05000410/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Implement Procedural Requirements for Evaluating Control Room Deficiencies as Operator Workarounds |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding (FIN) for CENG staffs failure to properly classify operator workarounds, operator burdens, or control room deficiencies in accordance with CNG-OP-1.01-2010, Operator Workaround/Challenge Control, Revision 0. Specifically, the failure to properly classify operator workarouonds resulted in an operator error when control room operators did not recognize a meter was degraded, used that meter during the performance of a surveillance test, and overexcited the Division II emergency diesel generator (EDG) on July 30, 2013. CENG staff entered this inspector identified issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-2013-009004. Corrective actions included reviewing, classifying, and adding the inspector identified operator burdens to each of the respective Units shift turnover checklist. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly classify the Unit 2 Division II EDG degraded volt amperes reactive (VAR) meter as an operator burden resulted in an operator using the degraded meter during a surveillance test and inadvertently overexciting the diesel generator for 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, in that CENG staff did not ensure control room deficiencies were evaluated properly in accordance with CNG-OP-1.01-2010. Specifically, CENG staff failed to classify the known degraded Unit 2 Division II EDG VARs meter as an operator burden; which resulted in the EDG being overloaded during a surveillance test. |
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000410/2013005 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dionne D Schroeder E Keighley E Miller H Gray J Deboer J Laughlin K Kolaczyk N Floyd S Hammann T Fish T Hedigan |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Nine Mile Point - IR 05000410/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Nine Mile Point) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Nine Mile Point)
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