IR 05000369/2014003

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IR 05000369-14-003, 05000370-14-003; on 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014; McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report
ML14213A372
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/2014
From: McCoy G J
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To: Capps S D
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR-14-003
Download: ML14213A372 (29)
v • d • e


Text

August 1, 2014

Steven Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2014003 AND 05000370/2014003

Dear Mr. Capps:

On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On July 9, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or the significance of these findings, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2014003 and 05000370/2014003 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ

_________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RI: DRS RI: DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE Via email GJM /RA for/ Via email MSC /RA/ GJM /RA for/ Via email GJM /RA/ NAME JZeiler JHeath PCooper MCoursey GLaska JViera GMcCoy DATE 7/24/2014 7/28/2014 7/25/2014 7/29/2014 7/21/2014 7/24/2014 7/28/2014 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Letter to Steven from Gerald J. McCoy dated August 1, 2014.

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2014003 AND 05000370/2014003 DISTRIBUTION: D. Gamberoni, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Report Nos.: 05000369/2014003, 05000370/2014003

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Huntersville, NC 28078

Dates: April 1, 2014, through June 30, 2014

Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector J. Heath, Resident Inspector P. Cooper, Acting Resident Inspector M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08) G. Laska, Senior Operations Examiner (Section 1R11)

J. Viera, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

Approved by: Gerald McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure REPORT

SUMMARY

IR05000369/2014-003, IR05000370/2014-003; 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014; McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and three regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision (Rev.) 5. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. Two violations of very low safety significance (Green), which were identified by the licensee, have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP). These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period shut down for a refueling outage. The unit was returned to 100 RTP on April 27, 2014, and operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Impending Adverse Weather Conditions: The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of severe weather program response actions for a tornado warning issued on May 15, 2014, for central Mecklenburg County. This included responding to the control room following announcement of the condition on the plant public address system and observing licensee actions required by emergency procedure RP/0/A/5700/006, Natural Disasters, Rev. 28. The inspectors verified the licensee implemented appropriate actions to protect personnel and mitigating system equipment from adverse weather effects in accordance with the procedure.

Summer Readiness of Offsite & Alternate AC Power Systems: The inspectors evaluated plant features, procedures for operation, and continued availability of offsite and alternate AC power systems to determine whether they were appropriate for the circumstances. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures affecting these areas and the communication protocols between the transmission system operator and the plant to determine whether the appropriate information was exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors walked down the Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchyard with the operations switchyard coordinator and discussed the status of outstanding offsite power system deficiencies and their impact on the ability of the system to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors walked down the alternate AC system (i.e., standby shutdown facility (SSF)) to determine system readiness for summer conditions and witnessed licensee operational testing of the SSF diesel generator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions: The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee's preparations for upcoming hot weather conditions. This included field walkdowns to assess equipment that might be susceptible to hot weather conditions in the Interior/Exterior Doghouses, Main Feedwater Flow Transmitter Houses, and cooling water supply to the Auxiliary Building and Spent Fuel Pool Building ventilation air handling units. The inspectors reviewed the station hot weather alignment procedure and verified actions were completed as required by the procedure. The inspectors attended plant management meetings prior to the onset of hot weather conditions to review the licensee's planning and discussions related to hot weather preparations and actions to address potential equipment challenges from hot weather conditions. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected Problem Investigation Program (PIP) reports in the licensee's CAP related to hot weather equipment challenges to ensure that adverse conditions were being identified and appropriately addressed in a manner commensurate with their significance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following three systems to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors focused on discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down control systems components to verify selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Unit 2 safety injection (NI) system flowpath alignment during refueling outage reduced inventory conditions
  • 1A and 1B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDCA) pumps while the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDCA) pump was out of service for emergent outboard bearing repair activities Complete System Walkdown: The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the Unit 2 containment spray (NS) system. To determine the correct system alignment, the inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Items reviewed during the inspection included: 1) verification of correct valve positions and leak tightness of valve packing; 2) availability of electrical power; 3) correct labeling, cooling, and lubrication of system components; 4) correct installation and functionality of hangers and supports; 5) proper configuration and functionality of essential support systems; 6) adequacy of area housekeeping and control of transient combustibles; and 7) accuracy and appropriateness of component tagging and clearances. To determine the effect of outstanding design issues on the operability of the system, the inspectors reviewed the operator workaround list, the temporary modification list, system health reports, and other outstanding items tracked by the engineering department. In addition, the inspectors reviewed outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders and deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following five plant areas to determine if they were consistent with the UFSAR and the fire protection program for defense in depth features. The features assessed included the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, firefighting equipment, and passive fire features such as fire barriers. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures for fire deficiencies to determine if they were commensurate with the significance of the deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the fire plans for the areas selected to determine if they were consistent with the fire protection program and presented an adequate firefighting strategy. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Unit 2 upper and lower containment (Fire Areas 33 and 33A)
  • 2A and 2B spent fuel cooling pump rooms (Fire Area 21)
  • 1A and 1B EDG rooms (Fire Areas 5 and 6)
  • Unit 2 MDCA and TDCA pump rooms (Fire Areas 3 and 3A)
  • Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary building 695 elevation (Fire Area 1) Annual Fire Drill Observation: The inspectors observed the performance of a licensee fire drill on May 30, 2014, to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to effectively fight fires. The fire drill scenario involved an electrical fault and resulting fire of a safety-related 480 volt breaker cubicle in the 1ETB essential AC switchgear room. The inspectors verified that the licensee drill evaluation members identified performance weaknesses in a self-critical manner at the drill critique and entered the issues into the CAP. Specific attributes evaluated by the inspectors included: 1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus; 2) proper use and layout of fire hoses; 3) employment of appropriate firefighting techniques; 4) sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene; 5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control; 6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; 7) smoke removal operations; 8) utilization of pre-planned strategies; and, 9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario and objectives. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

Internal Flooding Reviews: The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and the licensee's flooding analysis to determine which plant areas were subject to internal flooding and contained safety-related equipment. The inspectors walked down the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDG rooms, to determine whether the area configuration and flood protection barriers and equipment were consistent with the descriptions and assumptions described in UFSAR and licensee flooding analysis. The inspectors examined the state of functional readiness of important flood protection equipment (i.e., flood barriers, sump pumps, and sump level instrumentation) to confirm that the equipment was being properly maintained in a state of functional readiness. The inspectors reviewed the operator actions contained in the licensee's flood mitigation procedures to determine whether the desired results could be achieved by the times credited in the flooding analysis.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities: The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS), emergency feedwater systems, risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 2. The inspectors' activities included a review of non-destructive examinations (NDEs) to evaluate compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),

Section XI (Code of record: 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda), and to verify that indications and defects were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, acceptance standards.

The inspectors directly observed the following NDE mandated by the ASME Code to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement. A flaw in the Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1 weld was missed during UT examinations conducted in March 2008 and September 2012. The enforcement aspects of this issue are discussed in Section

4OA7 of this report.

  • Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of pipe to nozzle weld, Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1 weld, 1.5 in. (Augmented exam)

The inspectors reviewed records of the following NDEs mandated by the ASME Code Section XI to evaluate compliance with the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications and defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement.

  • UT of Containment Liner grid points for inaccessible locations
  • Visual Examination (VT-1) of 2-SCVI-0013, visible surfaces of Steel Containment Vessel inside surface area The inspectors reviewed associated documents for the welding activities, referenced below, in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code. The inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.
  • Work Order # 2016220, Replace Valve 2NV-0869 During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure (IP) attribute. Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities: For the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual (BMV) examination was required this outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a. The inspectors reviewed portions of the Unit 2 BMV examination and reviewed NDE reports for the BMV exam to determine if the activities, including the disposition of indications and defects, were conducted in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). In particular, the inspectors evaluated if the required visual examination scope/coverage was achieved and recorded in accordance with the licensee's procedures. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated if the licensee's criteria for visual examination quality and instructions for resolving interference and masking issues were consistent with 10 CFR 50.55a.

The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service during the BMV exam. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 2 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these IP attributes.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to ensure implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary," and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite record review of procedures and the results of the licensee's containment walkdown inspections performed during the current spring refueling outage (2EOC22). The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensee's BACC program requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensee's BACC and CAP.

The inspectors reviewed the following problem investigation program (PIP) reports and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage, to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

  • M-14-02698, Mode 5 Boric Acid Walkdown for Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations completed for evidence of boric acid identified in systems containing borated water to determine if degraded components were documented in the CAP. The inspectors also evaluated corrective actions for any degraded components to determine if they met the ASME Section XI Code and/or NRC approved alternative.
  • M-14-01465, 2-NS-VA-0092, Excessive Dry Boron Accumulation Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities: No steam generator (SG) tube inspection activities occurred during this outage, therefore, no IP attribute was performed for this area. However, the NRC inspectors verified the licensee's compliance in this area with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, commitments made to the NRC, ASME Section XI, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06 (Steam Generator Program Guidelines). Identification and Resolution of Problems: The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related PIPs that were identified by the licensee to confirm the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions.

The review also included the licensee's consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action,"

requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Inspector LOR Activity Review: On June 3, 2014, the inspectors observed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator NRC required annual requalification examinations. The simulator examination scenario involved a loss of condenser vacuum requiring a manual reactor trip followed by a steam generator tube rupture event. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to verify that the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator examination. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review: On April 23-24, 2014, the inspectors observed operators in the Unit 2 main control room during the performance of reactor startup and reactor physics testing following the refueling outage. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, thoroughness of pre-job briefings, reactivity management controls, and supervisory oversight. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Biennial Requalification Program Inspection: The inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of operating tests associated with the licensee's operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the facility licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, "Operators' Licenses." The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program." The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations using ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009, "American National Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for use in Operator Training and Examination." The inspectors observed three shift crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, Job Performance Measures (JPMs), simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records, simulator performance test records, operator feedback records, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding records, and medical records. The records were inspected using the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two activities listed below for items such as: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) charging unavailability for performance; 6) balancing reliability and unavailability; 7) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 8) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and 9)appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

  • PIP M-14-03898, Failure of 2A EDG to start during engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) testing

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments and the risk management actions used to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the five activities listed below. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee performed adequate risk assessments, and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, that appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented, and that work activities did not place the plant in unacceptable configurations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Yellow risk on Unit 2 for the spent fuel pool cooling system during full reactor core offload
  • Yellow risk on Unit 1 for 1A EDG out of service for planned maintenance
  • Unplanned Yellow risk on Unit 2 for the emergent repair of the outboard bearing on the TDCA pump
  • Yellow risk on Unit 1 and Unit 2 during transport of new main step-up transformer via locomotive across Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) dam railway
  • Yellow risk on Unit 1 and Unit 2 for planned complex plan activity involving excavation of a small section of underground nuclear service water (RN) system suction piping between the SNSWP and Auxiliary Building

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the six technical evaluations listed below to determine if Technical Specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed any compensatory measures taken for degraded SSCs to determine whether the measures were in-place and adequately compensated for the degradation. For the degraded SSCs, or those credited as part of compensatory measures, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine whether the measures resulted in changes to the licensing basis functions, as described in the UFSAR, and whether a license amendment was required per 10 CFR 50.59. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • PIP M-14-04524, Increasing level trends on 2A and 2B NI accumulator tanks
  • PIP M-14-04657, Excessive metallic particulate found in the Unit 2 TDCA pump outboard bearing oil
  • PIP M-14-05017, Unstable pressure control on Unit 2 pressurizer due to spray valve leakage
  • PIP M-14-05532, Low voltage on cell #11 associated with 120-volt DC vital battery EVCA

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • 2B ND heat exchanger outlet valve 2ND-14 functional testing following air supply line repair
  • High head safety injection (NV) valve 2NI-9A functional testing following replacement of actuator
  • 1A EDG functional testing following planned complex maintenance activities
  • Unit 2 TDCA functional testing following emergent replacement of the outboard bearing
  • 2B EDG functional testing following emergent replacement of JL relay base
  • SSF diesel generator functional testing following planned complex maintenance activities

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted the following inspection activities associated with the Unit 2 refueling outage that completed April 24, 2014. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Observed activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable TS when taking equipment out of service
  • Reviewed the licensee's responses to emergent work and unexpected conditions to verify that resulting configuration changes were controlled in accordance with the outage risk control plan
  • Periodically reviewed the setting and maintenance of containment integrity to establish that the reactor coolant system and containment boundaries were in place and had integrity when necessary
  • Observed fuel handling operations during reactor core reload including review of the videotape core loading verification and alignment to verify that those operations and activities were being performed in accordance with TS and procedural guidance
  • Observed aspects of the reactor vessel head reinstallation and upper internals to ensure the lifts were conducted in accordance the station procedures and heavy lift guidance
  • Reviewed system lineups and/or control board indications to substantiate that TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations
  • Conducted containment walkdowns to inspect for overall cleanliness and material condition of plant equipment after the licensee completed their closeout inspection prior to restart
  • Observed the approach to criticality, portions of reactor physics testing and power ascension activities
  • Reviewed the items that had been entered into the CAP to verify that the licensee had identified outage related problems at an appropriate threshold

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the six surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and reviewed the test data, to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures. In addition, the inspectors verified that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

Surveillance Tests

  • PT/2/A/4200/009A, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train A, Rev. 101
  • PT/0/A/4150/028, Initial Criticality and Zero Power Physics Testing, Rev. 64 (Unit 2) In-Service Tests
  • PT/2/A/4150/001B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation, Rev. 77 Containment Isolation Valve Testing
  • PT/2/A/4200/001C, Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test, Rev. 106 (Enclosure 13.40 for penetration M-374) Ice Condenser Systems Testing
  • PT/0/A/4200/032, Periodic Inspection of Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors, Rev. 21

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

Licensed Operator Simulator Emergency Preparedness Training: On June 3, 2014, the inspectors observed the performance of a simulator-based licensed operator requalification exam that required implementation of emergency preparedness actions for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. The simulator exam scenario involved a steam generator tube rupture event. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, and as applicable, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's conduct of the simulator examination and critique performance and verified that, as appropriate, performance weaknesses were captured in the licensee's operator training program or CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the six indicators during the periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the PI data, the inspectors compared the licensee's basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 7. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

  • Safety System Functional Failures (Unit 1 and Unit 2)
  • MSPI - High Pressure Injection (Unit 1 and Unit 2) The inspectors reviewed the PI data for the period April 2013 through March 2014 to verify the MSPI was properly calculated. The inspectors independently screened selected TS Action Item Logs, control room logs, maintenance rule failure data, and PIPs to determine if unavailability and reliability hours were properly reported.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

Review of Items Entered into the CAP: As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of condition reports, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensee's computerized CAP database.

Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends: As required by IP 71152, the inspectors performed a review of the licensee's CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. This review nominally considered the six month period of January 2014 through June 2014 although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, focus area reports, system health reports, self-assessment reports, and department PIP trending reports. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's latest quarterly trend reports. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Annual Sample Reviews: The inspectors reviewed the issue listed below in detail to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions for important safety issues.

  • PIP M-14-03898, Failure of 2A EDG to start during ESFAS testing due to loose relay wiring connection The inspectors assessed if the issue was properly identified; documented accurately and completely; properly classified and prioritized; adequately considered extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences; adequately identified root causes/apparent causes; and identified appropriate and timely corrective actions.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee documents against the requirements of the licensee's CAP and implementing procedures, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

a. Inspection Scope

Using NRC Inspection Procedure 60855.1, Operation of an ISFSI at Operating Plants, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and observed activities associated with the loading of Unit 1 cask, NAC-MAGNASTOR TSC-MNZ-061, and its transportation to the ISFSI storage pad. The inspectors independently evaluated selected activities to determine if the licensee operated the ISFSI in conformance with the commitments and requirements contained in the NAC-MAGNASTOR system Certificate of Compliance (CoC), TS, FSAR, NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and 10 CFR Part 72. The inspectors reviewed the cask loading documentation and spent fuel pool inventory for the cask to verify that each fuel assembly was placed in its intended cask location. The inspectors confirmed that each fuel assembly loaded met the TS and NAC-MAGNASTOR FSAR requirements for dry storage. The inspectors reviewed or observed selected licensee activities involving the cask loading, hydrostatic testing, drying/draining, helium testing, and transfer to the concrete container and ISFSI pad as specified in procedure MP/0/A/7650/227, Loading Spent Fuel Assemblies into MAGNASTOR Casks. The inspectors verified that these activities were being accomplished in a safe manner and in accordance with procedural requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed all 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations that were completed since the previous ISFSI inspection conducted in 2013. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000370/2013005-01, Evaluation of Gas Void Identified in Unit 2 ECCS Piping

This URI was previously identified for the December 14, 2013, licensee identification of a gas void in the Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping. The gas void was subsequently determined to be 1.9 cubic foot in volume and was located in the discharge piping of the 2A ND heat exchanger at vent valve 2NV-1056, which provides suction to the NV/NI pumps during cold leg recirculation phase of design basis accident events. The gas void had the potential to adversely impact the performance of both trains of the NV/NI ECCS pumps. This issue was unresolved pending completion of the licensee's evaluation to determine whether the NV/NI pumps would have been capable of performing their design basis accident function with the presence of the gas void and completion of their investigation into the circumstances leading to the large void formation. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the gas accumulation incident. The licensee completed an initial void transport analysis using a methodology referenced in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 09-10, Rev. 1a-A, Guidelines for Effective Prevention and Management of System Gas Accumulation. This NEI document was endorsed by the NRC via a Safety Evaluation (SE) and a subsequent NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2013-09, dated August 23, 2013, as an acceptable approach to managing gas accumulation in piping systems. The SE included several limitations and conditions on the use of empirical correlations in the methodology. Although the licensee made several conservative assumptions, they did not use the empirical correlations consistent with the NRC SE. A subsequent void transport analysis and potential water hammer effects analysis was conducted by an independent consultant contracted by the licensee. In addition, the licensee contacted the pump manufacturer and requested a void analysis for the specific model NV/NI pumps. These evaluations predicted that the as-found gas volume would not have prevented the NV and NI pumps from performing their safety function.

The inspectors discussed the results of the licensee's evaluation with NRC personnel in the NRR Reactor Systems Branch who conducted an analysis of void movement and concluded that the vertical piping lengths were sufficient to reasonably ensure homogeneous bubbly flow at the suction of the pumps. It was noted that the void would have to pass through eight inch to six inch to four inch diameter piping, seven 90 degree elbows, four 45 degree elbows, two tees, about 60 feet of horizontal piping, and encounter a 24 foot decrease in elevation to reach the pumps. It was judged that this flowpath would reduce the void fractions at the pumps to acceptable values. While a more extensive detailed NRC analysis would be necessary to quantitatively validate this judgment, the combination of the licensee's analysis and NRC evaluations provided reasonable assurance that the pumps would have performed their safety function. Therefore, it was concluded that a more extensive quantitative NRC analysis was not necessary.

The licensee determined the primary cause for the large accumulation of gas was from the 2A NV mixed bed demineralizer isolation valve replacement work conducted December 2013. Aspects of this work included draining a larger than normal section of the NV piping and purging the piping with argon gas during the welding process. The licensee determined that the procedure used to fill and vent the system upon completion of the maintenance work was inadequate, in that, it did not take into consideration the extent of the piping drained, did not ensure that appropriate high point vents were used in the fill and vent process, nor ensure that all of the argon gas was removed. The enforcement aspects of this issue are discussed in Section

4OA7 of this report.

The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as PIP M-13-11181.

The previous NRC-identified issue regarding personnel failure to conduct UT measurements at the ECCS header piping versus the high point vent stub piping in accordance with the surveillance procedure was determined to be a minor performance deficiency because the procedure was performed correctly at the first opportunity following the inadequate fill and vent of the NV piping that created the gas void and the licensee properly identified the voided condition. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP as PIP M-13-11297.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exits

On July 9, 2014, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Steven Capps and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which met the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as NCVs.

  • 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, the licensee to establish measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, in March 2008 and September 2012, the licensee failed to promptly identify a condition adverse to quality. A flaw in the Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1 weld was missed during UT examinations of this component. During the most recent outage, the licensee re-examined this weld and identified an 85 percent through-wall flaw originating from the inner diameter in the weld. Destructive testing and analysis established that this flaw most likely existed since 2005. This violation was determined not to be greater than very low safety significance (Green) because it could not result in exceeding the RCS leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and could not have likely affected other systems used to mitigate a LOCA. This violation was documented in PIP M-14-03544. (Section 1R08)
  • TS 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 3.d of RG 1.33 recommends that appropriate procedures be prepared for energizing, filling, venting, draining, startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for the ECCS. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to develop an adequate procedure to fill and vent the Unit 2 NV system following system draining and argon gas introduction associated with NV 2A mixed bed demineralizer valve modification work conducted December 1-12, 2013. On December 14, 2013, following this modification work, a large gas void was identified in the ECCS piping at high point vent valve 2NV-1056, located in the suction of the ECCS pumps during design basis accident conditions involving cold-leg recirculation. The licensee determined that the use of an inadequate fill and vent procedure during the system restoration from the modification work resulted in the accumulation of a significant amount of the gas at this location. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee provided reasonable evidence that the ECCS pumps would have been capable of performing their intended safety function had the gas void been ingested into the suction of the pumps. This violation was documented in the licensee's CAP as PIP M-13-11181.

(Section 4OA5.2)

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

B. Anderson, Superintendent of Operations
D. Black, Security Manager
S. Capps, Vice President, McGuire Nuclear
K. Crane, Senior Licensing Specialist
V. Ford, Operations Training Manager
J. Gabbert, Chemistry Manager
J. Glenn, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
G. Graham, License Requalification Supervisor
J. Hicks, Maintenance Superintendent
M. Kelly, Outage and Scheduling Manager
W. Killette, NEO/NRC Exam Supervisor
S. Mooneyhan, Radiation Protection Manager
C. Morris, Station Manager
S. Moser, Assistant Operations Manager
B. Richards, Regulatory Affairs/Senior Engineer
J. Robertson, Regulatory Affairs Manager
P. Schuerger, Training Manager
S. Snider, Engineering Manager

REPORT ITEMS Closed 05000370/2013005-01 URI Evaluation of Gas Void Identified in Unit 2 ECCS Piping (Section 4OA5.2)

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness of Offsite & Alternate

AC Power Systems Nuclear Switchyard Interface Agreement, Rev. 5 Nuclear Switchyard Operating Guidelines, Rev. 9
NSD 417, Generation Risk Management Process, Rev. 16
OMP 13-02, Control of Switchyard Activities, Rev. 6
AP/1/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, Rev. 11
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions PT/0/B/4700/039, Warm Weather Equipment Checkout, Rev. 20
Hot weather PM work orders and corrective work orders

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdown

PT/2/A/4200/006B, Boron Injection Valve Lineup Verification, Rev. 40 OP/1/A/6350/002, Diesel Generator, Rev. 122
OP/1/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 120
Attachment Complete System Walkdown UFSAR Section 6.5, Containment Spray System, Rev. 17
MCS-1563.NS-00-0001, Design Basis Specification for the NS System, Rev. 31
MFCD-2563-01.00, Flow Diagram of Containment Spray System (NS), Rev. 13
MCFD-2571-01.00, Flow Diagram Refueling Water System (FW), Rev. 31
OP/2/A/6200/007, Containment Spray System, Rev. 36
McGuire Unit 2 NS System Health Reports, 2013 Q4 and 2014 Q1

Section 1R05: Fire Protection Fire Protection Walkdowns

MCS-1465.00-00-0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection, Rev. 17
NSD 104, Material Condition/Housekeeping, Foreign Material Exclusion and Seismic Concerns, Rev. 33
NSD 313, Control of Transient Fire Loads, Rev. 15
FS/0/B/9000/033, Unit 2 Lower Annulus/Containment Fire Strategy #33, Rev. 1
FS/0/B/9000/033A, Unit 2 Upper Annulus/Containment Fire Strategy #33A, Rev. 0
MFSD-033, Unit 2 Lower Annulus/Containment, Rev. 0
MFSD-033A, Unit 2 Upper Annulus/Containment, Rev. 0 FS/0/B/9000/021, Aux 750 Fire Strategy #21, Rev. 0
MFSD-021, Aux 750, Rev. 0
FS/0/B/9000/005, 1A D/G Fire Strategy #5, Rev. 0
FS/0/B/9000/006, 1B D/G Fire Strategy #6, Rev. 0
MFSD-005.006, Unit 1 D/G Rooms, Rev. 1 MNS Fire Strategy #3, Aux-Unit 2
AFWP-Room, dated 6-21-07
MFSD-003, Unit 2 CA Pump Room, Rev. 0
FS/0/B/9000/001, (Aux 695) Fire Strategy #1, Rev. 0
MFSD-001, Aux 695, Rev. 0
Annual Fire Drill Observation PT/0/B/4600/121, Fire Drill, Rev. 8
PT/0/B/4600/126, Fire Brigade PPE Inspection, Rev. 2
NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training and Responsibilities, Rev. 12
RP/0/A/5700/025, Fire Brigade Response, Rev. 19

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

UFSAR Section 3.4, Water Level (Flood) Design
MCS-1154.00-0004, Design Basis Specification for the Auxiliary Building Structures, Rev. 11
MCC-1139.01-00-0054, Auxiliary Building Flood Protection, Rev. 16
MCC-1206.47-69-1001, Auxiliary Building Flooding Analysis, Rev. 17 AP/0/A/5500/044, Plant Flooding, Rev.14 PIP M-14-04865

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities (Unit 2) Procedures

NDE Procedures Manual - Volume 1 -
NDE-70, Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetrations, Rev. 1 NDE Procedures Manual - Volume 4 -
NDE-995, Ultrasonic Examination of Small Diameter Piping Butt welds and Base Material for Thermal Fatigue Damage, Rev. 6
Attachment NDE Procedures Manual - Volume 4 -
NDE-951, Ultrasonic Examination of Metal Containment Structures Field Change 11-01, Rev. 0 NDE Procedures Manual - Volume 4 - Procedure
NDE-67, Visual Examination (VT-1 and
VT-3) of Metal and Concrete Containments, Rev. 2
PDI-UT-10, PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds, Rev. E

Other Documents

McGuire Unit 2 Steam Generator 2EOC22 Skipped Inspection Cycle Outage Review, Rev. 0 Visual Acuity Records for NDE Personnel: Hunter, G.; Tucker, S.; Tucker, D.; Muirhead, B.; Howard, D.; and Hassel, M. Certification Records for NDE Personnel: Hunter, G.; Tucker, S.; Tucker, D.; Muirhead, B.;
Howard, D.; and Hassel, M. Visual Acuity Records for Welding Personnel: Arienza, R.; Curney, W.; Christmas, G.;
Johnson, B.; Paite, J.; Vause, W.; Vonstaden, T.; Weber, L.; and Williamson, M.
Certification Records for Welding Personnel: Arienza, R.; Curney, W.; Christmas, G.;
Johnson, B.; Paite, J.; Vause, W.; Vonstaden, T.; Weber, L.; and Williamson, M.
PDI-UT-10 Qualification Records for NDE Personnel: Tucker, D. and Muirhead, B. Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Check for
USN 60 SW, Serial No.: 0263P4
Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Check for
USN 60 SW, Serial No.: 0242D3
Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: SB0253
Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: 01F3JT
Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: 01MF7J Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: 01MBHK Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: 01XCH0
Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial No.: 13D021AU
Ameritech Transducer Certification for Serial No.: K26903
Aerotech Transducer Certification for Serial No.: J21886 UT Calibration/Examination Record for Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1, dated 4-8-14 UT Calibration/Examination Record for Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1, dated 10-4-12
UT Calibration/Examination Record for Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1, dated 3/18/2008
UT Calibration/Examination Record for 2NC2FW45-5, dated 4-8-14
UT Calibration/Examination Record for 2SGD-OUTLET-W6SE, dated 4-7-14
Visual Examination of IWE Surfaces (VT-1) for 2-SCVI-0013, dated 4/16/14 Visual Examination for Boric Acid Detection, 2RPV-Head-Multiple, dated 4/6/2014 Phased Array UT Calibration Report for
CAL-14-370, dated 4-4-14
UT Pipe Weld Examination Report for Cold Leg 2D Nozzle 4-1, dated 4-4-14
UT Pipe Weld Examination Report for 2NC2FW45-5, dated 4-4-14
MNS 2D Cold Leg Boron Injection Line Metallurgy File #5165, dated April 10, 2014 McGuire Unit 2 Steam Generator 2EOC22 Skipped Inspection Cycle Outage Review, Rev. 0 PIPs:
M-14-03153, M-14-03637
Work Orders:
2060324

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Quarterly Resident Inspector

LOR Activity Review
NSD 509, Site Standards in Support of Operational Focus, Rev. 6
SOMP 01-07, Control Room Oversight, Rev. 1
Attachment Active Simulator Exam (for described scenario) AP/1/A/5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, Rev. 14 AP/1/A/5500/23, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Rev. 7
EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 33
EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 37
EP/1/A/5000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 23
Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review
AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 1
NSD 509, Site Standards in Support of Operational Focus, Rev. 6
OP/2/A/6100/001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Rev. 143
OP/2/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations, Rev. 162 PT/0/A/4150/021, Post Refueling Controlling Procedure for Criticality, Zero Power Physics & Power Escalation Testing, Rev. 113 91-01 Activity Briefing Risk Management Plan
Biennial Requalification Program Inspection Records License Reactivation Packages (Three Packages Reviewed).
LORP Training Attendance records (various).
Medical Files (Seventeen Medical Records Reviewed).
Remedial Training Records (Four Records Reviewed).
Remedial Training Examinations (Two exams reviewed). LOR Feedback Records (One Year of Records Reviewed). Simulator Deficiency Reports (Two years of Records Reviewed)
Written Examinations
LOR 2014 Exam 2, RO Annual Exam
LOR 2014 Exam 2, SRO Annual Exam
LOR 2014 Exam 2,
RO-SRO Closed Reference Annual Exam

Procedures

NSD 512, Maintenance of RO/SRO NRC Licenses, Rev. 7
NSD 805, Nuclear Station Unit Specific Training Simulators, Rev. 3 ETQS 5100, Remediation and Reevaluation, Rev. 3 ETQS 5200, Examination Design, Development, and Administration, Rev. 2
ETQS 5401, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Rev. 1
MTP 2701.0, Simulator Configuration Management and Operating Limits, Rev. 7
MTP 4116.1, Licensed Requalification Program, Revision 30
MTP 5405.0, Operations Examination Development, Validation, and Security, Rev. 16
AD-TQ-ALL-0425, Simulator Scenario Based Testing, Rev. 1
PIP Report M-12-04157, During performance of Simulator Annual Exams questions arose regarding the application of Technical Specification requirements.
Simulator Tests Steady State Power Drift Test 100 percent, STP/ORCHID/S/01, Rev. 0 Simulator Core Update, STP/ORCHID MOD CORE CYCLE U, Rev. 0
Initial Critical and Zero Power Physics Testing, Rev. 63
Attachment Simulator 0-100 percent Power Normal Evolution Test, MNS\SIM\700, Core Cycle Update,
Rev. 5 Transient 2A, Loss of Main Feedwater, STP/ORCHID/T/02A, Rev. 1
Transient 3, Simultaneous closure of All MSIVs, STP/ORCHID/T/03, Rev. 1
Transient 11A, Load Rejection-Loss of 1 Feed Water Pump Turbine (FWPT), STP/ORCHID/T/11A, Rev. 1 SBT for
ASE-8, Rev. 8, 08/14/2013 SBT for
ASE-33, Rev. 13, 05/07/2014 SBT for ASE -17, Rev. 21, 05/14/2014
SBT for
ASE-38, Rev. 7, 05/19/2014
Simulator Problem Reports& Design Change Requests
WR 1011, Turbine valves close slowly when turbine trips compared to plant
WR 977, Red "First Out Lights" are dark when tested at DB sim panel
WR 269, Diesel Generator (D/G) start time clock does not show time when D/G starts
PIP M-10977, 2013 ILT Exam Common Mode Failure Review, 02/2013
Scenario Packages
ASE-08, Loss of all AC Power, Rev. 8
ASE-10, Rod Ejection Accident - LOCA, Rev. 18
ASE-17, Large Break LOCA with a failure of SI and Phase B, Rev. 21
ASE-33, ATWS and Steam Line Break Outside Containment, Rev. 13
ASE-38, Pressurizer PORV Fails Open - LOCA, Rev. 7
ASE-42, Loss of Heat Sink, Rev. 5
ASE-102, Medium LOCA with Failure of Turbine Trip, Rev. 2
JPM Packages
OP-MC-JPM-DG-DG: 233, Perform an Emergency Manual Trip of 1B Diesel Generator, Rev. 1
OP-MC-CF-CF: 036A, Establish Feedwater Flow to the S/G's Following a Reactor Trip, Rev. 19
OP-MC-ECC-ISE: 259A, Manually Align "Phase A Isolation" Components Following a LOCA, Rev. 1
OP-MC-CP-AD: 087T, Transfer of 1EMXA4 To SSF During A Loss Of All AC on Unit 1, Rev. 16
OP-MC-JPM-PSS-KC: 125T, Makeup to the KC Surge Tank, Rev. 8
OP-MC-PS-NV: 146A, Align Normal Charging With NV Recirc Path Isolated, Rev. 7
OP-MC-ECC-NI: 307A, Align the ND System to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 2
OP-MC-ECC-NI: 316A, Perform Enclosure 4 of EP/1/A/5000/E-1 with SI Reinitiation, Rev. 1
OP-MC-WE-EMF: 257, Respond to 1EMF-35 (Unit Vent Particulate) Hi Rad Alarm, Rev. 2
OP-MC-PS-NV: 312A, Emergency Borate the Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 1
OP-MC-CA-SA: 217, Manually Fail Open 2SA-48ABC and 2SA-49AB, Rev. 6
OP-MC-ADM-ADM: 271T, Determine an Emergency Classification per RP/000, Rev. 1

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

NSD 310, Requirements for the Maintenance Rule, Rev. 12
EDM 201, Risk Category Scoping, Health Grouping and ER Strategy, Rev. 17
EDM 210, Engineering Responsibilities for the Maintenance Rule, Rev. 27 SSC Function Scoping Database Attachment Section1R13:
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
NSD 213, Risk Management Process, Rev. 13
NSD 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) per 10
CFR 50.65(a)(4), Rev. 8
SOMP 02-02, Operations Roles in the Risk Management Process, Rev. 14
OMP 13-7, Operational Control of Protected Equipment, Rev. 6
Section1R15:
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
NSD 203, Operability/Functionality, Rev. 26
NSD 515, Operational Decision Making, Rev. 8
PIP M-14-2801, Entry into Unit 2 abnormal operating procedure
AP-19, Loss of ND or ND System Leakage PIP M-14-2795, Documentation of ITS 3.9.6 applicability pursuant to failure of 2ND-29

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

NSD 408, Testing, Rev. 17 PT/2/A/4204/002B, ND Train B Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly, Rev. 16

Work Orders

02146188,
02147117,
02147433, and
02147259 PIP M-14-03724, 2A EDG failure to start
Section1R20:
Refueling and Other Outage Activities
NSD 403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6, and No-Mode) Per 10CFR50.65 (a)(4), Rev. 30
MSD-585, Reactor Building Personnel Access and Material Control, Rev. 15 OP/2/A/6100/001, Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, Rev. 143 OP/2/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Rev. 162
OP/2/A/6100/SO-1, Maintaining NC System Level, Rev. 46
OP/2/A/6100/SO-10, Controlling Procedure for LTOP Operation, Rev. 33
OP/2/A/6100/SU-1, Mode 6 and Core Alterations Checklist, Rev. 45 OP/2/A/6100/SU-3, Mode 5 Checklist, Rev. 28 OP/2/A/6100/SU-5, Filling the NC System, Rev. 57
OP/2/A/6100/SU-6, Venting the NC System, Rev. 34
OP/2/A/6100/SU-7, Fill and Vent Valve Checklist, Rev. 19
OP/2/A/6100/SU-8, Heatup to 200 Degrees F, Rev. 50
OP/2/A/6100/SU-9, Mode 4 Checklist, Rev. 70 OP/2/A/6100/SU-10, Heatup Checklist, Rev. 12 OP/2/A/6100/SU-13, Heatup to 350 Degrees F, Rev. 48
OP/2/A/6100/SU-15, Mode 3 Checklist, Rev. 49
OP/2/A/6100/SU-16, Aligning ND System for Standby Alignment, Rev. 10
OP/2/A/6100/SU-19, Heatup to 557 Degrees F, Rev. 59 OP/2/A/6100/SU-20, Modes 1 and 2 Checklist, Rev. 39 PT/0/A/4150/026, Power Escalation Testing, Rev. 15
PT/0/A/4150/028, Initial Criticality and Zero Power Physics Testing, Rev. 64
PT/0/A/4150/033, Total Core Reloading, Rev. 65
PT/0/A/4150/046, Containment Walkdown, Rev. 4
PT/0/A/4150/047, 1/M Monitoring During Startup, Rev. 3 PT/1/A/4200/002C, Containment Closure, Rev. 79 PT/0/A/4550/003C, Core Verification, Rev. 28
PT/2/A/4600/003F, Containment Cleanliness and ECCS Operability Inspection, Rev. 20
Attachment

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

RP/0/A/5700/000, Classification of Emergency, Rev. 21 RP/0/A/5700/003, Site Area Emergency, Rev. 29
RP/0/A/5800/010, NRC Immediate Notification Requirements, Rev. 19
RP/0/B/5700/029, Notification to Offsite Agencies from the Control Room, Rev. 10

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

NSD 225, NRC Performance Indicators, Rev. 8 SRPMP 10-1, NRC Performance Indicator Data Collection, Validation, Review and Approval, Rev. 6

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

NSD 202, Reportability, Rev. 25
NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41
NSD 212, Cause Analysis, Rev. 27

Section 4OA5: Other Activities Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) 91-01 Complex Activity Plan for Cask #30

MCEI-0400-292, ISFSI McGuire Nuclear Station
MNZ-061, Rev. 0
MCC-1553.12-00-0041, Dry Storage Certification (for TSC
MNZ-061), Rev. 0
OP/0/A/6550/011, Internal Transfer, Rev. 63 OP/0/A/6550/029, ISFSI MAGNASTOR Fuel Assembly Loading/Unloading Procedure, Rev. 6 MP/0/A/7650/227, ISFSI Loading Spent Fuel Assemblies into MAGNASTOR Casks, Rev. 10 MP/0/A/7650/231, ISFSI Operation of Dry Cask Transporter, Rev. 5
MP/0/A/7650/234, ISFSI MAGNASTOR Spent Fuel Cask Loading Contingencies, Rev. 2
HP/1/B/1006/045, ISFSI Radiation Protection Controls for Loading Spent Fuel Assemblies into
NAC-MAGNASTOR Dry Storage Casks, Rev. 0
NSD 211, 10
CFR 72.48 Process, Rev. 7
CFR 72.48 Determination
NAC-13-MAG-060
CFR 72.48 Determination NAC-14-MAG-049
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