IR 05000390/2022010
| ML22301A010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/2022 |
| From: | James Baptist Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML22301A010 (16) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2022010 AND 05000391/2022010
Dear Jim Barstow:
On September 15, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, James Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch One Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000390 and 05000391 License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000390 and 05000391
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000390/2022010 and 05000391/2022010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-010-0039
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
Facility:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Location:
Spring City, TN 37381
Inspection Dates:
August 22, 2022 to September 16, 2022
Inspectors:
P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector
C. Franklin, Reactor Inspector
J. Lizardi-Barreto, Reactor Inspector
M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Gardner, contractor
M. Yeminy, contractor
Approved By:
James Baptist, Chief
Engineering Branch One
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance (DBA) Inspection The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 - Emergency Diesel Generator 125VDC Control Power System and Governor Controls
Design bases documents, system descriptions, and training documents
Primary design calculations
Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures
Surveillance Test Procedures and Recent Results
Material Condition of Batteries, Rack, Charger and Governor
Vendor Manuals for Batteries, Charger, and Governor
Corrective Action History
Circuit Protection Scheme
(2)120V AC Vital Inverters
Operating Experience
Preventative Maintenance/Repair history
System Health Report
Corrective Action History
- (3) Essential Raw Cooling Water Pumps
Design bases documents, system descriptions, and training documents
Primary design calculations
Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures
Inservice Test Procedures and Recent Results
Bases for Pump Test Acceptance Criteria
Calculation of Pump Capacity
Calculation of Pump NPSH
Material Condition of ERCW Pumps Vendor Manuals for Pump and Motor
Corrective Action History
- (4) Component Cooling Water Heat exchangers
System P&ID
System Design Basis Documents
Normal operating procedures
System health reports
Design calculations
Condition reports issued since last DBAI
GL89-13 program and commitments
Completed surveillance tests
- (5) Emergency Diesel Generator fuel transfer system
System P&ID
Vendor pump head capacity
Pump NPSH
Normal and abnormal operating procedures
Surveillance test
System health report
Preventive maintenance for inspection and lubrication
Condition reports issued since last DBAI
Design calculations Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
System P&ID
System Design Basis Documents
Normal operating procedures
System health reports
Design calculations
Condition reports issued since last DBAI
Completed surveillance tests
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
- (1) WBN-20-1243-01, EDG Governor Actuators Replacement and Alarm Removal
- (2) WBN-19-501, AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer Resolution (3)
===66683, Revise Emergency Diesel Generator Overcurrent
(4)100506-01, Throttle 1-THV-067-0643B-B and 1-THV-067-0646B-B and reduce design ERCW Flow to EBR Chillers A-A AND B-B
- (5) WBN-19-491, Add T-Drain to 2-FCV-63-73, 2-FCV-72-44, & 2-FCV-72-45 Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06)===
- (1) Information Notice 2010-23: Malfunctions of Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch Circuits
- (2) Information Notice 2017-06: Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contribution to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: Capability of Diesel Building Ventilation System to Withstand the Effects of a design basis Tornado 71111.21 M
This issue is a current licensing basis question and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.
Description:
The DBAI inspectors identified an issue of concern in that the diesel building ventilation system does not appear to be designed to withstand the effects of a tornado depressurization event during two scenarios. First, a passing tornado may hit the side of the Diesel Generating Building (EDB) through which the blowers exhaust building air to ambient.
The pressure differential could potentially damage the ventilation system blowers and ductwork. Second, a tornado strike could occur without any warning and the operators would fail to start the blowers to open the inlet and exhaust dampers. The tornado pressure differential could damage the dampers. The result is a potential challenge to the diesel building ventilation system and subsequent unknown impact to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to maintain their safety functions due to rapidly increasing room temperatures.
The diesel building ventilation system consists of two large (each 50 percent capacity)ventilation fans, ducts, and dampers that are arranged to maintain minimum ventilation requirements during diesel operation. The maximum temperature expected in the Diesel Building is 120°F.
Calculation TIECS40, DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING TORNADO DEPRESSURIZATION, Rev. 2, was performed to determine the pressures experienced in the EDG building in general and the ventilation system in particular. The calculation assumes that immediately following a tornado hit, the pressure differentials within the building and the ambient will be equalized immediately.
The inspectors reviewed the calculation and proposed that the licensee did not consider the pressure differential associated with a tornado approaching the EDG building. First, the inspectors assert that the calculation did not consider the impacts on the tornado direction. If the tornado hits the EDB from the north or south side, where the discharge of the two blowers is located, there would be an initial pressure differential between the fans outlet and their inlet openings. Second, the calculation input assumed the tornado translational speed was 60 mph. The inspectors could not review a calculation that evaluated lower tornado translational speeds (i.e. 60 mph to 5 mph). The inspectors believe that, with lower speeds, the pressure differentials within the building would not equalize immediately with ambient.
The licensee stated that the requirement to analyze a tornado with a translational velocity of less than 60 mph is outside of the WBN design basis and licensing basis. To support this claim, the licensee provided the following quote from the plants SER: All seismic Category I structures exposed to tornado forces and needed for the safe shutdown of the plant were originally designed to resist a design-basis tornado consisting of the following parameters: a 300-mph tangential wind velocity; a 60-mph translational wind velocity; a total pressure drop of 3 psi at the rate of 1 psi per second; and a postulated spectrum of tornado missiles that was appropriate. The inspectors postulate that this maximum translational speed bounds certain design concerns related to the structure but not necessarily systems that support the EDGs.
Finally, the calculation assumed that upon notification of a tornado warning, the operators will immediately (prior to the tornado whose translational speed is 60 mph hitting the building)turn two switches located in the EDG building to the tornado bypass position which will start the blowers and open the inlet and outlet dampers. The inspectors were concerned that not all tornado hits are preceded by tornado warnings. The inspectors reviewed data by the NOAA and NWS capturing the probability of detection (POD) of a tornado and the lead time to being hit by the tornado. Over a five-year period (2016 to 2020), the average POD was 60% with the average response time of 8.8 minutes. In other words, there could be a 40%
probability of a tornado strike without any detection. The inspectors' concern is that, if the operator failed to start the blowers, the tornado induced differential pressure across the dampers in the closed position could damage the dampers and result in a partial or complete loss of ventilation to the diesel generating room.
The inspectors believe the maximum pressure differential would be in the range of 1.0 to 3.0 psi (27.7 inches of water to 83.1 inches of water) between the fans outlet and their inlet openings depending on the size of the tornado. This caused the inspectors to question the capability of the blowers/dampers/ductwork to withstand higher pressure differential. The licensee stated that the blowers are rated to 5 inches of water or 0.2 psi. Even though the blowers appear to be robust, the licensee did not provide any additional data that may suggest capability to withstand higher pressure differentials. The vendor data for the installed air intake dampers did not contain pressure limits for the dampers. Based on generic manufacturers data for similar dampers, the inspectors believe that this type of dampers can withstand a maximum dP range of 14.8 in of water or 0.53 psi. The licensee was unable to provide any data on the maximum design dP of the ductwork.
The inspectors postulate that the blowers/dampers/ductwork would potentially not withstand a pressure differential of 1.0 to 3.0 psi. The ductwork could collapse, and the blowers/dampers would fail. However, these failures could be recoverable in an emergency. The inspectors did not evaluate the potential impact of the loss of the diesel building ventilation system, though the inspectors estimated that without recovery actions, with the loss of both ventilation blowers, at maximum ambient conditions, the emergency diesel generators could exceed their design ambient temperature within an hour or two.
Licensing Basis: The NRC staff reviewed the licensing basis documents, regulatory requirements, and regulatory correspondence related to the diesel building tornado protection criterion. The main documents reviewed are detailed below.
USFAR 2.3.1.3 Severe Weather - For the additional Diesel Generator Building and structures initiated after July 1979, the design basis tornado parameters are as follows:
1. 290 mph = Rotational Speed 2. 70 mph = Translational Speed
3. 360 mph
= Maximum Wind Speed 4. 3 psi = Pressure Drop 5. 2 psi/sec = Rate of Pressure Drop (3 psi/1.5 sec is assumed)
UFSAR 9.4.5.2.1.3, Item 4 states: During tornadoes, the essential components of the system remain functional because they are located in a Seismic Category I structure that is designed to resist damage by tornado missiles. For tornado depressurization mitigation, intake, and exhaust dampers are opened to assist in pressure equalization.
UFSAR Table 9.4-4: for components 2-FCO-30-444-A for Train 2A-A, 2-FCO-30-446-B for Train 2B-B, Tornado induced differential pressure across damper in closed position could damage damper and result in partial or complete loss of ventilation to DG room. Note that the damper may be closed in case of a tornado that was not preceded with a tornado warning. Also note that this may be a common cause failure that may affect all Emergency Diesel Generators.
UFSAR 9.5.8.2, System Descriptions, states: the major components of the diesel generator combustion air and exhaust systems are housed within the Diesel Generator Building which provides protection from missiles, snow, and ice. That portion of the exhaust subsystems exposed above the roof level is short and below the parapet level to reduce the vulnerability to tornado missiles.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, I. Overall Requirements, Criterion 2Design bases for protection against natural phenomena: Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these structures, systems, and components shall reflect:
- (1) Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated,
- (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena and
- (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control: Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-23: Notifies licensees of its regulatory position regarding loading effects caused by natural phenomena to safety related systems and components housed inside a structure partially exposed to the outside environment, specifically ventilating and air-conditioning (VAC) systems housed in the EDG room.
WBN is not committed to NUREG 1.76, though the WBNs SER specifies the same tornado parameters and values as Rev. 0 of NUREG 1.76.
Ultimately, the inspectors' conclusion differed from that of the licensee as to whether the current licensing basis analysis of a design basis tornado could inflict conditions which are more limiting than those assumed in the licensees calculation.
Significance: A risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst (SRA)using SAPHIRE Version 8.2.6 and NRC Watts Bar model version 8.67 dated 6/23/2021. The conditional analysis assumed failure of the diesel building ventilation fans for tornado initiating events with wind speeds
- (1) greater than 200 mph,
- (2) 166 - 200 mph, and
- (3) 136-165 mph)with a one-year exposure time. The SRA also credited operator actions to open the EDG building dampers upon receipt of a tornado warning. This was done by adjusting the EDG Failure to run probability to 0.5. This is conservative because it is recognized the room heat up would likely take approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to exceed design limits and equipment failures would also occur sometime after this temperature limit is reached. The dominant sequences were a tornado initiator accompanied by a loss of offsite power with failures of the emergency diesel generators and the turbine driven Auxiliary feedwater pump with operators failing to recover offsite power or and emergency diesel generator. The analysis determined that if a performance deficiency was assumed to have existed, it would result in an increase in core damage frequency of <1E-06/year and an estimated increase in large early release frequency of <1E-07/year, representing very low safety significance (Green).
Technical Assistance Request: No technical assistance was requested Corrective Action Reference: CR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On September 15, 2022, the inspectors presented the Design Basis Assurance Inspection results to Tony Williams, site VP and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EDQ00099920080014
Diesel Generator Loading Analysis
Rev. 39
EPM-JFL-120285
ERCW System Flow Requirements
Rev. 34
EPMRCT121490
ERCW Maximum Rejected Heat Load Requirement
Rev. 24
GEN-EEB-MS-TI28-
0001
Generic Accuracy Calculation for Non-Safety Related
Instrumentation
Rev. 0
SQN-CPS-007
Diesel Generator Battery Capacity
Rev. 0
TIECS40
Diesel Generator Building Tornado Depressurization
Calculations
WBEEBMSTI110062
25VDC Diesel Generator Control Power System
Evaluation
Rev. 32
1309040
06/20/2017
1345251
OE Review: NRC IN 17-6 Battery & Battery Charger
Short-Circuit
10/05/2017
1510550
2-FCV-63-72 Water Found Inside Limit Switch
Compartment
August 7,
2019
27123
T-08 WW 0819, WO 119839479 to perform VLF Testing
on the ERCW Pump Motor D-A cables was required
07/03/2019
1717990
ERCW G-B VLF Testing W/O 119402902 Work Delays
in WW 0823
09/20/2021
1791169
VLF Trend Results for ERCW Motor H-B Power Cables
08/16/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
773953
WBN Review of SQN PERs 763751 and 768294, Water
Intrusion into MOV Actuator Housings
September
15, 2017
1798208
August 24,
22
1802303
22 WBN DBAI DFOTP Skid Mounted Check Valves
09/14/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
1802605
EDG HVAC Exhaust Blowers and Ductwork Rating
09/15/2022
0-45W727
6900V Diesel Generators Single Line
Rev. 2
0-45W760-82-1B
Units 1/2: Wiring Diagrams 6900V Standby Diesel
Generator 2A-A Schematic Diagrams
09/22/2015
0-45W760-82-2
Standby Diesel Generator System Schematic Diagrams
Rev. 1
0-45W760-82-3B
Units 1/2: Wiring Diagram Standby Diesel Generator
System Schematic Diagram DG 2A-A
10/08/2015
Drawings
0-45W760-82-6
Standby Diesel Generator System Schematic Diagrams
Rev. 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0-47E235-77
Environmental Data Environment Harsh EL 685.0
Rev. 3
0-47W479-3
Mechanical Drains & Embedded Piping (Equipment
Drains)
Rev. 10
0-47W610-82-3
Units 1/2: Electrical Control Diagram DSL STG Air
04/30/2015
0-47W611-82-4B
Electrical Logic Diagram DSL Gen System DG 2A-A
05/19/2015
0-47W840-1
Flow Diagram Fuel Oil Atomizing Air and Steam
1-47W845-1
Mechanical Flow Diagram, Essential Raw Cooling Water
System
Rev. 32
115E615
Motor Op Gate Valve Mod 18000GM84FEH01B 18-300
ASME C
- L. 1, GPO ASSY
Rev. 0
1167E38
Motor Op Gate Valve Mod 12000GM82FBH01B 12-150
ASME C
- L. 1, GPO ASSY
Rev. 0
Mechanical Heating and Ventilation
Mechanical Heating and Ventilation
2-47W576-100
Mechanical Motor Operated Valve Orientation and T-
Drain Requirements
Rev. 1
2-47W576-101
Mechanical Motor Operated Valve Orientation and T-
Drain Requirements
Rev. 1
5V159V00027
P&ID HVAC Miscellaneous Buildings Essential Cooling
Water Intake Structure & Electrical Equipment Room-
CWIS
0-45W760-82-3
Standby Diesel Generator System Schematic Diagrams
Rev. 1
WBN-19-491
Add T-Drain to 2-FCV-63-73, 2-FCV-72-44, & 2-FCV-72-
Rev. 0
WBN-19-501
AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer
Resolution
Rev. 4
WBN-19-501-01
AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer
Resolution - Unit 1 Train A
Rev. 3
WBN-19-501-02
AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer
Resolution - Unit 1 Train B
Rev. 3
WBN-19-501-03
AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer
Resolution - Unit 2 Train A
Rev. 3
Engineering
Changes
WBN-19-501-04
AFW Check Valve Modification for Water Hammer
Rev. 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resolution - Unit 2 Train B
B26930924359
Justification for Use of Dow Corning RTV 738 Sealant on
Conduit Fittings and Junction Boxes for Flooding Due to
Rev. 1
CEB850214913
Summary of Piping Analysis Problem No. N3-63-08A
Rev. 11
CEB850214913
Summary of Piping Analysis Problem No. N3-63-08A
Rev. 8
WBN-VTD-W120-
2958
WESTINGHOUSE MOTOR OPERATED GATE
VALVES, MANUALLY
OPERATED GATE VALVES, SWING CHECK VALVES
[PUB. # 5710-99-H003]
Rev. 16
Engineering
Evaluations
WBN-VTD-W120-
5030
WESTINGHOUSE WATTS BAR UNIT 2 INSTRUCTION
BOOK FOR MOTOR OPERATED GATE VALVES,
MANUALLY OPERATED GATE VALVES AND SWING
Rev. 3
CFR 50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL
REPORT
WATTS BAR AND BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANTS
UNITS I AND 2 QUALIFICATIONN OF RR/DUR SUMP
VALVE ROOM NCRs WI NEB 8207 AND ELM MIB 8204
fBRD-50-390/82-42, WBID-50-391/82-39 &LR-50-
438/82-349 BLRD-50-439/82-31 10 CFR 50.55(e)
August 22,
1983
100506-01
Throttle 1-THV-067-0643B-B and 1-THV-067-0646B-B
and reduce design ERCW Flow to EBR Chillers A-A
AND B-B
3-OT-ECA0000
Operator Training, Emergency Contingency Actions
Rev. 17
B26850422023
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - RHR SUMP Manways -
Deletion of Inspection Requirements from the FSAR
April 22,
1985
Datasheet Code US:
5-14-205
Kaowool Blanket SDS: 201
July 2018
N3-82-4002
Letter, Power Systems, Exhaust Temperature Data
10/12/1982
NETP-116.1
Inservice Testing Program Evaluations and Reference
Values
Rev. 1
NRC Inspection
Reports 50-390/83-46
and 50-391/83-35
Inspection on September 22 -October 22, 1933
November
2, 1983
Miscellaneous
SDD-N3-82-4002
Standby Diesel Generator System QA Record
Rev. 29
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SDD-N3-82-4002
Standby Diesel Generator System
System 236 Health
Report
20VAC Vital Power, 125VDC Vital Power, 120VAC
Instrument Power, 120VAC Preferred Power, and
25VDC Emergency Diesel Generator Batteries
03/31/2022
WB-DC-30-27
Rev. 35
WBN-SFCP-003
STRIDE Station Blackout Test and Slave Relay Testing
Rev. 0
WBN-VTD-A998-0040
Amtek Solidstate Controls Instruction and Operating
Manual Dual 20Amp Battery Chargers in Single
Rev. 1
WBN-VTD-B260-0020
Sulzer Pumps Installation, General Operation &
Maintenance Manual for TVA WBN ERCW Pumps
Sulzer Model 30cc 2 Stage Vertical
Rev. 2
WBN-VTD-C173-0070
C&D Technologies Standby Battery Vented Cell
Instructions
Rev. 8
WBN-VTD-FR03-
0010
Formsprag Installation Instructions General Purpose
Overrunning Clutches FSO 300 THRU 700, FSO 750
Thru 1027, FS 750 Thru 1027.
Rev. 7
WBN-VTD-SI06-0020
Instruction Book for Siemens Energy And Automation
Systems Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump Motors
Rev. 13
WBNEQ-MOV-001
Equipment Qualification Package Binder
Rev. 39
0-AOI-13
Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water
Rev. 9
0-S I-67-901-A
O-SI-67-901-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Train A
Pumps Performance Test
Rev. 66
0-SI-215-1
Diesel Generator Battery Inspection
Rev. 25
0-SI-215-41-A
DG Battery Service Test and Charger Test
Rev. 21
0-SI-215-51-A
DG Battery Modified Performance Test and Charger
Test
Rev. 18
0-SI-215-65-A
Diesel Generator Battery Charging Test
Rev. 7
0-SI-67-918-A
0-SI-67-918-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump C-A
and Pump D-A Comprehensive Pump Test
Rev. 21
0-SI-82-11-A
Monthly DG Start and Load Test
Rev. 58
0-SI-82-11-A
Monthly DG Start and Load Test
Rev. 58
0-SOI-30.07
Shutdown Boardrooms HVAC Elevations 757 & 772
Procedures
0-TI-50.002
Diesel Generator 1A Fuel Oil Day Tank Pump Quarterly
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Performance Test
0-TI-50.003
Diesel Generator 1B Fuel Oil Day Tank Transfer Pump
Quarterly Performance Test
0-TI-50.004
, Diesel Generator 2A Fuel Oil Day Tank Transfer Pump
quarterly Performance Test
E-1
Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
Rev. 18
Emergency Diesel Generator Local Control Emergency
Abnormal Operation
Rev. 0
ECA-0.0
Loss of All AC Power
Rev. 25
MMTP-141
Routine Inspection and Maintenance of Limitorque Motor
Actuators
Rev. 5
NEDP-2
Design Calculation Process Control
Rev. 26
NPG-SPP-09.1.21
Inservice Testing Program Evaluations and Reference
Values
Rev. 0
O-SI-67-917-A
O-SI-67-917-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump A-A
and Pump B-A Comprehensive Pump Test
Rev. 20
TI-100.002
Inservice Testing of Valves
Rev. 17
Self-
Assessments
Health Report
Scorecard
Safety Injection System 63
April 2022
118815050
Replace Nonforming Gasket on MSIV Zone Switches
09/25/2018
119205912
Troubleshoot/Repair Inverter 1-IV, Inverter Failed
11/20/2017
119317659
Year Capacitor, Circuit Board and Fan Assembly
Replacements for 120V Vital Inverters
01/27/2018
21659800
2/05/2022
21852727
MMG to Install New Centrifugal Governor IAW WBN-20-
243-04
04/26/2021
21878127
Surveillance Task Sheet for Work Order Number
21878127
June 22,
22
2196540
O-SI-67-901-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Train A
Pumps Performance Test
01/22/2022
2403812
O-SI-67-901-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Train A
Pumps Performance Test
05/07/2022
2457198
Work Orders
2463381
O-SI-67-917-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump A-A
2/03/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
and Pump B-A Comprehensive Pump Test
2499568
2528922
0-SI-67-918-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump C-A
and Pump D-A Comprehensive Pump Test
2/05/2021
2561669
O-SI-67-901-A Essential Raw Cooling Water Train A
Pumps Performance Test
08/18/2022
2561676