05000271/FIN-2012004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Dedicated Operators Required for Operability Under Applied Administrative Controls Left Immediate Vicinity of Open Valves |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of technical specification (TS) 6.4, Procedures, for Entergys failure to implement a surveillance activity in accordance with the written procedure. Specifically, the inspectors identified that during a surveillance test, dedicated operators required to maintain operability of primary containment left the immediate vicinity of open manual containment isolation valves. Entergys corrective actions included restoring the administrative controls required to maintain primary containment operability during the subject surveillance test, initiating condition report CR-VTY-2012-03561, sending a memorandum to and discussing the issue with all operating crew shift managers explaining the error and the requirements of a dedicated operator, and issuing a temporary night order further explaining these requirements. Additional corrective actions included implementing and tracking training for all operators on these requirements, and revising licensed operator training on primary containment to specifically describe these requirements. The inspectors determined that the issue was more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the dedicated operators were required to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of the valve controls to rapidly close the valves when primary containment isolation is required during accident conditions, but the operators were significantly beyond the required immediate vicinity when they left the reactor building. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using Appendix H, Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power, because primary containment was inoperable for 37 minutes, i.e. less than 3 days. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Resources component, because the training of personnel did not describe specific requirements of dedicated operators, including the definition of immediate vicinity. |
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000271/2012004 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Fish T Burns R Bellamy C Crisden S Rich J Deboer B Dionne K Mangan S Rutenkroger |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Vermont Yankee - IR 05000271/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vermont Yankee) @ 2012Q3
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