79649 0.00075 0.01373 K3046ABEI s346abl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.78431 0.00080 K3042BCDI s342bc2.xxx 3.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.80923 0.00080 0.01006 K3042ACEI s342acl.xxx 3.0 42 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.80075 0.00078 K3038BDDI s338bd2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.83911 0.00099 0.01912 K3038ADEI s338adl.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.82169 0.00071 K3034BEDI s334be2.xxx 3.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.85793 0.00084 0.01453 K3034AEEI s334ael.xxx 3.0 34 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.84505 0.00081 K303OBFDI s330bf2.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88298 0.00099 0.01584 K3030AFEI s330a.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.86888 0.00075 K3026BGDI s326bg2.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90498 0.00094 0.01401 K3026AGEI s326agl.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.89268 0.00077 K3022BHDI s322bh2.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92658 0.00087 0.00909 K3022AHEI s322ahl.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91917 0.00081 K3018BIDI s318bi2.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.97460 0.00099 0.02853 K3018AIEI s318ail.xxx 3.0 IS 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.94783 0.00077 K3014BJDI s314bj2.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.98446 0.00096 0.01008 K3014AJEI s3l4ajl.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97620 0.00086 K301OBKDI s3Obk2.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.00535 0.00084 0.00102 K301OAKEI s3lOakl.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.00603 0.00086 K3006BLDI s306bl2.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.03359 0.00078

-0.00109 K3006ALEI s306al.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03625 0.00079 Axial Profiles at 300 PPM K3062AAD3 s362aa2.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.68572 0.00082 0.01423 K3062AAE3 s362aal.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.67297 0.00066 K3046ABD3 s346ab2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.73814 0.00084 0.01619 K3046ABE3 s346abl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.72350 0.00071 1

z2inp.XLS Page 13

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page do K3042ACD3 s342ac2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.75227 0.00068 0.01345 K3042ACE3 s342acl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.74023 0.00073 K3038ADD3 s338ad2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.78138 0.00079 0.02391 K3038ADE3 s338adl.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.75899 0.00073 K3034AED3 s334ae2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.79473 0.00089 0.01495 K3034AEE3 s334ael.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.78137 0.00070 K3030AFD3 s330af2.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.81765 0.00105 0.01616 K3030AFE3 s330afl.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.80341 0.00087 K3026AGD3 s326ag2.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.83919 0.00085 0.01544 K3026AGE3 s326agl.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.82538 0.00078 K3022AHD3 s322ah2.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirK4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.85846 0.00097 0.00869 K3022AHE3 s322ahl.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85156 0.00082 K3018AID3 s318ai2.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90243 0.00091 0.02705 K3018AIE3 s3iail.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.87730 0.00101 K3014AJD3 s314aj2.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90353 0.00083 0.00036 K3014AJE3 s3l4ajl.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.90487 0.00087 K301OAKD3 s3IOak2.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zitc4 300 Single assn-I8 axial nodes Water 0.92889 0.00077

-0.00224 K301OAKE3 s31Oakl.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93267 0.00077 K3006ALD3 s306al2.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.95490 0.00079

-0.00331 K3006ALE3 s306all.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.95977 0.00077 Axial Profiles at 300 PPM K3062BAD3 s362ba2.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.68415 0.00087 0.01271 K3062AAE3 s362aal.xxx 3.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.67297 0.00066 K3046BBD3 s346bb2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assn-18 axial nodes Water 0.73730 0.00091 0.01542 K3046ABE3 s346abl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.72350 0.00071 K3042BCD3 s342bc2.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.74910 0.00081 0.01041 K3042ACE3 s342acl.xxx 3.0 46 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.74023 0.00073 K3038BDD3 s338bd2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.77575 0.00093 0.01842 K3038ADE3 s338adl.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.75899 0.00073 K3034BED3 s334be2.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.79238 0.00078 0.01249 K3034AEE3 s334ae1.xxx 3.0 38 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node water 0.78137 0.00070 K3034BFD3 s33bfl.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-IS axial nodes Water 0.81780 0.00086 0.01612 K3030AF3 s330afI.xxx 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.80341 0.00087 0.01612 K3026B3D3 s326bg2.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.83862 0.00097 0.01499 K3026AGE3 s326ag2.xxx 3.0 26 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.82538 0.00078 0.01499 K3022BHD3 s322bh2.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.85879 0.00086 0.00891 K3022AHE3 s322ahl.xxx 3.0 22 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.85156 0.00082 z2inp.XLS Page 14

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 PagefZ_

K3018BID3 s318bi2.xxx 3.0 l1 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90273 0.00109 0.02753 K3018AE3 s3l8ail.xxx 3.0 18 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.87730 0.00101 K3014BJD3 s314bj2.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91129 0.00085 0.00814 K3014AJE3 s3l4aj l.xxx 3.0 14 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-l axial node Water 0.90487 0.00087 K3010BKD3 s31 Obk2.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92854 0.00092

-0.00244 K301OAKE3 s3lOakl.xxx 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93267 0.00077 K3006BLD3 s306bl2.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.95819 0.00091 0.00010 K3006ALE3 s306al1.xxx 3.0 6

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.95977 0.00077 Axial Profiles at 0 PPM K501SOA sSOlsO2.xxx 5.0 48.013 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.89127 0.00085

-0.01135 K501SOB s501sOI.xxx 5.0 48.013 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.90432 0.00085 K502SOA s502s02.xxx 5.0 46.688 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90032 0.00088

-0.00875 K502SOB sSO2sO.xxx 5.0 46.688 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91074 0.00079 K503SIA s503sl2.xxx 5.0 49.523 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88684 0.00077

-0.00838 K503SlB s5O3sl l.xxx 5.0 49.523 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.89679 0.00080 K504VOA s504v02.xxx 5.0 14.895 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.09373 0.00090

-0.00649 K504VOB s504vOl.xxx 5.0 14.895 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.10196 0.00084 K505TOA s505t02.xxx 5.0 35.696 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.96314 0.00077

-0.01075 KSO5TOB sS5OtOl.xxx 5.0 35.696 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.97553 0.00087 K506VIA s506vl2.xxx 5.0 20.408 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.05680 0.00087

-0.00934 K506VIB s506vl lxxx 5.0 20.408 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.06800 0.00099 K507VOA s507v02.xxx 5.0 22.090 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.04669 0.00101

-0.00761 K507VOB s5O7vOl.xxx 5.0 22.090 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.05614 0.00083 K508S2A s508s22.xxx 5.0 51.485 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.87445 0.00085

-0.00863 K508S2B s508s21.xxx 5.0 51.485 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.88469 0.00076 K509VOA s509v02.xxx 5.0 18.880 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.06785 0.00085

-0.00579 K509VOB s509vOl.xxx 5.0 18.880 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.07543 0.00094 K51OTOA s5lOtO2.xxx 5.0 35.485 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.96462 0.00082

-0.01080 K51OTOB s51OtOl.xxx 5.0 35.485 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97705 0.00081 K511VIA s51lvl2.xxx 5.0 25.651 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.02649 0.00099

-0.00581 K511VIB s5lvlI.xxx 5.0 25.651 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03419 0.00090 K512TOA s512tO2.xxx 5.0 41.171 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93159 0.00082

-0.01016 K512TOB s5l2tOl.xxx 5.0 41.171 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.94338 0.00081 K513TIA s513tl2.xxx 5.0 42.997 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92007 0.00079

-0.01064 K513TIB s513tl.xxx 5.0 42.997 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93228 0.00078 K514T2A s514t22.xxx 5.0 35.350 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.96551 0.00084

-0.01111 K514T2B s514t21.xxx 5.0 35.350 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.97838 0.00092 z2inp.XLS Page 15

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page-Iof K515VOA s515v02.xxx 5.0 19.295 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.06410 0.00088

-0.00902 K515VOB s515vOI.xxx 5.0 19.295 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.07477 0.00077 K516T2A s516t22.xxx 5.0 46.518 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90079 0.00085

-0.00887 K516T2B s516t21.xxx 5.0 46.518 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.911 28 0.00077 K517VIA s517vl2.xxx 5.0 26.726 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01743 0.00080

-0.00914 K517VIB s517v Il.xxx 5.0 26.726 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02815 0.00078 K518T2A s518t22.xxx 5.0 49.829 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88105 0.00076

-0.01169 K518T2B s518t21.xxx 5.0 49.829 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89428 0.00078 K519VIA s519vl2.xxx 5.0 27.257 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01588 0.00086

-0.00765 K519VIB s519vl l.xxx 5.0 27.257 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.02522 0.00083 K52OT2A s520t22.xxx 5.0 48.874 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88802 0.00083

-0.00977 K52OT2B s520t21.xxx 5.0 48.874 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89937 0.00075 K524VIA s524vl2.xxx 5.0 26.492 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01997 0.00079

-0.00935 K524VIB s524vl l.xxx 5.0 26.492 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.03091 0.00080 K525T2A s525t22.xxx 5.0 47.452 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.89696 0.00076

-0.00864 K525T2B s525t21.xxx 5.0 47.452 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.90720 0.00084 K526VIA s526vl2.xxx 5.0 27.861 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01223 0.00087

-0.00680 K526VIB s526vl.xxx 5.0 27.861 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02083 0.00093 K527T2A s527t22.xxx 5.0 50.026 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88127 0.00076

-0.01105 K527T2B s527t21.xxx 5.0 50.026 341.48 0.945 10.09375 O.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Wate 0.89381 0.00073 K528VIA s528vl2.xxx 5.0 27.664 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-i 8 axial nodes Water 1.01291 0.00086

-0.00847 K528VIB s528vl 1.xxx 5.0 27.664 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02300 0.00076 K533V2A s533v22.xxx 5.0 27.782 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01279 0.00085

-0.00699 K533V2B s533v21.xxx 5.0 27.782 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02151 0.00088 K534T2A s534t22.xxx 5.0 49.939 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88212 0.00079

-0.01008 K534T2B s534t21.xxx 5.0 49.939 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89385 0.00086 K535V2A s535v22.xxx 5.0 27.639 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01361 0.00082

-0.00797 K535V2B s535v21.xxx 5.0 27.639 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 1.02327 0.00087 K536T2A s536t22.xxx 5.0 49.592 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88620 0.00079

-0.00679 K536T2B s536t21.xxx 5.0 49.592 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89460 0.00082 K542V2A s542v22.xxx 5.0 27.667 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01453 0.00078

-0.00660 K542V2B s542v21.xxx 5.0 27.667 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02275 0.00084 K543T2A s543t22.xxx 5.0 49.325 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88586 0.00077

-0.00952 K543T2B s543t21.xxx 5.0 49.325 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89691 0.00076 K544V2A s544v22.xxx 5.0 27.779 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial nodes Water 1.01270 0.00091

-0.00864 K544V2B s544v21.xxx 5.0 27.779 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Wat 1.02305 0.00080 K552V2A s552v22.xxx 5.0 27.236 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01566 0.00094

-0.00780 z2inp.XLS Page 16

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page co_

K552V2B s552v21.xxx 5.0 27.236 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02526 0.00086 K553TOA s553tO2.xxx 5.0 40.843 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.93400 0.00086

-0.00914 K553TOB s553tOl.xxx 5.0 40.843 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.94473 0.00073 K554SOA s554s02.xxx 5.0 46.417 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.90097 0.00075

-0.01068 K5S4SOB s554sOl.xxx 5.0 46.417 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.91314 0.00074 K555VOA s555v02.xxx 5.0 22.094 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.04789 0.00085

-0.00777 K555VOB sSSSvOl.xxx 5.0 22.094 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.05741 0.00090 K556TIA s556tl2.xxx 5.0 42.987 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.92007 0.00077

-0.01120 K556TIB sS56tl l.xxx 5.0 42.987 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.93279 0.00075 K557T2A s557t22.xxx 5.0 48.56S 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88947 0.00075

-0.01021 K557T2B s557t21.xxx 5.0 48.568 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.90122 0.00079 K55SVIA s558v12.xxx 5.0 27.667 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l8 axial nodes Water 1.01443 0.00081

-0.00667 K558VIB s55Svll.xxx 5.0 27.667 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02275 0.00084 K559T2A s559t22.xxx 5.0 49.5S3 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial nodes Water 0.88405 0.00080

-0.00905 K559T2B s559t21.xxx 5.0 49.583 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.89462 0.00072 K56OV2A s560v22.xxx 5.0 27.735 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 1.01220 0.00087

-0.00956 K56OV2B s560v21.xxx 5.0 27.735 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 1.02346 0.00083 K56ITOA s561tO2.xxx 5.0 43.765 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.91574 0.00086

-0.01120 K561TOB s56ltOl.xxx 5.0 43.765 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.92865 0.00085 K562JOA s562jO2.xxx 5.0 50.648 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.88103 0.00074

-0.00700 K562JOB s562jOI.xxx 5.0 50.648 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-1 axial node Water 0.88951 0.00074 Whole Unit 2 SFP Models with Bisses and Uncertainties Including Burnup KU2SFPA 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Finite 1.19548 0.00093 1.25677 KU2SFPB 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit 2 SFP Finite 1.03257 0.00092 1.09386 KU2SFPG S.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 710 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.89142 0.00083 0.95271' KU2SFPH 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 720 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.89027 0.00092 0.95156.

KU2SFPF 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 730 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.88543 0.00090 0.94672 KU2SFPE 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 760 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.S7970 0.00102 0.94099 KU2SFPD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 960 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.82810 0.00104 0.88939 KU2SFPC 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.66036 0.00070 0.72165 Whole Unit 2 SFP Models with Biases and Uncertainties Excluding nup I__

KU2SFPA 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Finite 1.19548 0.00093 1.21492 KU2SFPB 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit 2 SFP Finite 1.03257 0.00092 1.05201 KU2SFPJ 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 590 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.92653 0.00103 0.94597 KU2SFPI 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 600 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.92342 0.00089 0.94286 KU2SFPG 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 710 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.89142 0.00083 0.91086 KU2SFPH 5.0 0

341.4 0945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 720 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.89027 0.00092 0.90971 z2inp.XLS Page 17

CalcList CA06015 Rev.0 PageZS_

KU2SFPF 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 730 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.88543 0.00090 0.90487 KU2SFPE 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 760 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.87970 0.00102 0.89914 KU2SFPD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 960 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.82810 0.00104 0.84754 KU2SFPC 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Unit 2 SFP Finite 0.66036 0.00070 0.67980 Single Assembly Model with Biases and Uncertainties Including Burnup K500000DI 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21112 0.00091 1.27241 K50000OD2 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13444 0.00094 1.19573 KSOOOOOD4 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 1930 Single assembly Infinite 0.88565 0.00086 0.94694 KS0000OD3 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.87907 0.00094 0.94036 Slngle Assembly Model with Biases and Uncertainties Excluding Burnup KS00000DI 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21112 0.00091 1.23056 K50000OD2 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Single assembly Infinite 1.13444 0.00094 1.15388 K500000D6 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 1590 Single assembly Infinite 0.92409 0.00094 0.94353 K500000D5 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 1670 Single assembly Infinite 0.91631 0.00094 0.93575 K500000D4 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 1930 Single assembly Infinite 0.88565 0.00086 0.90509 K500000D3 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Single assembly Infinite 0.87907 0.00094 0.89851 Configuration Control KU2CONA 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SF? Configuration Control Finite 0.89537 0.00108 0.95666 KU2CONB 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 0.78664 0.00095 0.84793 KU2CONC 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 1.08888 0.00105 1.15017 KU2CONDI S520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 1.13082 0.00111 1.19211 KU2COND2 S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SF? Configuration Control Finite 1.08464 0.00103 1.14593 KU2COND3 S560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SF? Configuration Control Finite 1.04690 0.00100 1.10819 KU2CONEI S420 4.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 1.07998 0.00107 1.14127 KU2CONE2 S440 4.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 1.03166 0.00096 1.09295 KU2CONE3 S460 4.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Configuration Control Finite 0.99762 0.00119 1.05891 Assembly Reconstitution KU2SFPAR 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP with Recon Finite 1.19271 0.00098 1.25400 KU2SFPBR 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit 2 SFP with Recon Finite 1.03236 0.00088 1.09365 KU2SFPCR 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Unit 2 SFP with Recon Finite 0.66218 0.00069 0.72347 Dropped Assembly KU2SFPAD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Dropped Assembly Finite 1.19382 0.00090 1.25511 KU2SFPBD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit 2 SF? Dropped Assembly Finite 1.03258 0.00106 1.09387 KU2SFPCD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Unit 2 SFP Dropped Assembly Finite 0.65990 0.00085 0.72119 Dropped Assembly During Reconstitntion RU2SFPARD l 5.0 [ 0 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP Recon/Dropped Assm Finite 1.19334 0.00102 1.25463 KU2SFPBRD 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 300 Unit2 SFP Recon/Dropped Assm Finite 1.03280 0.00100 1.09409 z2inp.XLS Page 18

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page 5Y/

KU2SFPCRD l 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 2000 Unit 2 SFP Recon/Dropped Assm Finite 0.66264 0.00068 0.72393 Isotopic Comparison K501000DI S510 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 1.13638 0.00085 K501000FI X510 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.12996 0.00091

-0.00642 K502000DI S520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 1.07119 0.00088 K502000FI X520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.06249 0.00084

-0.00870 K503000DI S530 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 1.01281 0.00079 K503000FI X530 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.00313 0.00086

-0.00968 K504000DI S540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.95358 0.00083 K504000F1 X540 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.94032 0.00081

-0.01326 K505000DI S550 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.89641 0.00079 K505000F1 X550 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.88183 0.00073

-0.01458 K506000DI S560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.84339 0.00071 K506000F1 X560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.82754 0.00075

-0.01585 K507000DI S570 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.79503 0.00072 K507000F1 X570 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.78126 0.00071

-0.01377 K401000D_

S410 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Singleassembly-S5lsotopes Infinite 1.08330 0.02M K401000F1 X410 4.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.07849 0.00090

-0.00481 K402000DI S420 4.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 1.01347 0.00082

-0.00481 K4020001 X420 4.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.00744 0.00080

-0.00603 K403000DI S430 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.94894 0.00083 K40300011 X430 4.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.93814 0.00089

-0.01080 K404000DI S440 4.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.8940 0.00076 K40400011 X440 4.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.87704 0.00079

-0.01136 K405000DI S450 4.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.83200 0.00071 K4050001I X450 4.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.81838 0.00073

-0.01362 K406000DI S460 4.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -1 Isotopes Infinite 0.78548 0.00073 K406000FI X460 4.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.77035 0.00069

-0.01513 K407000DI S470 4.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.74660 0.00070 K407000FI X470 4.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.73326 0.00062

-0.01334 K301000DI S310 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -50 Isotopes Infinite 1.73326 0.00083 K30100011 X310 3.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 1.00342 0.00092

-0.00708 K302000DI S320 3.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -

0 Isotopes Infinite 0093591 0.00077

-0.0070S K30200011 X320 3.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.92802 0.00082

-0.00789 K303000DI S330 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.87020 0.00069 z2inp.XLS Page 19

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page-f9t K303000F1 X330 3.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.86187 0.00070

-0.00833 K304000DI S340 3.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -50 Isotopes Infinite 0.81338 0.00070 K304000FI X340 3.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.80172 0.00074

-0.01166 K305000DI S350 3.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.76783 0.00074 K305000FI X350 3.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.75627 0.00071

-0.01156 K306000DI S360 3.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.73518 0.00070 K306000FI X360 3.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.72120 0.00067

-0.01398 K307000DI S370 3.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.71073 0.00063 K307000F1 X370 3.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.69729 0.00069

-0.01344 K201000DI S210 2.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.90578 0.00074 K20100OF1 X210 2.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.90008 0.00076

-0.00570 K202000DI S220 2.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.83855 0.00071 K202000F1 X220 2.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.83024 0.00071

-0.00831 K203000DI S230 2.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.78440 0.00087 K203000FI X230 2.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.77555 0.00075

-0.00885 K204000DI S240 2.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.74665 0.00066 K204000FI X240 2.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.73641 0.00065

-0.01024 K205000DI S250 2.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.71990 0.00068 K205000F1 X250 2.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 01 Isotopes Infinite 0.70752 0.00064

-. 01238 K206000DI S260 2.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.70267 0.00059 K206000FI X260 2.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 101 Isotopes Infinite 0.69013 0.00065

-0.01254 K207000DI S270 2.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 0 Isotopes Infinite 0.69082 0.00060

-0.01254 K207000FI S270 2.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -

01 Isotopes Infinite 0.67796 0.00067 0.01286 K50000DI 5.0 0

341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly Infinite 1.21112 0.00091

-0.0128 K501000DI S510 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-SO Isotopes Infinite 1.13638 0.00085 K501000DA S510mod 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -3 Isotopes Infinite 1.14193 0.00092 0.00555 K502000D S5520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 1.07119 0.00088 K502000DA S520mod 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -3 Isotopes Infinite 1.08389 0.00083 0.01270 K503000DA S530 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - O Isotopes Infinite 1.01281 0.00079 K503000DA S530mod 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -3 Isotopes Infinite 1.02581 0.00082 0.01300 K504000DA 50o 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -

Isotopes Infinite 0.95358 0.00083 0.01300 K50400ODA S540mod 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -38 Isotopes Infinite 0.97189 0.00073 0.01831 K505000DI S550 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.89641 0.00079 K505000DA S550mod 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -38 Isotopes Infinite 0.91505 0.00094 0.01864 K506000DI S560 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -50 Isotopes Infinite 0.84339 0.00071 z2inp.XLS Page 20

CaicList CA06015 Rev.0 Page_+/-93_

K506000DA S560mod 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 38 Isotopes Infinite 0.86469 0.00068 0.02130 K507000DI S570 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.79503 0.00072 K507000DA S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 38 Isotopes Infinite 0.81685 0.00067 0.02182 K507000DB S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-50 Isotopes-50/

Infinite 0.80674 0.00074 0.01171 K507000DD S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-50 Isotopes-75%

Infinite 0.79973 0.00076 0.00470 K507000DE S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-50 Isotopes-90/.

Infinite 0.79727 0.00071 0.00224 K507000DF S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-50 Isotopes-95%

Infinite 0.79587 0.00069 0.00084 K507000DC S570mod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-38 Isotopes-99%

Infinite 0.79587 0.00074 0.00084 K501000DI S510 5 O 10 i41.4t 0 945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 O

Single assembly -50Isotopes Infinite I.13638 0.0008 0.01979 K501000D S510o 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 1.13638 0.00085 K501000FA S50mod 5.0 10 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 1.13661 0.00086 0.00023 K502000D S520 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 1.07119 0.00088 K502000FA S520mod 5.0 20 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 1.07402 0.00089 0.00283 K503000D S530o 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 1.01281 0.00079 K503000FA S50mod 5.0 30 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 1.01601 0.00080 0.00320 K504000DI S540o 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 0.95358 0.00083 0

K504000FA S50mod 5.0 40 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-85 Isotopes Infinite 0.95673 0.00091 0.00315 K505000D S550o 5.0 50 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 0.89641 0.00079 K505000FA S50mod 5.0 S0 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 0.90193 0.00076 0.00552 K506000DI S560o 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -50 Isotopes Infinite 0.84339 0.00071 0.00529 K506000FA S50mod 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 0.94868 0.00070 0.00529 K507000D S570o 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 5 Isotopes Infinite 0.79503 0.00072 K507000FA S57Omod 5.0 70 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly -85 Isotopes Infinite 0.80151 0.00062 0.0064 K5062AADA s562aa2.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-18 axial nodes Water 0.87753 0.00087 0.02577 K5062AAEA s562aal.xxx 5.0 62 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assm-l axial node Water 0.85176 0.00068 IsotopIc Bias Calculation with SAS2I Validation Data

__I_____

K506000DI S560 l5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly - 50 Isotopes Infinite 0.84339 0.00071

-0.00358 K506000GI [ Hand 5.0 60 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Single assembly-50 Isotopes -Val Infinite 0.83981 0.00071 ReactIvIty Comparison with Moderator as UEF/LEF and Actual UEF/LEF KU2SFPA 50 T ° 341-48 T0945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP-H20 in UEF/EF Finite 1.19548 0.00093 KU2SFPX 5.0 341.48 0.945 10.09375 0.1524 zirc4 0

Unit 2 SFP-Actual UEF/LEF Finite 1.19449 0.00101 z2inp.XLS Page 21

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 9y ATTACHMENT B BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY RESULTS

CalcList CA06015 Rev.0 Page § Summary of Dies and Uncertainty Results:

0 PPM 0 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM No Bumup No Bumup No Bumup No Bumup With Bumup With Bumup Bias Uncertainty Bias Uncertainty Bias Uncertainty Calculational Methodology 0.00080 0.00760 0.00080 0.00760 0.00080 0.00760 SAS2H Worst Case Water in Gap 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00356 0.00000 0.00267 Temperature Worst Case -6C Fuel Cladding Composition Worst Case -zirc4 Stack Height Density 0.00000 0.00090 0.00000 0.00340 0.00000 0.00841 Nominal Storage Cell Pitch 0.00000 0.00358 0.00000 0.00449 0.00000 0.00454 Nominal Fuel Enrichment 0.00000 0.00155 0.00000 0.00210 0.00000 0.00304 Nominal Soluble Boron Concentration Worst Case Steel Thickness 0.00000 0.01346 0.00000 0.00775 0.00000 0.00698 Nominal Poison Loading Worst Case -0.000 gm/cm2 Eccentric Positioning 0.00000 0.00961 0.00000 0.01122 0.00000 0.00800 Nominal Fuel DepletionI 0.00000 0.02089 0.00000 0.01985 0.00000 0.01985 Nominal Axial Bumup Distribution 0.03250 0.00000 0.03250 0.00000 0.03250 0.00000 Nominal Total with Burup 0.03330 0.02799 0.03330 0.02620 0.03330 0.02593 1 1 1 0.06129 0.05950 0.05923 Bias and Uncertainty Total without Bumup 0.00080 0.01864 0.00080 0.01710 0.00080 0.01668

__________ =_________

0.01944 0.01790 0.01748 Bias ad Unctai z2inp.XLS Page 22

Calc~ist CA0601Rev.0 Page 5fi Summary of Bias and Uncertainty Results:

0 PPM 0 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM 300 PPM No Bumup No Bumup No Bumup No Bumup With Bumup With Bumup Bias Uncertainty Bias Uncertainty Bias Uncertainty Calculational Methodology 0.00080 0.00760 0.00080 0.00760 0.00080 0.00760 No Volatiles 0.00000 0.00084 0.00000 0.00084 0.00000 0.00084 Water in Gap 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00356 0.00000 0.00267 Temperature rst Case - 68C Fuel Cladding Composition Worst Case - zirc4 Stack Height Density 0.00000 0.00090 0.00000 0.00340 0.00000 0.00841 Nominal Storage Cell Pitch 0.00000 0.00358 0.00000 0.00449 0.00000 0.00454 Nominal Fuel Enrichment 0.00000 0.00155 0.00000 0.00210 0.00000 0.00304 Nominal Soluble Boron Concentration Worst Case Steel Thickness 0.00000 0.01346 0.00000 0.00775 0.00000 0.00698 Nominal Poison Loading Worst Case - 0.000 gmlcm2 Eccentric Positioning 0.00000 0.00961 0.00000 0.01122 0.00000 0.00800 Nominal Fuel Depletion 0.00000 0.02089 0.00000 0.01985 0.00000 0.01985 Nominal Axial Bumup Distribution 0.03250 0.00000 0.03250 0.00000 0.03250 0.00000 Nominal Total with Bumup 0.03330 0.02800 0.03330 0.02621 0.03330 0.02594 1

0.06130 0.05951 0.05924 Bias and Un ertainty Total without Bumup 0.00080 0.01864 0.00080 0.01710 0.00080 0.01670 0.01944 0.01790 0.01750 z2inp.XLS Page 23

CA06015 Revision 0 Page 2

ATTACHMET C DENSTY CALCULATIONS

CA060 15 REV 0

P AG E 5

Densities A

B C

D E

F G

H T Carborundum Material Densities:

2 F =

B4C density fraction B10L I PST / BIOA

• MWB4C / AWB4 / DB4C 3 F=

0.240685 0.213007 0.191706 4

5 BOL = BIO Loading (gm/cm2) 0.020 0.017700 0.015930 Ref.15 6 PST = Poison Sheet Thickness (cm) = 0.090"

• 2.54 =

0.2286 0.2286 0.2286 Ref.15 7 B10A = Abundance of B10 in a/f 0.19900 0.19900 0.19900 Ref.19

_ B11IA = B1 1 abundance in a/f 0.80100 0.80100 0.80100 Ref.19 9 AWBIO = B10 atomic weight in gm/mole 10.012937 10.012937 10.012937 Ref.19 10 AWB1 = BI1 atomic weight in gm/mole 11.009306 11.009306 11.009306 Ref.19 11 AWB = B atomicweight in gm/mole 10.81103 10.81103 10.81103 calculated 12 AWC = Atomic Weight of C 12.01100 12.01100 12.01100 Ref.19 13 MWB4C = Molecular Weight of B4C 55.2551 55.2551 55.2551 calculated 14 AWB4 = Atomic Weight of Natural B in B4C 43.2441 43.2441 43.2441 calculated 15 DB4C = Density of B4C in gm/cc 2.52 2.52 2.52 Ref.21 16 BOW = B10 abundance in w/f 0.18431 0.18431 0.18431 Ref.21 17 7

18 ZIRLO Material Densities 19 N(ATOMSIB-CM) =DZ

• f

• NA / AW / C 20 21 f(w/o)

AW(gm/mole)

N 22 Sn 1.00 118.71 3.2594E-04 23 Fe 0.11 55.847 7.6211 E-05 24 Nb 1.00 92.90638 4.1647E-04 25 Zr 97.89 91.224 4.1520E-02 26 100.00 271 28 f = Zirlo composition in w/o Refs.17-18 29 DZ = Zirlo density In gm/cc 6.425 Ref.18 30 AW Atomic weight In gm/mole Ref.19 31 NA = Avogadro's Number n atoms/mole 6.022E+23 Ref.20 32 C = barns/cm2 l_1.OOE+24 Ref.20 33 34 OPTIN Material Densities 35 NATOMS/B-CM) = DZ

• f

• NA / AW / C 36 37 f(w/o)

AW(gm/mole)

N 38 Sn 1.25 118.71 4.1535E-04 39 Fe 0.21 55.847 1.4832E-04 40 Cr 0.10 51.996 7.5862E-05 41 0 0.12 15.9994 2.9585E-04 42 Zr 98.32 91.224 4.2514E-02 43 100.00 44; 45 f = Optin composition in wlo Refs.17-18 46 DZ = Optin density In gm/cc 6.550 Ref.18 47 AW = Atomic weight in gm/mole Ref.19 48 NA = Avogadro's Number n atoms/mole 6.022E+23 Ref.20 49 C bams/cm2l 1.OOE+24 Ref.20 50 1

z2inp.XLS Page

CA060 15 REV 0 PAGE 91 Densities A

B l

C D

E F

G H

51 Soluble Boron Density 52 53 D(H31303) = f D(H20)

• MW(H31303) I AWB =Density of H3B03 in gm/cc 54,

55 B310A=3

=10abundance in wo 19.9 Ref.19 56 B11A=B11 abundanceinw/o 80.1 Ref.19 57 AWB10 = B10 atomicweight In gm/mole 10.012937 Ref.19 58 AWBI1 = B11 atomic weight in gm/mole 11.009306 Ref.19 59 AWB = B atomic weight in gm/mole 10.81103 calculated 60 AWH = H atomic weight in gm/mole 1.00780 Ref.19 61 AWO = 0 atomic weight in gm/mole 15.99940 Ref.19 62 MWH3BO3 = H3B03 molecular weight in gm/mole 61.83263 calculated 63 64 f

DH20 DH3BO3_

65 0.000100 1.0000 0.00057194 66 0.000200 1.0000 0.001143881 67 0.000300 1.0000 0.001715821 68 0.000400 1.0000 0.002287761 69 0.000500 1.0000 0.002859702 70 0.002000 1.0000 0.011438806 71 0.000100 1.0000 0.00057194 72 0.000200 0.9785 0.001119287 73 0.000300 0.9785 0.001678931 74 0.000400 0.9785 0.002238574 75 0.000500 0.9785 0.002798218 76 0.000590 0.9785 0.003301897 77 0.000600 0.9785 0.003357862 78 0.000710 0.9785 0.003973469 79 0.000720 0.9785 0.004029434 80 0.000730 0.9785 0.004085398 81 0.000760 0.9785 0.004253291 82 0.000960 0.9785 0.005372578 83 0.001590 0.9785 0.008898333 84 0.001670 0.9785 0.009346048 85 0.001930 0.9785 0.010801121 86 0.002000 0.9785 0.011192872 87 88 Fuel Isotopic ractions 89 U235 U238 U235 U238 016 90 2.000000 98.0000 1.7629 86.3826 11.8545 91 2.500000 97.5000 2.2036 85.9412 11.8552 92 3.000000 97.0000 2.6443 85.4998 11.8559 93 3.500000 96.5000 3.085 85.0585 11.8565 94 4.000000 96.0000 3.5257 84.6171 11.8572 95 4.500000 95.5000 3.9664 84.1758 11.8579 96 5.000000 95.0000 4.4071 83.7344 11.8585 97 98_

99, 1100(

z2inp.XLS Page 2

CA060 15 REV PAGE t6" Densities A

B C

D__E__

101 Upper End Fitting:

102 Length 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 103 Width 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 104 Height 15.295 in 38.8493 cm Ref.25 105 Total Volume 1008.46665 in3 16525.8075 cc 106 Inconel X-750 1100 gm Ref.26 107 SS-304 5080 gm Ref.26 108 Zirc4 680 gm Ref.26 109 SS-302 7980 gm Ref.26 11 0 Inconel X-750 8.30 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 111 SS-304 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 112 Zirc-4 6.56 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 11 3 SS-302 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 114 Inconel X-750 132.5301 cc 0.008020 vol frac 115 SS-304 639.7985 cc 0.038715 vol frac 116 Zirc-4 103.6585 cc 0.006273 vol frac 117 SS-302 1005.0378 cc 0.060816 vol frac 11 8 Water Vol 14644.7826 cc 0.886177 vol frac 119 120 121 Lower End Fitting:

122 Length 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 123 Width 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 124 Height 5.246 in 13.32484 cm Ref.25 125 Volume 345.89186 in3 5668.152086 cc 126 Inconel-625 1360 gm Ref.26 127 SS-304 5000 gm Ref.26 128 Inconel 8.30 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 129 SS-304 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 130 Inconel 163.8554 cc 0.028908 vol frac 131 SS-304 629.7229 cc 0.111098 vol frac 132 Water Vol 4874.5737 cc 0.859993 vol frac z2inp.XLS Page 3

CA06015 Revision 0 Page //

ATTACHMENT D FUEL DATA SPREADSHEET

CA060 15 REV 0 PAGE (at-Fuel 217 Assemblies per core UFSAR 3.1 77 CEAs per core UFSAR 3.1 176 Rods per assembly UFSAR 3.1 5

Guide tubes per assembly UFSAR 3.1 136.7 347.218 in-cm Active core height UFSAR 3.1 1.035 2.6289 in-cm Guide tube ID BGE Drwg E-550-701-303 - Ref.27 1.115 2.8321 in-cm Guide tube oD BGE Drwg E-550-701-303 - Ref.27 0.580 1.4732 in-cm Fuel rod pitch UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 0.20 0.508 In-cm Assembly spacing, fuel ros surface-surface UFSAR Table 3.3-5 8.12 20.6248 In-cm Assembly pitch (14*0.58)

UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 0.06 0.1524 In-cm Assembly gap (8.18"-8.12")

UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 548 deg F Tcold UFSAR Figure 4-9 572.5 deg F Tave UFSAR Figure 4-9 599.4 deg F Thot UFSAR Figure 4-9 532 deg F Thzp UFSAR Figure 4-9 Standard Fuel Design 0.3795 0.96393 In-cm Pellet diameter (A-C U1)

UFSAR Table 3.3-1 15.4626-in3 Piri fuevolufne 0.3805 0.96647 in-cm Pellet diameter (A-C

2)

UFSAR Table 3.3-2 15.5442 in3 Pin fuel volume 0.3765 0.95631 in-cm Pellet diameter (D-S U1, D-R U2)

UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 15.2191 in3 Pin fuel volume 0.388 0.98552 in-cm Clad ID (A-C Ul-U2)

UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.384 0.97536 in-cm Clad ID UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.440 1.1176 in-cm Clad OD UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 10.170 gm/cc Stack height density (max)

UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.9279 Stack height density ( TD)

VAP Fuel Design 0.381 0.96774 in-cm Pellet diameter UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 15.585 in3 Pin fuel volume 0.388 0.98552 In-cm Clad ID UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.440 1.1176 In-cm Clad OD UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 10.310 gm/cc Stack height density UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.9407 Stack height density (0o TD)

SAS2H Larger Unit Cell Effective Radii for 176 pin assembly (Standard and VAP Fuel Design) 1.31445 _

cm Clad ID/2 = 1.035"2 = 0.5175" (H20) 1.41605 cm Clad OD/2 = 1.115"/2 = 0.5575" (Zirc) 1.66233 cm SQRT[4*(0.58)A2/pi = 0.65446" (H20) 5.20391 cm SQRT[196*(0.58)A215/pi] = 2.04878" (Fuel) 5.22314_

cm SQRT[(8.15)A2/51pil = 2.05635" (H20)

In ORNLITM-1 2667, uses 8.18".

SAS2H Larger Unit Cell Effective Radii for 172 pin assembly (Standard and VAP Fuel Design) 1.31445 cm Clad ID/2 = 1.035"/2 = 0.5175" (H20) 1.41605 cm Clad OD/2 = 1.115"2 = 0.5575" (Zirc) 1.66233 cm SQRT[4*(0.58)A2/pi] = 0.65446" (H20) 5.15054 cm SQRT[192*(0.58)A2/5/pI1 = 2.02777" (Fuel) 5.22314 cm SQRT[(8.15)A215/pil = 2.05635" (H20)

In ORNLTM-12667, uses 8.18".

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