IR 05000271/2012007
| ML12216A097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/02/2012 |
| From: | Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Wamser C Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Larry Doerflein | |
| References | |
| IR-12-007 | |
| Download: ML12216A097 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 21OO RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 1OO KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 1940S2713 August 2, 20Lz Mr. GhristopherWamser Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 185 Old Ferry Road P.O. Box 500 Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500
SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MOD I F I CATI ON S TEAM I N S PECTI O N RE PORT O5OOO27 1 I2O1 2OO7
Dear Mr. Wamser:
On June 21,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 21 ,2012, with you, and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,A Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28
Enclosure:
I nspection Report 0500027 1 12012007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Mr. Christopher Wamser Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, lnc.Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 185 Old Ferry Road P.O. Box 500 Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500
SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT M OD I F I CATI ON S TEAM I N SPECTI ON RE PORT O5OOO27 1 I2O1 2OO7 Dear M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
lR 0500027112012007;61412012 - 612112012;
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.
This report covers a two week on-site inspection period of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications.
The inspection was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors.
The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.No findings were identified.
1R17
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Gornerstones:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (tP 71111.17)Evaluations of Chanoes. Tests. or Experiments (20 samples)a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed one safety evaluation to determine whether the change to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.
ln addition, the team evaluated whether Entergy had been required to obtain NRC approval prior to implementing the change. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluation.
The team compared the safety evaluation and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187 , "Guidance for lmplementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluation.
The team also reviewed a sample of nineteen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which Entergy had concluded that no safety evaluation was required.
These reviews were performed to assess whether Entergy's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes.The team reviewed the safety evaluation that Entergy had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection (i.e., since the last modifications inspection)not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors.
The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings were selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.In addition, the team compared Entergy's administrative procedures used to controlthe screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluations and screenings reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
.2 Permanent
Plant Modifications 2 (11 samples)Fuel Oil Storaqe Tank Liner Application Inspection Scope The team reviewed engineering change (EC) 24y'r04 that applied a spray-on protective liner to the bottom of fuel oil storage tank (FOST) TK'40-1A.
The FOST provides diesel fuel makeup to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) day tanks via the fuel oil transfer pumps (FOTPS). The liner covered the inside bottom of the tank and extended 24 inches vertically on the inside wall of the tank. Entergy applied the liner to simplify future tank bottom inspections and to facilitate effective corrosion control in the FOST as recommended by the American Petroleum Institute (APl).The team reviewed EC 24404 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the EDG fuel oil system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed calculations, industry operating experience (OE), nondestructive examination (NDE) and liner inspection results, and liner product specifications to verify that the applied liner would not adversely impact EDG fuel oil quality or delivery.
The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed.
The team reviewed the associated post-modification test (PMT) results, system health and walkdown reports, fuel oil sample results, and conective action condition reports (CRs)to verify proper fuel oil system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
The team performed a walkdown of the FOST, FOTPs, fuel oil day tanks, and EDGs to independently assess Entergy's configuration control and the material condition of the EDG fuel oil system.The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2.2 Hiqh Pressure Coolant Iniection
Turbine Auxiliarv Oil Pump Replacement
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 26967 that replaced the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system turbine auxiliary oil pump (AOP). The AOP automatically starts on HPCI initiation, to provide hydraulic power to the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves (which open to start the turbine) and to provide lubrication during startup until the shaft driven oil pump reaches sufficient speed to supply this function.
Entergy initiated this modification to upgrade the HPCI AOP based on mechanical seal leakage, potential pump re-build issues (availability of spare parts), and as a proactive measure in response to industry OE. Entergy determined that the replacement pump was nearly identical to the existing pump with a few differences (port size, shaft length, gasket a.Enclosure 3 material, and mounting flange reinforcement).
Entergy engineering evaluated these differences within EC 26967 and translated the required design changes to the EC i m plementing work order (51 07 07 40) instructions.
The team reviewed EC 26967 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the HPCI system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed.
The team reviewed the associated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, HPCI surveillance test results, and corrective action CRs to verify proper HPCI system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
On June 5, 2012, the team observed portions of the quarterly HPCI in-service test to verify proper HPCI AOP performance.
The team performed several walkdowns of the HPCI system, including control room instrumentation, to ensure that Entergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and to independently assess HPCIAOP operability, Entergy's configuration control, and the material condition of the HPCI system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2.3 Service Water Svstem Supplv Header Inspection
Port lnstallation
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 30317 that installed inspection ports in the A and B service water (SW) supply headers. Entergy committed to inspect internal sections of the piping within the SW system prior to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's period of extended operation (March 21,2012).
In order to facilitate visual examinations of the internal surfaces of SW system supply headers and evaluate their condition, Entergy installed inspection ports on the A and B SW supply headers in the intake structure.
Entergy implemented the A and B SW supply header inspection port installation under associated ECs 30318 and 30319, respectively.
Entergy used the associated ECs to track installation, testing, return to service, and update of configuration documents for each separate train because the return to service was completed at different times.The team reviewed EC 30317 and EC 30318 for the A SW supply header to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the SW system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed the work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed.
The team reviewed the associated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, and corrective action CRs to verify proper SW system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
The team performed several walkdowns of the SW piping in the intake structure to ensure that Entergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and to Enclosure b.4 independently verify that the modified SW system configuration did not adversely affect the structural integrity of the piping, pipe supports, and system pressure boundary.
The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified.
Seismic Monitor Replacement lnspection Scope The team reviewed modificationEC 21268 that replaced the seismic monitor. The function of the seismic instrumentation system is to provide timely evaluation of a seismic event. In March 2010, Entergy identified reliability concerns with the communication between the installed seismic instrumentation and the control room workstation.
Entergy determined that the installed seismic monitor was obsolete and spare parts were not available.
Modification EC 21268 replaced the installed seismic monitor with an upgraded model, upgraded the associated modems used for communication between the monitor and the control room workstation, and upgraded the control room workstation with a new computer and printer.The team reviewed EC 21268 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the seismic instrumentation system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed.
The team interviewed operators and reviewed the associated PMT results, recent functional tests, associated operating and event response procedures, and corrective action CRs to verify proper seismic instrumentation system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
The team performed several walkdowns of the seismic instrumentation system, including the control room seismic monitor workstation, to independently assess seismic instrumentation system standby readiness, the seismic monitor's operating environment, and the material condition of the system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified.
Restoration of Fire Barrier for DG-1-1A Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 33731 that sealed several open electrical conduit floor penetrations in the A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room floor fire barrier 21. The modification was performed because Entergy identified in condition report CR-WY-2011-05507 that EDG-1A electrical conduit penetrations were not sealed with Enclosure a.b..2.5 a.
5 the required fire rated material.
The Vermont Yankee Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) and Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis (SSCA) require these floor openings to be sealed with 3-hour fire rated material to mitigate the hazard presented by an EDG room fire.Penetrations through these barriers, including conduit and piping, need to be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself.The team assessed if the modification was consistent with requirements in the design and licensing bases. The team conducted interviews with the responsible engineer and performed a walkdown of the area and fire barriers affected by this modification.
The team reviewed calculations and the associated technical evaluation to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions.
Additionally, the team reviewed the Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation to verify the material used to seal the open penetrations met the minimum required three hour fire rating. The team verified the requirement for de-rating cable ampacity for cables routed through fire barriers was evaluated in Entergy's analysis and cable ampacity was not adversely affected.
The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
.2.6 RHR Shutdown Coolinq Inboard lsolation
Valve Motor Maqnesium Rotor Replacement a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 23301 that replaced the motor for motor operated valve (MOV) V10-18, residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve. The seismically qualified and safety-related V10-18 motor is located in the containment structure and is credited to close the valve for primary containment and reactor vessel isolation actuation signals. The modification was initiated because Entergy had identified motor degradation during the RF028 refueling outage inspection and determined that motor replacement was required.
During RFO29, the motor was replaced with an equivalent motor that was refurbished and certified by a qualified vendor that met the quality assurance program requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of the RHR valve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package to ensure that the replacement motor had similar electrical characteristics of the previously installed motor. The team verified that the impact of the change was adequately evaluated for power consumption, cable protection, voltage drop, and overload condition protection and short circuit protection requirements.
The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. Finally, the team reviewed post maintenance testing to determine if the motor and valve would operate as Enclosure 6 required and to verify that the replacement motor did not affect the minimum closing rate for the valve as specified in the W Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinss No findings were identified.
.2.7 Replacement
of Large Power Cables Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13130 that replaced two large power cables, each cable consisting of three single conductors (350 MCM), feeding 4160V Bus 4 from the'A' Diesel Generator, DG-1-1A. The diesel generators and auxiliary systems provide class 1E electrical power to the emergency buses in a loss-of-normal power (LNP)condition or a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with LNP/degraded grid voltage at the emergency buses. The modification was performed as a result of analysis of an identified damaged condensate pump motor cable (condition report CR-WY-2008-02929), which determined that it had reached end of life. Entergy determined that the diesel generator cables were installed approximately the same time as the damaged condensate pump motor cable. Although equipment run-time and environment conditions were not similar, Entergy conservatively decided to replace all4l(/ cables as equipment became available.
The team reviewed the modification to verify it was consistent with design and licensing bases requirements.
The team reviewed the replacement cable properties, such as cable insulation ratings, cable current carrying capacity, cable resistance and reactance, and reviewed the associated short circuit calculation to ensure that changes were adequately incorporated into the design analysis and bounded by the current design.The team verified that seismic loading of existing raceways was not affected by this modification.
The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and performed a walkdown of the affected components.
The team reviewed the implementing work order to ensure that it was consistent with the change package, and to ensure that proper post maintenance testing was performed and that the documented results were acceptable.
The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2.8 RCIC MOV V1 3-30 Motor Replacement
Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC17858 that replaced the motorfor MOV V13-30, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system test return valve to the condensate storage Enclosure a.b.a.
7 tank (CST). The modification was performed to resolve a 60VDC ground concern associated with the valve motor circuitry.
Entergy identified within condition report, CR-WY-2009-02680, that an electricalground associated with the 250 VDC supply panel (DC-2) had been traced to the motor for the valve. The RCIC system performs a function to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel to maintain sufficient inventory.
This ensures that adequate core cooling is provided following a reactor vessel isolation event accompanied by a loss of feedwater, or following a loss of all auxiliary power. The RCIC test return valve is normally closed and if opened for system testing, automatically closes on a RCIC system initiation to allow full injection flowrate back to the vessel.During the review of the EC to replace the motor, the team also reviewed the associated operability evaluation performed by Entergy to address the degraded ground condition.
This included review of the interim compensatory measures established by Entergy at the time to ensure the valve remained closed to ensure rated RCIC flow to the reactor upon an initiation signal.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of the valve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package to ensure that the replacement motor had similar electrical characteristics to the previously installed motor.The team verified that the impact of the change was adequately addressed for power consumption, voltage drop, cable protection, and overload condition and short circuit protection requirements.
The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. Finally, the team reviewed post maintenance testing results to verify the motor and valve would operate as required.
The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinss No findings were identified.
.2.9 Replacement
of the C RHRSW Pump Rotatins Assemblv.
P-8-1C
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 15733 which replaced the'C' residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump rotating assembly.
The modification was performed to replace the carbon steel pump rotating assembly with microbiologically influenced corrosion (MlC) resistant materialto assist in improving pump performance and overall reliability.
The RHRSW pump performance had previously shown some deterioration due to corrosion attack from MIC due to exposure to raw river water. Entergy had determined that the new RHRSW rotating assembly had an associated maximum horsepower which exceeded the previously installed coupled motor nameplate horsepower rating. The team reviewed the increase in horsepower rating to ensure Entergy had appropriately revised calculations associated with diesel generator loading and the increased heat load added to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)corner rooms. The team reviewed the calculations to ensure that design and licensing bases requirements associated with the equipment were maintained.
8 The team reviewed affected procedures such as alarm response sheets which were impacted due to the potentialfor higher operating RHRSW pump motor cunents to ensure they were adequately revised. The team reviewed the post modification pump test results to ensure that pump performance remained above the minimum required flowrate and pressure established in design calculations.
Additionally the team reviewed the associated in-service testing results to ensure the pump performed within established acceptance criteria.
The team reviewed the replacement pump rotating assembly minimum flow requirements to ensure that operational procedures ensured this minimum flow requirement would be maintained during RHRSW pump operation.
The team reviewed post modification testing to ensure that the assumed increase in motor electrical loading had been conservative.
The team reviewed the implementing work order for the modification to ensure that the replacement pump assembly had been installed consistent with the engineering change assumptions.
The team performed a walkdown of the pump to ensure the installed configuration was consistent with the EC requirements.
Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17
.1 of this report. The documents
reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified
.2.10 Vent Valve Installation
in 'A' RHR Torus Suction Line lnspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13969 that installed an air vent valve in the 'A' RHR torus suction line. This modification was performed to allow for venting air that can be entrained in the inverted U piping configuration between the torus and the pump suction isolation valve. A single isolation, locked closed and capped vent valve was installed as part of the 'A' RHR to torus suction piping pressure boundary.The team reviewed Entergy's method used to installthe vent assembly to ensure the welding procedures and pressure testing were in accordance with code requirements.
The team reviewed the process requirements contained within the design package to ensure installation of the valve using the hot tap procedure was consistent with engineering requirements.
The team reviewed the structural calculation associated with the change to ensure the new branch line and valve were adequately evaluated for loading conditions and pipe stresses remained within code requirements.
The team reviewed affected procedures and drawings to ensure they were adequately revised to reflect the modification.
The team performed a walkdown to ensure the installed valve configuration was consistent with the engineering change package. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
a.Enclosure Findinqs No findings were identified.
Replace Service Water Return Valve for Steam Tunnel Air to Water Cooler Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13467 that replaced service water gate valve V70-207 , an isolation valve in the service water return piping from the steam tunnel air to water cooler. The modification was installed to resolve erosion issues and ensure that the valve disc does not separate from the stem and block the cooling water flowpath out of the cooler. The previously installed gate valves had been found to have internal erosion on the gates and in some cases were difficult to operate.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the main steam tunnel cooling water system had not been degraded by the modification.
The team reviewed the associated piping analysis performed to ensure that pipe stresses were not adversely impacted by the modification.
The team reviewed the work order instructions and documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed, and welding and repair instructions were performed to code requirements.
The team reviewed the work package to ensure appropriate post modification test instructions had been developed to ensure in-service leak testing was performed.
The team reviewed corrective action CRs to verify proper SW system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.
Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17
.1 of this report. The documents
reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 ldentification
and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned and/or completed conective actions were appropriate.
In addition, the team reviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the conective action system.The CRs reviewed are listed in the ailachment.
b..2.11 a.b.4.a.Enclosure 10 b. Findinss No findings were identified.
40A6 Meetinss, includino Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Wamser, Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy's staff, at an exit meeting on June 21,2012. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
A-1 ATTACHMENT
=SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION=
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Enterqv Personnel
- M. Anderson, Fire Protection
Engineer
- M. Ball, Senior System Engineer
- G. Brede, Senior Mechanical
Design Engineer
- J. Devincentis, Senior Licensing
Engineer
- G. Gibbs, System Engineer
- J. Mully, System Engineer
- B. Naeck, Senior System Engineer
- A. Robertshaw, Senior Mechanical
Design Engineer
- J. Rogers, Design Engineering
Manager LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED None LIST OF DOCUIUIENTS
REVIEWED 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations
2010-01, Safety Evaluation
to Change Containment
lsolation
Valve Designation
for V10-394/8, Rev.0 10 CFR 50.59 Screened-out
Evaluations
AP 0894, Staffing Limits Revision 14 Process Applicability
Determination, dated 10128110 EC 11794, Fault Tolerant Turbine Trip Logic for Stator Water lnitiating
Event, Rev. 0 EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0 EC 13969, InstallVent
Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0 EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0 EC 18907, HPCI Lube Oil Pump Flexible Hose & Fittings Replacement
Equivalent
Change Evaluation, Rev. 0 EC 23206, Add Fuses Relay Circuits in Recirc MG Panels, Rev. 0 EC 31133, Remove Internal Component
Check Valve for Fuel Pool Cooling, Rev. 0 ON 3156, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 13 ON 3171, Loss of Bus 3, Rev. 8 OP 2120, HPCI System Revision 60 Process Applicability
Determination, dated 10117111 OP 2126, Diesel Generators
Revision 59 Process Applicability
Determination, dated 2129112 OP 4142, Vernon Tie and Delay Access Power Source Backfeed Surveillance, Rev. 16 OPOP-4KV-2142,4KV
Electrical
System, Rev. 2 OPST-ADS-4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness
Check Revision 0 Process Applicability
Determination, dated 41221 1 1 Attachment
OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance
from the Control Room Revision 1 Process Applicability
Determination, dated 10128111 OPST-FO-4195-04, Portable Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Equipment
Surveillance, Rev. 1 OPST-RCIC4121, Reactor Core lsolation
Cooling System Surveillance, Rev. 2 Revision to EOP-1 to Incorporate
New Table 3.2.2Main
Steam Line, RCIC and HPCI Area High Temperature
Setpoints
to Reflect Tech Spec Amendment#236
Process Applicability
Determination, dated 1 11 110 Modification
Packaoes EC 13130, Replacement
of Critical Large Power Cable, Rev. 0 EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0 EC 13969, InstallVent
Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0 EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0 EC 17858, RCIC MOV V13-30 has a +60V DC Ground, Rev. 0 EC 21268, Seismic Monitor Replacement, Rev. 0 EC 23301, Magnesium
Rotor Replacement, Rev. 0 EC 24404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom, Rev. 0 EC 26967, Replacement
of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-14), Rev. 0 EC 30317, SW System Supply Headers A & B lnspection
Ports (Base EC), Rev. 0 EC 33731, Restoration
of Fire Banierfor
DG-1-1A Room, Rev. 0 Calculations.
Analvsis.
and Evaluations
FPEE 40, Installation
of Silicone Based Fire Penetration
Seal Details in Barriers Less than 12 inches thick, Rev. 0 TE 2003-047, MOV Design Input for Stroke Time, FLA and LRA VYC-611, SW Discharge, Rev. 0 VYC-0685G, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Monitoring
Uncertainty, Rev. 2 VYC-0830, Voltage Drop Calculation
for W Distribution
Panels DC-1 and DC-z, Rev. 2 VYC-836, DG Loading, Rev. 15 VYC-1053, MOV Voltage Analysis, Rev. 9 VYC-1087, 4160VAC and 480VAC Relay and Breaker Coordination, Rev. 2 VYC-1088, 41601480 Volt Short CircuiWoltage
Study, Rev. 4 VYC-1171, Electrical
Design Bases Review of Safety Related MOVs for GL 89'10, Rev. 9 VYC-1183, Thermal Overload Heater Sizing for SR MOVs, Rev. 5 VYC-1296, Circuit Breaker Sizing and Settings for Safety Related MOVs, Rev. 4 l/YC-132]
ECCS Corner Room Heatup and Sensitivity, Rev. 1 VYC-1404, Emergency
Diesel Generator
Fuel Oil Usage and Storage Capacity, Rev. 2 VYC-1854, Determination
of Ampacity for Safety Related Power Cables for the AC Auxiliary Power Distribution
System, Rev. 5 VYC-3033, Service Water Pump Discharge
Pipe Valve Replacement, Rev. 1 Attachment
Condition
Reports 1998-1916
2010-4098 2007-3054
2010-5491 2008-0979
2011-1402 2008-2195
2011-2553 2010-0890
2011-3797 2010-1738
2011-3823 Design Design Design Topical A-3 2011-4489 2011-4530 2012-2315 2012-2545*
2012-2588*
2012-2666*
2012-2715*
2012-2716*
2012-2717*
2012-2757*
2012-2759*
2012-2842*
2012-2853*
2012-2878*
2012-281 3*2012-2640*
2012-2752*
2012-2761*
(* denotes NRC identified
during this inspection)
Design & Licensinq
Bases Amendment
No. 236 to License No. DPR-28, lnstrumentation
Technical
Specifications (TAC No. MD8111), dated 6112109 Basis Document for Emergency
Diesel Generators
and Auxiliary
Systems, Rev. 23 Basis Document for High Pressure Coolant Injection
System, Rev. 34 Basis Document for Service Water, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Alternate Cooling System, Rev.31 Design Basis Document for External Events Earthquakes (Seismic), Tornadoes, External Flooding, Low Water, Rev. 2 Drawinqs 5920-3914, Fuel Oil Storage Tank, EC 24404 Mark-up to Rev. 1 5920-9284, lsometric
Dwg for RHR Part 5, Rev. 4 5920-11255, Seismic Monitor Workstation, EC 21268 Mark'up to Rev. 0 5920-11256, Seismic Monitor Enclosure, EC 21268 Mark-up to Rev. 0 B-191300, Sht. 25A, 480V MCC-88 Power Distribution
and Motor Data, Rev. 54 8-191300, Sht. 68, 125V MCC 28 Power Distribution
and Motor Data, Rev. 20 B-191301, Sht. 1309, ControlWiring
Diagram RHR Reactor Shutdown Cooling lsolation
Valve V10-18 (inboard), Rev. 14 B-191301, Sht.331, Cable and Conduit List, Rev.8 B-191500, Sht. 240, Fire Barrier Seal Drawing, Rev. 1 G-191159, Service Water System Flow Diagram, Rev. 82 G-191172, Flow Diagram RHR System, Rev. 66 G-191233, lntake Structure
Piping Plans & Sections, Rev. 18 G-191300, Sht. 2,480VAuxiliary
One Line Diagram MCC-88, 8E, 89B, Rev. 34 G-191301, Sht.2,480VAuxiliary
One Line Diagram MCC-98, 9D,89A, Rev. 33 SK-5920-M-85, Fuel Oil Storage Tank TK-40-1A, Rev. 2 VY1-SW-Part
Sh. 1, Service Water Intake Structure
Piping lsometric, Rev. 2 Functional.
Surveillance
and Modification
Acceptance
TestinglCRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring
System FunctionalTest, performed9l22ll1
&513112 OPST-EDG-4126-02A, Monthly A EDG Slow Start Operability
Test, performed
5114112 OPST-EDG4126-028, Monthly B EDG Slow Start Operability
Test, performed
21112 OPST-FO-4195-02A, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1A) and Discharge
Check Valve (FO-28A)Operabi I ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 419 I 1 2 OPST-FO-4195-028, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge
Check Valve (FO-288)Operabil ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 41 1 61 12 Attachment
OPST-FO-4195-038, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge
Check Valve (FO-28B)Operability
Test (CYC), performed
1116112 OPST-HPCI-4120-02, HPCI Pump Operability
Test (Quarterly), performed
1113111 &2115112 OPST-HPCI-4120-04, HPCI Valve Operability
Test (Quarterly), performed
1113111 &2115112 Miscellaneous
268, Seismic Monitor Replacement
Return to Service Form, dated 9126111 24404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom Return to Service Form, dated 10129111 26967, Replacement
of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A)
Return to Service Form, dated 5127111 30318, Service Water System Supply Header A lnspection
Port (Child EC) Return to Service Form, dated 9110111 API Standard 652, Lining of Above Ground Petroleum
Storage Tank Bottoms, December 1997 API Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, December 1999 A SW fnspection
Port (WO 256119-13)
Component
Close-Out
Data Sheet, performed
9110111 ASTM D975 Table 1, Detailed Requirements
for Diesel Fuel Oils, Revs. 2,9, & 10 Aux Oil Pump Pipes WO 51070740)
Component
Close-Out
Data Sheet, performed
24111 NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation
for Earthquakes, Rev. 2 NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.54, Service Level l, ll, and lll Protective
Coatings Applied to Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2 NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.114, Guidance to Operators
at the Controls and to Senior Operators
in the Control Room of a Nuclear Power Unit, Rev. 3 NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake
Planning and lmmediate
Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post-Earthquake
Actions, Rev. 0 UESI QA Records Package for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant FOST Interior Re-Lining Project, dated 1119111 Non-Destructive
Exam inations and I nspection
Reports EGVN-FOST-10056, FuelTank Maintenance (FTM) Abrasive Blasting, Tank Lining and lnspection, dated 10128111 Evaluation
of the Service Water Piping Condition, Based on Internal Visual lnspections
During RFO-29 (Autumn 201'l), dated 1130112 lTl f nspection
Summary FOST Tank TK40-1A, dated 11t1n1 NUC201 1116-N-CAIR-001, UESI Coating Application
Inspection
Record (CAIR) Page 1 Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed
10125111 NUC2011116-N-DCIR-001-007, UESI Daily Coating Inspection
Record (DCIR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, dated 10124111 - 10127111 NUC2011116-N-DFTR-001-002, UESI Dry Film Thickness
Record (DFTR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed
101261 1')NUC2011116-N-SPR-001, Surface Preparation
Record (SPR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed
10124111 NUC2011-N-CAIR-2-002, UESI Coating Application
Inspection
Record (CAIR) Page2 Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed
10127111 NUC2011-N-CATR-1, UESI Coating Adhesion Test Record (CATR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed
10127 111 Structures
Monitoring
RFO28 Inspection
Summary Report, dated 6/30/10 Attachment
VY BOP-11-MT-01
1,24' SW-1A (3" SW Welds 3 & 4) Magnetic Particle Examination, performed
917111 VY BOP-11-PT-007, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 1) Liquid Penetrant
Examination, performed
919111 VY BOP-11-PT-008, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 2) Liquid Penetrant
Examination, performed
911Ol11 VY BOP-11-VT-001, 24" SW-1A (Piping, Valve lnstalled
per EC 30317) Visual Examination
System Leakage (W-2), performed
9l1ol11 VYNEF 8064.05, Vermont Yankee Non-Code Leak-Check
Examination
Report (P-85-1A Pump and Replaced Pipe), performed
24111 Normal and Special (Abnormal)
Operations
Procedures
ARS 21003, SLC Squib Valve Continuity
Loss CRP 5-A-1 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 12 ARS 21005, Seismic Monitoring
CRP 9-7 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 21 EOP-1, RPV Control, Rev. 4 OP 2120, High Pressure Coolant Injection
System, Rev. 60 OP 2126, Diesel Generators, Rev. 59 OPOP-PHEN-3127, Natural Phenomena, Rev. 8 OPST-ADS4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness
Check, Rev. 0 OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance
from the Control Room, Rev. 1 Procedures
AP 0894, Staffing Limits, Rev. 14 AP 3125, Emergency
Plan Classification
and Action Level Scheme, Rev. 22 ARS 21001, CRP 9-3 Alarm Response Sheets, Rev. 21 CHOP-DIES-4613-01, Sampling and Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil, Rev. 2 EN-DC-115, Engineering
Change Process, Rev. 12 EN-DC-117, Post Modification
Testing and Special Instructions, Rev. 5 EN-DC-126, Engineering
Calculation
Process, Rev. 4 EN-DC-132, Control of Engineering
Documents, Rev. 5 EN-DC-152, Preparation, Revision, Review, and Approval of Design Basis Documents, Rev. 7 EN-Ll-1 00, Process Applicability
Determination, Rev. 1 1 EN-Ll-101, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation
Program, Rev. 9 EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, Rev. 0 ENN-SEP-APJ-009, Table 2 Penetrations, Rev. 7 ICRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring
System FunctionalTest, Rev. 2 UESI Procedure
QCP-10-2-Vry-NUC2011116, Coating Inspection
of FOST Lining, Rev. 0 OP 0046, lnstallation
and Repair of Fire Barriers, Penetration
seals, Fire Breaks and Flood Seals, Rev. 14 OP 4019, Surveillance
of Plant Fire Baniers and Fire Rated Assemblies, Rev. 31 OP 5219, Diagnostic
Testing of Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 17 OP 5220, Limitorque
operator PM, Rev. 32 OPOP-RHR-2124, RHR System, Rev.6 OPST-RHR-4124-12C, RHRSW PumpA/alve
Operability
and Full Flow Test, Rev. 1 VYS-040, Guidelines
for Protection
and Coordination
of Electrical
System, Rev. 4 Attachment
Svstem Health Reports. Walkdown Reports. & Trendino Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A)
Amperage Trend Data, dated 511109 - 2115112 Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A)
Pressure Trend Data, dated 2120108 - 2115112 CHOP-DIES-4613-01
1, Diesel Fuel Oil Analyses Results per ASTM D975-09, dated 1112111 - 5115112 Fuel Oil System Health Report, Q1-2012 Fuel Oil System Walkdown Report, performed
413112 & 5115112 Fuel OilTransfer
Pump A & B IST Data (Flow - Pressure - Vibes), dated 7124106 - 119112 High Pressure Coolant Injection
System Health Report, Q4-2011 & Q1-2012 High Pressure Coolant Injection
System Walkdown Report, performed
23112 & 5121112 Main Computer/ERFIS
System Health Report, Q2-2012 (updated 614112)Service Water System Health Report, Q1-2012 Service Water Walkdown Report, performed
4118112 & 5124112 Vendor Technical
Manuals and Specifications
301803, Condor System Software Manual User's Guide, February 2007 301877, Seismic Monitoring
System Model Condor Calibration
Record, January 201 1 302208, QuickTalk
& QuickLook
Communications
Software for Altus Recorder Systems, August 1997 5920-58, Ebasco Specification - Miscellaneous
Tanks, Rev. 3 Performance
Data for UC Series Pump Model 5C, dated 11130100 SM 22, Tuthill Installation
and Service Instructions
C2 Series Pumps, dated 4l1l0g VYEM No. 0120, HPCI Turbine Operation
and Maintenance - Instruction
Manual, Rev. 12 Work Orders 001 84551 00205629 00237 1 96 00237 1 96 00242475 00242475 00246319 00299490 002561 19 52189034 00299488 50043629 LIST OF ACRONYMS 51 070740 ADAMS AOP API CFR CR CST DC DRS EC EDG Entergy EPRI FHA FOST FOTP Agencywide
Documents
Access and Management
System Auxiliary
Oil Pump American Petroleum
Institute Code of Federal Regulations
Condition
Report Condensate
Storage Tank Direct Current Division of Reactor Safety Engineering
Change Emergency
Diesel Generator Entergy Nuclear Northeast Electric Power Research Institute Fire Hazard Analysis Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Attachment
HPCI LNP LOCA MOV NDE NEI NRC OE PARS PMT RCrC SSCA SW TS UESI UFSAR A-7 High Pressure Coolant Injection Loss of Normal Power Loss of Coolant Accident Motor-Operated
Valve Nondestructive
Exam i nation Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operating
Experience
Publicly Available
Records Post-Mod ification
Test Reactor Core lsolation
Cooling Safe Shutdown Capability
Analysis Service Water Techn ical Specifications
Underwater
Engineering
Services, Inc.Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Attachment