IR 05000369/2018001
| ML18120A243 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2018 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Teresa Ray Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2018001 | |
| Download: ML18120A243 (15) | |
Text
April 30, 2018
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000369/2018001 AND 05000370/2018001
Dear Mr. Ray:
On March 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On April 12, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or significance of the NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA Jannette Worosilo Acting for/
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosure:
IR 05000369/2018001, 05000370/2018001
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
50-369, 50-370
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000369/2018001 and 05000370/2018001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-001-0058
Licensee:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Huntersville, NC
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2018 to March 31, 2018
Inspectors:
A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Cureton, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
F. Ehrhardt, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee performance by conducting a quarterly baseline inspection at McGuire Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Non-conservative Change to Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) Acceptance Criteria in Procedure PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000369/2018001-01 Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.22 -
Surveillance Testing The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4, Procedures for an inadequate procedure change to PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items.
Specifically, the licensee made a non-conservative change to the CET acceptance criteria.
The change reduced the lower temperature limit by subtracting CET total loop uncertainty from the existing lower limit of average cold leg temperature (TCOLD).
Failure to Adequately Implement the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Test Procedure Resulted in a Unit 1 Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000369/2018001-02 Closed
[H.12] - Human Performance -
Avoid Complacency 71153 -
Events A self-revealing Green NCV of TS 5.4 Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B, SSPS Train B Periodic Test With NC System Pressure Greater Than 1955 PSIG, resulting in a Unit 1 reactor trip.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and operated there until February 16, 2018, when a manual reactor trip occurred due to human error while performing reactor trip breaker testing. The unit was restarted on February 17, 2018, reached 100 percent RTP on February 18, 2018, and remained there for the rest of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP and operated there until March 2, 2018, when power was reduced to approximately 73 percent RTP to allow a turbine governor valve control repair. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power on March 3, 2018, and remained there for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for extreme cold weather from January 2-3, 2018.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 diesel generator (DG) 2B with 2A DG out of service (OOS) for preventive maintenance (PM) on January 23, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 B train of auxiliary feedwater (CA) while the A train was OOS for breaker PMs on January 23, 2018
- (4) Unit 1 A train of nuclear service water (RN) system with the 1B RN pump OOS for breaker PMs on February 6, 2018
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 1 cable spreading room (fire area 19) on February 7, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 cable spreading room (fire area 20) on February 7, 2018
- (3) Auxiliary Building 695 elevation (fire area 1) on March 21, 2018
- (4) Auxiliary Building 733 elevation (fire area 14) on March 22, 2018
- (5) Unit 1 CA pump room (fire area 2, 2A) on March 27, 2018
Annual Inspection (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on March 11, 2018.
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated active simulator exam ASE-100 on February 28, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated control room actions during an AP-15, Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power, entry on January 11, 2018.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Unit 2 loss of rod position maintenance rule evaluation (Nuclear Condition Report (NCR)
===2177327)
- (2) Periodic a(3) assessment covering January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 1 and 2 equipment protection plan for the emergent loss of KRB voltage regulator (shutdown risk), on January 22, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 equipment protection plan for planned maintenance on the 2A CA pump breaker, on January 23, 2018
- (3) Unit 1 equipment protection plan for planned maintenance on the A train service water to the 1A component cooling water heat exchanger on January 31, 2018
- (4) Unit 1 equipment protection plan for planned maintenance on the B DG on February 13, 2018
- (5) Unit 1 and 2 critical activity plan for the A train RN suction from the standby nuclear service water pond piping inspection on February 15, 2018
- (6) Unit 1 equipment protection plan for planned maintenance on the A train of CA (yellow risk) on March 28, 2018
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Cracked lid on standby shutdown facility battery cells 49 and 50 (NCR 2175124), on January 7, 2018
- (2) 1A1 component cooling pump outboard seal leak increase, on January 8, 2018
- (4) Unexpected annunciators during refueling water storage tank level channel operability test (NCR 2183374), on February 8, 2018
- (5) 1A CA pump has water leakage at 28 mL/min (NCR 2183699), on February 21, 2018
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 411233, Provide Temporary Regulated 120VAC Power to Unit 1 & 2 Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Data B
- (2) EC 411631, Provide Temporary Power to shared motor control center SMXE
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) IP/0/A/2001/004 H, Removal and Installation of Station Circuit Breakers after 5 year preventative maintenance (PM) activities on the CA pump input breaker, on January 23, 2018
- (2) PT/2/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test, following diesel fuel oil booster pump PMs, on January 23, 2018
- (3) PT/1/A/4350/002 B, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test, following diesel down day PMs, on February 14, 2018
- (4) PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Operability Test, following SSF diesel inspections, on March 1, 2018
- (5) PT/2/A/4403/002 E, RN Train B Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly Plant Evolution Valves following PMs on 2RN-190B, on March 6, 2018
- (6) PT/1/A/4252/007 A, CA System Train 1A Performance Test, following inspections on 1CA-11A, on March 27, 2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine
- (1) PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items, on January 4, 2018
- (2) PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, on February 1, 2018
- (3) PT/1/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test, on February 27, 2018
In-service===
- (1) PT/2/A/4252/001 A, 2A CA Pump Performance Test, on January 30, 2018
Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)
- (1) PT/2/A/4150/001 B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation on March 27, 2018
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated an emergency planning drill on February 14, 2018. The drill included a loss of offsite power with a reactor trip due to a turbine trip. The 1A steam generator main steam line safety valve (MSSV) failed open, faulting the steam generator.
Additionally, a 1A steam generator tube rupture and fuel pin failures caused a loss of all fission product barriers.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017.===
- (1) Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
- (2) Unit 1 and 2 Scrams with Complications per 7000 Critical Hours
- (3) Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) KTK-2 fuse failures caused Unit 2 to enter TS LCO 3.0.3 due to both trains of containment air return fans being declared inoperable (NCR 02176186)
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Events
The inspectors evaluated the Unit 1 reactor trip and the licensees response on February 16,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Non-conservative Change to Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) Acceptance Criteria in Procedure PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000369/2018001-01 Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias
71111.22 - Surveillance
Testing The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures for an inadequate procedure change to PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items. Specifically, the licensee made a non-conservative change to the CET acceptance criteria. The change reduced the lower temperature limit by subtracting CET total loop uncertainty from the existing lower limit of average cold leg temperature (TCOLD).
Description:
On December 27, 2017, the licensee made a procedure change to PT/1/A/4600/003 D, 13.1, Main Control Board Instrumentation Checklist, to expand the acceptance criteria for operable CET readings. The existing acceptance criteria specified an upper limit of saturation temperature (TSAT) and a lower limit of TCOLD. The procedure change subtracted 20 degrees Fahrenheit from TCOLD by applying CET total loop uncertainty. The licensee surmised that a CET could be reading as low as 20 degrees Fahrenheit below TCOLD and still be operating as designed. The purpose of the change was to allow the acceptance of CETs reading below TCOLD, as a number of CETs were failed and the margin to the required number of operable CETs was challenged. The inspectors noted that this logic would only apply to CETs that may be exposed to significant bypass flow (water at or near TCOLD). However, the vast majority of CETs would be exposed to water at hot leg temperature (THOT) or higher (90 degrees Fahrenheit or more higher than the new lower limit). The new acceptance criteria would increase the probability that a CET reading significantly lower than the actual water temperature would be considered operable. Since a low reading CET is non-conservative with respect to calculating sub-cooling margin, over time enough low reading CETs could be accepted such that the average core exit temperature used to calculate sub-cooling margin would be non-conservatively biased. This could have an adverse impact on appropriate operator actions for loss of sub-cooling conditions during accident mitigation.
Corrective Actions: The licensee made a procedure change to PT/1/A/4600/003 D, to require an NCR to be written for CETs reading below TCOLD to prompt an engineering evaluation of the acceptability of any low reading CET. Additionally, the licensee created an action register item to track completion of repairs/replacement of existing inoperable CETs for both units.
Corrective Action Reference: The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as NCR 2176763.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees non-conservative change to CET acceptance criteria in PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items was a violation of TS 5.4 and a performance deficiency. The new acceptance criteria would increase the probability that a CET reading significantly lower than the actual water temperature would be considered operable.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, this new acceptance criteria would increase the probability that a CET reading significantly lower than the actual water temperature it was seeing, would be considered operable. As a result, over time, the average core exit temperature used to calculate sub-cooling margin would be non-conservatively biased.
Significance: In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, dated October 7, 2016, this finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, dated June 19, 2012 and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because a sufficient number of CETs remained operable to satisfy TS operability requirements.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of conservative bias in the human performance area because the licensees decision to non-conservatively expand CET acceptance criteria failed to emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33 Appendix A, Section 8, Procedures for Control of Measuring and Test Equipment and for Surveillance Tests, Procedures, and Calibrations, requires procedures for surveillance tests. Licensee procedure PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items, is the plant procedure for verifying operability of CETs in accordance with TS requirements.
Contrary to the above, from December 27, 2018, until January 11, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately maintain procedure PT/1/A/4600/003 D, Monthly Surveillance Items.
Specifically, the licensee made a non-conservative change to the CET acceptance criteria reducing the lower temperature limit by subtracting CET total loop uncertainty from the existing lower limit of average TCOLD. This change would have allowed acceptance of CETs that were not operating as designed.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Adequately Implement the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Test Procedure Resulted in a Unit 1 Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000369/2018001-02 Closed
[H.12] - Human Performance - Avoid Complacency 71153 - Event Response A self-revealing Green NCV of TS 5.4 Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B, SSPS Train B Periodic Test With NC System Pressure Greater Than 1955 PSIG, resulting in a Unit 1 reactor trip.
Description:
On February 16, 2018, the Unit 1 reactor tripped from 100 percent power due to a human performance error. Specifically, during B train SSPS testing, technicians reached Step 12.4.6 in procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B which instructed Technician 1 to Depress and hold UV TEST pushbutton for Train B in back of breaker CABINET-1(RTB/BYB), and Technician 2 to proceed with Steps 12.4.7 through 12.4.13. Technician 2 completed the actions, out of the area, while Technician 1 stayed in the area holding the UV TEST pushbutton. Technician 1 proceeded, without the procedure, to Step 12.4.14, which states, Release UV TEST pushbutton, and proceeded to Step 12.4.15, which instructs the technicians to verify that the reactor trip breaker (RTB) opened. Technician 2 erroneously opened the bypass breaker (BYB) cabinet to perform Step 12.4.15 and noticed that the breaker was closed. Technician 2 proceeded to trip the BYB causing a reactor trip because the BYB was supplying power to the control rods while the RTB was being tested. Technician 2s actions were done without the procedure in-hand and the procedure did not direct the technician to manipulate the breaker, regardless of position.
Corrective Actions:
- Technicians were removed from duty
- Post-trip fitness-for-duty testing was performed
- Reactor Trip investigation performed
Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02185409, Unit 1 Reactor Trip during 1B SSPS Testing
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B, SSPS Train B Periodic Test With NC System Pressure Greater Than 1955 PSIG, resulting in a Unit 1 reactor trip, was a violation of TS 5.4 and a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a Unit 1 reactor trip.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, dated June 19, 2012. The finding was screened as Green because the reactor trip was uncomplicated and there was no loss of mitigating equipment used to transition the plant to a stable condition following the reactor trip.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of avoid complacency in the human performance area because the technicians were complacent and did not adequately plan for the possibility of mistakes and the inherent risk of a reactor trip during SSPS procedure implementation.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33 Appendix A, Section 8, Procedures for Control of Measuring and Test Equipment and for Surveillance Tests, Procedures, and Calibrations, requires procedures for reactor protection system surveillance tests. Licensee procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B is the plant procedure for testing the SSPS in accordance with TS requirements.
Contrary to the above, on February 16, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately implement procedure PT/0/A/4601/008 B during Unit 1 SSPS surveillance testing. Specifically, a technician failed to follow the procedure and opened the B train bypass breaker while the B train reactor trip breaker was being tested, which resulted in a reactor trip.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On April 12, 2018, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Ray, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection
AD-WC-ALL-0230, Seasonal Readiness
NSD 317, Freeze Protection Program
PT/0/B/4700/038, Cold Weather Protection
PT/0/B/4700/070, On Demand Freeze Protection Verification Checklist
71111.04: Equipment Alignment
MCFD-2592-01.01, Unit 2, Flow Diagram of Auxiliary Feedwater System
OP/2/A/6350/002, Diesel Generator
OP/2/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System
MCFD-1574-01.01, Flow Diagram of Nuclear Service Water System
MCFD-1570-01.00, Flow Diagram of Spent Fuel Cooling System
71111.05Q: Fire Protection
MCS-1465.00-00-0008, Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection
MCS-1465.00-00-0022, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis
MCC-1435.00-00-0059, NFPA 805 - Appendix R Safe Shutdown Deterministic Analysis
AD-EG-ALL-1520, Transient Combustible Control
FS/2/B/9000/002, Unit 1 CA Pump Room Fire Strategy #2
FS/1/B/9000/0019, Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room Fire Strategy #19
FS/2/B/9000/0020, Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room Fire Strategy #20
FS/0/B/9000/001, Auxiliary Building 695 Fire Strategy #1
FS/0/B/9000/014, Auxiliary Building 733 Fire Strategy 14
MFSD-002, Unit 1 CA Pump Room
MFSD-0019, Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
MFSD-0020, Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room
MFSD-001, Auxiliary Building 695 Level
MFSD-014, Auxiliary Building 733 Level
71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator
Performance
AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations
OMP 4.3, Use of Emergency and Abnormal Procedures and FLEX Support Guidelines
SOMP 01-07, Control Room Oversight
ASE-100
AP-15, Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power
71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness
AD-EG-ALL-1204, Single Point Vulnerability Identification, Elimination and Mitigation
AD-EG-ALL-1206, Equipment Reliability Classification
AD-EG-ALL-1209, System, Component, and Program Health Reports and Notebooks
AD-EG-ALL-1210, Maintenance Rule Program
AD-EG-ALL-1211, System Performance Monitoring and Trending
Duke Equipment Reliability Maintenance Rule Database
71111.13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
NSD-213, Risk Management Process
SOMP 02-02, Operations Roles in the Risk Management Process
OMP 13-7, Operational Control of Protected Equipment
AD-OP-ALL-0201, Protected Equipment
71111.15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
AD-OP-ALL-0102, Operability Decision Making
AD-OP-ALL-0105, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessment
71111.18: Plant Modifications
EC411233, Provide Temporary Regulated 120VAC Power to Unit 1 & 2 DRPI Data B
EC 411631, Provide Temporary Power to SMXE
AD-EP-ALL-0602, 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form for EC 411631
NCR 2188539 Immediate Functionality Assessment
71111.19: Post-Maintenance Testing
NSD-408, Testing
AD-EG-ALL-1155, Post Modification Testing
PT/1/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test
PT/2/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test
MP/0/A/7300/007, Rotating Equipment Inspection and Vibration Measuring
PT/2/A/4208/001 B, 2B NS Performance Test
IP/0/A/2001/004 H, Removal and Installation of Station Circuit Breakers
71111.22: Surveillance Testing
AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration
AD-WC-ALL-0250, Work Implementation and Completion
AD-EG-ALL-1720, In-service Testing (IST) Program Implementation
EC 411028, Evaluation for NCR 2178301, 1B ICCM CET Quadrant Three (III)
NCR 2173881, various core exit thermocouples read 32 degrees
NCR 2173882, multiple in-core thermocouples reading 32 degrees
MCC-1552.08-00-0160, Instrument Uncertainties for ICCM and OAC Subcooling Margin
71151: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
AD-LS-ALL-0004, NRC Performance Indicators and Monthly Operating Report
AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program
71152: Problem Identification and Resolution
AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program
AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation
AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation
AD-PI-ALL-0104, Prompt Investigation Response Team
AD-PI-ALL-0105, Effectiveness Reviews
AD-LS-ALL-0006, Notification/Reportability Evaluation
71153: Follow-up Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
RP/0/A/5700/010, Event Notification Worksheet dated February 16, 2018
PT/0/A/4700/045, Reactor Trip Investigation