05000346/LER-1982-024, Forwards LER 82-024/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-024/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054J639
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/21/1982
From:	Murray T TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20054J640	List: 05000346/LER-1982-024, Forwards LER 82-024/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000346/LER-1982-024-03, /03L-0:on 820522,discharge Valve Mu 348 from Boric Acid Pump 1-1 Found in Closed Position.Caused by Personnel Error.Operators Counseled & Maint for Check Valves Reviewed
References
K82-994, NUDOCS 8206290374
Download: ML20054J639 (3)

LER-1982-024, Forwards LER 82-024/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3461982024R00 - NRC Website

text

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TOLEDO

%sm EDISON June 21, 1982 Log No. K82-994 File: RR 2 (NP-33-82-30)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reportable Occurrence 82-024 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Date of Occurrence: May 22, 1982 Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 82-024 with a supplemental information sheet, which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Speci-fication 6.9 to provide 30 day-written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly, M

Terry D. Murray Station Superintendent Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station TDM/nf Enclosure cc:

Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enc 1: 30 copies Mr. Norman Haller, Director Office of Management and Program Analysis Encl:

3 copies Mr. Walt Rogers NRC Resident Inspector Encl:

1 copy VUN 23 W 8206290374 820621 PDR ADOCK 05000346 g

PDR THE TOLEOO EOISON COMPANY EOISON PLAZA 300 MAOISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHIO 43652 l_

/ h v0 h

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-30 DATE OF EVENT: May 22, 1982 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Less than the minimum boron injection flowpaths available.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWT) = 0, 3nd Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence:

On May 22, 1982 at 1648 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.27064e-4 months <br />, an equipment operator making his rounds found MU 348 closed. This is the discharge valve from the BAAT l-1 pump.

Boric Acid Addition Tank (BAAT) System design incorporates a common discharge header for the BAAT pumps to enable throttling either BAAT pump with one control valve. This typical arrangement requires a check valve on the discharge of each pump to prevent reverse flow when the "other" BAAT pump is running. These check valves have lost seating integrity which permitted leakage to the other BAAT.

Until repairs to the check valve could be conducted, a temporary modification had been made on the BAAT recirculation-procedure SP 1104.03 to require closing the manual valve downstream of the leaking check valves to provide positive isolation, and upon completion of the operation, restore the manual valve to its proper position. - In this case, the manual valve remained closed after the completion of the operatt.on, isolating the presumed boron addition flowpath. This left the station without an operable flow-path required by Tech. Spec. 3.1.2.1.

The action statement conditions limiting core alterations or positive reactivity changes until the path is restored were met.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurence is attributed to operator error. When the operator enacted the modification, he correctly closed the manual valve for the (BAAT) recirculation but, within the restoration verification line-up, he incorrectly transposed the modification's requirements and denoted the manual valve as baing required " closed" rather than "open".

The second operator making the verification' reviewed the restoration line-up and completed the independent verification by, verifying the valve closed.

Analysis of Occurrence:

1 There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to statiob personnel.

+

In the event that a boron addition would have been required and the'flowpath.

had been isolated, the Reactor Operator would have been aware of the condition ~

since flow instrumentation is provided in the Control Room. Lack,of, flow would initiate a line-up verification as dictated by standard operating; practices.

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Corrective Action

The correction action for this occurrence included counseling the operators involved, since the evidence pointed out an oversight had occurred.

i As a secondary corrective action, the maintenance plan for the two check valves has been reviewed to ensure the schedule is current and prioritized. The modifi-cation incorporated to compensate for the check valve leakage has been reworded to make it more clear and concise to help prevent a reoccurrence.

Failure Data:

Previous occurrences in which a personnel error left a valve mispositioned were reported in NP 33-82-18 (82-010) and NP 33-82-19 (82-017).

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